J OF CHIN POLIT SCI (2017) 22:1–15 DOI 10.1007/s11366-016-9454-7 R E S E A R C H A RT I C L E

Cross-Strait Relations in the Aftermath of Taiwan’s 2016 Elections John Fuh-sheng Hsieh 1

Published online: 4 January 2017 # Journal of Chinese Political Science/Association of Chinese Political Studies 2017

Abstract The 2016 elections in Taiwan resulted in a landslide victory for the proindependence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). It not only won the presidency but also an outright majority in the Legislative Yuan. It is now in full control of the government. An intriguing question is how the DPP government under President Tsai Ing-wen will deal with China which has warned Taiwan time and again that it would attack Taiwan if the latter declares de jure independence. The current study investigates the possible move that may be considered by the Tsai Ing-wen government, that will not irritate its own constituents on the island, and at the same time will not escalate the tension across the Taiwan Strait. Whether Tsai’s policy is tenable given the domestic and international constraints remains to be seen. Keywords Cross-Strait relations . Status quo . National Identity . ‘92 consensus . Median voter The elections of January 16, 2016 in Taiwan resulted in a landslide victory of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), ending the eight-year rule of the Kuomintang (Nationalist Party or KMT). In addition to winning the presidential race, the DPP was also able to capture, for the first time in history, an outright majority in the Legislative Yuan (Parliament).1 It is now in full control of the government. The major difference between the two parties lies in their attitudes toward the issue of national identity, referring to the future political association between China and Taiwan [11, 12, 15]. Generally, the KMT does not reject the notion of one China with Taiwan being part of it while the DPP objects to such an idea and prefers a Taiwan totally separated from China. Since China continues to insist that Taiwan is an integral 1

For an account of the election results, see Hsieh [10].

* John Fuh-sheng Hsieh [email protected]

1

University of South Carolina, Columbia, SC, USA

2

J. Hsieh

part of one China, and threatens to use force if Taiwan declares formal independence, the change of hand at the helm of Taiwan’s government will undoubtedly alter the dynamics of the cross-Strait relations. A critical issue is: how far can DPP go? Will it be able to distance itself from China while maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait? With the abandonment of Bone China with different interpretations,^ the socalled ‘92 consensus, which facilitated cross-Strait interactions during the KMT years, what will be the new formula, something short of ascertaining one China but nonetheless pacifying China, to manage the cross-Strait relations under the new DPP government? In this paper, I will start with an overview of the crossStrait relations, and then narrow it down to the policy choices of the Tsai government.

Continuity and Change in the Cross-Strait Relations The cross-Strait relations involve not only China and Taiwan, the two parties confronting each other directly across the Taiwan Strait, but also the United States which has exerted significant influence over the dispute. In general, the cross-Strait relations (or the U.S.-China-Taiwan triangular relations) have been relatively stable, albeit somewhat uneasy from time to time, in the past three decades. On the one hand, China has stressed peaceful reunification of the mainland and Taiwan, and yet, it has also insisted that it will use force against Taiwan if the latter declares independence. On the other hand, Taiwan has refrained from declaring formal independence, but occasionally attempted to test the red line. As a balancer of some sort, the United States has reassured China that it adheres to a one-China policy, and has prevented Taiwan from provoking China, but has also warned China not to use force against Taiwan, and continued to provide military assistance for Taiwan to fend off a possible military attack from China. Despite the ups and downs, a relatively stable situation, be it called the status quo, has prevailed. Here, the term, status quo, refers to the situation in which Taiwan enjoys de facto independence and maintains a certain degree of Chineseness in its polity (e.g., its official name, national flag, national anthem, a constitution passed and adopted on the mainland, etc.), and China does not resort to military force to resolve the Taiwan issue despite verbal threats now and then. It roughly reflects the situation in the past three decades. Such a situation is made possible by several factors. First, it is the extended deterrence provided by the United States for Taiwan to defend it against China that ensures the de facto independence of Taiwan. Indeed, even after the U.S. derecognized Taiwan on January 1, 1979, it has continued to provide arms for Taiwan by means of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), to facilitate the contacts between the people of the United States and the people of Taiwan. The TRA states that It is the policy of the United States … to consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States [4].

