SOPHIA DOI 10.1007/s11841-016-0511-7

God’s Existence and the Kantian Formula of Humanity John Lemos 1

# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2016

Abstract Immanuel Kant’s categorical imperative can be expressed as the formula of humanity. This states that rational beings ought always to treat humanity, whether in our own persons or in others, as ends in themselves and never as mere means. In this essay, I argue that if God exists, then the Kantian formula of humanity is false. The basic idea behind my argument is that if God exists, then he has knowingly created a world with all kinds of naturally occurring threats, such as disease, flood, drought, etc. and he has knowingly placed human beings in such a world without their consent, knowing that many innocent human beings will be led to suffer, and he allows this suffering to occur. I argue that even if this is somehow for their own good or the good of others or contributes to the goodness of the world as a whole, God treats these innocent human beings as mere means when he places humans in such a world without their consent and allows this suffering to occur. Keywords God . Ethics . Kant . Categorical imperative . Formula of humanity In his writings, Immanuel Kant endorses what he calls ‘the categorical imperative.’ He uses this label to reference a number of distinct principles. One of these principles has come to be known as the formula of humanity. This states that rational beings ought always to treat humanity, whether in our own person or in others, as ends in themselves and never as mere means. To treat someone as an end involves respecting his autonomy—respecting his capacity to decide for himself what he wants to do and how he wants to live and allowing him to decide and live as he sees fit for himself.1 1 See Kant (1981) [1785], p.36. For some discussions of Kant’s ethics and the formula of humanity, see Baron (1995), Herman (1993), O’Neill (1989, esp. Ch.7), Schneewind (1992, pp. 309–341), and Wood (2006, pp. 291–307; 2008, pp. 85–105).

* John Lemos [email protected]

1

Department of Philosophy and Religion, Coe College, 1220 1st Ave. NE, Cedar Rapis, IA 52402, USA

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In this essay, I shall argue that if God exists, then the Kantian formula of humanity is false. By ‘God’ I mean a supremely perfect being that both created the universe and sustains it in existence. When I reference God as a ‘supremely perfect being’ I mean that he is supremely good—including morally good— supremely rational, supremely knowledgeable, and supremely powerful. The basic idea behind my argument is that if God exists, then he has knowingly created a world with all kinds of naturally occurring threats, such as disease, flood, drought, etc., and he has knowingly placed human beings to live in such a world without their consent, knowing that many innocent human beings will be led to suffer, and he allows this suffering to occur. I argue that even if this is somehow for their own good or the good of others or contributes to the goodness of the world as a whole, God treats these innocent human beings as mere means when he places humans in such a world without their consent and allows this suffering to occur. My argument has some kinship to the atheistic argument from evil; however, it is distinct from it. I am not interested in arguing that God does not exist. Perhaps, he does. Rather, my point is simply that if he does, then it must be that the formula of humanity is false.

An Example for Consideration Imagine that I am the Minister of Morals, an important and very powerful government position, in some imaginary state. Imagine also that I recognize that in one province of this imagined state, the living conditions of the citizens are far too good. They are extremely wealthy and healthy. There is no crime nor disease, no significant pollution, no poverty, no shortages, and never any natural disasters. Suppose I decide that the people of this province simply don’t face enough challenges—suffering brought on by disease, poverty, flood, earthquakes, etc.— to exhibit significant levels of moral goodness. Thus, as the Minister of Morals concerned to promote the moral character of these people and having the power to do so, I decide without the consent of these people to alter the conditions of their existence. I see to it that they do face diseases, floods, and other natural disasters, as well as poverty and shortages. Notice that in doing this, I do not directly bring harm upon anyone; rather, I just create the conditions in which I know many innocent persons will be made to suffer and I allow this suffering to occur. I do this because by allowing this suffering, the citizens of the province will then have more opportunity to exhibit kindness, compassion, courage, patience, etc. By creating the conditions for this suffering and allowing it to occur, I increase the opportunities of the citizens to exhibit moral virtue. Let us also suppose that after many years, those who do act morally in the face of these hardships are rewarded handsomely for their virtue. Despite this, the citizens would rightly be upset with having these conditions foisted upon them without their consent. They would also be rightly upset to know that I have let this suffering go on when I could have prevented it. For here, the citizens are being treated as mere means in a scheme to allow for opportunities to exhibit moral virtue. Out of respect for the humanity of these people, I should not subject them to such treatment without their permission.

