Front. Philos. China 2010, 5(3): 377–395 DOI 10.1007/s11466-010-0104-4

RESEARCH ARTICLE

MENG Peiyuan

A Further Analysis of Zhu Xi’s Theory of Mind © Higher Education Press and Springer-Verlag 2010

Abstract Mind was the oneness of form and function. The change from an old theory to a new one about zhong 中 (the mean) and he 和 (harmony) was a shift from the idea of the separate form of nature and function of mind to one about both form and function of mind. Form was both the form of the spirit of the mind and of the substantiality of nature (not the same as substantial realities in substantialism); it was the integration of vacancy and substantiality, the integration of mind and nature. In contrast, function meant both feelings and perceiving action. It was infeasible to interpret function without reference to form; likewise, it was impractical to talk about perception without mentioning nature. On the other hand, a knower represented nature through concrete things and his actions, and a perceiver enlightened himself, realizing the self-consciousness of nature as a whole. Mind, nature, and perception could be interpreted as a whole, and these three could be separated too. Viewed in general, mind, nature, and principles were oneness; observed separately, nature differed with principles: nature meant principles, but perception was the quintessence of qi. The unfolding of perception, however, had its independence, and could be easily influenced by qi; thus, it was necessary to transform and cultivate qi-related temperament. Realistically, a man needs to face up to himself and to transform himself, and this sentiment is inspiring for today. Keywords Mind, form and function, nature, perception, interpretation from a holistic point of view, interpretation from an atomistic point of view

Translated by HUANG Deyuan from Hangzhou Shifan Daxue Xuebao 杭州师范大学学报 (Journal of Hangzhou Normal University), 2008, (6): 5–11 MENG Peiyuan ( ) Institute of Philosophy, China Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing 100732, China E-mail: [email protected]

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1 Introduction An important part, and perhaps even the most important part, of Zhu Xi’s 朱熹 philosophy was his theory of xin 心 (heart or mind). Many issues in his philosophical system could be classified as belonging to the category of mind, and had to be resolved through this concept. Therefore, Zhu himself paid attention to mind not less than to any other category. But it was also the most complicated and most disputable concept, and as such Zhu offered many different descriptions of it. These descriptions need to be reasonably explained on the basis of some new thoughts so that they can disclose Zhu’s original world of mind on multiple levels.

2 Mind was the Oneness of Form and Function What is mind? This was a question that had to be answered initially, and which is also the most disputable one when people today research Zhu’s doctrines. People hope to find a clear and simple answer in Zhu’s works, but they often lose one thing when they attend to another, and fail to explain it clearly. Usually, people divide the xin in the language of Li Xue 理学 (School of Principles) into two types: One was the mind of morality, and the other the mind of intelligence. People tend to summarize the xin in Zhu’s system as the mind of intelligence, and thus to distinguish Li Xue from Xin Xue 心学 (School of Mind). But is this correct? It is correct to say that the mind in Zhu’s language involved the sense of cognition and that to a certain extent, Zhu paid more attention to the role of the mind in cognition, but it is completely wrong to assert that the xin in Zhu’s language was and could only be the mind of cognition without having any other meanings. Zhu presented many paradoxes in his various descriptions about the mind, but one can grasp the basic contents of Zhu’s theory of mind and resolve some of these paradoxes if he makes concrete analyses rather than fixing his eyes merely on some of his words. The key in doing so rests in the correct understanding of his doctrine of “form and function of mind.” The doctrine of “form and function of mind” was originally established by Cheng Yi 程颐. In a letter known as Yu Lü Dalin Lun Zhong Shu 与吕大临论中 书 (A Letter on the Mean to Lü Dalin), Cheng remarked, “The mind is one and the same; when people mention its form, there are descriptions such as ‘stillness without actions’; and when people refer to its function, there are depictions such as ‘to perceive and to know the things of the world.’ It depends on how it is observed and what is seen” (Cheng 1981, p. 609). This quotation indicates that Cheng Yi had experienced a great change in his description of xin. Before he made the remarks quoted above, he had thought that “All the mentions of the mind refer to the cases in which it has been activated” (Ibid., p. 608), but in this

