European Journal oŸ Psychology of Education 1986, Vol. I, n. '~ 1, 77-89 1986, I.S.P.A.
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Interaction and Instruction in the Conservation Experiment Ed Elbers University o] Utrecht
Though there has been considerable research in recent years into the ways in avhich children's performance in conservation experiments is affected by the context of interaction, this research has so lar lacked a coherent theoretical basis. In this article, concepts [rom communication theory are appIied to the behaviour of experimenter and subject in the experimental situation. It is argued that the child behaves according to the ,metacontract,~ of a teacher-pupil interaction, i.e. he or she expects to receive instruction. In the classical conservation experiment oŸ Piaget, these expectations are t¡ because the e~:perimenter does not conŸ to the rules o1 a teacher-pupil relationship. Instead, the experimenter … the rules oŸ a different metacontract--that of examination. In experiments wlzere conservation abilities are taug¡ and in group interactions where conserving children cooperate with non-conserving children, the participants do behave according to the same metacontract. But the value oŸ these studies is reduced by the exclusive attention paid to the eventual achievements oŸ the chil• instead oŸ the cognitive processes during the learning phase. I n recent y e a r s m a n y investigators of cognitive d e v e l o p m e n t have a r g u e d t h a t the intellectual achievements of young c h i l d r e n can only b e u n d e r s t o o d b y considering the context of i n t e r a c t i o n in which p r o b l e m s are p r e s e n t e d to them. E x p e r i m e n t s have been designed, m o s t of t h e m using Piaget's conservation task, to s t u d y the effects of different interactional variables on children's p e r f o r m a n c e s , b u t u p to the p r e s e n t time n o b o d y has succeeded in s u b s u m i n g these isolated factors u n d e r one coherent theoretical perspective. In this paper, I shall p u t f o r w a r d such a theoretical f o u n d a t i o n for the s t u d y of the context of i n t e r a c t i o n a n d its influence on cognitive performances. As this field of s t u d y lacks in part i c u l a r a conception of the conventions and rules which underlie social interactions, and, consequently, of the expectations of the interlocutors, I shall b o r r o w ideas f r o m c o m m u n i c a t i o n theory to analyse the e x p e r i m e n t a l setting in which a child is p r e s e n t e d w i t h a problem. First, I shall d e m o n s t r a t e the shortcomings of
P a r t of t]ais p a p e r w a s p r e s e n t e d to the Conference of the British Psychological Society, Deve/ o p m e n t a l SectŸ L a n c a s t e r , S e p t e m b e r 1984. The a u t h o r wishes to t h a n k David Ingleby, w h o c o r r e c t e d the English text.
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studies of social context and conservation in a critique of the most p r o m i n e n t study among them, the experiment of McGarrigle & Donaldson (1974). Then I shall introduce some ideas from c o m m u n i c a t i o n theory and defend these by showing that they can be fruitfully applied to existing interactional research of the conservation task, and that they have heuristic value in yielding novel ideas for future research. Donaldson advances both cognitive and social factors to explain the answers of children in the conservation task (1978, 1982; McGarrigle & Donaldson, 1974). According to h e r account young children, in c o n t r a s t to older children and adults, are not yet able to u n d e r s t a n d verbal utterances detached from a context of action: , i t now looks as though he ( = the child) first makes sense of situations (...) and then uses this kind of u n d e r s t a n d i n g to help h i m to m a k e sense of w h a t is said to him,, (1978, p. 59). In the conservation e x p e r i m e n t m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g s arise because the child witnesses an action p e r f o r m e d by the e x p e r i m e n t e r (the undoing of the perceptual similarity of two stimuli) which is completely irrelevant to the question put f o r w a r d thereafter. To answer the question correctly, the child m u s t u n d e r s t a n d it independently of what the e x p e r Ÿ does, But ber their attention is directed to the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n , some children i n t e r p r e t the experim e n t e r ' s question wrongly. For instance, in a conservation of n u m b e r task, the question a b o u t the n u m b e r of counters in the two rows is u n d e r s t o o d as a question as to which row is the longer one. To test this theory, McGarrigle and Donaldson designed an e x p e r i m e n t in which the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a p p e a r s to be p e r f o r m e d accidentally and against the e x p e r i m e n t e r ' s will. Ir the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n is not executed by the e x p e r i m e n t e r , they argued, a conflict b e t w e e n the actions of the e x p e r i m e n t e r and the conservation question is avoided. Therefore the child, in listening to the e x p e r i m e n t e r ' s words, will not attach m u c h i m p o r t a n c e to the changed p e r c e p t u a l configuration. Their 80 subjects (4;2 to 6;3 years old, m e a n age: 5;4) h a d to solve a n u m b e r of conservation p r o b l e m s (conservation of n u m b e r and length). In half of the tasks the classical p r o c e d u r e of Piaget was given, in the other half the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n was carried out by a teddy-bear (manipulated by the experimenter) escaping suddenly from a box and changing one of the stimuli. Using a strict criterion, the investigators found that only 13 of the 80 children were successful in the classical procedure, w h e r e a s 50 of the same children were diagnosed conservers in the accidental t r a n s f o r m a t i o n condition. This e x p e r i m e n t has been replicated several times, in various forms, mostly with success (Light, B u c k i n g h a m & Robbins, 1979; Dockrell, Campbell & Neilson, 1980; Hargreaves, Molloy & Pratt, 1982). McGarrigle and Donaldson conclude that Piaget's classical p r o c e d u r e leads to an u n d e r e s t i m a t i o n of the reasoning abilities of the child. They p r e s u p p o s e that in the n o r m a l interaction of adult and child, verbal u t t e r a n c e s are c o n s o n a n t with the context of action. Therefore, Piaget's p r o c e d u r e is artificial a n d ecologically invalid. The transition f r o m pre-operational to concrete operational thinking may, they think, be r a t h e r the expression of a growing ability to differentiate b e t w e e n language and situation, than of a revolution in the intellectual capabilities of children. Donaldson has, indeed, introduced social-psychological elements in her explanation of the conservation task, but her analysis is nevertheless unsatisfactory, because her u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the experiment as a scene of interaction b e t w e e n e x p e r i m e n t e r and subject is insufficient. She analyses inadequately the p a r t played by the experimenter, and the expectations of the child vis-h-vis the interaction. She emphasizes that children infer the intentions of the e x p e r i m e n t e r from his or her actions, and that children's perception of these intentions has a bearing on their expectation of the experimenter's questions. But she does not reckon with
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the possibility that a child may have expectations a b o u t the behaviour of the expe¡ a p r i o r i , before the beginning of the interaction. Therefore, she employs no concepts which can be used to study the relationship between chitd a n d experimente:r as ah interactional setting. For an u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the developmental experiment, however, we m u s t consider it in terms of the interaction of experim e n t e r and child, and of the expectations with which the child approaches the experimental task.
