Int J Philos Relig (2011) 70:127–138 DOI 10.1007/s11153-010-9280-3 ARTICLE

Evil and the many universes response Jason Megill

Received: 27 July 2010 / Accepted: 10 September 2010 / Published online: 17 November 2010 © Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Abstract I formulate and defend a version of the many universes (or multiverse) reply to the atheistic argument from evil. Specifically, I argue that (i) if we know that any argument from evil (be it a logical or evidential argument) is sound, then we know that God would be (or at least probably would be) unjustified in actualizing our universe. I then argue that (ii) there might be a multiverse and (iii) if so, then we do not know that God would be (or at least probably would be) unjustified in actualizing our universe. It follows that we cannot know that the atheistic argument from evil is sound, in which case we cannot be certain that the argument succeeds, and so it is rational to refuse to reject theism because of such arguments. Keywords Theodicy

Arguments from evil · Problem of evil · Multiverse · Theism · Atheism ·

Introduction The argument from evil is the most famous argument for atheism. Arguments from evil generally fall into one of two broad categories, (i) logical arguments from evil and (ii) evidential arguments from evil. A logical argument from evil holds that the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent being (the “3-O” God, for short) is inconsistent with some known fact about evil; so, the 3-O God cannot exist.1

1 Logical arguments from evil are of course very old. See Mackie (1955) for a relatively recent, though already classic, formulation of the logical argument. See also McCloskey (1960). Logical arguments from evil come in various forms: an argument might claim that God is inconsistent with the mere existence of evil, or with the existence of some evils (e.g., gratuitous evils), or with the distribution or amount of evil etc.

J. Megill (B) Old Dominion University, Norfolk, VA, USA e-mail: [email protected]

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An evidential argument from evil has a more modest, though still important, conclusion; it holds that some known fact about evil makes the existence of the 3-O God improbable.2 There have been numerous theistic responses to these arguments. Leibniz (1710/1951) famously claimed that this is the best of all possible worlds, so the 3-O God is consistent with any evil in it. Some claim that there is no best possible world and we cannot fault the 3-O God for not actualizing something that cannot possibly exist (see, e.g., Schlesinger 1964, 1977 and Forrest 1981). Others claim that the evils in our world are consistent with the 3-O God because these evils serve a purpose, e.g., they develop our spirit or are “soul making” (see, e.g., Hick 1966). The free will defense claims that evil, or at least some evil, so called “moral evil,” is our fault since it arises as a result of our free actions (see Plantinga 1974, 1977).3 One reply to atheistic arguments from evil is the “Many Universes” (or “Multiverse”) response. This response has not received the amount of attention that some other responses have, but several philosophers have recently defended it, including McHarry (1978), Kraay (2010), Turner (2003), Hudson (2006), and Forrest (1996). There are different versions of the multiverse response, but it basically claims that theism should hold that God actualizes more than one universe. In fact, God actualizes the best set of all possible universes. So, our universe, while not the best of all possible universes, is (or at least might be) in the best set of all possible universes, and so God was (or at least perhaps was) justified in creating it. There might be better possible universes than ours, and these universes might also be in the multiverse, but the fact that there are better universes than ours does not entail that God doesn’t exist. In my opinion, the many universes response is promising. In fact, a version of it can be formulated that is such that all of the premises are either (a) fairly obvious, (b) cannot be denied by the atheistic naturalist, or (c) are even entailed by atheistic arguments, and so cannot be denied by the proponents of such arguments. The argument The argument is five steps; there are (3) premises. Premise one is: (1) If we know that any atheistic argument from evil is sound, then we know that (the 3-O) God would be (or at least probably would be) unjustified in actualizing our universe.4 Premise two claims, (2) There might be multiple universes. 2 For the evidential problem of evil, see Rowe (1978, 1979, 1988, 1996). But like logical arguments from

evil, evidential arguments come in various forms; also see, e.g., Draper (1989). See Trakakis (2006) for an introductory discussion of evidential arguments from evil. 3 Of course, this list of theistic responses to evil is not exhaustive. There have been very many theodicies, defenses and attempted refutations of the argument (see Tooley 2008). Another well known response is Adams (1972); yet another is Wykstra (1984) etc. 4 Of course, the parenthetical remark “or at least probably would be” is needed because all evidential

arguments from evil try to establish is that God probably doesn’t exist.