Cross-Strait Relations in the Aftermath of Taiwan’s 2016 Elections

3

And given such a concern, the United States will Bprovide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character^ [4]. Undoubtedly, without strong U.S. commitment, it would be difficult for Taiwan to sustain itself.2 Second, in addition to providing Taiwan with arms, the United States also adopts a one-China policy to pacify China and to discourage it from taking drastic actions against the island. Such a policy can be traced back to the Shanghai Communique issued during President Richard Nixon’s historic visit to China in February 1972, which states that The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain that there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves [2]. Again, in the Joint Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the U.S. and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) of January 1, 1979 and the U.S.-PRC Joint Communique of August 17, 1982, the U.S. government states that it Backnowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China^ [1, 3]. This policy has been reiterated by the U.S. government time and time again. To a certain extent, it alleviates the Chinese anxiety that the U.S. may lend support to Taiwan independence, thus not only paving the way for further improvement of relations between the U.S. and the PRC, but also reassuring the latter that there is no need to take drastic actions against Taiwan in a hasty manner. Third, although unification has been high on China’s agenda, economic reform has taken precedence over unification for many of China’s reform-minded leaders. As Deng Xiaoping said at the beginning of the 1980s, BModernization is at the core of all these three major tasks [opposing hegemonism, Taiwan’s return to the motherland, and four modernizations], because it is the essential condition for solving both our domestic and our external problems^ ([6]:225). He also made it clear that Bfor the interest of our own country the goal of our foreign policy is a peaceful environment for achieving four modernizations^ ([6]:226). Thus, for Deng and his followers, economic reform is the key to solving many thorny issues facing China, including reunification of the mainland and Taiwan. And a peaceful international environment in which the United States plays a pivotal role is a precondition for the success of economic reform. Indeed, if China decides to launch a war on Taiwan, it is very likely that the United States will be dragged into the conflict. Given the U.S. military prowess, China will suffer a great deal, and its economic reform will surely be set back for years. Thus, unless China really feels desperate, it will be very careful about taking military actions against Taiwan. That is to say, the extended deterrence provided by the U.S. for Taiwan does work. Finally, Taiwan has thus far refrained from seeking de jure independence. This does not mean that there is no call for such a move on the island, but that given the internal and external constraints, it is very difficult for Taiwan to actually move in that direction 2

Taiwan’s own military capability may deter a limited attack from China, but such deterrence is limited without the U.S. assistance.

4

J. Hsieh

in a significant way. On the one hand, immediate declaration of independence for Taiwan is not yet supported by a majority of the population; it is thus difficult for any Taiwanese government to seek outright independence even if it holds such an idea dearly. On the other hand, the likelihood of war and damage to Taiwan’s economy, and the lack of strong support for independence from the U.S. all deter Taiwan from formally declaring independence. These factors, the extended deterrence provided by the U.S. for Taiwan, U.S.’s oneChina policy, the restraint by China on the use of military force, and the restraint by Taiwan not seeking de jure independence immediately, serve to underpin the status quo up to this moment. Now, the question is: will the status quo be changed in the aftermath of the 2016 elections?

Moves to Change the Status Quo3 To be sure, changes in any of the above-mentioned factors may alter the status quo. However, thus far, there is no clear sign that the United States will change its policies toward the cross-Strait relations. On the one hand, the United States still maintains close ties with Taiwan even if the two do not have formal diplomatic arrangement. The United States continues to have important trade relations with Taiwan. In 2015, Taiwan ranks ninth among U.S. trading partners [20]. In addition, Taiwan is a full-fledged democracy now, sharing important values with the United States. Thus, the U.S. may feel obligated to provide security for Taiwan, not to mention the thinking among some people in Washington that Taiwan may be used to check the potential threat posed by a rising China in the not-too-distant future. On the other hand, the United States needs to deal with China. China is already the U.S.’s largest trading partner [20]. On the front of the North Korean crisis and, to a certain extent, war on terror, the United States also needs China’s help. In the case of the Taiwan Strait, the United States has to prevent a war between China and Taiwan. Indeed, if, for any reason, China decides to attack Taiwan, the United States will very likely be dragged into the conflict one way or another. If a war between China on one side and Taiwan and the U.S. on the other breaks out, it will definitely be a devastating event, affecting not only East Asia but also the whole globe. This is a nightmare for any U.S. administration. Therefore, as long as the one-China policy can reduce the risks of serious conflicts between China and Taiwan, it is hard to imagine that the U.S. would change it.4 3

Of course, unification of the mainland and Taiwan by peaceful means represents a change as well. However, though this type of change may very well bring about conflicts within the Taiwan society itself and may be frowned upon by some people in Washington and Tokyo, it may not lead to serious international confrontation. And more importantly, this is not a likely scenario at the moment. In the following discussion, I will thus focus on the other type of change, namely, the movement toward Taiwan independence and the likely conflict between China and Taiwan. This is also many people’s concern in the aftermath of Taiwan’s 2016 elections. 4 After the 2016 U.S. presidential election, President-elect Donald Trump made several surprise moves (e.g., receiving a congratulatory phone call from Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen, maintaining that U.S. is not bound by the one-China policy unless a deal is made with China on other things like trade, and so on) in violation of decades-long practices, casting doubt on the future U.S. policy toward the cross-Strait relations. However, given the U.S. interests in ensuring peace and stability in the region, it is hard to imagine that there will be a significant change in U.S. policy under the Trump administration.

