Civil Enculturation: Nation-State, School, and Ethnic Difference in FOUr European Countries

Thijl Sunier Erasmus University Rotterdam

This article is based on an international research project carried out among Turkish students of secondary schools in the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, and Germany. It proposes the following: the collective identifications of youth from post-migration backgrounds are crucially shaped by the dominant civil cultures of their countries of residence. These civil cultures, which particularly relate to modes of articulation and interaction and discursive methods, continue to differ between the various nation-states and are primarily received and absorbed through explicit and implicit curricula in school. Cet article, qui se base sur un projet de recherche international mend parmi des (tudiants turcs du secondaire en Grande-Bretagne, en France, dans les Pays-Bas et en Allemagne, avance ceci : l'identit( collective desjeunes, de parents immigrants, estfar de mani&re ddterminante par la culture civique dominante de leur pays de rdsidence. Cette culture civique, lide notamment aux modes de structure, d'interaction et d'expression, prdserve sa diff&ence entre les divers Etats-nations et se transmeL et est assimilde, en premier lieu, par l'intermddiaire explicite et implicite de l'apprentissage scolaire.

What would happen if, as an experiment of thought, we put together a couple of Turkish pupils raised in France, in Germany, in the United Kingdom, and in the N e t h e r l a n d s and let t h e m discuss issues of multiculturalism? The discussion would probably result in a conceptual misunderstanding between them. They might agree on content, but each of them would articulate his or her arguments such that they would not be fully comprehensible or even plausible to the others, because the conventional discursive strategies in each of the four countries differ considerably.

Keywords/Mots-clefs: civilculture/culture civique;education/6ducation;Turks/Turcs; migrants; nation-state/4tat-nation; Europe/l'Europe. O2000byPCERII.Allrightsreserved./Tousdroitsr6serv6s. ISSN:1488-3473 JIMI/RIMIVolume 1 Number/num6ro 3 (Summer/6t~ 2000):305-329

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This idea of an experiment is, of course, unrealistic both with respect to the expected results and to the logistics (it would be important, for example, that they talk in the language of the host country and not in Turkish, as this would be their only common means of communication). The idea of conceptual misunderstanding due to different discursive conventions and different argumentative repertoires was one of the "red threads" in the international comparative research project called "State, School and Ethnicity," which ran from September 1996 to September 1999 and was carried out in the four European countries mentioned above. The project aimed to throw light on two contemporary and often highly politicized themes in the studies on ethnic minority groups, namely, identity construction and integration (into the societies of residence).

Theoretical Assumptions Theoretically, the project has taken up recent discussions about nationhood, citizenship, civil society, and multiculturalism (Baumann, 1999; Brubaker, 1992; Bryant, 1997; Castles, 1995; Hannerz, 1996; Ireland, 1994; Kymlicka, 1995; Schiffauer, 1993; Shafir, 1998; Shils, 1994; Smith & Guarnizo, 1998; Soysal, 1994; Taylor, 1994; Van Gunsteren, 1994; Young, 1990). Against the background of the post-war influx of non-Western migrants, the increase of transnational networks, and processes of globalization, some scholars argue that these developments seriously challenge the nation-state as a prime political entity and that we have entered an era of postnationalism. 1Even multiculturalism as a political program, it is said, seriously challenges the traditional nation-state concept. We did not completely agree with this line of reasoning. Despite important developments, the nation-state still plays a crucial role as a powerful force, a political and cultural entity, and a meaningful and legitimizing principle.2 Despite the undeniable globalizing tendencies, each nation-state still entails its own historically grown political culture, which among other things implies that the modes of civic incorporation, concepts of citizenship, and models of integration differ considerably from one nation to the other (Brubaker, 1992; Ireland, 1994; Koopmans & Statham, 1999; Rath, 1991, 1996; Schiffauer 1993; Schiffauer, Baumann, Kastoryano, & Vertovec, 2000; Vermeulen, 1997; Walzer, 1997; Zolberg & Long, 1997). In addition, the project intended to cast new light on questions of assimilation, integration, and cultural change that have shaped the study

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of migrant populations for several decades (Barth, 1969, 1994; Baumann, 1996; Baumann & Sunier, 1995; Conelly & Romanucci, 1993; Eriksen, 1993). So far, the assimilation and integration of minorities have been assessed on the basis of what migrants said, did, or thought. However, in this approach the growing similarities or the reasserted dissimilarities between migrants' practices and convictions and those of native citizens are significant. The project went beyond the sole emphasis on content and concentrated at the level of discursive method. What matters, therefore, is not merely what migrants say and do, but also how they argue for or against certain positions that are contested in the ongoing negotiations of ethnic identity (Schiffauer et al., 2000). Although constructivist and situational analysis have long been accepted as analytical prerequisites and identity is generally understood as an interactive construct, most earlier studies lack a critical assessment of these qualities (Baumann & Sunier, 1995). One of the basic propositions of the research project was that modes of articulation of identity are structured by the dominant political cultures of nation-states. To a large extent they fit into and reflect the prevailing national discourse on citizenship and integration that characterizes these political cultures. Nation-states pass on to their citizens (and citizen-in-sp6 [young people or migrants who 'learn' to become citizens]) messages about how individuals are related to the state and how they envisage ideal citizenship. 3 We agree with those theorists who argue that the tremendous influx of migrants from all over the world has made all the more questionable the homogenizing messages that have characterized political culture in Western European nation-states for decades. Modern, well-established nation-states no longer convey simplistic messages of patriotism or nationalism: their civic and political messages have become far more subtle and sophisticated, conveying seemingly universal values of democratic participation, supranational inclusiveness, and the peaceful resolution of all conflicts. Nonetheless, it is still the nation-state's exclusiveness that wraps up these messages. Nation-states today develop a variety of ways to translate nation-state exclusivities into nationally specific, but productively inclusivist' styles of participation, integration, and identification (Anderson, 1991). The question then remains: what exactly is passed on to citizens(in-sp6)? Political scientists would at this stage probably refer to civic culture: the set of arrangements, conventions, and regulations that structure the relation between the individual citizen and the state (Almond & Verba, 1963, 1980). This may be a useful concept when referring to the Revue de