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That is, for all we know there might be more than one universe (the “might” is an epistemic might). Premise (3) is, (3) If there might be multiple universes, then we do not know that (the 3-O) God would be (or at least probably would be) unjustified in actualizing our universe. In other words, if, for all we know, it is possible that there are multiple universes, then, for all we know, God is justified in actualizing our universe. But then we can infer, with modus ponens and (2) and (3), that, (4) We do not know that (the 3-O) God would be (or at least probably would be) unjustified in actualizing our universe. Finally, with modus tollens on (1) and (4), we can conclude that, (5) We do not know that any atheistic argument from evil is sound. In effect, we do not know that any atheistic argument from evil is sound, because if we did, then given (1), we would know that God is not (or probably is not) justified in actualizing our universe, but given (4), we do not know this; but if we do not know if any atheistic argument from evil is sound, then it is rational to refuse to reject theism because of such arguments. The argument attempts to neutralize arguments from evil by placing us in a state of uncertainty as to the soundness of the arguments; call the new argument the “uncertainty argument.” The uncertainty argument is valid, and steps (4) and (5) follow from other steps, so if steps (1) through (3) are true, the argument is sound.5 I defend each premise in successive sections. Premise one Premise one claims that, if we know that any atheistic argument from evil is sound, then we know that God would not be (or at least probably would not be) justified in actualizing our universe. Atheistic arguments clearly depend upon the assumption that God (at least probably) would not be justified in actualizing our universe. After all, if God is (likely) justified in actualizing our universe, there is no reason to think that the evil in our universe calls into question the existence of such a being. In other words, at the heart of atheistic arguments is the claim that an all good and all powerful being would not allow at least some of the evil that exists in our universe to exist, i.e., such a being would not be justified in allowing such evil to exist or in allowing such a universe to exist, therefore at least some of the evil in the universe is inconsistent with, or lowers the probability of, the existence of such a being. But 5 The logical form of the argument is:

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)

If K(P), then K(Q) (where “K” is the knowledge operator, “it is known that”). R. If R, then ¬K(Q). ¬K(Q). Modus Ponens, 2 & 3. ¬K(P). Modus Tollens, 1 & 4.

The success of the argument hinges upon the truth of (1)–(3).

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if God would be justified in actualizing our universe, then the tension between the existence of this being and the evil in the universe dissolves, and the atheistic argument from evil dissolves along with it. So, if we know that any atheistic argument from evil is sound, then we know that God would not be (or at least probably would not be) justified in actualizing the universe. I cannot see how this premise can be denied.

Premise two Premise two states that there might be multiple universes. It is epistemically possible that there is a multiverse. For all we know, there are multiple universes. The premise does not claim that there definitely is a multiverse, but only that, given what we know right now, there could be one. The premise is so weak it is quite plausible; e.g., it has not been conclusively demonstrated that there is not a multiverse. Note that the existence of a multiverse is a live possibility in theoretical physics. Indeed, there are several distinct multiverse theories in physics (see Tegmark 2003). First, there is the many worlds interpretation of Quantum mechanics, which claims that, there are myraids of worlds in the Universe in addition to the world we are aware of. In particular, every time a quantum experiment with different outcomes with non-zero probability is performed, all outcomes are obtained, each in a different world, even if we are aware only of the world with the outcome we have seen (Vaidman 2008, Sect. 1). Second, physicists have speculated that there might be different universes beyond ours (see Tegmark 2003). Third, the chaotic theory of inflation also predicts that there will be a multiverse (Tegmark 2003). Fourth, there is Tegmark’s (2003) own theory, which holds that any universe that can be described in a mathematical structure exists. None of these theories have been conclusively refuted, let alone all of them. Furthermore, it is significant that multiverses have been posited as theoretical entities in physics. A common opponent of theism is (atheistic) naturalism. The naturalist holds that “philosophical theorizing about the natural world should be consonant with scientific facts and theses, concerning both scientific subject matter and scientific methodology” (Wilson 2005, p. 438). This generally includes the claim that science determines our ontology; e.g., naturalism generally holds that “whatever there is, is a proper object of science” (Jacobs 2009, Sect. 2a). This implies that naturalists cannot, or at least should not, simply dismiss the possibility that there is a multiverse a priori; given that multiverses play a role in several scientific theories, and that science determines our ontology, naturalists cannot simply deny that the existence of a multiverse is epistemically possible. The most likely opponent of the uncertainty argument cannot deny the second premise of the argument.6 6 Of course, one can be a naturalist and reject the argument from evil. Then again, many naturalists reject

