HUMAN STUDIES 4, 299-311 (1981)
Free-Phantasy, Language, and Sociology: A Criticism of the Methodist Theory of Essence 1
JAMES L. HEAP Department of Sociology Ontario Institute for Studies in Education and University of Toronto
1. Husserl held that parallel and prior to every empirical science there could and should be an eidetic phenomenological science, for example, a sociology addressed to the region of "the social" within the realm of pure possibilities of experience (1962, pp. 55-57). The development of an eidetic phenomenological sociology is seen as necessary to ground the analytic apparatus and epistemic claims of de facto inquiry. The possibility and intelligibility of such grounding rests on a theory of essence (eidos). Essential to the work of furnishing the grounds of social scientific constructs is the method of determining eidos. Husserl called that method "free-phantasy variation." In this paper we shall consider and critique a recent formulation of Husserl's theory of essence (Zaner, 1973a; 1973b) which is intimately tied to the method of free-phantasy variation. The crux of the critique is that the variational method has a "monological" bias that is adopted as a basic presupposition of what I shall speak of as the methodist theory of essence. The recommendation which issues from this critique is that we abandon the methodist theory of essence, yet retain the method of free-phantasy variation in order to clarify and ground social scientific concepts.
~The author wishes to thank Richard M. Zaner and D. Lawrence Wieder for their comments on an earlier draft of this paper, presented at the Eastern Sociological Society Annual meetings, Boston, Massachusetts, March, 1976.
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2. There are at least three theories of essence attributable to Husserl. They differ as to how they formulate the relation between essence and fact. They differ as well on the issue of the certainty ascribable to eidetic claims. Where they appear not to differ at all is on the point which is central to the methodist position: essence is what is invariant and common to all possible examples of some phenomenon. We shall come to focus on this point. The early theory found in Ideas (1962) and elsewhere (1965) is adamant in the distinction between the eidetic realm of pure possibility and the emnirical realm of actuality. The former yields a priori knowledge, while the latter can furnish only a posteriori knowledge. Essences here are given as ideal and capable of apodictic grounding. They rule actual experience with an iron hand, with the f~cts of the world unable to resist or reform their rule. Readers of later manuscripts argue that Husserl had softened his distinction between essence and fact. The two were now to be seen as linked, as poles on a continuum (Merleau-Ponty, 1964, pp. 43-95). The historicity of phenomena is recognized, and it is implied that as facts change, so can essences. Claims about apodicticity are noticeably absent. A priori takes on a looser sense by the time of the Crisis (1970). A third reading has recently been put forward which skates between absolutism and relativism to arrive at what we might call a "methodist" reading. This reading understands eidos strictly in terms of the method for its intuition. While the reading claims to be accurate to what Husserl really said, it has the merit of deciding the theory of essence on the ground of Husserl's method. This reading moves us beyond the focus on and worries about textual exegisis. Briefly, the methodist reading (cf. Zaner, 1973a; 1973b) shares with the absolutist stance the claim that there is an important distinction to be made between essence and fact. It does not erect-that distinction, however, as a fence preventing commerce between the two. While it is agreed that eidetic and empirical epistemic claims are addressed to qualitatively different domains, "there is a profound reciprocity among all levels o f inquiry so far as the significance of judgments and findings is concerned" (Zaner, 1978, p. 15). Like the relativist position, this reading views essence and fact as poles on a continuum, but that continuum is argued to have levels. The levels are not defined, as in the absolutist reading, in terms of apodicticity. As with the relativist reading, apodicticity is underplayed, the claim being that Husserl himself was suspicious of the quest for absolute apodicticity (1969, pp. 156-57). Eidetic epistemic claims are now argued to be subject to the same tentativeness that haunts empirical claims. In the methodist reading the continuum and its levels are understood in terms of "increasing completeness inherent to the very idea of knowledge" (Zaner, 1978, p. 15). De facto claims about actualities are thus seen as
