DESCARTES'

CAUSAL

ARGUMENT OF GOD

FOR

THE

EXISTENCE

Not only is Descartes' first causal argument for the existence of God rather different from the more usually discussed arguments, but it is also a somewhat neglected topic in writings on Descartes. It may be put as follows: 1 1. "It is manifest by the natural light that there must be at least as much reality in the efficient and total cause as in its effect" (p. ~63). 2. Thus, by Principle (B) below, "in order that an idea should contain some one certain objective reality rather than another, it must without doubt derive it from some cause in which there is at least as much formal reality as this idea contains of objective reality" (ibid.). 3. And, "if the objective reality of any of my ideas is of such a nature as clearly to make me recognise that it is not in me either formally or eminently, and consequently that I cannot myself be the cause of it, it follows of necessity that I am not alone in the world, but that there is another being which exists, or which is the cause of this idea" (ibid.). 4. Since one of my ideas is that of supreme reality or perfection, i.e., of supreme substance, or God, it is supremely objectively real (p. 166); but 5. only God could be sufficiently formally real to be the cause of such an idea, and therefore, since there is this idea, and since it must have an efficient and total cause, God exists (p. 165). Three principles lie behind this argument: A) There are degrees of reality, or perfection. B) A cause must be at least as real as its effect. C) Ideas have an objective reality, corresponding to the formal reality of those things of which they are the idea. I The Philosophical Works of Descartes, trans. Haldane and Ross (Cambridge: University Press, 1970) vo1.1, Meditation III, pp. 159-167. (All references in the text are to this work.) Viz. also vol. II, p. 57.

DESCARTES' CAUSAL ARGUMENT FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 419 The assumption is made that D)

We have a coherent idea of God.

I shall divide the paper into two more or less independent sections, I dealing with (A) - (C), and II with (D).

A

There are degrees o] reality, or perfection. It seems that Descartes does not distinguish reality from perfection, and, to avoid unnecessary confusion, I shall for the most part stick to "reality." 2 At the beginning of his treatment of ideas considered as images, Descartes writes that "There is no doubt that those [ideas] which represent to me substances are something more, and contain so to speak more objective reality within them (that is to say, by representation participate in a higher degree of being or perfection) than those that simply represent modes or accidents ..." (p. 162). The degrees of being in which ideas participate are known "from contemplation alone of our ideas, of whose existence we are certain, since they are modes of thought: for we know how much reality or perfection the idea of the substance affirms of the substance, and how much the idea of the mode affirms of the mode." ~ That there are degrees of reality is, it appears, a "very clearly and distinctly" perceived truth, since nowhere does Descartes seek to justify it in any detail. Like the Scholastics before him, and Spinoza, among others, after him, he takes it as axiomatic that some things are more real than others. 4 His notion of degrees of reality is thus dependent upon his doctrine of clear and distinct perceptions, if we are to take seriously his method of systematic doubt. I shall not, however, discuss that doctrine, noting simply that to question the notion of reality is, within a Cartesian framework, impossible, for it is one of its fundamental assumptions. Descartes was, after all, working with a "conception of the plan and structure of the world which, through 29 'Perfection and reality are identified; and not only is existence assumed to be itself a perfection, the existent is treated as varying in degrees of reality in proportion to its degree of perfection.': N.K. Smith, New Studies in the Philosophy o] Descartes (London: Macmillan, 1953), p. 298. 8 Spinoza, Principles of Cartesian Philosophy, trans. H . E . Wedeck (London: Peter Owen L td, 1961), p.26. 4 Haldane and Ross, op. cit., vol. II, p. 56, axiom VI.

