Transit Stud Rev (2010) 17:297–310 DOI 10.1007/s11300-010-0149-z

Drivers of Change in the Democratic Republic of Congo: The Role of China in Re-Shaping the Country Erica Enne • Giacomo Galanello • Eliana Marino

Received: 17 November 2009 / Accepted: 2 February 2010 / Published online: 22 April 2010  Springer-Verlag 2010

Abstract Africa has always been potentially one of the richest continents in the world, but, due to a series of causes (colonization and decolonization process, wars, dictatorships etc.) it has never reached its full potential. The fight against poverty has been carried out by different institutions at the multilateral and bilateral level during the last 30 years, but the route toward economic development seems to be still long for African countries. This paper will focus on the analysis of the new approach to international cooperation introduced by the People’s Republic of China in order to exchange rights of exploitation of Africa’s mining and natural resources with large amounts of capital without any conditionality. The case-study which will be considered is the agreement concluded between the People’s Republic of China and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Keywords Economic development
Social development
Poverty reduction
Cooperation
Investments
Sustainable growth
Mining sector
Infrastructures JEL Classification

I30
O10
Q01
L72

E. Enne (&)
E. Marino LUISS Guido Carli Rome, Rome, Italy e-mail: [email protected] E. Marino e-mail: [email protected] G. Galanello Universita` di Tor Vergata Rome, Rome, Italy e-mail: [email protected]

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Introduction The Democratic Republic of Congo is the third largest African country in terms of population and area, potentially one of the richest countries in the continent, thanks to its vast amount of untapped resources (minerals, woods, diamonds, etc.) and to its strategic position in the area. Its infrastructures and institutions are virtually nonexistent because of a decade of conflict and three previous decades of dictatorship from which the DRC is struggling to emerge. Only since 2002, has the Congolese economy shown a positive trend while in the 1990s it has suffered a dramatic collapse, determined by erroneous and erratic macroeconomic policies, political instability (corruption, rebellions, etc.), two major conflicts (the First and the Second Congo Wars) and multiple shocks on the supply side. GDP per capita nowadays is lower than in 1960, the year of the country’s independence, (it has declined from $380 to $170 per capita), and it is even lower than the medium average of the sub-Saharan area. Economic forecasts are tied to the government capability to maintain control of its own macroeconomic policies and to promote structural reforms, even with the strong support of International Monetary Fund and World Bank. As its finances are in desperate shape, the country is looking for an alternative development financing source, besides the channel proposed by the traditional western donors. To accomplish that, the DRC government has signed a deal providing for $6 billion of Chinese investment in roads, railways, schools and clinics and $3 billion for the improvement of the mining sector. In return, Congo will cede majority rights in a joint venture to develop copper and cobalt concessions in the region of Katanga. The Chinese proposals of cooperation to the DRC government have to be analysed in the context of the global Chinese policy toward Africa, aimed at achieving ‘‘the fundamental interests of both Chinese and African peoples’’ and to establish an economic win–win cooperation, political equality and mutual trust and benefit. From a political point of view, China proposes its experience of economic growth as a model for development which could be successfully replicated in Africa. However China’s interest in the continent could be explained also with the search for new raw materials, markets and political support for its action on the international scene. The aim of this paper is to consider different aspects affected by Chinese investments and especially by the new model of cooperation proposed by China. Firstly, we will analyse the formal agreement signed by the Congolese government with Chinese representatives on 17 September 2007, in comparison with the Poverty Reduction Strategy which is at the heart of the World Bank’s and International Monetary Fund’s interventions. Secondly, we will consider the impact of the Chinese investments on the five priorities established by President Joseph Kabila that are infrastructures, access to water, health, education and electricity, evaluating also the effects on private sector and human capital. Finally, we would like to focus on some aspects of governance which could have a negative influence on the achievement of the development objectives planned in

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the agreement, such as corruption, lack of control, transparency and effectiveness in the financing and implementation of the activities.