God’s Existence and the Kantian Formula of Humanity

In what follows, I shall argue that if God exists, then he is involved in a similar violation of the Kantian formula of humanity. That is, by knowingly creating a world in which many people will suffer and allowing this suffering to occur and making people live in this world without their consent, God violates the Kantian formula of humanity.

The Central Argument With these points in mind, let us now turn to my argument. In outline, the argument states: 1) God is by definition a supremely perfect creator and sustainer of the universe, and as such he is supremely good – including morally good – supremely rational, supremely knowledgeable, and supremely powerful. 2) A supremely knowledgeable (omniscient) and supremely powerful (omnipotent) being would be able to foresee all of the necessary and likely consequences of whatever he creates. 3) Many innocent human beings suffer greatly from natural causes, such as drought, flood, earthquakes, diseases, etc., and given the nature and structure of the natural world human suffering due to such natural causes is likely and foreseeable. So, 4) if God exists, then in creating the world and placing human beings within it God must have been able to foresee that many innocent human beings would be made to suffer, or at least very likely would suffer, from such natural causes. 5) The Kantian formula of humanity states that rational beings ought not to treat humanity as mere means but always as ends in themselves. So, 6) if this principle is true, then, given that God is rational, God ought not treat human beings as mere means but always as ends in themselves. 7) Human beings were not asked for their informed consent to be placed into this dangerous world where they face threats from natural causes and many innocent people are caused to suffer from such natural causes. 8) For a rational being to thrust human beings into these conditions without their informed consent is to treat them as mere means, even if they are thrust into this for their own good or to make the world a better place. So, 9) if God exists, then the Kantian formula of humanity is false. Premise (1) is a definitional point about the nature of God, which is in keeping with the traditional Judeo-Christian understanding of God. Premise (2) just works out some of the obvious implications of what it means to be a supremely knowledgeable and

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supremely powerful being. Premise (3) is just an obvious fact about the world in which we live. Premise (4), an intermediate conclusion, follows straightforwardly from premises (1) to (3). Premise (5) is simply a statement of the content of the Kantian formula of humanity. Premise (6) is an intermediate conclusion that just works out the implications of the Kantian formula of humanity and what this means given that God is rational. Premise (7) is also an obvious fact about the world in which we live. Premise (8) is controversial, and I will have more to say about it in what follows. Premise (9), the conclusion, follows logically from the prior assertions in the argument. Now, as noted, premise (8) is controversial. But, the example I provided above gives us some reason to think that it is true. Earlier, I said that it would be wrong of me, as the Minister of Morals, to make the citizens of this province suffer without their permission to allow them the opportunity to exhibit virtues, like compassion, kindness, justice, etc., as this would be to treat them as mere means. For me, to foist this upon them without getting their free and informed consent is a failure to treat them as ends—it is rather to treat them as a mere means. Presumably, if God is supreme in goodness, knowledge, and power, then in foisting a dangerous world upon human beings and allowing for innocent people to suffer, he must be motivated by a desire to make things better for them. In my argument, I suggest that, perhaps, the greater goods that might be achieved through the suffering of innocents might be the opportunity to exhibit moral virtues. However, my example in the prior section of this paper shows, that even if the suffering of innocent people is foisted upon them to make them better or to make the world a better place, this still violates the Kantian formula of humanity. If it is wrong for me, as the Minister of Morals, to foist suffering upon the citizens of this province to create opportunities for exhibiting the higher goods of virtue, then so too it would seem to be wrong of God for the same sorts of reasons. Both seem to be violations of the Kantian formula of humanity. Further, my point here is not that God does not exist; rather, my point is simply that if he does, then the formula of humanity is false. Perhaps God does exist. If so, then, according to my argument, the formula of humanity is false, meaning it can sometimes be acceptable for rational beings, like us and God, to treat human beings as mere means.