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dominant set of expectations, attitudes, and methods deemed to structure the interaction of citizens with a particular state and its civil service and other bureaucracies. As such, however, it is too much a criterion for citizenship in the sense of nationality as a status? In the research project, however, we were interested in the socializing, disciplining, and integrative mechanisms at work in any process of cultural change. We therefore proposed the slightly neologistic concept of civil culture. This concept has several advantages over civic culture. First, it adopts the relevance of civil society. It is basically through civil society, that "space of uncoerced human association" (Walzer, 1992, p. 89), that migrants integrate into society. The concept of cM1 culture encompasses the normative and disciplining notions of how civil society and civil exchanges should be structured and conventionalized. Understanding how civil society works is essential to defining a nation's civil culture. Second, the concept of civil culture adds to civic culture the historically particular conventions in each nation-state about how a citizen should interact with the powers that dominate the public sphere: the institutions of the state itself, judicial institutions or the rule of law, the conjunction of governmental and corporate powers, or civil servants running bureaucracies. It connects the idea of civic culture concerned with citizens vis-a-vis state bureaucracy with the idea of civility. Third, the concept of civil culture adopts the idea of a national imaginary as a crucial element in the route to citizenship. Both civil society and civic culture show their dynamics in the presence of a state, notably a nation-state. The most effective means to turn a cold and coercive state into a warm nation-state lies in the creation of a national imaginary that imbues its organizational controls with a sense of community. Anderson (1991) and Billig (1995) provided ample evidence of how this process takes place. The wide variety of symbolic resources that contribute to this national imaginary can be considered crucial elements in the making of citizens. From the term civil culture it is just one step to the process that is deemed to shape individuals into citizens: civil enculturation, s Once an individual in any given nation-state went through a process of discursive assimilation or civil enculturation, he or she might be expected to have acquired specific competences that enable him or her to meet the civic requirements and conventions of that particular nation-state. To sum up, the concept of civil culture fits better than civic culture in the actor-oriented approach we adopted in the research project, because it shifts the attention to (civil) competence. Civil culture and civil enculturation combine three elements: competence vis-a-vis the work308

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ings of a country's civil society; competence vis-fi-vis its nationally specific conventions of civic culture and norms of civility; and some familiarity, conformist or critical, with its dominant national imaginary. We speak of competence vis-h-vis, not competence in or with or of. The competence we speak of is a capacity to conform to or reject, play along with or undermine, but in socially shareable ways. Civil enculturation is not about conformity or resistance; it is about the competence of arguing for or against an option within a (nationally specific) framework of discursive conventions. One can sayYes or No to any proposition, but the style of arguing and the phrasing of agreement, difference, or any proposal for compromise must be recogmizable by others as a legitimate option. These methods and discourses are no longer about who you are, for everyone has the right, at least in normative parlance, to cultural or ethnic difference, but about how one does, for in this respect there must be some similarity of style regardless of the variety of roots. This has fundamental effects on the person thus enculturated into a new civil and/or civic identity. Thus civil identification is a matter of discursive adaptation or discursive assimilation rather than of the formation of new identities. In addition to this, we put forward a n e w related proposition. State-supervised schooling has long been recognized as the quintessential mechanism by which nation-states turn children into citizens or individuals into political persons (Anderson, 1991; Bourdieu 1978; Bourdieu & Passeron, 1977; Gellner, 1983; Harker, 1984). 6 Without state schools there would be no nations as we know them in northwestern Europe, no national conscience collective, and no effective means of inculcating and rehearsing the conventions of the dominant political culture. Although the establishment of state school systems took different routes, paces, and shapes in the respective countries, the present-day educational structures allow for a comparison across nation-state boundaries. We contend that civil cultures that continue to differ between the various nation-states are, though not exclusively, primarily received and absorbed through explicit and implicit school curricula. With respect to the role of schools I mention a few important issues below. First, because simple nationalist homogeneous rhetoric no longer fits with the new multicultural realities of the nation-state (Billig, 1995), its educational program must have a more subtle understanding of its specificity: it is no longer about content within and boundaries to the outside, but about ways and means, methods and discourses of legitimate political participation and civic or civil identification. Explicit curricula have in some countries begun either to reinforce the differences of Revue de l'integration et de la migration internationale

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students' home backgrounds in ethnic or cultural terms, or to ignore them. It is of special importance in studying these multiculturalist openings of school curricula to recognize that different civil cultures favour different m o d e s of translation for established cultural differences. All the nation-states concerned share the same ethos of seeing minority cultures represented in schools while also working toward their civic integration. Yet at the same time, the educational challenges of cultural diversity are taken up in different ways that reflect each country's dominant civil culture. The comparative approach of this project made it possible to revalidate schools as the crucial institutions through which different ideas of civil society are transmitted from political programs into social practice. Second, explicit curricula may be far less effective and their influence far less consequential than implicit curricula. In the latter we examined especially the informal skills and routines involved. Among these are the axiomatic rules of debate, the cultural preference for either majority or consensus decisions, and the legitimization or delegitimization of openly partisan interest. We thus concentrated on negotiation processes in and outside classroom situations in order to identify to what extent (in our research) Turkish students master the national civil conventions.

The Research: Methodology and Data Collection How, then, can the analytic idea of civil enculturation be operationalized in an empirical study of daily realities at school? Messages of civil culture are transmitted by teachers and schoolbooks, formal curricula, and informal disciplines or conventions, and they are received or rejected, absorbed or critiqued by students in their daily lives at school. This focus on daily lives has dictated our methodology, and we have relied on two methodological answers. The first was empirical: use the most detailed methods to observe and clarify what is happening in situ, that is, in the classroom and in the school in general. We have aimed at a "thick" description of what we could observe (Geertz, 1993) rather than at bloodless abstractions of what a theorist might expect. Like any study of civil society, a concrete understanding of civil enculturation "requires that careful attention be paid to a range of informal interpersonal practices overlooked by other disciplines" (Hann, 1996, p. 3). This at least implied that we had to concentrate on a limited number of schools on the basis of some well-chosen criteria in order to do qualitative, indepth research that would allow cross-national comparison. The first of 310