The China-DRC Agreement and the Actions of the WB and IMF Descriptive Analysis of the China-DRC Agreement In September 2007 an agreement (protocole d’accord) between the Democratic Republic of Congo and the People’s Republic of China was signed. DRC was represented by the Minister of Infrastructures, Public Works and Reconstruction, while the Export–Import Bank of China, the China Railways Engineering Corporation (CREC) and the SINOHYDRO Corporation signed the contract for China, represented by the President of CREC. In this section we would like to underline the most important aspects of this cooperation, focusing on the most relevant articles of the agreement. The first article of the contract describes the object of the cooperation between DRC and China: the development of the national infrastructure in exchange for the exploitation of raw materials in the territory (Art. 1). A joint venture society (JVS) composed of Chinese private companies and DRC state-controlled companies will be created in order to carry out mine exploitation (Art. 2). The contract establishes that Chinese companies will control 68% of the JVS while Congolese companies will own the remaining 32% (Art. 4). This difference in the percentages reflects the respective power of the actors, which is also clearly shown in the distribution of the profits obtained from the exploitation of the mineral resources. According to Art. 5 of the agreement, initially the profits will be used to repay Chinese companies for the mining investments (e´tape d’ammortissement d’investissement minier). After the recovery of the initial investments, including the interest rate, 66% of the profits will be used to reimburse and/or finance the costs of the infrastructures, while the remaining 34% will be distributed among the members of the JVS, according to their shares of participation (e´tape de remboursement ou de payement des travaux d’infrastructure). When all the contractual obligations related to the construction and/or improvement of the Congolese infrastructures are satisfied, profits will be simply distributed among the members of JVS (e´tape d’exploitation commerciale). After long negotiations, the Chinese and the Congolese governments agreed on a series of benefits to be guaranteed to the mining companies, addressed in the contract under the name of ‘‘Special Conditions’’ and defined in Art. 6. Among others, the mining activities will benefit from all the advantages in custom and fiscal matters established in the Investments and Mining Code of the Democratic Republic of Congo with the possibility to extend these benefits in order to allow the prompt reclaiming of the mining investments; neither direct nor indirect taxation will concern import–export; mining companies will be totally independent in the choice of materials, equipments and technology suppliers. The Congolese government will be responsible for the security of the investments and will ensure the payment of the

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public works. These advantages are balanced by a series of conditions to be satisfied by the JVS and especially by the Chinese members. In particular, great importance is attributed to the valorization of local human resources and to the attainment of high quality standards both in the mining activities and in the improvement of the infrastructure network.1 As for Art. 11, this contract establishes the basic principles of the cooperation between the parties and represents the starting point for any further agreement regarding the mines exploitation or the projects for the improvement of the infrastructure networks. Last Interventions of the World Bank and of the International Monetary Fund in RDC The international efforts toward the economic and social development of less developed countries have often been carried out through specific contracts signed by the beneficiary countries and international organizations such as World Bank and International Monetary Fund. In this section we would like to consider two instruments used by WB and IMF in the context of the Poverty Reduction Strategy: the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper—PRSP and the Poverty Reduction Growth Facility—PRGF. After the failure of the structural adjustment loans, both the Fund and the Bank decided to revise their own strategies to fight poverty and introduced new tools to guarantee an active participation of the beneficiary in the assessment of its development plan. Like other developing countries, also DRC was involved in this kind of program. The Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers The Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper is a document issued by the beneficiary country with the assistance of the WB and of other actors involved in the development of the country such as NGOs. It is a programmatic document aimed at identifying the guideline and the steps of the process of the country toward development. The Government of DRC completed its full-PRSP2 in July 2006 and it was confirmed by the new government in November 2006, entering into force in February 2007. The document reflects the needs of a country just coming out of a long armed conflict ended officially in 2003 but never finished unofficially.3 Living conditions have strongly declined since the beginning of the conflicts and, together 1

An estimated $6 billion will be used for the public works. The agreement contains a detailed description of the infrastructures to be built or improved and the related costs of the work. In Annex I we include an extract from the original agreement with this information.

2

The procedure provides that a preliminary draft called the Interim-PRSP is submitted to the competent institution and after the approval it becomes the Full-PRSP. At this stage the participation of civil society (through a series of meetings with the various social classes, ethnic groups etc.) is required but the government can also decide to write the document alone.

3

In fact, the eastern provinces are still in a situation of permanent conflict, which exacerbates the humanitarian crisis.

