J Environ Stud Sci (2016) 6:451–459 DOI 10.1007/s13412-016-0403-8
Adapting to dangerous climate change: implications for studies of politics, policy, and beyond Paul G. Harris 1 & John Barkdull 2
Published online: 19 May 2016 # AESS 2016
Abstract This essay interrogates the way that adaptation to climate change has been approached by environmental studies scholars focusing on politics, policy, and related perspectives. We describe how adaptation has gained prominence as awareness of climate change has increased, and we summarize the way that adaptation has been addressed. We argue that the types of environmental studies that are necessary to foster effective policies for adaptation must be much more mindful of the quite high potential for dangerous, potentially catastrophic, climate change. As the impacts of rising global temperatures become more severe, research pertinent to the problem changes. Put simply, the more severe the potential impacts, the more creative environmental policy studies will have to be if societies are to cope. Transformational, even radical, theories and approaches may be essential to understanding and preparing for a future that is greatly affected by climate change. We examine what this means for political and policy studies before highlighting some of the implications for several cognate environmental studies disciplines. Keywords Adaptation . Climate change . Environmental policy studies . Global warming . Social science
* Paul G. Harris
[email protected]
1
Department of Social Sciences, Hong Kong Institute of Education, 10 Lo Ping Road, Tai Po, Hong Kong
2
Department of Political Science, Texas Tech University, Lubbock, TX 79409, USA
B[T]his is one of those rare issues – because of its magnitude, because of its scope – that if we don’t get it right we may not be able to reverse, and we may not be able to adapt sufficiently. There is such a thing as being too late when it comes to climate change.^ President Barack Obama (2015)
Introduction What is actually happening in the natural environment is often at odds with environmental policies and related issues of politics. This disconnect is exacerbated if scholars studying these aspects of the human-environment relationship fail to analyze the most important ecological changes. Indeed, scholars of environmental politics and policy tend to avoid that which is potentially radical—both radical ecological change and related radical theory. An important example can be found in the study of climate change, the response to which has involved two major policy approaches: mitigation and adaptation. Mitigation refers to reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, especially carbon dioxide. Adaptation refers to measures that aim to minimize the social and ecological impacts of climate change. Indeed, at the December 2015 Paris climate change conference, diplomats and leaders earnestly debated the relative importance of mitigation and adaptation. At the conference, most affluent countries pledged to reduce their future GHG emissions while many developing countries proposed ways of limiting the increases in theirs. However, when added together, these pledges fall well short of what scientists say is required to prevent dangerous global warming and extremely adverse effects of climate change. Short of a severe global economic shock that radically reduces the burning of fossil fuels—which now provides roughly 85 % of the world’s
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energy—or a radical transformation in global political economy that moves away from material growth, the world is locked into substantial, and potentially devastating, climate change (BP 2015; World Bank 2014). Consequently, while efforts to mitigate climate change must continue and indeed be stepped up dramatically, robust policies for adaptation will be vital for humanity (not to mention other species). In devising these policies, governments and other political actors should ask whether existing social, economic, and political systems are capable of effective and equitable adaptation to increasingly severe climatic impacts (Adger et al. 2010). Policies for adapting to the effects of climate change will be costly for many sectors of societies. This inevitably politicizes decisions about these policies, which in turn means that political scientists may be able to provide useful insights for policymakers and other actors. An extensive literature on adaptation to climate change has emerged from many scholarly disciplines, think tanks, non-governmental organizations, and international agencies. Political scientists have played a role in developing this literature. However, political science as a discipline—which encompasses local and national politics, public policy, comparative politics, ecopolitics, international relations, political philosophy and much more—has given adaptation much less attention than mitigation. According to a survey of literature by Debra Javeline, nearly all political science research published in peer-reviewed journals focuses on mitigation (Javeline 2014). In her article, provocatively titled BThe Most Important Topic Political Scientists Are Not Studying: Adapting to Climate Change,^ Javeline calls attention to this gap in political science research and proposes that the discipline should use its analytical tools to find ways of developing and implementing effective adaptation policies. Assessing the appropriate role of political science requires specifying the nature of the problem. Put simply, as the actual effects of climate change become more severe, the political science that will be useful to policymaking will change. If they are to respond effectively to Javeline’s critique, political scientists may have to address fundamental questions of social justice and the constitution of domestic and global societies as the world adapts—or tries to adapt—to future climate change. Other scholarly disciplines within the social sciences, broadly defined, may have to take a similar path. In this essay, we survey and interrogate the way that adaptation to climate change has been approached by environmental studies scholars focusing on politics, policy, and related perspectives. We describe how adaptation has gained prominence as awareness of climate change has increased, and we summarize the way that adaptation has been addressed. We argue that the types of environmental studies that are necessary to foster effective policies for adaptation must be much more mindful of the quite high potential for dangerous, potentially catastrophic, climate change. Put simply, the more severe the potential impacts, the more creative environmental policy
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studies will have to be if societies are to cope. We examine what this means for political science before highlighting the implications for several cognate environmental studies disciplines.
