Science & Education 4: 147-159, 1995. © 1995 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

Between Epistemology and Hermeneutics DIMITRI GINEV Centre for Culturology, University of Sofia, Sofia 1000, Bulgaria

ABSTRACT. In this paper I discuss the hermeneutic and epistemologicaldimensions of science, and investigatethe role which this discussionmight play in science education. After a brief review of two main variants of hermeneutic conceptions of science, a general outline is given of the "existential-ontologicalnotion of science". Regarding the degree of objectification, the theoretical waysof "projectingthe world" as a scientifictheme lie on a continuum between the poles of "pure hermeneutics" and "pure epistemology". Finally, some conclusions for a new pedagogyare drawn.

INTRODUCTION The task of formulating the general principles of a hermeneutic philosophy of science is undertaken by the representatives of two lines of investigation. It is the purpose of the first group of authors (like Patrick A. Heelan, Mary Hesse and Martin Eger) to show that the cognitive structure of natural science has important hermeneutical dimensions. An example of such a dimension is what P. Heelan calls a "non-objective use of instruments in the scientific experimentation". Heelan considers this use as a "hermeneutical shift in the subject-object cut so as to place the instrument on the subject side of the cut, and the instrumental signals in a position of a 'text' in a 'context'" (Heelan 1972, p. 143). Another interesting dimension is the universality of the problem of "double hermeneutic" in all kinds of scientific knowledge. Roughly speaking, this problem arises from the fact that in each scientific discipline the work on a new research project is based upon a pre-interpreted world, which is constituted by a language there already in being. (See Eger 1993.) The issues raised in the investigations of this first group of authors do not go beyond the "epistemologically-centered paradigm" in the philosophy of science. The aim here is a hermeneutical extension of this paradigm by shifting the boundary between subject and object. A typical example in this respect is the hermeneutico-epistemological study of the constitution of "imperceptible realities" within the life-world of a given scientific community. Thus, in trying to revise the classical scheme of relationships between the original life-world of perception and the idealized scientific world by incorporating in the latter the life-worlds of the particular scientific communities (e.g. the life-world of a given laboratory, where the magnetic fields and cosmic rays are "familiar entities"), the studies of these moderate hermeneuticists bear significant resemblance to the studies in the relativistic and constructivistic sociology of scientific knowledge. By contrast, the representatives of the second approach (like Theodore

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Kiesel, Carl-Friedrich Gethmann and Joseph Kockelmans) are trying to surmount the epistemological foundationalism, and to elaborate on a "hermeneutically-centered paradigm". It is the aim of these authors to explore the "genesis" of the theoretical structures of scientific knowledge from the "pretheoretical modes of existence" by using Heidegger's "hermeneutic of facticity", Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics, and Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological theory of the corporeal schema of perception. They want therefore to counter a position that would proclaim the priority of epistemological reflections over the reflections upon the "hermeneutical situations" (in the Heideggerian sense) of scientific knowledge. These "radical hermeneuticists" do not claim a hermeneutical shift of the epistemological cut between subject and object. They rather pretend to demonstrate the secondary character of the whole epistemological problematic. The comparison between the two approaches poses the problem of the balance between epistemology and hermeneutics in philosophy of science. This problem, I think, is of prime importance for the methodology of science education. More specifically, I would like to suggest that the inclusion of ideas about how to resolve this problem in the science curriculum could create an appropriate philosophical background to students' understanding of the cognitive organizations of the different types of scientific knowledge. In criticizing the attempts to reduce the philosophy of science either to philosophical hermeneutics, or to epistemology, I will concentrate my efforts on two central issues. These are the hermeneutico-ontological conception of science, and the pluralism of theoretical attitudes for "projecting the world as a scientific theme". Since the first issue is totally ignored by the epistemological foundationalists, and the second issue is "forgotten" by most of the radical hermeneuticists, it is my hope that the integration of both issues could provide an interesting perspective for establishing the balance between epistemology and hermeneutics in the philosophy of science. Under "epistemology" here I mean the philosophical position that aims at revealing the transcendental conditions of the epistemic constructions elaborated within the different kinds of science. Furthermore, I hold that the epistemological language (in which the transcendental conditions are formulated) cannot be translated into any scientific language. In other words, the philosophical position of epistemology cannot be "naturalized". At the same time, however, I do not accept the view that epistemology is a normative domain, concerned to develop rational criteria for justification of the constructions of scientific knowledge. This view implies that epistemology as a theory of scientific rationality has both normative and metascientific status. In my view, the epistemological questioning discloses in a non-prescriptive manner the internal conditions of cognitive selforganization of scientific knowledge. Precisely these conditions, which are