Objections and Replies Natural Evils as the Necessary Means to Our Attaining Moral Excellence It might be argued that premise (8) is false. That is, it might be thought that in foisting suffering upon us through the existence of natural evils, such as disease, floods, droughts, etc., God does not necessarily treat us as mere means. Rather, it may be that in doing this he allows for the challenges that allows us to exhibit moral worth. A key element of what gives human beings a special dignity and worth is our capacity for exhibiting moral excellence. Without the hardships presented by the natural evils of this world, we cannot exhibit moral excellence. So, in providing the necessary means for exhibiting moral excellence, God actually does treat us as ends and not as mere means. Such a reply is problematic. To see why, let’s return to my earlier example. According to the example, I as the Minister of Morals decide that the citizens of this

God’s Existence and the Kantian Formula of Humanity

one province just aren’t facing enough hardship to exhibit moral excellence. Thus, without their permission, I create the conditions which will lead to great suffering among them to give them the opportunity to exhibit moral excellence. It seems obvious that by doing this to them, it would be wrong even if the intent is to provide them with the opportunity to exhibit moral excellence. There’s a paternalistic aspect to such action that flies in the face of the formula of humanity. I’m going to make them suffer without their permission because I think they need the opportunity to exhibit moral excellence in the face of adversity. I hardly think they will be grateful for my harsh treatment of them even if they know of my benevolent motive. It seems rather that they would be justifiably upset with my harsh and paternalistic intrusion into their lives. Thus, it seems to me that this sort of objection to (8) is misguided. I would also note here that this objection to (8) falters for other reasons as well. Consider that in this world, many young children suffer greatly and die young, never having an opportunity to exhibit moral excellence in the face of adversity. Are we to think that this suffering is part of God’s plan to allow us the opportunity to exhibit virtue? Perhaps, but if so, it seems evident that the suffering child is being treated as a mere means here. And so, again, the objection falters. On the Scope of the Formula of Humanity In defense of premise (8), I use an argument from analogy in which I maintain that just as I, serving as the Minister of Morals, would violate the formula of humanity by foisting disease, floods, draught, etc. upon innocent people to allow for their moral development or, perhaps, to allow for some other goods, so too God violates the formula of humanity by foisting these things upon us. It is then argued that if God exists, then since he is supremely good—including morally good—and since he violates the formula of humanity, it follows that if God exists, then the formula of humanity is false. It might, however, be argued that God’s existence doesn’t really falsify the formula of humanity because the formula of humanity might only be intended as a principle to be followed by human beings in their interactions with other human beings. Perhaps, the principle was never meant to have application beyond human to human interaction, so that even though God, who is not human, does not act in accord with the principle, the principle may still be true. In reply to such an objection, I would note that there doesn’t seem to be any good reason to think that this principle would apply only in contexts of human to human interaction. Suppose that in the future, human beings come into contact with intelligent life on other planets who are not human beings. Imagine that we can communicate with them and that we and they are able to understand the differences in our customs and practices. Would it be alright for us to treat these alien beings as mere means just because they are not human or for them to treat us as mere means just because we don’t share their life form? There doesn’t seem to be any good reason to think so, and that’s because it is not really membership in the species of human beings itself that makes us ends in ourselves. Rather, it is our capacity for reason and autonomous living that makes us ends. Whenever one rational and autonomous being encounters another, whether human or not, that being’s capacity for reason and autonomy is to be respected, i.e., that being is to be treated as an end and never as mere means. Sure, Kant says, ‘We

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ought always to treat humanity as persons and never as mere means,’ but that’s because human beings have the morally relevant capacities for reason and autonomy. Thus, given that God as traditionally understood is rational and autonomous and given that we are as well, it stands to reason that in his dealings with us, he should treat us as ends and not as mere means. Does God’s Supreme Goodness, Knowledge, and Power Exempt Him from the Formula of Humanity? A different but related objection might allow that, indeed, if human beings were to interact with other intelligent life forms with capacities for reason and autonomy, then the formula of humanity would have application in governing the ethics of their interactions. However, it may be objected that God’s supreme knowledge, reason, power, and goodness exempt him from the obligation to follow the formula of humanity in his dealings with us. Thus, even if God exists, the formula of humanity may still be true. Here, it must be considered why God’s supreme knowledge, reason, power, and goodness would exempt him from the obligation to conform to the formula of humanity. Suppose that I have a very kind and rational doctor and suppose that I am sick and need treatment. Suppose my doctor knows I want the best treatment I can get and he knows what that treatment is. Would this justify his imposing his treatment upon me without my consent? If I’m a rational adult, then doing so would be an act of paternalism which cannot be justified by the formula of humanity. Neither my doctor’s superior knowledge nor his superior healing powers nor his superior goodness would justify such a paternalistic violation of the formula of humanity. Thus, it is unclear why God’s supreme knowledge and power and goodness would exempt him from the obligation to follow the formula of humanity in his dealings with us. It could be argued that the preceding analogy is weak. It could be said no human being can know the wishes and needs of another human being with such a degree of certainty as to justify paternalistic measures on his behalf. But, given God’s supreme knowledge, he can know what we want and need with certainty. Thus, God has no obligation to conform to the formula of humanity in his dealings with us. Such a counter to my argument would be problematic, for it conflicts with the very nature of the Kantian formula of humanity. According to this counter, when one rational being, X, knows with certainty the wants and needs of another rational being, Y, then X has no obligation to treat Y as an end—getting Y’s informed consent from him—rather, X may act on Y’s behalf without his consent. But if we allow for such an exception to the application of the formula, this is to suggest that the formula only has legitimacy as a way to ensure that people’s needs and wants are met. In particular, the formula just becomes a way to ensure that some agents are not acting on behalf of others with a mistaken vision of what those others want or need. The problem with this is that the formula of humanity is a deontological principle that tells of the intrinsic wrongness of one rational being treating another as mere means, failing to respect that other being’s capacity for autonomy. The formula of humanity is not a rule of thumb to be followed so as to ensure that we do not act on the behalf of others based on mistaken conceptions of their needs and wants.

