Sex Roles (2009) 61:317–324 DOI 10.1007/s11199-009-9597-5

FEMINIST FORUM

A Structural Social Psychological View of Gender Differences in Cooperation Jane Sell & Kathy J. Kuipers

Published online: 12 March 2009 # Springer Science + Business Media, LLC 2009

Abstract We analyze differences in cooperation between men and women in social dilemma settings. Using a structural social psychological framework, we examine how the actor, the encounter, the microstructure, and the macrostructure might influence when gender differences emerge in cooperation. Many of the interaction differences, often linked to innate differences between men and women, are modified when the context is modified. We pay particular attention to how status and identity are connected to such modifications. Keywords Cooperation and gender . Social dilemmas and gender . Gender identity . Status and gender

Introduction Gerber (2009) clearly demonstrates the power of a structural analysis of gender and interaction. Gerber’s overall thesis is that personality differences attributed to gender are also associated with status differences. Consequently, many of the differences attributed to being a man or a woman are differences that can be tracked to high and low status. For example, instrumental personalities are associated with men. But such stereotypes are related to leadership and high office, positions more often filled by men than women. ConseJ. Sell (*) Texas A&M University, College Station, TX, USA e-mail: [email protected] K. J. Kuipers University of Montana, Missoula, MT, USA e-mail: [email protected]

quently, the stereotypes tied to societal position become tied to gender. Greater aptitude at socioemotional tasks is a stereotype associated with low status, and this is more associated with women than with men. So, an important question becomes: could gender personality stereotypes, and then their enactment, be produced almost solely by status? At the same time, reenactment of the status differences, since they are consistently associated with men as high and women as low status, reinforce the perception of the personality/ gender association. Further as Gerber convincingly argues, the performance of the “appropriate” gender roles serves to confirm to both the performer and the audience that the role really is associated with sex category. Gerber’s article is a powerful and thorough examination of the question of gender and stereotypes. She marshals together a great deal of evidence that documents the consistency in association between higher status and men and lower status and women. We will expand upon the general theme of how gender is enacted in one particular arena: cooperation. We emphasize, as does Gerber, how pliable the expression of gender can be when context or composition of a group is altered and we further demonstrate that gender is not a stable constellation of attributes. Structural social psychology (Lawler, Markovsky and Ridgeway 1993) affords an especially appropriate framework for examining how gender, as a status and as an identity (often associated with status), might affect interaction at some times but not others. This framework is multilevel; meaning that analysis at any point in time can focus on the actors themselves, their encounters (which are often interactions), microstructures (often the norms governing group interaction) and macrostructures (larger networks including societal structures). Consideration of all of these levels and the dynamic among them helps us to sort out the complexities of any interaction and its consequences.

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In fact, as we discuss below, there is a wide range of studies that demonstrate that at times gender is salient; and at times it is not. In large part this is because gender, what it means to be a man or a woman, depends on the context, which is composed of a set of structures and the set of actors within those structures (Burke and Reitzes 1981, 1991). As mentioned by Gerber (2009), expressive personality traits usually relate to communal or accommodating characteristics (Bakan 1966; Bem 1974; Spence et al. 1975, cited by Gerber). Although not an explicit personality characteristic, the trait of “cooperative” is often considered related to this kind of communal aspect. (Gilligan 1982) discussed at great length her findings that women seemed to be more communal in their orientations. As an example, many of the women she interviewed discussed connections with others rather than moral principles separate from such connections. Does the evidence support the notion that women are more cooperative than men? The answer to this is revealing: It depends. Specifically, we argue below that it depends on both the context (the microlevel context of the immediate group and the macrolevel context of the institutions) and the composition of the group. And a large part of the answer relates to Gerber’s focus on status.

Cooperation as a Class of Settings Cooperation is often defined in contradistinction to competition: Competitive settings are those in which the interests of one actor are pitted against the interests of at least one other. A zero-sum competitive setting is one in which one actor’s gain is another’s loss. A pure cooperative structure is one in which the same action or set of actions produces the best outcome for both actors. Any setting that is in between pure competition and pure cooperation is usually labeled as “mixed-motive”. (See Coser 1956; Rapoport and Chammah 1965; Thibaut and Kelley 1959; Van Neumann and Morgenstern 1944.) Mixed motive settings are most telling of actors’ motivations or strategies because in such settings actors are faced with choices that involve a conflict between their own self interest and the interests of others. In such settings cooperation can be costly for the individual, but helpful for others. We examine an extremely active research area in mixed motive settings that reaches across different disciplines: social dilemmas. In considering social dilemmas we are addressing what Eckel calls, one of the “canonical” settings explored most especially in experimental economics (Eckel 2007, 504). Social dilemmas are classes of settings in which, at each point in time, individual incentives for cooperating are less than the incentives for not cooperating. However, the group as a whole is better off if everyone cooperates (Dawes

