Lithology and Mineral Resources, Vol. 40, No. 1, 2005, pp. 1–8. Translated from Litologiya i Poleznye Iskopaemye, No. 1, 2005, pp. 3–11. Original Russian Text Copyright © 2005 by Naumov.
From the Fact to Empirical Generalization and Scientific Explanation (Methodology of V.I. Vernadsky) G. B. Naumov State Vernadsky Geological Museum, ul. Mokhovaya 11, Moscow, 103009 Russia e-mail:
[email protected] Received February 2, 2004
The real environment, in which a scientist lives, is the environment of scientific facts, empirical generalizations, and empirically deduced basic axioms and principles of the nature. Vladimir Vernadsky Abstract—In 1936, V.I. Vernadsky started his work on the manuscript The Logic of Natural Science, which remained unfinished. This communication is an attempt to generalize his main ideas concerning the methodology of natural science. These ideas run all through his publications, but they were never summarized in a single work.
The attitude to the scientific heritage of academician V.I. Vernadsky, whose 140th anniversary was commemorated last year, is far from being ambiguous. Long-term discussions on this topic (Lappo, 2000) did not also terminate at the ceremonial meeting of the Presidium of the Russian Academy of Sciences, where Russian and foreign scientists presented their overviews (Vernadsky..., 2003). The overwhelming majority of disagreements that emerged at that meeting concerned philosophical aspects of his scientific heritage. Leaving aside details of these debates, let us dwell on the natural scientific aspect of his methodology, which has recently provoked the keen interest of the world scientific community. Although Vernadsky formulated his basic ideas at the beginning of the 20th century, his scientific heritage became topical only during last years. In 1931, the scientist wrote in his diary “The reign of my ideas is ahead,” and he was right. Nowadays, his heritage is often attracting the attention of not only scientists, but also representatives of industry and business, politicians, and journalists both in Russia and abroad. Such the wide interest is not incidental. It is explained by his methodology of scientific investigation. The full text of his monograph Biosphere published in Russian as early as 1926 was first issued in English only in 1998 (Vernadsky, 1998). The second edition of the monograph was published in Russia in 2001 (Vernadsky, 2001). In 2000, the French journal Fusion published the work The Biosphere and the Noosphere with a detailed introductory article by E. Grenier who noted that Vernadsky was previously known in France as an armchair scientist, but now people are beginning
to understand the great practical significance of his ideas (Grenier, 2000). The International Conference Scientific Heritage of V.I. Vernadsky in the Context of Global Problems of Civilization (Nauchnoe…, 2001) was held in the Tauric University (Simferopol) in the spring of 2001. In the same year, LaRouche (2001) published in the United States the book Economics of the Noosphere, which included some original works by Vernadsky. The author shows that Vernadsky’s methodology can be applied to both natural and social disciplines. Politicians also noted these works. At the business summit of the AsiaPacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) held in November 2000 in the palace of the Brunei sultan, V.V. Putin, president of the Russian Federation said “At the beginning of the 20th century, our compatriot Vladimir Vernadsky put forward the theory of noosphere as a space uniting the mankind. This theory combines interests of countries and nations, nature, society, scientific knowledge, and state politics. The concept of stable development is in fact based precisely on this doctrine” (Programma…, 2000). The present communication is devoted to only one aspect of Vernadsky’s methodology that has acquired a particular importance in the age of the computer-based modeling of intricate geological processes. Vernadsky was always interested in issues of the methodology of scientific research. In the 1890s, Vernadsky, then assistant professor and later professor of the Moscow University was engaged in a wide range of scientific fields that played an enormous role in his personal fate as a scientist, thinker, pedagogue, and organizer. He wrote: “I am absorbed more and more with the thought to dedicate seriously my creative power to
0024-4902/05/4001-0001 © 2005 åÄIä “Nauka /Interperiodica”
2
NAUMOV
the history of science development. Although I would like to be engaged in this field, I feel that my education and knowledge are insufficient to overcome the impending problem. This work will require many years and I should be ready for it. I am interested not only in the pragmatic aspect. A coherent treatment of the development trend in line with recent data is important. However, works of this kind are absent in the literature. I am allured by the possibility to make some generalizations in this field and to apply this historical approach for understanding the essence of our world outlook in a more fundamental manner than it was hitherto possible on the basis of philosophical analysis or other abstract methods” (Vernadsky, 1994, p. 52). In 1902–1903, Vernadsky delivered a series of lectures devoted to Essays on the History of the Modern Scientific World Outlook. His main ideas expressed in these lectures were published in the article On Scientific World Outlook (Vernadsky, 1997) that was first published in the journal Problems of Philosophy and Psychology (1902, no. 65). This theme runs through all of his subsequent works. NATURAL BODIES Let us first dwell upon