Springer 2006
Journal of Business Ethics (2007) 73:119–128 DOI 10.1007/s10551-006-9197-z
Bridging Business and Society: The Abrinq Foundation in Brazil
ABSTRACT. This article presents the process of creation and expansion of the Fundac¸a˜o Abrinq pelos Direitos da Crianc¸a et do Adolescente (Abrinq Foundation for Rights of Children and Adolescents). Established in 1990 by a group of entrepreneurs from the Brazilian Toy Manufacturers’ Association (ABRINQ), the Fundac¸a˜o Abrinq has been successful at raising the issue of children in Brazilian society by bridging business and several other sectors of society. This article more particularly examines (1) the societal challenges related to the situation of children in Brazil; (2) the creation and development of the Abrinq Foundation; and (3) the achievements of this innovative bridging organization over 15 years. KEY WORDS: children, Brazil, Grajew, social entrepreneurship
Introduction: Brazil and its children: A sad reality On July 23, 1993, a little after midnight, about fifty boys and girls were sleeping under the porticos of Candela´ria Church in downtown Rio de Janeiro, one of the most densely populated cities in Brazil. A car pulled up carrying ‘‘a gang of hooded men,’’ who got out and opened fire on the sleeping children. ‘‘Seven children and one young adult were killed. Four boys died instantly, a fifth was killed as he ran away. Three others were abducted in a car and two of them shot dead in the nearby Aterro do Flamengo gardens. One young adult died of his Emmanuel Raufflet is an assistant professor in Management at l’E´cole des Hautes E´tudes Commerciales (HEC Montre´al), in Montreal, Quebec, Canada. Cecilia Gurgel do Amaral was a Masters student at HEC Montre´al when this article was written.
Emmanuel Raufflet Cecilia Gurgel do Amaral
wounds four days later. Another young adult, Wagner dos Santos, who had been left for dead in the Aterro do Flamengo, survived a shooting in the face’’ (Amnesty International, 2003). This shocking event came to illustrate the desperate lives of poor children and youth in Brazil in the early 1990s, victims of violence and society’s indifference. The social exclusion of poor children is still one of the darkest truths in Brazil, a country of rampant contradictions and inequalities. In 1991, with a population of more than 146 million distributed across 26 states, Brazil’s was the leading Latin American economy. This first, world-class Brazil could be represented by the states of Sa˜o Paulo and Rio Grande do Sul, which, ‘‘if they stood alone, would be numbered among the richest 45 nations on earth.... The state of Sa˜o Paulo has a gross national product (GNP) larger than Argentina’s, and Sa˜o Paulo City is a megalopolis with a ... vibrant cultural, financial and business life’’ (Maxwell, 2000). The other Brazil is a nation estimated at more than 40 million people living on less than US$50 a month, deprived of the most basic services, including sewers and potable water. ‘‘The most impoverished 20% of the population receive 2% of the nation’s wealth, while the richest 20% receive 60%’’ (ibid.), appalling numbers that qualify the country as having one of the worst income distributions in the world (Clements, 1997). In this poor Brazil, ‘‘festering shantytowns surround the large urban areas and Rio’s favelas are notorious for crime and violence’’ (Maxwell, 2000). It is in this other Brazil that millions and millions of children are completely excluded from society. The social exclusion of children in Brazil is not a recent phenomenon, and has been a persistent problem throughout the 20th century. However, according to some scholars, the Brazilian economic
120
Emmanuel Raufflet and Cecilia Gurgel do Amaral
recession in the 1980s brought an alarming increase in the numbers of boys and girls begging on the streets of major metropolitan areas. Despite laws that put Brazil in the vanguard of child rights protection – the 1988 Federal Constitution anticipated the basic principles of the 1989 International Convention on the Rights of the Child; and the 1990 Children and Young Persons Statute granted full, universal protection to all Brazilian children – Brazil’s day-to-day reality is much more somber. Reports of that reality, with numbers such as 4 children murdered every day in Brazilian cities (MNMMR, 1990), began to raise international awareness. In 1991, a Commission of Enquiry (CPI) of the Brazilian National Congress estimated that between 1988 and 1990, 4661 young people under the age of 17 had been murdered (Pinheiro, 2004). In February 1992, charges were filed against more than 100 people in Rio de Janeiro and Sa˜o Paulo, mostly off-duty police and security agents hired by private companies to ‘‘clean up’’ the cities. At the heart of the issue of homeless children in Brazil are ‘‘highly vulnerable families and communities, many struggling to come to terms with economic liberalization and growing inequality’’ (Volpi, 2002, p. 1). Beyond these inequalities per se, according to Elena Volpi in a report for the World Bank, ‘‘the problem can also be traced to a lack of communication in the family and the weakening of social capital. Street children are an alarm signaling the dire need for social development and poverty reduction policies to improve the situation in the community at large’’ (ibid.). In its 1989 annual report, The State of the World’s Children, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) drew a stark portrait of the situation in Brazil. Of 41 million children in that country aged 17 and younger, 25 million had no access to play, education, regular meals, housing or adequate hygiene, and were subject to every kind of violence; 350,000 children aged 5 and younger died every year. Estimates for 1990 by the Movimento Nacional dos Meninos e Meninas de Rua (MNMMR), the National Movement for Street Children, put at 18 million the number of children aged 7–17 who were illiterate and the World Health Organization estimates for 1993 put at 10 million the number of children living on Brazilian streets (Bejzman, 1998; MNMMR, 1990).