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letter, he clearly expressed that “that idea is not correct, of course”; that is, that he had given up his previous opinion and replaced it with a new theory that the mind had both form and function. In other words, the mind was not only in an activated state, but also in an inactivated condition; and it was not only a function, but also an origin (a thing-in-itself), depending on from which aspect you observed it. In essence, Cheng had affirmed that mind had its two aspects, form and function. It was this point that Zhu Xi accepted and developed. The transformation of Zhu’s so-called “old and new theories about the mean and harmony” was a change from holding that “the mind means an activated state” to holding that “the mind has its form and function.” Zhu himself admitted that “The remarks before are not correct in their denomination of mind as ‘inactivated’ and ‘activated’ though they are not wrong in discussing the essence of mind and xing 性 (nature)” (Zhu 1936, Vol. 67, p. 10). That is, such a change was an issue of conceptual analysis and division rather than a substantial transformation. However, this conceptual analysis and division was important for Zhu Xi to formulate his doctrine of mind. That they were “not correct in their denomination” just meant that they gave a wrong analysis of the concept, which “viewed the mind as activated, but conceived nature as the mean in an inactivated condition” (Ibid.). The new theory, that is, the opinion that Zhu had persistently insisted upon afterwards, was that “mind has both its form and function,” or that “mind is simultaneously in an activated and inactivated state.” That had not only affirmed the position of the mind as an origin (a thing-in-itself), but also involved the issue of practices for the cultivation of mind and nature. The fault of the previous opinion rested in its “lack of practices in daily life” (Ibid.), while a transformation like the one mentioned above could help to make efforts based on such an origin. That was one of reasons why Zhu turned towards his new theory. Comparatively speaking, Cheng Yi emphasized the difference between form and function, and that was why he remarked that “Form and function are distinct, of course; how could they not be separate as two?” (Cheng 1981, p. 606) According to Cheng, the form in an “inactivated” state was different from the function in an “activated” condition and could be confused with the latter, although they both concerned mind. But Zhu paid more attention to “holism,” holding that those two were “integrated as one single thing” and were inseparable. It seems on the surface that the two thinkers had merely differed in their emphases, but as a matter of fact, the difference indicated an important characteristic of Zhu’s thought: that is, the oneness and inseparability of form and function. When he commented on the relationship between stillness and reception, Zhu said, (Mind in its proper state) does not think or act. When it is still, it receives (external stimulation) all the time; when it receives and acts smoothly, it remains still all the time. That is a sign of the oneness of tianming 天命

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(Heavenly ordinance) and the utmost correctitude of mind, and that is what is meant by the opinion that both form and function share the same source and circulate ceaselessly. I suspect that mind cannot be analyzed in terms of time or stage; and also, I speculate the truth should be that the form on which the mind depends to receive and act smoothly is seen when the latter is inactivated, and that the function through which the mind remains still is seen when the latter is activated. In my opinion, both cases have their propriety and are actually not separated (Zhu 1936, Vol. 67, p. 3). Thus, mind could always receive whenever it was still, and it remained still whenever it received. In other words, form and function interpenetrated each other, and they shared the same source, existing and circulating simultaneously. This was the oneness of Heavenly ordinance, and also the oneness of mind. But “the mean and harmony are terms describing mind from the point of view of nature and feelings, and stillness and reception are the ones from the point of view of mind. In general, the mean and harmony come first, and thus does stillness and reception” (Ibid.). When it was depicted from the point of view of mind, there was a difference between the “inactivated” and “activated,” and that was the analysis “in terms of time and stage.” However, in an “inactivated” state, it was “the natural origin of mind as a thing-in-itself”; while in an “activated” state, it was the “circulation of the form of mind,” viz., “that the function through which the mind remains still is seen.” That was what was meant by saying that both form and function, or nature and feelings, “have their propriety and are actually not separated.” The expression to “have their propriety” described nature with an inactivated form, depicted feelings with an activated function, and interpreted both nature and feelings with the form and function of mind. On the other hand, the phrase “are actually not separated” suggested that the form and function or the nature and feelings of mind were inseparable: from the point of view of form, feelings existed within nature, and from the point of view of function, nature existed within feelings. Hence, form and function as well as nature and feelings were naturally integrated and inseparable. That simply indicated the oneness of Heavenly ordinance or of mind. The so-called stillness was the stillness in reception, for all states of stillness could receive; and the so-called reception was the reception in stillness, for all receptions had the quality of stillness. That was how “both form and function share the same source and circulate ceaselessly.” The theory of the form and function of mind was, in practice, about the issue of mind and nature, rather than about psychology. As such, it would be a gross mistake if the mind in Zhu’s eyes were merely viewed as a psychological and material one. But was the form of mind to which Zhu had referred about mind or

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nature on earth? This is the most disputable question. Sometimes Zhu referred to the body of “vacancy and spirit” with it, and sometimes to the form of nature. What was the relationship between these two? When he commented on the expression “ming ming de” 明明德 (to learn about brilliant virtue) in Daxue 大学 (The Great Learning), Zhu remarked, Brilliant virtue is what a man acquires from the Heaven, what is vacant and spiritual without ignorance and thus contains all principles and responds to all things. Restricted by qi bing 气禀 (endowed qi as composition) and shrouded by the desire for external things, it is muddled sometimes; but the brilliance of its original form is not interrupted at all. So, a learner should learn well about it in reference to its activation so as to restore its original state (Zhu 1983, p. 3). Literally, the expression “vacant and spiritual without ignorance” here was about mind from the point of view of its inactivated form—that is why it was followed by the expressions about containing “all principles and responding to all things” and “learning well about it in reference to its activation.” Here, the word “activation” just means the “activated” function. Obviously, the so-called “brilliance of its original form” was to explain that the guangming zhi de 光明之 德 (bright virtue) was just the brilliant virtue, viz., moral character, therefore it was followed by the expression “restore its original state,” which meant to restore nature rather than simply the “vacant and spiritual” form of mind. Therefore, the expression “vacant and spiritual without ignorance” described both mind and nature. From the point of view of mind, it was a “vacant and spiritual” form, viz., the form of mind that “contains all principles and responds to all things”; from the point of nature, it was bright virtue, viz., “the brilliance of original form.” Likewise, the expression to “learn well about it in reference to its activation” was both about the activation of mind and the enlightenment of nature; that is, the efforts or practices to learn about nature. As a matter of fact, mind and nature were two aspects of one single thing: Mind was vacant and nature was substantial; the vacancy and the substantiality were integrated, and thus mind and nature were also one. Therefore, Zhu commented, “brilliant virtue should be mind, and should be nature” (Zhu 1473, Vol. 5, p. 6). That was just what was meant by “oneness.” But this issue is complicated and perplexing, and has often been disputed. Zhu replied to one of his disciples by saying, Vacancy and spirit are the original form of mind, of course; and it is not I who can vacate it. Ears and eyes can hear and see owing to mind, but does mind have any shapes or figures? Now that ears and eyes depend on it to hear and see, it seems as if mind has shapes or figures. As for the vacancy and