Vernadsky’s conception of the natural science, the pivotal subject in all works of this scientist. It is based on the notion of natural body. He wrote: “In natural science, the scientifically defined natural (i.e., terrestrial, planetary) body or similar phenomenon, which is independent from the observer, represents the initial object of scientific knowledge” (Vernadsky, 1975, p. 70). Further: “The natural body is understood as any object logically isolated from the environment and formed by regular natural processes... Examples of natural body include any rock (and its occurrence form, such as batholith, stock, bed, and others), mineral (and its occurrence form), organism (both individual species and complex colony), biocoenosis (simple and complex), soil, mud, cell and its nucleus, gene, atom, electron, and so on; i.e., there are billions of all sorts of natural bodies. These examples indicate two categories of notions. Notions of the first category include objects that really exist in nature; i.e., they are not confined to logical process, e.g., certain planet, soil, organism, and so on. Notions of the second category include objects that are completely or partly created by the logical process (generalization of an infinite number of facts or logical concepts), e.g., soil, rock, star, state, and others. In fact, the development of science is based on the identification of natural bodies. One should simultaneously take into consideration in the study of such bodies not only the relevant notions, but also scientifically defined real natural bodies. Word and notion are always inconsistent for the natural object.
The notion of the natural object is not something permanent and unchangeable. Changes in the notion are sometimes very sharp in accordance with progress in the scientific work and evolution of mankind. Word corresponding to the notion of natural object can exist for centuries and millenniums” (Vernadsky, 1977, p. 114). This long quotation describes well the research object, in which Vernadsky was interested. On the one hand, he did not restrict himself and considered all the natural bodies and their combinations from a single point of view. On the other hand, he distinctly separated the natural object from the corresponding notion formed as a result of the development of science. The natural object is independent from our knowledge and approaches to its analysis, whereas the notion changes with the development of society and scientific knowledge. LOGIC OF NOTIONS AND LOGIC OF OBJECTS It is difficult to add something to the clear and sufficiently detailed definition of the origin of natural science given above. One can only note that science can be defined as a permanently developing notion (Arsen’ev et al., 1967) and the scope and even content of the notion expressed by the same word can significantly differ during different periods. This statement is invalid for natural bodies that remain constant. Only our concepts of the natural body change. Therefore, Vernadsky clearly discriminated the logic of notions and the logic of objects. “Logic based on objects, i.e., logic of empirical generalizations is closely associated with the complicated environment in which mankind of the 19th and 20th centuries is living, working, and thinking. The logic of objects is discussed in modern life among workers, engineers, politicians, and intellectuals of the 20th century. This logic sharply changes in the natural science depending on the relevant natural bodies. Naturalist cannot ignore this fact in any serious analysis of nature” (Vernadsky, 1975, p. 67). In this citation, he emphasizes again the principal difference between the nature and its reflection in our theoretical constructions. EMPIRICAL FACTS AND EMPIRICAL GENERALIZATIONS Empirical facts form the basis of scientific constructions and define the essence of science. “In fact, this is an inevitable tool of our scientific analysis. At the same time, this is a perverted reflection of reality, if we take into consideration only the empirical facts when speaking about science, scientific world outlook, and scientific creative work” (Vernadsky, 1975, p. 21). By definition, empirical facts obtained during immediate observations are unique and always true (but not always in our interpretation). Their number is
LITHOLOGY AND MINERAL RESOURCES
Vol. 40
No. 1
2005
FROM THE FACT TO EMPIRICAL GENERALIZATION
unlimited and it is rather difficult to apply them in science and practice. “Any naturalist either knows or feels that rules for the establishment of scientific fact are organized into a clear logical system to only a small extent… Any attempt to logically discriminate…the scientifically established fact from the fact or phenomenon of another kind is always doomed to the failure. This aspect of natural science is usually forgotten or insufficiently taken into consideration” (Vernadsky, 1975, p. 20). On the other hand, an individual empirical fact, which is not included into a system of facts, does not create knowledge. That is why proofs of the “selected example” type frequently used in geological publications are rather lame. However, repetitive scientific facts united into some set already make up empirical generalizations, which make it possible to perform further operations, construct systems, and obtain practical results. They have some stability area including a regular statistic density of the distribution of some parameters. For instance, the mineralogical or chemical composition of the particular rock sample provides an empirical fact, whereas the average rock composition based on many analyses with the defined variation limits