God’s Existence and the Kantian Formula of Humanity

When we keep in mind the deontological character of the formula of humanity—that it is designed to clarify the intrinsic wrongness of one rational being’s imposing of his will on another—then it stands to reason that if God designs the world in such a way as to knowingly impose suffering upon us through natural causes and he does so without our consent, then he does violate the formula of humanity. The Alleged Absurdity of Giving Humans a Voice in the Plan of the Universe Another objection to my argument might note how my argument suggests that if God is going to subject human beings to suffering for either their own good or the good of others and at the same time treat them as ends, then he must first consult with them and get their permission to do so. According to my argument, God’s failure to do so would be to foist suffering upon them in accord with his own plan without taking into consideration their own wishes, and this is to treat human beings as mere means. It might be objected that this would be to suggest that human beings should have a voice in deciding how the universe should operate. This might then be regarded as absurd, because it contradicts the very conception of God as the benevolent, all-knowing, and omnipotent architect of the universe. Why should he be obligated to consult with us in designing the plan of the universe? This objection does correctly point out an implication of my view. That is, before subjecting human beings to suffering for their own good or the good of others, he should confer with us and gain our informed consent. But to suggest that this is absurd is hasty. It may seem absurd to those who are already committed to a vision of God as a benevolent and almighty creator and we his lowly creatures made in his image. But if you keep in mind that God is all-good, all-powerful, and all-knowing, then it is not inconceivable that things could have been very different. The world could have been set up differently and in such a way that, instead of having natural evils foisted upon us without our having a say in it, we could have been consulted, informed, and allowed a voice in how things shall operate. No doubt this may seem absurd to many, especially those who have for so long accepted the traditional conception of God as almighty lawgiver and we his subjects. But, it’s not impossible and if we are rational agents with a dignity and worth deserving of respect, then it is not unreasonable to think that human beings should have a voice in determining how they will be treated in this world. Here, it may be thought that there is still something absurd in my suggestion. One might wonder what the point would be in God’s conferring with us before setting up a world. Given God’s supreme goodness, knowledge, and power, then by the time he gave us the information we need to make an informed decision on a world plan, we would inevitably agree with his plan. In further development of this point, it could be noted that given God’s supreme goodness, knowledge, and power, it stands to reason that any world he creates would be the best of all possible worlds. Thus, by the time he explained his plan to us, we would inevitably agree with his plan for the world. In response to this, it should be noted that even if we would inevitably agree, consultation with us would still be desirable. For then, we would at least know what the rationale is for the way human beings are treated in this life. As it is, however, no readily apparent explanation for the sufferings and inequities in this life is offered up to us from God and we are left to suffer with the consequences of his plan with no clear and agreed upon guide on how to live or whether things will turn out for the best in the

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end. It should also be noted that just because God knows what is best for us does not justify imposing his plan on us even if it is best for us. Again, consider that just because a doctor knows what is best for his patient, this does not justify imposing his will on the patient. Rather, assuming the mental competence of the patient, it is expected that the doctor inform the patient of her condition and the treatment options and offer a recommendation for treatment. The God as Parent Analogy Another objection might note that my argument overlooks the fact that, while respecting autonomy is a key part of what it is to treat them as ends, we do not believe it is always wrong to foist our will upon other persons in disregard of their wishes. For instance, it is morally acceptable to do this to children and the insane, and it is acceptable to incarcerate criminals contrary to their wishes not to be incarcerated. Perhaps, we are more like children in our relation to God and this justifies God in not consulting us and gaining our consent before subjecting us to suffering. Just as it can be acceptable for a parent to impose his will on his own child for the child’s own good, so too it can be acceptable for God to impose his will upon human beings for their own good. One problem with this response is that we are justified in imposing our will on children due to certain natural necessities. It is a biological, natural fact that cognitive development in human beings takes many years. Due to this and despite our best efforts, we cannot explain everything to children and then leave them to make their own decisions as they just won’t be able to understand us and use the information wisely. Thus, it is acceptable to make them do things—indeed to suffer through certain experiences (swallowing a nasty medicine, getting painful vaccinations, eating their veggies, etc.)—for their own good. Being omnipotent, God is not bound by such natural necessities in his dealings with us. Thus, what justifies adult human beings imposing their wills on children does not justify God’s imposing his will on us. As God is omnipotent, he should be able to communicate with us in clear terms allowing us to understand his wishes and options and allowing us a voice in how the world shall operate, rather than imposing a world of danger, inequity, and suffering upon us without our consent. It might be responded that while God is not bound by natural necessity, he is nonetheless bound by metaphysical necessity. That is, his nature as a supreme being gives him a goodness, power, and understanding which so far surpasses our own that there is no way for him to make clear to us the rationale behind all that he does. In this way, God may be justified in making us suffer for our own good in the same way that a parent is justified in doing this to his child. Further, as the principle of humanity does not demand the acquisition of a child’s consent in all our dealings with him, so too God need not acquire our consent when he subjects us to suffering Thus, God need not be viewed here as violating the principle of humanity. This move is also problematic. The assertion that God is bound by some metaphysical necessity which makes it impossible for him to explain his ways to us and to garner our consent simply seems to be a denial of God’s omnipotence. It is important to remember that human beings, as we are in this world, may not be capable of understanding the ways of God. But that’s the point! God could have made things quite

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different—indeed, he could have made a world in which we could understand him and we were consulted about how we would like to be treated, rather than having natural evils foisted upon us. Now, it may be objected here that just because God cannot explain things to inferior creatures—such as why it is right and good to subject innocent human beings to suffering—this does not mean God lacks omnipotence. Contra the point of the preceding paragraph, it might be argued that even human beings created with an enhanced intelligence would still be inferior to God and so they still wouldn’t be able to understand all that God understands. For the same reason an omnipotent God cannot make round squares or odd numbered sets of four, it may be that God just couldn’t explain all things to us, including why it is best that the innocent suffer. Perhaps, it is just not logically possible for God to explain this to us. But this is not to suggest that God lacks omnipotence, as an omnipotent being need only be capable of doing whatever is logically possible. Thus, God may not have been able to inform us of his plans in such a way that we could make reasonable choices as to how the world should be designed. In this way, what may at first seem like a paternalistic imposition upon us of a world with suffering and inequities that violates the Kantian formula of humanity may actually be a justified provision of challenges that allows for our moral development. This is an interesting counter, but it stacks the deck against my own argument in an unjustified manner. It may indeed be the case that any created being must be inferior to God. However, I am not proposing that we should have been created as equal to God in knowledge, goodness, and power. I am only suggesting that God should have made human beings in such a way that we could understand God’s proposed plan of the universe and then decide for ourselves whether we want to be a part of this and allowed to suggest alternative plans, engaging in a dialogue moving towards an agreed upon plan. It is not clear why we should think this is an impossibility. Granted the objection doesn’t say it is an impossibility but that it might be, and thus, it might explain why our world has not unfolded in this way. However, while it might be impossible for an omnipotent God to give us the information we need to fruitfully engage in dialogue about a world plan, it seems unreasonable to think it is in fact an impossibility. Notice I am not even suggesting that God should have made us omniscient, and I am certainly not suggesting that he should have made us all-good or all-powerful. I am just suggesting he give enough information and the opportunity for dialogue and consent to a world plan. There doesn’t seem to be any good reason to think an omnipotent being could not have supplied this. Finally, there’s an additional worry regarding these matters—namely, God’s utter silence. Even if God could not give us enough information to fruitfully engage in dialogue and to form rational consent to his plan, it could nonetheless be plausibly argued that God should at least do what all he can to make sense of his plan to us, trying to make clear to us why we must suffer. Suppose that I have cancer and I also suffer from some mental deficits that make it hard for me to understand the precise nature of my condition and the different treatment options. While my mental deficits may make it too difficult for me to reasonably deliberate and choose for myself which option is best and, thus, my doctor may be justified in acting on my behalf without my consent, and he would nonetheless out of respect for my humanity still be obligated to explain his methods and actions to me as best he can. God’s failure to make known his plan and will to so many who suffer and die in ignorance of his plan raises additional and

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significant concern about whether God’s existence is compatible with the Kantian formula of humanity. An Argument from the Best of All Possible Worlds My argument entails that if God exists, then when he thrusts us without our consent into a world in which innocent human beings are led to suffer, this is a violation of the Kantian formula of humanity. Given this, my argument might be attacked along the following lines: (a) Given God’s supreme goodness, knowledge, and power, then if he exists then any world he creates must be the best of all possible worlds. So, (b) if God exists, then this must be the best of all possible worlds. (c) There is no way that in the best of all possible worlds God treats human beings as mere means. So, (d) if God exists, then there is no way God treats us as mere means. According to this argument, it may seem that if God exists, then innocent human beings who suffer from natural evils are treated as mere means, but given that this would then have to be the best of all possible worlds this only seems to be the case—the reality must be otherwise. The first premise of this kind of argument is highly controversial; however, I am willing to grant it. Instead, I would note that even if this premise is granted, this argument begs the question against my own argument. I’ve given an argument from analogy which supports the claim that if God exists, then he treats us as mere means in foisting natural evils upon innocent human beings. From the perspective of my argument, there is no reason to think premise (c) of this argument is true. It would seem rather that if God exists and this is the best of all possible worlds, then the formula of humanity is false. My argument suggests that if God exists, then fans of the Kantian formula of humanity need to re-examine their ethical commitments and their conception of the best of all possible worlds. Perhaps, if God exists, then in making this the best of all possible worlds, God was guided by utility maximization principles instead of the formula of humanity and is, thus, willing to treat human beings as mere means to produce the best world. In response to the preceding remarks, one might retort, ‘Alright, then, if God exists, the Kantian formula of humanity is false, but who cares? A world in which this principle was true would be worse anyway.’ The idea here is that if it is granted that any world God creates must be the best of all possible worlds, it would stand to reason that if God exists and even if the Kantian formula of humanity is false, then this is still the best of all possible worlds. As long as this is the best of all possible worlds, why should we care that the Kantian formula of humanity is false? A couple of points are worthy of consideration here. First, many people, including many theists, believe the Kantian formula of humanity is true. If the central argument of my paper is sound, then either a supremely perfect (including morally perfect) creator

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does not exist or the Kantian formula of humanity is false. Thus, if my argument is sound, anyone who embraces both traditional theism and the formula of humanity should get busy reexamining their theological commitments or their ethical commitments or both. This is the significance of my argument. Admittedly, my argument poses no threat to those who think there is no God or that God is not supremely perfect and it poses no threat to those who think the formula of humanity is false. But I should think there are actually quite a few people that accept both traditional theism and the formula of humanity, and they might be surprised to learn that they must be mistaken in at least one of these commitments.2 Further, if I am right, the choices forced upon such a Kantian theist are not insignificant. If he holds on to the formula of humanity, then he should either deny that God exists or that God is supremely perfect. I take it as obvious that giving up the belief in God is significant, but what if he holds on to the belief in God while conceding that God is not supremely perfect? This would be a significant change. Historically, God has been conceived of as a supremely perfect creator and sustainer of the universe. If it is conceded that God exists but is not supremely perfect, then we might wonder whether he is any longer worthy of the high status and authority that he is granted in the lives of those who follow him. Also, if he is conceived of as less than perfect then this undermines one road to arguing for his existence—namely, the path of the ontological argument. Finally, if he is not supremely perfect, this raises additional questions as to the precise nature of his imperfection. Is he lacking in knowledge or power or goodness? What’s the nature and source of God’s imperfection? On the other hand, when faced with the soundness of my argument, the Kantian theist might prefer to hold on to his belief in a supremely perfect God, while jettisoning his commitment to the formula of humanity. But this too is not insignificant. Once it is conceded that it is sometimes acceptable to treat persons as mere means, this raises a whole host of questions about the circumstances and conditions in which doing so is legitimate. How often and in which sorts of circumstances will it be acceptable for us to impose our will upon others without their free and informed consent? One virtue of the formula of humanity is that it gives us fairly clear and plausible guidelines on how to conduct ourselves. Thus, rejection of this principle is not insignificant. An Argument from Virtual Consent A final objection to my argument might note that any rational person would consent to being placed in this world with its potential for great suffering if he 2

In support of my contention that there are likely many Kantian theists, I would note that I have had many students and friends who believe that God exists and who accept the Kantian formula of humanity. Also, one way of understanding the second great commandment, ‘Love thy neighbor as thyself,’ is to treat it as an assertion that we should respect the dignity and autonomy of others, as we want our own dignity and autonomy to be respected. Furthermore, I would direct the reader’s attention to the work of Robert Kraynak (2001), who argues that many twentieth century theists have embraced the Kantian formula of humanity; he finds evidence in the works of Jacques Maritain, Archbishop Desmond Tutu, Pope John XXIII, Cardinal Karol Wojtyla (Pope John Paul II), Reinhold Niebuhr, Martin Luther King, Jr., and Martin Buber. See esp. Kraynak (2001), pp.148-164.

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knew that it afforded the opportunity for the incommensurably greater good of communion with God in the afterlife. Thus, in subjecting us to this world and the suffering that it can and does bring to many of us, God is not treating us as mere means. The idea here is that since God may know that we would rationally consent to life in this world if we understood the much greater good that can come from this, then God has our virtual consent to being placed in this world. As such, it can be argued that by treating us in this way, he does not treat us as mere means. As a first pass at responding to this objection, we might wonder whether having virtual consent suffices to satisfy the Kantian formula of humanity. Imagine that I have a serious illness that requires amputating my leg so that I may survive. Imagine also that I would be able to lead a happy life after the operation, but I just don’t see it this way and while I am on the whole quite reasonable, I nonetheless have an irrational commitment to keeping my leg and not having the operation. Suppose as well that my doctor knows I would be able to lead a happy life without my leg and that eventually I would be grateful for his amputation of my leg. Would, then, the doctor be justified in forcing the operation upon me without my actual consent? It might be argued that since he knows I would be happy and appreciative in the end, then he has my virtual consent to the operation. Thus, according to the virtual consent argument, it would seem that forcing the operation upon me is not a violation of the Kantian formula of humanity. Any fan of the Kantian formula should be uncomfortable with the reasoning of such a doctor, as this kind of reasoning will allow for many other occasions in which one person, X, will be allowed to force actions upon another person, Y, with the intent of bettering Y’s situation. To allow this is to allow for levels of paternalism that runs counter to the Kantian formula of humanity. A fan of the virtual consent strategy might argue that indeed, the doctor should not force the surgery upon me. It might be argued that while the doctor can have a justified true belief and, thus, in some sense know, that after the operation, I’d be happy and grateful, he still cannot be certain of this. Thus, without certainty of my future happiness, the doctor’s forcing of the surgery upon me is a violation of the formula of humanity. In contrast, God’s having certain knowledge that we would consent to life in this world if we fully understood things does suffice for having our virtual consent. Thus, God is justified in forcing this world upon us and in doing so he does not violate the formula of humanity. It would seem then that it is the superior epistemic powers of God that makes it acceptable for him to force this world upon us without our actual consent. His omniscience allows him to know with certainty that we would consent to life in this world if we had full knowledge of the incommensurably greater goods that result from this, and this in turn seems to suggest that having our virtual consent suffices for meeting the demands of the Kantian formula of humanity. However, once we see that it is his supreme knowledge that seems to make this argument work, we should recall that God is also supremely powerful. In what follows, I will note a deeper problem with this argument. There is something flawed about a relationship in which one person subjects another to tremendous suffering and then wonderfully redeems him in the end. Thus, if God

God’s Existence and the Kantian Formula of Humanity

exists and given that some people do suffer greatly in this life, then God has created a situation in which we exist in a flawed relationship with him.3 Now, it might be thought that just because God makes us suffer and then redeems us, this is not a flaw. After all, a thoroughly loving parent might make his child suffer through any number of things to bring about a greater good for her, and no one needs to view this as a flaw in such a parent-child relation. Thus, just because God allows for our suffering to bring about some greater good for us, this need not be indicative of a flaw in his relationship with us. However, such a response overlooks the fact that God is omnipotent. Human beings are not omnipotent. Thus, we are faced with situations where the only way to secure what is best for our children demands imposing some suffering upon them without their consent. In contrast, God is omnipotent, meaning that if he exists, he has the power to shape the world in such a manner that he need not force suffering upon us to bring about greater goods for us. Thus, God has knowingly set up the world in such a way that we exist in a flawed relationship with him. Given his omnipotence, he could have done otherwise, providing the conditions for a more ideal relationship between us and God. It can be argued that due to human limitations of knowledge and power in meeting the demands of the Kantian formula of humanity, we are not obligated to create and maintain ideal relations with others. However, when a being, such as God, with supreme knowledge and power chooses to create a world in which his relations with his subjects is less than ideal, then he treats them as mere means, violating the Kantian formula of humanity.

Conclusion Again, my purpose in this essay has not been to show that there is no God. Since there is so much justified disagreement about questions of value, I don’t think the existence of evil in this world can show that there is no God. However, I suppose I would say that if we knew full well that the Kantian formula of humanity was true, then I would take the suffering of innocent human beings as a result of natural evils as evidence that there is no God. But, I don’t think we know the formula of humanity is true. It might be that on some occasions and for some reasons it can be morally acceptable to treat innocent human beings as mere means. Regardless, my point has been to show that if God exists, then the formula of humanity is false. If I am right about this, then it should make some difference for the ways in which theological ethics is conducted. For instance, if the duty to love thy neighbor as thy self—Jesus’ second great commandment—is interpreted as entailing the formula of humanity, then that is a mistake. I would also note that in the recent literature, there has been some discussion of whether we should want God to exist. Thomas Nagel has stated, ‘I hope there is no 3

A referee for this journal drew my attention to this issue concerning the flawed nature of such relations and directed my attention to Bishop and Perszyk (2011) in which they appeal to this flawed aspect of our relation with God to build what they call a ‘normatively relativized logical argument from evil,’ which suggests that the existence of an all-good, omnipotent God is inconsistent with certain sorts of moral beliefs that a number of theists are likely to hold.

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God! I don’t want there to be a God; I don’t want the universe to be like that.’4 As Guy Kahane has noted this view is distinct from atheism. Atheists believe there is no God, but they might nonetheless wish God existed. In contrast, Nagel wishes that God does not exist. Kahane calls the latter view ‘anti-theism’ and he has developed some arguments in support of it. Kahane’s arguments have been subjected to significant criticisms in the literature, and Nagel himself does not explain the basis of his antitheism.5 In closing, I will note that the considerations raised in this essay may present a different kind of reason for wishing there is no God. What I have in mind is that were one deeply committed to the formula of humanity, then one might reasonably wish there is no God on the grounds that God’s existence would undermine a deep moral commitment one holds. Perhaps, this was on Nagel’s mind when he said, ‘I don’t want there to be a God; I don’t want the world to be like that.’ Perhaps, he doesn’t want to live in a world in which it is deemed acceptable to treat others as mere means to bring about some greater good.

References Baron, M. (1995). Kantian ethics almost without apology. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Bishop, J., & Perszyk, K. (2011). The normatively relativized logical argument from evil. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 70, 109–126. Herman, B. (1993). The practice of moral judgment. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Kahane, G. (2011). Should we want God to exist? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 82, 674–696. Kant, I. (1785/1981) The grounding of the metaphysics of morals, trans. James W. Ellington, Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing. Kraay, K., & Dragos, C. (2013). On preferring God’s non-existence. The Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 43, 157–178. Kraynak, R. (2001). Christian faith and modern democracy. South Bend: University of Notre Dame Press. Nagel, T. (1997). The last word. Oxford: Oxford University Press. O’Neill, O. (1989). Constructions of reason: explorations of Kant’s practical philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Schneewind, J. (1992). Autonomy, obligation, and virtue: on overview of Kant’s moral philosophy. In P. Guyer (Ed.), The Cambridge companion to Kant. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Wood, A. (2006). Kant’s formulations of the moral law. In G. Bird (Ed.), A companion to Kant. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. Wood, A. (2008). Kantian ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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Nagel (1997, p.130). See Kahane (2011). For a critique of Kahane’s arguments for anti-theism, see Kraay and Dragos (2013).