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with the deficiencies in the economic management system, led to a huge collapse in the average national income, which decreased from US$380 per capita in 1960, to a little more than US$100 in 2004. The main goals of the PRSPs are the reestablishment of political stability, the consolidation of durable peace and the reduction of poverty through a sustainable accelerated growth. The PRSP follows a series of basic principles to determine a set of very ambitious objectives to be achieved in the short term and, with this aim, DRC plans to spend $3.4 billion in 3 years (2006–2008) for the implementation of the scheduled agenda. The strategy is based on 5 pillars: – – – – –

to to to to to

promote ‘‘good governance’’ maintain macroeconomic stability and to promote growth, improve access to public services and reducing vulnerability; combat AIDS; improve the dynamics between the various communities.

The strategy involves all aspects of social, human and economic development but, in this context, we prefer to focus our observations on the macroeconomic goals. Firstly, as had already appeared at the time of approval of the document, there were some doubts as to the country’s capacity to absorb such a quantity of public investments in a short period of time, assuming that this flow of investment remains constant. Although in 2007 the Joint Review Staff Assessment (JSA)4 defined the macroeconomic objectives of the country as ‘‘overambitious’’8, taking also into account data on the product of 2006 and 2007, the reality has been better than the forecasts. Real GDP growth is projected to rise to 12% in 2008 higher than envisaged under the SMP (10%), and compared to 6.3% in 2007 (Fig. 1). This growth has been driven by three sectors, mainly mining, trade and commerce, but also by construction and public works. On the demand side, growth has been boosted by private investments and exports but shortages in electricity still hinder economic activity. The strategy considers the lowering of inflation and the simultaneous increasing of foreign currency reserves as a fundamental basis for the economic stability of the country. Concerning fiscal policy PRSP underlines the opportunity to create a system independent from external aid in order to make DRC autonomous in the collection of taxes and in their use in the public expenditure. The improvement of the fiscal policy has to be based on the reform of taxes and revenues administration and on the enhancement of the efficiency of the public expenditures. Another aspect concerns the reform in the field of monetary policy, to be promoted especially through the increase of the role of the banking sector in order to

4

Joint Staff Assessment is a document that should be produced annually by the staff of the World Bank with regard to the PRSP and the International Monetary Fund concerning the PRGF. In fact, often delays in producing these documents have been experienced and the mechanism has never quite taken off.

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8.4

7 6

7.7 7

5 4 3 2 1 0 2006

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Fig. 1 Real GDP growth rate from 2006 to 2008 in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Source: Bank Information Center, summary results for resource-rich and substantial-resource countries, World Bank (2007)

enable private sector development. The promotion of activities of micro-finance, brokerage and financial restructuring of the Central Bank is also proposed. The PRSP states that fast and sustainable growth cannot be achieved without the contribution of the private sector, which should also be fundamental to the increase of employment, the development of industries and the competitiveness of exports. The development of the private sector, as the PRSP affirms, should be attained through the improvement of investments and of the climate in which they operate, the creation of codes of labor and trade, the reduction of the role of the state in some key areas, as State-owned enterprises, the increase in transparency and partnership in the management of contracts between these companies and private companies. These measures would be accompanied by a strengthening of the institutional and regulatory structure. One of the areas of greatest interest and wealth for the DRC economy remains unquestionably mining: DRC is one of the richest countries in the world as regards natural resources and it is clear that any attempt to restructure and improve the Congolese economy must move from this area. The mining activity has always been performed by state industries while the PRSP envisages the injection of private capital, accompanied by an increase in production and an improvement in the management system. The Mining Code, as well as the establishment of structures that would ensure the functioning of the sector (such as the Mining Planning Unit), represent some of the efforts made in this direction. Furthermore, the government acted with the aim to strengthen the management capacity of the enterprises active in the sector and to extend and develop SAESSCAM (Small-scale mining technical assistance and training service) in order to promote the expansion of even smaller enterprises.5 With reference to GECAMINES,6 which is a state-owned mining and exploration enterprise that controls most of the DRC mining activities, a definitive restructuring has been proposed. All these actions are intended, as a whole, to better define the field of 5

For example, the incentive to microcredit for smaller operators.

6

Currently, it has several joint ventures with foreign investors.

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mining, taking into account economic growth and the improvement of wages and social conditions of workers. Finally, in order to achieve the objective to guarantee a high level of transparency, the government has declared its support to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) that is an international initiative to promote transparency in mining, strongly supported by the World Bank. A National EITI/DRC was established in 2005, and, in addition, the government decided to put in place numerous mechanisms, such as the collection of statistical data, in order to identify priorities and develop an effective plan of action. However, despite these strong interventions at national and international level, corruption and un-declared exploitation still represent an important risk for the development of the mining industry. Poverty Reduction Growth Facility While the PRSPs are programmatic documents, the Poverty Reduction Growth Facility (PRGF) represents the ‘‘financial side’’ of the global fight for poverty reduction. It consists of an agreement signed between the beneficiary country and the International Monetary Fund aimed at financing the development program set by the State through loans with low interest rates which are subject to certain conditions. The first PRGF arrangement was signed by DRC in 2002, upon approval of the I-PRSP. The 3-year agreement provided an injection of funds amounting to $750 million. A further step was taken in November 2007, when the international development partners secured for DRC an additional loan of $4 billion for the period 2008–2010, with an annual outlay of about $1.3 billion, in order to allow the implementation of measures contained in the PRSP document. This agreement, together with a recent mission of the IMF general director Strauss Kahn in DRC, should pave the way for a new PRGF arrangement. Meanwhile, an additional outlay of $195.5 million was made by the IMF in order to mitigate the impact of the global financial crisis that has caused a huge decline in terms of patterns of trade and foreign direct investments, especially in the mining sector. Main Differences Between the Intervention of the Multilateral Organizations and the Chinese Proposal of Cooperation China’s soft power in Africa stands in direct competition with several Washington Consensus7 and Post Washington Consensus instruments initiated by the EU, US and South Africa at the turn of the 21st Century.8 7

Washington consensus is a term created by economist John Williamson in 1989 that describes a series of ten economic policies that the developing countries should have adopted in crisis situation, and that are considered mandatory by the financial institutions placed in Washington: WB, IMF and US Treasure Department. Cfr Kanbur (2008), The Co-Evolution of the Washington Consensus and the Economic development Discourse, p 5.

8

Criticism of many of the Washington consensus policies, including evidence of their detrimental impact on health, led to the development of the post-Washington consensus. Cfr in http://www.who.int/trade/ glossary/story074/en/index.html.

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In fact, beside the aforementioned programs of the WB and IMF, the EU has also provided for a framework, called the Cotonou agreement and signed in 2000, in order to deal with 77 African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states. This agreement is based on principles of free trade, including WTO compliance and a sub-continental regionalism; privileges for private enterprise, export production and FDI; austerity measures; conditionality for receipt of aid. The Beijing Consensus9 appears as an alternative to obviously neo-liberal ‘‘consensuses’’ because the People’s Republic of China aid comes without the strings attached by Western donors and other programs. Moreover, China approves African states policies to concentrate investment in infrastructure and human capital, rather than primary products, and to address development problems unsolved through market fundamentalism’s favored corporate initiatives. China’s aid to Africa, while not disinterested, is not used as a political tool in the same way as aid from Western political actors in Africa is. This approach is a longstanding policy. Julius Nyerere, Tanzania’s first leader, commenting on the loans stated: ‘‘The Chinese people have not asked us to become communists in order to qualify for this loan… they have never at any point suggested that we should change any of our policies—internal or external’’ (Nyerere 1974). Chinese aid has also differed from US aid in terms of whether it was to be the recipient or donor who decides the projects on which aid money had to be spent. Although China’s approach favors joint ventures between private firms, it contrasts with US insistence on supporting only private enterprise development (Fraser 2005). It continues to support some state-run projects, both in industry and agriculture. There is no evidence that China conditions its aid to the adoption of a particular political stance or alignment, except that recipients must maintain full diplomatic relations with the PRC rather than Taiwan (Liu 2001). It is clear that neither democracy nor transparency have much standing in China’s policy repertoire. Their philosophy of non-interference in the internal affairs of other nations fits well with the policy preferences of many African heads of state. President Hu Jintao said to the parliament in Gabon that China wants business ‘‘with no political conditions’’ (UCLA 2009).

Impact of Chinese Investments on Economic and Social Development As stated in the introduction, Chinese investments in the Democratic Republic of Congo can be analyzed as an important new model of international cooperation aimed at combining business and development. While discussing new loans for the post-war reconstruction, the President of RDC Joseph Kabila underlined five priorities to be achieved with the new programs: infrastructures, water and electricity, health and education. 9

Beijing Consensus is a term that represents an alternative economic development model to the Washington Consensus. While there is no precise definition of the Beijing Consensus, although many have laid out plans, the term has evolved into one describing alternative plans for economic development in the underdeveloped world, so-named as China is seen as a potential model for such actions. Cfr in http://ipezone.blogspot.com/2007/02/is-there-beijing-consensus.html.