Cross-Strait Relations in the Aftermath of Taiwan’s 2016 Elections

5

For China, it is also unthinkable that the current leaders in Beijing, most of whom are technocrats, are interested in launching a war on Taiwan unless Taiwan is clearly drifting away. As mentioned earlier, since Deng Xiaoping’s time, economic reform has been on top of Chinese government’s agenda, and a peaceful international environment is imperative. Particularly, as the importance of ideology fades, economic performance becomes a major source of legitimacy for the Communist regime. As a consequence, they may not want to risk the loss of legitimacy by unnecessarily engaging in war-like behavior. Of course, if they sense that they are going to lose Taiwan, then as dictated by nationalistic sentiments in the society, another important source of legitimacy, they cannot afford to stand by and do nothing. Indeed, the National People’s Congress of the PRC passed the Anti-Secession Law in 2005 to convey a clear message that if Taiwan declare independence, China will have to attack Taiwan Bby law.^ Besides, China has been doing extremely well economically. Its economy is already the second largest in the world. It also quickly builds up its military capabilities. It is for this reason that Chinese leaders may feel that time is on their side so that they can afford to tolerate minor deviations from the status quo. But, again, given rising nationalism in China, their room for maneuvering is not that large. After excluding the U.S. and China as potential sources for change, the only one left is Taiwan. As argued below, this is indeed the case. It is mainly due to the fact that there is a sizeable group of Taiwanese who advocate Taiwan independence, and if they occupy pivotal positions in the policy-making process, they may push for change. The 2016 elections indeed resulted in the victory of the pro-independence DPP. So, will it push for change? In the remaining part of this article, I will focus on this factor, and assess the likelihood of change.

How likely will Taiwan Push for Change? The National Identity Issue For anyone who knows something about Taiwan politics, he or she cannot fail to notice the division of the society along the lines of national identity: unification with the mainland, independence from China, or the status quo which stands somewhere in between. A lot of surveys have been conducted on this issue. In the following discussion, I will rely mainly on the 2016 Taiwan Election and Democratization Study (TEDS) survey, which was conducted after the elections, to examine the public attitudes toward the issue.5 In the 2016 TEDS survey, as in many earlier surveys, respondents were asked to choose a score between 0 and 10 with 0 standing for independence and 10 for unification. Figure 1 shows the distribution of voters’ positions on this issue. It exhibits a multimodal picture with a big mode at the center. 5

The TEDS surveys are conducted by a consortium of political scientists from various academic institutions in Taiwan and sponsored by Taiwan’s National Science Council/Ministry of Science and Technology. Chi Huang has been the coordinator of these surveys since 2000. Huang was also the principal investigator of the 2016 survey.

6

J. Hsieh

Source: 2016 TEDS Survey. Fig. 1 The distribution of voters on the national identity issue (%)

Indeed, voters’ distribution on this issue has exhibited a certain degree of stability over the years. To simplify the matter, I reclassify those who choose 5 as status quo supporters, and those who pick 0 to 4 or 6 to 10 as independence or unification supporters, respectively. As can be seen from Table 1, there has been a gradual increase in the number of supporters for independence, and a more pronounced decrease in the number of supporters for unification, with a majority or close to a majority of voters opting for the status quo. But overall, the distribution has been relatively stable particularly since the mid-1990s. Since this involves an individual’s attachment to the kind of nation he or she identifies with, and is thus highly emotional, it is understandable that there exists a certain degree Table 1 Respondents’ attitudes toward the national identity issue Independence

Status quo

Unification

Total

1992

12.4%

30.6%

56.9%

99.9%

1995

15.3%

51.1%

33.6%

100.0%

1996

21.4%

53.5%

25.1%

100.0%

1999

27.7%

43.5%

28.8%

100.0%

2000

21.5%

46.1%

32.4%

100.0%

2002

24.0%

48.3%

27.7%

100.0%

2005

29.2%

48.7%

22.1%

100.0%

2008

30.3%

49.1%

20.5%

99.9%

2012

27.8%

53.8%

18.5%

100.1%

2016

31.9%

52.3%

15.8%

100.0%

Based on surveys conducted by Opinion Research Taiwan in 1992, the Election Study Center of National Chenchi University in 1995–2000, and the TEDS surveys in 2002–2016 Cell entries are row percentages, and may not sum to 100 due to rounding

Cross-Strait Relations in the Aftermath of Taiwan’s 2016 Elections

7

Table 2 Attitudes toward the national identity issue by age Independence

Status quo

Unification

No response

Total

20–29

148 (51.7%)

101 (35.3%)

26 (9.1%)

11 (3.8%)

286 (99.9%)

30–39

118 (33.5%)

174 (49.4%)

50 (14.2%)

10 (2.8%)

352 (99.9%)

40–49

75 (23.1%)

189 (58.2%)

38 (11.7%)

23 (7.1%)

325 (100.1%)

50–59

68 (21.0%)

183 (56.5%)

41 (12.7%)

32 (9.9%)

324 (100.1%)

60-

78 (19.5%)

153 (38.2%)

85 (21.2%)

85 (21.2%)

401 (100.1%)