of individual components represent typical empirical generalization. “In the monograph Data of Geochemistry, F. Clarke strived for the correlation and criticism of precise quantitative data on the content of chemical elements in the Earth’s crust rather than for hypotheses and generalizations” (Vernadsky, 1954, p. 26). “Clarke collected facts and empirically united them into a new science (geochemistry). Thus, he completed in the 20th century Bischoff’s work and summarized the data obtained by thousands of scientists during many years of persistent investigations… Thanks to the great significance of Clarke values for new treatises on atoms and their influence on physical and chemical concepts of the 20th century, this work was completely integrated by concepts that were beyond the range of his interests” (Vernadsky, 1954, p. 28). No matter how our concepts change, these values will always remain fundamental empirical generalizations and they can only be refined. Main equations of electrodynamics can serve as the classic example of empirical generalizations and their significance in the development of science. They were created during the domination of the fluidal theory of electricity. The fluid theory is already forgotten, but all the basic equations (Ohm’s law, equations of parallel and successive connection, and others) remain valid. All of them were obtained from empirical generalization rather than theory. Newton’s laws are of the same kind. They function, although the cause of gravitation has not been explained so far. Vernadsky wrote: “Empirical generalization leans upon induced facts not going beyond their limits and worrying about the accord or discord with other available concepts of the nature. LITHOLOGY AND MINERAL RESOURCES
Vol. 40
3
Empirical generalization can exist for a very long time, although it does not submit to any hypothetical explanation. It can be incomprehensible but highly fruitful. Suddenly, it acquires a new impetus, provokes the creation of hypotheses, and starts to change our concepts of the universe. At the same time, the empirical generalization can also change. The significance of empirical generalization often does not coincide with our understanding or it can even surpass our expectation” (Vernadsky, 1960, p. 19). Thus, empirical facts and empirical generalizations make up a reliable foundation of science. SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATIONS, HYPOTHESES, AND MODELS According to Vernadsky, scientific explanations, hypotheses, and, as we formulate now, models, are “our fleeting creations of mind.” They are “necessary and unavoidable, because the scientific thought cannot function without them. However, they are transient, always incorrect, and ambiguous to a significant (but undeterminable for the contemporaries) extent” (Vernadsky, 1975, p. 33). “One should understand that empirical generalizations and criticism of facts are impossible without scientific hypotheses. A considerable share of facts and scientific tools is created owing to scientific theories and scientific hypotheses.” At the same time, “the main significance of hypotheses and theories is illusive. Despite their tremendous influence on the scientific thought and current scientific work, they are always more transient than the unquestionable part of science, namely the scientific truth that will survive centuries (or even millenniums) and, probably, is a creation of the scientific intellect of grand scale surpassing the limits of historical time” (Vernadsky, 1997, p. 403). “Despite their significance in the current scientific work, neither scientific theories nor scientific hypotheses are components of this main and decisive part of scientific knowledge” (Vernadsky, 1997, pp. 402–403). “The tremendous significance of scientific hypotheses and theories in scientific knowledge determines the role of philosophical thought in the scientific work. The reason is that the development of scientific theories and hypotheses is closely interrelated with the philosophical thought. Most of scientific theories and hypotheses are inevitably integrated into the philosophical thought, although it did not play a significant role in their creation. It is apparent that the scientific thought should take into consideration the critical and profound work of philosophy” (Vernadsky, 1975, p. 95). Hence, “scientific explanations” are also among the three backbones of scientific knowledge, but they differ from the two previous ones. They are essential for the development of science. Without them, scientists would have been entangled in the plethora of individual facts. However, in contrast to facts and generalizations, No. 1
2005
4
NAUMOV
which remain unchanged in any theoretical system (if they are correct) and historically pass from one theory to another, scientific explanations (hypotheses, theories, and models) are subjected to changes during the evolution of scientific knowledge. Moreover, they not only systematize the accumulated knowledge, but also serve as a bridge between science and practice. PRINCIPLES AND AXIOMS According to Vernadsky, principles and axioms are the most common empirical generalizations. He wrote: “Main principles and axioms are very slowly elaborated by science. Many generations should pass before new scientific discoveries, empirical generalizations, philosophical and mathematical analyses, and new scientific hypotheses will force scientists to consciously treat the main concepts that unconsciously always make up the basis of their scientific knowledge” (Vernadsky, 1975, p. 21). Further: “With time, materials accumulated in science slowly produced its