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spirituality of mind, it has never been a corporal thing (Ibid., p. 5). The expression “the original form of mind” was from the point of view of mind rather than nature. Mind was a bodiless thing, but ears and eyes could hear and see, and thus were tangible. The reason that ears and eyes could hear and see, however, owed to the mind. Therefore, mind was related to the hearing and seeing of ears and eyes; the hearing and seeing of ears and eyes was the role of mind, and mind could play such a role only because it had its form of vacancy and spirituality. Hence, when one of his disciples asked, “Was the spirit mind or nature,” Zhu answered, “The spirit simply means mind rather than nature, for nature only means principles” (Ibid., p. 3). In essence, the “spirit” was already a function, the function of the original form as an actor; but it was already qi rather than principles themselves. Hence he added, “The mind means the quintessence of qi” (Ibid.). Mind mainly functioned to perceive, so Zhu Xi often discussed it from the point of view of its function of perception. When he remarked as such, Zhu separated form from function or mind from nature, emphasizing only the cognitive function of mind. Despite this, however, he could not discuss only the mind of perception without referring to the fact that nature was principles. Question: “Is perception an intrinsic ability of the spirit of mind or a result of qi?” Reply: “It is not merely the result of qi. There is the principle of perception first of all. The principle does not perceive or sense things. When the principle integrates with qi after the latter aggregates into shapes, there is the ability of perception or sense. It is just like this candlelight: it is because of the grease that there is the light and flame.” Question: “Is the activation of mind a function of qi?” Reply: “It too is only perception” (Ibid.). This passage has often been quoted to argue that the mind in Zhu’s language was the mind of perception, and that the perception specially referred to qi. In other words, the mind in Zhu’s language was just qi, something peta-physical, viz., some cognitive organs. But a more careful analysis will preclude such a conclusion. “Spirit” was an important character of mind, and it referred to spiritual brilliance or divine brilliance. “Spiritual and brilliant consciousness” was the function of mind, but “divine brilliance beyond speculation” indicated the significant initiative of mind as a subject, which involved the issue of nature. Mind had its spirituality and thus its perception; then, was perception the action of qi? Zhu answered that “It is not merely the result of qi.” According to him, there was the principle of perception at first, and there would be perception itself after “the principle integrates with qi.” The “shapes” in the expression

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“aggregates into shapes” meant the shapes of mind. A mind must have its shape, just as a man must have his body as a carrier. But it was absolutely not the oneness of mind. The main function of mind was perception, and perceptions were the activities of qi; but the activation of perception must depend upon the principle of perception. The principle and the qi were bestowed upon a man simultaneously. That was what was meant by saying that the principle was born to form nature and the qi to form shapes, and that both the nature and shapes as well as the principles and the qi joined together to constitute the mind. Therefore, mind was the integration of principle and qi, and it was not merely the qi or the principle separately. That was the theory of the form and function of mind. Form equated to nature, viz., principle, and function meant the function of perception. These two were unified in one mind, but one could not say that the mind was no more than perception and that the principle was something outside perception. The principle of perception was inside perception, and it was not that there was a principle outside perception that acted on perception. Therefore, when the disciple asked another question, “Is the activation of mind a function of qi,” Zhu once again clearly answered, “It is only perception, too.” That was to say, mind could not be viewed merely from the point of qi; in other words, mind could not be merely summarized as peta-physical qi. Instead, it should be viewed from the point of view of “the integration of principle and qi.” The mind from the point of view of “the integration of principle and qi” could not be understood as a dualist parallel relation. That is, it could not be thought that principle and qi were separate things extrinsically combined. Zhu Xi had paid much attention to the conceptual distinction between principle and qi as the metaphysical and the peta-physical, respectively; but such a separation was merely an analysis in the sense of logic, and it was merely logically meaningful. From the point of view of form and function, it was an ontological issue, and an ontological issue could not be made clear merely by means of conceptual analysis. From the point of view of ontology, on the other hand, a form existed inside its function, and the function just meant the form; these two were integrated and inseparable, and they were oneness. That was the most fundamental meaning of mind at its very commencement. After mind was unfolded through its activities (mind was something active, and it was in activities all the time), the situation became complicated. Zhu’s various ideas about mind were to face up and resolve these issues, which this essay will discuss later. Let us now come back to the basic connotations of mind. Question: “What about the metaphysical and peta-physical forms of the xin of a man?” Reply: “As for the xin as one of the five kinds of internal organs, there is a tangible object indeed; but the xin that today’s learners talk about, which can hang on when it is looked after and would get lost when it is left