Child labor was another disquieting topic, also beginning to attract international attention. In 1989, 4 million Brazilians under 14 were working (IBGE, 1991), making Brazil, in absolute numbers, a leader in child labor in Latin America – only Haiti and Guatemala had more children in the labor force (Hilbig, 2001). Working conditions were also hazardous. In the agricultural sector, for example, children worked long hours, receiving no pay or payment in kind, handling sharp tools and toxic chemicals, and carrying heavy loads. In the industrial sector, the situation was equally serious, with children being widely exploited in small family businesses. The shoe industry, for instance, was identified as an employer of numerous children, who worked handling toxic glue.
Limited and inadequate government action Government action to address the problems of Brazilian children was, in general, ineffective, and in many instances simply contributed to making a bad situation worse. One infamous example was the Foundation for the Well-being of Minors (FEBEM), created in 1976. In October 1999, an international expert on prison conditions, invited to accompany an Amnesty International delegation to Brazil, wrote in his report: ‘‘I should say as clearly as possible that I have never seen children kept in such appalling conditions. In my view the place should be closed down’’ (Amnesty International, 2000, p. 3). Designed initially as a rehabilitation center for young offenders (children aged 12–17 who had committed a criminal act), FEBEM units had reverted to an outdated, violent, and repressive model of juvenile detention. Amnesty International received reports of torture, ill treatment, and cruelty directed against hundreds of children and adolescents at FEBEM. In 2000, Amnesty described the situation in the following terms: In the absence of adequate training and support for FEBEM staff, there is a culture of torture, ill-treatment and arbitrary punishments by monitors in juvenile detention centers. Chronically understaffed FEBEM employees and security staff under contract to FEBEM receive no training when put in charge of vastly disproportionate numbers of adolescents. There are no
Bridging Business and Society clear rules and regulations for either staff or inmates governing the administration of discipline. Punishments are arbitrary, and often deliberately designed to humiliate. (Ibid.)
It was this continued lack of effective public policy, and the worsening of children’s lives year after year, that finally triggered a response from civil society. Specific denunciations, such as those at FEBEM, gave people a focus for social reform, at which point efforts to help became stronger, and organizations emerged, prepared to act.