framework that can be considered obligatory for everybody and cannot (and should not) be questioned” (Vernadsky, 1997, p. 415). “Axioms became so evident in the course of many generations and millenniums that a person can be convinced about its correctness based on only logic” (Vernadsky, 1997, p. 400). Thus, axioms and principles of science are the most common generalizations based on the experience of many generations rather than deductions from theory. Nevertheless, precisely axioms and principles form the backbone of the whole scientific thought. “The whole scientific work is based on axiomatic thesis of reality of the scientific object—reality of the universe and its regularities, i.e., possibility of comprehension with scientific thinking. The scientific work is possible and acceptable only if the above thesis is accepted. This axiom is admitted by any researcher… Universal construction similar to that of the real world of science is absent in philosophy or religion” (Vernadsky, 1975, p. 91). However, one should note that axioms in the natural science differ from those in not only philosophy and religion, but also mathematics. “Notions (objects of philosophy) always include an endless series of consequences. The development and refinement of philosophical thought implies a more comprehensive and in-depth analysis leading to the discovery of new in the old. The revision with time is accomplished on the basis of advanced methods by the highest intellects of mankind in new historical environments. A new, previously unnoticed notion is revealed in the old, apparently fullblown notion. However, this new notion does not go beyond the limits of the old one expressed in words and represents only a refinement of the old version or something that is born in mind as a result of the in-depth
analysis and refinement of the old notion. The new notion created by philosophy is limited by the word. The notion is word and it cannot go beyond the word, its deep meaning, and understanding” (Vernadsky, 1975, pp. 91–92). The natural “science is single for the whole mankind, while there are several philosophies, which developed during millenniums, long centuries, and many generations” (Vernadsky, 1997, p. 386). In mathematics, all theorems are incorporated into primary axioms and deduced on the basis of logical constructions, deduced theorems, and eventually axioms. New empirical facts and generalizations are not needed here. At the same time, “for the naturalist-empiricist, it is an axiom intimately connected with his thought and form of his scientific work that such manifestations cannot be incidental. Their dependence on weight and measure is similar to that of the motion of celestial bodies or the process of chemical reactions” (Vernadsky, 1997, p. 145). In natural sciences, “none of the scientifically studied phenomena, none of the empirical facts, and none of the scientific empirical generalizations can be completely expressed by words or in the form of logical constructions (notions), i.e. in forms of the functioning of the philosophical thought that synthesizes and analyzes these notions. Objects of scientific research always contain an indecomposable (sometimes significant) rational residue that influences the empirical scientific study and completely disappears from the ideal constructions of philosophy, cosmogony or mathematics, and mathematical physics” (Vernadsky, 1997, p. 92). Therefore, new insights into natural sciences require new empirical facts and their empirical generalizations. The empirical generalization, which is always emphasized by Vernadsky, plays here a key role. Neglect of this stage in scientific research and immediate transition from individual facts to models and wide theoretical generalizations without the laborious but very important stage of empirical generalizations frequently distort the reality and create an illusion of knowledge. GENETIC CONCEPTS Since the middle of the 20th century, the genetic aspect began to dominate in geological sciences. This period was marked by the gradually appearance of an illusion of the excess of empirical facts and generalizations needed for the elaboration of new radical theoretical concepts. However, the genetic idea used as the basis for genetic models was borrowed (automatically, to a significant extent) from biological sciences. Geological sciences became dominated by genetic classifications that could help the scientists to find the common “ancestors” for rocks and mineral deposits. In biology, this approach is justified by the principle of F. Redi Omni vivum e vito, i.e., all the living is from
LITHOLOGY AND MINERAL RESOURCES
Vol. 40
No. 1
2005
FROM THE FACT TO EMPIRICAL GENERALIZATION
5
Classification of mineral deposits (after Lindgren, 1928, 1933) Deposit type
Temperature and pressure