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loose, is of course spiritual and unfathomable. So, the xin as one of the five organs could be cured with medicines if it catches a disease, but this xin in a metaphysical sense has no medical remedies.” Question: “Then, is the principle of the mind something metaphysical?” Reply: “The mind has some slight traces if compared with nature; but if compared with qi, it is more spiritual, of course” (Ibid., Vol. 5, p. 5). The above quotation was a very important dialogue indicating Zhu’s basic views on mind. Some people have distinguished Zhu’s Li Xue (School of Principles) from Lu Jiuyuan 陆九渊 and Wang Yangming’s 王阳明 Xin Xue (School of Mind) by labeling the mind of the former as the peta-physical one of cognition rather than a metaphysical one of morality. This passage, however, does not support such a conclusion. Zhu did not articulate whether mind was metaphysical or peta-physical, for he discussed it from the point of view of holism. Evidently, the xin in Zhu’s language was not “one of the five kinds of internal organs”; instead, it was the xin “which can hang on when it is looked after and would get lost when it is left loose.” Such a xin was obviously the mind of morality, and that had been a basic Confucian view about xin since Confucius and Mencius. But the mind of morality could not do without the mind of perception. Logically, the mind could be divided as the metaphysical one of morality and the peta-physical one of perception; but ontologically, mind was a whole composed of both the metaphysical and the peta-physical, thus was described as “divine and brilliant beyond speculation.” In particular, “mind is composed of both its form and function” (Ibid., Vol. 20, p. 30), which were respectively metaphysical and peta-physical. Therefore, it could not be viewed only from one single perspective. In the sense of its oneness, “mind has its form and function circulating thoroughly” (Zhu 1936, Vol. 40, p. 25), a reference simultaneously from the points of view of mind, nature, form, and function. If merely viewed from the perspective of mind, “mind has some slight traces if compared with nature; but if in comparison with qi, it is more of spirit.” Mind was not a tangible object, but it still had its traces in its function of perception, so it could not be equated with nature. And such “spirit” was more than the “spirit” of qi, for the spirit of qi was still qi; the so-called “quintessence of qi” was just the spirit of qi. The spirit in the line that “in comparison with qi, it is more of spirit” was both the spirit in the expression “vacancy and spirit” and in “divinity and spirit beyond speculation”; it had the meaning of a subject, and therefore could not be equated with qi. The point was that from the point of view of oneness, mind was not merely nature or qi. Question: “What the Master whisked with his fan days ago was qi. I happened

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to have a speculation afterwards: the thought in the mind, the hearing of the ears, the seeing of the eyes, the holding of the hands, and the stepping of the feet seems to have been beyond the reach of qi. So, the movement of qi must have its ruler.” Reply: “There surely is something spiritual within qi” (Zhu 1473, Vol. 5, p. 5). Both the statements “There surely is something spiritual within qi” and “vacancy and spirit surely mean the original form of mind” were about the form of mind. But the form of mind was just the form of nature. Ontologically, mind and nature were identical. The expression “must have its ruler” talked about both the subjectivity of mind and the existentiality of nature, rather than merely the consciousness of mind. Mind was vacant, but it contained some real principles in its vacancy. That was the theory concerning the combination of vacancy and substantiality, or the integration of mind and nature. Was mind metaphysical or peta-physical on earth? This was an important issue in Zhu’s theory of mind. But Zhu varied his words in different cases, thus causing disputes. Question: “Mind can be named feelings rather than mind after it is activated. Why is this so?” Reply: “Mind connects both the metaphysical and the peta-physical, so it cannot be viewed only from one single point of view.” “The statement that ‘Mind can be named feelings rather than mind after it is activated’ does not seem to be acceptable” (Ibid., Vol. 95, p. 24). That “mind connects both the metaphysical and the peta-physical” was a substitution that Zhu had made for his other statement that “mind is the oneness of form and function,” which meant the same as when he remarked that “mind is composed both of its form and function.” The former proceeded from the perspective of mind, and the latter from that of nature. But neither nature nor mind could do without the other. Therefore, one could not talk about mind without referring to nature and feelings (form and function), nor could he talk about nature and feelings (form and function) without referring to mind. The very reason why “the line that ‘Mind can be named feelings rather than mind after it is activated’ does not seem to be acceptable” was that it had separated the form and function of mind from its nature and feeling. The activated state of mind meant feelings, of course, but at the same time, it was still the mind; so it was with the inactivated state of mind, which was related both to the mind and nature. As for the connection between the metaphysical and the peta-physical, it would be the connection between metaphysical nature and peta-physical feelings if viewed from the point of view of the function of mind; and if from the point of view of existence of mind, it would be simultaneously the metaphysical nature

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and peta-physical feelings. Therefore, mind should not be viewed merely from one single viewpoint, that is, not merely from a metaphysical point or a peta-physical one; instead, it should be viewed from the perspective of the oneness of the metaphysical and the peta-physical.