Oded Grajew and the Abrinq initiative We can wait no longer for authorities to solve the problem. Something must be done, now. – Oded Grajew (1998)
Oded Grajew was born in 1947 in Tel Aviv, in the British protectorate then still called Palestine. At the age of 12, Oded and his family moved from Israel to Brazil; three years later, after the death of his father, Oded became the head of the family. While studying Electrical Engineering at the Polytechnic University of Sa˜o Paulo, Oded sold club memberships to support his family (Nascimento, 2000). On graduation, he and three friends decided to start their own business. After analyzing several options and studying the market, the group discovered that ‘‘intelligent games’’ for adolescents and adults were all imported and hard to find in stores. In August 1972, Oded and his friends founded Grow Jogos e Brinquedos S.A. (Grow Toys and Games), and began operations out of a small garage in Sa˜o Paulo. Their first product, called ‘‘War,’’ would become remarkably popular with generations of Brazilian adults. Based on strategy, the game is a war simulation in which players use intelligence and skill to conquer territories, deciding when to mobilize armies to attack and when to protect borders. From an initial production of 5000 units, which the partners themselves sold store-to-store, the game became a major success story in the industry. It now sells more than 90,000 units a year in Brazil; by comparison, the world’s most successful game, Monopoly, sells 150,000 units a year in Brazil
121
(Henrique, 2004). In January 1973, Grow launched its second product, Diplomacy, which became another blockbuster. Following its success in the adult game market, Grow expanded into children’s games. By now, the Grow name was synonymous with innovative and intelligent entertainment. The company added children’s puzzles to its line, differentiating itself mainly by the quality of the materials and the creativity of the themes. Their first puzzles, for instance, featured Brazil’s most popular children’s cartoon, A Turma da Monica (Monica’s Gang). Grow continued to add new lines, and opened up new market segments by expanding consumer age brackets. Currently, Grow’s products include the second bestselling game in Brazil, Imagem & Acao, at 110,000 units sold per year. According to one expert in the games industry, the history of games manufacturing in Brazil can be divided into two phases: ‘‘before Grow’’ and ‘‘after Grow’’ (Luiz Dal Monte Neto, 2004). Before Grow, the industry was divided between games for children and games of chance, mainly cards. Then, Grow came along with an innovative approach, offering products designed to challenge the player’s intelligence. The new design was a perfect fit for an unmet need in the market, and within only a few years, the ‘‘garage’’ company had become a well-known manufacturer. One of the major and continuing limitations on the industry’s growth, however, has been the low educational level of a significant part of Brazil’s population. Education is a sine qua non for consumers to be able to appreciate games of intelligence. Coupled with the weak purchasing power of large segments of Brazilian society, this meant that developing the industry further was not feasible. For example, in Brazil, a game that sells 24,000 units is considered a best-seller. In comparison, Germany, with only half Brazil’s population, has sales figures about 10 times higher than Brazil’s in the same sector (ibid.). In 1989, Oded Grajew reached a turning point in his career. He had left the presidency of Grow two years earlier, and was at that point chairman of Associac¸a˜o Brasileira dos Fabricantes de Brinquedos (ABRINQ), the Brazilian Toy Manufacturers’ Association. Then, he read the 1989 edition of UNICEF’s annual flagship report, The State of the World’s Children. The report’s shocking indicators on
122
Emmanuel Raufflet and Cecilia Gurgel do Amaral
the health and education levels of Brazil’s children deeply touched the businessman (dos Santos, 1996). These children, in the same age group as Grow’s consumers, were being denied the most basic necessities of life, and the picture the report painted of Brazil’s future was alarming. Remembering an old saying from his Israeli childhood, and with the deep belief that ‘‘if we want a better and different country, we have to make children a priority,’’ (Nascimento, 2000) Oded started searching for alternatives – for a way that Abrinq and its members could help improve the disturbing indicators. I was born in Israel. The country was fighting for independence then and facing a very difficult situation. There were shortages of many things, food was being rationed.... Despite these difficulties, however, I remember there was a national saying: Although those were hard times, children were not to live in want. However tough the difficulties faced by the population, children were to be protected and have all their needs met, because they represent the basis of society. I never forgot that.... The only chance of success for the country – which does not necessarily mean it will turn it to advantage – lies in taking care of its children. Nothing is more important than that. (dos Santos, 1996, p. 8)
Initial support for Oded’s initiative came mainly from UNICEF in the person of Cesare de Florio La Rocca. In 2001, Cesare received the UNICEF Award for his work in the Axe Project for the Defense of Children and Youth in Salvador, in the state of Bahia (Nascimento, 2000). Extremely receptive to Oded’s concerns and ideas, Cesare offered UNICEF’s expertise, and a partnership was born that would play a vital role in bringing Oded’s initial concept to fruition. UNICEF’s tasks were clear: to help sensitize and mobilize the toy manufacturers, and to suggest political action aimed at a guarantee of full rights to poor children and youth (ibid.). A key moment in that first year of organizing in 1989 came when a meeting, organized by Oded, drew more than 200 members of the toy manufacturers’ group. After hearing a UNICEF presentation on the situation of Brazil’s children, Abrinq decided to create, within the Association itself, a Board for the Defense of Children’s Rights. The belief was that ‘‘responsibility does not lie with the government alone, but with society as a whole’’ (Grajew, 1998,