I. Deposits formed by mechanical concentration Moderate temperature and pressure II. Deposits formed by chemical concentration Highly variable temperature and pressure A. In surface waters: 1. Owing to interaction with solutions (a) resulting from inorganic reactions Temperature 0–70°C. (b) resulting from organic reactions Pressure is moderate 2. Resulting from dissolvent evaporation B. In rocks 1. Owing to concentration of components enclosed in rocks (a) concentration during the weathering and decomposition Temperature 0–100°C. Medium pressure of rocks near the Earth’s surface (b) by groundwater of deep circulation Temperature 0–100°C. Medium pressure (c) related to dynamic and regional metamorphism Temperature 400°C or more. High pressure 2. Concentration of components alien to enclosing rocks (a) amagmatic genesis related to circulation of atmospheric water Temperature up to 100°C. Medium pressure at shallow and intermediate depths (b) genesis related to magmatic activity α. Related to ascending fluids of uncertain origin 1. Deposition and concentration at shallow depths. Epithermal deposits Temperature 50–200°C. High pressure 2. Deposition and concentration at intermediate depths. Mesothermal Temperature 200–300°C. High pressure deposits 3. Deposition and concentration at great depths. Hypothermal deposits Temperature 300–500°C. Very high pressure β. Directly related to magmatic emanations 1. From intrusive bodies. Contact-metamorphic and pyrometosomatic Temperature 500–800°C. Very high pressure deposits 2. From effusive bodies. Products of sublimation, fumaroles Temperature 100–600°C. Atmospheric to medium pressure C. Related to magma differentiation processes (a) Magmatic deposits Temperature 700–1500°C. Very high pressure (b) Pegmatitic Temperature ~575°C. Extremely high pressure
the living (Vernadsky, 1954, pp. 216–218). Each organism, species, genus, and so on should have particular ancestors. Genetic classifications based on this principle appeared to be so convenient that they were also extrapolated to inorganic objects. However, this principle is invalid for the inorganic nature where the primacy of physicochemical settings rather than ancestors is dominant. The same mineral product can be obtained from different primary substances and different processes. Nevertheless, nothing remains unchanged in the inorganic nature. Everything changes (in the geological time scale) and the changes retain a certain trend; i.e., they are not chaotic. Substance of the Earth’s crust gradually becomes more and more differentiated. Elements, minerals, and rocks are spatially scattered, not averaged. This directional development “represents another side (another aspect) of the evolutionary doctrine,” wrote Vernadsky in his LITHOLOGY AND MINERAL RESOURCES
Vol. 40
diary on March 9, 1920. In biology, evolution of individual “species occupied the central place in this world outlook and suppressed other not less (if not more) important biological phenomena,” such as complication of the nervous system, symbioses, adaptation functions, and eventual “biosphere organization” (Vernadsky, 1928). The magmatogenic model of ore-formation processes can probably serve as the most prominent example of the lame replacement of empirical generalization by a theoretical genetic model. The classification of ore deposits in (Lindgren, 1933) is an example of rather successful empirical generalization (table). This classification, based on physicochemical (temperature and pressure) rather than genetic criteria, was elaborated as a counterbalance to morphological classifications that are very inconvenient because of the convergence of many geological objects. No. 1
2005
6
NAUMOV
This scheme was actively backed by Niggli (1929) who, however, swung it through 180° by placing magmatogenic and pegmatitic deposits at the beginning and attributing everything, which is not immediately connected with the surface, to magmatogenic fluids. Thus, Niggli imparted the “genetic” sense to Lindgren’s classification. This interpretation of Lindgren’s classification originally compiled as a fundamental empirical generalization has been reproduced with various modifications in the literature (Emmons, 1937; Graton, 1946; Betekhtin, 1953) and the majority of manuals (Obruchev, 1929; Park and Mac Diarmid, 1966). In fact, Lindgren had presented a more rigorous, unbiased, and perspective classification. Thus, the primary source can substantially differ from its interpretation by students. For a long time, concepts that appeared on this basis “remained mainly unchanged since the time of their formulation as separate notions” (Pospelov, 1973), significantly hampering progress in the theory of ore formation. For example, despite the availability of factual data on many stratiform deposits of nonferrous and rare metals, some researchers continued to attribute the formation of these deposits to magma chambers that occur “at different levels of the upper mantle or the upper mantle–basalt layer interface, within the basal layer, or at different levels of the granite–gneiss layer” (Vol’fson and Arkhangel’skaya, 1987, p. 231). Many researchers are continuing to believe in the origin of lithophile elements from granite magmas, although all experimental data on the coefficient of ore element distribution in the melt–fluid equilibrium system (K1 = Cfl/Cm) refute this hypothesis. Experiments show that some elements, such as Ba, Sr, W, Sn, U, and Th, mainly accumulate in granite melts rather than fluids (Km < 1), whereas Mn, Fe, Cu, Co, Ni, and Cr are generally transferred to fluids (Km > 1) (Malinin and Khitarov, 1984). For instance, the distribution coefficient varies from 0.2 to 0.005 for tin, from 0.1 to 0.02 for uranium, and so on. Although this observation is inconsistent with ore deposits that can accompany granitoid massifs, notions, such as magmatic systems, ore-generating chamber, and magmatogenic deposits are still used. One can easily calculate that magmatogenic fluid, the share of which in melt does not exceed 2−5% (Ryabchikov, 1975), can remove only a few percents of metals from the melt. Nevertheless, experimenters who obtained these data easily assume the existence of ore-generating chambers with a size of 103 km3 or more (Zharikov, 1988). One can abstractly admit this value, but it is not a simple task to accommodate such volume of ore-generating melt in the real geological space. Taking into consideration that the area occupied by the majority of vein and stockwork deposits is less than 1 km2 and the depth of granite massifs ranges from 10 to 20 km, it is usually impossible to adjust all these data and determine relationships between horizontal and vertical components of flows. In addition, one should take into account that some