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these criteria was the choice of state-funded public schools for the theoretical reasons mentioned above. Apart from this there were more practical reasons. It is the type of school that can be found in all four countries included in the project. 7 The second criterion concerned the choice for Turkish pupils as our main research focus. We chose Turkish students and not any other minorities because they are more or less the only sizable minority group that has the same historical position vis-a-vis the four national states. For example, Turkey has no history of colonial links with any of the four countries. A heritage of colonization could be expected to colour both natives' and migrants' perceptions of the relevant political culture and would seriously hamper cross-national comparison. The recent decades of Turkish nation-state history, on the other hand, have thrown into stark relief the choices between a secular and nationalist political culture and countervailing religious and ethnic identifications. Most youth could thus be expected to be familiar with the problematic research and its relevance. Most important, there is great awareness of the fundamental choices inherent in articulating national, religious, and ethnic identities. ~ Despite these advantages of Turks over other ethnic groups, we were not interested in Turkish students as such. We were interested only in to what extent they were enculturated into these four civil cultures, how "German," "French," "Dutch," or "British" they acted. In order to optimize the comparability between the schools, we further decided to confine ourselves to the highest grades. Thus the average age of the students involved was between 15 and 19 years. We surmised that younger pupils would not yet be able to articulate their identity well enough for our purposes. Most of the students were raised and in many cases born in the country of residence. 9 On the basis of these criteria we selected one average-sized secondary school located in each of Paris, London, Berlin, and Rotterdam with a reasonable number of Turkish pupils. 1~ Each researcher spent a little over one year at the school collecting data and observing school life. 11 The data collection consisted of an analysis of relevant teaching material and other written material concerning the school, classroom observations, and interviews with teaching staff and pupils.

Main Results The research findings presented here are, due to limited space, necessarily limited and general. For the analysis in the book (Schiffauer et al., Revue de fintogration et de la migration internationale

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2000) we chose a comparative approach that juxtaposed the most contrasting and most telling cases. Sometimes all four cases were included; in other instances we took only two or three cases to build the argument. This, we contended, would not only improve analytical eloquence, but would also add to the readability of the book. A comprehensive overview of all the results in a single article would, therefore, imply detailed casuistry at the expense of overview and insight. I therefore confine myself here to the most crucial results. Although we took for granted that there is indeed a difference between the four national cM1 cultures in the four countries, for the sake of analysis we had to investigate to what particular aspects of civil culture Turkish students were exposed and in what particular frames the process of inculcation of civil culture took place before we could analyse the actual process of civil enculturation of Turkish students. Thus we distinguished three main dimensions of analysis. These can be considered as the constituent empirical cornerstones of the study, but at the same time they together gave us a total picture of the processes at work. The first dimension concerned civil culture as it appears in written and spoken (formal) curriculum. We selected particular subjects of the curriculum that in our view were relevant to the topic. The second dimension concerned relevant aspects of the framework in which teaching takes place, and the third dimension concerned the articulation of identities by pupils as we observed them at the schools.

First Dimension: Formal or Explicit Curriculum With respect to the first dimension, the formal curriculum, the main question to be asked was: How are the principles of civil culture translated into the curriculum? In all four countries similar principles about general educational aims can be found, but they are put into practice differently. Some of the subjects and topics that come up in a school term are particularly qualified to be used as lenses for the prevailing concepts of self and other in each of the civil cultures. The main emphasis of our investigation is situated on the level of how these concepts are translated into narratives and agendas for education. We selected four topics that are relevant to identify civil culture, particularly where it concerns the national imaginary of the four nation-states and the location of minorities in the discursive field: (a) the construction of national history, (b) the role of religion, (c) lessons about national socialism, and (d) teaching about immigration and multiculturalismJ 2 I confine myself in this article to the results concerning national history and issues of migration and multiculturalism. 312

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Although there are some similarities between the countries with respect to themes treated in history books and history lessons, there are also considerable differences with respect to how themes and topics are dealt with. In all four countries history is mainly taken-for-granted national history. The message represents different ideals about how societal exchange should be organized, and one can read them as "civil methodology": Who are the agents who should participate?; What are the principles that should be adhered to?; What are the techniques that should be used? A coherent image of the ideal nation emerges from this. In the UK case, where the nation is conceived of as constituted by heterogeneous parts, meaningful agreements are possible only on the basis of recognition of this plurality. Collective rights, therefore, must be respected. This also means that one is very sceptical about any onceand-for all decisions, which necessarily do not take into account the heterogeneity. Emphasis is rather on individual and pragmatic solutions to do justice in any particular case. The construction of national history directly corresponds to this idea. National history can be depicted as a history of events and conflicts that could be solved only by the British referee role. What the UK stands for--in two words--is relativist pragmatism. The British virtue is to be cool-headed and to be able to find pragmatic solutions that respect the culture, identity, and community of each of the groups that constitute the UK. The common good is reached best by fair treatment in intergroup relations. Boundaries should be respected or they may harden. In France this would not be an acceptable conceptualization of society and history. France considers itself an important and pivotal force in grand universal developments and historical events. Meaningful agreements are possible only on the basis of ever-growing rationality and equality. The public is the sphere where this equality must be realized-the citizens might be (and should be) different only in the private sphere. Collective rights are considered as particular privileges and therefore illegitimate. In other cases collectives might limit the individual's freedom of participation. The state guarantees the strict separation of the public and the private and is, therefore, the frame for the individual's emancipation. Whereas the British notion of history is problem-oriented (and selective), French books try to give a comprehensive picture of the historical process. The whole undertaking can be described with one catchword: rationality, or rather culture-transcendent republicanism. Modern history is presented as a series of revolutionary reconstructions. Dates Revue de [integration et de la migration internationale