Total

487 (28.9%)

800 (47.4%)

240 (14.2%)

161 (9.5%)

1688 (100.0%)

2016 TEDS Survey Cell entries are numbers of respondents, with row percentages in parentheses. Row percentages may not sum to 100 due to rounding

of stability over time. Of course, things may still change as a result of the changes in the environment or the socialization process. A hostile China, messages received from the media or in schools, and so on may all contribute, to a greater or lesser degree, to the changing attitude of the public toward the issue. If we disaggregate the respondents by age, it can be found that a generational change may be going on right now. Based on the 2016 TEDS survey, Table 2 displays the distribution of attitudes toward the national identity issue across different age groups. It is obvious that the younger age groups, particularly the youngest, are more likely than others to turn to independence, signifying that the trend is unambiguously moving in that direction.6 However, the labels given to these positions are somewhat misleading. The positions voters may take include not only their true or sincere beliefs but also their strategic calculations. For example, a lot of people may support the status quo not because they truly believe it but because they sense that their most preferred position (unification, independence, or whatever) may not be feasible, so they end up choosing something less preferable. Thus, the distribution of voters’ sincere positions on this issue is not readily known by looking solely at these figures [13]. In order to dig into voters’ true intentions, the two questions addressing voters’ conditional preferences in the 2016 survey are examined. For these two questions, respondents were asked about their support (1) for independence if peace can be maintained between China and Taiwan after Taiwan declares independence and (2) for unification if Taiwan and the mainland are similar in economic, social and political conditions. Obviously, these two preconditions are perceived by most people as unrealistic. Under the current circumstances, a war is likely if Taiwan declares independence, and of course, the socioeconomic and political conditions between the two differ markedly. Thus, for those who are willing to select independence or unification even under the current unfavorable conditions (i.e., attack by China if Taiwan declares independence and dissimilarities in socioeconomic and 6

A high percentage of those ages 60 and over do not respond to the question. It is hard to ascertain why. A possible explanation is that the atmosphere in the society changes rapidly, rendering positioning or repositioning difficult for those who are old.

8

J. Hsieh

Table 3 Approval of independence or unification under favorable conditions Unification if both sides differ little

Independence if peace can be maintained

Total

Yes

No

No response

Yes

250 (14.8%)

675 (40.0%)

58 (3.4%)

983 (58.2%)

No

193 (11.4%)

275 (16.3%)

37 (2.2%)

505 (29.9%)

No response

20 (1.2%)

37 (2.2%)

144 (8.5%)

201 (11.9%)

Total

463 (27.4%)

987 (58.4%)

239 (14.2%)

1689 (100.0%)

2016 TEDS Survey Those who respond that they Bagree^ or Bagree strongly^ are categorized as Yes, and those who Bdisagree^ or Bdisagree strongly^ are categorized as No. Cell entries are numbers of respondents, with total percentages in parentheses

political conditions between the two) in response to the 11-point scale question discussed above, I assume they are, to a certain degree, sincere in their responses. Consequently, I will focus on those who pick a score 5 (roughly the status quo), and check whether they may shift to either independence or unification if the conditions are favorable. But before doing that, let us take a look the distribution of all the respondents in the 2016 survey on the two questions with preconditions. As Table 3 shows, 58.2% of all the respondents respond positively to the question about declaring independence if peace can be maintained, and 27.4% agree that Taiwan and the mainland should be unified if the conditions are right. Together, 14.8% of the respondents show flexibility by saying yes to both questions while 40.0% of the respondents would support independence but not unification even if the two sides are similar in economic, social and political conditions, and 11.4% would accept unification but not independence even if peace can be maintained. Some respondents (16.3%) would favor neither independence nor unification even under favorable conditions. Then, how about those who support the status quo on the original 11-point scale question? How many of them truly favor the status quo and how many choose it due to strategic considerations? To answer these questions, I first reclassify the status quo supporters on the basis of the following criteria: (1) if they favor independence if peace can be maintained, but do not support unification even if both sides are similar in economic, social and political conditions, they will be reclassified as independence Table 4 Respondents’ attitudes toward the national identity issue Independence

Status quo

Unification

No response

Total

Original

487 (28.8%)

800 (47.3%)

241 (14.3%)

161 (9.5%)

1690 (99.9%)

Adjusted

824 (48.8%)

411 (24.3%)

357 (21.1%)

98 (5.8%)

1690 (100.0%)

2016 TEDS Survey The adjusted figures include those who are in the BNo Response^ category in accordance with their original responses to the 11-point scale question, but are now reclassified according to the questions about conditional preferences. Cell entries are numbers of respondents, with row percentages in parentheses. Row percentages may not sum to 100 due to rounding

