EcoHealth 1, 196–204, 2004 DOI: 10.1007/s10393-004-0021-x

Ó 2004 EcoHealth Journal Consortium

Involving Diverse Interests: Theoretical and Practical Insights from Native Vegetation Management in New South Wales, Australia Darren Halpin Centre for Social Science Research, Building 18, Central Queensland University, Bruce Highway, North Rockhampton, Queensland 4702, Australia

Abstract: Through an Australian case study, this article considers the broad issue of involving multiple stakeholders in processes designed to resolve complex issues that link environment, society, health, and sustainability. The approach adopted to address native vegetation management in New South Wales, a state of Australia, is an interesting attempt at directly involving farming communities with other ‘‘stakeholders’’ in formulating vegetation management plans. The process included a unique combination of centralized interest group mediation and decentralized regional planning processes through regional committees. The article draws upon evidence from one Regional Vegetation Committee in order to highlight some of the difficulties in coupling together centralized representative group bargaining with decentralized deliberative decision making. Suggestions are made as to further areas for research. Key words: deliberation, participation, representation, multiperspective

INTRODUCTION: CAN ORTHODOX MODES INTEREST GROUP POLITICS FACILITATE A MULTI-PERSPECTIVE CONSENSUS?

OF

There has been renewed emphasis among Australian policy makers and academics in exploring the interrelationships between, and more holistic and interdisciplinary approaches to, what have tended to be considered as discrete ecological, economic, public health, or social issues (see review by Booth and Rodgers, 2000). (The term ‘‘triple bottom line’’ has broad currency across all tiers of Australian government and refers to the importance of evalu-

Published online: April 19, 2004 Correspondence to: Darren Halpin, e-mail: [email protected]

ating the economic, environmental, and social impacts of policy.) This concern has also been reflected in the ecosystem health literature which has emphasized the need to consider the interrelationships between environment, society, health, and sustainability (see Rapport et al., 1998ab; Robertson et al., 2000; Wilcox, 2001). While academics, researchers, and policy actors may recognize a need to emphasize these type of interrelationships, one of the central challenges is in integrating the full range of perspectives—biophysical, socioeconomic, and public health—in the management of a given space (see Parkes and Panelli, 2001). Pivotal to translating this theoretical concern into practical effect is the task of developing processes of decision making through which those with a ‘‘stake’’ in a particular space can have their perspective represented, heard, and integrated into a shared vision for

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that space. Scholars, particularly those focused on natural resource management or planning issues, often deploy terms such as ‘‘stakeholder’’ governance or participation to refer to institution building to address a similar concern with broad participation in local decision making (see, for example, Moore et al., 2001; Johnson and Walker, 2000). This literature highlights that the task of ‘‘sharing perspectives,’’ as straightforward as it sounds, is an especially complicated task (see, for example, Campbell and Marshall, 2000). The need to share perspectives has become evident in the management of Australian rural spaces, dominated as they are by agricultural production. Over the past two decades, issues that had hitherto been framed as ‘‘farm management’’ issues have been (re)framed as ‘‘environmental’’ issues (land clearing and preserving biodiversity), ‘‘indigenous rights’’ issues (such as native title rights in Australia), and ‘‘food safety’’ issues (the application of biotechnology). In policy terms, representatives of environmental movements have gained a voice within the agricultural policy community formerly dominated by farmer representatives (Halpin and Martin, 1999). This elite-based approach to sharing perspectives is evidenced by the work between peak interest groups, National Farmers’ Federation and Australian Conservation Foundation, to develop and promote Landcare which supports local environmental action of a voluntary nature (McEachern, 1993; Martin and Woodhill, 1995; Martin and Halpin, 1998). But just as the intersection between the particular agendas of the government, the farm lobby, and the environment lobby are reasons for policy stability to prevail, so too may their absence be reasons for its removal. In some cases, the considerable urban pressure for action associated with rural environmental issues has meant government could ill-afford to ignore the substantial political support for direct environmental controls on rural lands. On occasions this has prompted government to interrupt the stable networks of interest-group exchange that underpin the orthodox public policy process, through impositional acts to regulate the land management activities of farmers on private land. (See discussion of impositional approaches in Richardson, 2000, pp 1006–1010.) Current examples in Australia include controls on the use of underground and aboveground water, and regulations prohibiting the destruction of habitats for particular native Australian animal populations. This type of response seems to be deployed where an ‘‘environmental’’ issue is framed in terms of protecting specific habitats, ecosystems, or species, or managing specific land systems on