theism at least in part because of the argument from evil.

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To complicate matters for the atheist, the fine-tuning argument strongly suggests that the atheist should posit the existence of a multiverse.7 Some have argued that if there is only a single universe, then the probability that the universe would be capable of containing life—through pure chance—is quite low; so the probability that the laws of nature were fine-tuned to support life by an intelligent being is quite high. This has prompted some to posit a multiverse: if very many universes exist, then the existence of life in one of those universes is not that surprising, and there is no need to posit a “fine-tuner.” That is, the claim that a multiverse exists is the best response to an important argument for theism; this makes a denial that there might be a multiverse somewhat problematic for the atheist.8 This suggests that the atheist should endorse premise two of the uncertainty argument. In sum, there are several reasons to endorse premise two: (i) it is so weak it is plausible, (ii) it has not been shown that there is not a multiverse, so it is epistemically possible that there is one, in which case premise two is true, (iii) the premise is entailed by several current theories in physics, (iv) given (iii), premise two cannot be denied by the most likely opponents of the uncertainty argument, and (v) if the premise is denied, then a theistic argument is greatly strengthened, so much so that it would be imprudent for the atheist to deny it. Premise three Premise three claims that if there might be multiple universes, then we do not know that God would be (or at least probably would be) unjustified in actualizing our universe. If two additional claims are true, premise three is true. Consider the following two claims: CLAIM ONE: God is obligated to create good.9 CLAIM TWO: There might be more good than evil in the actual universe. Suppose that these two claims are true, and suppose, for conditional introduction, the antecedent of premise three, i.e., assume there might be multiple universes. If, as claim one states, God is obligated to create good, and if, as we have assumed, there might be multiple universes, then it might be that God would be obligated to actualize any universe that contains more net good than evil, because doing so would in fact be creating 7 See Schlesinger (1988) and Collins (1999, 2003) for two examples of fine-tuning arguments. For more

on the fine-tuning argument, also see Ratzsch (2008). 8 Indeed, cosmologist Bernard Carr, e.g., states that, “If there is only one universe, you might have to have

a fine-tuner. If you don’t want God, you’d better have a multiverse” (Folger 2008). That is, either (i) there is a multiverse or (ii) God exists. If this disjunction is true, then a denial that there is a multiverse entails theism. 9 The source of this obligation could be a couple of different things. It could be that morality depends upon

the consequences of actions. So, e.g., God has to create good because the creation of good would be a good consequence of the act of creation. Or it could be that morality depends not upon consequences but rather in acting in accordance with moral principles (such as the Categorical Imperative), and whatever these moral principles are, they obligate God to create good. The point is that it appears that claim one is consistent with various ethical theories. In any event, as I argue below, arguments from evil are clearly committed to claim one, so even if claim one is committed to a false or problematic ethical theory (though I don’t think it is), arguments from evil are as well.