Cross-Strait Relations in the Aftermath of Taiwan’s 2016 Elections

9

supporters; (2) if they favor independence if the condition is right, but do not respond to the question about unification, they will also be reclassified as independence supporters; (3) if they support unification if both sides are similar in economic, social and political conditions, but do not favor independence even if peace can be maintained, they will be reclassified as unification supporters; (4) if they support unification if the condition is right, but do not respond to the question about independence, they will also be reclassified as unification supporters; (5) if they say yes or no to both conditional questions, they are regarded as status quo supporters; (6) if they do not respond to both questions, or they say no to one but do not respond to the other, they will not be reclassified; (7) for those who do not respond to the original 11-point scale question, they are reclassified in accordance with their responses to the conditional questions in a similar fashion. Table 4 shows the results. As can be seen from the table, the distribution of voters on the national identity issue is now skewed to independence. That is, many of those who support the status quo (i.e., picking score 5) in response to the original question on national identity are found to prefer independence under certain conditions. More are in favor of unification, too, but it remains a minority. The status quo which is supported by close to a majority of the total (including those with no responses) in accordance with the original question is now the favorite position for only about a quarter of the respondents. Undoubtedly, a lot of people, in response to the original question, choose the status quo for strategic reasons. If the conditions are right, they may shift their positions. It should be noted that national identity has been the dominant cleavage underpinning the party configuration in Taiwan [11, 12, 15]. Indeed, as can be seen in Table 5, respondents’ attitudes toward the national identity issue are closely associated with their partisanship. Using their responses to the original national identity question, those who lean toward independence overwhelmingly support the DPP; those who prefer

Table 5 Respondents’ attitudes toward the national identity issue and their party identification (a) Original Pan-KMT Camp

Pan-DPP Camp

KMT

NP

PFP

DPP

NPP

Total

Independence

36 (10.3%)

7 (2.0%)

0 (0.0%)

280 (80.5%)

25 (7.2%)

348 (100.0%)

Status quo

211 (43.5%)

19 (3.9%)

1 (0.2%)

238 (49.1%)

16 (3.3%)

485 (100.0%)

Unification

118 (67.0%)

4 (2.3%)

2 (1.1%)

50 (28.4%)

2 (1.1%)

176 (99.9%)

Independence

102 (18.0%)

12 (2.1%)

1 (0.2%)

419 (73.9%)

33 (5.8%)

567 (100.0%)

Status quo

111 (48.3%)

11 (4.8%)

0 (0.0%)

99 (43.0%)

9 (3.9%)

230 (100.0%)

Unification

160 (66.7%)

7 (2.9%)

2 (0.8%)

69 (28.8%)

2 (0.8%)

240 (100.0%)

(b) Adjusted

2016 TEDS Survey Only parties winning more than 3 % of the vote in the proportional representation part of the parliamentary election are included. Cell entries are numbers of respondents, with row percentages in parentheses. Row percentages may not sum to 100 due to rounding. The number in boldface is the largest in each row. KMT Kuomintang, DPP Democratic Progressive Party, NP New Party, PFP People First Party, NPP New Power Party

10

J. Hsieh

unification back the KMT; and those who are in favor of the status quo are divided between the DPP and the KMT with somewhat more choosing the former over the latter. Actually, in most of the earlier surveys, the KMT was favored by most of the status quo supporters as compared to the DPP. This is a main reason why the pan-KMT camp, which includes the KMT, the New Party (NP), and the People First Party (PFP), is larger than the pan-DPP camp, which consists of the DPP, the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU), and the new New Power Party (NPP), over the years. It is understandable since the status quo is very much defined by the KMT (e.g., official name of the country, national flag, national anthem, the constitution which was passed and adopted on the mainland, and so on). However, the 2016 TEDS survey shows a significant change in favor of the DPP or the pan-DPP camp among the status quo supporters, which was one of the primary reasons for the success of the DPP and its allies at the polls in recent elections. Indeed, DPP’s presidential candidate, Tsai Ing-wen, was very successful in eroding the support for the KMT by campaigning on the theme of maintaining the status quo, instead of advocating for a change of the polity. And the first KMT presidential candidate, Hung Hsiu-chu, who was later replaced by Eric Chu, made a strategic mistake by moving the party away from the status quo to a position closer to unification. [10]. Then, after we tease out the different types of status quo supporters, and place them in different categories in accordance with their supposedly sincere preferences on the national identity issue, the result, as shown in Table 3b, is similar except that slightly more status quo supporters now prefer the KMT to the DPP, due to the fact that a lot of old status quo supporters are reassigned to the independence category. What Tables 4 and 5 indicate is that the number of radical independence supporters remains relatively small, and many of those who cherish independence may opt for the status quo for fear of, say, a war with China. They may turn to the DPP or its allies, but not to the point of causing serious conflicts between China and Taiwan. This is a constraint facing DPP’s leaders in formulating their policies toward China. To summarize, national identity is the dominant cleavage underpinning Taiwan’s party structure, and the distribution of voters on the issue will very much determine the political fortunes of various political groupings. If the DPP or the Pan-DPP camp is able to win elections and control the government, it may formulate different policies toward China as against the situation in which the KMT or the Pan-KMT camp wins the elections. However, even for the DPP or the DPP camp, there are constraints on what it can actually achieve. Tsai Ing-wen’s Policy Options Of course, Taiwan’s mainland China policy involves more than just the national identity issue. There are other mundane issues about which people are concerned, too. For instance, China as the most populous country in the world is a huge market with, at least until recently, an abundance of cheap labor. For many Taiwanese businessmen, China is a land of opportunities. Some got to China in the 1980s when the Taiwanese government actually forbade them to go. Then, after the lifting of the ban, a lot more poured into the Chinese market either to utilize China’s cheap labor for manufacturing goods to be exported to other countries or to work directly for the consumers within China [19]. At the same time, a certain degree of hostility between

