Decision Making by Communicative Design: Rational Argument in Organisations Erik Odvar Eriksen
How can free and equal people cooperate to solve conflicts and common problems in a rational and legitimate way? In this article I deduce principles for doing so from the requirements of rational communication set out in the discourse theory of Jürgen Habermas. I apply them in defining a process of efficient decision making. What I call ‘communicative design’ denotes the design of a reason giving process in which the practice of proposing and assessing claims with regard to rulemaking and problem solving is undertaken on an equal and autonomous basis. Two sets of prescriptions are given: organisational principles for the composition of groups and argumentative principles for deliberation. However, any procedure aimed at achieving a rational consensus in decision making in organisations has to deal in practice with limitations of time, participation and the information available. Communicative design may not guarantee strictly rational decisions, then, but the procedure it constructs does promise relatively ‘more valid’ decisions than might be expected if another procedure had been adopted. This article sets out a procedure for rational problem solving and conflict resolution, an example of communicative design based on the principles of discourse theory.1 Communicative design refers to the institutionalisation of rules for rational discourse.2 It is needed because even in well conducted processes of deliberation and decision making, the discussions may be fragile, prone to disruption and vulnerable to deceit and self-deception of various kinds.3 Practices in organisations need to be regulated by norms of fairness to ensure that deliberation and decision making are sound. If a theory is to be workable and consistent with democratic principles, the citizens themselves must decide what is to apply. Only they are competent to decide what is a good outcome because - as Habermas put it - in a process of enlightenment there can only be participants.4 Discourse theory, however, functions as more than a critical standard for evaluating existing social and political power structures; it also has a liberating purpose in that it defines the conditions of a free society. Unconstrained communication is not the quintessence of the good society but it is a precondition for the citizens to be able to decide what counts as one. Discourse theory gives criteria for rational decision making and for evaluating the validity of norms based on the conception of a justly organised process. A collective decision-making process is said to be fair to the extent that all affected parties have been able to voice their opinion on equal terms, and when the discussion has lasted long enough to reach an agreement that the members can support with reasonable or identical arguments. The question I aim to address is how this account of justice can be used to shape the design of an organisational process. Discourse theory certainly offers an ideal for institutional design. It sets the terms for the legitimate regulation of interactions between free and equal individuals who have to collaborate in solving conflicts and common problems. More precisely, it defines the requirement of symmetric communicative relations and the co-ordination of action plans by means of a reason-giving practice. The standard is based on terms for a legitimate consensus, i.e. an agreement that the participants in a discourse can
1
I am very grateful for comments on a previous version of this article provided by Nigel Laurie, Anders Molander and two anonymous referees. 2 Cf R Alexy A Theory of Legal Argumentation. The Theory of Rational Discourse as Theory of Legal Justification Clarendon Press, Oxford 1989; J Habermas Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action Polity Press, Cambridge 1990; J Habermas Between Facts and Norms The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass 1996 3 J Elster Sour Grapes. Studies in the Subversion of Rationality p 42 Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1983 4 J Habermas 1994 The Past as Future Polity Press, Cambridge 1994 p 101
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Erik Odvar Eriksen support with rational reasons. When applied to institutions the principle gives us procedural criteria for resolving conflicts and solving problems and for deriving concrete organisation principles. I will expand on this step-by-step. The following section introduces the ideal requirements of communicative design, their basis and their status, according to discourse theory. From these ideal requirements of rational communication, principles for institutional design are derived. In the next step, prescriptions for organisation design emerge when the institutional design principles are applied to meet the requirements of efficient decision making. Both formal rules - or organisational principles based on participation rights - and argumentative rules are delineated. Finally, some modifications and limitations are discussed. A key point is that we have to renounce the requirements for optimal rational decisions. We have to design institutions instead for ‘good enough’ solutions accompanied by the means for learning from experience and for re-evaluating the outcome of each decision.
1 The Ideal Deliberative Procedure Discourse theory starts by presuming symmetry or equality of persons which it holds to be a fundamental characteristic of the relation between parties in a communicative situation. However, the theory has cognitive-normative implications as well. People will contradict themselves in practice if they try to justify a norm which would not itself be accepted through a communicative procedure. For, just by venturing into an exchange of arguments with colleagues, the speaker implicitly accepts them as, in principle, equal to him or herself in terms of cognitive and moral capacities. This makes it possible to identify basic rules of argumentation that the speaker cannot deny or flout because they are presupposed as valid the moment discussion starts. By reasoning thus, Habermas has arrived at a rule of argument he holds to be fundamental for justify norms. He calls it the principle of discourse ethics, which expresses the core content of discourse theory: Just those action norms are valid to which all possibly affected persons could agree as participants in rational discourses.5
The normative claims of discourse theory are based on a multi-step argument which can be simplified and formalised as follows:6 1
Justifying a normative assertion in a rational manner means that those involved in the discussion attempt to agree on what is the right thing to do, that is, agree on the valid norms when a morally relevant problem demands a concrete answer. We may then come up with norms such as ‘discrimination because of skin colour is unjust’, that everyone is entitled to equal concern and respect.
2
Such an agreement can be obtained by following the rules for open and just discussion. Such rules can be formulated as ‘formal-pragmatic’ presuppositions for rational argument. They can be called process rules for argument which require a high level of information and the absence of coercion. In practice this means equal opportunity to join in discussion, no limits to time, information or involvement, and equal opportunities to oppose and put forward arguments.
3
These process rules embody respect for the inviolability of the person and the norm that their opinions should be subjected to equal and impartial consideration. Thus the rules of process have a certain moral substance.
5
J Habermas Between Facts and Norms p 107 The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass 1996 Here I draw on: S Benhabib Situating the Self. Gender, Community and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics Routledge, New York 1992 p 31; J Habermas Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action Polity Press, Cambridge 1990; and R Alexy A Theory of Legal Argumentation. The Theory of Rational Discourse as Theory of Legal Justification Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1989. See also E O Eriksen and J Weigård Understanding Habermas. On communicative action and deliberative democracy Continuum, London 2003 6
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The moral message is that the people should be given an opportunity to express their opinion in an autonomous and equal manner.
