Social Justice Research, VoL 8, No. L 1995

Applying Social Psychology: The Case of Redistributions in Unified Germany Leo M o n t a d a 1

Large redistributions between West and East will be necessary within the unified Germany for a long time. The perceived justice of these redistributions is discussed, applying theory and evidence from social justice research and research on prosocial behavior, l,%ws about just distributions and entitlements vary according to the preferred principles of distributions and according to attributions of responsibility for existing inequalities. It is hypothesized that acceptance of redistributions in West Germany depends on whether the East is seen as having been unjustly disadvantaged after World War II when it was assigned to the influence sphere of the Soviet Union. This fact can be considered in analogy to an exploitation of the East by the West. On the other hand, the economic problems in the East may also be considered self-inflicted by the former communist regime. A key question is what the attitudes of the population in the former GDR had been toward the communist regime. If the population is considered the victim of the regime, it is entitled to get support; if it is considered to have been sympathetic toward the regime, this is not the case. Acceptance of redistributions depends not only on their justice but also on their efficiency. The relative weight of justice and efficiency depends on the reasons given for the support. If support means repaying debts that were accumulated during the preceding period of being undeservedly privileged in the West, justice will remain the dominant criterion. If support is justtfied by actual neediness of the East, it will only be granted as help to self-help. Claims for discontinuity of support are expected if it will not be efficient in a near future. Some dangers concerning the integration of the two populations are outlined by listing some potential conditions for a growing distance and reciprocal discrimination up to a reciprocal ethniflcation between the Eastern and the Western populations. KEY WORDS: redistribution; unified Germany; economic problems. 1University of Trier, Trier, Germany. 73 0885-7466/95/0300-0073507.50/09 1995 Plenum Publishing Corporation

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It is the task of social sciences to describe and explain or understand phenomena, events, and changes in social perceptions, judgments, interactions, and structures. The sciences fulfill this task by applying and generating concepts, and by formulating and testing theories. Ordinarily, the usefulness of concepts and theories is tested and demonstrated in systematic research, not in efforts to apply scientific knowledge to the analysis of single cases. It is, however, worthwhile to find out whether scientific concepts and theories help to explain or to understand difficult real life cases. Such a case is Germany after the unification of the democratic Western part with its market economy and the Easter part with its state-controlled economy. The unification did not actually involve the integration of two different systems. The former German Democratic Republic (GDR) applied to join the Federal Republic of Germany. In fact, the Western political system, economic system, and nearly all institutions were simply adopted for the East. This situation means a kind of colonization of the East by the West. For the Eastern economy the unification in 1990 was the starting point of a vast number of discontinuities and transformations as well as problems. Just a few of them are mentioned: the breakdown of large parts of Eastern industry which could not compete on the free market, a consequent dramatic increase in unemployment, the need for professional reeducation, for learning the new administrative and legal rules, and the difficult juridical determination of private ownership concerning real estate. In this article, I focus on the issue of differences in wealth between West and East Germany. Balancing these differences will continue to require substantial monetary transfers from West to East for what might be a long time. This means redistributing income and wealth. Claims for redistribution are based on arguments derived from (i) the conception of a welfare state, (ii) the conception of a federal state with the obligation to balance economic differences between regions, and (iii) historical disadvantages caused by the assignment of East Germany to the sphere of influence of the Soviet Union. By applying knowledge generated by justice research and by research on prosocial behavior, I analyze some of the already evident problems and some of the anticipated ones caused by the inequalities and the claims for redistributions. The questions I deal with are (i) How are claims for redistribution justified? (ii) What psychological prerequisites are helpful to accept these claims as justified? What psychological conditions will cause them to be rejected? Answers to these questions are derived from research on social justice and on prosocial behavior. Which justifications for distributions are approved may depend on personal beliefs and attitudes (Schmitt and Montada, 1982) and on traditions within a society (Trrnblom et al., 1985). Moreover, the kind of rela-

