HUMAN STUDIES 1,289-299 (1978)

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Alfred Schutz and the Social Sciences FRED KERSTEN University of Wisconsin-Green Bay

A review of ROBERT L. GORMAN, The Dual Vision. A Ifred Schutz and the Myth of Phenomenotogical Social Science. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977. 234 pp.

I This book is another testimony to the wide influence of the thought of Alfred Schutz in the two decades since his death in 1959. For better or worse, Schutz's work has attracted thinkers of many differen~ persuasions in many different fields. For some thinkers Schutz has provided the foundation for new theories and an understanding of the social; for others not only the work but the influence of Schutz represents a barrier to penetrating the nature of the social and to the righting of social wrongs (as in the book under review here). Nevertheless, Schutz's work remains at the forefront of recent research, and whether perceived as foundation or barrier, it is always catalytic in bringing the urgent demand for new ideas to bear on the understanding of ourselves and the world in which we live. Professor Gorman's book is no exception to the catalytic effect of Schutz's thought. The Introduction to The Dual Vision expresses the dire need for what the author calls a "heuristic critique" (p. 2) of the phenomenological social science of Alfred Schutz. The discussion of Schutz's work is therefore analytic and dogmatic, rather than phenomenological. The first chapter sketches the basic ideas of Max Weber and Edmund Husserl on which Schutz drew for his work. This is followed, in the second chapter, by a rather cursory summary of Schutz's ideas about the nature of social structure and social action. The third chapter attempts to assess the epistemic and logical claims of Schutz's phenomenology, illustrated with examples from decision-making theory and with reference to the "almost surrealistic form of social data collection known as ethnomethodology"(pp. 3, 104ff.), though the derivative relationship to Schutz's work is only tenously established (of. pp. 88, 98). }n order to expand the horizons of the heuristic critique, the fourth chapter elaborates the philosophies of science found in Hempel and Husserl, and attempts to determine the sort of claims they make for objective, scientific knowledge. The book concludes with an epilogue in which the author tries to find an alternative to the various strians of thought discussed in the fourth chapter.

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The "dual vision" of the title refers to the basic and valuable critical question which guides the book's discussion: whether Schutz's phenomenological social science can, at the same time, epistemically claim to be both phenomenological and empirical, without being logically inconsistent or even contradictory. More specifically, Schutz is said to have sought a dual vision by trying to "re-invigorate subjective aspects of a non-idealistic phenomenological methodology" and to "proclaim scientific, objective knowledge inherent to the empirical world, independent of subjectively constituted transcendental reality" (p. 139). The author concludes that such a dual vision is a logical impossibility, that therefore Schutz's phenomenology is invalid, and that the "myth of phenomenological social science" consists of refusing to acknowledge its invalidity (cf. p. 142). The "myth" of the title is a socially and politically dangerous one because "In the last two decades, despite what I [scl. Gorman] have argued is a blatantly illogical and illusory theoretical development, there has been a gradual but persistent increase in the popularity of phenomenology as a philosophical framework for empirically explaining aspects of social behavior" (p. 142). On the negative side, then, the task of the book is to expose the "myth" for what it truly is, and heuristically to counteract the popularity of phenomenology, specifically that of Schutz--but also of other philosophical frameworks such as found, for instance, in the work of Sartre and Paci (cf. pp. 157ff.). As a result, the epistemic claims of Schutz's social science are seen to exceed themselves and thereby to impugn the very possibility of social science itself (cf. pp. 83, 140). Schutz's work has therefore no right to be influential and persuasive by not attempting, as should all social theory, according to Gorman, to explain the "seamy side of life" in a "functioning democracy," i.e., by being "humanly relevant" (pp. 84, I06, 151). On the positive side, the task of the heuristic critique possesses the "potency of ideological commitment" (p. 143), and can therefore serve as a "creative interpretation" of social phenomena (p. 15 I) which is "useful" in contrast to "being true" (pp. 163ff.), in consequence of which scholars "in their social roles as educators can be charged with'awakening'citizens to the reality of their social environments... Each [scholar] can prove a theory by getting involved in the common social quest.., unleasing forces of knowledge in... the reflective perceptions of the oppressed..." (p. 164; emphasis is mine). While Schutz is perceived to fail when judged by the criteria of the "rigorous demands of empirical scientific logic" (pp. 48, 68), or "empirically verified, scientific explanation" (pp. 36, 41), these criteria are not mentioned in connection with the canons of "creative interpretation" that form the basis for Gorman's own brand of "phenomenology" (pp. 163ff.). The author then concludes, at least to my surprise after all that has gone before, that Marxism and phenomenology are both internally coherent and consistent theoretical systems, and that we are free to choose which we prefer since neither "convinces from outside its own

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theoretical parameters" (p. 165)--though for reasons I could not fathom, the "naturalism" of Hempel is not a component of that choice. Besides Alfred Schutz, the author refers to a broad range of writers, and the book has extensive footnotes referring to a large body of secondary literature. The style of the book is often polemical, equally reflected in the many footnotes of considerable length that also discuss issues not dealt with in the main text. The manuscript of the book was "set by Computacomp," which I found especially difficult to read, and the book appears as a volume in the International Library of Sociology, edited by John Rex. II The background of Schutz's thought is identified with a European tradition that wanted to reconcile "individuality with a rigorous scientific method." The initial assessment of Schutz's contribution to that tradition is that it is eclectic (p. 5), though it is hard to perceive why the author believes this. Two major pre-World War I sources are singled out as ones influencing Schutz: the neo-Kantians and neo-Positivists on the one hand, and the "romantic intuition-oriented" reaction to them by Dilthey, Windelband, and Rickert. Both sources provide "organic" interpretations of human nature which fail to "explain how we can scientifically explain aspects of cultural behavior apart from either the metaphysical assumptions of Dilthey or the positivists' demand for criteria of objectivity based on empirically confirmed regularities of nature" (p. 9). Because, according to Gorman, it was Max Weber who was the first to confront these issues, Schutz "for this reason devotes much of his early career to constructively criticizing the ideas of Max Weber" who introduced his notion of"understanding" to mediate what the neo-Positivists and Windelband and Rickert failed to explain. Weber devised his theory of ideal types to replace the old holistic concepts of human nature and to produce empirical studies while still doing justice to the "subjectivity implicit in all social interactions" (p. 15). Schutz, it turns out, was "so impressed with the quality of Weber's approach to social science that his own writings are intended more to perfect than supplant it" (p. 17). To the reader familiar with the literature cited by Gorman his account will, I suspect, appear overismplified; to the reader not familiar with it, the account, I submit, will appear unintelligible. And the same is true, I believe, for the account of Husserl's phenomenology (pp. 20ff.) which follows; indeed, it is difficult to see why Gorman finds it necessary to recapitulate the development of Husserl's thought at all. In any case, Husserl's phenomenology, by means of an "intellectual intuition" (not explained in the text), reveals the "nonempirical" essence of consciousness (pp. 23, 126ff).) and arrives at a "new theory of objectivity and a new philosophical method" (p. 25). To be sure, for Husserl the essence, or, as he also says, the concept, of consciousness is a

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"material" or nonformal one--what Gorman means by"nonempiricar' is not clear--in contrast to a formal essence or concept. Schutz, Gorman notes, was especially influenced by H usserl's later work, such as the"lectures" making up the Crisis of European Sciences. Embellishing somewhat on Husserl's biography, Gorman informs the reader that these "lectures" were given when Husserl was "forced to flee Germany because of his 'non'Aryan' ancestry," as a result of which Husserl unearths "root philosophical causes of this rampant irrationality" (pp. 27ff.) to be found in an account of the Lebenswelt. There is little or no mention of other influences on Schutz, such as Bergson, James, Meade, Simmel, and Scheler. The neglect of Scheler I find especially puzzling in the light of the rather forced comparison of Schutz and Heidegger in the third chapter (pp. 75ff.). According to Gorman, while Schutz did follow Husserl in many respects, he nonetheless did not take the path of transcendental phenomenology (pp. 32ff.), and thus ran the risk of abandoning the "universal criteria of valid knowledge" that would bridge the "gap between Dilthey and the positivists" (p. 33). To be sure, we learn from the last chapters of the book that even if Schutz followed Husserl's transcendental phenomenology he still would have failed since, Gorman believes, such criteria are not to be found in transcendental phenomenology. In this connection, a basic question that occupies the author is whether or not Schutz's expanded Husserlian notion of subjectivity is incorporated into a valid scientific method (p. 36). Concerned with the form taken by subjectivity in the commonsense world, the task of the philosopher is then to analytically reconstruct the commonsense world "where social action is nonthinking behavior resulting from pre-reflective processes" (p. 38). It is not clear here or elsewhere in his text what Gorman means by "nonthinking behavior"--the term is not Schutz's. It could mean, on the one hand, perceptual and volitional behavior; or it could mean, on the other hand, the routines of encountering the commonsense world, the more or less regular patterns of action and being geared into the world. To be sure, for Schutz not all behavior in the commonsense world is "nonthinking," nor does it follow for him that because experiential behavior in the commonsense world is typified and habitualized that it is therefore of necessity automatic or mechanical--though I suspect that this is what Gorman believes Schutz to mean. Nor would it be the case that for Schutz all thinking behavior is theoretical thinking behavior. That behavior, any behavior, exemplifies a type or a typical structure does not mean it is any the less perceptual, volitional, or thinking. Similarly, that our actions or behaviors exhibit typical structures does not therefore imply that they are"passive"(p. 106). To impute any other view to Schutz is incorrect, and to leave the whole notion unclear seriously damages Gorman's argument against Schutz. At the very least, Gorman has artificially narrowed the scope of Schutz's inquiry.

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It is in the second chapter that Gorman examines a basic difficulty he finds in Schutz's phenomenology. He quotes the following statement from Aron Gurwitsch: "the very rise of philosophical problems and their formulation in radical terms motivates the phenomenological reduction and, hence, the abandonment of the natural attitude"(p. 38). For Gorman such a view, which he also attributes to Schutz, indicates an inconsistency in Schutz's thought because Schutz is said to want to "remain within the world of the natural attitude" (p. 38). Thus, Gorman concludes, Schutz attempts to "apply the results of phenomenological analysis to a sphere where the reflective attitude is forbidden" (p. 00). Of course, if we reflect phenomenologically, we no longer engage in the positing of the commonsense world peculiar to the natural attitude. However, not engaging in or presupposing this positing (as do other sciences and even Gorman's own brand of"phenomenology") does not prevent in any way making the commonsense world of the natural attitude a theme for examination and clarification. And this is what Gurwitsch is talking about. That a radical phenomenological reflection is carried out, moreover, and "abandons" the positing peculiar to the natural attitude does not therefore imply in any way that the natural attitude "forbids" such reflection. There is nothing in Gurwitsch or Schutz which even hints at such a conclusion. Indeed, Gurwitsch specifically takes up the topic in his Field of Consciousness (1964, p. 166) to make the point that the natural attitude allows for other attitudes, including the phenomenological one that abandons its positing. What Schutz and Gurwitsch agree on is that the commonsense world allows, though is not the ground, for its own illumination. This crucial point is completely ignored by Gorman, who cites the following statement from Schutz's Phenomenology of the Social World (1967): "In the ordinary social life we are no longer concerned with the constituting phenomena as these are studied within the sphere of the phenomenological reduction" (p. 44). Schutz is inconsistent in making this statement, Gorman believes, because "Schutz implies that knowledge gained through the reductions is applicable to behavior in the natural attitude. Without explicitly defending the thesis, Schutz accepts the results of an extraordinarily reflective procedure of constituting knowledge, and applies them to the common-sense world, where social action is non-thinking behavior resulting from pre-reflective processes" (p. 38).J Now, the statement cited from Schutz is taken from the English translation of Der Sinnhafte A ufbau der sozialen Welt (1932, 1960) and considered out of I I suspect that what Gorman has in mind is the idea that thinking is not only individual but also spontaneous; hence, if it exhibits any sort of typicality, it ceases to be spontaneous and therefore becomes mechanical, routinized. I do not believe that Schutz would agree with this idea, nor need it follow from his theory of types.

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context. In the German text, Schutz speaks of"mundane Sozialit'~t" which he explicitly contrasts with "transzendentale SozialitZ2t"; thus the translation of "mundane" with "ordinary" is false. Because the statement is so important as a basic premise in Gorman's argument against the basic epistemic claims of Schutz, it seems strange to me that he did not check the original text: for in the original text Schutz, in the passage in question, does not say that knowledge gained through the phenomenological reduction is applicable to behavior in the natural attitude. In the German text Schutz speaks instead of transcendental experience ("Erfahrung", 1960, p. 42), and the whole sentence reads, properly translated: "The aim of this book, to analyze the sensephenomena in mundane sociality, does not require the acquisition of transcendental experience beyond [mundane sociality] and therefore a further remaining in the transcendental phenomenological reduction." In the next lines Schutz explicitly explains what he means by referring to the "Nachwort" (1930) Husserl wrote to the First Book of his Ideen (1929). In the light of this text, Schutz says that he is not concerned with "constitutionphenomena in the phenomenologically reduced sphere," that is, as he indicates a few lines previously, the transcendentally phenomenologically reduced sphere, but is concerned instead with their "corresponding correlates in the natural attitude." What this means Schutz then explains in the next lines: having formulated a transcendental phenomenological eidetJc account of the consciousness of internal time, he will apply the results to the natural attitude, not as transcendentally phenomenologically reduced, but as psychologically phenomenologically reduced. He goes on to say that, in what follows in his book, we are to be phenomenological psychologists remaining in the psychological phenomenological attitude in Husserl's sense in the "Nachwort." Schutz quotes Husserl's statement that "we remain on the ground of intuition of what is internal [scL internal time] as intuition of what is peculiarly essential to the psychical," again in Husserrs sense of consciousness in the world of the natural attitude. In the "Nachwort" Husserl (1930) restates the relation between psychological and transcendental phenomenology: they both have the same content, and while for every true proposition of psychological phenomenology there is a corresponding true one in transcendental phenomenology, the converse is not necessarily the case. Thus Schutz, like Husserl, can methodically "leave aside," as Schutz says, "all problems of transcendental subjectivity and intersubjectivity"--contrary to what Gorman says Schutz does not take from Husserl a transcendental phenomenology and "de-transcendentalize" it; Schutz rather develops a psychological phenomenology and, by extension, sociology, which is not in any way inconsistent with a transcendental phenomenology. If we take Schutz at his word in the early work, a psychological phenomenology only has meaning within a transcendental phenomenology. And because not every proposition in a transcendental

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phenomenology is included in a psychological one, it is possible to proceed as a psychological phenomenologist without having to maintain the transcendental phenomenological attitude. And clearly Schutz's implication is that sociology is a broadening of the psychologically reduced theme, but that does not preclude a transcendental account as Gorman claims (p. 45). To be sure, in much later writings, Schutz became more and more wary of the transcendental account, even wondering if it were possible; he became critical of Husserl but n e v e r "cynical" as Gorman says (p. 137). I mention all of the foregoing because unless some care is taken to establish the precise setting of Schutz's statements it is impossible to attach any consistent and meaningful sense to them. It is precisely this care which I find lacking in Gorman's book. And it leads to not only misunderstandings of Schutz's work, but also to pseudo, rather than genuine, problems. Thus when Gorman says that "When I phenomenologically investigate my perception of this desk I realize that 'desk' in fact means 'desk as I perceive it,' or 'desk as it appears to me'," it does not follow that "because consciousness is the basis of all conceivable knowledge I can have of this desk, its truth or reality is expressed only in consciousness, with no way to verify whether or not it has a material equivalent in the bracketed outer world" (p. 25). Therefore, according t o G o r m a n , Schutz has the problem of "reconciling" subjectivity with the "equally necess~iry element of empirically verified scientific explanation" (p. 41; of. p. 43); since Schutz does not effect the reconciliation, his phenomenology is said to be an "ironic" failure (p. 104). But phenomenologically it need not follow that, because the desk is taken as an object of perceiving, it is not what I see when I see the desk, if it is there. No matter what scientific explanation might otherwise be, it is always about what I perceive as what I perceive (and it is that, even if it denies that what I perceive is what I mean it to be). The problem is a pseudo problem. Nor does it follow that subjectivity for Schutz (or Husserl) is a "filter" of the world (see pp. 67, 81ff.). Moreover, to verify something empirically is still an act of consciousness--as much an act of consciousness as is the addition which produces a sum. And the scientific explanation produced by that act can no more be reduced to the act than can the sum be reduced to the act of addition, or the desk to the act of perception. Thus, to "synthesize subjectivity and science" (p. 43) makes no more sense than "synthesizing" addition and its sum, perception and the desk. But by not heeding with care the setting of Schutz's thought, there is an even more profound equivocation on "subjectivity," "consciousness." Gorman asserts that, according to Schutz, "Our knowledge of the world is a function ofsubjective perception, yet.., by objectifying those we come in contact with we seemingly deny the universality of even this statement and fall, instead, into a solipsistic dilemma" (p. 44). But for Schutz it is not the ease that knowledge of the world is solipsistic because--at least so far as scientific

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knowledge is concerned--cognition of mundane sociality is produced on the basis of an analysis of psychologically phenomenologicaUy reduced intersubjectivity, and not on the basis of a "common generalization" of each individual person's interpretation of the world. Moreover, within the framework of a psychological phenomenological reduction, Schutz is interested in producing an eidetic account (that is, an account of essential necessities) rather than generalities, based upon formalization and exemplification (the basis for constructing the "homunculii," hence the Eidos"Social Action" can just as well be exemplified by induction into the army as it can by mailing a letter or making music together2). Gorman also asserts that Schutz and Heidegger talk about the same thing and draws important conclusions concerning Schutz from this comparison. But Heidegger, even in Being and Time, does not purport to carry out a phenomenological reduction, and certainly not a psychological phenomenological eidetic reduction (see Kersten, 1973). Their statements do not have the same sense (though those of Schutz and Scheler do). The conclusion drawn from the comparison is that Schutz believes that people of necessity hide behind the facade of social mores and institutions. According to Gorman, this is what Schutz means by an "ingroup," and this is for Schutz the paradigm of social behavior. If this is the case, and I see no reason for agreeing with Gorman that it is, then Schutz deals only with alienated groups and not with individuals who are free (though previously Gorman criticized Schutz for dealing only with individuals and the "generalization" of their perceptions). As a consequence, Gorman believes, at best Schutz only confirms what we already learn from the "traditional scientific approach to studying society" (p. 81); Schutz's work is superfluous. Though, again, how the sense of Schutz's statements can simply be equated with the "traditional scientific approach" is unexplained. A similar difficulty arises in connection with the notion of "freedom" in Schutz. Like Husserl and Scheler, Schutz holds the view that there is a sharp distinction to be made between the "causality" of the physicist and that of the commonsense world, the former being an "idealization" of the latter, and the former being mathematically "exact." Because for Schutz, however, the causal style of the commonsense world is "inexact," there is always limited freedom compatible with "determinism," i.e., with that degree of determinism that actually exists in the commonsense world (e.g., the fact that it is always "pregiven" to any individual biography). This, again, is not something which ZGormancomplains on several occasions that Schutz does not considercases such as being inducted into the army in time of war. It might be noted that Schutz does discussan even more interestingcase: that of beingdischargedafter the war is over. I do not believeGorman presentsa fair inventory of Schutz's views and findings as arguments, summarizing them in almost syllogistic fashion (see, e:g., p. 65). So far as I can tell, he makes no attempt to verifySchutz's finding sphenomenologicallyby reflecting on those acts in which Sehutz alleges the various features of the socialworld to be presentedin the most originalways. In this sense,the "heuristic critique" is uncritical.

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follows from a theory of the commonsense world, but is rather the datum for analysis that will eventually be accounted for in the theory (cf., e.g., pp. 52, 71 ff.). Hence, it is simply not true that Schutz's account eschews any account of freedom; he accounts for as much freedom as there actually exists. In the fourth chapter, as mentioned, Gorman introduces an account of "empirical science" based on what he says is what "most contemporary scientists feel is the nature and purpose of their scientific enterprise" (p. 109). What they "feel" to be the case proves to be what Hempel believes to be the case. And before the chapter is over, what is "felt" to be contemporary empirical science turns out indeed to be contemporary empirical science. I find this treatment of "naturalism" cavalier to say the least. Moreover, it is dubious if that "naturalism" can so easily be identified with the "naturalism" Husserl criticizes--to put Hempel in this position seems unfair, and the sense of his statements is different both from those Husserl criticizes and Husserl himself. Nor is it the case that for Husserl and phenomenology generally it is "idle chatter to suggest an objective world" which "exists apart from our conscious experiences" (p. 145): it does not follow, as I tried to suggest earlier, that because consciousness and objective world are not, of necessity, conditions for each other, that therefore they are concretely apart from one another as though the desk I perceive is not indeed the "real" desk in the outer world. Not even Berkeley would hold that view, and phenomenology is not some sort of Berkeleyian idealism. And it is certainly not a Kantian critical philosophy. Finally, it does not follow that the "principle uniting all phenomenologists is this shared thesis that valid knowledge must be subjectively verified" (p. 145). It is one thing to examine critically the acts of consciousness which are verifying acts; but that does not mean that such acts are a necessary condition for valid knowledge, even if the verifying is correct. In other words, if anything unites phenomenologists at all it is the rejection of psychologism rather than its affirmation--a point Gorman has already made in the first chapter. There are many other statements filling this book which involve countersensical imputations of ideas to writers which they simply do not hold. A final example: "Husserlian phenomenology is based on faithful description of phenomena exactly as they appear to a philosopher's intuiting consciousness" (p. 144). It is the case, instead, that phenomenology--Schutz's or H usserl's--is concerned with the description of phenomena as they appear to any consciousness whatever, be it an intuiting one or any other sort. Neither philosopher nor social scientist has a privileged status in phenomenology. III Gorman would seem to develop a three-pronged attack on Schutz. In the first place, he tries to show that there is a logical impossibility involved in Schutz's task of producing a phenomenological social science because

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subjectivity3 cannot be reconciled with empirical science. In the second place, Gorman tries to show that even were there no logical impossibility, Schutz's account of society is superfluous, and that to let one's scientific studies be influenced by Schutz and related approaches risks becoming unscientific (cf. pp. 82, 84, 104ff.). One might note in this connection, however, that because Schutz is dealing with social phenomena as pyschologically phenomenologically reduced, it makes no sense to say that this is accomplished by other disciplines which do not consider social phenomena in this manner. The reason is this: sciences carried out in the natural attitude always beg the question by presupposing the positing of the commonsense world peculiar to the natural attitude; that is, the ground of legitimation of the science in question always lies in what it analyzes. This is the basic reason why Schutz introduces the phenomenological reduction after his discussion of Weber (1932, 1960). For his task, it is irrelevant whether or not he is impressed by Weber? The third prong consists neither of logic nor of usefulness. It is rather ad hominem in nature. Gorman finds himself surprised that Schutz did not publish much during his lifetime, that he completed but one book. The reason for this, Gorman says, is that Schutz not only exercised extreme care in writing each work, but that it is also "partly the result of Jekyll-Hyde type of life in which days are spent pursuing money and success in the business world, leaving only nights to read and write" (p. 36). Later on, in connection with a comment on radicalism and phenomenology, Gorman says that Schutz's ideas "are used.., to justify an extremely bourgeois--even conservative-ethic; a business executive by day, a professor of social science at night" (p. 207). Gorman's argument against Schutz may then be summarized in the following way: Because Schutz pursued money and success by day, by night he constructed a social theory to justify that pursuit which, in its claims to scientific validity, is a logical impossibility and superfluous. Because Schutz views human beings as nonthinking, causally determined, and alienated groups (Hyde), his social science inhibits social action and reform on the part of individual actors on the social scene, indeed oppresses them (Jekyll). Schutz thus prevents the task of social science, namely, of"choreographing the future to the rhythm of operational human goals" (p. l). Gorman not only imputes meanings to the statements of Schutz (and others) that are false, but he also attributes motives that are not true. In any

3Gorman refers, for instance, to the article of Spiegelberg 0959), in which three basic meaningsof~subjectivity"are formulated.Gormandoes not state whichof them be believesbest characterizes Schutz's view. 4For a defenseof his book against one of his critics, see the "Exchangeof Views"between Gorman and Helmut Wagner(1958).

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case, the underlying ad hominem premise begs the question, and belies the stated purpose of a study that"rigorously describes Schutz's phenomenological method" (p. 2). It seems to me that it is not so much a question of Schutz having a "dual vision" as it is of the author of this book being "blind." In my opinion, G o r m a n has violated that famous admonition in Auden's"Hermetic Decalogue: .... Thou shalt not sit/With statisticians nor c o m m i t / A social science."

REFERENCES Gorman, R. A., & Wagner, H. Exchange of views. Newsletter. Phenomenological Sociology, 1978, 6(2), 11, 20. Gurwitsch, A. Thefield of consciousness. Pittsburgh: Duquesne Univ. Press, 1964. Husserl, E. ldeen zu einer reinen Ph'~nomenologie und ph'~nomenologischen Philosophie. Halle: Max Niemeyer, 1929. Husserl, E. Nachwort zu meinen "ldeen zu einer reinen ph~nomenologie und ph'~nomenoIogischen phitosophie. " Max Niemeyer, 1930. Kersten, F. Heidegger and transcendental phenomenology. The Southern Journal of Philosophy 1973, 11, 202-215. Schutz, A. Der sinnhafie aufbau der sozialen welt. (Orig. publ. 1932.)New York:Springer, t960. Schutz, A. The phenomenology of the social world(G. Walsh & F. Lehnert, trans.). Evanston, Ilk: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1967. Spiegelberg, H. How subjective is phenomenology?Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, 1959, 33. 28-36.