The bottom line of discourse theory is that everyone has an effective opportunity to express his opinion and give his own account of his interest and needs. This meta-norm for justifying norms constitutes the ultimate court of appeal for judging established institutional arrangements, and it represents a fundamental test of democratic legitimacy. It may be used to settle the question whether the procedure or the outcome of a collective decision-making process deserves to be accepted by those involved. When there is dissatisfaction at the outcome, or when conflicts and problems arise in connection with an institutional arrangement, for instance, one may look into which interests have been excluded, who was not heard - or how well they have been heard and taken into consideration. When, for example, differences in resources, pertaining say, to education, seniority, status or position result in different opportunities to take part, the deliberations will not lead to rational consensus, in which the participants agree with the same reasons. The same will occur when discussions are limited in some way by deep-rooted commitments and loyalties on the part of members, when participants withhold information regarding interest and standpoints, and when they misrepresent their interests. For a rational consensus can be achieved only in a situation where all force and all limitations of time and resources are set aside, and all arguments are presented and assessed by everyone affected. This demands non-coercive and angst-free bodies and a high level of openness. It also requires that all taking part have equal opportunities to put forward arguments and to oppose any assertion.7 In discourse theory the process rules are given equal weight; there is no mention of which are more important. The theory thus becomes under-determinate and incapable of discriminating properly between various democratic arrangements.8 Moreover, the formal requirements do not themselves provide an answer to how the people’s needs and views can be brought to influence the decision. Equal opportunities for participation and discussion do not suffice. It is also essential to ensure that the arguments are actually heard and taken into consideration. We need an additional requirement, that of a qualitatively good discussion. Hence, discourse theory requires that we comply with not only legal or formal rules but also with rules of argument. This derives from the concept of procedure in discourse theory. Neither a procedure’s formal qualities nor the substantial reasons advanced in themselves legitimate the decision reached. To be legitimate, the process leading up to it must have included objections and counter-arguments in such a manner that the outcome can stand up to public scrutiny: …legitimation through procedure does not result from the structure of procedure itself, which guarantees the right of participation, but rather from the quality of discursive processes which they make possible.9
Design and Rationality Habermas himself is cautious when it comes to the question of institution design; designing practical institutions is beyond the theory’s competence. It is so abstract that we cannot derive rules for practical affairs. Regulating conflict situations involves dealing with concrete individuals with unique biographies and life stories. Situational insight and practical judgement (phronesis) are required for knowing what would be right in a particular context. Designing institutions ex ante may therefore easily fail to meet the moral demand to protect vulnerable individuals who are entitled to respect. There is always the danger that a particular institutional set-up may be selective because some voices have been excluded or argumentation is asymmetric because some dominate others thanks to the unequal distribution of resources. Paternalism and new forms of technocracy based, say, on monopolies of knowledge may emerge under cover of ‘just’ procedural principles. The suppressed must achieve their own liberation because only they can decide what is and what is not in their best interest. This should not be left to 7 R Kemp ‘Planning, Public Hearings, and the Politics of Discourse’ in J Forester (ed) Critical Theory and Public Life MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1985 p 186 8 R Blaug ‘Between Fear and Disappointment: Critical, Empirical and Political Uses of Habermas’ Political Studies 45 pp100-117 (1997) p 109 9 I Mauss ‘Liberties and Popular Sovereignty: On Jürgen Habermas`s Reconstruction of the System of Rights’ Cardozo Law Review 17 pp 825-882 (1996) p 880f
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Erik Odvar Eriksen theoreticians who can easily take on the role of ‘master thinkers’ or moral experts. One cannot derive from theoretical considerations what is just and fair or what constitutes the public interest or the common good. The most discourse theory can do is therefore, according to Habermas, to prescribe autonomous public spheres which can function as a safety net and court of appeal for problematic decisions. This is the reason why one has to give up the utopian hope that a completely just procedure can be established, one that guarantees rational and legitimate decisions. Nonetheless, I believe, a constructive application of the theory is still possible, one which takes us a few steps towards the conditions for a rational debate, even under conditions that are not ideal.10 I would argue that this way of reaching a decision - on otherwise equal terms - is more in accordance with normative requirements than other forms of decision making such as voting and bargaining. In a sense it is also ‘logically prior to all other modes of collective decision making’,11 and it leads to more rational decisions because it pools information, induces justification and enhances distributive justice.12 In its present use, the design principle is not applied at the societal level - the society as such - but at the level of social organisation. On this level we find groups and associations where the participants themselves more or less choose the framework of their co-operation.13 There is a range of organisational forms, outside as well as within the parliamentary system of governance, where interaction is not necessarily bureaucratic, governed by legal regulations or interest-based strategies. I am thinking of committees, councils and panels - including ethical committees and citizens juries - teams and other deliberative and decision-making bodies which under public scrutiny define and solve problems and conflicts with no fixed agenda, recipe or pre-defined answers. For all of them communicative action is both possible and necessary.14 Communicative design is therefore relevant to these bodies as well and not only to voluntary organisations such as associations, social movements and NGOs in civil society. The discourse principle is applicable when the procedures regulating the debate, the terms of reference and selection of participants, issues and problems are known and acknowledged in an open public debate. In a way, the design concept could be said to resemble manipulation. It prescribes the control of behaviour to attain particular goals. Indeed, anyone who attempts to improve matters by prescribing rules of action is performing design15 and designing institutions to change interaction patterns amounts to manipulating social relations for the sake of specific goals. In its simple form the design principle thus breaks with Kant’s third formulation of the categorical imperative: always regard others as ends in themselves. On the other hand, the design concept is essential because decision making always embodies a social process of some sort. Social organisations are designed to achieve collective goods, and the purpose of the parties’ participation is instrumental. They take part for the sake of the results they seek and their efforts are coordinated purposefully to fulfil the objectives of the unit to which they belong. This is reflected in the organisation structure of command and control. However, the structure also has to take account of the fact that members may have rights to participate stemming from labour and employment laws and that the need for efficiency imposes its own pragmatic requirements. In modern knowledge-based organisations, employees need to be included if rational decisions are to be made. Employees need to be included in co-decision making processes both
10
Cf the distinction of Apel between part A and part B of discourse theory, and the distinction of Rawls between ‘ideal and non-ideal theory’: K-O Apel ‘Das Sokratische Gespräch und die gegenwärtigen Transformation der Philosophie’ in D Krohn et al (eds) Das Sokratische Gespräch – ein Symposion Junius, Hamburg 1989; John Rawls Political Liberalism Columbia University Press, New York 1993. Apel’s part B and Rawls’ non-ideal theory are thought to control strategic action and power politics. 11 J Elster ‘Introduction’ in J Elster (ed) Deliberative Democracy Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1998 p10 12 D Gambetta ‘Claro!’ An Essay on Discursive Machismo’ in J Elster op cit, and J Fearon ‘Deliberation as Discussion’ in J Elster op cit 13 This is based on a proposal from David Sciulli who links Talcott Parsons’ concept of the professions’ collegial organisation with legal procedural requirements. 14 E O Eriksen Demokratiets sorte hull (The black hole of democracy) Abstrakt Forlag, Oslo 2001, and E O Eriksen ‘Leadership in a Communicative Perspective’ Acta Sociologica Vol 44 No 1 (2001) 15 H Simon The Science of the Artificial The MIT Press, Boston 1969 p 55
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Decision Making by Communicative Design because their skills and knowledge are decisive for rational decision making and because of ‘the shoe pinching argument’ – they are the ones who really know the nature of the problems in the organisation. However, as members of a democratic constitutional state, they also possess ‘inalienable rights’ that should not be overridden. One should therefore seek to establish a design concept that does not use (abuse) people in the search for efficient solutions, but rather institutionalises their autonomy and thereby draws on their capacity to be swayed by the better argument and to find an impartial and rational basis for decision making. So far I have tried to make clear why the discourse principle and the concept of communicative rationality are relevant to institutional design. Someone is rational if s/he is able not only to choose the right means to obtain an objective – a matter of instrumental rationality – ‘but also if he is following an established norm and is able, when criticised, to justify his action by explicating the given situation in the light of legitimate expectations’.16 A wholly rational actor is not merely able to choose the correct means to achieve his goals efficiently but can also give an account of his action that is understandable and acceptable by other concerned parties. Hence, communicative design denotes the organisation of a reason-giving process in which the practice of proposing and assessing claims with regard to rule making and problem solving is undertaken on an equal and autonomous basis, i.e. in compliance with the discourse principle.