3 Interpretation Respectively from Holistic and Atomistic Points of View But this did not mean that the separation of the mind was absolutely unacceptable. In fact, Zhu himself separated it in many cases, which caused people to think that many of his ideas about mind were contradictory. The “separation” here had two meanings: one was the separation of mind and nature (feeling), and the other was the separation of the metaphysical and the peta-physical, or that of the form and function. These two meanings were mingled together, which incurred more confusion. Actually, the separation was an “expedience” for the sake of analysis. Zhu Xi had stressed the “separation and analysis” of concepts all the time, but the separation of mind never meant that its aspects were independent or unrelated. Question: “What a man or an object is endowed with from Heaven is ming 命 (destiny or ordinance), and what a man or object receives from Heaven is nature, and what dominates inside a human body is mind. Then, is what is gained from the mind and is brilliant and fair the brilliant virtue?” Reply: “How could mind be separated from nature? How could brilliance be placed? How could ‘receiving’ and ‘gaining’ be different? And how could a man be distinguished from objects and his body? Brilliant virtue should be mind, and should be nature.” Reply: “Nature is substantial, and can be described with respect to reception, responses, vacancy, and brilliance; the mind has multiple meanings, too.” Reply: “These two always combine and cannot be separated. Without mind, there would be no way to discern nature; and without nature, there would be no way to discern mind. Hence, when he mentioned mind and nature, Mencius always referred to them together: benevolence, righteousness, propriety, and intelligence fell into the category of nature, but meanwhile he referred to the mind of commiseration, the mind of shame and adverseness, and the mind of modesty, considering them in detail” (Ibid., p. 6). The above paragraph featured interpretation both from a holistic point of view and an atomistic one. In particular, it clearly defined the relationships among mind, nature, and brilliant virtue. Brilliant virtue could be explained from the viewpoint of mind; meanwhile it could also be interpreted from the viewpoint of

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nature. From the viewpoint of mind, it was the form which was “vacant and brilliant,” and from the viewpoint of nature, it was “substantial principles”; but such vacancy contained substantiality, and the vacancy and the substantiality were integrated. In other words, mind and nature were not really distinct even though they could be mentioned separately, for there would be no way to discern nature without mind, and vice versa. It was not a sort of extrinsic combination; instead, it was a kind of intrinsic identity. With respect to the function of mind, it was vacancy, spirit, and brilliant consciousness; with respect to the existence of mind, it was nature, viz., substantial principles. Brilliant virtue was nothing more than the oneness of these two. So, “brilliant virtue should be the mind, and should be the nature.” The question of “how brilliance could be placed” meant that there was a subsistent thing-in-itself, viz., morality, which was the place where “brilliance” rested. This “brilliance” was not only a form which was vacant and brilliant, but also the morality which meant enlightenment. Zhu held that Mencius referred sometimes to nature and sometimes to mind and feelings, and that he meant the same thing despite the difference of terms. This was interpretation from a holistic point of view. Sometimes, however, Zhu Xi insisted on the separation of mind. In doing so, he referred to it in the sense of the function of perception. Question: “Does spirit mean mind or nature?” Reply: “Spirit means only mind rather than nature, for nature means only principles” (Ibid., p. 3). Mind and nature are different, of course. What is spiritual is mind, and what is substantial is nature. And spirit is just what perceives (Ibid., Vol. 16, p. 8). Xie Liangzuo 谢良佐 commented, “The nature in Buddhism is like the mind in Confucianism, and the mind in Buddhism resembles the meaning in Confucianism.” This remark is extremely profound and penetrating (Zhu 1936, Vol. 43, p. 11). The major function of mind is perception (perception in a broader sense, not the “perception” in the sense used today), and Zhu Xi hence paid much attention to the function of perception and discoursed upon the mind from the viewpoint of perception. When mind was viewed from the perspective of perception, mind and nature were different. Here, it involved the relationship between existence and its function. In principle, function is the function of existence, and these two were combined; in addition, Zhu had stressed heavily that existence should be indicated through its function, and that form should be displayed through its function. But the point was what the original existence as a thing-in-itself was.

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For this issue, Confucianism fundamentally differed from Buddhism, and this was an important reason why Zhu insisted on his separation of mind. Such function of perception originated from the form which was vacant and spiritual, and thus meant vacant and spiritual brilliance and consciousness. This was a general principle of the mind of perception. But there was a dispute on whether what originated from “substantial principles” was just nature, for the form of vacancy and spirituality could involve nature, which meant an interpretation from the viewpoint of oneness, and it could also refer only to mind without mentioning nature, which meant an interpretation from separate points of view. Confucianism insisted on the oneness of mind and nature, which meant discussing nature from the viewpoint of mind, that is, the substantiality in vacancy. In contrast, Buddhism paid attention only to vacancy rather than substantiality, that is, it discussed only mind without referring to nature. But this did not mean that the mind in Buddhism was not one of this type. It was in this sense that there was the separation of mind and nature. Zhu criticized Xie Liangzuo’s proposition that “perception means benevolence”: The so-called “perception” in Xie Liangzuo’s language…was the activation and function of intelligence, but only the benevolent can have both simultaneously. Therefore it is all right to say the mind of a benevolent person has its perception, but it does not necessarily follow that those whose minds have perception are the benevolent. As for the idea that the mind of the benevolent has its perception, it is to contain the functions of the four with benevolence…. Therefore, Hu Dayuan 胡大原 commented that the meanings of Xie had their intrinsic spirit, and that with such spirit, all the roles of the Heaven and the Earth would become those of oneself. This theory is profound and wonderful. But if one directly refers to the spirit without knowing well its connotation or paying attention to the practices actually involved, then the more profound and wonderful the theory is, the more foundationless he himself would be (Ibid., Vol. 32, p. 20). Zhu held that perception was the activated function of the form of nature, i.e., the form of benevolence. When mind was referred to from the viewpoint of perception, it was only a reference from the viewpoint of function of mind rather than its real form, viz., nature, but the nature of form of mind, i.e., benevolence, was only the basis of perception. The so-called “knowing well its connotation” suggested that nature could be viewed from the perspective of perception only after the ground of perception was affirmed, and that one single perception could not be separately equated with nature. Likewise, the expression “the practices actually involved” meant that efforts should be made on how to perceive nature