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In this section we will evaluate the agreement signed between China and DRC on the basis of these priorities and we will try to investigate especially the possible impact of this $9 billion investment on some specific variables, such as Private Sector and Human Capital. Infrastructure, Access to Water and Electricity Facilities and Health Infrastructures in DRC are virtually non-existent: there are an estimated 153,000 km of roads of which only 2,800 km are paved, 46,200 km are improved earth and 97,000 are of unimproved earth. There is a strong need for improvement and investment demonstrated by the fact that, for example, in May 2001 heavy rains and a lack of maintenance effectively closed the main road from Kinshasa to its sea ports for several days (Gettleman 2009; Vandaele 2008). Most goods are transported by plane or boat: DRC has 6 major airports located in Kinshasa, Lubumbashi, Kinsangani, Goma, Mbuji-Mai, and Gbadolite, and hundreds of small landing strips elsewhere in the country while the waterways network has a length of 16,238 km. In 1995, there were 5,138 km of railways, but most of these were destroyed or damaged during the wars of the late 1990s. These deficiencies in the transport network represent a major impediment to economic development, hindering trade and restricting people’s access to basic social services. Following the available information, the second and third tranches (each equal to $3 billion) of the Chinese investment will be used for the construction and/or rehabilitation of roads and railways: more than 3,500 km highway between Kisangani in the north-east and Kasumbalesa on Congo’s southern border with Zambia will be improved and the section of the road between Lubumbashi and Kasumbalesa will be transformed into a highway, although it has been recently redone (Encyclopedia of the Nations 2009). 550 km of urban roadways will be built, 250 km in Kinshasa and 300 km in the main locations of the provinces (around 30 km for each one). Furthermore, nearly 3,000 km of railway will be created in order to link the country’s southern mining heartland to the main Atlantic port of Matadi and the two airports of Goma and Bukavu will be upgraded (Jopson 2009). With reference to water facilities, as shown in the following graph, in 2006 only 46% of DRC’s population had access to improved drinking water although DRC is one of the richest countries in terms of water resources. In addition, in spite of several projects carried out by international organizations and NGOs in order to provide drinking water networks, from 1990 to 2006 the increase of the proportion of the population with access to water has been equal to 3%. Different agencies of the United Nations are continuing to work on the supply of drinking water to towns and villages but war and conflicts are reducing the potential benefit of these interventions (Fig. 2). The agreement signed with China does not involve any program for the construction of the water service system, while important interventions are planned in the field of electricity facilities. Actually, although DRC has 60% of Africa’s hydroelectric potential, in 2005 only 6% of the country’s population had access to

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Fig. 2 Proportion of the population using improved drinking water sources (%) in RDC from 1990 to 2006. Source: UNdata, A World Information (2009)

electricity. In response to this need, Chinese investments will provide two hydroelectric dams: the Katende dam in Kasai-occidentale and at Kakobola in Bandundu. Furthermore, the two electricity distribution networks in Kinshasa and Lumbumbashi will be upgraded. The Chinese hydroelectric company, SINOHYDRO, declares in its website that it cooperates with the government of DRC for the construction and improvement of the Inga1 and Inga2 dams, which are supposed to become the biggest dams in the world and which are at the center of a high-pitched debate at the international level. At the moment, there is no official evidence about this cooperation and the project of the dams still involves only Western donors and African organizations such as the African Development Bank. Concerning the access to health facilities and the sanitary system in DRC, the total expenditure on health in RDC in 2006 represented 4.3% of the GDP, but many efforts have been made in this sector also by international donors, in particular in fighting the AIDS/HIV epidemic which is really diffused in RDC (around 1 million people living with HIV/AIDS in 2005). Anyway, as shown in the following graph, there are not enough health workers to meet the needs of the population (Fig. 3). The deficiency in the health system is a fundamental issue for DRC government and, for this reason, a huge amount of Chinese investments will be directed to the construction of a modern 50-bed hospital in Kinshasa, three 1,150-bed hospitals distributed among the future Provinces, and 145 health centers, one for each territory. Impact of Chinese Investments on the Private Sector Despite its weakness, the private sector is the principal sources of wealth and job creation. The impact of Chinese investments on this sector can be analyzed considering two important fields that are trade and industry. With reference to the former, the following graph shows that since 2005, when DRC government decided to strengthen its political and economic relations with China and when the negotiations for Chinese investments in DRC began, the value

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0.53

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Laboratory health workers

Health management & support workers

Dentistry personnel

Nursing and midwifery personnel

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Fig. 3 Human resource for health for 1,000 people in Democratic Republic of Congo—2004. Source: World Health Organization (2009)

of the export from RDC to China obtained a huge and prompt increase (Fig. 4). Considering the export value from January to April 2008, China is the first client of DRC followed by Brazil, Belgium (which was the most important commercial partner until 2007) and Finland, the United States are in fifth place, after Zambia (Fig. 5). On the contrary, China is at the 11th position in the ranking of DRC suppliers, representing only 2.95% of the total import value. Concerning the industrial sector, after a strong decline in the period 1995–2000 when the manufacturing value added per capita (MVA) experienced a negative growth equal to—7.84%, many efforts have been made in order to increase the industrial production. Actually, although UNIDO still considers DRC among the

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Fig. 4 Export value in million dollars from DRC to China, from 1999 to 2007. Source: Istituto per il Commercio Estero—ICE (Italian Institute for International Trade) (2008)

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Fig. 5 Ranking of the commercial partners of DRC considering the export value (in million dollars) from January to April 2008. Source: Istituto per il Commercio Estero—ICE (Italian Institute for International Trade) (2008)

less developed countries, MVA growth for the years 2000–2006 presents a positive value equal to ?6.05%. Chinese investment is supposed to give new impetus to the industrial development since the agreement with DRC established that 11–12% of the total value of each project in all the fields of execution of the contract has to be subcontracted to local companies. Education and Improvement of Human Capital Higher and university-level education and scientific research is called to be a leading force in the country’s development but it is undergoing an acute crisis. The dysfunctions which have been noted are: – – – –

Social inequalities in terms of access; Outdated curriculums and multiplicity of courses; Limited number of qualified teachers, laboratories and libraries; High cost of private education.

Chinese investments will finance two large modern universities, the location of which has yet to be determined by the government of DRC, and two vocational training centers in the field of construction and public-works sector in Kinshasa and Lubumbashi. Great importance has been given to professional training of local human resources and to the transfer in know-how: under the agreement, only one in five workers can be Chinese and in each of the projects financed with Chinese money half of 1% of the investment must be spent on transfer of technology and on training Congolese staff. With reference to primary and secondary education, no intervention is planned in the agreement even if the need for the enhancement of the educational sector is really strong: according to DRC Poverty Reduction Strategy, the gross enrollment ratio in primary school has declined sharply, from 92% in 1972 to 64% in 2002,

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while in secondary school it is estimated at 29% in 2001–2002 as compared to 26% in 1977–1978. These data reflect the strong deficiency of the educational system which urgently needs to be faced with strong and direct interventions.

Conclusions Starting in early 2006, China’s Africa Policy is impressive for its extent. In pursing a relationship with Africa, China has emphasized the common experiences of the two areas and underlined a promise of a ‘‘win–win’’ relationship with a continent with a long history of imperialism and exploitation. This expansion has generated an international discourse which focuses on how to characterize China-Africa relations and ranges from presenting China as the new colonialist to depicting her as Africa’s benefactor. In 2007 the government of the Democratic Republic of Congo signed an innovative agreement with the People’s Republic of China that could motivate Congolese leaders to reevaluate their economic and development strategies or represent another opportunity to lose money in corruption and internal fights, further worsening the financial situation of the country. The big challenge will depend on the de facto rules and principles that guide the Sino-Congolese relations forward and on how the two sides deal with the issues of corruption, lack of transparency, popular participation, accountability and respect for human rights. There is a clear need to go beyond the rhetoric and critically evaluate what China-DRC relations holds for the African country and how DRC and Congolese might maximize this new opportunity. The future for DRC in its relationship with China is complex and ambitious. First, the Congolese government must avoid mistakes of the colonial era which was marked by exploitation and fragmentation of the country. Moreover, DRC must guarantee that its population, particularly the poorest parts of it, is not sacrificed to the altar of economic growth.

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