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the Middle Ages and down to the late eighteenth century, many philosophers, most men of science, and, indeed, most educated men ... [accepted] without question--the conception of the universe as a 'Great Chain of Being,' composed of an immense ... or infinite number of links ranging in hierarchical order from the meagerest kind of existents, which barely escaped non-existence, through 'every possible' grade up to the ens p e r f e c t i s s i m t t m . . . . ,, 5 If one thing was higher up the scale of being than another, then it was more real than the other. To object that something can be only real, unreal, or perhaps half-real, and that what is meant by "real" depends on the particular context in which the word is used, would by-pass Descartes altogether. He says, for example, that "substance has more reality than mode" ~ and that what is infinite is more real than what is finite (p. 166). Reality is an attribute, and moreover, one of which it is possible to have varying quantities. It is, like height and weight, measurable; and "real" is what I should call invariable, unlike adjectives such as "rich," "usefull," or "adequate." If we are told that y is rich, we know nothing more about y than we did before, unless we already know what y is--coffee; a Texan oil milionaire; a joke? "Rich" denotes different qualities when attached to each of these, and we should be much inclined to say that "real" (or "perfect") also denotes different things (not necessarily qualities) when attached to different nouns: a real pink elephant, not an imaginary one; a real footballer, a good, or skillful one; a real man, one with what are thought to be characteristically manly attributes;a real fright, one which produces a considerable amount of fear. r None of these share some one quality, identifiable as reality. For Descartes, however, the position is quite the reverse. If a is said to be more real than b, then there is some attribute which both a and b have, and of which a has more than b. Even without knowing what a or b were, we would, on this account, be in a position to know something definite about a and b, and something about how they differed. Both would appear on the ontological scale, with a above b. Both would have some degree of perfection; both would to some extent share in being. While this may remain both unattractive and unsatisfactory to the modern 5 A.O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being (New York: Harper and Row, 1960), p. 59. Haldane and Ross, op. cir., vol. II, p. 56, axiom VI. r Cf. I.L. Austin, Sense and Sensibilia (Oxford: University Press, 1962). ch. VII, pp. 62-77.

DESCARTES' CAUSAL ARGUMENT FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 421 mind, I do not think I could profitably say more about it, without going into the entire Scholastic view of the world. And even then, I rather suspect that it is a question where full understanding is unlikely without considerable intellectual sympathy. B

A cause must be at least as real as its effect

This again is a Cartesian axiom, ~ which he explains thus: if x is caused by y, then whatever reality x has, must have been derived from y, which must therefore possess at least that degree of reality. The principle relies, of course, on the supposition that reality is quantifiable, and on another of Descartes' axioms, namely that " A thing, and likewise an actually existing perfection belonging to anything, can never have nothing, or a non-existent thing, as the cause of its existence. ''~ To put this crudely: a thing, p, having 12 units of reality, cannot have been caused by a thing, q, having, say, only 10 units of reality, since 2 units of p's reality would be without a cause. Reality, it seems, perhaps rather like energy, or at least potential energy, is something that can be produced only by a similar or greater amount of the same. Reality, or perfection, or being, can~not be brought about by anything other than reality, or perfection, or being; nor by a smaller amount of the same. There is, moreover, a further complication. The reality of a thing "exists formally or else eminently in its first and adequate cause." 10 By the "first and adequate" cause of a thing, Descartes means very much what Aristotle means by the "formal" cause, i.e., the essential cause of a thing. This will need to be borne in mind when discussing Principle (C). The distinction between the formal and the eminent cause of a thing must not be confused with Descartes' distinction between the formal and the objective existence of objects, which will also come into the discussion of Principle (C). To save later confusion, I shall deal with the former distinction here. In his comments on Descartes' axioms, Spinoza explains the distinction thus: "By eminently I understand that the cause contains all the reality of the effect more perfectly than the effect itself; by formally, that it contains it with equal perfection." 1, Reality, there-

s Haldane and Ross, ibid., axiom IV. 9 Ibid., axiom III. lo Ibid., axiom IV. it Spinoza, op. ciL, p. 27, axiom VIII.