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privately owned land, and further, where there is a concern that consultation would give time for landowners to preempt regulation/legislation—hence leading to damage to the environment in question. (This paper is not about debating the merits of this rationale; merely that it forms the basis of defending impositional acts by the state to regulate land management without prior consultation.) Yet this type of impositional activity can rarely, in and of itself, resolve the issues at hand (see discussion by Reeve, 1996). Apart from the question as to how one would effectively police purely regulatory approaches, the issue focusing the minds of politicians and bureaucrats alike is the need to avoid a long-term and sustained politicization of the issue with its logical electoral impact. Further, this type of imposed solution is partial in the sense that it ignores the socioeconomic and public health of the rural community situated within the space. In the case of Australian rural communities, which are generally depressed in socioeconomic terms (see, for example, Lawrence et al., 1992; Alston, 2000) and exhibiting low levels of personal health (see, for example, Gray and Lawrence, 1996; HREOC, 1996, p 5), a single-minded approach to maintaining ‘‘biophysical’’ health ignores its potential to contribute positively to resolving socioeconomic and public health problems (see Horwitz et al., 2001, p 255). Therefore, even where an impositional strategy is applied, there is often a need to return again to some type of stable policy-making process. It is, therefore, not surprising that a range of institutions should be developed to recreate stability after ‘‘impositional’’ approaches to resolving rural environmental issues. This article will explore the management of Native Vegetation in New South Wales (NSW) and the approach adopted to reestablishing stability after an impositional episode. In so doing, this article will highlight the way in which an attempt to create a decision-making institution imbued with values of inclusion, deliberation, and a commitment to a multiperspective approach, floundered due to what tend to be regarded as ‘‘peripheral’’ issues of representation. It is concluded that these ‘‘peripheral’’ issues are in fact crucial to generating local or regional decision making that is able to govern areas in a way that emphasizes the interrelationships between environment, society, health, and sustainability.

CASE STUDY: NATIVE VEGETATION MANAGEMENT IN NEW SOUTH WALES Native vegetation management is an issue of immense national importance in Australia. It has attracted political

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attention as figures revealed that clearing of native vegetation has proceeded at unacceptable rates and largely occurred on more fertile soil types useful for agriculture or on land useful for urban development (Benson and Howell, 1990). These revelations prompted some states to introduce targeted programs and legislation (see Dore et al., 1999 for details). NSW was one of the last states to act when it gazetted the ‘‘State Environmental Planning Policy No. 46—Protection and Management of Native Vegetation (SEPP-46)’’ in 1995 (Saunders, 1998). Under this NSW regulation, clearing of native vegetation could only be carried out through submitting a development application. The regulation was introduced without consultation with farmers. This reflected a broad governmental consensus that consultation would prompt some landowners to preempt regulation/legislation by clearing land. The desire to clear preemptively was all the more likely given that the continuing decline in farmers terms of trade made constant productivity gains essential for farm survival (Higgins and Lockie, 2001). For these reasons, and in this case, consultation as a first step was deemed counterproductive. The introduction of SEPP-46 was the first phase of a four-phased approach to address the conservation of native vegetation in NSW (DLWC, 1998). Table 1 is a summary of how these phases unfolded. Given that much of the remaining native vegetation in Australia is on privately owned land used for agricultural purposes, any successful attempt to pursue native vegetation management necessarily involves engaging with and seeking the commitment and involvement of farmers. Efforts were made soon after the implementation of SEPP-46 to recreate a dialogue with farm and other interests. Before the release of the Bill, ‘‘interim Amendment No. 2’’ was made to SEPP-46 allowing for the preparation and implementation of interim regional plans in lieu of the compatible legislation going to Parliament. This planning mechanism, utilizing locally based committees, reflected the ‘‘distributed intelligence’’ model that the NSW Farmers’ Association had woven into the outcomes of the initial report of the Vegetation Forum. (This model asserted that the knowledge required to make ‘‘good’’ decisions resides, or is distributed, among local people with an innate knowledge of conditions. It was a position that refuted ‘‘command-and-control’’ models of state regulation.) In the intervening period between the White Paper and the Legislation, the first pilot Regional Vegetation Management Plans (RVMP) was commenced. These commit-