Adaptation on the international political agenda Throughout most of the international negotiations on climate change over the last quarter century, mitigation has been prioritized on the assumption that too much focus on adaptation Bwould distract from the need to cut emissions^ (Gillis 2014). The 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) noted the need for cooperation on adaptation, especially in vulnerable areas (UNFCCC 1992: Article 4.1e). More recently, concerns about adaptation have increased as governments have proved unable to stem global GHG pollution enough to avert serious climatic impacts, and indeed as communities have started to experience the effects of climate change. Currently, the United Nations identifies five components of policy intervention with respect to adaptation: observation, assessment, planning, implementation, and evaluation (UNFCCC 2014b). The main focus of the United Nations has been developing countries. The so-called Marrakesh rules, agreed in 2001, called on developing countries to produce National Adaptation Programs of Action. At the same time, the climate change Adaptation Fund was created to support adaptation projects in developing countries. In 2006, parties to the UNFCCC created the Nairobi Work Program, which called for a 5-year investigation of impacts, vulnerability, and adaptation. In 2007, they agreed to the Bali Road Map, which called for Benhanced action on adaptation^ with the aim to Benable climate-resilient development and reduce vulnerability of all Parties^ (UNFCCC 2008). After the 2009 Copenhagen UNFCCC conference failed to result in progress toward cutting global GHG emissions, adaptation gained much greater importance. The impacts of climate change were already evident, and the probable inadequacy of future mitigation was becoming more obvious. Thus, in 2010, the Cancun Adaptation Framework was adopted, incorporating five major elements: implementation, support, institutions, principles, and stakeholder engagement (UNFCCC 2014a). By 2014, additional commitments to adaptation were agreed, with the UNFCCC’s secretariat noting progress on Belevating adaptation onto the same level as the curbing [GHG] emissions^ (UNFCCC 2014c). The means proposed for increasing attention to adaptation included greater visibility for National Adaptation Plans, expanding networks for determining the adaptation needs of communities, a work program to improve understanding of how climate change affects vulnerable developing countries, and better knowledge of how climate change influences migration (UNFCCC 2014c).
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Management policy or political transformation? Conceivably, adapting to climate change is largely a problem of proper management. This is the impression that one might derive from the UN’s proposals. From this perspective, it is a question of how governments at all levels can design and implement policies to adapt effectively to the challenges of climate change, such as coastal flooding and declining agricultural productivity. A managerial approach assumes that existing social, economic, and political institutions have the capacity to address the challenges arising from climate change (see IPCC 2014a). Indeed, many governments have strategies and plans for doing just that (see, e.g., Australia Department of Environment 2007; National Development and Reform Commission 2007; European Commission 2013). The assumption is that societies can make their way effectively through a difficult future if governments do a better job of cooperating with one another, if they adopt the correct policies on human migration and other issues, and if they are equitable and democratic in adaptation policymaking (Moser and Boykoff 2013). Taking actions such as moving populations away from coastal areas, building resilient infrastructure and engineering relatively heat-resistant crops are probably within current human capability. Nothing in this managerial perspective on the challenges of climate change suggests that a future catastrophe is very likely. In contrast, the increasing severity of climatic changes, notably those related to temperature rises, could imply the need for system transformation (Pelling 2010). The potential need for transformation is largely premised on the belief that the world faces an environmental catastrophe. Tweaking the policy process, designing new disaster responses, and relying on engineering would fall well short of what is required (Lovelock 2009). Major transformations of global institutions would be necessary. For example, according to eco-socialists, global capitalism, with its endless quest for economic growth, is an insuperable barrier to the kind of social reforms needed to protect societies and people that are most vulnerable to climate change (Magdoff and Foster 2011; Klein 2014). From this perspective, the overriding question is how to replace capitalism with a global economic system that rests on ecological principles (Jackson 2009; Williams 2010). Regardless of whether one accepts these warnings, they at least suggest that determining the contribution of political science to climate adaptation requires a preliminary step: the nature of the problem must be clearly specified. If the world can remain below the internationally agreed 2 °C threshold of average global warming above historical levels, beyond which scientists say the worst impacts will be felt, then political studies on the management of climate challenges should be adequate. However, if global average temperatures rise above 2 °C, even increasing to 4 °C or more, as seems likely (World Bank 2014), then political studies should focus much more
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attention on systemic transformation. In other words, before deciding where to direct their research, political scientists investigating adaptation should first consider the possible impacts of climate change. The more severe the foreseeable impacts, the greater the need to focus research on transformational politics. Without taking this first step, political science research on adaptation, to the extent that it actually informs effective policies, could prove to be irrelevant in the not-toodistant future.