deposits associate with minor intrusions that are substantially smaller than granite plutons. Even though many researchers do not strictly follow the magmatogenic model, they retain its structure by inertia in a virtually unaltered form adopted from the classical theory of magmatogenic ore formation (Ovchinnikov, 1988) or the model of the formation of a wide range of deposits under the influence of deepseated fluids, the ore-bearing potential of which is governed by the depth of their origin (Letnikov, 2000). In all these cases, the authors select from the huge data set only individual facts that support their point of view and ignoring inconvenient facts. This approach (the method of selected examples) appears to be quite natural. It is impossible to mention all facts and reliable empirical generalizations are absent. There is no malicious intent. This situation is a result of distorted succession in the development of scientific knowledge, particularly in the intricate branch of science, such as geology, in which direct experiments are absent and, therefore, new data are compared with the results obtained by other adjacent sciences. In his methodology, Vernadsky constructs a distinct succession from empirical facts to empirical generalizations, scientific principles, and axioms. Theories (or “scientific explanations,” according to Vernadsky) are “fleeting creations of intellect” that can change with increasing scientific knowledge. “Both theories and facts are based on knowledge of the latter. Knowing facts is more than knowing theory,” …“because all future theories are hidden in the facts” (Vernadsky, 2001, p. 234). “The scientific apparatus completes depends on the progressively improving and deepening systematization and methodology of research. Thus, science encompasses at an accelerating rate millions of new facts every year and registers them for the future to create on their basis the multitude of large and small empirical generalizations (italicization by G.B.N) (Vernadsky, 1997, p. 403). Since the middle of the 20th century, euphoria of the scientific and technical progress changed relationships between separate constituents of scientific knowledge and emphasized the importance of “scientific explanations.” The difficult work on the formation of “empirical generalizations” was reduced. Moreover, this could not remain within the limits of a single discipline under new conditions and required the interdisciplinary approach. Possibilities of computer-based modeling aggravated this situation. The adequacy of modeling requires the adequacy of two factors: model structure and its initial and boundary conditions. The second factor takes into consideration new factual data, wherever possible, including those from the adjacent scientific disciplines. The model structures retained the traditional schemes developed at the beginning of the century.
LITHOLOGY AND MINERAL RESOURCES
Vol. 40
No. 1
2005
FROM THE FACT TO EMPIRICAL GENERALIZATION
7
observations, measurements
NATURE
feedback method of choice examples (?) assemblage of individual empirical
empirical generalizations
facts scientific principles and axioms
scientific explanations (hypotheses, theories, models) practical application
Principal scheme of the logic network of the formation of scientific knowledge.
CLASSIFICATIONS
THE SYSTEM OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE
Classifications play a specific role in theoretical constructions. First, they represent a tool that enables one to orient himself in the huge mass of empirical facts. Vernadsky wrote: “Classification of natural bodies was always (and continues to be) an empirical (spontaneous) process… Theoretically, when natural classification represents in fact empirical generalization (when it becomes a persistent constituent of life) and is based, without any hypotheses, on empirical facts that are methodologically proved and selected on the basis of some major facts that do not contradict the proven scientific facts” (Vernadsky, 1960, p. 547). However, their systematization is relative rather than absolute and depends on the purpose of a particular scientific study. “Classification of minerals in mineralogy plays the subordinate role similar to that of chemical compounds in modern chemistry. Like chemist, any mineralogist, who tries to consider mineralogy, in general, can and should use different classifications of minerals” (Vernadsky, 1955, p. 11). Further: “Classification of minerals… on its own is not a purpose of mineralogy. This makes it possible to only consider some natural bodies among the plethora of compounds produced by the human thought and, thus, provides insights into their chemical nature and character of newly forming processes” (Vernadsky, 1960, p. 13). Virtually all mineralogical classifications are based on the compositional rather than genetic aspects. In the genetic classification, the same mineral species, e.g., quartz would occur in many taxonomic groups. The mineral is, however, a simplest natural inorganic object. All other inert bodies, such as rocks, their complexes, and ores have a more complicate structure. Inorganic bodies can be obtained from different initial components and processes. In the nature, convergence is rather widespread and natural “technologies” are quite diverse. It is at least strange to reduce this diversity to a single genetic lineage.