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tionship between those who have to give and those who receive or benefit from redistributed resources might play a significant role. Redistributions can be realized between various kinds of social entities: for example, personaUy acquainted individuals, groups, social categories, and social aggregates (Griffith et al., 1993). On the social level, redistributions are effected between social categories or aggregates, for instance, between the wealthier and the poorer part of the population. There are reasonable doubts about whether the psychology of social support and justice applies in the same way to interactions between social categories or aggregates and between members of primary groups, between individuals in personal interaction, and between groups (Griffith et al., 1993; Montada and Bierhoff, 1991). Deutsch (1985) has hypothesized that preferences for principles of justice depend on the kind and the context of interaction. For allocation of goods, for instance, many people (not all, however) prefer the equity principle within economic exchanges, the equality principle within close relationships, and the need principle within nurturing contexts. Schmitt and Montada (1982) and others have corroborated this hypothesis empirically. There are data suggesting that within primary groups, readiness to support depends to a greater extent on sympathy and less on deservingness, whereas between social aggregates, the opposite is true (Montada, 1992). Currently, the case of Germany is best conceived of as being an interaction between social aggregates that are not yet integrated. It is, however, possible that the population in the West and in the East will develop into groups with opposite identities and interests. However, differences in social attitudes and interactions between social entities should not be expected to be consistent and stable in general. On the level of individuals, on the level of groups, as well as on the level of social categories and aggregates, social perceptions of the recipients of support are probably significant and may determine the kind of motivation and the appraisal of what is just and deserved. In every single incident, various social constructions (Berger and Luckman, 1967) are possible about the parties of exchange, about the causes of the needs, and about the responsibilities for support. The public discussion of any case has an impact on the construction and the distribution of these social constructions.

REDISTRIBUTIONS IN GERMANY: TRANSFER PAYMENTS FROM WEST TO EAST The focus of this article is on appraisals of monetary transfers from West Germany to East Germany after reunification. The inequalities between East and West are still very substantial with respect to income, em-

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ployment chances, job security, quality of lodgings, quality of the ecology in general, private property, and even the (quality) of health and average length of life. Though diminishing, significant inequalities are to be expected for a long time. Large-scale redistributions from West to East were and still are necessary so that the new states and communities can fulfill their tasks in administration, education, economy, inner security, jurisdiction, the health system, and the many infrastructural systems. Unemployment and health insurance benefits have to be paid for mainly by the West, just like the many programs for professional education. The traffic systems and the telecommunication systems have to be brought up to a necessary standard for successful economic competition. Taking over the debts made by the former state (GDR), the stateowned industry and the state-owned real estate companies, the Treuhand Anstalt was established, a trust that is responsible for the (re)privatization of state-owned companies, land, and buildings. As this is very expensive, Treuhand did not make any money but had to subsidize the new owners for required investments and restorations. Altogether, these transfers and the accumulated interest that has to be paid will add up to more than 30% of the current annual budget of the Federal Government. These transfer payments must be raised by an increase in tax rates, by cuts in national and state budgets, by reducing subsidies for parts of the economy and for private households, by a very significant extension of the national debt, which, in turn, has contributed to the rise in interest rates with all the well-known consequences for the economy and for private households. All this constitutes a big load to be carried during the next few years, most likely burdening the next generation. This program has been approved by all parties in parliament. None of the existing West German parties is calling for a reduction in the program. A Western league, like the Lega Nord in Italy which was very successful in the last elections by promising a political separation or at least a reduction in supplies for the poor South, does not exist in Germany. It is open to question, however, whether the program will be approved by the West German population in the long run, as well as whether delays in the process of equalization between East and West will be tolerated by the East German population. Political parties that claim to pursue the interests of one of the two populations would probably contribute to transforming them into two opposing groups. Whether or not the program will be accepted for a prolonged period will depend on how it is viewed, and this is mostly a matter of social constructions. Applying concepts, theories, and evidence from other areas of research, some options about these social constructions that may play a role in the expected future political struggle over the extent of redistribu-

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tions and their justifications are outlined. Current policy as well as planned programs are not backed by any convincing "philosophy" that includes both justice arguments and efficiency arguments.