Climate scenarios and some of their implications Expectations regarding the impact of climate change on human interests depend to a great extent on how much the earth’s temperatures will increase above historical norms. The average global temperature above long-term norms has already reached 1 °C (UCAR 2016), and a net 1.5 °C rise is certain to occur, regardless of policy responses (World Bank 2014). This leaves very little likelihood that global warming will remain below the 2 °C threshold. Indeed, it seems very likely that at least a 4 °C rise will be experienced within 50 years (Betts et al. 2011). With this in mind, it is useful to consider not only the Bideal^ (and probably unrealistic) scenario of staying below 2 °C but also scenarios in which global average temperatures exceed this level. What consequences can we expect, how might humanity adapt, and what does this imply for the study of climate politics? The answers depend upon the extent of future global warming and associated climate change, as described in this section. To be sure, this brief description does not reveal the full complexity of the adaptation problem. Many cognitive, social, and other factors affect what counts as effective adaptation, and global average temperatures obscure the regional variations that will make enormous differences to what can and should be done. However, a brief consideration of what might happen at different levels of warming can help to highlight the challenges for politics and political scientists. Serious climate change: 2 °C The world is already witnessing the effects of 1 °C rise in the global average temperature (Pope 2013). Even in the very unlikely event of full implementation of the national GHGreduction pledges made at the 2015 Paris climate conference, global warming would reach about 2.7 °C (Gutschow 2015). Only the most optimistic policy scenarios predict that global warming can be kept below the 2 °C target, and then only with extremely rapid implementation of mitigation measures (Jacoby and Chen 2014). It seems that the objective of limiting warming to 2 °C is Beffectively unachievable^ (Victor and Kennel 2014). Nevertheless, the 2 °C limit is still the official objective of international negotiations and of most
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governments. What would the world look like under such an optimistic scenario? Many regions of the world will become much drier if global temperature increases another degree, adversely affecting already scarce water supplies and agriculture. Alternatively, some regions will experience heavier rainfall. According to the US National Research Council, for each 1 °C increase in global temperature, there could be a 5–10 % change in precipitation in many regions, 3–10 % more rain falling during extreme rainstorms, and 5–10 % reductions in water flow in many river basins (NRC 2011: 5). One consequence of these changes is an expected 5–15 % fall in crop yields, assuming current agricultural practices (NRC 2011: 5). The Arctic is now warming faster than other regions. It will continue to do so, with possible impacts including disruptions of the jet stream, which will likely affect weather patterns much farther south. Globally, glaciers are retreating. Eventually, this trend will result in less water flowing into rivers, including some of the world’s largest, notably in South and Southeast Asia. Melting of Greenland’s icecap will likely contribute to longterm rises in sea level (IPCC 2013: 25). Rising seas are already inundating atolls, including several small island countries, and will likely devastate some low-lying poor countries, such as Bangladesh. Declining biodiversity, already underway around the world, will accelerate. Hurricanes will likely become stronger; super-typhoons that have battered the Philippines in recent years may be indicative of what to expect. Even this small sampling of the sorts of impacts with a 2 °C rise in global temperature points to significant dislocations around the world and difficult challenges for governments. Adaptation under such circumstances would require vigorous public policy. For example, roads, bridges, ports, and other facilities will have to be strengthened to withstand extreme weather events. Coastal regions will have to take steps to cope with more powerful hurricanes and tropical storms. Some coastal areas will be defended with seawalls, but others will have to be abandoned as seas encroach on shorelines and storm surges render some coastal areas uninhabitable. Although this may take decades, it will still be very costly and disruptive to coastal communities. While individual choices and market forces can direct much of the relocation, public authorities will have to play a significant role. Even the best-equipped communities may have trouble adapting; New Orleans and New York have been less than prepared for extreme weather events in recent years. Cities in the developing world will need enormous international assistance to have any chance of adapting to a 2 °C-warmer Earth. As drought affects cities and agricultural regions, people can be expected to move to areas with adequate water and economic activity. Assistance to affected areas will be required to minimize human suffering as communities lose population and wealth. The international community may need to develop much more effective policies to ensure food security as productive