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hidden from the viewpoint of the actual research practice, play the role of transcendental conditions. (See, Ginev 1992, 1993.) Under "hermeneutics" here I mean the philosophical position that asks about the different "pre-structures" (e.g., Polanyi's "tacit knowledge", or Gadamer's "prejudgments") of scientific knowledge. The main task of this philosophical position is not to unfold the structure of the knowledge being conceptually articulated but to study the very process of conceptual articulation within the primordial "fusion of meaningful horizons". I deny, however, the view that hermeneutical study has nothing to do with method. Indeed, the direct methodologization of hermeneutical study (or, its "methodological reconstruction") leads either to committing a kind of "intentionalist fallacy" by concentrating upon the interpreter's procedures instead of upon the ontological totality of interpretation, or to some sort of objectivism by claiming that there are "objective criteria" for justification of the validity of hermeneutical study. Yet the critique of "intentionalist fallacy" and objectivism does not imply that radical antimethodologism, which characterizes contemporary philosophical hermeneutics. In my view, it is the method of the existential analytic that shows how the "pre-structures" of scientific knowledge become constituted. In taking the foregoing into consideration, I will formulate my task as a search for a cooperation between the "epistemology without normative naturalism" and the "hermeneutics without antimethodologism". It is my conviction that the existential analytic of the modes of Being-in-the-world provides the relevant framework for this cooperation. So, let me give now an outline of the Heideggerian conception of science as it is summarized in Being and Time.

I. ON THE EXISTENTIAL CONCEPTION OF SCIENCE

The existential interpretation of science (or, the interpretation of science by means of the hermeneutico-phenomenological analytic of existence) is a hermeneutical program that aims at disclosing the shift from the pretheoretical dealing with the things within-the-world to the perceiving of these things as theoretical objects. According to this claim, "the existential structure of science" has to be unfolded by the same hermeneutical analysis that reveals and articulates the ontological structure of existence. At the same time this is a kind of transcendental analysis, because what is unfolded is the possibility of science within the meaningful self-constitution of human existence. The hermeneutico-phenomenological interpretation of science is asking which of those conditions implied by the selfconstituting Being-in-the-world are necessary for the possibility of modifying the pre-theoretical concernful deliberation within-the-world into a way of theoretical objectification of the intramundane entities as a "thematized world". Here one has to distinguish between ontical and ontological treatment