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fore, may be possessed more or less perfectly (or really; although Descartes himself does not usually seem to distinguish reality from perfection, it is interesting to note that Spinoza, at this point, does at least use the two different words). It seems, then, that if a is higher up the ontological scale than b, it is not only more real than b, but any perfections it happens to share with b, it will possess in a more real, or more perfect, way: "... any absolute perfection is formally in God. On the other hand, if the effect be contained in the cause ... in a higher grade or m o d e o] perfection ... it is said to be in its cause eminently. In this sense the Divine intellect contains the human, since God knows, but without the imperfections incident to the exercise of our faculties of cognition." 13 This will be of .importance when examining the notion of God as the cause of our idea of him. Moreover, it does suggest that there may, after all, be some distinction in Descartes between perfection and reality. Let us imagine that A, B, and C are entities, with C higher than B, and B higher than A, along the ontological scale. B will have certain perfections (not "realities") which A has not, let us say, the faculty of reason, and moral sensitivity. B is therefore more perfect, or more real, than A. Or Descartes might say that B has more perfection, or more reality, than A. C, which also has the faculty of reason and moral sensitivity, has these to a greater degree than B. (Its power of reasoning is more profound, its moral sensitivity both more acute, and quite unfailing.) C possesses these perfections (not, "realities") more perfectly, or more really (truly?) than B. C may, of course, have perfections which B does not have at all. Thus, the degree of reality, or the degree of perfection, of a thing depends on the perfections it has, and on the degree to which it has them. Which attributes are to be accounted perfections is a matter for Scholastic debate--hence the inconclusiveness of our discussion of degrees of reality. That existence is one such attribute was of course beyond question for Descartes, as well as for the Scholastics. Returning to Descartes' causal principle, we find his own two examples in the Meditations puzzling, especially the first one. Neither seem adequately to explain why a given degree of reality cannot be produced by a lesser degree. He writes: "... the stone which has not yet existed ... cannot now commence to be unless it has been prol~ Descartes, A D i s c o u r s e on M e t h o d , Everyman, 1912), notes, p. 252.

etc.,

trans. John Veitch

(London:

DESCARTES' CAUSAL ARGUMENT FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 4 2 3

duced by something which possesses within itself, either formally or eminently, all that enters into the composition of the stone (i.e., it must possess the same things or other more excellent things than those which exist in the stone) ..."13 (p. 162). It seems straightforwardly false to say that whatever produces a stone (say, for simplicity's sake, small particles of matter, plus heat) should have in them everything the resulting stone has in it, for the particles are transformed by the heat. They need not, for example, contain the same molecules, or be of the same colour, or the same weight or density, as the stone into which they are made. It is quite unclear what Descartes means by "things" here. Nor does it help to say that the particles contain potentially whatever the stone contains, since he specifies that the cause must contain "formally or eminently" whatever reality the effect has. The point is, I think, that matter and heat would in this case be counted as the material cause, or perhaps material and efficient causes respectively, of the stone, which is why we could say, I suppose, that they potetially contain it. But Descartes' principle applies to the "primary and adequate," i.e., the formal, cause of the stone. The trouble is, what would the formal cause of a stone (or of its coming into existence) be? The second example may be clearer: "... heat can only be produced in a subject in which it did not exist by a cause that is of an order (degree or kind) at least as perfect as heat ..." (p. 162). If I am cold, I cannot make myself warm merely by sitting longer in the same cold room and wishing or imagining I were warm; I have to use energy from some source or other' to produce heat. But there is no clear reason, as far as I car~ see, why the heat produced by whatever energy-source is used should necessarily be no more real than the energy-source concerned, even granting the vocabulary of Descartes' metaphysics to this example. (If the energy-source of a certain amount of heat is not its formal cause, then, insofar as I do not understand what would be its formal cause, this example remains as unclear as the last.) At least, there is no clear reason unless one at least of Descartes' criteria for saying, for instance, that such-and-such an energysource is at least as real as the heat it produces is the possibility of just such a causal connection. One at least of the criteria--and it may well be the decisive o n e - - o f A's being more real than B is that B is 13 One might question the propriety of Descartes' using as an example a physical object at this stage of the Meditations, since he is still supposed to be in doubt regarding the existence of any such.

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a member of a class of entities, none of whose members can be the formal cause of any of the members of the class of entities of which A is member, but only vice-versa. In the absence of any clear exposition of this principle of causality in Descartes' writings, this conclusion is rather tempting. Certainly, it would be a neat way of filling the lacuna at the end of our discussion of principle (A). If causal power is the chief criterion of degree of reality, then perhaps those attributes (a) are deemed by Descartes more perfect than some other attributes (b), if the former are possessed by entities of type A, which may, at least in principle, be the formal cause of entities type B, which have the latter attributes (b). An entity, P, would be more real than another entity, Q, if P were a member of the class of entities which can be the formal cause of members of the class of entities of which Q is a member, but not vice-versa. If this is a correct interpretation, then Principles (A) and (B) gain their sense within the metaphysical system from each other, and can be understood only in terms of each other. But that is just what is to be expected of principles in a metaphysical system.