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like 1789, 1830, and 1848 mark phases in the battle of rationality against irrationality. It seems as if a (relatively) rational order is erected for a certain time in these revolutionary processes, but it is then threatened again by new social developments. Reactionary forces that have been silenced for the time being start to be articulated again; new classes emerge and pose new problems, and a new revolutionary adjustment has to take place. According to this line of thinking, history has proved that any ensuing historical phase was in fact a step further in the development toward universal rationality. The topics treated in the history books used at the school are modelled around this idea. As in the UK case, historical descriptions in the Dutch case, are problem-oriented. But the themes chosen are systems-oriented rather than event-oriented. They seem to serve as examples not so much of what society is made up of, but rather how it functions. State formation in the Netherlands is traced back to the 16th century. In a relatively early stage the bourgeoisie, petite bourgeoisie, and the labourers were able to challenge the aristocracy. In a series of insurrections against absolutist power and foreign potentates, the citizens were able to gain influence on political decision-making. These insurrections did not so much aim to replace one grand political system with another, but rather to create autonomy and independence. It is no coincidence that ample attention is paid to the city-states of the Renaissance in Italy, and implicitly a line of continuity is drawn from the democracy of the ancient Greeks, the city-states like Sienna, and present-day Netherlands. This led to the development of real democracy where everybody strives for autonomy without slipping into anarchy; this is possible because of a basic commitment to the structural whole, the nation. Contemporary Dutch history shows that this particular political ideal is reached step by step. Thus the unity of the Dutch nation is emphasized. In this sense it is different from the Belgian nation, which is divided into three language communities that still face the difficulty of becoming an integrated whole. The Dutch nation has managed to develop unity without neglecting its internal diversity. The thread in almost all the chapters is the imaginary of the Dutch nation state as the result of an evolutionary development by way of trial and error to a peaceful society where everybody has his or her (equal) share of equality but not uniformity. It is not the history of grand universal ideas, the battle between evil and good, nor that of great men who led the nation to victory; it is the history of ordinary people who take part in a political community and thus contribute to the development of that community, even when they have adversarial opinions. 314

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It can almost be read as a civil religion: civil enculturation is about the development of the moral individual. It is an account of a certain type of morality allowing for democracy, negotiation, and inclusion: the very essence of Dutch civil culture. 13The implication of all this is that the Netherlands managed to organize a peaceful coexistence of religious minorities by "not making an issue of the differences," but rather by "playing down the impact of differences." The Dutch model in a way seems similar to the British in it that it emphasizes techniques (rather than principles); and it resembles the French model because its ideal is the individual transcending his or her culture. The German concept of history is different again. Like the French they try to give a comprehensive picture of the past. However, it is a mainly German history that is taught rather than a world history. The frame is clearly narrower than in French books: developments outside G e r m a n y are discussed only w h e n they have direct implications for Germany (like the Russian revolution or the rise of the United States). The second striking difference is the completely different outlook. The basic message is: Germany has been an economic success story, but it has been a political problem. Whereas political history is depicted in an optimistic way in French books, it is treated sceptically in the background of German histo~. Whereas French history books teach an offensive attitude to history ("judge and act according to reason"), German history books take a defensive outlook: The explicit aim is to teach German children to be on the alert against all totalitarian tendencies. Democracy in German schoolbooks is something that must be defended and thus appears fragile. The messages in these lessons about civil culture are strikingly different from those in the French, British, and Dutch history books. In France, the UK, and the Netherlands one trusts that the common good will prevail if the social preliminaries are correct. Whereas a "rational" and systematic procedure is followed in France, a relativist pragmatic procedure is followed in the UK (i.e., one that respects the particularities of each case), and a common ground is established in the Netherlands. In all three cases the affirmation of the rules is demanded that then permits an ordered social competition, which finally results in the formation of the common good. This trust in the working of the system is absent from the political culture of Germany. The commitment to the rules of the game only appears unsatisfactory, as "merely external." Identification with the general well-being is demanded and must come before affirmation of the rule. One cannot (and should not) participate Revue de l'integration et de la migration internationale

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responsibly unless the collective has been internalized. This is what civilization stands for. Emphasis is on democratic attitude (demokratische Gesinnung) rather than on democratic practices, that is, ways to find a consensus, to defend one's rights vis-a-vis the police (UK), or even strategies of civil disobedience (Netherlands). With regard to migration and multiculturalism, we again see striking differences between the four countries. In the German and French cases they are treated as topics that bear no relation to the actual societal situation in the countries, albeit for different reasons. Migration is mainly a socio-economic p h e n o m e n o n . Economic problems cause migration m o v e m e n t s over the world. Ethnic and religious diversity are apparently not related to the immigration of people from other countries. In French books it is mainly a demographic topic. Integration is measured against a statistical average of the whole population on birth rates, school enrollment, and so forth. The history of migration in France did not and does not affect the universal route to rationalism. The same is true, although for other reasons, in Germany. Germany still does not consider itself an immigration country, which is clearly reflected in the absence of any treatment of the so-called multicultural society. Ethnic diversity is there (in India, the Balkans, and Latin America) but not in Germany. This clearly reflects the dominant political culture of the respective countries. France is the country of individual (republican) citizens, Germany is the country of (ethnic) Germans. In both countries ethnic diversity is treated as something that exists outside or independent of their own civil society. In the Dutch and British cases, on the other hand, immigration is mainly and sometimes only connected to multiculturalism in society itself. Immigration to the UK leads to cultural diversity in society. In Dutch maatschappijleer (social studies) lessons multicultural society is a separate exam topic. Thus we see that both in the UK and in the Netherlands immigration and multiculturalism are specific civil society topics. Immigration influences h o w society is organized, and pupils should be aware of this because it affects daily interaction in society. In the UK case it is a topic often connected to all kinds of anti-discrimination programs, whereas in the Dutch case it often leads to endless discussions about how society should be organized with so much diversity.