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of science. If one attempts to investigate the disciplinary differentiation of science, or the structural emancipation of scientific activity from the established professions (law, theology, administration) in modern European culture, or the curricular structures in the system of scientific education, or the multiplicity of cognitive organizations in scientific knowledge, one proceeds on the ontical level of reflection. In all these cases science is analyzed not in connection with the meaningful temporality of existence. Thus, in these cases the peculiarity of science could not be formulated as an existential-ontological problem, because the existential analytic refers only to the modes of Dasein's Being-in-the-world. According to this analytic, the most significant for the development of the existential ontology is the everyday (pre-theoretical) mode of Dasein's "concernful Being alongside the ready-to-hand within-the-world". The strategy of Heidegger's Being and Time is to build up the existential ontology as an ontological theory of the temporality of concernful everydayness. Within this strategy, the "existential-temporal possibility of science" lies in the fact that circumspective concern of Dasein's primordial mode may be modified into a theoretical thematization of entities withinthe-world. In correspondence to this modification of the primordial existential mode, the ready-to-hand within-the-world is transformed into entities that are present-at-hand. These entities are the "raw material" for the constitution of theoretical objects of scientific knowledge. The existential conception of science does not offer a specific view of the cognitive organization of research activity. What is of interest here is the "ontological genesis" of the plurality of secondary theoretical modes of Dasein's existence. These are modes in which the concernful dealing with the ready-to-hand within-the-world is replaced by the theoretical thematizing of world-as-a-presence-at-hand. Heidegger stresses that the decisive moment in the modification of the primordial mode of Being-inthe-world in a theoretical attitude lies in the "disappearance of praxis". In fact, however, it is not the disappearance but the transformation of everyday praxis into a type of research praxis. There is no theoretical mode of Dasein's existence without a specific type of research praxis. Let me shed some light on this transformation. One of the most important postulates of the hermeneutico-phenomenological analytic of Dasein calls that within the primordial existential mode it is impossible to separate everyday concernful dealing from the readyto-hand within-the-world. They are both involved in a network of hermeneutical interconnections. In other words, the epistemological relations between an autonomous subject of knowing and the "pure" objects of knowledge are not to be found within the primordial existential mode. Indeed, in its primordial mode of existence Dasein is distinguished by the ability of knowing-the-world-concernfully. This sort of knowing, however, is an aspect of the everyday dealing with intramundane things as things that are ready-to-hand. The world as a totality of these things plays the role of a horizon of concernful knowing. Yet "concernful knowing" cannot

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be reconstructed in an epistemological manner (i.e., in a manner that allows it to be regarded as a self-organizing cognitive system), for it cannot be extracted from the "totality of Dasein's intramundane involvements". Furthermore, "concernful knowing" is not guided by any special interest for gaining knowledge about the peculiar aspects of the world. As an intrinsic moment of the meaningful self-constitution of the primordial existential mode, knowing in a concernful-practical way is based upon a prior understanding of the relationships of the "in-order-to", the "towards-which", the "towards-this", and the "for-the-sake-of". The interconnection of these relationships is precisely defined by Heidegger as an existential-hermeneutical conception of the world. In this sense, "concernful knowing" is the pre-epistemological or protohermeneutical way of orientation within-the-world. (I am saying "protohermeneutical" in order to distinguish it from specialized hermeneutic kinds of theoretization in human studies based upon the procedures of interpretation.) The guiding idea here is that the complexity of "concernful knowing" does not depend on the complexity of autonomous (from the intramundane behavior) cognitive structures, but rather on the interaction of Dasein with the intramundane environment. A very important corollary of the existential conception of science is that the transition from the primordial mode of existence to the modes of theoretical Being-in-the-world is at the same time a transition from the hermeneutical integrity of existence within-the-world to the epistemological bifurcation into a knowing subject and a thematically given world. Heidegger describes the process that leads to this bifurcation by introducing the notion of "work-world", which is a concretization of the existentialhermeneutical concept of the world. The "work-world" is the instrumental (equipmental) totality which in the existential mode of concernful everydayness has been discovered beforehand. It is the Being-in-the-work world, where Dasein's concern and the intramundane ready-to-hand are interwoven in what Heidegger calls "existential constitution of dealing", that makes possible the basic hermeneutical integrity of human existence. The emergence of dysfunctions in the work-world leads to the disintegration of Dasein's everyday concern and the intramundane beings. A dysfunction here means a moment of un-ready-to-hand within-the-world. The concernful dealing "discovers" the dysfunction as a deficient mode of the present, or, as a "non-retaining which awaitingly makes present". But when equipmental totality does not work, then concernful dealing should be transformed into the reflexive inspecting, testing, and eliminating of the disturbance. Thus circumspective concern becomes a theoretical attitude, and concernful praxis becomes a research activity. The arising of the theoretical attitude out of the circumspective concern is a sort of compensation of the dysfunctions of the work-world. Only through Dasein's existing in the way of scientific research can the disturbances be eliminated. But the overcoming of the dysfunctions does not mean a restitution of the original