p. 11). The new Board, in a collective effort, began organizing its activities around UNICEF’s proposed model, which emphasized the need to build capacities in the Brazilian society regarding the issues children were facing – as opposed to more actionoriented models. For UNICEF, the Board’s founders had the ability and the profile needed to involve the business community and social sectors in children’s issues. This articulation model would be a template for all Board activities, and would shape the Abrinq Foundation’s action plan when that organization was established the following year. The first thing the Board did was organize a photography contest on the theme of Children’s Rights, sponsored by a photography equipment chain and a department store chain. Subsequent projects included: • Publication and promotion of the book The Child and the Youth in the Brazilian Constitution, sponsored by Brazil’s three leading paper manufacturers; • Printing the Universal Declaration of Children’s Rights on toy packages and in magazines and comic books for children and youth, with the support of Editora Abril, Brazil’s largest publisher; • Publicizing the ‘‘Salt and Sugar Home Remedy’’ (a recipe against dehydration) on 10 million supermarket bags. The project had the support of the leading Brazilian supermarket chain at the time; • Launching a campaign to promote knowledge of children’s rights among schoolchildren, through a partnership between the Ministry of Education and Culture and UNICEF. The Board wanted to avoid a charity-oriented philosophy. They proceeded as a group of entrepreneurs committed to thinking about, and bringing people together around children’s problems. By 1990, the Board’s activities were expanding rapidly, and it was decided to review its structure and create a Foundation separate from the Toy Manufacturers Association. On February 13, 1990, the Abrinq Foundation for Children’s Rights was born, and in 1993, Oded left Grow to dedicate himself full-time to the Foundation and other social responsibility initiatives.
Bridging Business and Society The Abrinq Foundation for children’s rights: Creating a social response (1989–1993) About the role of the Abrinq Foundation for Children’s Rights, Ana Maria Wilheim, the Superintendent of the organization, has written: From the outset, it was clear that the Abrinq Foundation would not be engaged in charity-oriented or philanthropic activities, and that its activities would be more in tune with its nature as a professional association of toy manufacturers which interacts, on the one hand, with suppliers and, on the other hand, with customers. Therefore, the idea of implementing projects to assist children and adolescents directly managed by Abrinq, such as schools, day-care centers and shelters, was discarded from the beginning. It was decided that the association would be active in the defense of the rights of children and adolescents by mobilizing, organizing and ensuring the participation of suppliers, manufacturers, and storekeepers in this drive. (dos Santos, 1996, p. 9)
The goal of the Abrinq Foundation was defined as ‘‘to ensure respect for the rights of the child in compliance with national and international standards (particularly the 1988 Brazilian Constitution, the 1989 UN International Convention on the Rights of the Child, and Brazil’s 1990 Child and Young Persons Statute)’’ (ibid.). Although their goal was clear, the strategy as to how to reach that goal was not. There was a strong political will and an ethical commitment on the part of those involved to change the children’s situation, but a clear, tangible chain of actions was missing. On this topic, Ana Maria Wilheim reported: In the beginning, there were no clear perspectives. We believed we would learn with time. We had a poem: ‘‘Caminante no hay camino, se hace camino al andar,’’ which in English means ‘‘The walker has no path, he makes the path as he goes.’’ Now, looking back, we can see we were going in the right direction. (Grajew, 1998, p. 13)
And so, Foundation members began with what they had already been doing successfully as a Board of Defense, based on UNICEF’s mobilization and articulation model. The Board was a consultative body composed of experts from various sectors of society, who discussed the challenges around the situation of children in Brazil. UNICEF itself applies the articulation model widely to its own activities:
123
by gathering data, contracting surveys, and analyzing information, the UN agency identifies violations of children’s rights, which it then denounces widely through media, opinion makers, and federal and local governments; it also organizes conferences, workshops, debates and publications on the issues. Using UNICEF’s model, the Foundation selected specific theme areas as initial guidelines for its program ‘‘Defense of Rights, Health, Education and Culture, Child Labor, and Family and Community.’’ Between 1990 and 1993, it became clear that, in all the theme areas selected, articulation was achieved mainly through political action and communications. In the area of political action, the Foundation kicked off 1990 with projects ranging from publishing books denouncing the extermination of children to lobbying for the proposed Child and Young Persons Statute. It was clear that communications would also be an important part of the Abrinq Foundation’s mission. The best example of this key role for communications was the Child Award, created while the Board of Defense was still in existence. The Child Award recognized people and organizations that had developed exemplary activities and best practices to improve conditions for Brazilian children. Given out every November, on the anniversary of the proclamation of the Universal Declaration of Children’s Rights, the Award was primarily a communications activity. The Foundation was responsible for selecting and evaluating the projects, then announcing the awards with a broad publicity campaign resulting in articles, interviews, and appearances on radio and TV. Visibility was greatly enhanced by the awards ceremony itself, attended by distinguished members of the country’s political and artistic elites. The Abrinq Foundation still runs the Child Award and in 2002, 293 organizations applied to be nominated. Other communications activities have been significant as well. Campaigns such as Pre´-Natal e´ vida (Prenatal care is life) to raise pregnant women’s awareness of the importance of the prenatal exam, and Da´ para resolver (It can be solved), a quarterly bulletin publicizing corporate initiatives to assist needy children, were both launched with strong media support. In the language of UNICEF’s articulation model, the Abrinq Foundation was acting as a kind of representative, voicing and echoing the interests of its