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good (e.g., it would be adding to the sum total of good in concrete existence). That is, assuming that there is more than one universe, part of creating good for God would be (or at least might be) the actualization of any universe that contains more good than evil. Consider, for instance, the following example. Say that there are two universes, u and u ∗ . Universe u is an extremely pleasant universe; in u, good outweighs evil by a very great margin. In fact, u is so wonderful the atheistic argument from evil has never even been formulated. Indeed, in u, some endorse the theistic argument from goodness; a God must exist, they say, because things are so perfect that the degree of perfection in u seems incompatible with the non-existence of the God. Now consider universe u ∗ . There is a fair amount of evil in u ∗ , but there is much good as well. In fact, in u ∗ , good still outweighs evil, even though the margin is much slimmer than in u. If we can quantify goodness, the amount of good in u ∗ is positive, although not as large as that in u. Clearly, the actualization of u ∗ would lead to an increase in the amount of goodness in concrete reality, because u ∗ contains more good than evil. But if God is obligated to create good, and actualizing u ∗ would be creating good insofar as it increases the amount of good in concrete reality, then God is obligated to actualize u ∗ . So, given the possible existence of multiple universes, and claim one, God might be obligated to actualize any world that is on balance good, and so is (or at least might be) justified in actualizing any universe that contains more good than evil.10 Furthermore, suppose that claim two is true: there might be more good than evil in our universe. That is, it might be that our universe contains more good than evil; we simply do not know. But then, given that God might be justified in actualizing any universe that contains more good than evil, God might be justified in actualizing our universe. But then we do not know that God would be (or likely would be) unjustified in actualizing our universe, and this is simply the consequent of premise three. In sum, given claims one and two above, premise three is true. Consider again claim one: God is obligated to create good. This claim cannot be denied by the proponent of an atheistic argument from evil. The reason is that atheistic arguments from evil presuppose this claim as well. To explain, the proponent of an atheistic argument cannot deny that God is obligated to create good, because if God is not obligated to do so, then God could actualize any random world, no matter how terrible it is, in which case God is perfectly consistent with the evil in our universe and atheistic arguments fail. In other words, it does not even matter if claim one is true, since if it is false, atheistic arguments fail anyway. That is, if one denies claim one in an effort to refute the uncertainty argument, this denial will also amount to a rejection of atheistic arguments, given that these arguments also depend upon claim one. If an atheistic argument from evil is knowably sound, and so the uncertainty argument fails, this failure cannot be a result of the falsity of claim one, because if claim one is false, then atheistic arguments cannot be sound, in which case we cannot know that they are sound (at least if knowledge entails truth, as many suppose).

10 One might be wondering what would happen in the case of a tie, i.e., a universe in which there is the same amount of good and evil. Would God actualize such a universe? I’m not sure. Perhaps God appeals to various principles to break the tie, e.g., it is better to exist than not exist, so it would be better for a universe that has the same amount of good as evil to exist than not exist, so God actualizes the universe?

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Consider again claim two: we simply do not know if there is more evil than good in our universe. Of course, if one thinks that we know for certain that there is more good than evil in our universe, the uncertainty argument will still work; this type of denial of claim two only strengthens the uncertainty argument. For if we know that there is more good than evil in our universe, then given claim one and the possibility that there are multiple universes, we know that God might be justified in actualizing our universe, in which case we do not (and cannot) know that God would be unjustified in actualizing our universe, and so atheistic arguments fail. A denial of claim two is not sufficient to save atheistic arguments from evil; the denial must also be of a certain type. That is, the denial must specifically claim that we are certain that there is (or at least probably is) more evil than good in our universe. But there are numerous problems with this claim. First, we might need some way to quantify good and evil (or suffering etc), perhaps some system of measurement that measures good and evil, if we are to conclusively determine that our universe has more evil than good in it. It isn’t clear what such a system of measurement would look like, or even if such a thing is possible.11 Second, at least in relation to moral good and evil, while there are certain acts that all—or at least most—ethical theories will call evil or immoral, there are differences between ethical theories too; that is, one ethical theory might entail that some acts are moral, while another might entail that they are immoral. So, arguably, before we can even weigh the amount of moral good and evil, we must conclusively determine which ethical theory is correct. Third, to ascertain whether the suffering that exists outweighs the good, we must determine what suffering and what good we should take into account. For example, does the suffering of animals count?12 Does it depend on the type of animal in question? Is all suffering weighed the same; for example, does human suffering count for more than animal suffering? It seems to me that we should take into account the suffering of a dog, e.g., but I’m not sure about the suffering of an insect; indeed, I’m not even sure if an insect can be said to “suffer.” These first three issues have a common theme: it appears that in order for us to determine that evil outweighs good, a number of other issues must first be settled (e.g., how do we measure suffering etc). But it does not appear that these issues are easily settled, so it’s far from clear that the effort to show that evil outweighs good can even get started. But assume, for the sake of argument, that we can come up with a “system of measurement,” we can determine, in a manner agreeable to most involved, what suffering to take into account etc. Even so, there are further problems. First, we must determine how much good and how much evil (or suffering) there is in the world today, and it is far from clear how to do that. Should we take a poll of all of the world’s inhabitants (at last count, nearly seven billion), asking everyone if there has been more evil than good in their lives, and by what margin? Or could we simply take a representative sample? 11 One might object that a system of measurement might not be needed. One doesn’t need the Fahrenheit