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work-world. It is rather a replacement of the work-world by a "thematized world" of certain theoretical objects. The "objectification of the world" leads to epistemological bifurcation into a knowing subject and a thematically given world. This bifurcation is the first step in the formation of a theoretical attitude. The very process of formation is founded upon the primordial Dasein's Being-in-the-world. Yet the theoretical attitude is not a pure contemplative position. It is not to be extracted from a certain kind of research praxis. Thus, in terms of the existential conception of science, the disappearance of concernful praxis is compensated for by the appearance of a research praxis. Furthermore, the "thematized world" of a given theoretical attitude is constructed in its peculiar research praxis. The notion of a "theoretical mode of Being-in-the-world" as a special existential mode is an ontological expression of the relations of mutual interdependence between theoretical attitude, research praxis, and thematical world. Let me now concentrate on this notion. Heidegger distinguishes the existential conception of science from the logical theory of science. The task of the latter is to establish the validity of the propositions formulated by scientists. So, logical theory is guided by a propositional view of science and scientific truth. By contrast, the existential conception denies from the very beginning the "atomistic" picture of the internal structure of science. Heidegger emphasizes that the adequate existential conception of science can only be carried out within the context of the "connection" of Being and truth. Because the theoretical attitudes (with their kinds of research praxis) are existential modes, they are revealing Being in specific manners. The way of revealing Being within the research praxis of a certain theoretical mode of Being-in-theworld provides the concept of truth that is characteristic to this theoretical mode of existence. It is not difficult to see that this Heideggerian conception of science and scientific truth is very near to the contemporary holistic orientation in the philosophy of science. The latter focuses on the holistic cognitive structures and their models rather than on the validity of the particular propositions of scientific theories. (It claims that the empirical adequacy of the propositions formulated in "observational language" follows not from particular theoretical propositions but from a large system which includes a kernel theory, bridge laws, initial conditions, and background theories.) Similarly, the Heideggerian conception of science claims that a given theoretical mode of Being-in-the-world consists of a general project of the world, which defines a certain class of intramundane systems of beings that are relevant to the respective kind of research praxis. According to Heidegger, the classical example of the ontological genesis of such a theoretical mode is the rise of mathematical physics. He goes on to say: What is decisive for the development of the mathematical physics does not lie in its rather high esteem for the observation of 'facts', nor in its 'application' of mathematics in

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determining the character of natural process; it lies rather in the way in which Nature itself is mathematically projected. In this projection something constantly present-at-hand (matter) is uncovered beforehand, and the horizon is opened so that one may be guided by looking at those constitutive items in it which are quantitatively determinable (motion, force, location, and time). Only 'in the fight' of a Nature which has been projected in this fashion can anything like a 'fact' be found and set up for an experiment regulated and delimited in this projection. (Heidegger 1962, pp. 413-14)

The projecting of the world within a given theoretical mode of Beingin-the-world is a process of "thematizing", which is characterized by some principal moments for the constitution of theoretical objects. However, the projecting is not to be reduced to this process. Each projecting of the world as a scientific theme is a transcendence of that region of intramundane things, which lays the pre-theoretical foundations of the possible research areas within the scientific praxis of a given theoretical mode of existence. The totality of projecting is presupposed by each process of thematizing. It is well known that the hermeneutico-ontological program in Being and Time is oriented against neoKantian epistemology, and more generally, against the absolutization of epistemology. However, the critique of epistemological foundationalism does not mean a replacement of the epistemological problematics by hermeneutical or ontological ones. On the contrary, it is the existential conception of science which by means of confronting and opposing the absolutization of epistemology shows the place of epistemological reasoning within philosophical discourse. This thesis is opposed to all variants of postmodern destruction of epistemology which claim that epistemology must be succeeded either by a "linguistic therapy", or by a universalization of empirical science, or by an "edifying hermeneutics". (Here I am not going to discuss whether this thesis is in agreement with the original position of Heidegger in Being and Time. This is a too specific topic to be discussed on this occasion.) But let me clarify what I mean by the expression "the place of epistemological reasoning within philosophical discourse". Though the origin of the cut between the subject and the object is a hermeneutico-ontological theme, the structure of the thematizing project that characterizes the concrete mode of bifurcation between the knowing subject and the research object could only be analyzed in epistemological terms. (Of course, here I am speaking of constructivistic and holistic epistemology. It is constructivistic, since it is founded not on a copy theory of knowledge but on the view that knowing subject by means of certain thematizing project constructs her research objects. It is holistic, since it reflects on the cognitive structures in the horizons of the thematizing projects.) Hence, the role of epistemology is to analyze the theoretical modes of Being-in-the-world from the viewpoint of their thematizing projects. It is this role that determines the "place of epistemological reasoning within philosophical discourse". By saying this I am sketching the first form of a dialogue between hermeneutics and epistemology within the frame of reference of existential