Second Dimension: Frames and Contexts This dimension was to show h o w perceptions of civil culture are reflected in educational practices and concepts, for example, frames and 316

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modes of teaching. However, identifying the differences in frames of teaching in relation to civil culture was one of the more difficult tasks in the project. As stated earlier there is no average German or French school. Although the educational methodology of each school reflects the basic principles of the dominant national civil culture, it is also heavily influenced by a variety of specific intervening factors. Local circumstances, the location of the school, the composition of pupils, the (perceived) image of the school, to name a few factors, all contribute to the specific educational agenda adopted by a particular school. It was, however, how these circumstances were linked with principles of civil culture that exposed the crucial differences that made these schools unmistakably Dutch, French, German, or British. Encyclopedic versus problem-oriented teaching is the main dichotomy in modes of teaching. How the school is built up, how it distributes space, gives room for pupils' needs, and so forth are expressions of such educational concepts. But the more general perceptions about the role of education (and school) in society were also relevant. Our focus was not sociological data as such, but on people's perceptions of school, how schools are used, instrumentalized, and commented upon. The analysis of styles of teaching (knowing vs. discussing, frontal vs. project teaching), the role of order (discipline vs. self-responsibility), the role of extracurricular activities, and the division of tasks continue the same argument. Furthermore, the relationship between the school and the outside world ("extension or bastion") and its attitude toward the neighbourhood reflect the self-concept and images of education and society. The main differences between the four schools with regard to frames of teaching lie in the extent to which the schools consider themselves a reflection of (civil) society. Of course, all of the four schools admitted that they have a pedagogical task, but they differed in opinion as to how far and to what fields this task reaches. In France the school is an institution of the republic par excellence. It is considered as the principal instrument of the nation-state. This is (ideally) demonstrated in the symbolic boundary between the school and the surrounding civil society. The school building is closed, and only controlled entry is possible. In the other three countries the school is much more conceived of as part of civil society. In the Netherlands there are schools that explicitly consider themselves as an extension of the neighbourhood. Their task reaches beyond the school gates. Occasional closing of the school to the outside in those countries is a highly sensiRevue de fintegration et de la migration internationale

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tive issue (as we witnessed in the German school and to some extent in the UK school). Such an event accentuates the place of the school in civil society rather than as an instrument of the nation-state. All these civil-culture-related issues and conventions intervened with a variety of situational factors that made each of the schools a unique case. In order to comprehend fully the relation between situational factors and principles of civil culture, we described the schools as places in their social space. 14 Concepts of discipline and social order turned out to be another central element in structuring implicit curricula. This refers not only to c o m m o n observations of how a practical order is applied in a large social setting like a school, but also to modes of conduct and interaction both inside and outside the classroom. Modes of discipline also turned out to be powerful criteria by which civility and discursive routines and conventions were regulated, is In examining these disciplinary modes we found important differences between the four cases. In Germany the code of conduct is not considered genuine if it is an imposed rule. Self-discipline and self-responsibility must come from internalized conviction. Before school it is a task of the family to instill conviction without using authority. The impact is difficult: internalization of codes of conduct is not instilled successfully by families who stress other matters. Non-discipline is regarded as a moral failure and a factor of social class. Contextual evaluation and individual performance of pupils must be under strong teacher-centred, top-down control. This top-down organization of discipline is also characteristic of the French school, but it is not extended to the family as much as in Germany. It is seen as a public educational task. The presence of additional disciplinary staff in schools reflects this idea. The fact that children in France are sent to kindergarten and nursery school at an earlier age and for more hours a day also contributes to this. Discipline is imposed in the institutions, which represent the neutral, rational organization that is set up as an objectified system of competition. Thus non-discipline is seen as failure to live up to this ideal, and thus a failure of reason. Although in France and Germany discipline is imposed vertically, both in Britain and in the Netherlands organization on a horizontal level requests the respect of others (e.g., pupils ask their classmates not to disturb them or others in class). This relates to consensus, community, and negotiation. In the school context it means that one must respect one's fellow pupils, and horizontally imposed control requires a different form of socialization. In the Netherlands lack of discipline means that one failed to participate in the idealized moral community. In Brit318

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ain non-discipline is seen as disloyalty and lack of respect for the normative multicultural mosaic.

Third Dimension: The Articulation of Identities At this level we analysed the net effect of inculcating implicit and explicit aspects of national civil culture by discussing the ideas of the students. The central question here was: What is the benefit and what is the cost of opting into and out of the civil culture projects? The opposite of opting out is civil assimilation, which is sometimes a matter of "knowing and playing the game," and sometimes "internalizing the principles." In general two main tendencies were distinguished in the process of civil enculturation: one convergent and one divergent. By convergence we mean processes and practices of identity construction that were similar in all four countries. In this case one could exchange students from each of the countries, whereas in the case of divergence one could see how national these students have become. I concentrate on the divergent cases because they reveal most strikingly the results of the process of civil enculturation. In order to collect relevant data, we analysed negotiation processes, argumentative strategies, modes of conflict management, and other discursive processes that gave us a clue as to how Turkish pupils argue and negotiate given the conventions and conditions that are related to specific civil cultures. We particularly (but not exclusively) concentrated on issues related to (ethnic or religious) identity negotiations because they gave us good insight into the extent to which Turkish pupils in each of the four schools mastered and understood the dominant civil conventions. An important aspect of civil culture in this respect is the construction of otherness. 1~ Negotiation of identity is a common practice in all four countries in a variety of situations. We concentrated on those within the (more or less) binding limits of the school. An examination of the negotiation processes revealed, first of all, that Turkish pupils are not trapped between two cultures as is often claimed, but between several culturalized and ethnicized discourses in a field of forces that demands complex processes of association and dissociation. They follow a winding path between the varying demands placed on them: their identity negotiations vis-~-vis parents, peers, or society thus draw on different resources under different circumstances. The most successful pupils manage to cope with these sometimes conflicting requirements and to "play the game of civility." Each of the four civil cultures has its own principles as to how Revue de I'integration et de la migration internationale

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negotiations ideally should take place. Negotiating identities is a matter of manipulating boundaries, but what are seen as crucial boundaries and what operational space is available differed considerably. 17 The French "nation above communities" concept says: play the French card, make use of what the French civil project offers as identity options. The ethnic card is taboo and ruled out following alienation from the French republican concept. In France a legitimate argument is that one may be accused of denying universalism or republican equality or social exclusion. Ordinary matters such as the timetable or a quarrel between two pupils are settled by teachers or the subdirector, but when republican principles are involved conflicts are defined in more collective terms. In such cases ethnic and republican arguments and strategies are pitted against each other. In the French case there seemed to be a sharp division between ethnic categorization--common among pupils at the school--routinely used for daily reference and the much more politicized dominant criteria by which the French state distinguishes between Immigrds and Franr Pupils know that their ethnic background cannot be a factor in discussions about rights and duties pertaining to citizenship. None of the students voiced arguments that distinguish between people with and without French citizenship. The republican message was clearly understood: if you want full rights, become a French citizen. It leaves no room for boundary manipulation: you are either French or you are out. The last option is also a viable strategy. In the UK case, where the nation is perceived as "nation of communities," boundaries were clearly defined. Apart from this the British case was almost the reverse of the French. The emphasis in the UK on community rights can give rise to a perception of unfair treatment that can lead to the envy of and comparison with English pupils. Because boundaries are more or less well defined and acknowledged in the British case, asking for fair treatment is situated on the basis of a shifting of boundaries under an overarching common denominator: we, the Turks, want the same as the English because we are British too. This was even more observable in conflict situations. The net result, or rather the successful strategy in this case was, however, more complex. Whereas the French way to civil enculturation is straight and unidirectional and results are relatively easy to calibrate, the British case revealed many situations where conflicting requirements intersected. Thus emphasizing community rights often infringed on the other British principle of fair and equal treatment and non-discrimination. We observed many cases at the British school where the staff had to take pains to reconcile these conflicting requirements. 320