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1980). There are many different kinds of social dilemmas, but most fall within one of two general categories (Sell and Son 1997). Public goods (Samuelson 1955) create settings in which people must decide whether to contribute to produce or maintain a resource. Common examples are public radio or television and collective movements. Resource goods create settings in which individuals decide whether to restrain their taking or consumption of a good, usually so that it may replenish. An important aspect of such social dilemmas is the nonexcludability property: Regardless of whether or not a given individual cooperates, all share of the good. Nobody is excluded from sharing the good. This nonexcludability property creates an incentive for each individual to “free ride” on the cooperation of others. But, if all act in their immediate personal interest, the public good will not be provided or the resource will degenerate. All will be worse off. So herein lies the dilemma. Hardin’s (1968) classic example of the Tragedy of the Commons describes a situation in which these principles might operate, the use of communal lands for grazing. The common grazing area is sustainable if each cattle rancher keeps his herd at a small number. But the temptation is for each person to think that he can increase his own benefit by adding just a few head of cattle. Yet if each person is thinking the same way, too many cattle will be added, the cattle themselves will suffer and the commons will be destroyed. (For a discussion of social dilemma properties and their definition, see Dawes 1980; Kollock 1998; Messick and Brewer 1983; and Sell 1988). It is obvious that the dilemma is only solved if individuals can realize that they must cooperate (either by contributing or by restraining consumption). There have been some efforts to try to estimate whether men or women are more cooperative and how the context might change this (Gneezy et al. 2003; Kuwabara 2005; Sell et al. 1993; Sell 1997; Simpson 2003). As we discuss below, these efforts have varied in their approaches. As pointed out in Gneezy, Niederle and Rustichini (2003), Simpson (2003), Sell (1997), and Kuwabara (2005), studies in cooperation have produced confusingly mixed results. To illustrate, using only social dilemma studies, Stockard, van de Kragt, and Dodge (1988) examined 66 nine person dilemmas and 64 seven-person one-decision social dilemmas and found that, overall, women were slightly more cooperative than men. However, in these studies the experimentally manipulated variables were more powerful in predicting outcomes than was the gender of the participants. Other early studies found no gender differences in behavior: Caldwell (1976) and Goehring and Kahan (1976) found no gender differences. Kerr and MacCoun (1985) found that when participants knew their partner was a man, both men and women were less cooperative. Sell and Wilson (1991) and Brown-Kruse

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and Hummels (1993) found that men in their studies contributed more than women. In an effort to make sense of these findings, we can consider why and then how gender differences in social dilemmas might emerge using the structural social psychology framework. This framework clarifies how the social structure intervenes and affects the manner in which gender is expressed (Lawler, Markovsky and Ridgeway 1993; Ridgeway 2001, 2006, 2007). Specifically, gender could be activated through the individual actor, through the encounter or interaction among the actors, through the microstructure that includes the norms and rules of the immediate group, or through “importation” of societal norms in more macrosociological settings. An actor brings a social identity with her into any given interaction; she encounters others who act based on her and their social identities; they are subject to rules or norms of the particular setting and these rules are also conditioned by the larger institutional setting and rules.

The Actor One of the strongest aspects of Gerber’s arguments is her consideration of alternative explanations for gender role enactment. She interrogates evidence seriously and demands that we consider HOW differences that, at first, look “innate” or personality-based might be manifestations of a different phenomenon—status. This line of argument has particular relevance for the role of the actor because, from the point of view of an observer or a participant, it seems easier to observe a particular individual actor rather than a “structure” or set of patterned interactions. We expand Gerber’s analysis of this by emphasizing the issue of identity. An examination of how identities influence gendered behavior further demonstrates how an additional mechanism can help account for behavior consistent with gender stereotypes. The belief that men and women are different in their personality traits can also be illuminated through a focus on gender identities and the contexts calling for identity enactment. Like other identities, gender identity is socially constructed through the categorization or classification of oneself, as either male or female. Rather than being linked to specific settings, gender identities are those selfmeanings associated with gender roles that cut across situations (Stets and Burke 1996). Men and women apply their gender identities to themselves, based on cultural beliefs about what it means to be male or female, and those meanings of categories of gender, male or female, are not only created, but also verified and maintained through social interaction (Burke and Reitzes 1981, 1991). Current western cultural meanings for male may include being dominant, competitive, and autonomous (Ashmore