Cross-Strait Relations in the Aftermath of Taiwan’s 2016 Elections

11

China and Taiwan continues with Chinese missiles targeted at Taiwan and Taiwanese military trained to fend off a possible Chinese attack. In general, we can depict the making of Taiwan’s mainland China policy in a twodimensional issue space with the independence vs. unification issue being one dimension and business interests vs. security concern as another [11, 21]. The importance of the national identity issue has just been delineated in detail. The issue of business interests vs. security concerns is also self-evident. In a way, business and security can be placed on one dimension since many people in Taiwan do feel that economic dependence on China may hurt Taiwan’s security given that the mainland may hold Taiwan’s businesses hostage, thus endangering not only Taiwan’s economy but also its national security. In particular, currently, approximately 40% of Taiwan’s total export goes to China and Hong Kong [16], which is deemed excessive and worrisome by many, especially those in the pan-DPP camp, on the island. Even though we can theoretically separate the two dimensions, it can be found out quickly that the two are closely intertwined [9, 14]. In general, those who support independence tend to be more concerned about security than business, while those who lean toward unification tend to favor business and are less concerned about its implications for security. Of course, there are exceptions to this general rule. For example, Taiwanese businessmen in China may hold different views on the national identity issue, but they may favor business dealings with China. And many of those working in Taiwan’s security apparatus are socialized in Chinese nationalism, but may be very much concerned about national security [9]. Nevertheless, generally, the two dimensions are so intertwined that we can merge the two into one without losing much explanatory power. Thus, in the following discussion, I will use a one-dimensional national identity issue space to account for the policy choices facing the Taiwanese government (see Fig. 2). Along this independence vs. unification dimension, we can identify the positions of various players: DPP hardliners, DPP moderates, Ko Wen-je, 7 KMT moderates, and KMT hardliners. We can easily add more to this list, for instance, NPP, PFP, and NP. But for the sake of simplicity, I will refrain from doing so. Given that the pan-DPP camp is the larger of the two major political camps in Taiwan, the median voter in this simple unidimensional issue space should be in the pan-DPP camp, and Tsai Ing-wen’s position is roughly the median voter position. So her position is likely to be the equilibrium, and should be stable. However, in reality, her position does not seem to be stable, resulting not so much from domestic political juggling as from external sources, particularly from China’s insistence on the one-China principle. If China decides to take retaliatory acts against Taiwan such as reducing the number of mainland tourists to Taiwan, it would surely have repercussions in Taiwan’s domestic politics. During the Ma Ying-jeou years, his administration accepted the notion of Bone China with different interpretation^ or ‘92 consensus which serves as the foundation for facilitating cross-Strait interactions. China and Taiwan were able to maintain relatively cordial relationships in those years. However, the notion of one-China is a taboo in the DPP circles. Thus, during the election campaign and afterwards, Tsai Ing-wen refused to endorse the ‘92 consensus 7

Ko Wen-je is the current mayor of Taipei City. In the mayoral election of 2014, he ran as an independent but was supported by the pan-DPP camp.

12

J. Hsieh

Ind.

DPP

Tsai Ing-wen/

Hardliners

DPP Moderates

Ko Wen-je

Ma Ying-jeou/

Hung Hsiu-chu/ Uni.