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agricultural areas decline. As increasing heat-related health problems become more prevalent and some diseases become more widespread, additional public health measures will be required. Areas affected by additional flooding, such as occurred in South Asia in 2014 and 2015, will require both infrastructure investments to control water flows and enhanced disaster-response capabilities. Populations on flood plains may have to migrate as what were once considered B100-year^ floods occur regularly. Policies to manage these problems can be implemented, but doing so will require diverting scarce resources from other objectives. The upshot is that a 2 °C-warmer Earth presents very significant challenges for policy makers, governments, and international organizations. The questions that Javeline (2014) asks political scientists seem to be directed at responding to this 2 °C-warmer world. It is probably within the capability of extant political and policy institutions to manage these challenges, assuming those institutions can be fully mobilized. Political science research may be able to foster such mobilization. However, as noted earlier, global warming will very likely exceed 2 °C even if we assume that governments can agree to unprecedented cuts in GHG emissions. A question is whether the current global order will be up to the task of adapting to almost-certain temperature increases above 2 °C. Severe climate change: 3–4 °C If (when) the world exceeds the 2 °C threshold, there will be severe consequences for the natural and social worlds. Areas expected to suffer from drought with Bonly^ a 2 °C rise in global temperatures will become increasingly desert-like as the increase approaches 4 °C (World Bank 2014). SubSaharan Africa will likely experience chronic drought, and droughts will probably spread to Europe. Parts of southern Asia could enter permanent drought, while other parts of the subcontinent will experience heavy rain and major flooding. The melting of ice in Greenland will accelerate, substantially raising sea levels and possibly affecting ocean currents, with potentially enormous impacts on regional climate and marine ecosystems. The Arctic Ocean will be ice-free much of the year, adding to warming temperatures (due to dark water absorbing energy from the sun rather than year-round ice reflecting it away). Loss of snow and glacier melt in mountain areas around the world will dry up many river systems. Agricultural productivity in nearly all of the major grainproducing regions of the world will suffer from more heat and less water. More ecosystems will be under stress because temperatures will rise above the ranges to which species are adapted (Malcom et al. 2006; National Audubon Society 2014; IPCC 2014b, p. 72). Adaptation to a globe that is 3–4 °C warmer on average— meaning that some places will be far warmer—will mean
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having to cope with chronic crisis conditions in many parts of the world, not least in those countries where governments already have difficulty meeting people’s needs. Some societies will be stressed beyond endurance. Millions of people will likely flee encroaching deserts and rising seas, perhaps igniting civil strife in the places they move to. Much of the migration will occur within the developing world, increasing stresses on already-stressed societies. But many of the Bclimate migrants,^ possibly many millions of them, will try to reach developed countries. The ongoing refugee crisis in Europe, with all of its political and social implications, will pale in comparison to the potential flows of migrants in the future due to climate change. Food and water scarcity will affect an increasing share of the world’s regions, with implications for human welfare and national security. If past and present policies are any indication, infrastructure investments, disaster preparedness, and assistance to affected communities will be unlikely to meet these challenges. In a world that is 3–4 °C warmer than pre-industrial times, policymakers and publics will have to consider the viability of existing social, economic, and political arrangements. The growth imperative of global capitalism would have to be questioned (cf. Newell and Paterson 2010). The world may have to face the prospect of wars over scarce water and arable land (cf. Lee 2009). Adaptation under such circumstances could mean anything from increasing a country’s military capability, to enable it to protect its resources or secure more of them from abroad, to establishing a world government that is potentially able to manage chronic crisis on a global scale. If a humane and just response to climate change is the objective, in a 3–4 °C warmer world, some sort of transformation of the world’s political, economic, and social systems will almost certainly