scale to know today is hotter than yesterday, and one need not be familiar with “liters,” e.g., to know that one glass has more water than another since one can tell this simply by looking. But we are talking about very large scale amounts of good and evil. Can one confidently say that today is the hottest day in June ever without a system of measurement, or can one tell that the Pacific Ocean has more water than the Atlantic simply by looking? Because these are the sort of large scale measurements that are relevant. 12 The evidential argument from evil is often formulated such that animal suffering does count; see, e.g., Rowe (1988), where he speaks of a fawn dying in agony after a forest fire.

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Should we scan some newspapers for evidence of good and evil events, and then tally them up (e.g., there were four births today in San Antonio, but there were five deaths, so….) and hope that our sample is representative? And what if animals are factored into the equation? I have no idea how to determine if the lives of dogs are, on average, filled with more evil than good. I suspect no one else does either. Second, of course it is not enough to determine if evil outweighs good in the present; we must also determine how much good and evil has occurred throughout history. But how could we do this? Should we gather up a bunch of history books and weigh the good and the evil? This is hopeless; while one can point to a long miserable event, say, the 30 Years’ War, and say that evil outweighed good at least during that period, it’s possible that even during that conflict, good outweighed evil. Perhaps the vast majority of people on Earth lived lives that were on balance good while the war waged in a relatively small area of the globe? Third, even assuming that we can determine if there is more evil than good in the world today, and even assuming that we can determine that evil has outweighed good throughout the course of human history, we still couldn’t establish the denial of claim two because we have no idea what the ratio of good to evil will be in the future. Even if one thinks that human history is merely a tedious list of pointless brutalities, perhaps things will take a turn for the better at some point, and the good that will occur will eventually outweigh the evil that has occurred? These problems all have a common theme as well: we simply cannot obtain enough information about the ratio of good to evil to reliably state that evil outweighs good, or even that evil probably outweighs good. Furthermore, when one examines extant responses to the argument from evil, one finds additional reasons to doubt that we can confidently claim that evil outweighs good. First, the free will defense suggests that we are responsible for a lot of evil, i.e., moral evil. It is often argued that the free will defense fails to account for natural evil. But this does raise a question: when trying to determine if good outweighs evil, should we include both moral evil and natural evil in our calculation, or should we only include natural evil, i.e., the evil that God would be obviously responsible for? We have yet another issue that needs to be settled before our calculations can begin. Second, one might question our ability to judge accurately the amount of good or evil generated by a given past or present event because the event might have positive consequences that we cannot foresee.13 Quite simply, it might be that we are bad judges of the worth of an event. Third, a venerable theistic strategy in the face of the argument from evil is to claim that God might have different standards of world goodness than us. For example, God might think that at least part of what determines the goodness of a universe is the variety of phenomena in it, aside from, or perhaps in addition to, the amount of suffering that the universe’s inhabitants endure?14 Perhaps God values orderly universes over chaotic ones, i.e., ones in which there are no laws of nature? So, how can we determine that there is more evil than good when we are not even sure what being good entails to God? Yet again, these worries have a common theme:

13 See, for instance, Wykstra (1984) “skeptical theism.” 14 The idea that God might consider a wide variety of phenomena in existence a “good” can be found in

Leibniz (1710/1951), for instance.