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analytic: the hermeneutical investigation is dealing with the transformations of the work-world and the genesis of the theoretical attitudes towards the world, whereas the task of epistemology is to reveal the cognitive selforganizations of the existential modes guided by thematizing projects of the "world". In the next section I shall argue that this is not the only form of dialogue between hermeneutics and epistemology. In this connection I am going to discuss in more detail the issue of the typology of the general modes of Being-in-the-world-theoretically.

II. ON THE CONTINUUM OF THEORETICAL MODES OF BEING-IN-THE-WORLD

Following the preceding deliberations, one can characterize the existential mode of concernful everydayness as a zero-level of theoretization. Against the background of this zero-level, a theoretical mode of Being-in-theworld is a general theoretical attitude, which objectifies the world by means of developing a specific thematizing project. With respect to the degree of this objectification, the theoretical modes of Being-in-the-world lie on a continuum between the pre-theoretical concernful everydayness and the total formalization of the world. Thus, one can describe the theoretical modes by analyzing their thematizing projects. This will be my strategy in the remainder. Let us now examine more closely the notion of thematizing project of the world that underlies the Heideggerian conception of science. In Being and Time we can find only one illustration of what a "genesis of a theoretical attitude" out of concernful circumspection is. This is the attitude that projects the world as a physical Nature. Yet the theoretical interrogating of intramundane beings cannot be reduced only to this scientific attitude. There is a pluralism of "scientific worlds", which correspond to the different thematizing projects. But if this is so, how can one obtain a coherent differentiation of these projects? Let me first of all attempt to answer this question from a methodological point of view. If one "dedicates" herself to a certain theoretical mode of Being-in-the-world, then one constitutes the theoretical objects by thematizing the intramundane things in such a manner which is already determined in principle by the respective project. Hence, each thematizing project involves a set of "transcendental conditions" for an objectifying thematization of the world, or, conditions for a constitution of a certain kind of theoretical objects. These conditions can be summarized in three groups: principles of invariance which determine the different kinds of symmetry in theorizing; theoretical schemes (including in particular deductive theories); and modes of explanation (including in particular rules of hermeneutical interpretation). (I am not including here scientific laws as a special group because I agree with Bas van Fraassen's thesis that the roles that scientific laws were meant to play in the understanding of science

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can be illuminated by discussing the notions of symmetry, transformation, and invariance.) If one of these groups of conditions is missing in the thematizing project, then the intramundane things could not be transformed into objects of the attitude toward the world proper to a given theoretical mode of Being-in-the-world. The three groups of conditions can also play the role of parameters for differentiation of the projects. Now it becomes evident that the notion of "thematizing project" can be characterized in more technical terms. In the last analysis, each project is a way of constituting the "world" as a class of systems of theoretical objects, in which the transcendental conditions for objectifying thematization being specified in a certain form are "materialized". This technical approach to the notion shows an important resemblance with the so-called semantic approach to scientific theory. According to Ronald Giere, the semantic approach presents a theory as consisting of theoretical definition, which defines a certain class of systems, and a theoretical hypothesis, which asserts that certain real systems are among members of that class (see Giere 1979). (Bas van Fraassen's more sophisticated version of the semantic approach says that a theory has many clusters of models, each with its state-space. Each particular cluster is united by a certain statespace type. So the presentation of the theory must proceed by describing a class of state-space types. See van Fraassen 1989.) In the perspective of the semantic approach the thematizing project of a given theoretical mode of Being-in-the-world need not be committed to any discipline, research area, or domain of investigation. It can get a semantic "realization" in the systems of theoretical objects that belong to different kinds of sciences. Thus, e.g., the project of the world as a "teleonomic Universum" determines the manner of constituting systems of theoretical objects within ecology, sociology, cultural anthropology, cognitive psychology, urban studies, demography, and literary criticism. As already mentioned, all theoretical modes of existence are founded upon concernful dealing as a primordial mode of Being-in-the-world. This is why each one of them can be considered as a "secondary" mode of Being-in-the-world-by-projectingthe-"world"-thematically, where the "world" is no more a horizon of concernful dealing with intramundane things but the domain of all possible systems of theoretical objects, in which the project can be interpreted. These short remarks concerning the specificity of the notion of thematizing project indicate only the general way of combining the existential conception of science with the semantic approach in contemporary philosophy of science. But nevertheless they provide the grounds for differentiating the basic theoretical modes of existence. Let me give a short description of them by referring to the peculiarities of the systems of theoretical objects which are constituted by the semantic "realizations" of the respective thematizing project. In so doing, I will start with the thematizing project that in the highest degree objectifies the "world", and will end with the project that is most closely related to the primordial mode of Being-in-the-world. My principal assumption is that the more complex