Organisation and Efficiency Social and political organisations are established in order to realise actual interests and to distribute goods and burdens efficiently. Their raison d’être is not the protection of everybody’s interests but the achievement of collective goals. Their purpose is an instrumental one. In practice, therefore, we have to think about design within an organisational order that is based on interests and power, or which has come about in a conventional manner, i.e. based on custom, tradition and precedence and which for that reason does not respect everybody in a neutral and equal manner. Hierarchy, division of labour, technical mechanisms of coordination, formal channels for communication and information, are all formal instruments of power that are required if people are to do something which otherwise would not have been done. Hence, power is constitutive for formal organisations and is exercised in the employment of sanctions to achieve goals. In this context an instrumentally rational agent does not try to achieve goals by using merely convincing (or sound) arguments, but by weighing up the situation in advance and deploying threats, warnings or even deception and coercion.17 He is primarily interested in achieving preferences efficiently and not in what is morally right or the common good. Because a formal organisation reduces transaction costs and is an instrument for rational problem solving, its legitimacy to a large degree derives from its efficiency. This justifies asymmetric relations between the members but these give rise to conflicts, disagreements and struggles for power and influence. Conflicts may arise, for example over the distribution of resources, rights and duties within an organisation. The question, then, is how we can adequately handle the relationship between efficiency and legitimacy. Discourse theory offers a process of rational problem solving and conflict resolution based on a conception of the justly organised decision-making process. It suggests a method claiming to be superior to other modes of collective decision making. It is normatively superior, because it respects individuals’ autonomy, being based on the principle that only norms that the affected parties can support in an open debate are valid. When some individuals are not being heard, or when someone does not get the opportunity to voice his or her opinion or does not dare to speak up, it is impossible to know whether the norm is valid or not. Only norms and statutes that are justified to those affected and that are accepted by all in a free debate can claim to be truly legitimate.18 In the strict moral principle of validation it is formulated as follows:
16
J Habermas The Theory of Communicative Action bd. 1 Beacon Press, Boston 1984 p15 Cf T C Schelling The Strategy of Conflict Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1960 18 For less strict claims, see A Gutmann and D Thompson Democracy and Disagreement The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1996 p 101; John Rawls Political Liberalism Columbia University Press, New York 1993 p 253 17
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Erik Odvar Eriksen A law is valid in the moral sense when it could be accepted by everybody from the perspective of each individual.19
Consequently the discourse theory’s demand for a qualified consensus ensures the individual a strong position. It gives the participants equal status, formally and actually. The demand for rational grounds for standpoints may on the other hand contribute to a shift of stands, and avoids the paralysing effect that often results from a requirement for unanimity when matters are put to the vote. This is the problem with contractual constitutionalism and the public choice theory, which claims that procedures are legitimate when they respect the actors’ preferences on an equal basis. This can only be achieved when there is unanimity, which can only be expected in the case of Pareto-optimal solutions, i.e. when an improvement in some people’s situation does not aggravate other people’s situation. Hence, the parties have a veto right. Anything short of unanimity will threaten the rights of the minorities.20 One problem with discourse theory is that to be able to identify whether a decision is rational or not everyone affected must participate in the deliberation process. And this further gives rise to the thesis that the more people who participate, the more legitimate and reasonable the results will be. The trouble with this is the problem of limitation when it comes to deciding who actually are the affected parties. Many are directly or indirectly affected by decisions without it being possible in practice to give them participation rights. Modern societies are shaped increasingly by decisions made previously and by current decisions not under democratic control. In a globalising world and within so-called risk society, the risks and damage which decison-makers can expose others to are growing and becoming more difficult to cope with for territorially confined systems of governance.21 On the other hand, it is obvious that there is no connection between increased participation and increased rationality, something that was already established by Plato. On the contrary, the greater the number of participants, the more difficult it is in practice to reach agreement and the more suboptimal the decisions.22 This is so simply because the more people that are involved, the more questions have to be answered and the more views and standpoints have to be clarified. This not only requires more time and energy, it also increases the opportunities for demagoguery, theatricality, and sophism during the debate. A large number of participants can lead to special interests triumphing over a common interest because discussion becomes over-complicated and unruly. Free riding, rent seeking and the like may occur. How then can discourse theory deal with the requirement for efficiency in decision making?
Contingency and Rationality The fact that the legitimacy of a decision derives from open rational debate does not exclude claims of efficiency. In any practical context people are faced with coercion and limits on time and resources, and decisions have to be made even when there is no agreement. It is impossible to discuss all aspects of a case, one cannot wait until everyone has been heard, and even a sub-optimal decision can be better than no decision at all. Communication is therefore subject to several types of limitation.
Limitations to Communication First there are structural disruptions as when economic, legal and political imperatives demand an immediate result, no matter what morality and communicative rationality would require. Due to
19
J Habermas ‘A Genealogical Analysis of the Cognitive Content of Morality’ in J Habermas The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1998 p 31 20 G Brennan and J M Buchanan The Reason of Rules. Constitutional Political Economy Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1985 p 22 21 U Beck Risk Society. Towards a New Modernity Sage, London 1992 and N Luhmann Risk: A Sociological Theory deGruyter, Berlin 1993 22 Cf B Barber ‘Unconstrained Conversations: A Play on Words, Neutral and Otherwise’ Ethics 93 pp 330-348 (1983)
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Decision Making by Communicative Design expediency and the functional logic of bureaucratic and political systems, concerns are included or excluded.23 Moral reasons, after all, constitute only some of the reasons for decision making in formal systems for getting things done. Secondly, there are limitations on time. It is costly and time consuming to reach an agreement but time is also the very reason why activities are coordinated and alternatives selected in the first place. ’Time is the reason for the compulsion to select in complex systems, for if there were an infinite amount of time available, everything could be coordinated with everything else’.24 Thirdly, one has to deal with limitations on motivation, as when someone is committed to a particular outcome, or when someone acts against their better judgement - the classic problem of weakness of will. Passion, envy and interest - not only reason - are powerful forces in social life.25 Finally cognitive limitations give rise to problems of bounded rationality, as when people have incomplete information, restricted horizons of understanding and limited abilities to process data.26 Rational communication is limited because full information or complete knowledge is impossible and because people are not willing or able to view things from each other’s perspective. Because of such limitations impeding communication, majority decisions and bureaucratic instructions are used so that ‘necessary’ decisions can be made without a ‘detour’ via consensus. In such situations the requirements for equal access and public accountability are waived. Discourse theory allows such concessions to efficiency to be treated as a ‘trade-off ’ between procedural justice and efficient decisionmaking. Such a trade-off, however, must itself be justified in an open debate. Decisions so made are legitimate only if there is the possibility of a discursive scrutiny of the concessions made to effectiveness. Exceptions from public deliberation must themselves be subjected to the requirement to be justified in open debate.27 Because the outcomes of a decision depend on factors beyond the control of the discourse, decisonmakers face several problems. Several conditions have to be clarified prior to the discussion, some issues and participants are pre-selected and time and coincidences decide what happens afterwards. In short, path dependencies rather than rational arguments decide.28 This problem of the contingency of communication, however, which Luhmann29 among others, has commented on, seems different when the distinction between justification- and application-discourses has been introduced in discourse theory. In justification discourses time and knowledge problems are put into parentheses, and the question asked is what is right from an impartial and neutral perspective.30 By addressing the question from a general point of view or from the ideal perspective of humanity as a whole, one may arrive at a presumptively rational answer to what is a justified norm – what it is that must hold for everyone without exception . Justification discourses take place in the general public sphere in which everyone in principle can take part. In this way valid deontologic norms are selected - norms that everyone has a duty to comply with. But it is impossible in this kind of discourse to predict all possible combinations of facts or changes in objectives and value structures. It is these kinds of problems that must be dealt with when justified norms are to be applied in actual situations. Thus a different procedure has to be applied to arrive at the correct result in a particular context. In practice, as we know, justified norms may conflict, and to find out which one is appropriate for the current situation one has to take 23 H Wilke ‘Soziologische Aufklärung der Demokratitieorie’ in H Brunkhorst (ed) Demokratischer Experimentalismus Suhrkamp, Frankfurt 1998 p 27 24 N Luhmann Soziale Systeme Suhrkamp, Frankfurt 1984, cited in K Günther The Sense of Appropriateness p 8 State University of New York Press, Albany, N Y 1993 p 15 25 A O Hirschman The Passions and the Interests Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1997 26 Cf H Simon Administrative Behavior The Free Press, New York 1945 27 R Blaug ‘New Theories of Discursive Democracy: a User’s Guide’ Philosophy and Social Criticism 22 pp 49-80 (1996) p 67 and K Baynes The Normative Grounds of Social Criticisms: Kant, Rawls and Habermas State University of New York Press, Albany N.Y. 1991 p 1 28 For an account of path dependence see Duncan Pritchard ‘Are Economic Decisions Rational? Path Dependence, Lock-In and ‘Hinge’ Propositions’ Reason in Practice Vol 2 No 3 pp 29-40. 29 N Luhmann ’Systemtheoretische Argumentation’ in J Habermas and N Luhmann Theorie der Gesellschaft oder Sozialtechnologie - Was Leistet die Systemforschung Suhrkamp, Frankfurt 1971 30 K Günther The Sense of Appropriateness State University of New York Press, Albany, N Y 1993
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Erik Odvar Eriksen account of all concrete matters of an empirical or normative nature that arise in the situation. This conceptual strategy makes it clear that the requirements that must be satisfied to obtain a rational justification of norms are not totally unattainable after all.31 Besides the presence of path dependencies such as competency traps apparent in technological lock ins another difficulty faced by decison-makers is that, according to discourse theory, the validity of the outcome depends not only on parties being heard on an equal basis, but on the rational justification of action plans. The existence of demagogues and sophists who may manipulate the audience is one problem. This can be handled by a procedure that includes affected parties, and which sanctions strategic action and compensates for unequal distribution of resources. But this does not in itself guarantee a rational debate and sound outcome. If the process is not good, if the debate is ill informed, if the arguments are not tested, there is a high probability that the outcome will be unsound. Only rational deliberation among affected parties can get collective results right. Therefore, procedures based on participatory rights are insufficient because they cannot guarantee rationality. The requirement for normative argumentation must also be fulfilled if rational results are to be expected with some certainty. Only when the participants are compelled to argue their case and defend the norms, and only when they sincerely engage with each other’s reasoning, and critically evaluate each other’s standpoints, is it possible to speak of an argumentation that has the power to change people’s preferences and to justify interest-regulating decisions. Thus, in addition to the demands for equal access to discussions, of absence of limitations on it, and of equal opportunities to argue, a demand for qualification must be added. For the people involved not only to approve of a solution, but to do so with reasonable or identical grounds, we have to take measures such as influencing group composition and applying deliberation rules that can enforce role-taking and rational communication. A wide range of organisational means and social mechanisms may be used to ensure a qualitatively good debate, and not only rational problem solving and efficient decision making. Before we get that far, however, we will derive a few concrete institutional principles that follow when the discourse principle is applied to actual institutions under realistic circumstances.
2 Principles of Institutional Design The concept of communicative design suggests that groups can be composed in a more or less legitimate manner. In democracies, formally organised orders that provide the framework for and structure participation as well as communication already exist. These may be more or less legitimate. If institutions exhibit a minimum of democratic features, the discourse theory applies. People may then use the power invested in the institutions to criticise the established order and seek more democratic forms of organisation. New and more deliberative bodies that include previously excluded groups may be established.32 People can also create new public spheres for open discussions.33 This insight can be generalised as it directs us to the core normative content of the modern democratic constitutional state, of which discourse theory gives an account by reconstructing the rational content of its procedures.34 Hence the concept of deliberative democracy. Central to this notion of democracy is the norm that the reasons and justification for any political decision should be properly explained to those affected by it. It is based on the ideal of public reasoning and on the principle that legitimate decisions are those that can be accepted - or at least are not discarded - in a free discourse. When, from this perspective, it comes to designing an organisation, specifying procedural constraints and composing groups, a collegial form proposed by David Sciulli can be adopted. This is found in various types of private and public professional organisations. Membership is voluntary and the members have equal rights. The members themselves decide the terms of cooperation. The power is
31
K Günther ibid p 8 A Gutmann and D Thompson Democracy and Disagreement The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1996 p 42 33 J Bohman Public Deliberation: Pluralism, Complexity and Democracy The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1996 p 133, pp 197ff 34 J Habermas Between Facts and Norms The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1996 32
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Decision Making by Communicative Design democratically allocated and thorough discussions, modelled on the principles of scientific discourse, precede any decision.35 This makes it possible for Sciulli to use a modified version of communicative rationality as a characteristic of the collegial form of organisation. In his opinion it can be used to evaluate the degree of democracy in social and political groups. In this connection he specifies the procedural norms as the threshold which a group composition must meet in order to become a collegial organisation. Individuals are competent to understand and accept mutual commitments when the following fundamental procedural norms are met:
The rules that constitute the group are general and comprehensible to all parties involved; The rules are free of contradictions and allow all affected parties to participate; The rules may be revised by the affected parties.36
These basic principles ensure that everyone enjoys equal rights to participate within an order that is self-sustaining. However, they are too general to generate practical prescriptions. We need to infer more concrete principles for processes to solve shared problems. Moreover, different types of problem or question require different procedures. Which kind of procedures is appropriate depends on the nature of the problem to be solved. It is mainly when questions raise ethical and moral considerations - i.e. defining collective goals and resolving clashes between interests and values - that democratic procedures are required. This means that issues of an obviously technical or pragmatic nature may be resolved without extensive participation. Although it is difficult to define precise and objective criteria for these, there is considerable agreement in our (western) culture about which types of tasks can be solved by the help of technical and scientific expertise, and which cannot. There is a distinction between facts and values, between scientific and normative assessments, between politics and administration. Insofar as we can isolate questions where the answers depend only on what actually is the case in the world, instead of what we think ought to be the case, we have reason to think that solutions may be chosen without participation from the affected parties. Scientific evidence and empirical knowledge is sufficient when the question pertains to what actually is the case, and, for example, when pragmatic, means-end choices should be made. When the ends and goals are given, pure prudential reasons or cost/benefit analysis may suffice in selecting the correct means for achieving them. According to discourse theory we do not have substantive criteria for the correct answer to normative questions. One can only know if the answer is satisfactory when certain procedural requirements have been met. The result that emerges must be based on insight and good reasons. Ultimately it has to withstand public exposure; it must be capable of being defended against rationally-founded criticism. Institutional principles that can satisfy the following requirements are therefore needed: -
they must be inclusive enough to make it possible for the affected parties to accept the outcomes; they must be sufficiently exclusive to make it possible to come to a decision within a reasonable time; they must be able to apply sanctions to strategic, egoistic actions such as the use of threats and warnings, trickery, deception and manipulation; they must be able to prevent paternalistic argumentation based on monopolies of knowledge, authority and the like; they must be able to enforce an exchange of roles so that proponents view the issues from the perspective of the opponents.37
35 Cf T Parsons Essays in Sociological Theory The Free Press, New York 1964 and E O Eriksen Demokratiets sorte hull Abstrakt Forlag, Oslo 2001 36 This is a modified version of the eight principles laid down by D Sciulli ‘Habermas` Structural Change: Professions and Corporations Today’ paper, APSA Annual Meeting, San Francisco 1996 which are based on Lou Fullers ‘Threshold of Procedural Norms’ in L L Fuller The Morality of Law rev ed Yale University Press, New Haven 1969 37 Adapted from M Kettner ‘Scientific Knowledge, Discourse Ethics, and Consensus Formation on Public Policy Issues’ in R von Schomberg (ed) Science, Politics and Morality Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht 1993
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Erik Odvar Eriksen The principles that we arrived at earlier, as well as these more concrete principles for institutional design, are still just standards of criticism. They show what it takes for outcomes of decision-making processes to be legitimate. But they say nothing about why people in the first place should join together to solve problems communicatively, or what it is that can bring about a communicative action instead of instrumental-strategic action based on given preferences and the calculation of consequences. If a group is to get together at all, function well and address questions in a rational manner, these principles must be made concrete and be embedded in practical organisational measures. I will deal with this in the next section which addresses the problem of motivation as well as that of rationality. But first I address here the question: how can these principles be operationalised? So far we have arrived at institutional requirements by applying the discourse principle to institutions. However, these requirements are quite general and abstract and have to be pinned down concretely. Several practical means are needed to foster rational deliberation and decision making. By applying the discourse principle to the formal structure, allocating rights and duties in an organisation, one can arrive at some of the required elements. In accordance with the established distinction between formal or rights based and argumentative procedures, I will distinguish between two sets of requirements:
Requirements concerning the composition of the group and the type of tasks involved - principles of organisation - and Requirements concerning how communication between the participants should be conducted principles of argumentation.
First, the principles of organisation.
Group Decision Making: Principles of Organisation38 Group Membership and Tasks This first set of requirements deals with the composition of representative and competent groups, including appointing advocates for weaker interests and neutralising any unequal distribution of power and resources. These are rules for including affected parties, the distribution of competence, the neutralising of power differences (by e.g. constraining the strongest) and resource compensation for disadvantaged groups, i.e. the empowerment of weak parties. They aim to establish the effective conditions for everyone to promote their cause and argue their view. In these bodies what matters is the conditions for an application discourse; one must be able to describe the situation fully enough to make it possible to choose the appropriate action norms for regulating interests. It is therefore important to involve all relevant normative aspects of the context in question. To justify the outcome of a decision-making process one must establish bodies that will motivate people to take part and which can reach decisions without excessive use of resources, time, attention and money. The problems requiring mutual deliberation must involve norms or principles and the outcomes must have an impact on the participants. Practical principles for designing deliberation and decision-making bodies can be formulated as follows:
The problem must require practical judgement or normative discussion. It should not be one that can be answered by scientific procedures or by aggregating preferences. The nature of the problem should not be merely theoretical or pragmatic but require normative consideration and public reflection. When science or empirical evidence can provide adequate answers, this type of participation is redundant.