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furnishing knowledge which is incomplete in light of further possible knowledge about the essence of the claimed state of affairs. Complete knowledge requires awareness of the limits of possibility for that which is known. That awareness, however, can never be apodictic; knowledge is only "complete" in degrees. 3. The methodist theory of essence is based on the method of free-phantasy variation. That method was put forward by Husserl in various texts (1960; 1962; 1969) and has been explicated and further developed by Richard Zaner (1973a; 1973b). Let us call it, then, the Husserl-Zaner method of freephantasy variation. a) The method begins with anything (cf. Husserl, 1969, p. 248; Zaner, 1973a, pp. 31-34), whether an actual or possible particular individual (whether "real" or "ideal"). The concern is to take the individual as an example of some eidos. To do this, and to get around the problem raised by Schutz (1966, pp. 92-115) of a typification circumscribing an eidos, the method requires attending to the particular individual as to its type. By making explicit the type as a type it becomes possible reflexively to allow the specific individual itself "to come to the fore" as the "thing itself" (Zaner, 1973b, p. 202). It is this "thing itself" which is then intended as an example of some eidos. b) The method requires that the example be purged of its mundaneity through the invocation of first the phenomenological, and then the eidetic epoch~ and reduction. The meth'od can then begin from examples taken as intentional experiences or as their intended noematic-objective correlates. Without this purge the method remains merely empirical. c) Having a reduced example in hand, we then "freely vary "2 the example and any other possible example of the kind of which the original example is an instance. As Husserl (1969, p. 248) puts it, in such a fully free variation, released from all restrictions to facts accepted beforehand, all the variants (examples) belonging to the openly infinite sphere--which includes the (initial) example itself, as "optional" and freed of all its factualness--stand in a relationship of synthetic interrelatedness and integral connectedness; more particularly, they stand in a continuous and all-inclusive synthesis of ~coincidence in conflict." But precisely with this coinciding, what necessarily persists throughout this free and always repeatable variation comes to the fore: the invariant, the indissolubly identical in different and ever-again different, the essence common to all, the universal essence by which all ~imaginable" variants of the example, and all variants of any such variant, are restricted~ This invariant is the ontic essential form (a priori form), the eidos, corresponding to the example, in place of which any variant of the example could have served equally well.
2The sense of "freely vary" is explicitly taken up by Zaner (1973a; 1973b) but it does not bear directly on our concerns here.
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Zaner follows Husserl explicitly here. However, he has introduced "kind" as a techriieal term which denotes eidos. This allows him to speak of examples as being examples of a kind. Any particular item, it is clear, exemplifiesmany kinds: or, wecan say, anysuch itemis an example of a kindsolelyby virtueof its havingcertainfeaturesor properties,and it is these which exemplify,whetherwellor poorly.The kind is presentedthrough or by meansof the latter, it "runs through~ or "is common to" them. (Zaner, 1978, pp. 7-8) The "essence is what is common to a set of individual items." The contexture or "'system o f c o m m o n features " is precisely the kind itself, the eidos (Zaner, 1978, pp. 9, 8). d) The method, while it requires varying an "in principle indefinite n u m b e r " o f examples (Zaner, 1973a, p. 39), provides no markers to inform its user that enough examples have been considered. The only criterion for stopping is one that is arbitrarily applied: that the work of free variation has elicited the invariant through "coincidence in conflict." It is precisely this feature of the method that renders eidetic epistemic claims essentially tentative, and thus subject to error, continual criticism, denial and modification (cf. Zaner, 1973a, pp. 37-40). It is this feature of the method for obtaining essences that makes absolute apodicticity a chimera. e) While there are.other details of the method, e.g., exemplicating and possibilizing acts, and other points to be elucidated, e.g., the difference between phantasizing and imagining (of. Zaner, I973a), the relevant features of the method have been outlined. 4. In one sense the method of free-phantasy variation can be said to operate with a "monological" bias. That bias is not adventitious. It is there by design. Free-phantasy variation is designed to arrive at that which is common to all and any examples of some particular kind. The method elicits the invariant through "coincidence in conflict." It freely varies examples and interrogates the contexture of their actual and possible occurrence to bring to the fore their common features. Their differences are the materials and field which allow commonality to show through. The bias of free-phantasy variation is towards commonality. Thus, the bias can be spoken of as "monological." It is a bias in favor of a logic which organizes a range of examples of some phenomenon in terms of a single set of common features. 5. Earlier the point was made that the methodist theory understands essence strictly in terms of its method of intuition. Thus, the methodist theory of essence is founded on the method of free-phantasy variation. Husserl (1969, p. 248) writes of the invariant as "the indissoulubly identical.., the essence common to all" examples. Zaner (1978, p. 93)writes that "essence is what is common to a set of individual items." Given these specifications of essence, it is clear that the monological bias of free-phantasy variation is