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the systems being constituted, the more hermeneutic preunderstanding is involved in the process of constitution and the less likely it is that the "world" will be submitted to the epistemological criteria of objectivity. The need for hermeneutic preunderstanding is more and more often established in the natural sciences, when one is constituting theoretically systems with a high complexity. So, the outstanding molecular biologist Gunther Stent in his efforts to develop a "cerebral hermeneutics" writes: Neurobiology covers a broad range on the hardness-softness scale. At its hard end, neurobiology is represented by cellular electrophysiology, whose phenomena, although more complex than those associated with rolling steel balls, can still be accounted for in terms of explanations that are susceptible to seemingly objective proof. But at its soft end, neurobiology is represented by the study of the function of large and complicated neural networks. The output of these networks comprises phenomena whose complexity approaches that of human psyche, in fact includes the human psyche. Hence, at that soft end, neurobiology takes on some of the characteristics of hermeneutics; the student of a complex neural network must bring considerable preunderstanding to the system as a whole before attempting to interpret the function of any of its parts. Accordingly, the explanations that are advanced about complex neural systems may remain beyond the reach of objective validation." (Stent 1987, pp. 344-45)

Another good example of the crucial role which the hermeneutic preunderstanding plays in modelling complex systems in the natural sciences are those programmes in AI that are based on mathematical complexity theory. These programmes proved to be a hermeneutic alternative to the traditional knowledge-based programmes. The idea is that by modelling a complex behavioral system one should keep the internal representation of the system to a minimum, and to refer to one's preunderstanding of how the system may interact with the environment directly rather than by applying a knowledge-based model of this environment. According to this kind of modelling, the system acts opportunistically on the basis of its preconceptions of the different situations (see Chapman 1987). The thematizing projects which I am going to differentiate are: (1) The projecting of the "world" as a Universum of pure formal systems. In this thematizing project the role of any "hermeneutical factors" is radically excluded. There are only formal (axiomatic) systems and the elements of each system are positions in the system that have no identity outside of the system. The constitution of such a system approximates the ideal of epistemological objectivism: the universal formal structures of the "world" can be achieved by "pure mental representations" which ex hypothesi exclude any sort of subjectivism. (2) The projecting of the "world" as a deterministic physical Nature. The "world" is a collection of systems of physical entities developing in mathematical, or reversible, time. The preunderstandings of causal relationship, geometrical space and temporal interval are included in the process of constitution of such a system as a space of possible states which can be taken during a certain temporal trajectory. (3) The projecting of the "world" as a probabilistic physical Nature.