tees, and the RVMPs they produced, are the most significant innovation from this process. They are interesting because they signify the orthodox, state-level, interest-group system decentralizing issues to a smaller spatial level for resolution. As the only tangible manifestation of the Bill, the Mid-Lachlan Regional Vegetation Committee (RVC) became the focal point for the conflict over native vegetation management. This will also be the focal point for the remainder of the article. The issue is ongoing, and this report refers to the postimpositional period between 1995 and 1999. It focuses principally, but not exclusively, on the involvement of the NSW Farmers’ Association and farmer representatives involved in the first committee formed under the Act.

MID-LACHLAN RVC The first pilot RVMP under SEPP-46 Amendment No. 2 commenced in the Mid-Lachlan region. The Mid-Lachlan Regional Vegetation Committee formed in July 1997. The composition of the Mid-Lachlan Committee reflected what was ultimately embodied in the new legislation. (It consisted of four representatives of rural interests [at least two nominated by the NSW Farmers’ Association]. There were required to be two representatives of conservation interests nominated by the Nature Conservation Council of NSW (NCC) and aboriginal interests nominated by the NSW Aboriginal Land Council. There was one representative for each of the following: Catchment Management Committee (CMC) or Catchment Management Trust (CMT), a Landcare group, local government, Department of Land and Water Conservation (DLWC), National Parks and Wildlife Service (NPWS), Department of Agriculture, and a scientific expert. All nondepartmental representatives had to be from within the area to be covered by the plan [(Native Vegetation Conservation) NVC Act 1997 (No. 133) (NSW), S.51(7)(1)]). After developing some draft aims, goals and objectives, and subjecting these to a public consultation process, the group proceeded to draw up the RVMP. By late 1998, the Mid-Lachlan Committee had produced a draft RVMP under the Act then under operation.

Assumptions of Interest Groups about the RVC The NSW Farmers’ Association viewed these RVCs as likely to reproduce the centralized interest group process albeit with a local flavor. The original objection of the Farmers’ Association to the decentralized approach was based on the

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Table 1. Summary of Events Phase

Events

Phase One: Imposition and regulation (SEPP-46)

‘‘State Environmental Planning Policy No. 46—Protection and Management of Native Vegetation (SEPP-46)’’ was gazetted in NSW without consultation [August 10, 1995] Under this regulation, clearing of native vegetation could only be carried out through submitting a development application The Native Vegetation Foruma was established in November 1995 as an attempt to reestablish a measure of stability after the imposition of SEPP-46 It reported to government in 1996 on a unanimous basis The Minister accepted the Forum’s recommendations The draft Native Vegetation Management Bill and subsequently the White Paper outlining the proposed Native Vegetation Conservation Act were released The ‘‘Native Vegetation Conservation Act, December 1997’’ came into force in NSW on January 1, 1998 The central element of the legislation was a tiered system of planning with a development consent framework. Regions within the state that developed approved Regional Vegetation Management Plans (RVMP) were exempt from consent requirements (except in areas of high conservation value). A Native Vegetation Advisory Council (NVAC) replaced the NSW Vegetation Forum. The make-up of the NVAC was similar to that of the RVMP committees