be required. Determining what kind of transformation is desirable and possible will require political responses and related research that are on the fringes of today’s mainstream approaches. Extreme climate change: 5 °C and beyond Planning for a world in which temperatures rise by 5 °C or more is speculative due to the higher level of uncertainty. However, such speculation is unavoidable because ecological changes would be even more severe than those described above. For example, if the worst happens and the world experiences 12 °C warming, large land areas could become uninhabitable, too hot and unproductive to support civilized life (Sherwood and Huber 2010). Even with Bonly^ a 5 °C rise, vital climatic tipping points would likely be surpassed. BPositive^ feedbacks, such as the release of methane from polar soils (tundra) and from the oceans, could lead to enormous amounts of additional GHGs reaching the atmosphere. Nothing humans can do will halt this process once it begins: even if human-caused GHG emissions were cut completely,
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the earth might continue releasing far more GHGs than all of the fossil fuels burned in human history (Hansen 2009: 238– 251). What is more, Paleoclimate data suggest that past warming resulted in mass extinctions, an extreme example being the Permian extinction that eliminated 95 % of marine species and as much as two thirds of land species (Benton and Twitchett 2003). While such an outcome is unlikely, even something far short of it would devastate human societies. For example, Hans Joachim Schellnhuber has asserted that a 4 °C rise in global temperature would reduce Earth’s carrying capacity to less than 1 billion people, implying that even higher global temperatures would decimate human populations (cited in Kanter 2009). Likewise, after reviewing thousands of scholarly papers, Mark Lynas (2007: 236) concluded that humans would survive in a much warmer world, albeit only as a small remnant of today’s more than 7 billion people. Humans would almost certainly survive in these extreme climates, but the process of moving toward a world of severe scarcities and a much-reduced population would be brutally painful. It is hard to imagine that adaptation as currently conceived by policymakers and most analysts would have much meaning in such circumstances. Do humans have the capacity to foresee future events, to reason, and to employ technologies to solve problems consistent with the need for individuals and their societies to survive, even flourish, in a radically changed natural world? If adaptation means ensuring survival and meeting human needs, a radical change in how society is organized may be required. This could include giving up industrial capitalism, urban society as known today, and most of the trappings of modern life. Humanity might survive in small farming communities, with population reduced from billions to perhaps hundreds of millions or less in future centuries. If some of the most worrying predictions of climate change are realized, human society is going to be very different in the future. In such a world, adaptation would not mean trying to preserve modern civilization. It would instead mean preparing for the end of customary ways of life and finding pathways that provide people in a much warmer world with a good life. This would require radical new forms of social and economic institutions compared to today, and similarly radical new kinds of underlying politics—and thus new kinds of political science.
Political science for future climate change The potential futures implied by different levels of global warming (not to mention ocean acidification, a manifestation of climate change occurring alongside increasing ocean temperatures that could devastate global fisheries) are vitally important for political scientists contemplating research into adaptation. The political science appropriate for adapting to
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serious, severe, and extreme climate change can vary considerably. If it is possible to remain below 2 °C of warming, then it makes sense to ask more or less Btechnozoic^ questions (Brown and Schmitt 2014: 68): Why do different levels and types of governments adapt better than others to climate change? What role can foreign aid, non-governmental organizations, and international regimes play in facilitating adaptation? How can the market be harnessed to foster effective adaptation? What role can civil society play? What normative concerns are pertinent to allocating the costs of adaptation? However, if global temperatures continue to rise, reaching 4 °C or beyond, the relevant political science may be that which focuses on managing social chaos and disaster in a hostile natural and political environment, or potentially that which facilitates emancipation and transformation in a much warmer world. Because a significantly warmer world is likely, the task of many political scientists should be to do the latter. Interest in studies of bureaucratic fragmentation, the urban politics of infrastructure development, and the like, while important