Let us try to outline the entire chain of accumulation and transformation of scientific knowledge based on Vernadsky’s methodology. The chain begins with the immediate observation of natural objects or their responses to different natural and anthropogenic impacts. Thus, we obtain a sum of numerous, scattered, and frequently contradictory empirical facts that should be classified and generalized. They form the basis for empirical generalizations that summarize individual empirical facts and are stable under specific conditions with a certain degree of confidence. Two last conditions (realization area and confidence interval) limit the application sphere of any empirical generalization. Empirical generalizations are most stable and retained during changes in theoretical generalizations, but they can be refined with the accumulation of new empirical facts. During their formation, empirical generalizations are repeatedly tested by comparing natural objects through observations and measurements in line with the feedback principle. This stage of scientific knowledge formation is a very responsible and obligatory process for constructing the scientific explanation. All attempts to ignore this stage and construct theoretical models based on individual facts (the method of “selected examples” shown in the figure by dotted line) commonly result in errors. Scientific principles, postulates, and axioms are formed on the basis of empirical generalizations. They represent the most stable empirical generalizations with a wide application sphere. Their influence is not limited by the formation of scientific explanations. In line with the feedback principle, they govern the initial process of observations and measurements. This procedure is also affected by theoretical constructions that are created at each specific moment. The additional specific significance of theoretical constructions consists in the fact that they serve as the main link between the entire system of scientific
LITHOLOGY AND MINERAL RESOURCES
Vol. 40
No. 1
2005
8
NAUMOV
knowledge and its practical application. This sphere is shown by the dotted line in the figure. CONCLUSIONS Vernadsky’s main ideas concerning the methodology of natural sciences run through his entire creative activity, but they are not summarized in a single work. Their scrutinization reveals that the system of scientific knowledge evolves from empirical facts to their generalization and scientific explanation. This scheme functions productively only as an integral unit. All attempts to accelerate the general process by excluding the intricate and laborious stage of the formation of empirical generalizations may result in its distortion and illusory knowledge. REFERENCES Arsen’ev, A.S., Bibler, V.S., and Kedrov, B.M., Analiz razvivayushchegosya ponyatiya (Analysis of Developing Ideas), Moscow: Nauka, 1967. Betekhtin, A.G., Hydrothermal Solutions, Their Genesis, and Processes of Mineralization, in Osnovnye problemy magmatogennogo rudoobrazovaniya (Principal Problems of Magmatogenic Ore Formation), Moscow: Akad. Nauk SSSR, 1953, pp. 123–237. Emmons, W.H., The Formation Mechanism of Some Metalliferous Vein Systems Associated with Granitic Batholiths, Geologiya rudnykh mestorozhdenii zapadnykh shtatov SShA (Geology of Ore Deposits in the Western United States), Moscow: Gos. Nauchn.-Techn. Izd., 1937, pp. 311–355. Graton, L.S., Nature of Ore-Forming Fluids, Econ. Geol., 1933, vol. 28. Translated under the title Priroda rudoobrazuyushchego flyuida, Moscow: Gosgeolizdat, 1946. Grenier, E., Vladimir Vernadsky, De la Biosphere a La Noosphere, Fusion, 2000, no. 89, pp. 4–10. Lappo, A.V., V.I. Vernadsky Pro & Contra, St. Petersburg: Ross. Khim. Geol. Inst., 2000 [in Russian]. LaRouche Lindon, H., The Economics of the Noosphere, Washington: EIR News Service, 2001. Letnikov, F.A., Fluid Regime of Endogenic Processes in the Continental Lithosphere and Their Metallogeny, Problemy global’noi geodinamiki (Problems of Global Geodynamics), Moscow: GEOS, 2000, pp. 204–224. Lindgren, W., Mineral Deposits, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1933. Translated under the title Mineral’nye mestorozhdeniya, Moscow: ONTI, 1934. Malinin, S.D. and Khitarov, N.I., Ore and Petrogenic Elements in Magmatic Melt–Fluid System, Geokhimiya, 1984, vol. 22, no. 2, pp. 183–196. Nauchnoe nasledie V.I. Vernadskogo v kontekste global’nykh problem tsivilizatsii. Doklady (Scientific Heritage of V.I. Vernadsky and Problems of Global Civilization: Reports.), Moscow: Izd. Dom Noosfera, 2001.