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et al. 1995; Deaux and Major 1987), agentic and instrumental (Eagly 1987); or loud, restless, and less skilled in verbal communication (Briton and Hall 1995; Hall 1978) while meanings for female may include being submissive, cooperative, and affiliated (Deaux and Major 1987), communal, expressive and nurturing (Eagly 1987); or fluent, more skilled and involved in verbal communication, and socially sensitive (Briton and Hall 1995; Hall 1978). While these are not all of the meanings that may be associated with gender, when individuals see themselves as more masculine or more feminine, they will identify to some degree with these cultural meanings and will behave accordingly in interaction (Stets and Burke 1996). Of course, “doing gender” in interaction creates and reinforces gender identities in a process not separate from self-identification (West and Fenstermaker 1993; West and Zimmerman 1987). The meaning of one’s gender selfidentity (as more or less conforming to masculine or feminine meanings for oneself) is created, and differences between men and women are reinforced, through behavior that is more masculine or feminine; and this reproduces social structure and, in turn, sustains gender identity (Stryker 1980). In these ways, through confirmation and disconfirmation, identities are socially constructed—not innate properties of individuals. How might such identities account for differences in cooperation? First, as mentioned above, women as “cooperative” and men as “competitive” are generally established stereotypes connected to identities. What this means might vary dramatically by the particular group and the particular setting as we discuss below. Additionally, incentives for an actor’s behavior might be produced through preferences conditioned by gender. There is some discussion, for example that women are more risk averse than men (see Eckel and Grossman 2008) and conditioned by fear (of the partner defecting) more than men (Simpson 2003; Kuwabara 2005). This is an open area for investigation and it also should be noted that large variations in risk aversion and trust can occur, dependent upon the measurement of them (see Eckel and Grossman 2008; Schwieren and Sutter 2008) One consideration of different preferences has centered upon resources. Some have argued that women may value money less than men (Crosby 1982) and numerous researchers have argued that women value interpersonal factors more than monetary factors (e.g., Brock-Utne 1989). Sell, Griffith and Wilson (1993) specifically considered this issue in a set of experiments. When men and women had no information about others in their group and money was the resource, cooperation rates were the same. Other types of resources did seem to prompt gender differences, but money was not one of them, at least in social dilemma settings.

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Innate Differences: The Evolutionary Argument Some evolutionary social scientists (Buss 1989; Buss and Schmidt 1993) have argued that women and men might differ on cooperation levels based upon evolutionary adaptation. This is part of a much larger literature on evolutionary gender differences (e.g., Buss and Kenrick 1998; Geary 1998; Mealey 2000). There have been many spirited debates among different groups of researchers (see for example, Eagly and Wood 1999; Wood and Eagly 2002), and a vigorous exchange on women’s intrasexual aggression (Campbell 1999). We do not enter into this entire discussion about evolutionary origins of gender differences but what is clear is that evolutionary arguments, just as other arguments, must consider and rule out alternative interpretations. Arguments about why women might be more cooperative or men more competitive have to examine potential alternatives. So, as an example, if a researcher asserts that cooperation or competition “traits” are parts of being a male or female as adaptation, there must be an assessment of different kinds of evidence. As argued by Lloyd (2005) and following her summary of Sinervo and Baslo (1996), there are four major steps, three of which apply to human behavior. First it should be shown that individual or geographic variations in traits have a genetic basis. Basically, what this means is that variation can be accounted for on the basis of genetics, not social structure. Secondly, the trait should be linked to reproduction success, to ensure that the “passing on” of the trait increased the likelihood of progeny. Thirdly, there should be some evidence that explains the link between the trait and reproductive success “in the wild.” In this way, the evolutionary argument is not just a hypothetical possibility but rather has some empirical support. (The fourth step is experimental manipulation of the trait—not possible or permissible with humans. In animal studies, one way to accomplish this is by varying the environment and then observing whether traits change.) So, for example, there are experimental studies asserting the “male-warrior hypothesis” that men are more competitive generally, but more cooperative within groups because it puts them at a reproductive advantage; whereas it was not the same case for women. Van Vugt, De Cremer and Janssen (2007) argue that one manifestation is that men’s behaviors (and cognitions) are more intergroup oriented than women’s (Van Vugt et al. 2007, 19). In a public good experiment they find that men cooperate more (or contribute more to the public good) when there is intergroup competition than when no such competition is present. But, at a minimum, such arguments need to consider the possibility that identity issues, rather than evolutionary issues might be at play. Testing such explanations is possible by considering how encounters, microstructures,

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and macrostructures might change gender behaviors that look like they are evolutionarily linked. A missing portion for many arguments that rely on innate differences in the actors is the examination of the other structural components of interaction. It is not that evolutionary or personality difference arguments can automatically be dismissed; it is just that relevant alternatives must also be considered. The relevant alternatives include the encounter itself, the microstructure of the group and the macrostructure of the institutions surrounding the interaction.