C Ideas have an objective reality, corresponding to the jormal reality o] those things o] which they are the idea. Before discussing this principle, let me take up my earlier remarks about "formal," in order to avoid confusion. In the principle as I have stated it, "formal" is used in the sense discussed under (B), where it is contrasted with "eminent." In the following discussion of the principle, however, it will be used in another of the senses in which Descartes uses it, to contrast with "objective." 14 By "formally," we should understand "actually," or, as we should be more inclined to say, although confusingly in the circumstances of this paper, "in the real world." The sense of "objectively" will, I hope, come out of the discussion. (To save further confusion, I shall in this part of the paper talk simply of the reality of entities or objects, and not distinguish between their possessing it formally or eminently.) Descartes uses the term "idea" in two quite different ways: "If ideas are only taken as certain modes of thought, I recognise amongst them no difference or inequality, and all appear to proceed from me in the same manner; but when we consider them as images, one representing one thing, and the other another, it is clear that ~ Viz. Veitch, op. cit.

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they are very different one from the other" (p. 162). The principle under discussion concerns primarily the latter sense. 15 An idea, Descartes writes, "... does require a cause to make it be conceived ... Nor will it suffice to say that the mind itself is its cause, being the cause of its own acts; for this is not disputed, the question being the cause of the objective artifice which is in the idea. For these must be some definite cause of the fact that this idea of a machine displays this objective artifice rather than another." 1~ By the "cause" of an idea, Descartes seems to have in mind the notion of a model on which the idea is based, that without which this particular idea would not have the particular content it has. It is the content of ideas that must needs have a model other than the mind itself, since, although ideas "considered in themselves" are products of the mind, the mind cannot be the model of ideas "considered as images," since it has no inbuilt content on which they could be modelled: and ideas without content are of course impossible. It is hard to see how we could have ideas without there being something which, at least initially, produces their particular c o n t e n t - - w h a t could they be ideas oJ? As Descartes puts it, "... in the end we must reach an idea whose cause shall be so to speak an archetype, in which the whole reality [or perfection] which is ,so to speak objectively [or by representation] in these ideas is contained formally [and really]" (p. 163). Every idea, then, has an "... exemplary cause, standing in relation to the idea as the archetype to the ectype, the principal to the vicarious." 1; Thus, if I think of something, say X, with attributes P, Q, and R, then there will be something, x, which is p, q, and r, which serves as a model for that idea. And if P is such-and-such a perfection, then it will be modelled upon the actual perfection, p. This will, of course, be true of whatever idea I have, even if it turns out to be of something fictional, or imaginary--the content of any idea must have a model. ~8 And the reality of X (dependent upon P, Q, and R) will have as its model the reality of x (dependent upon p, q, and r). T h i s - - t h e reality of X - - D e s c a r t e s calls the objective reality of an idea, and it contrasts with the formal, or actual, reality t5 For good discussions of the two senses, and the propriety or otherwise of

using "idea" as Descartes does, viz, L.I. Beck, The Metaphysics o] Descartes (Oxford, 1965), p. 151 ff., and A Kenny, "Descartes on Ideas," in ed. W. Doney, Descartes (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1968). ~G Haldane and Ross, op. cit., vol. II, p. 11. 17 Veitch, op. cir., p. 247. ~s Fictional ideas turn out to be ones put together by the mind from various models; viz. Reply to Objections 1, Haldane and Ross, op. cit., p. 20.

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of that of which the idea is an idea. By "objective reality," "... I mean that in respect of which the thing represented in the idea is an entity insofar as that exists in the idea; and in the same way we can talk of objective perfection, objective device, etc. For whatever we perceive as being as it were in the objects of our ideas exists in the ideas themselves objectively." ~9 At this point, however, Descartes is not in a position to assume that the model for, or cause of, the reality to be found in a particular idea, is the reality of an actual object: he perceives it "as being as it were in the objects of our ideas," but he cannot assume that these objects are things in the physical world. He may know that our ideas must have causes, and that their content, including their reality, must be modelled upon s o m e t h i n g , but he is in no position to know what sort of thing that is. The reality of an idea may be said to correspond to the reality of its cause, and it may be termed "objective" by way of contrast. What cannot be said is that objective reality corresponds to actual ("formal") reality, if "actual" refers to what we should ordinarily call real things, since the existence of these must, for Descartes, wait upon proof of God's existence and non-deceptiveness. Granted that "the idea of heat, or of a stone, cannot exist in me unless it has been placed within me by some cause which possesses within it at least as much reality as that which I conceive to exist in the heat or the stone . . . . " (p. 162). "For if we imagine that something is found in an idea which is not found in the cause, it must then have been derived from nought" (p. 163) (Principle (B)), it is yet not the case that I must not "imagine that, since the reality that I consider in these ideas is only objective, it is not essential that this reality should be formally in the causes of my ideas" (p. 163). This is to a s s u m e that the causes of ideas are of a particular nature (i.e., actual), and Descartes' justification of the above relies on just that assumption: "For just as this mode of objective existence pertains to ideas by their proper nature, so does the mode of formal existence pertain to the causes of those ideas (this is at least true of the first and principal): by the nature peculiar to them" (p. 163). This is true only on the assumption that the causes of ideas have such-and-such a nature, i.e., that they are actual. To some extent, such a criticism is valid; Descartes, on his own argument, cannot ~9 Haldane and Ross, op.