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after “knowing well its connotation” to really realize the benevolence of the original form, and that it could not be resolved by merely mentioning that “perception means benevolence.” It would be groundless if “spirit” was viewed only from the perspective of the function of perception even though it was profound and wonderful. Therefore, analyzed conceptually, mind could be separated into its form and function, and nature was just the form of mind. This was a Confucian standpoint. But there was another case, viewing mind separately without reference to nature. In this case, mind was only a form of vacancy and spirit. This was the standpoint of Buddhism. As for the function of perception, it could be interpreted in terms of the activated function of nature as a form, and meanwhile, it could also be viewed from the perspective of the activated function of a vacant form. In the latter case, however, it did not necessarily follow that such function originated from the nature as a form. Therefore, one could not assert that perception was just benevolence or nature. It indicated that Zhu had intended to insist on a Confucian standpoint, a standpoint that viewed morality as a thing-in-itself, and at the same time, that he had tried to view from a broader perspective and to admit that the Buddhist theory of mind and nature had its theoretical sources too. However, viewed from the position of modern Neo-Confucianism, Zhu’s parlance finally failed to integrate mind with nature, or form with function; that is, it failed to insist on a consistent theory. Mou Zongsan 牟 宗 三 once commented that Zhu’s concept of nature “only existed but did not act” (Mou 1968, p. 5). Mou’s remark was probably made in this sense. Conceptually, asserting that “mind and nature have their distinction” just meant separating the mind from nature at the level of the mind of perception, viz., the function of mind. From this perspective, Mou’s idea was reasonable; in other words, the existence and activities did not keep their “consistency.” But Zhu had a particular intention in making his remarks this way, and he indicated it when he criticized the Buddhist idea that “function belongs to nature”: He held that Buddhism had made a mistake in its very foundation, and that it was not inferentially wrong. If only viewed formally, the Buddhist view might be more brilliant. In Buddhism, nature—either “xuan kong” 玄空 or “zhen kong” 真空, which was the ultimate “reality”—had all its contents taken out, leaving only an empty concept; its idea that “function means nature” was based on the deduction of such a concept. That is, function was just the original form as a thing-in-itself. Such inference was smooth and logical. From the viewpoint of its inferential form, the Buddhist idea that “function means nature” “was also reasonable,” but it was also in this place that a problem resided. Buddhists comment, “It is seeing for eyes, it is hearing for ears, it is smell for nose, it is speaking for mouth, it is holding for hands, and it is moving for feet.

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Such things are universally seen all over this phenomenal world and are contained even in a small piece of dust. One who knows it knows it is the Buddha-nature, and he who does not know it calls it spirit or soul.” They have also made a reasonable remark… Therefore, the Buddhists of the Chan School advocate “directly pointing at the human mind, discerning nature and gaining the Buddhahood.”… Buddhists have remarked correctly and cultivated the right things, indeed. But the problem also lies right here. What we Confucians cultivate are benevolence, righteousness, propriety, and intelligence, but Buddhists cultivate only seeing, hearing, speaking, and motion (Zhu 1473, Vol. 126, p. 15). From the standpoint of formal inference, Zhu admitted that “Buddhism has close similarities to our Confucianism,” and “outdoes trifling narrow-mined Confucians” by “scoring some points in the sense of taking the Heavenly Principle as a fundamental source” (Ibid., p. 11& p. 6). What then was the crux of Buddhism? “It makes a mistake in its very source” (Ibid., p. 15). In other words, Buddhism only viewed “emptiness or stillness” as a form rather than taking the “substantial principles” as a form. To view “emptiness or stillness” as a form essentially meant to take consciousness as a form, thus it had to take out the existence of a man as a thing-in-itself, that is, taking out the morality as human reason. Correspondingly, to take the function of perception, viz., seeing, hearing, speaking, and actions as nature, rather than viewing benevolence, righteousness, propriety, and intelligence as nature, meant replacing the thing-in-itself with its function. In Zhu’s words, “Buddhism simply aims at perception and actions to pretend its profundity” (Ibid., p. 29). These two mistakes were actually identical, but could be analyzed at different levels. From the viewpoint of “existing while acting,” Buddhist theory could be the most exhaustive, convenient, and “pleasant,” but in Zhu’s opinion, despite its profundity, “the insufficiency of Buddhism lies here,” viz., what Confucians cultivated was a nature composed of benevolence, righteousness, propriety, and intelligence, but what Buddhists did was no more than seeing, hearing, speaking, and moving. This “insufficiency” was essential rather than formal. For the first mistake in Buddhism, Zhu could have a consensus with Lu Jiuyuan in principle, for both had promoted “substantial principles.” Lu said, “There are substantial principles in the universe, of course; and it is important for learners to understand such principles” (Lu 1936, Vol. 14, p. 1). Again, he remarked, “the principles that I understand are the correct, substantial, and common principles and axioms in the world” (Ibid., Vol. 15, p. 2). The so-called “substantial principles” were nature as principles that the thinkers of the School of Principles had promoted. As for the second mistake in Buddhism, however, in

