Expanding the Debate on Generic Theory of Conflict Resolution: A Response to a Critique john W Burton and Dennis J D. Sandole

The Avruch-Black response to our article in the October, 1986 issue of Negotiation journal is, we hope, just the beginning of a debate that is important in the development of a theory of conflict resolution from which conflict resolution processes must be deduced. The core issue they have raised is whether the generic or recurring patterns of human behavior are due to genetic or to cultural influences. As anthropologists they wish to assert "human culture" as the explanation, a subject they will explore in a later paper. The argument whether human behavior is genetic or cultural is of little importance from the point of view of a theory of conflict resolution. In any event, the issue seems not to be one on which those directly concerned can agree. But we note the recent publication by Robert Boyd and Peter). Richerson, Culture and the Evolutionary Process (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986 ). They come to the conclusion that there are two information channels, one cultural and one genetic, and hence a "dual inheritance system." We would be happy to accept this apparent compromise, especially since it is compatible with the view stated in our paper that, "Conflict may involve ... not a clash of basic needs as such, but a clash of ... culturally determined ways in which needs are expressed." (p. 343) The important conclusion is that universal patterns of behavior exist-for whatever reason-making possible a generic approach to conflict resolution, across cultures and across social levels within cultures. If the generic culture debate throws light on the nature of human behavior, so much the better. A facilitating party should be as well informed as possible about generic patterns, and aware especially of the differences between those motivations that are transitory interests (and therefore negotiable) and those cultural specific values and universal human needs that are not for trading. Avruch and Black have some other problems with our exposition, focusing in particular on "role defense." It is true that Sites did not include role defense in his lists of needs. He did, however, title his book Control: The Basis of Social Order. The focus is on control by the individual for pursuing human needs. We stress this because empirically, when parties to disputes are brought together, it is this tactic of control by role occupancy which comes to the surface and is elevated to a "need." Hence, role defense is not so much the protection of needs once they have been acquired as much as it is the protection of means and tactics John W. Burton is Distinguished Visiting Professor in Conflict Resolution and International Relations at George Mason University, Fairfax, Virginia 22030. Dennis}. D. Sandole is Associate Professor of Government and Politics and Faculty Associate in Conflict Resolution at George Mason University.

0748-4526/87/0100-0097S05.00/0' 1987 Plenum Publishing Corporation

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that actors develop for purposes of protecting and fulfilling needs. An important task for the third party is to make clear the difference between human needs and tactics designed to fulfill them. Role defense, therefore, far from being "conceptually and logically flawed," presents an important challenge for third parties: How does one deal effectively with disputants who are locked into power-based, adversarial processes with potentially destructive consequences? Role defense is, as Avruch and Black point out, zero-sum, whereas the human needs to which we refer-security; identity and recognition-increase with consumption and make possible "'in-win outcomes. What they missed is the emphasis we place on costing in the resolution process. No mention was made of this key element-perhaps because they were not relating theory to process. Our colleagues state that they "have little to say about process, the actual techniques of conflict resolution that Burton advocates." They also say little about the overall field that our paper was about, conflict studies, which includes theory and applied research regarding conflict dynamics, third party intervention and conflict resolution. This may account for their difficulty in "finding the locus of the paradigm shift that Burton and Sandole claim to represent." (We do not represent it; our article made it clear that this was a shift to be discerned in all behavioral disciplines.) The conflict resolution process is designed precisely to enable disputants to cost the maintenance and pursuit of roles against the background of the human needs of personal and group identity they seek to ensure by role occupancy. In short, parties are encouraged to seek means that are not dysfunctional for their goals. White South Africans, for instance, have certain human needs that they will pursue with all the power at their disposal, as did whites in Rhodesia. However, the power is being employed for role defense, on the assumption that this is the best tactic. In a conflict resolution setting, they would be assessing the costs of role occupancy-the longer-term violation of those needs that their role occupancy will in practice bring about-and they would be examining alternative means. Regarding comments on our reference to a paradigm shift, we would still wish to emphasize the importance of this. As our article suggested, there has been a growing realization in the last few decades that the unit of analysis in many; if not all the social sciences, has been authorities and institutions, and that there has been an important human element missing. The "Economic Man," "Legal Man," and "Sociological Man" who were invented to fit into theories have little relationship with the total real person with whom a facilitator has to deal in a dispute. Perhaps anthropology has been more sophisticated than all other disciplines, but we suspect that the focus on tribal and cultural differences has created an "Anthropological Man" who is uniquely different from all others in other tribes and cultures. In a conflict situation, we would perceive such differences merely as alternative means for achieving common human goals. The "paradigm shift" that we are addressing is not merely some Kuhnian phenomenon occurring within the context of one or more disciplines where academic theory and practice might be affected. It is a more general phenomenon taking hold in various professions and in society at-large. It is a movement from power-based, coercive bargaining to problem-solving processes of conflict resolution, from settlement to resolution, at all levels (thereby indicating generic 98 Burton and Sandole Expanding the Debate