The Encounter (Interaction and Group Composition) and the Microstructure We first consider the encounter and examine how an individual acts with respect to the gender identities (or performances) of others in the group. Group composition and the characteristics of the setting can potentially activate gender identity by making it more or less salient. According to social identity theorists and social categorization theorists, gender identity will become salient or activated depending on the context, the situational cues, and how that identity fits with the priorities of the actor (Deaux and Major 1987; Oakes 1987; Turner 1999). Through social comparison processes and making distinctions between one’s own group and some other group, individuals assess their own position in relation to the other group. Because gender is a basis for differentiation, individuals also define themselves based on features of their own category of male or female, in comparison with their perceptions of the other group. And they will use the degree to which they are similar to or different from others who are relevant to a specific context: a potential network of others. Social categories are distinctive when individuals occupy a minority status within the group or when their relative numbers are small (when women find themselves in groups surrounded by men); therefore their gender identities will become salient (Cota and Dion 1986; Deaux and Martin 2003). In accordance with Gerber’s analysis, power differentials could condition an actor to respond in a particular manner that is “expected.” As discussed in Gerber (2009) and also by Ridgeway and Smith-Lovin (1999), settings that are particularly masculine might activate masculine identities for men and “other than masculine” identities for women. If group tasks are stereotypically masculine or feminine, those stereotypes can produce, in a self-fulfilling manner, stereotypical behavior. Such behavior is consistent with research that demonstrates the ability of people to first recognize stereotypes (see Rashotte and Webster 2005) and then respond with behavior, even when that behavior actually may disadvantage the person. (This is the mystery associated with stereotype threat and identity.)

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Another way in which an identity may become salient is when an identity is threatened, implying that the group has a negative reflection on the individual, that it may not be possible to distinguish the group from others, or that the individual is not accepted by the in-group (Ellemers et al. 1999). In a study of identity threat, Spears et al (1997) found that identity threat made social categorization more salient. Contexts in which gender identities are challenged make related aspects of the self salient (Deaux and Martin 2003) and lead to behaviors necessary to confirm gender identities, consistent with cultural beliefs about gendered behavior. In public goods settings, then, there is evidence that when the setting is more stereotypically masculine, men and women will behave in accordance with the stereotype: men will be expected to contribute more and women less. So, for example in the social dilemma considered in the Kerr and MacCoun (1985) study, the contributions involved physical exertion. In these cases, men contributed more than women. Sell et al. (1993) argued that gender differences would not emerge in a gender neutral, public goods setting since there was no characteristic to prompt initial gender identification. Further, when the gender composition of the group was known, if no communication was allowed, they again posited and found no gender effects. Their argument was based on the idea that the activation of gender would entail some kind of cueing—that is, if there is no behavior to evaluate, then gender identities could not come into play. In a follow up-study, when feedback was provided, gender differences emerged (Sell 1997). Why might gender differences emerge with feedback? Feedback provides a way to interpret the behavior in conjunction with gender identity. In the public goods setting investigated in Sell (1997), the participants in the social dilemmas knew the gender composition of their groups and they saw others’ contributions after each decision. This information was interpreted in terms of the gender of participants and the likelihood that participants might be influenced by others’ contributions. In these cases, both men and women contributed less in groups when they thought the rest of their group was composed of men. Notice that such an interpretation is not just saying that people cooperate with women but not men—if that had been the case, just knowing the gender composition without knowing their contributions or cooperation would have activated the gendered behavior. But just the knowledge of the composition was not sufficient. Follow-up social dilemma studies using the same public goods setting showed no gender differences when actors do not know the gender of the other group members (Sell et al. 2002). This further supports the interpretation that gender becomes relevant for cooperation, not always, but rather when the setting or the behavior and audience of others prompt it. Findings from naturally occurring microcredit