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tailor-made, if not custom designed for discovering or formulating essences. An eidos can be spoken of as a "monological structure" in the sense that it consists precisely in a single "system of common features"(Zaner, 1978, p. 8). An eidos is that one logic or system of common features which a phenomenon must exemplify in order to qualify as an example of the " k i n d " phenomenologically defined by that system. If a phenomenon is an example of a particular kind, yet does not share the heretofore discovered common features of that kind, that is grounds for rejecting the current formulation of the eidos. A new formulation is sought that will hold for all known examples of that kind. The new formulation, on the Husserl-Zaner theory, will still be in terms of a single system of common features. Under the Husserl-Zaner theory it is not conceivable or grammatical that examples could be of one kind, eidos, yet not share a single system of common features. The theory defines an eidos as such a system. The theory does more, however, than define essense this way. Along with the other theories of essence it goes further and presupposes that "anything whatever" has an essence. Thus " a n y t h i n g whatever" is taken to have or exemplify a monological structure appropriate to its "kind." This brings us to a critical point. When a monological presupposition governs the use of a method having a monological bias, one cannot discover--or recognize the discovery--that the world is organized in any way other than within "kinds" consisting of individuals having common features. Under the direction of the methodist theory, free-phantasy variation imposes on "kinds" the monological structure which the theory presupposes. The method is rendered blind to its own bias. It is thereby assured of discovering "kinds," i.e., essences. Precisely in the way that free-phantasy variation arrives at essences it produces them. If one presupposes that the world is monologically organized, that production can be regarded as trivial. If that presupposition is unwarranted, however, that production is obviously momentous, and self-defeating for phenomenology. Eidetic phenomenology would become another instance of constructive analysis (cf. Garfinkel and Sacks, 1970), telling us one more "likely story" while rendering opaque the "things themselves." 6. What is at issue here is the connection between kinds and their constitutent members. What is the logic by which kinds are organized? a) Note here the trap set by this question. If we understand,kind" as Zaner does, then we are asking a question about eidos, and are thus buying into the notion that, in some sense, there are such things as essences. If we free the term "kind" from its technical use, and revert to the ordinary use that makes technical use intelligible (cf. Heap, 1976) we are free to discover an answer to our question. The warrant and impetus for the return to ordinary use is that Husserl and Zaner claim that their method can be applied to "anything whatever."
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If we consider the use made of their method, as in Husserl's work, it seems clear that the method does not begin from an interest solely in the "thing itself," a particular individual. As Zaner (1978, p. 7) has written, "Any particular item it is clear, exemplifies many kinds." In Schutz's terms (1970), the item would be interpretationally relevant to an indefinite number of themes. For one doing eidetic phenomenology, the item is of interest as a:n example of some particular kind, where that kind is the object of concern. That particular kind achieves and displays its relevance in terms of the problematic that furnishes eidetic phenomenology with its order of problems. When eidetic phenomenology is carried ~ut in the service of sociology, the order of problems is decided by the sociological constructs and apparatus, which are in need of grounding. Thus any particular item is of interest not solely for itself, but rather for what it can reveal about some theoretically predecided theme, a particular kind, an eidos. A question arises here, though. How does one know or decide that there is a kind prior to its discovery, such that an item can become of interest not for itself, but as an example of that preknown kind? b) An answer is that the one doing eidetic phenomenology begins from within the world, which is always a social world. As one having a mastery of natural language, he/she has an endless resource of kinds for eidetic clarification. What could count as "anything whatever" is anything that can be called something, that can be named. For "anything whatever" to mean anything else, is to presuppose that thereare things outside of language which are nonetheless conveivable prior to their discovery through eidetic variation. The possibility of their being "kinds" in the technical sense turns on the conceivability of kinds in the ordinary sense(s). c). It is through mastery of natural language that one has inter-subjective access to "anything whatever," "kinds," and "particular items."That mastery is a pre-reflective competence on which phenomenologists have no choice but to depend, even while epoches and reductions are in force (cf. Heap, 1975; Cunningham, 1976). While we may wish to clarify and explicate the structures of phenomena as they are given in self-evidence, our beginning is always from within the world, and thus from within language. If we must start from and continually draw on our linguistic competence to conceive and report on phenomena, we ought to consider whether there is a chance that "kinds," as ordinarily conceived, might have a logic that is (somehow) furnished in and through language. It might turn out that there is a logic to the organization of kinds that is at odds with the logic of common features presupposed by the methodist theory of essence. 