in the near term, will fall short in anything but the most optimistic scenarios. Most of the questions that a managerial approach poses would have utility in a 2 °C warmer world, but finding answers to them would not go very far toward adapting to the harsher future environment that looks increasingly likely. This is not to say that such questions are irrelevant; the near-term is upon us and we need to adapt. But many political scientists will want their work to help the world prepare for mediumand long-term futures. If the discipline of political science is to be relevant for long in a warmer world, they may have to do so. Bearing all of this in mind, and assuming a much warmer world, the most relevant political science may be that which at least takes system transformation as its research subject. Such research would likely examine whether modern capitalism, with a growth imperative that is largely heedless of ecological consequences, may not be a sustainable economic system. An alternative political science may also consider whether the world’s anarchic state system is able to provide an avenue for successful adaptation to worsening climate change. Indeed, humanity may have to face up to the contradiction at the heart of the system within which states operate, namely, that adhering to sovereignty-focused and security-oriented institutions and practices is harmful to billions of people, at best, and slow-motion collective suicide, at worst. Global consumerism, heavy resource use, fossil-fuel dependency, and militarism could hasten the coming of an unprecedented social disaster. In the long term, governments cannot continue to pursue policies intended to ensure national survival against military threats from other states when the real threat to survival is the coming ecological crisis. Comprehending this challenge may require drawing upon
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alternative theories, such as critical and eco-socialist theory, possibly feminism and neo-Marxism, to help identify models of system transformation that could help the world to achieve just, equitable, and peaceful adaptation in a radically changed global climate. Some observers have already offered alternative visions for adapting to a future of severe or extreme climate change. For example, climate activist Bill McKibben (2010) advocates a return to the land—replacing industrial agriculture with small-scale, labor-intensive farming—to reverse the process that has substituted petroleum for farm labor and to bring large numbers of people back to environmentally sustainable rural life. Naomi Klein argues that climate change requires Bchanging everything,^ building on the experiences of indigenous peoples and movements opposed to fossil fuel development, and kindling Ba desire for a deeper form of democracy, one that provides communities with real control over those resources that are most critical to collective survival—the health of the water, air, and soil^ (Klein 2014: 295). John Barry argues that Bissues of major structural transformation in social, economic and political relations and institutions cannot be avoided in the transition to a sustainable society, including the transcending of capitalism^ (Barry 2012: 130). Advocating critical theory, Timothy Luke has asserted that Becofeminism, environmental justice groups, radical social ecology and deep ecology now hold much of the vision and energies needed to build qualitatively new, ecologically rational forms of communal production and reproduction within various already existing free spaces^ (Luke 2003: 247). More of this sort of thinking, rigorously applied by political scientists, may be required to help devise effective ways of adapting to climate change. If the accumulation of GHGs in the atmosphere continues, in a few decades, we will be destined to surpass 4 °C of global warming. Global average temperature will be much higher than human civilization has ever experienced—and in some regions it will be radically higher. As noted, the social problem facing humanity could be the collapse of modern civilization during a precipitous drop in human population. Rather than studying managerial questions, to plan ahead for such an outcome political science could draw analogies from previous civilizational collapses, with particular attention to the ecological factors bringing about decline and fall (e.g., Diamond 2005). Managerial studies so common today would be grossly inadequate when the organizations and institutions in question are likely to be swept away by a profound social and ecological crisis. Thus, the more serious predictions of global warming call for creative forms of political science focused on ensuring survival amidst decline, on helping to create and foster a Bhospice earth^ with a much smaller population, in which people can live relatively good lives as contemporary
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civilization declines (Barkdull and Harris 2015). Granted, it is possible that no political science will be enough. But arguably, political scientists must do some radical thinking before reaching this conclusion.