KMT Moderates KMT Hardliners

Fig. 2 Taiwanese players’ positions on the national identity issue

even though she guaranteed that she would maintain the status quo. In her inaugural address on May 20, she stated that We will also work to maintain the existing mechanisms for dialogue and communication across the Taiwan Strait. In 1992, the two institutions representing each side across the Strait (SEF & ARATS), through communication and negotiations, arrived at various joint acknowledgements and understandings. It was done in a spirit of mutual understanding and a political attitude of seeking common ground while setting aside differences. I respect this historical fact [17]. She respected what happened in 1992, but did not endorse the ‘92 consensus. To Tsai, this seems to be the closest she can get to, but to Chinese, this is obviously not satisfactory. As a result, China shut down the communication channels and took a number of retaliatory measures (e.g., reducing Chinese tourists to Taiwan). To be sure, China did not thus far take truly drastic actions against Taiwan yet. However, pressures have built up gradually but unequivocally. So, what will happen next? Or more precisely, what are Tsai’s policy options? It is difficult to ascertain what will happen exactly, but there are some clues [5, 7, 8, 18, 22]. On the independence vs. unification dimension, she can either move closer to Ma’s position, not necessarily the ‘92 consensus but a proposition acknowledging the notion of one-China, or she can take an opposite direction to embrace the traditional DPP supporters. Each option may be pushed forward by certain forces, internal or external, but may also be pushed back by other constraints. Let me start with the latter, viz., to move to a more pro-independence stance. This may happen if she is in political troubles, and is in need of some support from her base as seen in the later years of Chen Shui-bian’s presidency. In particular, if Tsai and her supporters believe that the U.S. will not actively oppose it due to the U.S. concern about, say, a rising China, a move in the independence direction is not unthinkable. However, there are constraints preventing such a move from getting too far. Most obviously, it will irritate China. Given that economy remains on top of China’s political agenda, it is hard to imagine that China will take military actions unless it really feel that Taiwan is drifting away. Yet, short of military actions, China still has a number of options to retaliate against Taiwan, e.g., significantly cutting down economic interactions (trade, tourism, and so forth) with Taiwan. Without an alternative market for Taiwan’s businesses, this will deal a serious blow to Taiwan’s economy. Reactions from those affected by such development may turn against Tsai and the DPP as witnessed by the demonstration of tourist bus drivers. It is a tradeoff that the Tsai administration has to make and be very careful about. In addition to the challenge posed by China, the U.S. attitude is also an important factor for the DPP government to pay attention to. Some DPP supporters may harbor the hope that the United States may come to Taiwan’s rescue if a conflict between China and Taiwan breaks out, and the situation may turn out to be in Taiwan’s favor as the United

Cross-Strait Relations in the Aftermath of Taiwan’s 2016 Elections

13

States is very much concerned about a rising China. However, the top priority of the U.S. policy is to maintain peace and stability in the region, and it is hard to believe that the U.S. will let the conflict escalate. In the end, the U.S. will very likely pressure the Taiwanese government to scale back its movement toward independence. It is thus difficult for the Tsai government to choose this path. What Tsai can actually do is to solidify the gain of the independence forces on the island in a tacit way, but not to do it explicitly so as to cause serious conflicts between the two sides across the Taiwan Strait. Then, how about moving closer to China’s position by proposing some kind of oneChina framework but not the ‘92 consensus? This is likely given the pressure from China. As noted earlier, Taiwan depends very much upon the Chinese market. In order to reduce Taiwan’s dependence on China, the Tsai government has been promoting a southward policy by redirecting Taiwan’s businesses from China to Southeast Asia. Frankly, there have been some doubts about the merits and the feasibility of such a policy, and even if it is feasible, it will take time to realize. Yet, China’s pressure is immediate as shown in the case of reducing the number of Chinese tourists to Taiwan. The impact can be felt throughout the tourist industry. Thus, tourist bus drivers protested in the streets, followed by others in the industry—and possibly in other industries, too. The room of maneuver is limited—at least in the not-too-distant future. What can the Tsai administration do? Is it possible to come up with a formula to pacify both China and its core supporters? In August 2016, Taipei City mayor Ko Wen-je hosted a Taipei-Shanghai forum. His attitude toward the ‘92 consensus is interesting. To be sure, he did not endorse the consensus, but stated instead that he Bunderstood and respected^ China’s position. He was also quoted as saying that the two sides across the Strait belong to one family.8 Apparently, such a gesture is not satisfactory but, to some extent, tolerable to China, particularly in comparison to the Tsai government’s position. Thus, China sent, instead of the mayor of Shanghai, the head of the United Front Work Department of the Communist Party’s Municipal Committee in Shanghai, to attend the forum. Will Tsai Ing-wen move to a position similar to Ko’s in Fig. 2? It is likely, but perhaps not right now. If the cross-Strait tensions go on, and thus hurt Taiwan’s economy, not to mention military conflict, it will certainly affect the support for Tsai and the DPP, particularly among those who are more moderate in their attitudes toward the national identity issue and may question Tsai’s sincerity in maintaining the status quo. If the tensions heighten to such an extent that the regional peace and stability may be brought down, the United States may also intervene. Then, there will not be many options left for the Tsai government. One possible option that Tsai Ing-wen may choose is to stress one-China in a cultural rather than a political sense. This may be accepted by many of her supporters, and may also be seen as tolerable by China. But of course, this may not solve all the problems. Tensions may stay, but may not get out of control. At this moment, China is still taking a wait and see approach toward the Tsai government, and the full impact of the cross-Straits tensions have not yet been felt; thus, there is still time for Tsai to think about the options to pacify China and at the same time not to alienate her core supporters.

8 See a news report in Chinese summarizing Ko’s position on the issue at http://www.chinatimes. com/newspapers/20160725000301–260,102.