Niggli, R., Ore Deposits of Magmatic Origin, London: Tomas Murby and Co., 1929. Translated under the title Geneticheskaya klassifikatsiya magmaticheskikh rudnykh mestorozhdenii, Moscow: Geolrazvedizdat, 1933. Obruchev, V.A., Rudnye mestorozhdeniya (Ore Deposits), Moscow, Leningrad: Gorgeoneft’izdat, 1929. Ovchinnikov, L.N., Obrazovanie rudnykh mestorozhdenii (Formation of Ore Deposits), Moscow: Nedra, 1988. Park, S.F. and Mac Diarmid, R.A., Ore Deposits, London: W.H. Freemen and Co, 1964. Translated under the title: Rudnye mestorozhdeniya, Moscow: Mir, 1966. Pospelov, G.L., Paradoksy, geologo-fizicheskaya sushchnost i mekhanizmy metasomatoza (Paradoxes, Geological–Physical Essence, and Mechanisms of Metasomatism), Novosibirsk: Nauka, 1973. Programma “Segodnya” NTV, 15 noyabrya 2000 g., 19:00 i 22:00, syuzhet Kondrat’eva (TV Program “Segodnya;” NTV Channel; November 15, 2000; 19:00 and 22:00; Kondrat’ev’s Report). Ryabchikov, I.D., Termodinamika flyuidnoi fazy granitnykh magm (Thermodynamics of the Fluid Phase of Granitic Magmas), Leningrad: Nauka, 1975. Vernadsky, V.I., Evolution of Species and Living Matter, Priroda, 1928, no. 3, pp. 227–250. Vernadsky, V.I., Izbrannye sochineniya (Selected Works), Moscow: Akad. Nauk SSSR, 1954, vol. 1. Vernadsky, V.I., Izbrannye sochineniya (Selected Works), Moscow: Akad. Nauk SSSR, 1955, vol. 2. Vernadsky, V.I., Izbrannye sochineniya (Selected Works), Moscow: Akad. Nauk SSSR, 1960a, vol. 4. Vernadsky, V.I., Izbrannye sochineniya (Selected Works), Moscow: Akad. Nauk SSSR, 1960b, vol. 5. Vernadsky, V.I., Razmyshleniya naturalista (Reflections of a Naturalist), Moscow: Nauka, 1975, book 1. Vernadsky, V.I., Razmyshleniya naturalista (Reflections of a Naturalist), Moscow: Nauka, 1977, book 2. Vernadsky, V.I. Pis’ma N.E.Vernadskoi. 1893–1900 (Letters to N.E. Vernadskasya, 1893–1900), Moscow: Tekhnosfera, 1994. Vernadsky, V.I., O nauke (On Science), Dubna: Feniks, vol. 1, 1997. Vernadsky, Vladimir I., The Biosphere, New York: Copernicus, 1998. Vernadsky, V.I., Biosfera. Mysli i nabroski (The Biosphere: Ideas and Sketches), Moscow: Izd. Dom Noosfera, 2001. Vernadsky V.I. and Contemporaneity, in Materialy torzhestvennogo zasedaniya, posvyashchennogo 140-letiyu so dnya rozhdeniya akademika V.I. Vernadskogo (Proc. Ceremonial Meeting Devoted to the 140th Jubilee of Academician Vernadsky), Moscow: Izd. Dom Noosfera, 2003. Vol’fson, F.I. and Arkhangel’skaya, V.V., Stratiformnye mestorozhdeniya tsvetnykh metallov (Stratiform Deposits of Nonferrous Metals), Moscow: Nedra, 1987. Zharikov, V.A., Experimental Study of Processes of the Formation of Rocks and Ores, Vestn. Akad. Nauk SSSR, 1988, no. 8, pp. 29–41.
LITHOLOGY AND MINERAL RESOURCES
Vol. 40
No. 1
2005