cit.,

vol. II, pp. 52, 53, Definition III.

DESCARTES' CAUSAL ARGUMENT FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 427 at this stage of his discussion, have shown that objects or entities in the real world are the cause of our ideas. However, if he is right in what he says about the need for the content of our ideas to have a model, he has at least shown that ideas and their causes must be different sorts of things: " . . . although it may be the case that one idea gives birth to another, that cannot continue to be so indefinitely; for in the end we must reach an idea whose cause shall be so to speak an archetype ..." (p. 163). Let us then accept that the objective reality of an idea must correspond to the formal reality of its cause, but without assuming that those things possessing formal reality n e e d be more real, higher up the ontological scale, than those things, i.e., ideas, possessing objective reality. Although necessarily different, they could nevertheless be equally real. ~0 Descartes does of course assume that ideas are lower along the ontological scale than their causes; his "ideas" must not be confused with Plato's "Ideas." Whereas Plato moves from the comparative unreality of the external world to the full reality of Ideas, Descartes moves in precisely the opposite direction, from ideas, via the veracity of God, to the reality (although not the absolute reality, which is reserved for God) of the external world. He appears, however, to take it for granted that ideas are less real than actual entities--as well he might, I suppose. This becomes clear in his reply to the first set of objections, where, in an attempt to vindicate his causal theory of the contents of ideas against the objection that ideas have no strong connection with objects, being merely mental acts occasioned by " 'modification due to an object, which is merely an extrinsic appellation and nothing be,longing to the object'", ~1 he says that " . . . the idea of the sun will be the sun itself existing in the mind, not indeed formally, as it exists in the sky, but objectively, i.e., in the way in which objects are wont to exist in the mind; and this mode of being is truly much less perfect than that in which things exist outside the mind, but it is not on that account mere nothing ...".~2 If the idea of the sun is the sun itself as it exists in the mind, then I would think it s0 Spinoza, in his comments on this principle, makes the same assumption as Descartes, that the formal cause of a thing must be more real than the thing caused; op. cir., pp. 28, 29. 21 Haldane and Ross, vol. II, p. 9. "-"- Ibid., p. 10.

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reasonable to assume that it is ontologically inferior to the sun as it actually exists; and if the cause of the idea of the sun is also the sun itself, then it seems reasonable to assume that the idea of the sun is ontologically inferior to its cause. Much more could of course be said about this, and it would involve a lengthy discussion of Plato. Much more also needs to be said about the coherence or otherwise of the doctrine that ideas of things are those things as they exist in the mind, and on whether or not that doctrine can consistently be maintained in conjunction with Descartes' modeltheory of the origin of ideas. I rather doubt that it can be consistently maintained; but I shall not pursue these questions here.

II We are now in a position to see how Descartes' causal argument for the existence of God fits into his metaphysical scheme, and despite our doubts about the coherence of the scheme, it is interesting, I think, to see how Descartes pursues the argument. Since an absolute degree of objective reality is perceived in the idea of God, the cause of this idea must be absolutely real. Only God could be absolutely real, therefore God exists. I shall not here question the identification of God with supremely perfect substance, ~" although it is, of course, open to serious criticism, not only as part of a general criticism of the entire metaphysical scheme of which it is part, but also as being yet another example of the "God of the philosophers." It is worth remarking in passing that God is said to possess eminently the perfections which are found objectively in the idea of him, for, if he possessed them formally, he would have them as we understand them to be (in our idea of him); but because our understanding is imperfect, that would mean that he did not have all possible perfections perfectly, or in the most real manner possible. ~ D

We Step man is of my

have a coherent idea o / G o d .