14

J. Hsieh

Conclusion In the aftermath of the 2016 elections, the political situation in Taiwan changes drastically. The new DPP government has long advocated an independent Taiwan to be separated from China permanently. Some would like to change the official name of the country and to eliminate anything associated with the old regime. Some are more moderate, insisting that Taiwan is already independent, and its current name is the Republic of China. It is hard to tell what President Tsai Ing-wen has in mind, but her approach so far is to stick to the latter position. Whether her policy is tenable given the domestic and international constraints remains to be seen.

References 1. BJoint Communique of the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China (Normalization Communique). 1979.^ https://www.ait.org.tw/en/us-joint-communique-1979.html. 2. BJoint Communique of the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China (Shanghai Communique). 1972,^ https://www.ait.org.tw/en/us-joint-communique-1972.html. 3. BJoint Communique of the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China (the 1982 Communique),^ https://www.ait.org.tw/en/us-joint-communique-1982.html. 4. BTaiwan Relations Act^. 1979.https://www.ait.org.tw/en/taiwan-relations-act.html. 5. Copper, John F. (2016), BTaiwan President Tsai Ing-wen’s Strong Headwinds,^ IPP Review, http://ippreview.com/index.php/Home/Blog/single/id/198.html. 6. Deng, Xiaoping. 1984. Bthe present situation and the tasks before us^ (January 16, 1980). In Selected works of Deng Xiaoping (1975–1982). Beijing: Foreign Language Press. 7. Glaser, Bonnie S. (2016), BProspects for Cross-Strait Relations as Tsai Ing-wen Assumes the Presidency in Taiwan,^ A Report of the CSIS China Power Project, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fspublic/publication/160418_Glaser_ProspectsCrossStraitRelations_Web.pdf. 8. Hickey, Dennis V. 2016. Endorse the 1992 Consensus, Ms. Tsai. PacNet 40 .https://csis-prod.s3. amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/160505_PacNet_1640.pdf 9. Hsieh, John Fuh-sheng. 1994. Chiefs, Staffers, Indians, and Others: How Was Taiwan’s Mainland China Policy Made? In Inherited Rivalry: Conflicts Across the Taiwan Strait, ed. Tun-jen Cheng, Chi Huang, and Samuel S.G. Wu. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. 10. Hsieh, John Fuh-sheng. 2016. Taiwan’s 2016 elections: critical elections? American Journal of Chinese Studies 23(1): 9–23. 11. Hsieh, John Fuh-sheng, and Emerson M.S. Niou. 1996a. Issue voting in the republic of China on Taiwan’s 1992 legislative yuan election. International Political Science Review 17(1): 13–27. 12. Hsieh, John Fuh-sheng, and Emerson M.S. Niou. 1996b. Salient issues in Taiwan’s electoral politics. Electoral Studies 15(2): 51–70. 13. Hsieh, John Fuh-sheng, and Emerson M.S. Niou. 2005. Measuring Taiwanese public opinion on the Taiwan independence issue: a methodological note. China Quarterly 181: 158–168. 14. Lin, Syaru Shirley. 2016. Taiwan’s China dilemma: contested identities and multiple interests in Taiwan’s Cross-Strait economic policy. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 15. Lin, Tse-min, Yun-han Chu, and Melvin J. Hinich. 1996. Conflict displacement and regime transition in Taiwan: a spatial analysis. World Politics 48(4): 453–481. 16. National Statistics, Republic of China (Taiwan) (2015), BYearly Statistics: Exports by Regions and Principal Countries (Areas),^ http://eng.stat.gov.tw/lp.asp?ctNode=5615&CtUnit=1072&BaseDSD=36&mp=5. 17. Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan) (2016), BInaugural address of ROC 14th-term President Tsai Ing-wen,^ http://english.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=491&itemid=37416 &rmid=2355. 18. Romberg, Alan D. (2016), BTsai Ing-wen Takes Office: A New Era in Cross-Strait Relations,^ China Leadership Monitor, http://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/clm50ar.pdf#overlay-context= research/chinese-views-presumptive-us-presidential-candidates-hillary-r-clinton-and-donald-j-trump. 19. Santoro, Michael A. 2000. Profits and principles: global capitalism and Human Rights in China. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Cross-Strait Relations in the Aftermath of Taiwan’s 2016 Elections

15

20. United States Census Bureau, BTop Trading Partners—December 2015,^ https://www.census. gov/foreign-trade/statistics/highlights/top/top1512yr.html. 21. Wu, Yu-Shan. 1999. Taiwanese elections and Cross-Strait relations: mainland policy in flux. Asian Survey 39(4): 565–587. 22. Wu, Yu-Shan. 2016. Heading toward troubled waters? The impact of Taiwan’s 2016 elections on CrossStrait relations. American Journal of Chinese Studies 23(1): 59–75. John Fuh-sheng Hsieh is a Professor of Political Science at the University of South Carolina. The author would like to thank Professor Dennis Hickey and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions.