International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society, Vol. 14, No. 2, 2000

Commentary

Global Ethic: A Response to My Critics* Hans Ku¨ng†

On the review symposium of Hans Ku¨ng’s 1999 book A Global Ethic for Global Politics and Economics and Ku¨ng’s article ‘‘A Global Ethic in World Politics: The Middle Way Between ‘Real Politics’ and ‘Ideal Politics.’ ’’ The article and symposium appeared in the International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society Vol. 13, No. 1, (Fall) 1999: 5–106. First, my warmest thanks to the editors of the International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society, and above all to Professor E. Doyle McCarthy, for not only publishing my article on the Global Ethic Project but also inviting colleagues from various disciplines to respond to it. I am also, of course, grateful to those colleagues who have taken the trouble to read it and respond to it. I am grateful to Professor Jose´ Casanova of the New School for Social Research, New York, for his very helpful account of the genesis of the global ethic project—against the dark background of the repudiation of human rights and freedom of religion by the papacy until the change of direction taken by the Catholic Church under John XXIII and the Second Vatican Council, in which I personally took part. From then on, he describes the five ‘‘milestones’’ or phases in the formulation of the project: the 1982 Tu¨bingen ecumenical dialogue among the world religions; the 1989 UNESCO Colloquium on ‘‘World Religions, Human Rights and Peace; then *Translation from the German by John Bowden. †Stiftung Weltethos, Waldha¨user Strasse 23, D-72076, Tu¨bingen, Germany. 421  2000 Human Sciences Press, Inc.

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in 1990 the programmatic book Global Responsibility: In Search of a New World Ethic, published in English in 1991. This provided the basis for the 1993 ‘‘Declaration Toward a Global Ethic’’ by the Second Parliament of the World Religions. It was also the occasion for an enthusiastic reader of Global Responsibility, Count von der Groeben, to found the Global Ethic Foundation, through which after my retirement from the University of Tu¨bingen in 1996 I have been able to continue my work with an effective team of colleagues. Casanova’s pertinent and sympathetic account of the genesis of the global ethic project culminates (fifth phase) in my book A Global Ethic for Global Politics and Economics (1997), which also forms the starting point of his critique. I would like to discuss that critique briefly here. Every author and also every critic has his or her particular preferences. Unlike a later critic, Casanova can make little of my concentrated historicsystematic analysis of the paradigm of specifically modern politics from Richelieu’s raison d’e´tat through Bismarck’s Realpolitik to Kissinger’s ‘‘geopolitics,’’ although the tension, indeed the contradictions, between ‘‘realism’’ and ‘‘idealism’’ in American political theory and practice is of considerable topical significance. I have cited illustrations from the twentieth century: from Versailles through Kissinger’s foreign policy and a realistic human rights policy to the ‘‘warning example’’ of Yugoslavia. But the main point is that in my ‘‘outlines of a new paradigm of politics’’ I by no means want to replace sovereign nation-states as the main agents in world politics, as Casanova suggests, but rather to insist on the observance of basic ethical principles by states and governments as well. To make the great many highly concrete statements which have been asked of me, I would also have had to develop a ‘‘theory of democratic politics’’— and yet more: I would have had to write a different book, of the kind that my critic would have written or has written. As a theologian I know my limitations. It is enough for me to have worked out what is needed and to have explained why it is absolutely essential. At any rate, I by no means intended to present just a ‘‘person-oriented’’ ethic, as Casanova thinks, but at the same time an ‘‘institution-oriented political ethic.’’ Not only do I state this programmatically; I have also given a concrete account of it in my book. Both the ‘‘Declaration Toward a Global Ethic’’ of the Parliament of the World’s Religions and the proposal of the InterAction Council for a Universal Declaration of Human Responsibilities quite explicitly address persons and institutions. And it was my express intention not to venture into every possible ramification of political theory but to apply to global politics and economics the fundamental ethical principles which appear in the great religious and philosophical traditions of humankind. There is no need for these fundamental ethical principles

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of humankind constantly to be ‘‘constructed and reconstructed’’ by us. The most recent political scandals from Clinton to Kohl, all the cases of lies and corruption illustrate that the issue is the application of fundamental ethical principles that by no means concern only private morality today but—pace Niklas Luhmann—apply to all systems and limit the ‘‘autonomy’’ that is claimed for them. To this degree, along with many others I, in fact, affirm a primacy of politics over the economy and a primacy of ethics over politics and economics. In this approach I completely agree with the 1986 Pastoral Letter of the Catholic Bishops of the USA, Economic Justice for All, which Casanova brandishes at me. For all the differences of opinion about how they are to be implemented, I too assert that ‘‘there are no legitimate disagreements on the basic moral objectives.’’ But when Casanova remarks that I should have followed the bishops in saying more about the problems of the ‘‘New American Experiment’’ (which in any case is disputed in the USA), he fails to see how specific my criticism is and how detailed my constructive proposals already are, with reference both to American neo-capitalism and to the Swedish welfare state. To this degree I indeed advocate a ‘‘thirdway policy’’ of the kind that should be advocated by any political party worth serious consideration—in any case, in the specific present-day situation of our developed Western societies. Finally, when it comes to the problem of motivation, Casanova has failed to see that I have discussed this throughout in the context of sustainable development, and in so doing have referred to the problems of both philosophy and religion. In any case, I see no conflict between the efforts of the consensus thinker Ju¨rgen Habermas for communicative action on a rational basis oriented toward understanding and my own efforts also to involve the religions in the ethical consensus. I have always rejected any attempt to set philosophy over against theology. I am painfully aware that ‘‘the religious leaders in each tradition’’ could do more than ‘‘liberal religious scholars’’ to mobilize people for a global ethic. This request by Casanova should have been addressed in the right direction. But now that the present pope has already taken up my concern of ‘‘world peace through peace among the religions,’’ perhaps the next pope will take up my second great concern, that of a global ethic. Whereas Jose´ Casanova takes the greatest pains not only to describe my course toward a global ethic but also to discuss the problems with admirable objectivity, Richard K. Fenn of Princeton Theological Seminary uses the occasion of a ‘‘response to Hans Ku¨ng’’ to compose a notably repetitive plea for ‘‘a secular social system’’ and a secularized Christianity. The first third of his article is filled with such remarks, before my name and my theme even appear; he then devotes the third part to Yugoslavia and Canada. His key

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witness is one Denys Munby and his 1963 The Idea of a Secular Society; unfortunately, in four decades, I have never set eyes on it. But this ‘‘Professor of Christianity,’’ who asserts the ‘‘absence of an ethic,’’ contrary to all that we read in the New Testament, makes me a Durkheimian or an advocate of ‘‘civil religion’’ and quotes me randomly at whim, so that he hears in me an ‘‘unmistakeably authoritarian voice’’— when all my life I have fought against Roman authoritarianism and have paid a heavy price for doing so. So what? This is not the place to go into Fenn’s interpretation of Christianity, which by-passes our theme. I simply want to contradict his main argument quite clearly, namely, his assertion that for me a ‘‘global social system’’ must necessarily be built on religion. Any reader can find quite the opposite in my books. For me the global social system need by no means be built on religion. After all, in Global Responsibility in particular, I expressly argued that a moral life is possible without religion. I gave reasons, and I am surprised that a man from Princeton Theological Seminary, of all places, of which I have several good memories, can ignore all this: Even believers would have to concede that a moral life is possible without religion. To what extent? 1. Biographically and psychologically there are sufficient reasons why enlightened contemporaries want to renounce religion which had deteriorated into obscurantism, superstition, stultification and ‘‘opium’’ of the people. 2. Empirically it is indisputable that non-religious people in fact have a basic ethical orientation and lead a moral life even without religion, indeed that in history there have often been non-believers who pioneered a new sense of human worth and did more for adulthood, freedom of conscience, freedom of religion and other human rights than their religious allies. 3. Anthropologically, it cannot be denied that many non-religious people in principle have also developed and possess goals and priorities, values and norms, ideals and models, criteria for truth and falsehood. 4. Philosophically, there is no denying that men and women as rational beings have a real human autonomy which allows them to have a basic trust in reality even without belief in God, and leads them to perceive their responsibility in the world: a responsibility for themselves and the world. [Hans Ku¨ng, Global Responsibility (SCM Press, Ltd.:1996), p. 37]

For these reasons I would argue for ‘‘freedom to decide for or against the religion’’ and in the case of a global ethic for ‘‘a coalition of believers and nonbelievers (deists, atheists, agnostics) in mutual respect, without which a new world order is impossible.’’ However, the religions too have their contribution to make to this new world order, and to this extent I, in fact, think that in a ‘‘postmodern age we should discard that neglect of the religions so characteristic of modernity in favor of a realistic assessment.’’ In this sense I certainly am ‘‘secular,’’ but not a dogmatic ‘‘secularist who wants to banish religion.’’ Moreover, I have always argued for the freedom of the individual, and

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the first ‘‘fundamental demand’’ of the ‘‘Declaration Toward a Global Ethic’’ of the Parliament of the World’s Religions, which I drafted, runs: ‘‘Every human being must be treated humanely.’’ However, for that very reason I am against unrestricted individualism, hedonism, and consumerism. And I may surely assume that a ‘‘Professor of Christianity’’ too is opposed to such things as the sexual abuse of children, and so like me is opposed not only to ‘‘Roman moralizing’’ but likewise to a nihilistic ethic. It is certainly a piece of luck for an author to find a congenial critic, as I do in Professor Richard Falk of Princeton University. In fact, he already answers many of the questions put by other critics. And unlike that ‘‘Professor of Christianity’’ who offers no word of acknowledgement of the project, Richard Falk, Professor of International Law and Practice, who more than any other political scientist in America has devoted himself to arousing an awareness of global values and norms, is well aware of the effort needed in the global ethic project. He, in particular, brings out how the project is an invitation to both believers and nonbelievers. ‘‘Global ethic’’ ‘‘invites participation by nonbelievers and secular humanist perspectives, as well as by fellow-adherents to one of the world religions. Ku¨ng stands for maximal inclusiveness in relation to the form and content of a proposed global ethic.’’ Unlike Casanova, Falk takes the systematic historical analyses very seriously and also gives due emphasis to the remarks about a Europe with an ethical foundation (as opposed to a purely technocratic Europe and the restoration of a Christian Europe). I find Falk’s comparison of the global ethic project with ‘‘secularist alternatives to an inclusive global ethic’’ particularly informative; they are an important addition to the discussion. I particularly like his comparisons with Hans Jonas; with the report of the UN Commission on Global Governance and particularly with the World Order Models Project (WOMP), which Falk himself has been promoting since 1967 and which centers on four normative ideas: the minimization of political violence, the maximization of economic well-being, the promotion of social well-being and human rights, and the promotion of environmental sustainability. I completely agree with Falk’s conclusion: ‘‘The two perspectives can be seen to be complementary, and there is an encouraging convergence. Ku¨ng is recently grounding his global ethic on an analysis of substantive challenges ranging from the future of Europe, through an approach to ethnic conflict in the Balkans, to the regulation of the world economy. At the same time, WOMP appreciates increasingly the relevance of culture, which is shaped by religious traditions, and of the religious resurgence, to mobilizing social forces committed to achieving ‘humane governance’ at all levels of political authority, from the local community to the world.’’ I gladly concede that it is a great encouragement to me that a colleague

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with the competence and reputation of Richard Falk pronounces such an overall positive judgment on the global ethic project: ‘‘Ku¨ng’s general line of thinking seems to correspond with the ethical requirements of humane governance for the peoples of the world. At the very least, it provides a coherent framing of the issues relating to perspective and dialogue.’’ I gladly note Falk’s critical comments: First, I recognize the difficulty of formulating a global ethic in such a way that it is neither so abstract as to become irrelevant nor so concrete and radical that consensus is illusory. Beyond doubt the Golden Rule is not sufficient here. But it would be important for me to know whether the Declaration of the Parliament of the World’s Religions, which was pondered for so long and discussed by many people, has taken the right middle way. It seeks to state principles and, at the same time, also be very specific: neither too ‘‘thick’’ nor too ‘‘thin.’’ It is certainly neither ‘‘irrelevant piety’’ nor ‘‘utopian dream.’’ Second, on the question of ‘‘agency,’’ social forces that can implement the ethical demands made on the state and the market, we obviously cannot think just of the self-interests of the state and business elites, but have to build on a ‘‘collaboration among transnational social forces and moral humanely oriented governments’’; the 1997 Ottawa antilandmine treaty and the Treaty of Rome for an International Criminal Court (1998) are good examples of this. Third, even if one does not share Falk’s estimation of the person and position of Oskar Lafontaine, a representative of the old left, who as finance minister and chairman of Germany’s Social Democrat Party lost all support, the question, say, of a framework for the international financial markets and a limitation of unfriendly take-overs also arises for the ‘‘New Democrats’’ and ‘‘New Labor’’ as it does for the German Social Democrats. In this connection new thought needs to be given to the role of the last remaining superpower, the USA, toward the West and the rest of the world. Fourth, I was not able to say enough about the question of ‘‘religious relevance’’ in A Global Ethic for Global Politics and Economics. But more than ever I recognize the significance of ‘‘engaged spirituality.’’ I would like to spend more time on Richard Falk’s remarks, but unfortunately I must turn to the fourth critic. I deeply regret, especially since this voice comes from Germany, that here we descend from the highest to the lowest academic level. As any reader can recognize from the very first page, the article by Hans-Ju¨rgen Krysmanski of the University of Mu¨nster, Westphalia, is a caricature of the global ethic project, though it is not meant to amuse and provide witty stimulation; rather, it discredits the project intellectually and

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defames it morally. With the motto above his article the sociologist makes mock of my gratitude to the generous founder of the Global Ethic Foundation, when he, Krysmanski, is having his research project on ‘‘science in the media’’ paid for by the European Commission. That’s called ‘‘talking on the left and living on the right.’’ At the same time, he criticizes me for travelling to China, of all places, and for our big and exhausting multimedia project Spurensuche (‘‘Looking for Traces: The World Religions on the Way’’), when he (completely unknown to me at the time) wanted to interview me about the ‘‘NATO-Yugoslavia-Kosovo Complex’’ in connection with some TV documentary on which he was working. . . . ‘‘Do not eat the food of anyone who is jealous,’’ says the book of Proverbs (23.6), and ‘‘Calumny is the daughter of the envier,’’ says a worldly sage: any one who would prefer not to read the whole article can also see this easily on the last page. There Krymanski mocks not only ‘‘the Pope’s belief in angels and saints’’ and ‘‘Tony Blair’s belief in ‘God’ ’’ but also ‘‘Hans Ku¨ng’s belief in the wisdom of Count von der Groeben’’; in so doing, he thinks himself brilliantly witty. In reality it is all stupefyingly boring. One notes the intention and turns away bored. So it will certainly be understood that I do not want to argue with this gentleman, especially when he himself does not engage in critical discussion with the global ethic project so much as write polemic against Ju¨rgen Habermas, Helmut Schmidt, the red-green government in Berlin, and, of course, Tony Blair, recommending that all the world should return to the old left-wing themes of ‘‘class struggle, polarization, ideologies and alienation.’’ Just one thing must be said quite clearly to our ‘‘blind flyer’’ (in his own words, ‘‘circling through the clouds to muse over the end of liberalism and national governments, over the totality of conspiracy, over finance capital and mass culture’’): to want to describe the global ethic project as an ‘‘elite ethic’’ is nonsense from beginning to end. Instead of studying and discussing the precise scholarly terminology of the global ethic, he thinks he can simply dismiss it with the comment that it is ‘‘not the language of our kids—‘who shall inherit the earth.’ ’’ But this representative of an empirical science has not taken the slightest trouble to inform himself about the work of our foundation, which is intensively committed to grassroots awareness. Therefore, should he once again return to earth from his blind flight and stand on solid ground, I invite him to read the report of the Global Ethic Foundation after three years. Or also to talk with one of the more than seven hundred teachers in the Federal Republic of Germany who have asked for teaching material on the global ethic project or with one of the sixteen authors of teaching projects out of fifty-two who have won prizes in a competition sponsored by our Foundation. These have now

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been published in two books which are available to teachers and pupils, together with our multimedia Spurensuche. At the end of this brief reply to what generally speaking is a most enjoyable issue of the International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society, I would like to express one wish: that people in the United States—whether in New York at Fordham or in Princeton or wherever—could devote themselves to the dissemination of the idea of a global ethic with institutional support like the Foundation in which I work.