(5) of Descartes' argument depends on the recognition that not supremely real. If it is not in fact clear that at least one ideas contains more objecive reality than I possess formal

r~ Ibid., p. 53, Def. III. :4 Viz. Spinoza, op. cir., p. 27, axiom VIII: and cf. Anselm, Proslogion, ch. XV.

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reality, the entire argument collapses. This in turn depends on whether or not I actually have a clear and distinct idea of God, for, if I do not have "within me some idea of a Being more perfect than myself, in comparison with which I ... (should) recognize the deficiences of my nature" (p. 166), it is likely that I 'will not understand these deficiences, if I admit to them at all, as being of the same ontological significance as Descartes takes them to be. They will simply be deficiences, perhaps unfortunate ones, like greed, selfishness, limited intellectual capacity, etc., but not such as necessarily to detract from my ontological status. I might recognize them as imperfections, relative to the attributes and qualities of other people, or even relative to some ideal, but not as reality-diminishing attributes, since there would be no superior standard of reality with whose attributes to compare mine, either in number or in quality And I can hardly compare my degree of reality with that of an ideal. The idea we have of God, is, according to Descartes, more real than that of finite substance, because it is an idea of infinite substance; his reason is just that "I see that there is manifestly more reality in infinite substance than in finite ..." (p. 166) (and thus in the idea of infinite substance than in the idea of finite). Indeed, we have the idea of God before the idea of ourselves--it is in this sense innate--since, in order 1~.o know that "I am not quite perfect" (ibid.), I must already have "some idea of a being more perfect than myself" (ibid.), For Descartes, then, the idea of God precedes, in fact but not in exposition, even his primary knowledge that he is because he thinks; since under "thinking" he includes such phenomena as doubting and desiring, which indicate that "something is lacking to me" (ibid.), that I am imperfect, or not fully real. The clarity and distinctness of our idea of God is the guarantee of its not being materially false, for clear and distinct ideas cannot be false--"we can imagine that such a Being does not exist, we cannot nevertheless imagine that his idea represents nothing real to me" (ibid.). This is the case by definition. If we have a clear and distinct idea of God, as supreme reality, then it must represent something supremely real, otherwise the ultimate model of the idea would be less formally or eminently real than the idea is objectively real. Finally, Descartes says that he cannot himself be the model for his idea of God, since he can conceive of his being less imperfect than he is, which, together with the fragmentary nature of his knowledge, and his doubting,

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desiring, etc., precludes his being perfect; and the idea of G o d must have a model which is perfect. Even if he (Descartes) were potentially p e r f e c t - - i f his knowledge could evolve unlimitedly, his desires be eradicated, e t c . , - - h e would still be unable to produce his idea of God, or to be w h a t he calls " G o d " in that idea, since it needs something formal, or actual, to produce the objective reality of an idea, and not something "that exists potentially only" (p. 167). "~ To have the idea of God, then, I must be conscious of myself as not fully real: but to be so conscious, to recognize my attributes as being limited both in n u m b e r and quality, and to regard their so being as detracting from my ontological status, I must k n o w that there is something, i.e., God, to serve as a standard for ontological comparison. Once again, we find what appears to be a tautological feature of Descartes' metaphysics. The objections put f o r w a r d to the argument by Mersenne, Hobbes, and Gassendi, are as follows. First, that " G o d " can be modelled on man, by simply thinking of w h a t goes to make up the degree of perfection possessed by man, and increasing it infinitely, or at least, increasing it as m u c h as we are able to imagine.-26 Descartes replies that " N o t h i n g that we attribute to G o d can come from external objects, as a copy proceeds from its exemplar, because in G o d there is nothing similar to w h a t is f o u n d in external things, i.e., in corporeal objects."-,7 Since Descartes' idea of G o d is clear and distinct, he must presumably k n o w at least what he is .not like; his perfections are possessed by him eminently, so that if their exemplar were the attributes of corporeal objects, these w o u l d be fully real (Principle B ) - - b u t they are not. Such a reply, however, invites the question, just w h a t is G o d like? Is not G o d unthinkable?~s Since G o d is