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In the German "nation of one community" the impermeable boundary between Auslfinder and Deutsche on the one hand seems to encourage ethnicized debate, but on the other hand rules out any reference to collective rights for communities other than the Germans. As most immigrants and their children, whether they are born in Germany or not, remain foreigners, and as their status does not ensure structural equality, they cannot invoke equality. Rights can only be granted by the Germans. Thus with respect to discussing strategies, it is not for foreigners to manipulate boundaries with reference to cultural hybridity or to demand rights with reference to cultural difference. Only if introduced as a legitimate argument by the teacher may students also refer to it. Boundaries are then equally crystallized as in the UK, but without any reference to a c o m m o n denominator as a means to overcome them. The apparent lack of instrumentality so typical of French civil culture makes it hard for Turkish students to live up to the requirements. In the Dutch "nation despite communities" a different strategy is needed. One may emphasize one's ethnic background as an important part of one's identity, as long as it does not lead to a sort of self-exclusion. Ideatly, do not play the ethnic card. It is better to look for similarities with the dominant population than for dissimilarities. Inclusivist argumentative strategies are favoured over exclusivist ones. The abundance of empirical evidence we gathered substantiated this. One is best understood when one can negotiate and construct one's identity such that it fits into the overarching Dutch moral community. Thus the viable option is to blur the boundaries and shift them. As in the British case, this leaves room for boundary manipulation, but where the British project considers the private a political issue, the private in the Dutch concept is rather completely depoliticized: it is none of your business how I behave and what my convictions are; that is my private matter.

Language and Integration: Concluding Remarks To conclude this overview of the project, I reconsider the general implications of the process of civil enculturation in relation to current debates about the integration of migrants and the role of language. The concept of civil culture offers insight into the arguments, considerations, and principles that underlie these debates in that it shows that integration routes as they exist in the respective countries are not just technical matters. It seems, at least in some countries, that debates about integration increasingly concentrate on cognitive aspects such as mastering the Revue de fintegration et de la migration internationale

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host country's language as the principal condition for integration into a de facto multicultural society (Lynch, 1986). Language is an integrative device per se, but it is also a principal cultural prerequisite and a means of communication (Rampton, 1995). Language thus brings together all the elements of civil competence. In the UK case there is an in-built tension between the principle of equal rights for all communities and the principle of racial equality and fair treatment. The apparent dominant status of English is linked to an idea of racial equality and fair competition, e m b e d d e d in a notion of the nation as an ethnic mosaic. The argument is: whether we accept a certain degree of multiculturalism in our society or not, everybody must have a reasonable c o m m a n d of English; otherwise nothing works. A good c o m m a n d of English was considered to be essential for being a part of the nation. On the other hand, however, the use of Turkish was considered as opting into the British national concept. Language (in this case Turkish) was thus conceived as (part of) the cultural heritage of a section of the population. On this level Turkish was equal to English as both are community languages. But at the same time English was understood as the language in which one could negotiate and defend equality. It is the lingua franca for equal rights. Thus although language belongs to the field of cultural politics per se, the strong emphasis on performance and communication gives English its central status. Widespread arguments against the use of mother tongues in the German case were linked to ideas about German culture and descent. But there seemed to be little need to articulate these arguments. German as the homogenizing agent is self-evident, and the prevalence of German as a crucial feature of German culture was taken for granted. There was no need to argue in favour of German. Mastering proper German was considered an integral part of a long-term route to adaptation as a key to taking part in that society. In order to function properly in a Germ a n school and to attain an adequate level of linguistic competence, one must have a good command of German. This is considered one of the essential prerequisites for being qualified to make responsible personal comments and evaluations. Speaking Turkish is, therefore, a sign of unwillingness to live up to these requirements and to adapt to German society. But complete adaptation as envisaged in the German model may also give rise to mistrust about intentions, which is why inclusion is a matter of generations. Because Germany is perceived as a nation with ethnic and linguistic h o m o g e n e i t y it m a k e s no difference if Germany's foreigners (Auslfinder) speak German, at least not in the short 322

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run. If their ethnic background is Turkish, they are considered a foreigner, even when they speak only German. As in the British case language is equated with culture. In the Dutch case arguments are much more pedagogical and explicit. In the Dutch model of a nation despite communities, moral community is envisaged to which every member of society, irrespective of his or her ethnic background, must be able to subscribe. This a moral community is the key to opting into the national model. One remains a Turk (or rather an alien [allochthon]) in the Netherlands whether one speaks Dutch or Turkish, but in order to participate in that moral community one needs to be on "speaking terms". This strategy of internal inclusivism demands an approach in favour of participation where ethnic and cultural differences must be deemphasized. The contrast with the German case is that no exclusivism is implied in this idea because ethnic diversity is part of the Dutch model. The school is a pedagogical instrument of society. It is a place where civil values and goals crystallize. A good command of Dutch is the key to optimal participation in society which will lead to equal opportunities and overcome backwardness (achterstand). The principal task of the school is to accomplish this aim. However, because the Dutch nation is also perceived as a nation despite communities, a certain degree of cultural diversity must be ensured. Arguments for allowing Turkish in schools were easily challenged by "rational" cognitive arguments. Turkish does indeed constitute an important part of the cultural background of Turkish pupils, but not in a school. Even w h e n lessons in mother tongues were taught, this was justified with the argument that it is beneficial for learning the second language (i.e., Dutch) more quickly. So this situation was almost the opposite of the British case. Turkish is a (sub)cultural prerequisite that pertains to the strictly private sphere. It only functions within Dutch society when it sustains the integration process. Language is thus a social skill rather than a relevant cultural trait. The effectiveness of the French model lies in the fact that cognitive arguments and arguments related to the characteristics of the French nation are consistent and reinforce each other: the only key to integration as a migrant is French citizenship. In other words, French minority policies and republican policies run parallel to each other. One result is that the boundary between private and public is defined differently. In other words, the private sphere is considered to be smaller than in the other countries. In the French case the argument was that equality is accomplished only through a complete command of the French lanRevue de l'integration et de la migration internationale