Interaction and Metacontract The Norwegian c o m m u n i c a t i o n theorist Rommetveit (1978, 1979) proposes that we investigate which presuppositions the participants in a conversation use and how such presuppositions influence their interaction. Rommetveit conceives of c o m m u n i c a f i o n as the a t t e m p t by the interlocutors to t r a n s c e n d their private worlds a n d to create temporarily a shared, social world. The i n t e r a c t i o n is regulated by rules a n d tacit agreements, the rnost f u n d a m e n t a l of which is the rule of complementarity: the speaker attunes his or her utterances to the listener, who, in turn, exerts himself or herself to u n d e r s t a n d what the speaker means. The accomplishment of c o m p l e m e n t a r i t y is dependent on the consonance of the expectations and intentions the interlocutors start out with. The interaction occurs within c o m m u n i c a t i o n a l frames, which are often tied to i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d traditions, and which channel and guide the behaviour of the interlocutors. The set of general expectations and presuppositions originating with such frames, which pertain to the motives, knowledge and appropriate behaviours of the participants, is denoted by Rommetveit by the term m e t a c o n t r a c t . The expectations, rules a n d presuppositions, in other words the metacontract, governing for example the communication between teacher and student, are different from those which govern their casual meeting as equal partners. The m e t a c o n t r a c t creates a space in which the participants negotiate about the subject of the conversation, the way of dealing with it, the relevant background knowledge and the precise m e a n i n g of terms. The results of these negotiations, which can be called 'contracts', are continuously incorporated in already made agreements, and in this way a store of shared knowledge is built up, which functions as a base for action and verbal expression and a s a condition for understanding what is said and done next. These ideas can be applied to the interaction between experimenter and child in the experimental situation. Rommetveit (1978) suggested that the interaction in an experiment is regulated by the m e t a c o n t r a c t of the teacher-pupil relationship. The e x p e r i m e n t e r supervises the interaction; he or she formulates the problem and says which actions m u s t be performed. The questions the e x p e r i m e n t e r asks are u n d e r s t o o d by the child as questions the adult does not ask out of curiosity. The subject, therefore, will u n d e r s t a n d the situation as a context of instruction. (A similar idea is proposed by Hayes, 1972.) It does not seem feasible to simply ask children what they expect to happen in the experimental situation. The results of investigations in which children had to reflect on the situation a n d on their actions are not encouraging enough to make this research approach a rational strategy. For instance, some investigators found that children are not capable of giving valid i n f o r m a t i o n afterwards about the strategy they had been using in solving a problem (Neilson, Dockrell & McKechnie, 1983; Siegel & Hodkin, 1982). Therefore, I shall try to assess the idea that the child perceives the experimental setting a s a context of i n s t r u c t i o n along other fines, by showing that it allows ah integration of various i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s
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of the c o n s e r v a t i o n experiments, and by d e m o n s t r a t i n g how s u r p r i s i n g l y well the results of m a n y conservation experiments fit into the f r a m e w o r k p r o v i d e d b y this idea. But first, R o m m e t v e i t ' s suggestion m u s t be a m e n d e d in two respects. Firstly, c h a r a c t e r i s i n g the e x p e r i m e n t a l situation b y the m e t a c o n t r a c t of the teacher-pupil r e l a t i o n s h i p is not specific enough. V a ¡ forros of t e a c h e r a n d p u p i l roles exist b e t w e e n infant school a n d university. R o m m e t v e i t ' s idea, therefore, m u s t be adapt e d to the i n t e r a c t i o n b e t w e e n a d u l t and child in an i n s t r u c t i o n a l context, as c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the age g r o u p p a r t i c i p a t i n g in the c o n s e r v a t i o n e x p e r i m e n t s . This specification, which witl b e c a r ¡ o u t in the r e s t of this section, will necessitate a second a m e n d m e n t : In the e x p e r i m e n t a l setting t h e child c o n f o r t a s to the m e t a c o n t r a c t of the teacher-pupil relationship, b u t the e x p e r i m e n t e r does not. I n o r d e r to a p p l y R o m m e t v e i t ' s idea to the age group of c h i l d r e n b e t w e e n 4 to 7 o r 8 years, I shall now s u m m a r i s e s o m e conclusions of t h e r e s e a r c h on t h e i n t e r a c t i o n b e t w e e n a d u l t a n d yotmg child in i n s t r u c t i o n a l settings. W h e n ,,ve k n o w the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of adult-child i n t e r a c t i o n in such situations, we m a y be able to d r a w conclusions a b o u t the expectations w i t h which c h i l d r e n begin interactions in a c o n t e x t of instruction. In p a r t i c u l a r , I shall b u i l d on two sources: (1) Studies b y W e r t s c h (1979; in press; Wertsch, ,McNamee, McLane & Budwig, 1980) a n d b y Wood, B r u n e r a n d Ross (1976), in w h i c h i n t e r a c t i o n s b e t w e e n a d u l t s a n d c h i l d r e n in a problem-solving t a s k a r e observed. Although the t a s k s in b o t h cases a r e p e r f o r m e d in t h e l a b o r a t o r y , t h e y a t e carefully designed to s i m u l a t e a n a t u r a l context of interaction. (2) A group of studies o r i g i n a t i n g w i t h the p r o j e c t , L a n g u a g e at H o m e a n d at School,, of the University of Bristol, E n g l a n d (.MaeLure & French, 1981; Wells, 1981, 1983). I n this p r o j e c t s p o n t a n e o u s v e r b a l i n t e r a c t i o n s b e t w e e n a d u l t s a n d c h i l d r e n in n a t u r a l contexts are recorded. I n b o t h the W e r t s c h and the Wood et al. s t u d y a child h a s to p e r f o r m a puzzle task, a s s i s t e d b y the adult. I n the W e r t s c h s t u d y a jig-saw puzzle h a s to be m a d e in a c c o r d a n c e w i t h a given m o d e l (a truck). I n the W o o d t a s k 21 blocks m u s t be f i t t e d t o g e t h e r to forro a p y r a m i d . B o t h groups of i n v e s t i g a t o r s u s e d c h i l d r e n f r o m a b o u t t h r e e to five y e a r s old. W e r t s c h c a r r i e d out his investigation in o r d e r to s t u d y the process of internalisation. H e i n s t r u c t e d the m o t h e r to induce h e r child to m a k e the puzzle, a n d to help hito o r h e r w h e n she t h o u g h t this necessary. I n the W o o d design the e x p e ¡ herself a s s i s t e d the child in perf o r m i n g the task. I n doing so she followed a s i m p l e scheme: w h e n the child was n o t a b l e to get on, she first gave a v e r b a l hint, and only if the child could not use this d i d she intervene m o r e directly. The W o o d et al. e x p e r i m e n t , because ir does not observe s p o n t a n e o u s interaction, is c e r t a i n l y h a r d e r to i n t e r p r e t t h a n the o t h e r study. Nonetheless, t h e i r article is v e r y useful, b e c a u s e ir t r i e s to a n a l y s e the a d u l t ' s h e l p carefully. T h e y s p e a k of a ~,scaffolding process,,, which consists in the a d u l t s t r u c t u r i n g the t a s k in such a w a y t h a t the child can m a k e m a x i m a l use of his o r h e r capacities. Wood et al. d i s c e r n a n u m b e r of , s c a f f o l d i n g functions,,, the m o s t i m p o r t a n t of which can b e s u m m a r i s e d as follows: - - T h e i n t e r a c t i o n in the p e r f o r m a n c e of the t a s k is led b y the adult. He o r she induces t h e child to begin the t a s k a n d t o o b s e r v e its rules, a n d sees to it t h a t the child does not lose sight of the end-goal of the task. The a d u l t subdivides the p r o b l e m into p a r t s a n d specifies subgoals. I n doing so the a d u l t p a y s r e g a r d to the child's capacities, b y assigning t a s k s to the child w h i c h he o r she c a n p e r f o r m independently. Other t a s k s which a r e b e y o n d the child's capacities a r e dealt w i t h b y the adult.
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- - T h e child's a t t e n t i o n is directed by the adult to relevant aspects of the problem. The a d u l t points out m i s t a k e s and explains how they can be prevented. When difficulties arise, the adult uses the o p p o r t u n i t y to show the p a t h to the solution. In c o n t r a s t to the Wood study, Wertsch gives excerpts from the communication between the a d u l t a n d the child, l Ÿ is p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t e r e s t e d in the estab l i s h m e n t of the problem-solving strategy and the c o n t r i b u t i o n s of m o t h e r and child to reaching it. Therefore, Wertsch concentrates on verbal c o m m u n i c a t i o n during the m a k i n g of the puzzle. H e analyses precisely h o w the m o t h e r induces her child to a d o p t a given strategy, a n d how she a d a p t s h e r u t t e r a n c e s to the actions of the child, b u t he does not mention when she places pieces of the puzzle herself. I t is clear, however, f r o m the m a t e r i a l Wertsch presents, that the m o t h e r s t r u c t u r e s the task, specifies subtasks, p o i n t s out e r r o r s a n d explains them, just as Wood et al. describe. The observations of Wertsch, moreover, yield two new, i m p o r t a n t results. First, he noticed t h a t the m o t h e r a d a p t s and in p a r t i c u l a r simplifies h e r instructions during the interaction, until the child u n d e r s t a n d s tbem. I n a typical i n t e r a c t i o n with h e r child of three years old, a m o t h e r t r i e d to direct the child's attention by talking a b o u t the ewheels,~ of the truck. When the child did not u n d e r s t a n d this, she no longer used context-bound information, first b y using w o r d s like ,.,circles,, or ,rounds~,, u l t i m a t e l y by only using deixis ('this' o r 'these', o r simply pointing). A second finding of W e r t s c h is t h a t children w h o do n o t u n d e r s t a n d the instruction, do not ask for clarification, b u t simply try. The m o t h e r can only infer indirectly, f r o m erroneous actions, that the child did not comp r e h e n d her. This observation, indeed, is in accord with similar o b s e r v a t i o n s of children r e a d to (Donaldson, 1978) a n d children p a r t i c i p a t i n g in e x p e r i m e n t a l tasks (Siegel & Hodkin, 1982). The second group o f studies, by Wells and his colleagues, is a i m e d at cont r i b u t i n g to the knowledge of the differences and similarities between v e r b a l interaction in the home and school contexts. The investigators r e c o r d e d n u m e r o u s interactions with children f r o m about two to six years old in various social situations. F o r the p u r p o s e of this paper, the verbal exchanges in instructional settings o r adult-assisted p r o b l e m solving are p a r t i c u l a r y relevant. E x a m p l e s of such exchanges are: (at home) conversations of m o t h e r and child reading a