2~ If we were the model of our idea of God, we would, in a sense, be God: we would stand at the summit of the Great Chain of Being, as the model of the most objectively real idea. This in fact - - in a figurative sense, though perhaps less figurative than one might imagine - - is precisely what, from a ScholasticCartesian point of view, humanists may be said to have done, namely to set marl up as the new God. Viz. The Pope, "Man as God no Substitute for Theology" (edited extracts from Pope Paul's Christmas Day message, Urbi et Orbi) The Times Higher Education Supplement, no. 117, 11-1-74, p. 24: "'It is a humanism that, with a persistent and falsely logical precipitation of thought, will dare to affirm that man is his own absolute cause " .,8 Haldane and Ross, vol. II, p. 25; Mersenne, p. 72; H'obbes, pp. 158, 159; Gassendi. .,r Ibid., p. 36. Viz. also pp. 36, 7; pp. 215-217. ~-s Ibid., p. 26, Mersenne; p. 67, Hobbes; p. 159, Gassendi.

DESCARTES' CAUSAL ARGUMENT FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 4 3 1

infinite, Hobbes says, "we have no image, no idea corresponding ... to the most holy name of God." ~" Descartes' reply to a3[1 three critics is the same: that ideas are not to be confused with images. "... Substance is not perceived by imagination, but by the intellect alone." 30 The idea of God is not "of a nature akin to the images of material things depicted in the imagination, but ... something that we are aware of by an apprehension or judgement or inference of the understanding alone."31 To have a clear and dist~.:lct idea of God is to grasp in some purely intellectual way that there is supreme substance, even if it is not "to comprehend adequately ''3~ what this substance is like. The images which Descartes maintains we can consider as ideas are intellectual, not pictorial: "I take the term idea to stand for whatever the mind directly perceives. 9 ,, 38 That we have no adequate image of God does not therefore refute Descartes' claim that we have a clear and distinct idea of him. Finally, there is Mersenne's objection that our idea of God is derived "from reflections previously entertained, from books, from interchange of converse with your friends, etc., ''3. to which Descartes' reply is correct, given his view of the nature of, and need for, ultimate models, or formal causes, of our ideas; that "it is God from whom it first originates." 35 Descartes' rebuttal of his critics seems to me successful. But he has failed to show that we actually do have a clear and distinct idea of God. I/ we have, then, granted Descartes' metaphysical principles, it renders the knowledge that God is supremely real; and if supreme reality must include existence, as it must for Descartes, since he treats existence as an attribute, and something which is supremely real must have all possible attributes, as well as having them all as perfectly as is possible, then God exists. But this is Descartes' ontological argument; and inasmuch as his causal argument, even if the difficulties peculiar to its metaphysics could successfully be resolved, must eventually cope with precisely those difficulties met by his ontological argument, it would seem that it is inferior to the latter. Both arguments rely on the supposition that 29 3o 31 3~ 32

Ibid., Ibid., Ibid., Ibid., Ibid., 34 I b i d . , 35 I b i d . ,

p. 67. p. 215. p. 37. p. 74. Viz. opening para., Sec. II. pp. 67, 8 (my italics). p. 26. p. 35 (my italics).

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we have a coherent idea of G o d as supremely real, and on the supposition that existence is an attribute, one necessarily attaching to anything supremely real; but the causal argument involves other difficulties besides. 3, Is the concept of supreme reality coherent? I n Descartes' metaphysical system it is, if it is clearly and distinctly perceived. But Descartes does little to show that it is so perceived. The fullest statement he makes on the subject is in a letter to Clerselier 3~. "... we shall be unable to deny that we have some idea of God, except by saying we do not understand the words -that thing which is the most perlect that we can conceive; for that is w h a t all men call God. But to go so far as to assert that they do not understand the words which are the commonest in the mouths of men, is to have recourse to strange extremes in order to find objections. Besides, it is the most impious confession one can m a k e . . . f o r this is not merely to say that one does not k n o w it by means of natural reason, but also that neither by faith nor by any other means could one have any knowledge of it . . . . " Exactly; but the assertion in question is hardly a strange extreme. BOB BRECHER

University o[ London, Goldsmiths' College

r This is of course a simplification: but I think it is a fair outline of what Descartes' version of the ontological argument amounts to. 37 Haldane and Ross, op. cit., vol. II, p. 129.