124
Emmanuel Raufflet and Cecilia Gurgel do Amaral
constituents – Brazilian children and youth. This solely representative role, identified with the period of institutional start-up, would expand in 1993, when a new project brought the Foundation to a turning point in its capabilities and strategic orientation.
Facilitator and fundraiser: One step further (1993–1996) The 1993 launch of the Nossas Crianc¸as (Our Children) project turned the Foundation upside down. It went from having a simple representative role (involving political and communications actions) to taking on the additional role of facilitator and fundraiser. For the Our Children project, the Foundation identified and selected institutions providing services directly to children, and mounted a media campaign to encourage individuals and corporations to make monthly financial contributions to those institutions. The project solved an age-old problem for people who want to help: which institution to trust, and how to make sure that contributions are being channeled to those who need them. Out of this project model – on one side, individuals and corporations willing to help with the resources to do so but not knowing how; and on the other side, trustworthy institutions in need of funds but without the expertise to raise them – came a new role for the Foundation: that of facilitator, able to bridge the gap between the two groups. As Oded Grajew explained it in an April 1998 review of the Abrinq Foundation’s activities from 1990 to 1997: Our country has enormous resources, financial and material; knowledge, competence, goodwill and sensitivity in many individuals; civil society organizations committed to human rights; and corporations aware of their social responsibilities. Our proposal was to channel these resources to areas where they are lacking and to connect and organize networks and associations supporting our causes (Grajew, 1998, p. 7).
The success of the Our Children project depended on three main factors: first, the competence of the Abrinq Foundation’s staff; second, a partnership with the W. K. Kellogg Foundation, which provided funds for operations; and third, a dramatic advertising campaign. This campaign, created by the well-
known Brazilian agency Lew Lara Propeg, deserves special mention. The advertising spots featured an executive in a suit begging for money from passing cars; their shock value was tremendous. Viewers were quick to recognize the fact that the sight of children begging on the streets had become a sad but normal part of everyday life – just one more feature in the urban landscape. Hundreds of phone calls started coming in from individuals and associations willing to help, and the Foundation rushed to install an automated call service. The Our Children project marked another turning point for the Foundation. It took another look at its mission, and transformed both its structure and scope. The public interest in contributing meant the Foundation had to respond quickly. It also had to adopt operating methods that would allow it to manage the project effectively, and to establish permanent relationships with partner institutions. Above all, it had to assume the role of a prominent and respected organization. This transformation phase deserves further elaboration. The Our Children project, besides reorienting the Foundation’s activities, also strengthened its relationship with the project’s main partner, the W. K. Kellogg Foundation, and encouraged the Foundation to think further about consolidating and enhancing its scope. An organizational analysis conducted by a consulting firm was begun in mid1994, and the immediate goals agreed on were the establishment of an endowment fund, and an increase in the monthly budget to ensure the Foundation’s continued existence and to bring in quality management for its activities (Grajew, 1998, p. 43). The final report called for bigger teams, more projects, more physical space, and more results. For the first two and a half years, support from Kellogg’s Institutional Strengthening Project meant the Abrinq Foundation was able to launch major new initiatives, some of them quite complex. With the Strengthening Project in place, the Abrinq Foundation held two strategic planning seminars resulting in a reformulation of its strategy. The theme areas were abandoned and replaced by four strategic areas: (1) political action, (2) communications, (3) project management, and (4) fundraising. The mission was then redefined as: to sensitize and mobilize society around children’s issues, promoting social and corporate involvement, with proposals for
Bridging Business and Society the solution of children’s problems through political action in defense of their rights and through exemplary actions that can be disseminated and multiplied (Grajew, 1998, p. 44). The reframed mission statement made corporate participation a priority, and that participation was pursued through the establishment of long-term partnerships with institutions and companies, partnerships that would become the hallmark of the Abrinq Foundation. ‘‘The year 2002 ended with a total of 3154 people and companies pledged to contribute monthly to the cause of childhood and adolescence promoted by the Foundation’’ (Abrinq Foundation, 2003, p. 37).
The child-friendly company program: A managerial task (1995) The 1994 review put the Foundation on solid ground for the next phase in its program development: the Child-friendly Company (Empresa Amiga da Crianc¸a) program, launched in April 1995. To the Foundation’s existing representative and facilitator roles, the new program added a managerial role (dos Santos, 1996, p. 15). In the 1990s, with the promulgation of Brazil’s Child and Young Persons Statute, and the implementation of the International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour (IPEC) by the International Labour Organization (ILO), more social movements emerged, and more business leaders willing to fight the child labor battle came forward and became more organized. Profoundly concerned by the child labor issue, and with a profound belief that ‘‘if companies are part of the problem (by hiring children), they are also part of the solution’’ (dos Santos, 1996, p. 12), the Abrinq Foundation created the ‘‘Child-friendly Company’’ program, identifying companies that pledged not to use child labor in their production chain and committed themselves to contributing toward better prospects of needy Brazilian children. Although awarded to corporations, not to products, the ChildFriendly Company Seal was authorized for use on packaging, as well as in advertising and merchandising. To qualify for the seal, a company had to meet the following criteria:
125
1. Make a formal commitment not to hire children under 14, which according to Brazilian law is the minimum age for engaging in paid work; 2. Publicize this commitment throughout its network of suppliers and customers (the company may not, in any phase of its production, take direct or indirect advantage of child labor, whence the importance of raising the issue with suppliers); 3. Develop or support a social program for children or an occupational training program for adolescents (dos Santos, 1996, p. 19). (This clause reflects a continuing concern for the Abrinq Foundation, which is to ensure that causes, and not only effects, are being addressed.) The Child-friendly Company program demanded a broad range of resources and skills, including a call center to receive enquiries, and staff trained to meet with companies interested in the certification process, provide detailed information on how to qualify, and prepare letters of commitment to be signed. Work teams had to be trained to evaluate and file applications and, above all, to check with an array of actors (public officials, councils, unions) on the credibility of the company applying for the Seal and the accuracy of the information provided. The staff is also responsible for organizing ceremonies that publicly recognize approved companies. These ceremonies are attended by government officials, celebrities, media and other social actors. The oneyear validity of the Seal increases the complexity of the project enormously, since the information, activities and credibility of each company have to be checked annually to qualify it for renewal of its social contract. It was clear that the Child-friendly Company program represented one step further towards the Abrinq Foundation’s stated mission. The complexity of the program demanded management capability, a capability the Foundation had been building throughout its years of operation and which became evident in the Child-friendly Company Program. At this point, the range of roles managed by the Foundation was complete, covering:
126
Emmanuel Raufflet and Cecilia Gurgel do Amaral
• A representative role, carried out through a range of effective political and communications actions; • A facilitator role, exercised through fundraising projects made possible by the high profile and credibility of Foundation members and partners; • A management role, exercised in complex projects such as the Child-friendly Company program. The Child-friendly Company program has been a massive success. By 2002, there were 587 childfriendly corporations, which had invested more than US$34 million in health, education, social assistance and other projects for children and youth (Abrinq Foundation, 2003, p. 32). One result of that success was a strengthening of the Abrinq Foundation’s international reputation. In recognition of its work and influence, the Foundation was asked to coordinate South America’s participation in the Global March Against Child Labour, and it became an active participant at ILO and UNICEF meetings on the issue. Further recognition of the Foundation’s status, internationally and at home, came in the form of proposals for ad hoc projects. Well established as a modern and effective non-governmental organization, the Foundation began to attract all sorts of groups, organizations and international agencies who wanted to set up programs for needy children and youth using the Foundation’s network and know-how. This was the case for the Adote um Sorriso (Adopt-a-Smile) Project. In 1996, a group of fifteen dentists approached the Abrinq Foundation to offer free treatment to children and adolescents supported by social service organizations. By 2002, 20,324 children in 185 organizations had been helped, and the volunteer dentists’ network had 3220 members (Abrinq Foundation, 2003, p. 7). The Digital Garage program is another example of a successful ad hoc program implemented with the Foundation’s help. The idea came from Hewlett-Packard Brazil who wanted to develop, with the Foundation, a project to support the inclusion of Brazilian youth in the digital revolution. Offering computers equipped with the latest software, the first
Digital Garage in 1998 attracted 120 young people, who mastered basic applications, learning to operate Windows, Dreamweaver and Photoshop. In 2002, the Digital Garage Project won the International Annual Corporate Conscience Award in the Innovative Partnership category (Abrinq Foundation, 2003, p. 11).
Scaling up: Involving government (1996–) After 1996, the Abrinq Foundation made yet another shift in its strategy, expressed as a desire to increase the scale of its operations and to make its message more effective through a more clearly articulated partnership with the public sector. Oded Grajew commented in the Foundation’s 2000 annual report: No exemplary action of any non-governmental organization will have the power to positively change Brazilian reality if it is not made concrete in public policies that prioritize social issues, since only the State has the scale and universality to accomplish such a task. It always has been and always will be that way in any country in the world (Abrinq Foundation, 2003, p. 17).
This shift in the Foundation’s program towards a renewal of its ‘‘public policy articulation dimension’’ is seen in such projects as Child-friendly Mayor (1996), Child-friendly Journalist (1997) and Childfriendly President (2002). In this last initiative, the Foundation piggy-backed on the 2002 presidential election campaign, publicly calling on the leading candidates to sign a commitment that, within their first 6 months in office, they would write an action plan detailing the steps they would take to achieve the United Nations’ objectives for improving the situation of Brazilian children and youth, and then implement that plan. When the four main candidates all signed the pledge, which was widely publicized, a broad sweep of civil society became aware that public policy would be key to resolving the issues.
Conclusion The Abrinq Foundation has become a respected organization, internationally recognized for its
Bridging Business and Society expertise on children’s issues, social entrepreneurship, and troubleshooting capabilities. Having responded to the needs of more than 1,100,000 children from 1990 to 2003, the Foundation now has 78 full-time employees and more than 100 partners. Its 13 ongoing programs and projects are overseen by an Operational Management Division staffed by experts on database management, communications, fundraising, public policy, planning, and financial and administrative services. Looking back over Abrinq’s history, it is clear that flexibility in the Foundation’s leadership has been a key element in its success. From the beginning, adopting a ‘‘learn as you go’’ approach, coupled with a truly entrepreneurial culture – business people, experts on children’s issues, and artists, all linked by the desire to change the status quo – made it possible for the Foundation to achieve and implement a modern approach to social programs. The Foundation’s strategic orientation and its roles emerged, one by one, along the way. Hiring people who fit into the Foundation’s culture has also been instrumental in ensuring that the staff would stay motivated while coping with a task as enormous and complex as transforming the lives of Brazil’s children. Silvia Gomara Daffre, Foundation Vice-President from 1990 to 1993 and President of the Advisory Board from 1993 to 1996, described the prevailing attitude inside the Foundation: Committed people make up the Abrinq Foundation. The Boards are filled with volunteers. There is a voluntary managing group and a professional technical staff, all deeply involved with the issues. They are all people who were already engaged, with their own history and their own interests. This choice of people, and these people having chosen the Foundation, is the beautiful side of it. (Grajew, 1998, p. 16)
Although the social indicators in Brazil have been slow to change, the conviction that a solution will come permeates all the Foundation’s projects and programs. And if the Abrinq Foundation alone has not been enough to change the situation of Brazil’s children and youth completely, still it has managed throughout its 14 years of existence to be a key player in raising and shaping society’s awareness
127
around the issue of children’s rights. In the words of Oded Grajew: We did wrong and we did right. If we had improved the life of one single child, it would have been worth the trouble. However, we did much more. What resulted was the conviction that the problem has a solution, and a rewarding feeling of having done something for the community. In the future, we would like to have our mission guiding our actions and to see our organization as an instrument and not as an end onto itself. We want the outcome of our work to be an evaluation of the effects of the problems, but mainly, it must result in decisive action on their causes. We also seek to have the numbers related to our children to be among the best in the world (Grajew, 1998, p. 14).