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Zhu’s opinion Lu could hardly be separated out, for Lu’s proposition that “mind is just principles” was expressed as a whole, without the separation of the original form and its function. Actually, he also viewed function as an original form, equating seeing, hearing, speaking, and acting with nature. For example, Lu remarked: “You have your own ears that can hear, and your own eyes that can see, so it is a natural thing that you can serve your father with your filial piety, and serve your elder brother with your brotherhood. You have nothing lacking at all, and thus you do not have to seek for it somewhere else. The only key point depends upon your self-reliance” (Ibid., Vol. 34, p. 4). Such remarks closely resembled Buddhist attitudes. In Zhu’s opinion, although Lu viewed benevolence and righteousness as the proper form of mind, how could it be guaranteed that all the actions conformed to the “original mind” when seeing, hearing, speaking, and actions, i.e., the function of perception, was let loose? Or in other words, how could a man guarantee that all his seeing, hearing, speaking, and actions were the function of the “original mind”? This question had not been resolved. In addition, Lu himself also admitted that a man might be blinded by his desires for things. According to Lu, such blindness should be attributed to the influence of external things, and was unrelated to the mind itself; therefore he suggested an “unburdening” or “divesting” method to resolve it. But Zhu held that it could not resolve problems even though it seemed to be very “simple,” for a man would need a series of methods “starting with function to reach the form,” among which “gewuqiongli” 格 物 穷 理 (to discern objects and to learn about principles thoroughly) was a major one. The problem lied in the perception as a function. Theoretically, it was an issue of the relationship between form and function, for perception as a function simply meant the activation and function of the original form; but in essence, it was an ontological issue, and ontological issues were always much more complicated. Lu’s theory and Buddhism had different prerequisites; that is, one was based on substantial principles, and the other on an empty form. However, these two had their similarities in viewing function as nature; in particular, Buddhism regarded the function of perception as something profound, and Lu thought it benevolence and righteousness. Despite his repeated discourses, Lu “merely referred to something peta-physical,” for he could not guarantee that perception was just the nature as benevolence and righteousness either. Here, it involved both conceptual deduction and the issue of practical existence, and one could not substitute conceptual deduction for actual existence. The key point was that the perception as function involved “the restriction of endowed qi as composition and the blindness of desires for things.” It was also an issue of mind, and one could not assert that it had nothing to do with mind. That showed the complexity of the issue of mind. Ontologically, the form of mind was nature, viz., principles, and was goodness, but it did not necessarily follow that all the

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function of perception was good, for the latter was an issue of practical existence rather than an issue of formal inference of concepts. Zhu argued for the oneness of form and function, but he was more concerned with the possible tension between these two in reality; therefore, he called for overcoming such tension and realizing the true oneness by means of man’s cognition and practices. In Zhu’s opinion, a man lived in reality and his mind was active even though morality as a thing-in-itself, viz., the original form of mind and nature, existed in the mind of everyone, so one could not resort merely to the “original mind” for the possibility of morality as a thing-in-itself, nor could he leave it to perception. Instead, it had to be guaranteed by practices or practical efforts. Nowadays, Confucian scholars have a complete set of methods with which to acquire knowledge. Hu Yin 胡寅 has explained well in his passage about not losing the original mind, which deserves perusal and contemplation. The saints had spoken thousands upon thousands of words, whose only purpose was to ensure that people take care of their original minds in case they become lost (Zhu 1473, Vol. 23, p. 25). Zhu did not oppose Lu’s theory about “original mind” or “inborn knowledge and inborn ability”; rather, he supported the latter theory at this point, for it was consistent with his own idea of the original form of mind and nature, and these two had no substantial differences. But it would be wrong if it was imagined that only a reference to an original mind was enough to make all of a man’s activities conform to the “original mind” and to resolve the issue of how morality as a thing-in-itself was possible. The reason was that a man as an existence in reality could be blinded by the “desire for things” except for the restriction of “endowed qi as composition,” and that was beyond the guarantee that the “original mind” could offer. Therefore, a man had to experience self-cultivation in order to sustain and foster his “original mind.” Here, to sustain the original mind in case it got lost was most important, and it was not a problem whether there was such an original mind or not. When he referred to inborn knowledge, inborn ability, si duan 四端 (the Four Commencements), and some other qualities of mind, many of Lu Jiuyuan’s remarks appeared the same as the classical Confucian works, so one could not deny that he was correct. But when he asserted that only reference was enough and no sustaining and fostering efforts were necessary, he missed the point (Ibid., Vol. 124, p. 3). Hence, the dispute between Zhu and Lu did not rest in that Lu promoted the

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original mind and Zhu did not, nor was it the difference between the proposition that “mind equates principles” and the idea that “nature equates principles.” Ontologically, Zhu also held the theory that “mind equates to principles” and “mind equates to nature,” and it could not be asserted that he radically opposed the idea that “mind equates to principles.” But at the level of functions, Zhu did not completely accept the opinion that “mind equates to principles.” That “mind equates to principles” was only an ontological prerequisite, but at the level of function, it would be much more complicated: the integration of mind and principles was an issue that Zhu’s theory about mind was to resolve, and it was much more complicated than a simple inferential process based on a prerequisite. It might be disputable whether it was a deficiency in Zhu’s theory, but from the point of view of practices, Zhu had his own reasons. Lu’s theory contains many deficiencies, all of which are due to that he does not know the complexity of endowed qi as composition, and thus mistakes many sorts of rough and harmful qi for the profound principles in mind, and regards things as naturally being that way (Ibid., p. 10). Lu is indulged in the proposal that mind is something good and allows no definition. According to him, the only problem is the blindness of this mind due to personal desires. Once it is known, all things would come out of it, and there would be no more trouble (Ibid., p. 14). As these quotations show, Zhu stressed two things: one was the “complexity of endowed qi as composition,” and the other was “the blindness of this mind due to personal desires.” These two were “not the original form of mind, but they also originate from mind.” “The original form of mind is good indeed, and yet one cannot deny that evil has something to do with mind. If it were not the mind, how did it come out?” (Ibid., Vol. 5, p. 4) If the original form of mind was good, then from where did evil arise? It originated from endowed qi as composition and from personal desires. These two were not out of the original form of mind, but they did have something to do with mind: they originated from the function of perception. In particular, “endowed qi as composition” was inborn and could be found in everyone. It was not necessarily that all such endowed qi as composition was evil, but for human beings in reality, its “complexity” did generally exist to various extents. In this sense, a man was not born with perfection. It was not an evil-in-nature theory, let alone a theory of “original sin,” but it indicated that the mind of a man did contain some evil component or possibility, which should be removed by “changing qi-related temperament.” This actually meant that self-transformation was necessary for a man. It was an important characteristic of Zhu’s theory of mind. Some people might feel

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uncomfortable when they hear the expression “self-transformation,” but in practice, it was intended to enable people to face up to themselves, improving themselves and making their lives more meaningful. It would really “do harm,” even though it appeared easy and pleasant, if one held that all things flowed out of mind were good so long as the original mind was good, and thus gave up his cultivation. The reason is that not all the things that come out of the mind are the activated function of the original mind of morality, which the original mind could guarantee to be all good. Therefore, it would be necessary to make efforts on “changing qi-related temperament.” In Zhu’s opinion, “changing qi-related temperament” was not only possible, but also necessary. In other words, the qi-related temperament of a man was alterable. “Personal desires” were not inborn, and were the activated function of the form of mind that “went astray”; that is, the departure from the original mind due to selfish intentions. They were attributed to the enticement of external things, but they had to show themselves through the function of mind anyway. This must be remembered. Mind was the rule of the whole body of a person, but it might be trapped by the desire for external things. From the viewpoint of the function of perception, mind was always impacted by the body and external things; due to the restriction of the body, one would easily act for the sake of self-interest without thinking of the benevolence in the original mind, and even become unrestrainedly selfish. Therefore, a man needed to “overcome” his personal desires and to cultivate his original mind. “All original minds contain benevolence, but once it gets lost due to the desire for external things, one need make great efforts to restore the benevolence in the original mind” (Zhu 1936, Vol. 40, p. 38). The loss of the original mind meant the loss of human nature and that one would lose the value of his existence, so the efforts of cultivation were necessary. Once the sainthood was achieved, which meant the “oneness of principles,” it would be the state “both existing and acting” in which “the Heavenly principle prevails in mind.” As has been shown, Zhu was not a substantialist who argued for “only existing but not acting.” Instead, he focused on the existence of man in reality and on a variety of related possibilities for resolving the issue of how to make the original form of mind and nature “both existing and acting.” In other words, he had not only been intended “straightforward smoothness” from top to bottom, but also “converse smoothness” from bottom to top; only in this way, in Zhu’s opinion, could the top and the bottom be smoothly connected. At this point, Zhu seemed to have paid more attention to issues at the level of reality in the world of men’s minds; hence, he worked out a concrete and practical method of improving the attainment of minds, asking people to view cultivation and practices as a part of life. In his opinion, the promotion of awareness or the conviction of a subject

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could not alone solve all the problems of a mind. That was an important reason why Zhu insisted on separate interpretation. The true purpose of separate interpretation, however, rested in some connectivity, i.e. the oneness of mind and nature as well as their form and function. What he was driving at was an interpretation from a holistic view, being both a starting point and a destination. This was why the separate interpretation was viewed as an “expedience.” References Cheng Hao, Cheng Yi (1981). Er Cheng Ji 二程集 (Collected Works of Cheng Hao and Cheng Yi). Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju Lu Jiuyuan (1936). Xiangshan Quanji 象山全集 (Complete Collection of Lu Jiuyuan). In: Si Bu Bei Yao 四 部 备 要 (Collected Quintessence of Four Types of Classical Works). Shanghai: Zhonghua Shuju Mou Zongsan (1968). “Song Ming Ruxue zhi Keti” 宋 明 儒 学 之 课 题 (“A Topic of Confucianism of the Song and Ming Dynasties”). In: Xingti yu Xingti 心体与性体 (The Form of Mind and That of Nature), Vol. 1. Taipei: Zhengzhong Shuju Zhu Xi (1936). Zhu Zi Wenji 朱子文集 (Collected Works of Zhu Xi). In: Si Bu Bei Yao 四部 备要 (Collected Quintessence of Four Types of Classical Works). Shanghai: Zhonghua Shuju Zhu Xi (1983). Sishu Zhangju Jizhu 四书章句集注 (Collected Annotations for the Four Books). Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju