Higher Education 43: 7–25, 2002. © 2002 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
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Higher education reform in perspective: The Japanese experience AKIHIRO ITOH Graduate School of Education and Human Development, Nagoya University, Furo-cho, Chigusa-ku, Nagoya-shi 464-8601, Japan (E-mail:
[email protected]) Abstract. Japanese colleges and universities are in an age of great transition. Current reforms can be counted as some of the most extensive and radical changes in the history of Japanese higher education. Although the agenda of recent reforms has been conditioned by contemporary socio-political circumstances, many of the ongoing changes are rooted in history. In this article, the reforms of Japanese higher education are examined from a long-range historical perspective. Though pre-war years are briefly mentioned, the main concern here is with reforms after World War II.
Introduction Since the introduction of the modern higher education system into Japan, the reform of higher education has been a constant topic of discussion. Compared to other periods of reform, however, the changes at the turn of this century can probably be counted as some of the most extensive and radical reforms in the history of Japanese higher education. Present-day academics feel a sense of impending crisis, due in large part to the sharp decline in the population of younger Japanese. Moreover, academe has come under intense pressure from the public, who often holds it responsible for the stagnation of Japanese society due to its inefficiency and indolence. The Ministry of Education and higher education’s leaders use these external pressures as levers for change, although most academics see them as deeply threatening to intellectual freedom. Thus, the reform of higher education is going forward at a fevered pitch. Recent reforms have not been instigated by contemporary socio-political circumstances alone. Many of the ongoing changes are rooted in history. Some reform issues have arisen frequently over the past one hundred years. In fact, some current reforms can be understood as a reconstruction of the system that was formed during the Meiji era. Therefore, to grasp the exact nature of current reforms with all their manifold characteristics, it is essential to examine them from a historical perspective. In this article, the history and characteristics of past higher education reforms are analyzed. Though the main concern here is with reforms after
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World War II, the pre-war years are briefly mentioned because a remarkably stratified system of higher education, which gave rise to the major issues of reform in the pre-war period, was constructed at that time. In the subsequent sections, the following eras of reform are examined: the occupation period (1945–1950s), the period of rapid expansion and campus strife (1960s), the beginning of the flexibility and diversity policies (1970s), and the impact of administrative reforms on higher education (1980s). Lastly, reforms in the 1990s are briefly highlighted in order to provide answers to the following question: what is the historical context under which the recent higher education reforms occurred? The focus of analysis is primarily limited to policies at the national level. This is justified due to the centralized nature of socio-political systems in Japan. However, this approach does not consider several significant aspects of higher education reform, such as changes in individual institutions, particularly private institutions, which tend to be more variable and diverse than their national counterparts.
The pre-war reforms The importation of modern higher education began with the advent of the Meiji Restoration. After some trial and error, the basic structure of the pre-war higher education system was formed by the end of the nineteenth century. The main characteristics of the system were its multi-sectional and stratified structure (Amano 1986). First, there was a division between universities and other forms of shorter-term higher education institutions. The imperial university (teikoku daigaku), modeled after European, especially German, universities, was placed at the summit of the strata. At the other end were the specialized schools (senmon gakko), which included various vocational and liberal arts institutions. Second, the division between public and private institutions was firmly established. The central government was the one and only provider of universities by the end of the 1920s and private schools were relegated to the relatively low status of specialized schools. Since that period of time, these stratifications have remained deeply rooted in modern Japanese bureaucracy and society, consequently resulting in rigidity and strong resistance to reform. The pre-war system was highly stratified by gender as well. Until the 1920s, women were not permitted to enter universities. Even after the 1920s, with rare exceptions, the imperial universities did not open their doors to women. It is no overstatement to say that the stratified structure was rational and efficient in terms of resource allocation and for manpower training. However, discrepancies gradually developed between the structure and newly emerging
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social needs. Higher education reform in the pre-war period, especially after the turn of the century, came about basically because of dissatisfaction with the stratified system. One of the pre-war drives for reform emanating from the Meiji era was that of egalitarianism. Essentially, this was the demand to eliminate status differentials between universities and specialized schools, or between public and private institutions. This demand was particularly strong from the underprivileged groups attending higher education institutions. A demand for increased efficiency also served as an impetus for change. The higher schools (koto gakko), which were part of the most elite institutions, were most often the targets of criticism. Higher schools were originally established as preparatory foreign language training schools for universities. As the need for this function declined, the reason for these schools’ existence was questioned. The third driving force for reform was for greatly expanding higher education enrollment. Although the government attempted to encourage more applicants to enter specialized schools, students still coveted entry into the elite institutions, namely, higher schools and imperial universities. Since the expansion of expensive imperial universities would have been problematic, a new structure of higher education was pursued. These driving forces for change pressuring the existing system, created an environment where the stakeholders of higher education were required to engage in political proceedings. In addition, the situation represented a conflict between the imported models of higher education, between the elitist European university model and the popular American college model, or between the university model and the vocational institution model. Partial reform of the higher education system was conducted before World War II, in response to social demands of the time (Itoh 1999). At the end of the 1920s, universities other than imperial universities were permitted to be established for the first time since the Meiji Restoration. Consequently, some of the most prominent public and private specialized schools were able to move toward the university model. However, this reform did not include the imperial universities, so even though the range of the university was expanded, status discrimination between imperial universities and the other universities persisted. Numerous proposals were set forth by various stakeholders to reform the stratified structure of higher education in the 1920s and 1930s. The most widely supported reform proposal, which was quite similar to postwar reforms, was for eliminating distinctions among the imperial universities, the other universities, and the specialized schools. However, such reforms were not carried out until the end of World War II. One reason for this lack of progress was that the social and political resources that elite institutions
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had at their disposal were much greater than those of other institutions. Another reason was that the stratified structure of higher education was firmly entwined with educational credentialism in the labor market (Amano 1986). The basic structure of the pre-war system has been essentially maintained with the exception of the reforms that took place after Japan’s defeat in World War II and the subsequent occupation by the Allied Forces.
Reforms under the occupation Radical reform of the education system began with the arrival of the Occupation Forces in the summer of 1945. The education system was one of the key targets of the Allied Forces’ “democratization policy.” The pre-war system, which consisted of a highly diversified and stratified secondary and higher education system, was replaced by a more egalitarian system with a single track “6-3-3-4 scheme.” All specialized schools and normal schools became universities, the latter of which had already gained the status of institutions of higher education during World War II. The wall between the imperial universities and other universities was essentially eliminated. Preparatory schools for universities and higher schools were closed. For institutions not qualified to become a 4-year university, a system of junior colleges (tanki daigaku) was introduced to serve as a temporary relief measure, although this system would also attain regular status in 1964. As a result of these reforms, the post-war higher education system presented a striking egalitarian appearance. The new university system (shinsei daigaku) reflected the strong influence of the United States forces, which formed the center of the Allied Forces. The Civil Information and Education Section (CI&E), a division of the Allied Forces and responsible for educational policy during the occupation, imported modified versions of many components of American higher education, including general education, the credit system, graduate school, and accreditation. Every university was required to have a new general education curriculum, something which had not existed in pre-war universities. General education consisted of courses covering the humanities, social sciences, and natural sciences. The credit system, which had been adopted by a few institutions in pre-war Japan, was imposed on every university. This system uniformly enforced the minimum requirements for general education and the completion of courses. The post-baccalaureate program, which formerly did not have courses of study nor defined terms of study before World War II, was transformed into American-like graduate education, in which courses were held, requirements for completion were defined, and masters degrees were newly established.
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These new standards for post-war universities were set, not by the Ministry of Education, but by the Japanese University Accreditation Association (Daigaku kijun kyokai), which was independent of the government, but under the strong influence of CI&E. The Ministry of Education employed these new standards when it gave authorization to establish new institutions. Thus, a quasi-accreditation system was introduced, in which chartering and accreditation were intermixed and academe’s self-regulation and voluntarism were at a minimum. CI&E also initiated a proposal that would have transferred supervision of national universities and colleges to local governments. However, this proposal, which was modeled on the existing state university system in the United States, was not implemented. Another CI&E plan that was left unfulfilled was the introduction of an American-style higher education administration system, such as a board of regents and a top-down decisionmaking mechanism. These proposals were evidence of the CI&E’s strong push for the Americanization of higher education in Japan, but ultimately were not realized due to fierce opposition from Japanese bureaucrats and academics. Despite the great influence of the American reforms on Japanese higher education, it may be shortsighted to regard higher education during the occupation period as being the introduction of solely the American model. Reforms also incorporated elements of the German university model that were adopted by the highest stratum of higher education institutions. This can be clearly observed by looking at the degree of academic freedom, or autonomy, granted to the individual faculties. Only imperial universities were formally allowed to hold faculty-wide meetings (kyojukai), a function that gave broad power to the faculty throughout the pre-war period. In contrast, other institutions, such as specialized schools, did not enjoy this type of administrative freedom. As a result of the reforms, however, all newly established post-war universities were permitted to hold regular facultywide meetings, and academic freedom in terms of departmental control was established at every institution of higher education. The dispersion of the German model influenced the values and attitudes of post-war academia as well. Wilhelm von Humboldt’s ideal of the university – “elimination of utilitarianism,” “scholarship exclusively for scholarship itself,” and “integration of education and research” – spread from the elite institutions throughout the entire system. As a result, most university professors came to recognize themselves as not only educators but also as researchers. The transplantation of a higher education system from foreign countries is generally classified into two types: voluntary importation and forced importa-
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tion (Clark 1983, p. 227). The importation of education in pre-war Japan was basically voluntary. Policy makers in Meiji Japan created the system by selecting aspects from various higher education systems in Western countries. In contrast, the Allied Forces largely forced the introduction of the post-war system onto Japan. When importation is voluntary and piecemeal, there is less difficulty in adapting to the new system. When the introduction of the system is compulsory and sudden, however, conflicts often occur (Clark 1983, p. 232). Post-war Japan is representative of the latter. Neither university professors nor the bureaucrats in the Ministry of Education were very aware or knowledgeable of what constituted “general education.” The concept of graduate courses encompassing an educational component as opposed to only research was outside the realm of their understanding. When the CI&E required the establishment of master’s degrees, Japanese stakeholders were at a loss as to what to do with this unknown degree level. This voluntary versus forced dichotomy is not sufficient for describing the complexities of post-war higher education. First, some of the higher education reforms were based on requests from Japanese academics themselves. Second, the Allied Forces were not, as was generally believed, monolithic. Antagonism was present within the CI&E (Hata 1999). Factions often had their own Japanese counterpart. Third, the Occupation Forces left most of the bureaucracy of Japanese government untouched and used it to govern the country indirectly. This reflects, in part, the United States’ inadequate preparation for the occupation and in general, the deep-rooted influences of the bureaucracy in Japanese society. The Allied Forces, in fact, relied on Japanese bureaucrats to implement their policies. Fourth, within the American system of higher education that the Occupation Forces were intent on transplanting into Japan, the role of government was at a minimum. Thus, it was rather paradoxical for the Americans to force the introduction of such a system upon Japan. Ultimately, aspects characterizing the pre-war model of higher education never disappeared entirely. On the contrary, their influence actually became stronger in the post-war era. The post-war higher education system that resulted was considerably different from what the Occupation Forces had originally intended. The system was unsatisfactory for the Occupation Forces, who failed in attaining their desired outcomes, as well as for the Japanese, who had this new system thrust upon them. The aftereffects have been serious. As Osaki (1999) pointed out, one of the aftereffects was the weakening of the functions of teaching and learning in Japanese higher education. General education was introduced without a full understanding of what it encompassed. Its transplantation resulted in a decline of the quality of professional education. Moreover,
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the strong research-orientation among Japanese academics accelerated the weakening of the function of teaching. The second aftereffect concerned the issue of quality assurance. Despite efforts to import the American system of accreditation, this endeavor was unsuccessful for several reasons. The existing hierarchy among higher education institutions, which had formed in the pre-war period, was still persistent, and the institutions were most likely rated not by the quality of education they provided, but by the selectivity of their entrance examinations. The third problem was related to the uniformity of the system. Universities demanded that they be treated equally in an official capacity and they were all subsequently granted the status of “university.” However, in reality, functional differences existed between the universities. Hence, even though the egalitarian post-war system represented a progressive and drastic solution to the problems that existed during the pre-war period, the Japanese higher education system did not truly improve. In addition to the above three areas of concern, a new graduate school system was imported without the appropriate support and conditions necessary for its implementation. Moreover, the national universities were also lacking systematic management procedures. Until recently, the most important aim of post-war higher education reform has been to correct many of the consequences of inadequate reforms that were initiated during the occupation (Osaki 1999).
Revisions to the occupation reforms The Allied Forces left Japan in 1952. After the restoration of Japan’s independence, it became feasible to attempt a reexamination of higher education reform. The most vocal reformists were leaders of big business and conservative politicians. Their typical point of view was expressed in a 1954 report by the Japan Federation of Employers’ Association (Nikkeiren). Among its proposals were the following: a. the expansion of engineering in higher education; b. diversification of higher education institutions, especially the establishment of short-term vocational institutions; and c. more emphasis on professional education rather than general education. These proposals reflected criticism and doubt regarding the post-war higher education system, in which most institutions became 4-year universities and great emphasis was placed on general education. A similar feeling of dissatisfaction with the new universities was shared by leading academics and intellectuals who graduated from the pre-war imperial universities (Watanabe 2000). Bureaucrats in the Ministry of Education were also deeply
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discontented with the new system since many reforms enacted during the occupation period were carried out without consultation with the Japanese government. They were eager to reestablish their control over institutions of higher education. As a result of these assertions of dissatisfaction with the system, higher education was once again subject to revision. First, policies toward establishment of new institutions were altered. The Ministry of Education enacted the University Establishment Standard (Daigaku secchi kijun) in 1956. Until then, the Japanese University Accreditation Association had been entitled to set the standards for establishing universities. Second, the proportion of general education credits in the university curriculum was decreased. Specifically, some professional education credits could now be substituted for the required general education credits. Third, the system of “dissertation doctor” (Ronbun hakase) returned. This kind of doctoral degree, which was common in the pre-war period, demanded no schooling and granted degrees only on the basis of submission and examination of theses. The Occupation Forces strongly opposed the former system, since it conflicted with the establishment of the graduate school system they wanted to introduce into Japan. In spite of this, the “dissertation doctor” was revived after the end of the Occupation. The last major reform was the implementation of a more clear and systematic method of classifying institutions of higher education. The Ministry of Education proposed a new system of short-term vocational institutions, which was essentially a return to the pre-war system of specialized schools. Owing to criticism from egalitarian groups, the proposal was delayed for a while, but later was amended and enacted in 1961. As mentioned earlier, the system of junior colleges, which had served as a temporary relief measure, acquired formal status in 1964. In the case of four-year universities, however, institutional reclassification was not successful. Newly established universities that were formerly specialized schools during the pre-war period firmly resisted being evaluated and labeled as second-class universities. At a less noticeable level, other significant means of differentiating between four-year universities developed. One of them was the establishment in 1956 of the distinction between the chair system (kozasei) and the subject system (gakkamokusei) among national universities. Only universities that possessed pre-war university status were approved to have the chair system, in which personnel and money were distributed preferentially. The Ministry of Education clearly intended to distinguish old universities from new universities (Kuroha 1993). In contrast, such discrepancies were not institutionalized in the private university sector. The pre-war universities were likely to have more resources at their disposal and therefore were in
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an advantageous position. The stratified pre-war system of higher education essentially continued well into the post-war period. Thus, although the post-war system looked egalitarian, redistribution of resources occurred only within a limited sphere (Amano 1986). The changes that occurred after the end of the occupation have often been referred to as a “reverse course” (gyaku cosu), or reactionary measure that was intended to revive the pre-war system. But this was not entirely the case. Although the gyaku cosu reforms surely modified the reforms initiated during the period of occupation, there was also substantial continuity with those reforms as a whole (Hata 1999). The basic structure of higher education, which took shape during the occupation, was unaltered and has continued ever since. With the explosive expansion of higher education and campus strife during the 1960s, however, a new direction of structural reform gradually became apparent.
Educational expansion and the student riots of the 1960s In 1963, the Central Council for Education (Chuo kyoiku shingikai), an advisory board for the Ministry of Education, submitted a report that has become commonly known as the “38 Report.” (The number indicates the year of publishing in the Japanese Showa era.) The report contained a summary of higher education reform from the late 1950s to the beginning of the 1960s, and it reflected a sense of return to the pre-war system. On the other hand, it also mirrored the emerging changes in higher education; namely, higher education’s rapid growth and the transformation of its social function. As the report stated, the university had been transformed from an “ivory tower” to a “social institution.” The report recommended the reclassification of higher education institutions in response to the various needs of the expanding number of students and of society in general. It also made distinctions between research universities and those devoted to undergraduate education, between four-year universities and short-term vocational institutions, and between researchoriented graduate schools and professional schools. In addition, the “38 Report” made the following major recommendations: a. strengthen the executive administrative function of higher education institutions by adding the position of vice-president; b. encourage participation from outsiders in management decisions; c. establish fixed terms of office for academics; d. introduce standardized entrance examinations; e. institutionalize the Division of General Education (kyoyobu) responsible for general education;
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f. formulate long-range plans on the national level for higher education; and g. provide national subsidies to private institutions. The “38 Report” anticipated many of the government’s higher education reform measures undertaken in the 1970s. With the goal of managing the massification of higher education in mind, the report intended to transform the post-war university system, which was criticized as being deficient and vague in its mission, into a more Americanized system. But such reforms were thought too progressive for Japanese society in the 1960s. Only a few peripheral proposals from the report, such as the introduction of a nationwide scholastic aptitude test and institutionalization of the Division of General Education, were implemented. Since some of the reforms required the reclassification of institutions or reinforced administration’s authority, they were seen as detrimental to the vested interests of academics and were strongly resisted. The report lacked discretion in dealing with academics who could still exercise much authority in the early 1960s (Watanabe 2000). The transformation of higher education in the 1960s came about not as a result of Council reports but from other sources. One of them was the explosive expansion of higher education accompanied by a “high growth” (kodo seicho) economy. The government in the early 1960s carried out policies which expanded science and engineering departments in national universities, and took anticipatory measures to accommodate the baby-boom generation’s rapidly increasing higher education enrollment in the late 1960s (Itoh 1996). The growth of the education system, however, was even greater than the government had anticipated due in large part to policies of private universities who were at the forefront of the expansion effort. This great expansion had the affect of bringing to light many policy issues such as finance and quality assurance. What shook higher education even more directly and intensely, however, was the campus strife of the late 1960s, which was also deeply rooted in the massification of higher education. Student rioting not only caused considerable turmoil on campuses throughout the country, but was also an opportunity to increase public awareness regarding the necessity of higher education reform. Student-led campus strife brought about unprecedented disappointment and broad dissatisfaction with the system of higher education. Because of this, government, universities, political parties, professional associations, business circles, and student groups developed numerous programs for reform. From 1967 to 1971, 521 proposals from 125 groups were submitted (Kitamura 1972), the contents of which covered a variety of higher education issues. When the campus strife ended, however, enthusiasm for reform quickly subsided and most reform proposals were dissolved. The only exceptions
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were reforms dealing with the improvement of teaching methods, such as reduction of class size, or with campus democratization efforts, such as participation of junior faculty and students in decision-making (Osaki 1999). Yet, the long-term effects of the strife have been tremendous. One major impact has been the gradual reduction of authority held by both universities and academics. Higher education reform in the 1990s has in particular begun to exhibit clear signs of this phenomenon.
The “46 Report” and reforms in the 1970s The Central Council for Education published a report in 1971 entitled “Basic Policies on Future Comprehensive Expansion and Maintenance of School Education,” commonly called the “46 Report” (the number indicating the year of publication in the Japanese Showa era). This report encompassed a wide range of educational levels from kindergarten to graduate school. Since discussion of the report was held during the period of student unrest, the main emphasis was on higher education. The report’s recommendations were varied, but most of them built upon proposals from the Council’s prior “38 Report.” The central aim of the report was for the diversification of higher educational institutions, responding to demands for both expansion in quantity and improvement in quality. The history of rapid enrollment and campus strife in the 1960s formed the background for the report. The student riots exposed the ineffectual management existing at many universities, and it was therefore strongly recommended that leadership be strengthened and that outsiders be allowed to participate in institutional decision-making. Also, since massification of higher education made the relationship between teaching and research more problematic than before, a separation between units for teaching and research was proposed. Explosive and unruly expansion brought about financial difficulties in private institutions and deterioration in the quality of higher education, so in response, national subsidies for private institutions and more long-term planning on the national level were suggested. Due to the changes in the relationship between the government and universities brought about by the expansion of higher education, there was a reexamination of the legal status of national and municipal institutions and even a recommendation for the incorporation of those universities as legally independent from the government. Lastly, proposals were made for the revision of university curriculum standards, which had formerly consisted of a general education curriculum that was mandated for every university.
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The response to this ambitious reform program was generally negative. Many stakeholders, including academics, criticized the proposals as being right-wing reactionary policies of conservative political forces. Some of these reforms could certainly have undermined the traditional autonomy and vested interests of academia, and given the socio-political climate of the time, the policies of the Ministry of Education in general were likely to be viewed as conservative and reactionary. Even a few Ministry of Education insiders disapproved of the report, criticizing it as being too radical and unrealistic. In short, the report was considered too ambitious for the Ministry of Education’s moderate policies of the 1970s. Ultimately, the magnitude of the report was an obstacle to its acceptance, and only a few of the proposals were implemented in the 1970s and the 1980s. Among the major reforms from the “46 Report” that were implemented were the long-term national planning of higher education and the national financial support to private institutions. However, these had been proposed earlier in the Ministry of Eeducation’s advisory board reports from the 1960s, and would have been implemented even in the absence of the “46 Report.” These related reforms dealt with the unrestrained proliferation of private universities in the 1960s, and other related problems such as financial or regional inequality opportunities in higher education. From the mid-1970s, national planning virtually prohibited the expansion of private universities for a ten-year period. National subsidies for private institutions were considered as compensation for the tight control exerted over them. Some policies contributing to the flexibility and diversity of higher education were not directly based on the report but overlapped with its objectives. For instance, the curriculum standards were liberalized somewhat, and the establishment of new types of academic units other than faculty (gakubu) were allowed. In addition, the government founded several “new-concept universities,” which were expected to be models of university reform. A typical example was Tsukuba University, which is a national institution founded in 1973, where innovative academic units and organizations were introduced, research and educational functions were separated, the line between general and professional education curriculum became flexible, and the structure of decision-making was highly centralized within the university. This university could be regarded as one notable example of the experimental universities that emerged in the 1960s and 1970s. Tsukuba University, however, was not popular with most academics nor with the public, since it was established on the strong initiative of the government and did not have the traditional departmental autonomy, which was common in Japanese universities. Consequently, the influence of this model on other institutions was very limited. However, a quarter of a century after its establishment, many other
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universities are now beginning to reexamine the Tsukuba system. As a model institution, its emergence could have been premature (Itoh 1995). Among the many significant reforms in the 1970s was the establishment of the special training colleges (senmon gakko) and the Graduate School Establishment Standards (daigakuin secchi kijun). By introducing the senmon gakko system in 1975, Japanese higher education gained a new category of short-term higher educational institutions. Senmon gakko, in which the duration of courses had to be more than one year and certain conditions regarding the number of class hours and enrollment had to be satisfied, included diverse schools that provided a broad range of vocational education, thus expanding the lower level of Japanese higher education. The enactment of the Graduate School Establishment Standards in 1974 revised an irregular procedure that had allowed a non-government association, the Japanese University Accreditation Association, to establish standards for graduate schools since the time of the Occupation. Moreover, the purpose of masters’ courses was redefined to include advanced vocational education in addition to training for the academic professions. The purpose of doctoral degrees was also redefined as a basic qualification for academic life, as opposed to being an honor bestowed on a great person of learning. Both the senmon gakko and the graduate school standards had been long-debated issues whose resolution was postponed due to factors such as the campus strife in the 1960s. However, there were several positive consequences derived from the implementation of these reforms in the 1970s. The senmon gakko, which emerged as the result of national planning measures that restricted expansion of universities, were able to respond to the high demand for alternative higher education in the mid-1970s. Likewise, the Graduate School Establishment Standards were enacted because the graduate school system introduced after World War II had, until the 1970s, taken root in only a few disciplines such as engineering. In sum, the main focus of reforms in the 1970s were on diversification and on enhancing the flexibility of higher education. These reforms sought to reexamine the post-war system of higher education and, whether or not reformers were conscious of it at the time, to transform it into a more Americanized system. While the “46 Report” intended to make sweeping reforms, the actual changes were moderate. This became more apparent in the 1980s and 1990s. Most of the proposals in the “46 Report” have been followed-up with reports by the National Education Council (Rinji kyoiku shingikai, or Rinkyoshin) and the University Council (Daigaku shingikai).
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The role of administrative reform in higher education A different line of reform based on the logic of “administrative reform” (Gyosei kaikaku) emerged in the 1980s. The Provisional Commission for Administrative Reform (Rinji gyosei chosakai or Rincho), established in 1981, was a major actor. The commission attempted to reduce the huge government deficits that had accumulated since the oil crisis and was well known for its role in the privatization of the National Railway Company (Kokutetsu) and the Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Public Corporation (Dendenkosha). Similarly, the commission was eager to make drastic cuts in higher education budgets. The commission’s higher education proposals were twofold: restraining budgets and shifting the financial burden to the beneficiaries of higher education, the students. To keep the budget under control, the commission advocated curtailing expansion, restructuring institutions, and restraining national subsidies to private institutions. The emphasis on the beneficiary principle was carried out through an increase in tuition at national institutions, the introduction of scholarship loans carrying interest, and the elimination of exemptions from loan repayment. Most of these proposals were quickly implemented. Expansion of national universities was effectively halted, and tuition at national universities increased considerably. National subsidies to private institutions, which had been increasing during the 1970s, flattened out in the early 1980s. The Japan Scholarship Society (Nihon ikuei kai), the largest provider of public scholarships, began to provide interest-accruing scholarship loans. Thus, Japanese higher education, for which “growth” had been a key word throughout its history since the Meiji period, had shifted to an era characterized by stagnation and cutbacks. In other words, higher education was no longer a developing industry. Perhaps relatively few academics fully understood the meaning of the changes taking place in the 1980s, and many may have regarded the reforms as temporary. In fact, owing to the bubble economy in the late 1980s, most administrative reform was suspended. The consequences of these changes, however, became widely apparent in the 1990s. The National Education Council was founded in 1984, three years after the establishment of the Rincho. The Council was directly responsible to the Cabinet and was strongly backed by Prime Minister Nakasone. When the Rincho was founded, Nakasone was head of the Administrative Management Agency (Gyosei kanri cho) and a leader in the establishment of the Rincho. Since he was well known as a staunch nationalist, people were afraid that the Council would initiate a full-scale restructuring and nationalization of the education system. Critics often referred to it as the “Rincho of Education” (Kyoiku Rincho).