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when one examines extant theistic responses to the problem of evil, one finds reasons for doubting our ability to determine if evil outweighs good. In sum, given two claims, premise three is true. If the first claim is false, then atheistic arguments fail, so it cannot be denied to save such arguments. The second claim is quite plausible for a number of reasons. We should conclude that premise three, like the first two premises, are true, and so the uncertainty argument is sound.

Possible objections I conclude by considering some possible objections. Objection One: “While it might be true that we cannot show that evil outweighs good in our universe, or will do so at the end of human history, assuming human history does end, it also cannot be shown that good outweighs evil.” Response: This objection misses the mark. I concur that we cannot show that good outweighs evil, just as we cannot show the opposite. But we need not show that good outweighs evil for the uncertainty argument to succeed; all we need is the claim that we cannot show that evil outweighs good. The goal was to neutralize the most prominent atheistic argument; if we cannot show that evil outweighs good, the goal has been met. Objection Two: “God would not be justified in actualizing a universe that contains more good than evil. God must actualize the universe that contains the most good and the least amount of evil, or at least the universe that contains the maximum net good. Surely this is not that world.” Response: I grant that there are universes better than this one. But this objection misunderstands the many universes reply; it fails to take into account that more than one universe will be actualized. While there are universes that are better than this one, they will be actualized too according to the many universes reply. Further, there might be universes that are worse than the actual universe; again, if such universes contain more good than evil, these universes will be actualized as well. In short, any possible universe in which good outweighs evil, however so slight the margin between good and evil might be, will be actualized. The reason is that these worlds are on balance good, even if only by a little, and so creating them would be creating good. Objection Three: “If the goal of the 3-O God is to create good, then why wouldn’t that being just keep actualizing a better universe—with a greater net good—over and over? Why bother creating universes with a small net good at all? Surely there is a better universe than the actual universe, why not simply make two of those universes, instead of one of those universes and the actual universe?” Response: It is not clear to me that there can be distinct yet qualitatively identical universes; this might violate the identity of indiscernibles for all I know (see, e.g., McHarry 1978). But assuming that the 3-O being could actualize duplicate universes, the being would still be justified in actualizing our universe if our universe is on balance good. If our universe is on balance good, and God is obligated to create the good, then God is obligated to actualize our universe. It might be that there are an infinite number of actualized duplicate universes that are better than this one, plus this universe is actualized.

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Objection Four: “What is the relationship between these other universes and other possible worlds? For example, are these other universes the same thing as other possible worlds; so if they exist, then other possible worlds exist, and therefore some form of modal realism is true? But then doesn’t your argument face all of the problems that modal realism does etc.?” Response: I am not sure what the relationship between other universes and other possible worlds are; but the argument is as agnostic as possible about such issues. There are a couple of different possible stances here: for example, one might hold that possible worlds and possible universes are not the same thing. So, e.g., a given possible world might contain more than one universe, a multiverse, while another possible world might contain a different multiverse, and there might be possible worlds that only contain one universe, and so on. On this picture, ersatzism might be true: it might be that only one possible world is actualized, and this single concrete possible world contains a multiverse, and one of these universes in this multiverse is ours. Only one possible world is concrete, but this world contains multiple universes. A different view might hold that other possible worlds and other possible universes are the same thing. On this picture, when one says that there are other concrete universes aside from ours, one is saying that there are other concrete possible worlds aside from ours. Some form of modal realism is true on this view. Either of these views is consistent with the uncertainty argument. Objection Five: “You claim that the uncertainty argument is consistent with ersatzism; but this might be incorrect. Suppose that it is possible for someone to exist in more than one possible world, but it is not possible for someone to exist in more than one universe (on this view, possible worlds and universes obviously cannot be the same thing). Basically, one can be in multiple possible worlds, but not in multiple universes. So, if you tell someone not to complain that this universe is subpar because there are other, better universes that also contain them, as the uncertainty argument more or less does, this is a mistake, because again, it is impossible for someone to exist in more than one universe. What the uncertainty argument must hold is that one should not complain that this possible world is subpar because there is another concrete possible world that contains us (again, we have assumed that we can exist in more than one possible world); i.e., God actualized both possible worlds. But now there are multiple concrete possible worlds, and ersatzism is false.” Response: First, for all we know, ersatzism is false. Many, including myself, happen to think that ersatzism is true, but we are not so certain of its truth that we would claim that it is epistemically impossible that it is false. Second, the claim that God actualized more than one possible world is perfectly consistent with theism; the theist already believes that God actualized our possible world, so why not think that God could actualize another as well? Even assuming that the objection shows that the uncertainty argument is committed to the claim that there are multiple concrete possible worlds, perhaps all this shows is that the theist should reject ersatzism, despite its initial plausibility? Third, the objection depends upon the claim that it is impossible for us to exist in more than one possible universe. But we are not certain that it is impossible for us to exist in more than one universe, in which case we are not certain that the objection is legitimate, in which case the uncertainty argument might still succeed, and so the argument from evil might still be unsound. Fourth, even assuming that it is impossible