INEQUALITIES, RELATIVE DEPRIVATION, AND RELATIVE PRIVILEGE

Growing Disappointment and Resentment in East Germany Survey studies in several Western societies regularly confirm that the existing large differences in income and property are not perceived as unjust by the majority of the population (Shepelak and Alwin, 1986; Szirmai 1991; Wegener 1987). Instead of explaining this fact, I shall just say that currently this is also true for West Germany where 70% of the people state that they get a fair share of the gross national product. In contrast, 80% of the East German population state that their share is unfairly low. What are the facts? A few figures are warranted in this context: The average East German wage level is currently about 70% of the West German level. The unemployment rate in February 1994 was 17.1% in the East compared to 8.9% in the West; at the same time, another 25% were only temporarily employed in publicly subsidized jobs, or in subsidized reeducation programs, or laid-off and involved in early retirement programs. The relatively unproductive state-controlled economy of the GDR had an employment rate of nearly 100% of the healthy adult population (men and women, nearly all employed full-time). It is now dropping toward the ratio in the West, which is below 70% with 15% part-time employees, but it is still higher than in West Germany. The basic need~ lodging, health care, basic food supply, public transportation----were modest but cheap in the GDR. Basic material needs could be satisfied and, most likely, this has strengthened a basic feeling of material security. Today, tenants can be given notice, and employment can be terminated. Everything is available, but prices may be too high. The basic needs can no longer be satisfied at a price that is near zero. The feeling of insecurity is growing. The growing disappointment and resentment is reflected by an interesting fact. During the summer of last year, committees for justice were founded in most East German cities. Their purpose is not to fight against the crimes of the former regime but to claim more wealth, more economic and social security, guaranteed employment, dwellings, and so forth. These claims were addressed to "the state" (to which responsibility can be attributed) and not to the "market economy." (Adam Smith's "in-

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visible hand," which explains the functioning of a free market, is not a suitable addressee for claims and reproaches.) The disappointments in the East are understandable. People in the East had hoped to improve their life situation substantially and rapidly by pushing for reunification. Prior to his victory in the most recent federal elections, Chancellor Kohl promised what economists call Pareto efficiency: "After reunification nobody will be worse off and many will be better off than before." Kohl's promise could not be kept. There are gains (and a majority in the East admit to being better off than before reunification), but there are also losses. More freedom may be experienced as a gain by quite a few. "Effective" income is, on average, higher today than it was before. Money was not the scarce good in the GDR; the problem was that income could not be spent meaningfully. From time to time, surplus private income was skimmed off by offering Western goods at high prices. Kohl's promise was not fulfilled with respect to the labor market, the social status of a good part of the Eastern population, and the security of keeping one's lodging. Moreover, many lost their social status, power, and former positions, and not just those who had positions of political or ideological importance in the GDR. Quite a few were replaced by people from the West. There is a strong feeling of being derogated by arrogant "Wessis" who express their opinions about everything that had gone wrong in the GDR and who criticize inefficiency in the former GDR and the continued lack of competence, knowledge, initiative, motivation, and self reliance in the Eastern population. Large parts of the industry are considered junk, the dwellings looked at as poor, the ecology as polluted, even the former successes in sports are downgraded by pointing to widespread "doping." Instead of any recognition of formerly praised "Accomplishments of Socialism," the life accomplishments of two generations are downgraded by the West with rare exceptions. Thus, victimization may be experienced through derogative evaluations of the past and the present. Therefore, disappointments and feelings of injustice are understandable. Quite few people have experienced losses and discrimination since unification.

Relative Deprivation A substantial part of the population in the East may experience relative deprivation (cf. Crosby, 1976; Martin, 1986). Relative deprivation implies a comparison to a reference social entity that is better off while perceived as essentially similar to oneself. Those in East Germany who had preserved the concept of being members of one German nation (even dur-

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ing the existence of the GDR) had reason to consider the West German population as their reference group. Since reunification the East German people belong to the Federal Republic of Germany as equal members; they have the same citizenship as the West Germans. So they are similar to them by membership. The claim "equal payment for equal work" is justified by this fact. It is also justified by an article of the constitution stating that, across the regions (the sates) of the country, comparable conditions of life have to be realized as far as possible. Thus, similar life conditions may be claimed as long as the differences are not considered self-inflicted.