Acknowledgements The authors are grateful to the FLIPE fund, HEC Montre´al (2003–2004), which provided financial support for the research and writing of this article.
References Abrinq Foundation for Children’s Rights: 2003, 2002 Annual Report (Sa˜o Paulo), p. 37. Amnesty International: 2000, ‘A Waste of Lives: FEBEM Juvenile Detention Centers, Sa˜o Paulo: A Human Rights Crisis, Not a Public Security Issue’ (July 12), http://www.web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGA MR190142000?open&of=ENG-BRA, 01/12/2004. Amnesty International: 2003, ‘Rio de Janeiro 2003: Candela´ria and Viga´rio Geral 10 Years On’ http:// www.web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAMR19015 2003?open&of=ENG-BRA, 01/12/2004. Bejzman, I.: 1998, ‘Crianc¸as da rua (e na rua)’, Obser´ ltimo Segundo iG (May 10), vato´rio da Imprensa, U http://www.observatorio.ultimosegundo.ig.com.br/ artigos/pb051098c.htm, 01/12/2004. Clements, B.: 1997, ‘The Real Plan, Poverty and Income Distribution in Brazil’ (World Bank Institute), http:// www.worldbank.org/fandd/english/0997/articles/018 0997.htm, 01/12/2004. dos Santos, B. R. : 1996, Mobilizing Corporations to Eradicate Child Labour in Brazil: A Study of Strategies Developed by the Abrinq Foundation for Children’s Rights (UNICEF, Sa˜o Paulo).
128
Emmanuel Raufflet and Cecilia Gurgel do Amaral
Grajew, O.: 1998, A History of Action 1990–1997 (Abrinq Foundation for Children’s Rights, Sa˜o Paulo). Henrique, C.: 2004, ‘Capitalismo lu´dico: O Banco Imobilia´rio, eleito o jogo do se´culo na Inglaterra, ganhara´ versa˜o de luxo no Brasil’, E´poca, http:// www.epoca.globo.com/edic/20000320/soci7.htm,03/ 22/04. Hilbig, S.: 2001, ‘Trabalho Infantil no Brasil: Dilemas e Desafios’, DHnet, http://www.dhnet.org.br/denunciar/Brasil_2001/Cap4_Trabalho_Infantil.htm, 01/12/ 2004. IBGE: 1991, Brazilian Institute for Geography and Statistics, Annual Statistical Report (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatı´stica, Brası´lia).. Luiz Dal Monte Neto: 2004, ‘Criac¸a˜o de Jogos no Brasil’, http://www.ludomania.com.br/Variedades/ldmcria. htm, 04/30/04. Maxwell, K. R.: 2000, ‘The Two Brazils’, Wilson Quarterly Winter 1999/2000, 50–60, http://www.cfr.org/ pub3637/kenneth_r_maxwell/the_two_brazils.php,05/ 15/00. MNMMR: 1990, Movimento Nacional dos Meninos e Meninas de Rua (Sa˜o Paulo). Nascimento, G.: 2000, ‘A Elite Mudou’, Revista Istoe´ 1635(December 20), http://www.unicef.it/comita. htm, 01/12/2004.
Pinheiro, P. S.: 2004, Most Vulnerable Groups: Children and Adolescents (Violence Study Unit, University of Sa˜o Paolo), http://www.mre.gov.br/cdbrasil/itamaraty/ web/ingles/polsoc/dirhum/grvulner/index.htm, 06/ 22/04. Volpi, E.: 2002, Street Children: Promising Practices and Approaches (World Bank Institute, Washington, DC).
E. Raufflet Department of Management HEC Montre´al 3000 Chemin de la Coˆte-Sainte-Catherine, Montreal, Quebec, Canada H3T 2A7, E-mail:
[email protected] C. Gurgel do Amaral Rua Dias Ferreira 125 apto 302, Leblon, CEP 22.431-050, Rio de Janeiro-RJ, Brazil E-mail:
[email protected]