7. To encounter an alternative logic, consider the situation where the sociologist (or any social scientist) has an interest in games. To have complete
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a n d clarified knowledge o f games, a n d thus to operate correctly with the concel~t o f game as a p a r t of a n analytic a p p a r a t u s , free-phantasy v a r i a t i o n w o u l d be exercised to arrive at the essence o f game. W e might take a game of chess a n d freely vary it, t h e n take football, then hopscotch, t h e n solitaire, etc. T h r o u g h the variations we would expect t h a t the i n v a r i a n t properties of games w o u l d show through. As o r t h o d o x methodists could we r u n into trouble7 I f we t u r n a n d consider the r u m i n a t i o n s o f Wittgenstein we can locate trouble. 66. Consider for example the proceedings that we call "games." I mean board-games, card-games, baH-games,Olympicgames, and so on. What is common to them all?--Don't say: "There must be something common, or they would not be called 'games'"--butlook and see whether there is anything oommon to alL--For if you look at them you willnot see something that is common to all, but similarities,relationships,and a wholeseries of them at that. To repeat: don't think, but look!--Look for example at board-games, with their multifarious relationships. Now pass to card-games;here you find many correspondences with the first group, but many common features drop out, and others appear. When we pass next to ball-games,much that is common is retained, but much is lost.--Are they all "amusing'? Compare chess with noughts and crosses. Or is there always winning and losing, or competition between players?Think of patience. In ball games there is winning and losing; but when a child throws his ball at the wall and catches it again, this feature has disappeared. Look at the parts played by skill in chess and skill in tennis. Think now of games like ring-a-ring-a-roses; here is the element of amusement, but how many other characteristics have disappeared! And we can go through the many, many other groups of games in the same way; can see how similarities crop up and disappear. And the result of this examination is: we see a complicated network of similarities overlapping and crisscrossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail. 67. I can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities than ~family resemblance:" for the various resemblancesbetween members of a family: build, feature, colour of eyes, gait, temperament, etc., etc., overlap and criss-cross in the same w a y . And 1 shall say: "games" form a family. (1958:31-2) Now it c a n n o t be claimed, or need we claim, that W i t t g e n s t e i n is engaged in f r e e - p h a n t a s y v a r i a t i o n i n a n y strict sense. N o epoch~s or r e d u c t i o n s are (explicitly) in force. G a m e s are (perhaps) not being treated as purely i n t e n t i o n a l objects. Yet, given the reciprocity betweem empirical a n d eidetic levels o f i n q u i r y (cf. Z a n e r , 1978, pp. 14-15), Wittgenstein's reflections in a n d o n the m u n d a n e sphere are u n a v o i d a b l y relevant to j u d g m e n t s a b o u t purely possible examples. If some set of examples ot games does n o t share c o m m o n features y e t sanctionably can be called games, t h e n n o a m o n t o f f u r t h e r varying, exemplicating, a n d possibilizing can u n c o v e r a n eidos. Z a n e r (1973a, p. 36) has n o t e d that "a single instance to the contrary is all that is needed"to d e n y a n eidetic epistemic claim. N o w we must a d d that w h e n t h a t single
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instance still counts as one of the kind under analysis then we cannot speak of that kind in a technical sense as an eidos. 