theory and process). This movement explains why, in the last 12 to 15 years, we have seen divorce mediation, hostage negotiation, environmental mediation, Track II diplomacy, etc. coming to the fore, involving lawyers, law enforcement officers, diplomats and others in processes for which they were not originally trained. During that same period of time, we have witnessed the creation of the Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution (SPIDR), the National Institute for Dispute Resolution (NIDR), the American Bar Association Special Committee on Dispute Resolution, the National Conference on Peacemaking and Conflict Resolution (NCPCR), the Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School (plus this journal), the United States Institute of Peace, the University for Peace, and the Center for Conflict Resolution at George Mason University, which offers a master's program in conflict management. Indeed, just in terms of alternatives to litigation, in 1971 there were three dispute resolution centers in the United States and in 1986 there are over 350 according to the ABA Special Committee on Dispute Resolution. Taking all this and more into account, we certainly have "shifting" on a scale which transcends even the Kuhnian phenomenon. This paradigm shift is at the heart of conflict resolution: Legal processes are based on certain assumptions about law and order and the need to conform, while conflict resolution is concerned with analysis of motivations and changes in structures to bring them into harmony with human aspirations. Conflict resolution is going through a transition stage from the use of processes which, like legal processes, are based more on tradition than on any theory of human behavior, to the use of process that is theory-based. This interaction between us at George Mason University's Center for Conflict Resolution demonstrates the great advantage of a constant interaction between theory and process, the one helping to develop the other. Our hope is that this is merely the start of a debate into which others will enter.

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. And Avruch and Black Reply

Burton and Sandole's response to our criticism makes a number of points, several of which we are prepared to accept and others which we are not. In this brief note, we think it important to point out which areas of disagreement remain. So, for example, while we are more than ready to agree that ultimately human behavior is an outgrowth of a "dual-inheritance system"-genetic and culturalthe analytical weight given to each input must be addressed. Otherwise, it is tempting to lean implicitly towards the genetic, our pan-human, universal, inheritance, in order to establish "generic" claims. Our critique focused on two points: logical and conceptual flaws in the theoretical structure, especially with respect to human needs, and the claims made for a paradigm shift. With regard to the former, it seems to us that Burton and Sandole, in their brief comment on our paper, have clarified considerably their portrayal of role defense. We would point out, however, that this protrayal is different from the one drawn in Burton's Deviance, Terrorism and War and in their article. Perhaps our comments have helped them to reformulate, and we

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think sharpen, the sense of role defense. However, they have not addressed all the difficulties that reliance on it entails. So far as paradigm shifts are concerned, we would only reiterate our difficulty in locating them. At base, their theory of human needs is, in conception and logic of operation, a species of functionalism, thinly disguised. Finally; Burton and Sandole point out that we have ignored the issue of "costing," and of conflict resolution process in general. This is correct. But it is Burton and Sandole who vigorously (and we think correctly) maintain that a close connection between theory and practice must be sought and nurtured. Our critique was aimed at elucidating the problems of the theory which they say undergirds the process. These problems, in our view, remain to be addressed. Otherwise, we find ourselves in the position of being told that the theory must be adequate because the process seems to work just fine. Perhaps the process does work. But, given the unresolved deficencies in the theory; it may work for reasons unknown to the theorists. -Kevin Avrnch and Peter W Black

100 Al>rUch and Black Respond