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In this part I draw on J S Dryzek Discursive Democracy. Politics, Policy, and Political Science Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1990 pp 97ff
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The documented problem must affect the parties and interest them sufficiently to take part. Taking part should not be just an end in itself. By-products from doing so such as enhanced personal development and social integration are not themselves sufficiently motivating. Indeed, seeking them can impair the debate among those who are genuinely affected.39
A willing, competent and confidence-generating mediator must be available, one who can lead and help clarify the discussion. He should be a neutral third party who by virtue of knowledge and analytical abilities can help prevent irrelevant discussion and forestall attempts at manipulation. The parties can thus work through their disagreements and differences in a rational manner. The mediator should not be a negotiator, examiner, expert, judge or arbitrator but rather one who ensures that the requirements of communicative rationality are met as far as possible. He or she enforces the rules for unbiased argument, and can thereby lead the debate by pointing out the speakers’ inconsistencies and requiring them to view matters from each other’s perspectives. Research on such neutral mediators stresses that their diagnosing and catalysing contributions make possible solutions that otherwise would not have been achieved.40 The third party helps analyse the conflict ‘...but also facilitates the group discussion by providing the appropriate situation, norms and interventions’.41 A chairperson able to act in these ways may be suited to act as a third party mediator.
Participants must have roughly similar capacities and be able to acknowledge each other as equal parties. Any disparity can be mitigated by advocatory communication which means that the weak parties are given more able spokespersons to put forward their views. Asymmetries in competence can also be corrected by limiting strong actors’ opportunities to promote their own view by, for example, limiting the time allotted for speaking, having trial votes and using roleplay. In experimental situations prior to actual decision making, actors can be compelled not to vote for their own proposal or be required to defend the opponents’ view.
These prescriptions constitute some minimum requirements for communicative design, but they in no way guarantee rational decision making. They are necessary, but not sufficient conditions. It may be difficult to list further conditions independent of a particular context, but more often than not the following additional conditions must be met:
Powerful parties must be included since otherwise they may sabotage any agreement. By being included they are made responsible. However, their strong position should be balanced in the deliberation process by giving the weaker parties assistance in presenting their arguments.
The number of participants must be kept manageable. Including too many will make it impossible for each to view the others as individuals as opposed to an undifferentiated crowd and there will be opportunities for free riding. A balance needs to be struck between small groups in which effective decisions are more likely and larger groups whose size will increase the chances that broader interests will be endorsed and thereby reach more legitimate decisions.42
A contract zone must be established – a set of decisions that all parties can support in case an agreement is not achieved. If there is no such contract zone, it may be created with the help of a third party, or it may come about through a preliminary clarification of principles and limitations for the discussion.43
39
J Elster Ulysses and the Sirens rev ed Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1984 R J Fisher ‘The Problem-Solving Workshop in Conflict Resolution’ in R L Merritt (ed) Communication in International Politics University of Illinois Press, Urbana, Ill. 1972 41 R J Fisher ‘Third Party Consultations as a method of Intergroup Conflict Resolution’ Journal of Conflict Resolution 27 pp 301-334 (1983) p 323 42 ‘Small size does increase the average individual’s power within this or her group, but it also reduces the group’s power vis-à-vis the rest of the world. But direct analysis of outcomes suggests that the interests of the poor are better protected in larger units.’ J Mansbridge Beyond Adversarial Democracy University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1983 p 279f. 43 J S Dryzek op cit Cf also O R Young ‘Intermediaries: Additional thoughts on Third Parties’ Journal of Conflict Resolution 16 pp 51-65 (1972), and I M Young ‘Self-Determination as a Principle of Justice’ Philosophical Forum 11 pp 172–182 (1979) 40
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Erik Odvar Eriksen The concept of a contract zone needs to be defined more precisely. It can be seen as an agreement prior to the actual proceedings, where the parties confirm what they are not willing to risk in the cooperation. Where does the matter stand now, what is the situation, what is to be discussed, what do we agree on even if we should continue to disagree on the actual case? The participants agree to observe procedures and rules, and to keep up their cooperation even if they should fail to agree over a particular question. Such a contract zone helps reduce the number of relevant questions in the decision-making process and to take the heat out of differences. It also establishes a common definition of the situation, which makes further deliberation easier. In general, procedural questions should take precedence over the substantial ones, i.e. the parties should make clear which rules they can accept and which contingencies they cannot accept so that there will be no procedural disagreement when substantial questions are discussed.44
2.2 Group Decision-Making: Principles of Argumentation The above principles concern the make-up of groups. The second set concerns how communication between group members should be regulated. There are four types: rules for validation, for process, for justification and for solidarity.