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The "world" is a collection of linear statistical ensembles. The latter are much more complex than the deterministic systems. For this reason hermeneutic preunderstandings have a greater weight in the process of constitution. They concern the nature of probability, the correlations between system parameters, the specifity of measure and so on. (4) The projecting of the "world" as a self-organizing physical Nature. The "world" consists of all non-linear self-organizing systems, i.e. systems whose description requires linking the type of initial condition with the law of evolution. The very system's evolution is characterized by what Prigogine calls the "in-built arrow of time". The knowing subject with her preunderstanding of the system's complexity is not to be detached from the complexity of the systems. (5) The projecting of the "world" as a teleonomic Universum. The "world" is a set of all systems with intrinsic teleonomy based on a homeostasis which are not undergoing changes over time. In contrast to the previous "worlds", the teleonomic Universum is not a regularizing, but a normalizing "world" (see Pettit 1986). The world's systems here are not working to a causal order, emboding mechanical regularities. To identify an element of such a system means not to discover its regular mode of operation (as is the case with the previous "worlds"), but to depict it as something that had to happen if the system was to satisfy the norms of its functioning. So, the constitution of the system requires a preunderstanding of its integral normative order of functioning. (6) The projecting of the "world" as an evolutionary Universum. Here the systems that belong to this "world" are no more conceived of as spaces of possible states during a certain temporal dynamics. They are distinguished by the mechanisms of natural selection which increases their adaptive capacity. These systems are also teleonomic but they are undergoing changes over time. The constitution of such systems would be impossible without preunderstandings of natural selection, fitness, emergent quality, direction of evolution, etc. (7) The projecting of the "world" as a historico-relativistic Universum. Here the "world" is made thematically intelligible not by constituting "objective systems" (i.e. systems which are submitted to a certain set of epistemological criteria for objectivity), but by constructing "ideal types". The very method has a hermeneutical character. It is represented by the different variants of "interpretive understanding", or "explanatory understanding". The ideal type arises within the interplay between the interpreter's horizon of preunderstandings of what should be interpreted and the proper contexts of meaningful structures in which the phenomenon being interpreted is embedded. Nevertheless, the ideal types have an important epistemological ingredient. They are closed and finite constructions. And precisely because they are constructed in such a manner causal explanations can also be applied to them. (8) The projecting of the "world" as a potentially unending interpretive dialogue. Here the presumption that the "world" being interpreted her-

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meneutically can be articulated into ideal types is given up. The "world" is conceived of as a continuous "fusion of horizons". To interpret a concrete phenomenon means not to isolate it as an ideal type, but to participate in its "effective history" (Wirkungsgeschichte)which is a neverending process. Thereby the epistemological ingredient of ideal types construction is eliminated and the "world" is constituted as a "totally hermeneutical Universum". The way of looking at the thematizing projects as distinguished with different degrees of theoretical objectification of the "world" allows us to concretize the idea of the epistemological continuum already mentioned. In following some suggestions of Mary Hesse (1980) regarding the role of hermeneutics in the different kinds of science, one can arrange the thematizing projects between the pole of "pure epistemological objectivism" that excludes radically the role of any hermeneutic preunderstanding and the pole of "total hermeneutical universalism" that radically excludes the role of any epistemological standard of rationality. In this view, the thematizing projects located between these poles are "superpositions" of the hermeneutical and epistemological dimensions that characterize the constituting of theoretical objects. This conclusion epitomizes a second form of a dialogue between hermeneutics and epistemology. This time it concerns not only the philosophical understanding of science but the internal structure of "real science".

CONCLUSION

In conclusion I would like to stress the significance of the existentialontological approach to science for restoring the philosophical dimension of scientific education. The centrality of the existential conception of science makes clear that the epistemological aspects of theoretical reasoning have not to be detached from the roots of every scientific activity in human existence. As a consequence, each general educational research program should take into account the interplay between hermeneutical and epistemological moments in the process of formation of scientific discourses. An important implication for the methodology of curriculum design is that the vehicle for understanding science in a general educational context should not be the scientific theory, the scientific paradigm, or the scientific discipline, but rather the thematizing project. Another essential contribution of the incorporation of the existential conception of science in science education is the new picture of integrity of science. Without any rehabilitation of the old positivistic conception of united science, the existential conception shows the common roots of all types of theoretical knowledge, and thereby, reveals the secondary character of the various divergencies and dichotomies in the historical development of science. A science education that neglects the existential foundations of theoreti-

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cal knowledge is doomed to be an affirmative and not critical education. It remains blind towards the phenomena of the crisis of science, and of the crisis of culture provoked by the crisis of science.

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