3 In re-examining Wittgenstein's discussion we might wish to claim that it is faulted. His discussion appears as offering merely a reasonable conjecture. We cannot be sure that his work on games is any more detailed or thorough than what he reports in the above quoted passage. Even this is enough, though. The very character of the passage as a reasonable conjecture opens up the possibility that some kind, e.g., games, might not be organized in and as a set of common features. If this is possible for one kind, it is possible for other kinds. The mere possibility of this being the case reflexively reveals to us the risk of using free-phantasy variation under the sway of the methodist tl~eory of essence. We can no longer presuppose that every or any kind has a monological structure. We therefore can no longer presuppose that"anything whatever," considered as something nameable, reportable, accountable, has an eidos. The presupposition of monological structure is the rug upon which eidetic phenomenologists stand. The possibility of an alternative logic to kinds pulls that rug from under them/us. The logic of any kind now becomes a research question which we can no longer afford to settle by fiat. 8. If we make the logic of kinds into a research question we can begin to understand why the methodist theory runs into trouble. While the discussion ultimately must be opened wider, here let us begin from the situation where eidetic phenomenology is enlisted in the service of sociology. It is here, perhaps, where the trouble can be seen best. a) It has become a truism of Reflexive Sociology (cf. Gouldner, 1970; O'Neill, 1972; Zaner, 1973c) that sociology is about, while being in, the very world it studies. This has been formulated a n d s h o w n most strongly in the work of ethnomethodologists (cf. Garfinkel, 1967; Z i m m e r m a n & Pollner, 1970). That work shows the multifarious ways in which sociology is dependent on c o m m o n sense for its topics and resources. That dependence is such that any phenomenon of sociological interest is already preconceived in everyday life. Motives, power, the family, roles, attitudes, values, etc. are already part of the repertoire of the w o m a n on the street. Sociology's phenomena are already worked up, shaped, given currency, and made noticeable prior to the arrival of the professional sociologist. 3Levin(1970, p. 185n) has remarked on the problems raised for Husserl'stheory ofessence by Wittgenstein's investigations. This had led him, however, to revise Husserl's theory by claiming that "there might be essences which are founded on important 'family resemblances,'rather than on self-evidentlynecessarycommon properties"(Levin, 1973, p. 176). In terms of the methodist reading of Husserrs theory, Levin's revision of the theory is unacceptable; it severs the theory's relationship to the method which discoverseidos. It should be noted, as well,that Levindoes not locate the trouble created by Wittgenstein's inquiries as traceable to the monological presupposition of free-phantasy variation.
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Schutz recognized this dependency, in one form, and formulated a methodology within its limits. He argued that sociologists are and must be in the business of building second order constructs based on common sense members' first order constructs 4 (cf. Schutz, 1962, p. 59). Thus not only the phenomena, but also the analytic apparatus of sociology depend on the everyday world of common sense members, as a necessary and inexhaustible resource.
b) For anything whatever, and thus for anything that can count as a thing for societal members, there are words and ways of speaking. Those words and ways may not be eloquent or"accurate," but they usually do as well as needed. They get members' work done. They get sociologists' and phenomenologists' work done before, during, and after their doing of sociology and phenomenology (cf. Cunningham, 1976). They are the"first order constructs" on which sociology depends. In that these constructs are necessarily linguistic, we can speak of them as concepts. In sociology and phenomenology it is concepts which lead us, indeed guide us, to the phenomena they announce. c) If we begin in sociology and phenomenology from concepts, we should be prepared to ask whether concepts might have a logic of their own. In that "kinds," in particular or in general, cannot but be concepts in order for us to conceive and speak of them, we are back to the question of the logic of kinds. The writings of the later Wittgenstein (1958; 1965) are rich evidence of the logic of concepts. He does not speak, however, of the logic of concepts. He speaks of their grammar (1958, pp. 18n,70, 75,92, 109, 112, 151; 1965, pp. 20, 34, 51, 53, 70, 109). In his work grammar is not formulated as syntactic rules governing the construction of sentences. Instead it is the rules or conventions which constitute the meaning of a sign (Specht, 1969, p. 146). I have the sense that these rules or conventions include, for Wittgenstein, the rules of syntax, in whatever ways syntax is drawn upon to accomplish the meaning of signs. While grammar may apper as a type of logic, it is different in important ways. Logics are outside of daily life, as self-enclosed abstract systems. Happenings in the world cannot overrule logics, though they can be rendered ironic by them. Grammar, on the other hand, is at the center of daily life, as a communal structure having a natural history, always in change. It is altered, shaped, reconstructed, or abandoned not on its own initiative, but in response to the human needs, activities, and experiences of concrete socio-historicai settings. Grammar is then in an important sense, arbitrary and contingent. Speakers necessarily depend on grammar, but its necessity is historical rather than logical. 41t should be noted that any attempt to use the free-phantasy method following the methodist theory to develop second degree constructs, or ideal types, cannot produce results which meet Schutz's Weberian postulate of adequacy (1962. p. 40) (cf. Heap and Roth, 1973, pp. 359-61).