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Such criticism, however, was not very relevant to higher education. The Council’s proposals were completely different from those of the Rincho, in that they did not advocate plans for restructuring universities or increasing the beneficiaries’ financial burden, but instead reflected the interests of academia. These measures were taken to facilitate the internal improvement of higher educational institutions. In fact, one leading scholar wrote drafts of the proposals, in contrast to the previous government advisory reports which were typically prepared by bureaucrats.1 The emphasis of the National Education Council’s reports was on “enhancement, diversification, and individualization” of higher education institutions. Many of the Council’s proposals had much in common with those of the Central Council for Education reports in the 1960s and 1970s, since they all faced the problem of how to manage the massification of higher education. But there were differences in terms of nuance. The economicnationalistic and industrialist agenda for higher education, which was characteristic of the era of high economic growth and the desire to keep order on campuses, had both disappeared from the National Education Council’s reports. Moreover, the Council advocated for diversification by encouraging institutional initiatives and autonomy, in contrast to the forced and planned diversification that had been proposed until the 1980s. The Council was emulating reforms taking place in other higher educational systems worldwide, and to use a phrase by Burton Clark, sought “diversity by creating conditions of autonomous action – planning for unplanned change, as it were – and giving legitimating help, by means of pronouncements and rewards, to those who accept and create limited niches” (Clark 1983, p. 272). Thus, what was new about the National Education Council reports was the emphasis on deregulation for the creation of “conditions of autonomous action” referred to in the reports as “simplification” and “liberalization.” Although deregulation focused on the reform of university curriculum, which involved a sweeping liberalization of the University Establishment Standards, the reports also proposed greater flexibility in the higher education system as a whole. Examples of this can be seen in the establishment of the National Institute for Academic Degrees (Gakui jyuyo kiko), which was allowed to grant degrees to qualified graduates of non-university institutions, the introduction of a “credit accumulation system,” in which university degrees were to be conferred on the basis of total credits earned at one or more institutions of higher education, and greater opportunity for students to transfer between universities and other higher education institutions. The second newly emphasized area in the reports was the expansion and strengthening of graduate school education. Not only was increased enrollment encouraged, but there was also the recommendation for the estab-
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lishment of various professional masters-level courses beyond what had been considered traditional education for an academic profession. The third new emphasis was on the introduction of “self-assessment and evaluation” to encourage each institution’s self-improvement, and to facilitate transparency and public access to university information. The reports strongly emphasized that institutions were to implement such evaluations and disclose institutional performance on their own initiative. As these proposals suggest, higher education reform had entered a new phase. Deregulation of the higher education system, which was a component of the overall changes occurring in public policy, also reflected the circumstances by which the government could no longer manage a large, diversified system of higher education. The expansion of graduate education was supported by the rapid growth of undergraduate education, and the transformation from elite to mass education. Evaluation of higher education was now seen as indispensable for promoting deregulation and maintaining institutional quality. That only a few stakeholders objected to self-assessment and evaluation clearly reflected that higher education was no longer a sanctuary for academics. Few of the various National Education Council proposals were implemented in the 1980s. This did not mean, however, that the proposals were seen as unrealistic and were ignored as those of the “46 Report.” On the contrary, nearly all of the Council’s suggestions were carried out through the University Council (Daigaku shingikai), which itself was founded in 1987 through the impetus of a recommendation by the National Education Council (Itoh 2000).
Conclusion This article is not intended to be a detailed explanation of higher education reforms in the 1990s. However, based upon the explanations above, two major points need to be stressed. First, two general trends can be observed from recent reforms. The first is that of “enhancement, diversification, and individualization,” which emerged in the reports of the Central Council for Education in the 1960s and 1970s. These themes were slightly modified and became more visible in the reports of the National Education Council in the 1980s and were revisited and later materialized in the reports of the University Council in the 1990s. The goals of “enhancement, diversification, and individualization” of higher education institutions were promoted by means of deregulation and encouragement of institutions’ initiatives and choices. In short, this line of reform essentially placed strong emphasis on academia’s self-improvement.
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A second line of reform of an entirely different nature has had remarkable visibility in the 1990s. Administrative reform, led by powerful politics, has pursued financial efficiency above all. Such reform emerged in the reports of the Rincho in the 1980s and has jolted the higher education system, particularly national universities, in the 1990s’ climate of economic recession, government financial crisis, and the sharp decrease of the student population. Keywords characteristic of these reforms are “efficiency,” “accountability,” “restructuring,” and “reduction.” While deregulation and self-improvement reforms were more pronounced in the beginning of the 1990s, attention to administrative reforms gained predominance in the latter half of the decade. Both reform areas are considered inseparable and interconnected in present-day higher education reform, although greater stress is placed on administrative reform. Clear examples of this tendency are the push to transform national higher education institutions into public corporations (hojinka), and the introduction of university evaluation by a third party organization (daisansha hyoka). Hojinka has been proposed since the beginning of the 1970s as a means of achieving more autonomous management of the national institutions. It has reappeared as a measure that would reduce the number of national government employees in the 1990s, and is on the verge of implementation under robust political pressure. Although hojinka was originally characteristic of the trend for deregulation, it is now powerfully backed by those advocating administrative reform. The introduction of daisansha hyoka, which has been underway since 2000, involves movement to an evaluation system that is initiated by the government and links evaluation to funding. It clearly reflects the recent emphasis on efficiency and accountability. A second major characteristic of reforms in the 1990s is that they bring to a conclusion the unsatisfactory and inadequate reform attempts of fifty years ago, which represented a move toward Americanization. It is not an exaggeration to state that most higher education reforms over the past halfcentury were devoted to treating the aftereffects caused by the inconsistent reforms of the occupation period. Although some post-war reforms reflected a return to the pre-war stratified system, there was much impetus for a more thorough process of Americanization, as was found in the proposals of the Central Council for Education in the 1970s. But such proposals were not easily implemented and were largely postponed until the 1990s. Deep-rooted problems, such as the improvement of general education, graduate education, and quality assurance systems, are dealt with systematically in the University Council reports. The promotion of Americanization in higher education is interrelated with the above-mentioned trend of deregulation and admin-
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istration reforms, since the American system is highly regarded as having flexibility, efficiency, and accountability mechanisms firmly in place. The rapid progress of reforms in the 1990s can be explained by several macro-level factors such as the expansion of globalization, financial crises resulting from a burst bubble economy, and the vigorous promotion of neoliberalistic administrative reform in the late 1990s. Of more urgency, however, is that the public trust in the Japanese socio-economic system as a whole has declined to an all-time low. As such, higher education, long considered a vital component of the Japanese system, has come under fire for its inefficiency and lack of competitiveness. What has consequently been advocated as the “cure” for the Japanese system is essentially Americanization (Otake 1997). To add to the sense of impending crisis among academics is the sharp decrease in the population of the younger generation, which gives the impression of higher education as a declining industry. Owing to the expansion of higher education and that academe’s authority and prestige have been undermined since the 1960s, higher education can no longer be considered a sanctuary for insiders. Lastly, since most of the pre-war generations of academics have been replaced with the post-war generation, traditional views on academe have become almost obsolete among academics (Osaki, Terasaki and Amano 2000). The majority of present-day scholars who entered academia during or after the campus strife of the 1960s did not experience the so-called “good old days” of higher education in Japan. Ultimately, academics in Japan are being forced to submit to the ongoing rapid and far-reaching reforms that negatively impact their vested interests. Some fear the loss of their academic autonomy as well as their own selfesteem. Others criticize what may be seen as the uncritical and unprincipled acceptance of the American model. Japanese higher education stands at a crucial turning point for establishing a new mission for the 21st century.
Note 1. Interview with Iijima Soichi (a former president of Nagoya University and the head of the higher education division of the National Education Council), 9 October 1993.
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