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for the same person to exist in more than one universe, i.e., even assuming that you cannot be numerically identical to someone in a different universe, perhaps identity is not the relevant relation here? Perhaps, e.g., a counterpart relation (Lewis 1986) is sufficient? So, while you are not numerically identical to someone in a better universe, and so we cannot claim that you are also in a better universe than ours, perhaps there is someone in one of these better universes that is sufficiently similar to you? But then we need not posit the existence of another concrete possible world for the uncertainty argument to work; there might be only one concrete possible world that contains multiple universes, one of which contains you, and others of which contain your various counterparts? Fifth, and most importantly, the theist can claim that ersatzism is indeed true. There is only a single concrete possible world. Further, there might be multiple universes in this single possible world. And you are in one and only one of them. So, the theist can even grant that it is impossible for you to be in more than one universe. Then, the theist can simply reiterate that this is the best possible multiverse; the multiverse that exists contains as much or more happiness than any other multiverse. God could not have done any better. So, it is unfair for one to complain that they or we should have been in a better universe in this multiverse. One might as well complain that God cannot make 2 and 2 equal 5: this multiverse is the best possible multiverse, so God could not have done any better. Objection Six: “Perhaps we can, at some point, obtain enough knowledge of the universe, it’s history, and even its future etc., to reasonably conclude that there is more evil than good in the universe, so God must not exist.” Response: The seriousness of this objection depends on how serious the obstacles to us obtaining such knowledge are. But it is unlikely that we will be able to reliably predict the future, especially the distant future, any time soon; so it is unlikely that we will be able to confidently state that the actual universe contains more evil than good any time soon. Plausibly, theism is safe from arguments from evil, at least for quite a while. References Adams, R. M. (1972). Must God create the best?. Philosophical Review, 81(3), 317–332. Collins, R. (1999). A scientific argument for the existence of God. In J. M. Michael (Ed.), Reason for the hope within. Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co. Collins, R. (2003). The evidence of fine-tuning. In N. Manson (Ed.), God and design: The teleological argument and modern science. London: Routledge. Draper, P. (1989). Pain and pleasure: An evidential problem for theists. Noûs, 23, 331–350. Folger, T. (2008). Science’s alternative to an intelligent creator: The multiverse theory. Discover Magazine. http://discovermagazine.com/2008/dec/10-sciences-alternative-to-an-intelligent-creator. Accessed 14 Nov 2010 Forrest, P. (1981). The problem of evil: Two neglected defenses. Sophia, 20, 49–54. Forrest, P. (1996). A speculative understanding of evil. God without the supernatural. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Hick, J. (1966). Evil and the God of love. New York: Harper and Row. Hudson, H. (2006). Hyperspace and theism, the metaphysics of hyperspace. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Jacobs, J. (2009). Naturalism. The internet encyclopedia of philosophy. http://www.iep.utm.edu/naturali/. Accessed 14 Nov 2010

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