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In that the use and shaping of language is irremediably indexical and reflexive to the occasion of its use (cf. Garfinkel, 1967), we should be surprised if it turned out that the domain of some concept had a monological structure. In such cases we might wonder why members had sought a consistency in their concept formation and use that goes beyond the pragmatic orientation that is definitive of everyday life (cf. Schutz, 1962, pp. 208-29). If we return to games, we can conceive that in the course of the natural history of the concept of game, it made sense in some situations to call certain activities games, e.g., throwing a ball against a wall. It made sense in some concrete situations because the activity was enough like things-we-call-games to be called a game. The activity bore a family resemblance to games, and that was enough for all practical purposes to allow members, sensibly and sanctionably, to call it a game. As it is with games, so it is with an indefinite set of other phenomena of other "kinds." When we understand language and experience as a paired phenomenon (of. Ihde, 1969, p. 51; Kotzin, 1972, p. 342; Searle, 1969, pp. 19-21) we can begin to understand how the concept and the thing grow together. Both are socially and historically situated. As such they have a socio-historical structure that is, and only can be expressed in, language. A world wherein kinds would be monologically structured in terms of a single, finite set of c o m m o n features would be a totally rationalized and centrally controlled world. It would be a world where we could not speak as we ordinarily do. We would be cohstrained always to speak technically, like scientists. Such a world only could be the construction of some method operative outside of daily life. Free-phantasy variation is such a method. Under the direction of the methodist theory it cannot reveal the accountable structures of the everyday world. 9. Given g r a m m a r as a possible (indeed, probable) logic of concepts, and therefore of kinds, there is no a priori guarantee that "anything whatever" will turn out to have an eidos. The methodist theory of essence presupposes that the things of the world (and the world as a thing) are organized into and by c o m m o n features. As such, the methodist theory of essence presupposes what it needs to discover: how kinds are organized. If Wittgenstein is right about games and other concepts, then not all kinds can be called essences. Thus the methodist theory perhaps should be renamed a theory of kinds. This makes " k i n d " the generic term and turns "essence" into a specie. Eidetic phenomenology is t h e r e b y d e m o t e d from a position of omni-relevance, and the possibility of Husserl's transcendental program is made even more questionable. Free-phantasy variation, however, does not suffer the same fate. If we free this method from the theory of essence, an important but previously unthematized point comes to the fore. Wittgenstein, in his analysis of games, used some variation of the free-phantasy method in order to discover that
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"game" does not reference a monologicalty ordered domain. Precisely by not presupposing that concepts denote classes of objects sharing all features in common, Wittgenstein was able to vary examples of things we call games in order to discover "a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criscrossing ~ like family traits (1958, p. 32). Freed of the essentialist metaphysic, we see that free-phantasy variation is a candidate method for discovering the organization of all kinds; whether monological or"familial" in organization. It is a method whose monological bias can be controlled to bring out both commonalities and differences. The control of the bias depends on the very thing on which the use of the method itself depends: mastery of ordinary language. It is such mastery which allows a user to recognize as an instance of some kind, some phenomenon which does not share all the features of other members of that kind. Thus the work of Husserl (1969) and Zaner (1973a; 1973b; 1978) on the free-phantasy method is useful and important precisely to the degree that we separate that work from their methodist theory of essence. 