picture-book, a m o t h e r helping her child colouring a painting-book, a m o t h e r asking h e r child who has j u s t visited them; (at school) the first reading lessons, c l a s s r o o m discussions about apples a n d the seasons, conversations during the p r e s e n t a t i o n of slides. As it t u r n s out, the interactions at h o m e and at school in such situations of adult-guided p r o b l e m solving are not essentially different. Such interactions are the rule in the classroom; at home, however, they mingle and a l t e r n a t e with o t h e r forros of interaction. In p a r t i c u l a r open, spontaneous conversations, b a s e d on m u t u a l interest, and t o w a r d which child and adult can b o t h take the initiative, occur relatively seldom at school. But the i n t e r a c t i o n schemes which a t e characteristic of school life are well p r e p a r e d at home, and, for a s u m m a r y of v e r b a l c o m m u n i c a t i o n in instructional settings (which I mainly base on MacLure and French, 1981), we need not differentiate between the contexts. 1. Question and a n s w e r sequences n o r m a l l y have a three p a r t structure: the a d u l t a:sks a question, the child answers and the adult r e s p o n d s b y giving ah evaluative j u d g m e n t of the answer. The questions are mostly pseudo-questions, i.e. questions which give the child the o p p o r t u n i t y to d e m o n s t r a t e bis o r h e r knowledge, and to which the teacher knows the c o r r e c t answer. The asking of a question is carefully p r e p a r e d b y the creation of a context. I n the interaction the
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child's a t t e n t i o n is directed to the relevant aspects to which the question refers, sometimes by verbal rneans, sometimes (e.g., in readmg a picture-book) by pointing, o r a cornbination of both. 2. The reaction of adults to mistakes a n d errors can be divided into two categories: ,,other corrections,,, in which the adult corrects the child by providing the right answer, and , i n v i t a f i o n s to self-correct,,, in which the adult makes clear that the answer was wrong, and invites the child to revise the answer. ~Other corrections,, appear to be quite rare, especially at school, and mostly follow several failed ,,invitations to self-correct,,. ,,Other corrections,, ate also found when the adult u n d e r s t a n d s that the question is beyond the child's capacities. I n the classroom the question has been given in the m e a n t i m e to a n o t h e r child. We can use these descriptions of the n o r m a l course of c o m m u n i c a t i o n in ah i n s t r u c t i o n a l context to r e c o n s t r u c t the expectations with which young children enter ah experimental situation. Young children, then, expect to interact with a teaching a n d helpful adult, who will take a n d m a i n t a i n the initiative during the interaction. They treat ir a s a m a t t e r of cota'se that the e x p e r i m e n t e r wiU p u t a p r o b l e m before them, introduce it carefully to thern a n d will assist in finding the solution. They anticipate having to r e s p o n d to ,~pseudo-questions~ a n d expect a clear reaction from the e x p e r i m e n t e r to their answers. They t r u s t that the e x p e r i m e n t e r will indicate i m p o r t a n t aspects of the p r o b l e m a n d that he or she will either invite them to revise a wrong answer or correct it. The e x p e r i m e n t e r will adapt bis or her utterances to the child's level, a n d will take u p o n hito- or herself too difficult parts of the task.
I n t e r a c t i o n in t h e C o n s e r v a t i o n E x p e r i m e n t Now t h a t we have an idea of the expectations of the child, we can proceed to the analysis of the conservation experiment. If we c o m p a r e the expectations of the child with the course of events in a classical conservation experiment, the expe¡ behaviour does not correspond to these expectations in at least three respects, which gives rise to as m a n y sources of confusion for the child: 1. The conservation task involves, as Donaldson (1978) points out, drawing a child's a t t e n t i o n to aspects of the situation which are irrelevant to the problem. The child is oriented to perceptual characteristics and therefore thinks that the question of the e x p e r i m e n t e r pertains to these. 2. Braine a n d Shanks (1965) d e m o n s t r a t e d that a m a j o r i t y of young children (between four a n d seven years of age), in an experiment in which they had to judge the size of two ring segments in the ring-segment illusion, did not differentiate b e t w e e n these two formulations: ,,Which is really bigger?,, a n d Cq~hich looks bigger?,,. Because the conservation question generally is p u t as ,,Which is more, which contains more, which is longer,,, etc., confusion about the i n t e n t i o n s of the experimenter is easily created in the conservation experiments. I n reeent studies of verbal c o m m u n i c a t i o n between child and adult it has also been shown that young children tend to confuse what they think was m e a n t with what was said, w i t h o u t being conscious of their confusion (Robinson, Goelman, & Olson, 1983). The conservation question, clear as crystal to adults, is therefore extrernely sensitive to the way the p r o b l e m is presented to the child. The finding of m a n y investigators (e.g., Sinha & Carabine, 1981) that young children often m i s u n d e r s t a n d and confuse the m e a n i n g s of such terms as 'more', 'less', 'same' a n d 'different', doubtless contributes to this effect. But, c o n t r a r y to n o r m a l instructional interaction, the possibility that the child has not c o m p r e h e n d e d the experimenter's Ÿ is not carefully ruled out.
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3. The repetition of the conservation question m a y lead the child astray. Rose a n d Blank (1974) suppose that the repetition of the conservation question is a p p r e h e n d e d by the child a s a signal to change the previously given answer. Under n a t u r a l conditions, they think, a question is never a s k e d twice w i t h o u t a sufficient ground. I n the conservation e x p e r i m e n t the child takes the change of the stimulus p a t t e r n to be the ground. The c o m m o n factor of these three sources of confusion is the b e t r a y e d expectations of the child. C o n t r a r y to expectations, the child is not o r i e n t e d to the p r o b l e m (1 and 2), a n d the e x p e r i m e n t e r does n o t m a k e sure t h a t t h e i n t e n d e d message is not m i s u n d e r s t o o d (I, 2 a n d 3). Now, the a n s w e r s of m a n y c h i l d r e n to the conservation task can be u n d e r s t o o d as reactions to ah u n c l e a r a n d m i s u n d e r s t o o d situation. As we saw in the previous section, c h i l d r e n do not usually react to u n c o m p r e h e n d e d s t a t e m e n t s with a r e q u e s t for clarification. They g i r e a serious answer, confident t h a t the e x p e r i m e n t e r has sincere i n t e n t i o n s a n d t h a t they will be c o r r e c t e d o r p r o v i d e d with new i n f o r m a t i o n . But, instead, the e x p e r i m e n t e r does not continue the conversation t h e w a y t h e child expects h i m of h e r to do. The e x p e r i m e n t e r n e i t h e r gives f e e d b a c k o r e x t r a i n f o r m a t i o n , n o r a d a p t s his oi" h e r questions to the child's level of u n d e r s t a n d i n g . A t e n t a t i v e a n s w e r of the child, p r o n o u n c e d in a n t i c i p a t i o n of f u r t h e r i n f o r m a t i o n , is t a k e n for the definitive achievement of the child. I n sum, the e x p e r i m e n t e r robs t h e commtmication of the sequential s t r u c t u r e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of adult-child i n t e r a c t i o n in such situations. W h a t h a p p e n s when the sources of confusion a r e eliminated? F o r all three cases evidence exists showing that, c o m p a r e d to c o n t r o l groups w h i c h a r e subj e c t e d to the classical procedure, m o r e children p a s s the conservation test. G e l m a n (1969), who t r a i n e d h e r s u b j e c t s to a t t e n d to relevant a t t r i b u t e s of t h e p r o b l e m situation, found a larger n u m b e r of conservers (point 1). Children taught b y Braine and Shanks (1965) to d i s c r i m i n a t e the two f o r m u l a t i o n s p e r f o r m e d consid e r a b l y b e t t e r (point 2). Rose and B l a n k (1974) tested t h e i r idea w i t h six-year-old children in a n u m b e r conservation experiment. They a s k e d the conservation question only once, a f t e r the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of the stimulus array, a n d f o u n d a subst a n t i a l l y higher p r o p o r t i o n of conserving subjects (point 3). The Rose and Blank e x p e r i m e n t has b e e n r e p l i c a t e d several times w i t h different conservation p r o b l e m s a n d yotmger age groups, b y Neilson, Dockrell, a n d McKechnie (1983), S a m u e l a n d B r y a n t (1984) and S i l v e r m a n (1979). The results of these replications were not unanimous. There are, however, also n a t u r a l i s t i c o b s e r v a t i o n s w h i c h s u p p o r t the hypothesis of Rose & Blank. F o r example, W a l k e r d i n e (1982) o b s e r v e d question a n d a n s w e r sequences between t e a c h e r and class (children b e t w e e n t h r e e a n d five years old), in a game used to teach and p r a c t i c e counting. E v e r y t i m e the t e a c h e r asked a question, the c h i l d r e n had to chorus ~yes~ o r eno~. W a l k e r d i n e r e c o r d e d t h a t the t e a c h e r reacted to a m i s t a k e n a n s w e r b y simply r e p e a t i n g h e r question. This r e p e t i t i o n seemed to function a s a signal that the previous a n s w e r was wrong, because the children in chorus rectified t h e i r mistake. Other natura]istic examples in which a repetition of the a n s w e r is obviously m e a n t b y ah a d u l t as an invitation to the child to revise the a n s w e r can be found in Kaye (1982, p. 100) and Mishler (1972, pp. 274-275). I n the conservation e x p e r i m e n t the c o m m u n i c a t i o n does not t a k e the n o r m a l course f o r a situation in which an adult p r e s e n t s a p r o b l e m to a y o u n g child. The child, however, reacts in the expectation that the i n t e r a c t i o n will have t h a t course. A s a result, a ~state of alienation,, is created, which according to R o m m e t veit (1979) occurs when a m e t a c o n t r a c t is b r o k e n b y one of the interlocutors. Because the e x p e r i m e n t e r does not observe the rules of the m e t a c o n t r a c t to which
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the child conforms, it is doubtful if these e x p e r i m e n t s are suitable for revealing the cognitive capacities of young children. The b e h a v i o u r of the e x p e r i m e n t e r in the conservation e x p e r i m e n t m u s t b e conceived of as connected, not to the m e t a c o n t r a c t of instruction, b u t to a n o t h e r m e t a c o n t r a c t , t h a t of testing o r examination. The rules of this m e t a c o n t r a c t m a y be thought of as: lŸ o r i e n t a t i o n to the p r o b l e m , no i m m e d i a t e feedback, no o r i n a d e q u a t e a s s i s t a n c e in solving the p r o b l e m . This m e t a c o n t r a c t m a y b e f a m i l i a r to o l d e r children, who have h a d some y e a r s of experience in school, a n d w h o have learnt to observe its rules. I did not find such forros of i n t e r a c t i o n in the studies of young children b y WeUs a n d his colleagues. I g n o r a n c e of the i n t e r a c t i o n rules of e x a m i n a t i o n m a y c o n t r i b u t e to the failures of young children in the c o n s e r v a t i o n task. A different w a y of i l l u s t r a t i n g m y c o n t e n t i o n t h a t the a n s w e r s of children in the classical conservation e x p e r i m e n t s can be i l l u m i n a t e d b y looking at the collision of the