1. Validation Rules The so-called validation rules aim to secure objectivity and demands supported by justification. They refer to norms such as participants voicing their real opinions without self-contradiction, considering the arguments of others, and letting discussions continue long enough to ensure that the issues are thoroughly aired so that all strands are made clear and all relevant information has been presented. Robert Alexy has formulated four rules for ensuring argumentation will lead to a valid result: -
no speaker may contradict him- or herself; every speaker may only assert what he or she actually believes; every speaker who applies a predicate F to an object a must be prepared to apply F to every other object which is like a in all relevant respects; different speakers may not use the same expression with different meanings.45
2. Process Rules At the beginning I mentioned the process rules basic to the discourse principle. These secure participation, equal access, openness, freedom and non-coercion and constitute conditions for symmetry. They are conditions that every competent speaker must accept as sufficiently satisfied for him or her to take part in a rational discussion. They are rules that participants must accept in order to view each other as equals. They read as follows: -
everyone who can speak may take part in the discourse; everyone may problematise any assertion; everyone may introduce any assertion into the discourse; everyone may express his or her attitudes, wishes, and needs; no speaker may be prevented from exercising the rights laid down in the first two process rules by any kind of coercion, whether internal or external to the discourse.46
44
Cf. U Preuss ‘The Roundtable Talks and Breakdown of Communism’ in J Elster (ed) The Roundtable Talks and the Breakdown of Communism The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1996 45 R Alexy A Theory of Legal Argumentation. The Theory of Rational Discourse as Theory of Legal Justification p188 Clarendon Press, Oxford 1989 46 R Alexy ibid p 193
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3. Justification Rules In addition to these validity and process rules some principles for distributing the duty to argue are required. These principles pertain to deciding who will be called on to speak. Regarding the demand to justify assertions, it is obvious that this should also provide an opportunity to explain why one is not willing to provide a justification, if that is the case. These are rules for reason-giving pertaining, for example, to why one is obliged to produce further arguments only when met with counter arguments and to what morally significant difference can justify the unequal treatment of participants. On the other hand one should stop doubting a point of view once it has been defended adequately. The burden of proof is on the parties who doubt the arguments of another participant. Judging the relevance and adequacy of the arguments is of course in the last instance a matter for the participants involved in the discussion. Alexy distinguishes between four sets of justification rules, which all rest on the principle of the burden of proof or argumentation: -
whoever proposes to treat a person A differently from a person B is obliged to provide justification for so doing; whoever attacks a statement or norm which is not the subject of the discussion must state a reason for so doing; whoever has put forward an argument is only obliged to produce further arguments in the event of counter-arguments; whoever introduces an assertion or an utterance about his or her attitudes, wishes, or needs into a discourse, which does not stand as an argumentation in relation to a prior utterance, must justify this interjection when required to do so.47
4. Solidarity Rules In any actual discussion such requirements can only be partially met and must be adapted by the participants to their particular situation and task environment. The claims will have to vary according to the type of cases at issue, the subject matter, local terminology and forms of argumentation. Local contexts and specific constellations of meaning have to be taken into account, as interpretative frames vary culturally. As I have mentioned, it takes situational insight and practical judgement to know what it is right to do in a concrete form of praxis. Moreover, different fields of action and task environments require different adaptations of the principles. Health care services and car production, for instance, give rise to different concerns and constraints on what counts as an optimal form of organisation and discourse. These prescriptions also, however, need to be supplemented by norms of a more ethical nature because if the parties are not treated with the equal concern and respect required by justice - if they feel disrespectfully treated or offended in the discourses - they will not offer their opinions. It is often noted that there is much fear - and angst - and informal power relations at work in deliberation and decision-making processes, and that they prevent formally equal participants actually behaving in an equal manner. Knowledge, arrogance and top-down, authoritarian attitudes flourish. It is therefore vital to have a set of rules that ensure the members’ moral autonomy so that they do not feel used as instruments when they are seeking the truth. Intellectual instrumentalisation is still instrumentalisation bcause each person’s autonomy is to be respected regardless of their epistemic contributions. Too much emphasis on cognitive knowledge is a threat to personal dignity as well as to the integration of social communities.48 So-called solidarity rules - norms for politeness, friendliness and decency - that ensure mutual confidence and respect are thus required. The chair of the discussion can help here and bring a greater degree of security and safety for the participants. Basically, however, this comes
47
R Alexy op cit pp 196-197 V Hösle ‘The Greatness and Limits of Kant’s Practical Philosophy’ Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 13 pp 133-157 (1990) p 151 48
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Erik Odvar Eriksen down to a question of institutionalising a liberal organisational culture, i.e. one based on tolerance, respect and compassion embedded in the overall pattern of interaction in the organisation. These rules for group communication and arguing help define the role of the chairperson. His or her job is to ensure that the rules are followed as fully as possible. He or she should therefore preside over the debate and bring out all arguments, reveal inconsistencies and misunderstandings, clarify the governing idea in the debate, relate the issues to experience and move towards a result by imposing formal proceedings and approaches.49 There are limitations on how far one can go with institutional design without relating principles to the material to be regulated, which gives rise to particular normative requirements. Fields of action like education, health and environmental protection raise different concerns and should not be subjected to exactly the same institutional principles. Excessive prescription also runs the risk of overburdening the participants ethically. The principles set out here, however, are still general enough to apply, I believe, in some form or other to many fields of cooperative problem solving and conflict resolution. It should, however, be noted that instrumental design, which denotes designing with egoistic actors in mind, based on worst-case scenarios (i.e. actors potentially not complying with the rules) will be required when security - law and order - has to be maximised and corruption and fraud are to be prevented.50 Also when superordinate political objectives are to be achieved in a standardised way by different groups and when legal requirements and the need for predictability have to be satisfied, one must follow instrumental bureaucratic principles of organisation.
3 Limitations of Judgement The recommended procedure has the capacity to ensure results with a high degree of legitimacy. I believe it is relevant in all situations where decisions affecting interests are to be made, and when important principles and goals are involved. To be sure, this is also true for policy questions and the distribution of goods and burdens in general, but it will be of particular importance when it comes to establishing procedures for solving problems and handling conflicts. We face however, as mentioned above, a new danger, that the consensus thus obtained may be perceived to be more valid than it really is. There will always be conflicting interests and preferences and if an outcome serves the interests of a particular set of actors they may be able to point to the fact that the ‘correct’ procedure has been followed and go on to claim that the result which happens to match their preferences is in fact ‘just’. This exposes the theory to the risk of technocratic abuse. Moreover, there are exceptions even for valid rules, and a consensus may be fallible even under ideal conditions. This also applies to theoretical, scientific discourses. Hence rationality and absolute certainty should not be equated. A procedure aiming at rational results is no guarantee of correctness. There will always be new perspectives, new ways of looking at things, and the existing forms of normative evaluation are too varied for us to think of any consensus as a lasting one. This is underscored by the limits of judgement, which arise from unavoidable sources of disagreement. Even presumptive rational agents may remain at odds with each other after rational deliberation. There are unavoidable limits to qualified agreement, limits due to what Rawls calls ‘the burden of judgement’, and which refer to sources of disagreement that arise even when people reason as rationally
49 See D Horster D ‘Sokratische Gespräche in der Erwachsenentbildung’ in D Krohn et al (eds) Das Sokratische Gespräch – Ein Symposion Junius, Hamburg 1989 p 151. Cf K-O Apel ‘Das Sokratische Gespräch und die gegenwärtigen Transformation der Philosophie’ in D Krohn et al (eds) ibid, and I M A M Pröpper ‘Argumentation and Power in Evaluation-Research and in its Utilization in the Policy Making Process’ in R von Schomberg (ed) Science, Politics and Morality. Scientific Uncertainty and Decision Making Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht 1993 pp 138ff 50 On these terms see Chapter 10 in E O Eriksen and J Weigård Understanding Habermas. On communicative action and deliberative democracy Continuum, London 2003, and further R E Goodin (ed) The Theory of Institutional Design Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1996, and S L Elkin ‘Constitutionalism’s Successor’ in S L Elkin and K E Sotan (eds) A New Constitutionalism Chicago University Press, Chicago 1993.