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groups and group cooperation support this interpretation (Anthony and Horne 2003). Other aspects of the microstructure, for example, the institutional rules for interaction, can also create gender differences through identity processes. As we have discussed, the stereotype that men are more competitive and women more cooperative is pervasive. So, when structures are explicitly made competitive, it would seem that gender identity processes would be activated. Many studies of stereotype threat have demonstrated that when gender identity is made salient, people behave in accordance with the stereotype, even when it disadvantages them. This is usually interpreted as a product of anxiety about confirming the threat (Steele 1997; Steele, Spencer, and Aronson 2002). Such threat has been demonstrated for the negative stereotype about math proficiency for women, for example (Gresky et al. 2005; Keller 2002; Spencer et al 1999). But even those possessing the advantaged status demonstrate the confirming behavior for negatively evaluated stereotypes associated with that status. Koenig and Eagly (2005), demonstrate that men’s performance on a test of social sensitivity was decreased when the stereotype of woman as superior on the skill was activated. Although not testing cooperation in social dilemmas. Gneezy, Niederle and Rustichini (2003) report behavior consistent with this idea of stereotype threat by simply varying the competitive structure on a group interaction. Women perform less well than men in competitive settings, and performed much higher in settings where they were simply paid according to their output. This effect was magnified when women had to compete with men; it was decreased when women competed with other women. The confirmation of identities, both positive and negative, serves as powerful methods for the reproduction of stereotypical behavior. Such behavior looks like it is connected to the actor, but the evidence points to variations dependent upon group composition, the type of tasks, and the institutional rules (such as rules endorsing competition).

The Macrostructure (The Societal Context) There are many statements and theoretical analyses of the deep-rooted gender system at a societal level (Lorber 1994; Ridgeway 1997; Ridgeway and Correll 2004; Risman 2004). As pointed out by Ridgeway (2007), most social scientific approaches have focused upon the individual and the macrosociological level. But, as she argues, gender, at its core, is a group process that stitches together the individual and the macrostructure and constantly feeds back into identity processes, group interaction and the macrostructural relations. This, in fact, is illuminated through the structural social psychological approach. As

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clearly indicated by Gerber (2009), Wagner and Berger (1997), Ridgeway (2001, 2006), Ridgeway and Bourg (2004) and Ridgeway et al. (1998), one of the most potent ways that this occurs is with the constant conjunction of social status and gender. Studies that would examine differences in macrostructural effects would involve determining structural variation and then examining whether gender differences reflect that variation. As we indicated earlier, such studies would be important for assessing whether there are “universal” gender dispositions. Of course, there have been many such studies, and they too have been the subject of quite a bit of controversy (see Buss 1989, 1995; Eagly and Wood 1999). As far as cooperation, there are many claims about biological predispositions. Some of these have lead to the conclusion that men, on average, are simply “forgetful of others,” (Baron-Cohen 2003), while women are more cooperative. Relatively few studies directly address cross cultural differences in how men and women cooperate in social dilemmas, although there are many studies that address the different roles of men and women in differing institutional regimes involving social dilemmas (Ostrom 2005). (Cross cultural studies on social dilemmas by Sell et al. (2002) and Yamagishi (1988) have controlled for gender composition of groups and report no gender effects of individuals or groups on cooperation.) However, a recent study does directly address this question. Andersen, Bulte, Gneezy and List (2008) examine the cooperation rates of men and women in three different Indian societies located relatively close to one another yet different in their societal structure such that two are patriarchical and one is matrilineal. In particular, the question of interest was whether contributions (or cooperation) in a public goods experimental setting would be higher in the matrilineal societies than in the nonmatrilineal societies. Interestingly, the results demonstrate that cooperation rates in the matrilineal society are higher than in the other societies; however the difference is not attributable to women’s contributions, but rather to men’s. This provides evidence suggesting that cooperative behavior is not necessarily innate, but rather conditioned through the macrostructure, as well as the microstructure, the encounter and the actor. As the authors state, “Our data are consistent with the notion that societal structure is critically linked to public good provision” (Andersen et al. 2008, 380).

Conclusion Gerber’s analysis is a convincing structural argument based upon the pervasiveness and potency of social status. We add to this analysis by examining just one common area of

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gender stereotyping: cooperation in social dilemma settings. While this is a quite specific behavior, it has been of interest in many different disciplines. Using a structural social psychological framework, we find evidence that cooperative behavior is highly flexible. At times women are more cooperative than men, less cooperative than men, or equally as cooperative as men. These variations are explained, in large part, by structural differences and identities triggered by those differences. Because the structure is composed, in part of institutional rules and norms, it can be changed. This is encouraging and suggests that we can overcome differences that are often perceived as fixed or innate. Gerber’s analysis suggests that changing social status will likely change other aspects of interaction that have been linked to personality. Similarly, our analysis suggests that the encounter, microstructure, and macrostructure all feed into each other and that change in one can lead to change in others. This is an exciting prospect that encourages us to think of ways in which negative stereotypes might be countered and social dilemmas solved.

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