child's expectations a n d the b e h a v i o u r of the e x p e r i m e n t e r is b y s t u d y i n g t h e i r opposite: those v a r i a n t s of the c o n s e r v a t i o n t a s k w h i c h p r e v e n t such collisions. A first e x a m p l e is an e x p e r i m e n t b y Perner, Leekam, a n d W i m m e r (19~4) in which ah evident (for the child) transition to another metacontract follows the c h a n g e of the s t i m u l u s array, b u t precedes the second asking of the c o n s e r v a t i o n question. P e r n e r et al. devised a v a r i a n t of Piaget's conservation of liquid e x p e r i m e n t . The child is a s k e d to give ah equal a m o u n t of w a t e r to a toy h o r s e a n d cow, b y first p o u r i n g w a t e r in two identical ,,buckets,> a n d then e m p t y i n g the b u c k e t s in the b e a k e r s b e f o r e the animals. The b e a k e r s , of course, have unequal dimen~ions. After the b e a k e r s have been filled, b u t b e f o r e the c o n s e r v a t i o n question is r e p e a t e d , t h e e x p e r i m e n t e r is called away. A colleague, who allegedly knows nothing of the e x p e r i m e n t , comes in and asks the child to i n f o r m h i m of h e r a b o u t the s i t u a t i o n and, in passing, asks the c o n s e r v a t i o n question. P e r n e r et al. u s e d children of 4 1/2, 5 1/2 a n d 6 1/2 years of age. When we leave out the 6-year-old s u b j e c t s (who were all b u t one classffied as conservers in b o t h conditions), the figures are: 22 conserving s u b j e c t s out of 27 (81%) in the e x p e r i m e n t a l condition, a n d 14 out of 30 (47 %) in the c o n t r o l condition, in w h i c h the first e x p e r i m e n t e r s t a y e d until the end. I n the P e r n e r at al. e x p e r i m e n t a m e t a c o n t r a c t of teacher-pupil i n t e r a c t i o n m a k e s w a y f o r a m e t a c o n t r a c t of asking a n d giving information. I n bis o r h e r ~wn r e g a r d , the s u b j e c t t u r n s f r o m p u p i l to i n f o r m a n t . The t a s k is m u c h c l e a r e r thar~ in the classical situation a n d some of the f a c t o r s w h i c h confuse the conservation j u d g m e n t in the classical procedure, d i s a p p e a r at the s a m e t i m e as the i g n o r a n t e x p e r i m e n t e r e n t e r s the room. I t is t h e r e f o r e n o t s u r p r i s i n g t h a t m a n y c h i l d r e n p r o v e to know the a n s w e r in these circumstances. The studies in which conservation abilities a r e t a u g h t or t r a i n e d a r e a s e c o n d e x a m p l e of situations in which the m e t a c o n t r a c t is n o t b r o k e n . A characteristic of m a n y of these studies is t h a t the m e t a c o n t r a c t of the teacher-pupil i n t e r a c t i o n is also being a d h e r e d to, at least in p a r t , b y t h e e x p e r i m e n t e r . S o m e investigators t r a i n e d c h i l d r e n to a t t e n d to relevant aspects of the p r o b l e m , s o m e gave c l e a r f e e d b a c k to the a n s w e r s of the children, others t a u g h t t h e i r s u b j e c t s the concept of reversibility a n d its consequences, still o t h e r s p r e s e n t e d children p e r f o r m i n g the conservation t a s k correctly as m o d e l s flor reviews see, e.g., B r a i n e r d , 1978 a n d Kuhn, 1974). I n m a n y e x p e r i m e n t s the t r a i n i n g proves to be effective (cf. in p a r t i c u l a r B r a i n e r d , 1978). I shaU use the well-known e x p e r i m e n t b y G e l m a n (1969), one of the m o s t successful training studies, to d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t the m e t a c o n t r a c t of t h e teacherpu!ail i n t e r a c t i o n is b r o a d l y k e p t intact. G e l m a n divided h e r s u b j e c t s b e t w e e n
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4;9 a n d 6 years old, classified as nonconservers i n tests of length, n u m b e r , mass and liquid conservation, into three groups. The experimental group was subjected to an exten:~ive training, relevant for the conservation of length and n u m b e r . Eaeh subject was shown a succession of static p a t t e r n s of three stimuli, two stimuli b e i n g equal either in respect of n u m b e r or of length, and different from the third stimulus, for instance two rows of five dots a n d one of three dots. The child was asked to indicate which stimuli were the same. I n the course of the t r a i n i n g session not only the n u m b e r of dots, b u t also the length of the rows were varied, forcing the child to discriminate b e t w e e n the relevant aspect (in this example, n u m b e r ) and the irre]evant one (length). I n all the child had to judge 192 problems, 96 for length a n d 96 for n u m b e r . After each j u d g m e n t the experimenter gave this feedback: ,,Yes, ~.hat is right,, after a correct answer, giving the child a ,,prize,,, and ,,No, that is not right,~ in the other case, b u t without giving c o m m e n t or explanation. The subjects in a first control group were confronted with the 192 problems and had to decide a b o u t which stimuli were equal, b u t did not get feedback: the e x p e r i m e n t e r only told t h e m after the p r e s e n t a t i o n of the stimuli, that they were playing the game very well. A second control group did not receive training. The dramatic results of the i m m e d i a t e post-tests of n u m b e r and length conservation were: 96 % a n d 95 % correet, i. e. conserving j u d g m e n t s , compared to 21% and 27 % in the first control group a n d 1% a n d 7,5 % in the second control group. There was also a considerable generalisation to conservation problems of mass and liquid in the experimental group (58 % and 55 %) against negligible generalisatŸ in the control groups. Although a n u m b e r of traits of the adult-child interaction in what we reconstructed as n o r m a l instructional contexts ate absent in Gelman's experiment, sorne traits are u n d e n i a b l y present..First, the t r a i n i n g session can be considered as ah intensive p r e p a r a t i o n and orientation to the problems to come in the post-tests; the p r e p a r a t i o n of the child is also furthered by the alternating presentation of the length and n u m b e r stimuli, helping the child to discriminate the situations in which a length cue is relevant from those in which it is irrelevant. Second, consistent feedback was given. Though this was m i n i m a l beeause it did not involve explanation, this fact was compensated b y the large a m o u n t of stimuli, giving the child time to invent, test and c•ange hypotheses. Apart from the training, a n o t h e r factor contributes in this experiment (and i n rnany other t r a i n i n g experiments) to the success of the children: the transifion to the post-test is a smooth one. The problems in the post-test m a y be different from the t r a i n i n g problems, b u t the i n t e n t i o n of the experimenter in the m e a n t i m e has become clear enough. I n the post-test, therefore, no m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g s arise about what the child is expected to do. The subject is guided b y the e x p e r i m e n t e r to p e r f o r m a defined set of behaviours: The child will find ir a m a t t e r o n course t h a t there is ah end to this guidance and that he of she rnust show the ability to solve a similar p r o b l e m independently. I n interpretations of the t r a i n i n g studies, the effects ate usually ascribed to the training. I do not deny the effect of the training, b u t the p r e p a r a t i o n in the training session for the post-test as a n interactional setting is a n element which m u s t also be taken into account and which has been totally neglected in the literature. Not all training experiments, of course, approximate as well to n a t u r a l interactions between adult and child in problem solving situations as the Gelman study. Conceivably, t r a i n i n g experiments are more successful, the more their design resembles the n o r m a l interaction between teacher and pupil a n d the m o r e the post-test is a n a u r a l extension of the training, instead of a b r o k e n metacontract
E. ELBERS F u n d a m e n t a l p r o b l e m s , however, a t t a c h to the training studies. A first p r o b l e m has been p o i n t e d out by Kuhn (1974). When the s a m e conservation t a s k is offered in the training a n d in the post-test, the evidence that the s n b j e c t has a c q u i r e d conservation abilities is not convincing: An a r g u m e n t learnt b y h e a r t in the training m a y be r e p e a t e d in the post-test without true understanding. On the o t h e r hand, the i n t r o d u c t i o n of other conservation tasks in the post-test to d e m o n s t r a t e generalisation also creates p r o b l e m s because of the weU-known h o r i z o n t a l d› b e t w e e n the various conservation tasks (conservation of n u m b e r is l e a r n t b e f o r e c o n s e r v a t i o n of weight, and this before conservation of volume, etc.). The effects of training conservation of n u m b e r , therefore, cannot be tested s a t i s f a c t o r i l y with a conservation of liquid p r o b l e m . Ku¡ concludes that these m e a n s a r e not very useful to evaluate the training of c o n s e r v a t i o n abilities. A s a remedy, she r e c o m m e n d s , in the first place, a s s e m b l i n g n o r m a t i v e d a t a b y s u b j e c t i n g a large n u m b e r of children to the well-known tests. After that, training i n t e r v e n t i o n s could be a p p l i e d to a n o t h e r group of c h i l d r e n c o m p a r a b l e in all i m p o r t a n t r e s p e c t s to the first group. The effects of the training, d e t e r m i n e d with the s a m e tests, could then be c o m p a r e d to the criterion group. I t is, however, doubtful, w h e t h e r we m a y expect the achievements of the two groups to differ so m u c h o r to have so little variance as to m a k e this l a b o r i o u s p r o c e d u r e worth undertaking. A second o b j e c t i o n to the training studies, as they aro usually p e r f o r m e d , is t h e i r a l m o s t exclusive fixation on the achievements of the s u b j e c t s in the post-tests. S u p p o s e the child does not r e a c h the c r i t e r i o n in the pest-test, does this m e a n t h a t he o r she has n o t learnt anything at all a n d has m a d e no p r o g r e s s ? Such a conclusion is u n w a r r a n t e d . F r o m the child's p o i n t of view the training p r o c e d u r e is only one of ma.ny situations of adult-guided p r o b l e m solving, not different in any essential r e s p e c t from the sort of i n s t r u c t i o n s the child receives daily a t school o r at horno. I n the n a t u r a l context of life, a child meets o f is p r e s e n t e d with by an a d u l t all kind of p r o b l c m s , conservation p r o b l e m s being a s u b s e t of them. When the child has not h a d m u c h experience w i t h c o n s e r v a t i o n p r o b l e m s , it is i m p r o b a b l e t h a t he o r she reaches the c r i t e r i o n u n d e r the influence of s h o r t - t e r m training. More s u b t l e m e t h o d s m u s t be developed to show t h e b i t of p r o g r e s s t h a t even s u b j e c t s non-conserving in the p o s t t e s t m a y have m a d e . One p o s s i b i l i t y is to divide the group of nonoconservers in s u b g r o u p s according to t h e i r achievement, like Perret-Clermont (1980, chap. 4) a n d R o b e r t a n d F o r t i n (1983) do. But m o r e i m p o r t a n t l y , the focus of a t t e n t i o n m u s t be d i r e c t e d to t h e changes in the child's b e h a v i o u r and intellectual strategies during the t r a i n i n g session, to the m i c r o a n a l y s i s of cognitive activities, o r to microgenesis, defined b y Rogoff (1982, p. 151) as ~the d e v e l o p m e n t of cognitive activities over a b r i e f pr B o t h for the m i c r o g e n e t i c study of cognitive d e v e l o p m e n t during the experim e n t a n d for the l o n g i t u d i n a l s t u d y of c o n s e r v a t i o n studies o v e r a long period, the studies of social-cognitive conflict by Doise and bis colleagues (Doise, Mugny, & Perret-Clermont, 1975; Perret-C1ermont, 1980 a n d Perret-Clermont & Schubauer-Leoni, 1981) p r e s e n t m o r e possibilities than has h i t h e r t o been recognised. These a u t h o r s use the c o n s e r v a t i o n p r o b l e m in gronp settings. According to them, the l e a r n i n g of conservation abilities, and cognitive abilities in general, is facilitated in g r o u p contacts. A c h a r a c t e r i s t i c e x a m p l e is the e x p e r i m e n t by Perret-Clermont (1980, chap. 2 ) i n which three children, two conservers a n d one non-con,,~rver, have to solve a p r o b l e m on the c o n s e r v a t i o n of liquid together. These studies evoke basicaUy the s a m e o b j e c t i o n s as can be b r o u g h t against t h e t r a i n i n g studies. The co-operativo i n t e r a c t i o n of the c h i l d r e n in the g r o u p session is followed by a h individual post-test in which the classical p r o c e d u r e
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is used. The child, however, is not p r e p a r e d for the kind of i n t e r a c t i o n taking place in the post-test. What this a m o u n t s to is that the co-operative metac o n t r a c t of the g r o u p session is b r o k e n in the post-test. Moreover, these studies pay exclusive a t t e n t i o n to the differing results b e t w e e n pre- a n d post-tests, to the neglect of the d e v e l o p m e n t of the subjects during the collective sessions. Unf o r t u n a t e l y these studies, despite their extensive descriptions of the conversations in the pre- and post-tests, contain h a r d l y any literal r e p o r t s of the conversations in the collective sessions. Only Perret-Clermont's (1980) b o o k gives five s h o r t excerpts (pp. 49-52) of these discussions between children. In studies of this kind, interest should not be exclusiveIy d i r e c t e d to the results of the post-test. By analysis of the discussions b e t w e e n the children in the collective sessions, we might be able to observe h o w a child in a social situation learns to deal with conservation p r o b l e m s . The Doise design m a y also be suitable for longitudinal investigations, in which t h e child is periodically p r e s e n t e d ~ i t h conservation p r o b l e m s in social situations. Ir would b e interesting to see how c h i l d r e n a r e increasingly able to u n d e r s t a n d t h e p r o b l e m a n d h o w they find novel a r g u m e n t s to express this understanding. I n this way, w h a t K u h n (1974, p. 599) calls the ,,severe (and self-imposed) l i m i t a t i o n of existing training studies, their confinement of intervention to a single occasion~ could b e abolished a limitation which is indeed not confined to training studies, b u t t o the whole field of conservation research.
Conclusions To end with, let m e s u m m a r i s e m y conclusions. 1. In the s a m e w a y t h a t social psychologists have become a w a r e of the ,,demand characteristics,, of the e x p e r i m e n t a l situation (Orne, 1962), developm e n t a l i s t s should analyse the p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s a n d tacit t m d e r s t a n d i n g s which underlie the e x p e r i m e n t a l relationship between e x p e r i m e n t e r a n d subject. F o r a child the conservation e x p e r i m e n t is n o t a p u r e l y cognitive task, a n d the communication between child a n d e x p e r i m e n t e r is not led exclusively b y the rules of argument. The child, in beginning the task, expects some things to h a p p e n and o t h e r things not to. I n particular, the child has expectations t o w a r d s the interaction and the b e h a v i o u r of the experimenter. Only when we know the conventions regulating the interactions b e t w e e n adults a n d children in daily life, will we p e r h a p s be able to u n d e r s t a n d the child's reactions in the conservation experiment. 2. In the classical conservation task children a t e c o n f r o n t e d with an extremely difficult social situation, because the course of c o m m u n i c a t i o n differs f r o m w h a t they expect. They perceive the s i t u a t i o n as a context of instruction. The experimenter, however, acts according to a different m e t a c o n t r a c t , that of examining o r testing. Young children have not l e a r n e d to recognise this metacontraer. Because the e x p e r i m e n t e r b r e a k s the m e t a c o n t r a c t , a ,,state of alienation,, (Rommetveit) is created. It is doubtful, w h e t h e r such social conditions a r e a suitable occasion for the study of cognitive development. 3. In the training and group studies, the m e t a c o n t r a c t of i n s t r u c t i o n is kept intact during the experiment. I n principle, therefore, these studies a r e suitable for creating situations in which the d e v e l o p m e n t of conservation abilities can b e invcstigated. In these experiments, however, a t t e n t i o n is fixed on the results of the posttest. Instead, this interest in the p r o d u c t s of the training should be t r a n s f e r r e d to t h e cognitive processes the training b r i n g s a b o u t in the child, i. c., to the microgenesis of cognitive structures, activities a n d knowledge.
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Le ~m› de communication dans l'exp› de conservation: intcraction et instruction. Bo~z nombre de recherches › l'influence du context.e interactionnel sur les performances de jeunes enŸ dans l'exp› de conservation de type Piaget, mais jusqu'~z maintenant ces recherches ne reposent guste sur un [ondement th› Dans cet article, des conceptions emprunt› ~ la th› de la communication sont utilis› pour analyser les conduites de l'exp› et de l'enŸ dans la situation exp› L'auteur avance que l'en[ant se comporte • cette situation selon le ,,m› de I'interaction entre pro[esseur et › c'est-&-dire que renfant s'attend ~t se trouver en [ace d'un adulte enseignant. Dans l'exp› classique de conservation de Piaget les attentes de l'en[ant sont d› parce que l'exp› ne se conforme pas aux r~gles de l'interaction entre pro[esseur et › L'exp› se comporie selon un aulre n~› celui de l'examen. Dans lea situations exp› oil l'on tente d'enseigner le prŸ cipe de conservation et dans les interactions de groupe dans lesqueUes il y a coop› d'enfants conservants et non-conservants, les participants se comportent selon un type unique de m› Mais la signification de ces exp› reste Iimit› puisque rattention porte uniquement sur les performances finales des enŸ sans tenir compte de rensemble des processus cognitiŸ pendant l'apprentissage.
Key u'ords: Adult-child interaction; Communication theory; Conservation; Ins-
truction.
Revision
Received: September 25, 1985 received: November 20, 1985
E d E l b e r s . University of Utrecht, Facultv of Social Science, Department of Psychonomics, Hcidel. berglaan 2, 3584 CS Utrecht, The Netherlands
Th~mes actuels de recherche: Deve|opmental t hr