10. We began by noting Husserl's position (1962, pp. 55-57) that parallel and prior to empirical sociology there could and should be an eidetic sociology which would ground the analytic apparatus and epistemic claims of de facto inquiry. This eidetic sociology was to proceed by way of freephantasy variation to recover the "system of common features," the eidos of empirical sociology's analytic constructs. This essay has attempted to show that this enterprise is faulted from the beginning. In that sociology and eidetic p h e n o m e n o l o g y start f r o m within the world, with an interest in intersubjectively conceivable accountable things, they are already situated within a field of language. Ordinary language furnishes both their topics and their resources. Given the historical and situated formation and development of concepts, we have no reason to presuppose that the phenomena denoted by concepts will be organized monologically. We have no reason then, to presuppose that an eidetic sociology is possible or that it could give clarity to empirical research. In fact, by blindly following the monological bias of freephantasy variation, an eidetic sociology would be sure to misconstruct social phenomena. Ironically, we find that the methodist theory is formulated strictly in terms of what has turned out to be the instrument of its rejection: the method of freephantasy variation. While we must reject the methodist theory of essence as not being applicable to "anything whatever," we must recognize that the method of free-phantasy can be applied to "anything whatever." Its application must be clear as to the bias of the method, that it is designed to discover commonalities, through "coincidence in conflict." If we recognize and attend to the fact that it thereby also locates differences, and that there is a (large?) specie of concepts that allows for family differences, then the socalled "eidetic" method still has a use in clarifying social scientific concepts, in relating them to their grounds, in ordinary usage. Rejecting the theory of
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essence, however, means that we no longer ground social scientific concepts in the realm of possible structures of experience. Instead the use of the method is self-reflectively oriented to language. The method is used to ground social scientific concepts in the realm of possible uses of language. How the method can be used systematically to accomplish this task requires attention, attention freed from the methodist theory of essence. REFERENCES Cunningham, Suzanne. Language and the phenomenological reductions of Edmund Husserl. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976. Garfinkel, H. Studies in ethnomethodology. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hail, 1967. Garfinkel, H. & Sacks, H. On formal structures of practical actions. In J. C. McKinney & E. Tiryakian (Eds.), Theoretical Sociology: Perspectives and Development. New York: Appleton, 1970. Gouldner, A. The coming crisis of western sociology. New York: Basic Books, 1970. Heap, James L. The structure of answer-seeking. Reflections: A Journal of Interpretive Sociology, 1975 (I), pp. 97-111. Heap, James L. What are Sense Making Practices? Sociological Inquiry, 1976 (vol. 36) No. 2, pp. 107-115. Heap, James L. & Roth, Phillip. On phenomenological sociology. American Sociological Review, 1973, 38 (3) (June). Husserl, E. Cartesian meditations. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960. Husserl, E. Ideas: General introduction to pure phenomenology. New York: Collier Books, 1962. Husserl, E. Phenomenology and the crisis of philosophy. New York: Harper and Row, 1965. Husserl, E. Formal and transcendental logic. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969. Husserl, E. The crisis of European sciences and transcendental phenomenology. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970. lhde, D. Language and Experience. In. J. M. Edie (Ed.), New essays in phenomenology. Chicago: Quandrangle Books, 1969. Kotzin, R. Kurt Goldstein's theory of concrete and abstract attitudes: some phenomenological applications. In L. Embree (Ed.), Life-world and consciousness. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1972. Levin, D. Reason and evidence in Husserl's phenomenology. Evansfon: Northwestern University Press, 1970. Levin, D. Husserlian essences reconsidered. In D. Carr & E. S. Casey (Eds.), Explorations in phenomenology. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973. Merleau-Ponty, M. Signs. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964. O'Neill, J. Sociology as a skin trade: Essays toward a reflexivesociology. New York: Harper and Row, 1972. Schutz, A. Collected papers 1: The problem of social reality. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962. Schutz, A. Collectedpapers lll:Studiesinphenomenologicalphilosophy.TheHague:Martinus Nijhoff, 1966. Sehutz, A. Reflections on theproblem of relevance. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970. Searle, J. Speech acts: An essay in the philosophy of language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969. Specht, E. Thefoundations of Wittgenstein'slatephilosophy. New York: Barnes and Noble Inc, 1969. Wittgenstein, L. Philosophical investigations. New York: The MacMillan Co, 1958.
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