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Decision Making by Communicative Design as possible.51 Such sources may include relevant but contradictory data, different weightings given to different views, competing accounts of and understanding of concepts, the impact of personal experience and life history on judgements of what is normatively correct or good, and finally different but equally powerful normative arguments in the same case. There can therefore be reasonable and rational reasons for disagreement and rational discussion may not always lead to a qualified consensus. There are various degrees of agreement, there are different rules for deliberation, and moral standards are complex.
The Need for Additional Procedures Any decision-making procedure will be limited with respect to time, participation and information, and thereby be potentially unjust. This risk of injustice is linked to the facts that: -
some voices will necessarily not be heard;52 even a just process may give an unjust result;53 and discussions may be disrupted even under optimal conditions.54
A procedure that guarantees correctness is not yet in sight, and perfect procedural justice is impossible.55 The point is, then, that communicative design does not guarantee correct decisions. Rather, the procedure provides for relatively ‘more valid’ and fairer decisions than might be expected if a different procedure was adopted. A preliminary agreement - a working agreement - based on provisional solutions is better than pure disagreement or a bargain struck between the powerful in a group.56 The parties have shifted their ground to some extent in relation to the original divergence and have obtained an agreement for, say, how to proceed or how to solve some aspects of the problems involved. Such intermediate agreements may differ qualitatively from a compromise struck by people acting strategically, i.e. following the logic of bargaining where the actual resources at the parties’ disposal and not the quality of the argument are decisive. They may have been reached communicatively. Additional procedures are, however, needed to prevent people settling for sub-optimal solutions, i.e. to ensure further deliberation as to how problems and conflicts should be resolved in a just and rational way. First, procedures are needed to ensure periodic re-evaluation of the results. Irving L. Janis prescribes that: -
there should be one or more of the devil’s advocates during every group meeting; in conflict situations, extra time should be devoted to interpreting warning signals from rivals and to constructing alternative scenarios of their intentions; ‘second chance’ meetings should be held to reconsider the decisions once it has been reached and before it is made public’.57
‘Good Enough’ Arrangements Secondly and consequently, ‘good enough’ arrangements to fall back on are needed in case the discussion should fail, or not reach consensus. Recall here the previous discussion of the contract zone. Communicative design, then, implies institutionalising a process which makes it possible to evaluate
51
John Rawls Political Liberalism Columbia University Press, New York 1993 pp 54ff J D Moon Constructing Community. Moral Pluralism and Tragic Conflicts Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ 1993 p 96 53 R A Dahl Democracy and Its Critics Yale University Press, New Haven 1989 p 161 54 B Peters ‘On Reconstructive Legal and Political Theory’ Philosophy & Social Criticism Vol 20 No 4 pp 101– 134 (1994) p 113 55 John Rawls A Theory of Justice Oxford University Press, Oxford p 198 56 ‘Whereas a rationally motivated consensus (Einverständnis) rests on reasons that convince all the parties in the same way, a compromise can be accepted by the different parties each for its own different reasons.’ J Habermas Between Facts and Norms The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1996 p 166 57 I L Janis Groupthink Houghton Mifflin, Boston 1982 pp 262-63 52
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Erik Odvar Eriksen a consensus at a later time and to institutionalise other modes of collective decision making - such as bargaining or voting - as alternatives to deliberative consensus-making. This is not extrinsic to the deliberative approach but quite the opposite. The guarantee of a continued discussion of problematic claims after a decision has been made has obvious merits as it facilitates trust. The contract zone creates a climate for communicative cooperation. An alleged problem with the deliberative procedure is that it presupposes a fairly high degree of equality between the participants of the discussion. If that is not the case, the free discussion will probably favour those who have more information and are generally more resourceful. But if it requires approximately the same resource level, how can this form of democratic cooperation be realised? It is well known that modern market-based societies breed inequality, and there are vast resulting differences between the resources available to different social groups and classes. This has caused many people to regard deliberative democracy as more an attractive normative ideal than a practicable system. Others have, in line with the criteria for communicative design, discussed basic capacities and resources, as well as various forms of inequality that must be dealt with for a deliberative process to be possible.58 However, certain forms of inequality may in fact be a resource.59 It is difficult to define, on a purely theoretical basis, the degree of equality required before one can say that citizens possess acceptable opportunities to partake in the discussion of those decisions that affect themselves.
Conclusion In this article I have outlined the basic requirements of communicative design. I began with the discourse principle and the argumentation rules that apply to the ideal discourse situation. Then I applied the discourse principle to the concept of institutions. This is the second step in the derivation, and it concerns the procedural requirements which argumentation must meet for any final agreement to be regarded as valid. Such principles are of a quite abstract and general character, and must relate to the structural limitations within which the communication process takes place. Once this is done, we can establish more specific institutional principles, and this constitutes step three in the deduction. At the fourth level we apply these principles to the requirements for efficient decision making and we arrive at organisational principles, i.e., norms for argumentation and for group composition in order to bring people to adopt a reason-based mode of interaction. The ideal requirements of discourse theory can be used to derive criteria to judge if a consensus has come about in a valid manner, and if the outcome can be considered legitimate. However, in the real world it is impossible for everybody to be heard. In practice, any ‘just’ procedure will be incomplete and thereby unfair. Any attempt at communicative design will probably mean excluding certain interests and arguments. It is therefore important to implement procedures that will block irreversible decisions, and which ensure a re-evaluation of the outcome. Erik Oddvar Eriksen
Erik Oddvar Eriksen is Professor of Political Science at ARENA - Advanced Research on the Europeanisation of the Nation State - at the University of Oslo, Norway. He is also Professor II at the Centre of Professional Studies at The University College of Oslo and has been a professor at the Universities of Tromsø and Bergen. At Bergen he was director of research at The Centre of Organisation and Management (LOS-Centre) between 1994-98. His main research fields are political theory, democratic governance, public policy and European integration. His interest in legitimate governance has led to publications on democracy in the EU, governance and leadership, functions and limits of the state, deliberative democracy, communicative leadership, regional politics, and the welfare state. He has published 10 books and more than 60 articles. www.arena.uio.no/presentation/eriksen.htm
[email protected] 58
J Bohman Public Deliberation: Pluralism, Complexity and Democracy The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1996 and J Knight and J Johnson ‘What Sort of Political Equality Does Democratic Deliberation Require?’ in J Bohman and W Rehg (eds) Deliberative Democracy. Essays on Reason and Politics The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1997 59 I M Young ‘Difference as a Resource for Democratic Communication’ in J Bohman and W Regh (eds) Deliberative Democracy The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1997
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