Relative Privilege How does the relatively privileged West German population respond to the claims for redistribution? Do they reject them? Not much in the sense of public refusals is currently evident, maybe because the increase in costs has grown slowly and the causes of a real decline in private budgets through raised interest rates and taxes are somewhat foggy. But the main increases have been postponed till after the next federal and state elections. However, a justice motive can be considered an anthropological universal. The responses depend on the appraisal of whether or not the claims are justified. Not all of those who are better off perceive their advantages as fully justified and deserved. Some who perceive themselves as partly lucky feel uncomfortable vis-a-vis the disadvantaged. Appraisals of inequalities in income and general life conditions as unjust are not only observed in the less fortunate parts of the population, they are also not uncommon in the more advantaged parts (Hochschild, 1981). In a series of studies conducted in the mid-1980s with samples from different categories of advantaged people (advantaged with respect to wealth, status, education, health, social security), we assessed their responses to the needs and problems of less fortunate people, namely, the poor in the developing countries, the unemployed in Germany, foreign workers and their families in Germany, or the handicapped (Montada et al., 1986; Montada and Schneider, 1989, 1991). We assessed a variety of emotional responses ranging from contentment with one's own better life to fears of losing the advantages, from sympathy for the disadvantaged to anger about them. We also assessed moral outrage of the advantaged about the injustice of existing huge differences in life conditions and an emotion we called existential guilt because of own advantages. The important finding was that not all of the advantaged respondents defended or justified their advantages. A considerable number experienced existential guilt feel-

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ings or resented the existing differences in life conditions between themselves or the (sub)population they belonged to, and various categories of the disadvantaged. The evaluation of justice and deservedness of the existing inequalities turned out to be most important for the emotional responses to the problems and needs of those who are less well off than the respondents themselves. Some justified the existing inequalities; others criticized them. Some perceived themselves, or the states and (sub)populations they belong to, to be responsible for the given inequalities; others perceived these as caused by the disadvantaged themselves. Those who feel responsible are ready to look at the causal relationships between their own advantages and the disadvantages of others. For example, sharing jobs would reduce unemployment, paying a higher price for the products of the developing countries would reduce poverty there; differences in income and wealth result from unequal allocation. As we also know from experimental research on prosocial behavior (cf. Piliavin et al., 1969) the view that needs are caused by the needful themselves significantly reduces the motivation to help, whereas taking some responsibility motivates helping and supporting or compensating the victims for the harm suffered. We assessed readiness for various prosocial commitments in favor of the groups of disadvantaged addressed and found moral outrage and existential guilt because of unjust inequalities to be the best predictors. What is interesting: Sympathy or empathy, which is considered in psychological literature to be the primary motivation for prosocial activities (Batson, et al., 1991; Eisenberg and Miller, 1987), does not play a significant role in committing oneself to help the disadvantaged. As sympathy does not imply that the disadvantaged or the victims were treated unjustly, it does not imply an acceptance that they are entitled to receive support or to claim redistributions. These convictions (and/or the corresponding emotions of existential guilt and resentment) seem to be better predictors for readiness to support these groups of people or to engage in helping them (in contrast to personally acquainted individuals). The results of these studies help to formulate hypotheses about the German case in question. The acceptance of redistributions from which the Eastern population will benefit is required in the privileged Western part of the country. Thus, an exchange between social aggregates is required. It is not a case of altruism in direct personal relationships and within direct personal contact that is requested. In this case, sympathy/empathy should not be considered a prerequisite for accepting the burden of redistribution. Instead, perceiving the fates of the less fortunate as undeserved or unjust (and those emotions that conceptually imply the percep-

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tion of injustice, namely, resentment and existential guilt) should be more effective. Whoever strives to find acceptance for redistributions in the West should use justice arguments.

COMPONENTS FOR THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OR DENIAL OF INJUSTICES AND ENTITLEMENTS What became obvious in the above-mentioned studies is that there is a multiplicity of views of reality. These reviews are best conceived of as individual or social constructions, and we have to ask which are the components of those constructions, (and which are the motivations). This German case has some specific features that make it different from the usual inequalities within a society: (i) It is not the common inequalities between social classes that have developed over generations, but the inequality between two parts of a country that were separated by a decision of the victorious states of World War II. (ii) The unification was a decision made by democratic institutions. (iii) Unification was followed by a lot of rapid changes (gains and losses) that are attributable to decisions of political and economic leaders. Unexpected and severe losses that are attributable to responsible agents are likely to instigate resentment and protest (Moore, 1984). Claims for redistribution originate from the conviction that the actual distributions or the unequal life conditions that result from former distributions are considered unjust. Which arguments can be formulated to prove or to disprove the assertion that the inequalities between the West and the East of Germany were and still are unjust? Disadvantages in the East: Bad Luck or Self-Infliction?

At the core of the subjective or social construction of injustices and entitlements are attributions of responsibility for inequalities, disadvantages, or losses. In nearly every case, different views are, in principle, reasonable. There are three basic possibilities to look at in a case: (i) The subject is self-responsible, (ii) some other agent or agency is responsible, or (iii) nobody is responsible, meaning that what happened was not an outcome of human activity, it was just bad luck. It is commonly understood that the first of these alternatives is irrelevant to (in)justice: (Unintended) serf-inflicted misery is not unjust. Injustice is bound to the second alternative stating that others are responsible. The third alternative, bad luck, states that nobody is to blame for unjust inflictions. However, bad luck is

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undeserved by the victim, and, within a community of solidarity, the lucky ones have the obligation to care for the victims, to share with them, and to compensate the fate of the less fortunate. Attributions of responsibility are, however, subjective cognitions or social constructions, and in most cases there are several options to take, because (i) most events are brought about by multiple causal chains and/or decisions of several agents, including the subjects themselves, and because (ii) thinking of responsibilities for bad outcomes is not restricted to the reconstruction of their causation, but includes thinking about possibilities of how to prevent them. Considering the German case, several stories may be told that focus on the responsibilities for the less productive development of the East.

The Bad Luck Story Indeed, the relative deprivation of East Germans can be considered bad luck. The differences between East and West might be considered the result of the lost World War II, when East Germany came under the control of the Soviet Union. Some exploitation within the Comecon and the inefficiency of Communist economies are arguments for denying self-made contributions by the population to the actual economic situation in the East German States. The forced assignment to the Communist system with all its negative implications can be considered an undeserved disadvantage that has to be compensated for by the lucky Western population who had enjoyed all the advantages of a free democratic and free economic system. The assignment of West Germany to the Western world and of East Germany to the influence of the Soviet Union was a deal between the victorious nations that turned out to be profitable for the West and very bad for the East. The growing inequalities in wealth that followed can be considered an analogy to exploitation: The West profited at the expense of the East. Suppose it would have been possible to buy East Germany back from the Soviet Union after the war, the West would have had to pay a high price. This price at least (including its accumulated interest over four decades) is the sum that can equitably be claimed today by the East.

The Stir-Infliction Story Were the people in East Germany really the unfortunate victims of the last war, the population would be entitled to adequate compensation and to have the same living standard as the Western population very soon. However, different stories can be told, for instance, the following one: Dur-

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ing the 1950s before the Wall was built, the flight from the GDR to the West was neither extremely difficult not extremely dangerous. Millions decided to "go West." How about those who stayed? Were they communists, didn't they feel competent enough to succeed in the Western economy, didn't they feel deprived in the GDR, or did they even approve of the communist system? Why didn't those who stayed protest against the regime? Not much in the sense of protest has been documented after the single widespread rebellion in 1953. A large number of people who stayed in the East were members of the state party, the SED. They served the regime in one or another position and took advantage of the system. Elections were reported to result in nearly 100% consent for the SED and the block parties (which were created by the SED to give the system an appearance of democracy); a lot of acclamation in the ceremonies staged by the state is documented. Hirschmann (1981) argued that loyalty is inferred if neither "voice" not "exit" as forms of protest are observed. Thus, it is easy to blame the population of the GDR for having been identified with the former system and for having self-inflicted their relative deprivation in this way. Self-infliction cancels entitlements to compensation and the willingness to give support. Attributions of responsibility to the GDR population result in denials of its status as victims and in the denial of its claim that the West is responsible for building up the East. Concerning the thesis of self-infliction, counterarguments are also available, of course: A significant minority, at least, of the GDR population had maintained, in fact, distance from the state. This is evident for the persecuted dissidents and those who tried to escape or to emigrate. A retreat into unpolitical niches was quite common and has to be mentioned, just like the growing attraction of the Protestant Church that offered some room for free and uncontrolled communication (in fact, the secret service, the STASI, was nearly ubiquitous). And, above all, there was the mass rebellion of June 17, 1953, which was battered down by Soviet tanks and ended in the persecution and imprisonment of many thousands. The risks of dissidence and even of disengagement were as high as in every totalitarian system. A repeated report about these risks (imprisonment, interrogations close to torture, professional disadvantages, educational disadvantages for one's children, etc.) would help to disseminate an understanding of why resistance and opposition were rare until the very last days of the GDR. In searching for evidence about the distancing of the population from the state, the manipulation of elections by the state is an important issue. These manipulations have hushed up the fact that the acceptance of the state was not 100%. Bringing these cases to court and legal punishment would help to modify the picture of an overwhelming acceptance of the regime by the population. The GDR regime was not independent but in-

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tegrated in the Eastern military and economic systems. The Soviet Union used massive interventions and threats against those who intended to go their own ways, which is well known from the examples of Hungary and Czechoslovakia. This dispute is one about the victim status of the population of the former GDR. Only if the victim status were attributed to the majority of the population could an entitlement for redistributions be derived from the actual facts of disadvantages and the current inequalities. The more evidence for a broad tolerance of the regime by the population or even an identification with the regime, the more blame of self-infliction of the current situation is to be expected. The higher the votes for the PDS, which is the successor to the former state party SED (even if some efforts are made to communicate discontinuity) and the more voices that utter preferences for the former state compared to the actual problems, the less willingness should be expected in the West to raise the needed funds for the subsidies to the East. Microjustice and Macrojustice: The Perspective on Individuals and the Perspective on Populations We should not expect a single and simple truth concerning these questions. Responsibility attributions can be made along a historical chain or sequence of responsibilities. It is true that influential members of the SED and of powerful state institutions were responsible for the bad state of the political and economic system and the human rights in this state. It is also true that neither the G D R nor the SED would have existed if the East had not been left to the Soviet Imperium after the war. The individual and the system are two separate issues for analysis. It is morally reasonable to think that all individuals who supported the former system and who repressed opponents of the system should be disqualified at least for a period of time, that they do not deserve the blessings of redistributions, that they should not profit from the unification. Corrective justice is located on the level of individuals. It is as undeserved that the members of the former ruling elite survive in high positions as it is undeserved that former victims are disadvantaged again today. This individual perspective is adequate for individual cases. It is microjustice. The redistributions between West and East are an issue of macrojustice. The adequate level of justifying arguments is that of aggregates: the population. The population has a history with many constraints. Attribution of responsibility presupposes the assumption of freedom to act in another

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way. The freedom to avoid commitments to the regime may reasonably be assumed on the individual level for a substantial part of the population; at the same time, it may be negated for the state and the population as a whole. Information about undeserved advantages on the individual level interferes with the acceptance of the costs of redistributions in the West. Therefore, corrective justice at the individual level gains importance, psychologically, on the macrolevel, too. The justification of redistribution is, however, an issue on the macrolevel.

How do Justice Principles Serve as a Basis for Claiming Redistribution?

The application of rules of distributive justice presupposes borderlines (Cohen, 1991). It is membership in, for example, the same group, the same state, or the same community that entitles one to receive a fair share. As Walzer (1983) noted, membership is probably the most important good to be allocated. This becomes evident in the debate about asylum seekers and immigrants; under the label of "moral exclusion"; it is a theoretically as well as politically virulent issue of research. Moral exclusion means to exclude individuals, groups, categories, or aggregates from one's own community where moral norms of respect, solidarity, social responsibility, and norms of justice are applied. East Germany asked to join the Federal Republic of Germany in the hope of participating in Western wealth. By "granting" membership, the rules of distribution that are valid in the Western part have to be applied to the East (in some fields that are specified in the Unification Agreement, a delay is allowed). Therefore, the global justice rules for distributions that are valid in West Germany have to be applied. Germany is a welfare state: The need principle is accepted to justify basic welfare and health care; the rough equality of opportunities for development and growth is a constitutional goal; and the equality principle is applied, for instance, in terms of similar wages for similar jobs, the right to private property, equal freedom, and so forth. These allocation rules are the basis for the claims by the East German population for welfare payments, basic medical care, unemployment support, and equal wages for equal positions within the same branch of the economy or within the Civil Service. Four kinds of justice arguments are given in order to refuse claims from the East. 1. Membership is psychologically not a categorical concept (given or not given), but a dimension. I have no valid data about this but many casual observations. Full membership is not given with the identity card but, psy-

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chologically again, presupposes seniority within the community or a longer lasting membership in the community. It may also presuppose being born in the community, having acquired merits, or even having inherited merits acquired by ones ancestors, having specific cultural typical knowledge and attitudes, and so forth. Therefore, it is doubtful whether juridical membership psychologically implies the allocation of full membership rights. After 40 years of separation the populations in the West and in the East no longer had strong bonds. The feeling of being one country faded more and more (probably more so in the West). Currently, there is no strong and shared "we feeling." Without having a strong ingroup identity, the West perceived the East as outgroup, and vice versa. 2. The East cannot claim privileges that do not exist in the West, for instance, to keep a higher employment rate, to have the state own more industries (with the well-known consequences of being unproductive and costly), to maintain a higher teacher-pupil or professor-student ratio than in the West, which currently is still the case. 3. The East cannot claim equal life conditions as in the West within a short period of time. Living standards in the West have grown from the very poor beginning after the war. The conviction is widely shared that growth in wealth is a step-by-step development. And this is considered to be in order for the East as well. It could only be achieved by massively increasing taxes in the West. None of the political parties risks this, knowing that the majority would not accept a significantly higher burden. The higher the costs, the higher the tendency could be to reject them with the argument that the misery was serf-inflicted. 4. There is another line of argument that may interfere with the willingness to help. The regime had accumulated resources in hidden accounts: The GDR owned companies in the West. The SED had accumulated considerable riches and a number of the former elite took advantage of the system through buying real estate in attractive areas at very low cost, property that today is worth millions. Why not expropriate these assets first before taxes are raised for the West German population?

IMPLICIT CONTRACTS IN REDISTRIBUTIONS The Kind of Justification Makes a Difference

As stated above, empathy or sympathy with the needy is usually considered the motivation for helping and granting support. We could not corroborate this hypothesis in relationships between social aggregates or between (sub)populations. In these cases, the motivation to prosocial corn-

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mitments including the motivation to redistribution seems to be more frequently justice-based. The provider of support has to acknowledge that the recipient is entitled to receive support. Corresponding evidence is found in research with recipients of help and support who feel better if they believe that they are entitled to get help than if they have to beg for help. At least in our cultures, many recipients of support have problems with self-respect and with their social status when they have to ask for help without being entitled to it (Bierhoff, 1991). In this respect, the various justice principles are by no means equivalent as a basis for an entitlement to help or redistribution. It makes a large psychological difference whether an entitlement is based upon own achievements, prior exploitation, or afflicted disadvantages, or whether one's own needs and the expectations of a caring society or community are the basis for asking for help. In the first category, an entitlement to get support is established by previously acquired rights. In the second category, the needy are merely dependent on help. In this case, the granted help represents a debt that, principally, has to be repaid later either by material repayments, by achievements, or at least by the expressed gratitude of the helpee. Especially in cases of continued need of support or continued redistributions, it is extremely important to explicate the applied justice principles. If the basis is merely the need of the recipient, then it is very important to ask what caused the need and who is responsible for having caused it. Help might be refused if the needy are held responsible.

Justice and Efficiency In cases of continued support, questions about its efficiency that might interfere with justice considerations have to be asked. The willingness to grant continued help depends far more on the efficiency of the measure than on the willingness to give spontaneous help when confronted with the immediate needs of others (Rabinowitz et al., 1986). In most cases that are investigated, except for very close relationships, the helpers had implicit normative expectations concerning an improvement in the situation of the supported that would demonstrate that the given support was successful. This is even true in health care settings (Koschmieder, 1992; Wills, 1978), where the medical and paramedical staff have implicit normative expectations concerning recuperation processes by patients. Research on social support given to those who have experienced a loss after various critical life events (death of a close one, serious illness, lesions following accidents, dismissals, etc.) shows that if the first few efforts of support are not successful, the motivation for further support drops rap-

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idly, and support-giving is mixed with, if not replaced by, negative social responses like distancing, critique, or derogation of the supported (el. Bennet-Herbert and Dunkel-Schetter, 1992). Indicators of success may be regaining a positive view on life, reducing, negative moods and emotions, regaining the ability to work, or regaining social and material independence. Those who receive support are treated as if they had consented to an implicit contract to improve their situation and to achieve this within a period implicitly set by the helper. This does seem to be true not only for individuals but also for states or populations or subpopulations. Social policy is frequently critized for inefficiency (Hardin, 1977), seemingly unsuccessful programs in early education or rehabilitation, unsuccessful affirmative actions, and so forth, end with the discrimination of the supported groups and with the judgement that support was not deserved (Brickrnan, 1977; Bronfenbrenner, 1974; Hardin, 1977). Repeated requests for support and continued complaints may nourish doubts about the potentials and the willingness for self-help. Help to selfhelp is the preferred alternative. Continued dependency is open to criticism. Currently there is an all-party consensus in Germany with respect to the financial transfers to the East. In the long run, however, a convincing justice argument as well as evidence for the efficiency of the program is needed. Continued complaints from the East (together with complaints from the West) would indeed be an indicator of inefficiency (and of a lack of gratitude as well). The politicians should be aware of the fact that in Western countries, the free market economy and its rules is given better marks by the population even with respect to justice than the policy that is blamed more often for arbitrary decisions, one-sided programs, and the privileged treatment of the favored clientele (Lane, 1986).

CONCLUDING REMARKS The redistribution of wealth is an important issue in Germany. There are voices in the East continually condemning old and new injustices. There are voices in the West doubting the obligation to pay for the inherited burden and to pay for more equality. This bears the risk of social conflicts, of social discriminations, and of increasing resentments on both sides. Some already fear a reciprocal ethnification of the two populations in West and East which would mean a further barrier against integration. Should the PDS (the successor of the former SED) continue to be successful in elec-

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tions by claiming to represent the interests of the East German population, it might provoke the foundation of an opposing group in the West. Concerning macrojustice, the problem in Germany is that national policy has a program for large-scale redistributions but has failed so far to formulate a cogent philosophy for the program. Instead, there is a vacuum of justifications that offers room for social and individual constructions about the justice or injustice of redistributions that are yet to start and really will become "painful" in the future. The constructions of the case will vary a lot. They will use different concepts of justice and deservedness, different views about responsibilities, different views about efficiency. Since there are many options, we shall have to expect motivated or biased choices. The government will be acting carelessly if it leaves these constructions to the free market of opinions without participating in this opinion-making process. Predictions from the given situation may only be made conditionally. A process of segregation (or continuing distance) between West and East and political struggles about the distribution of resources should be expected (i) if redistributions cannot be financed by an increase in gross national product, avoiding losses of public and private budgets in the West, (ii) if no convincing philosophy can be found to justify redistributions (iii) if the East continues to condemn injustices, inequalities, and colonization, and (iv) if the already performed redistributions are not efficient enough to rapidly enhance self-reliance in the Eastern states and the communities.

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