Implications for other disciplines The natural sciences are essential foundations for understanding future climate change. Political scientists build on that foundation to understand human-environment relationships as they relate to questions of political institutions and public policies. But effectively adapting to future climate change, including global warming that substantially exceeds what policymakers are currently planning for, will require the insights of more than political scientists. Other disciplines within the social sciences and cognate disciplines can also offer insights. Given the key roles of economic systems and institutions, as well as consumers and businesses, in driving greenhouse gas pollution, the economic sciences and business studies have obvious potential utility in increasing understanding of future adaptation strategies. These disciplines, much like political science, have already contributed enormously to understanding the importance of (for example) economic globalization, capitalism, and Bcorporate social responsibility^ in efforts to mitigate climate change (Jackson 2009; Newell and Paterson 2010). Innovative studies of alternative economic models, practices, and institutions will likely help to devise pathways to alternative futures in which societies, industries, and individuals are better able to cope in a much warmer and much altered climate. Similarly, and perhaps even more profoundly, the disciplines of sociology and psychology have the potential to outdo political science and economics in helping the world to adapt to dangerous global warming. These disciplines have explored the social and psychological explanations for collective and individual behaviors that largely create and perpetuate the problem of climate change (Dunlap 2015; Stoknes 2015). They have the potential to find novel approaches to social interactions and institutions that assist communities and individuals to cope with increasingly hostile environmental conditions. Psychology, for example, may be able to discern means by which people in the future learn to be happier with lifestyles that entail vastly less material consumption—a world in which people are finally cured of Baffluenza^ and learn to live within the reduced carrying capacity of the natural environment (James 2008). To some extent, we can assume that sociology and psychology already have many of the answers; we already know what types of societies and what types of behaviors and individual worldviews are necessary to achieve climate-friendly sustainability. Thus, these disciplines share a challenge faced by critical political scientists, economists, and other scholars: how to persuade individuals,
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communities, businesses, and governments to embrace and implement alternative ways of living and operating in a future with a greatly altered climate. This raises the question of what dangerous global warming and other manifestations of climate change say about how people are educated. Educational studies have already explored in depth how to Beducate for sustainability,^ albeit with limited success in changing many people’s ways of living, particularly on a global scale (Jones et al. 2010). Indeed, for the most part, students almost everywhere are educated to be competent workers and, in turn, consumers who contribute to local and national economic growth. They are seldom encouraged to aspire for less material wealth, less consumption, and indeed less work (because consuming less requires less income). This will have to change in a future where environmental conditions leave limited room for material consumption. Happiness and success will have to be measured in ways other than financial income and economic growth. Good citizenship may entail consuming less, not more—to grow (or at least preserve) the environment rather than the economy. Educationalists may have to be critical of prevailing teaching objectives and find alternatives, which by current standards may appear to be radical, to help future citizens adapt in ways that are good for themselves and their communities. Much as for political science and other disciplines, doing this will require planning for a much warmer world.
Conclusion Despite numerous warnings from climate scientists that emphasize the severity of climate change, public opinion remains relatively apathetic and policies have failed to stem GHG emissions (Jacquet et al. 2013). To stay within the 2 °C safety zone, GHG emissions must decline soon (Mann 2014; UNEP 2014). However, despite modest progress at the Paris UNFCCC conference, mitigation efforts show little sign of meeting the 2 °C target (Gutschow 2015; Tokar 2015). If the last few decades of climate politics and policy serve as any kind of guide, business as usual, or something close to it, is likely over the next decade at least (Galbraith 2014). It does not help that the price of petroleum is at a multiyear low and governments are challenged by economic conditions to find resources necessary to push through policy reforms aimed at reducing fossil fuel consumption. Consequently, the world may be on track toward at least 4 °C of global warming within decades (Betts et al. 2011; Brysse et al. 2013). Indeed, by the time we surpass 2 °C, it will likely be too late to prevent a rise to 4 °C (Hansen et al. 2013). This means, as Dale Jamieson (2014: 1) notes that Bfamiliar comforts, places, and ways of life will disappear on a timescale of years or decades.^ It is unlikely that normal legislative and administrative practices will suffice to manage the cascading challenges that societies
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will encounter in a world that is 4 °C or warmer. The modern state, the state system, and global capitalism may stand as barriers to effective adaptation in such dire circumstance (Harris 2013). Can those who study political sciences and related social sciences contribute to the most effective long-term responses to climate change and specifically help communities to adapt? No doubt they can. However, as temperatures rise more than 2 °C above what societies and most species are accustomed to, policy-oriented scholars may have to focus less on how to limit climate-changing pollution, or even on how to adapt to serious climate change, and much more on social transformation that enables long-term environmental sustainability. To adapt effectively as the planet warms requires that political and social scientists undertake this kind of research robustly, and without further delay—well before temperatures increase to the point where transformation becomes unavoidable. Mainstream study of climate politics aimed at understanding local, national, and international mitigation efforts is important and will remain so for some time, but it is very unlikely to be adequate in the long term. Research aimed at explaining and improving existing policy institutions and their ability to implement adaptation measures may have to yield to radical theory and radical policy approaches. Political science journals, universities, and scholarly think tanks, not to mention government officials, will have to be receptive to such research if it is to accelerate. The specific forms of the political and other social sciences that should be undertaken are open to debate, but up to now that debate has been muted. It is now time for it to get underway in earnest.
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