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guage. Any other option was inconceivable. The key concept was citizenship through assimilation. The school was not considered as just an instrument of the republic; it embodied the republic. In France, which is envisaged as a nation above communities, the prominent status of the French language apparently led to a clear and explicit attitude against the use of Turkish. According to the French rationality model there are no intermediary identities in the public domain other than French citizenship. The use of Turkish belongs to the private domain, which is more narrowly defined than, for example, in the UK. Speaking Turkish at school, which belongs to the public domain, was considered to be opting out of this model. At school speaking Turkish was considered a purely personal and private matter used mainly in family situations. Language (i.e., French) is the key to civil competence. As in the Dutch case the cultural dimension was considered irrelevant to the social process. Although one can apply the concept of assimilation as in the German case, assimilation (through language skills) had an instrumentalist rather than a cultural connotation. In addition, we see that in the French, the Dutch, and to a lesser extent in the UK case there were arguments that pertain to the integration of individual members of minority groups. A comparison of these types of argumentation, reveals some remarkable similarities and dissimilarities. With regard to arguments that pertain to individual routes to integration into society, the French and Dutch schools seemed to follow the same kind of instrumental logic, which accords a prominent status to the national language as the integrative device. Consequently, rules about the use of mother tongues were transparent and unequivocal and reinforced each other. In the German case, on the other hand, such instrumentality was nonexistent as the status of mother tongues and German was not linked to any instrumental integration route. The dominance of German is an expression of the monolingual habitus of German schools, rather than a pedagogical instrument (Sunier, 2000). Although the research project was aimed primarily at contributing to the theoretical debates about citizenship, multiculturalism, and identity formation, it is also relevant to issues like school success among migrant pupils, integration policies, so-called split loyalties, and other themes that seem to dominate the contemporary public debate about migrants. The results of the research offer us, for example, evidence about h o w school success is to be understood. Many observations about low levels of educational achievement among migrant pupils are still confined to cognitive shortcomings. These may be essential, but success requires 324

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not only the simple mastering of the content of the formal curriculum, but also acceptance of the principles of civil culture and the "civil methodology" as they are implicitly transmitted to pupils. Success also requires a high level of civil enculturation and thus a positive attitude toward the ideal route to full citizenship. A critical assessment of this route in its full consequences at the school level may well contribute to a better understanding of the (failing, but also successful) school careers of migrant pupils. Acknowledgments The research project was funded by the German VW Stiftung and was carried out in close cooperation by the Viadrina University of Frankfurt (O), the CERI Institute of Paris, the University of Amsterdam, and Oxford University. This article is based on the findings of this project, and although I am entirely responsible for the content of the text, t am greatly indebted to my colleagues Werner Schiffauer (Germany), Steven Vertovec (UK), Gerd Baumann (Netherlands), Riva Kastoryano (France), Beate Collet (France), Sabine Mannitz (Germany), andTalip Kiir (UK), with whom I took part in the research project. The first four supervised the research and the latter three carried out the fieldwork in the respective countries. My part was in the Netherlands. The book entitled Civil Enculturation. Nation-State, School and Ethnic Difference in four European Countries is due to be published toward the end of 2000.

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Notes Soysal (1994) argued that "The recent guestworker experience reflects a time when national citizenship is losing ground to a more universal model of membership, anchored in deterritorialized notions of persons' rights. This new model, which I call postnational, reflects a different logic and praxis: what were previously defined as national rights become entitlements legitimized on the basis of personhood" (p. 3). On the basis of the results of an ongoing research project on migrants' mobilization processes and the articulation of political interests, Koopmans and Statham (1999) have convincingly shown that the nation-state did not lose its salience. As they put it, "the nationstate continues to be by far the most important flame of reference for the identities, organisations, and claims of ethnic minorities, and national authorities remain the almost exclusive addressees of the demands of these minorities" (pp. 688-689). Koopmans and Statham (1999) came to a conclusion that points in the same direction when they stated, "The kind of collective identities that migrant minorities put forward in their claims making are not self-evident, but signify specific constructions of the group's image of itself and its relation to the wider society, including other migrant groups" (pp. 671-672). They show that identity negotiation takes place in the ideological, societal, and political framework of society. In recent debates about multiculturalism, several alternative concepts have been proposed such as postnational citizenship (Soysal, 1994), multicultural citizenship (Kymlicka, 1995), neo-republican citizenship (Van Gunsteren, 1994) to overcome the limitations of national citizenship and civic culture. Although these concepts shift the emphasis from citizenship as a status to citizenship as a competence, they lack a clear assessment as to how this competence is acquired and passed to citizens in-sp6 (Baumann, 2000). The term can be specified by adding nothing more than the adjective civil to the well-established definition: [civil] enculturation is "the process by which an individual acquires the mental representations (beliefs, knowledge, and so forth) and patterns of

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behaviour required to function as a member of a [civil] culture ... [largely] taking place as part of the process of ... education" (Rhum, 1997, p. 149). As Smith (1995) has put it, "certainly, most governments since the end of the nineteenth century have seen it as one of their prime duties to establish, fund and increasingly direct a mass system of public education-compulsory, standardised, hierarchical, academy-supervised and diploma-conferring-in order to create [both] an efficient labour force and [a] loyal, homogeneous citizenry" (p. 91). This is especially relevant in the Netherlands where there are, apart from a few private schools, state-funded confessional schools. The Dutch system originated in the so-called school struggle at the beginning of the 20th century that resulted in the Constitution of 1917. From then on Catholic, Protestant, and public schools were treated on a completely equal basis (Knippenberg & van der Wusten, 1992). Although all types of school must adhere to the same educational standards set by the state, there has always been public discussion about the extent to which confessional schools teach pupils the required civil principles that are said to characterize the Dutch nation-state. This discussion has gained m o m e n t u m in the 1990s when Muslims, making use of the legal possibilities, started to set up their own confessional schools ( R a t h e t al., 1996). Although there are state-funded confessional schools in other countries, their position is in no way comparable to those in the Netherlands. There are differences, of course, in this category. Mainland Turks, Cypriot Turks, and Turkish Kurds are obvious distinctions, and we referred to them wherever the data suggested that they were relevant. The topic of this analysis, however, was not Turkish youth as such, but, as the title says, "nation-state, school, and ethnic difference." We therefore reported the comments and arguments of "native" students almost as much as those of "foreign" ones, and we also left intact the discussions where students from Turkey were seconded or contradicted by other Muslim students from Somalia or Mauritius, just as we reported "native" students seeking the support of fellow students born in Bosnia or the Caribbean. How could one do otherwise w h e n working in mixed schools where different cultural identities run across each other in changing contexts? So far as there was a focus on "non-native" students, it was for the obvious reason: if civil enculturation is the crucial mechanism of the post-nationalist and p o s t - i m m i g r a t i o n n a t i o n - s t a t e school, t h e n we need to focus on the n o n - or yet-to-be-nationals, the n e w citizens. Having applied these criteria, it becomes immediately clear what methodological difficulties one has to face in such qualitative research. Because we confined ourselves to one school in each of the four countries, the critique could well be that every school, even in the centralized French school system, is unique. How can a single school give us insight into the relevant traits of civil culture that are transferred? Or, in other words, there are so many schoolspecific intervening factors that it is hardly possible to distinguish them from civil culture. There is indeed no such thing as an average Dutch, German, French, or UK school. Tire basic assumption in this type of research is that cM1 culture is transferred at school. Schools do not work in a void. They are an integral part of civil society and instruments of the state. There are patterns and indeed consistencies of designing, inculcating, and receiving or rejecting cMl-cultural messages, which could not be plausibly shifted from Paris to London or Rotterdam. These patterns can only be analysed through a research methodology that takes into account all possible factors that contribute to and influence the inculcation process. School-specific circumstances such as the composition and characteristics of the staff, the location of the school, its image and reputation vis-a-vis other schools, and the number and ethnic composition of migrant pupils are relevant and must be taken into account in the analysis. Through careful and thorough data collection, close co-operation between the researchers on an almost weekly basis, and continual comparison of the results, we were able to identify relevant processes at work.

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The choice for a school in these (large) cities was again a point for concern. Not only it is expected that circumstances in larger cities differ considerably from those in towns and villages, but in some countries the educational policies are regionally different, notably in Germany where education is a matter of the Bm~desliiuder.All these factors had to be taken in account. In order to optimize the comparability- of data and to avoid "blind spots" so common when one digs oneself into a research site, each of the researchers visited the other project schools at least once. By' evaluating these visits and the observations made, we were able to improve our sensitivity_"for relevant information that needed to be collected. We chose these four topics because we expected they would give us adequate insight into how nation-states view themselves. With respect to the role of reli~on, one of the two topics that are not discussed in this article, we analysed the status of religious education (both religious nurture and religion lessons) in the school, how these lessons were organized, and how religion and religious diversity were envisaged in school books. With respect to National Socialism, we were interested in how the World War II as an historical event was presented, notably' the respective nation's (historical) position in it but, more important, what was to be learned from the rise and fall of the Nazis and how we should deal with National Socialism and related political ideologies in contemporary society. Precisely these qualifications are often inw)ked when the present-day Dutch political system is characterized under the heading of poldennodel (polder is land reclaimed from the sea, a catchword for the Netherlands' proverbial battle against the water). Schools are real; civil cultures are a heuristic abstraction. What makes them comparable, however, are such factors as their comprehensiveness and thus a socially varied intake, their funding and management as state-financed institutions open, in principle at least, to all residents' children, and their location in or at the edge of an area of suburban social problems and inter-ethnic tensions. What makes them contrastable, so far as their nation-state and civil-cultural dimensions are concerned, are their different positions vis-A-vis their local areas, the surrounding civil socie~' at large, and the state conceived of as a nation-state (Baumann & Sunier, 2000). As Mannitz (2000) has argued, "The concepts of civili~.' aim at social cohesion to activate mutual respect and societal solidarib, they represent codified expectatk)ns of adequate conduct and its limits, in the positive norm of suggesting an ideal as to how the individual should contribute to the whole, and also in the negative sanctions to recall an expected norm after that it was broken. Neither teachers nor pupils relate their immediate individual performances in school to the scope of societal reproduction, but school routines of discipline unmistakably reflect and reproduce the ethos of the specific civil culture." Each civil culture makes use of cultural dichotomies, entailing shared images of the own national collectivit~ that are deeply' ingrained in everyday consciousness, bolstered by' routine svmbols,, language habits, practices, belief, and effect that nations are horizontally imagined as communities (Anderson, lg91: Billig, 1995; Shils, 1994). The construction of national profiles carries a conception of who belongs to the nation. More or less implicit by' depicting the traits of the in-communitY, the images of what lies outside its boundaries are defined as well. Inclusion and exclusion are thus both contained in the images of the nation (Mannitz & Schiffauer, 2000; Koopmans & Statham, "1999). In the German and Dutch case we were able to collect an abundance of data about discursive strategies by registering and analysing classroom discussions between pupils. In both countries debate and discussion form essential aspects of the curriculum. In the schools in France and the UK, discussions occurred rarely; so we had to rely' on other sources. In France there were some cases of conflict about the strict regulations with respect to religious markers such as the headscarf. In the UK school discussions in the classroom were mainly provoked by events. For the rest the teaching staff claimed to have no time for activities other than instruction on the content of the books, because most students can-m from poor families and had no books. Revue de Iintegration et de Ia migration internationale

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