Phase Two: Consultation and reestablishing stability Phases Three and Four: Legislation

NSW, New South Wales. a The composition of the NSW Vegetation Forum was representatives of relevant state agencies and departments, local government, environmental groups, farm organizations, and three representatives from Catchment Management Committees (New South Wales Legislative Assembly, 1995).

absence of a farmer majority on the committees: clearly it assumed the committees would operate on a standard one person–one vote model of decision making. This rationale is evident in the reaction by the Farmers’ Association to the final legislation, which confirmed that they would not have a farmer majority on committees. At this point, the NSW Farmers’ Association threatened to remove members from the committees, it withdrew from the Vegetation Forum (and its replacement Advisory Council), and publicly opposed the Act. Representative institutions are formulated on the basis that each participant represents a set of preexisting interests. It would then follow that such institutions would be constituted as an arena for the strategic bargaining of those interests. This is the basis upon which the centralized interest-group mediated processes occurred, and it is this set of expectations that framed the NSW Farmers’ Association’s suggestion to the Forum of creating local committees. Apart from the rules governing the decision-making processes of the committee, the NSW Farmers’ Association also relied on those it appointed to these local committees to:

d

pursue the same position as the Association leadership (establishing continuity and agreement);

d

have similar experiences to those foreshadowed by the Association (establishing the Act as unworkable and cumbersome); and,

d

comply with leaders’ requests to abandon participation should the need arise (establishing compliance).

The experiences and actions of participants on the MidLachlan Committee established that the assumptions about the method of decision making and the actions of their appointees were incorrect.

Experiences of Mid-Lachlan Participants Clearly the experiences of the committee members were crucial in the way the issue played out. These experiences were gathered by a series of largely semi-structured interviews with seven participants. (A Landcare representative,

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three Department of Agriculture staff members, two farmer representatives, and an environmental group representative were all interviewed.) The experiences of committee members illustrates that decision making departed significantly from the ‘‘representative’’ model practiced at the centralized interest-group level. All the members of the committee interviewed, which included farmers, environmentalists, and staff of government agencies, observed that the process of decision making was consensual and one where ‘‘people started to understand each other more’’ (Committee Member Interview, 1998). Indeed, understanding one another was an important precursor to setting goals and objectives which was instrumental in transforming interests. For example, one participant noted, ‘‘we weren’t as fixed in our views as when we first started.’’ Importantly, one farmer made the point that: ‘‘If you took something like we have now [the draft plan] you would lose a lot in that you wouldn’t really understand the changes in points of view’’ (Committee Member Interview, 1998). Similarly, from a State Agency participant: ‘‘In my experience, the Mid-Lachlan has been quite a journey for everyone involved in learning other people’s perspectives, an immense amount of learning has gone on’’ (Committee Member Interview, 1998). In the end, the NSW Farmers’ Association’s central concern over the lack of a farmer majority on the committees turned out to matter very little. The experience of members of this committee suggests this was never a decisive factor in determining outcomes. Decisions of the Mid-Lachlan Committee were made on a consensus basis rather than by a majority vote. If there was any temptation for participants to view themselves as delegates for a larger group, and hence a need to represent a set of interests attached to that group, it was to a more local constituency that they saw themselves accountable. One participant nominated by the Farmers’ Association set up his own adhoc consultative committee from which he gained advice and reported progress. If any, it was to this group that he professed accountability, rather than the state’s farmers as a whole or the NSW Farmers’ Association in particular (Committee Member Interview, 1998). While not explicitly by design, this committee seems to have adopted a deliberative style of decision making. The NSW Farmers’ Association’s three assumptions regarding the actions of its farmer appointees were also proven to be incorrect. The first, that the delegates would concur with their claims that the process was unworkable was damaged when, in response to the Association’s re-

portage, the entire Mid-Lachlan Committee took the unprecedented step of writing a letter to The Land newspaper (the highest circulation rural affairs newspaper in NSW) to set the record straight about its progress. It pointed out that the committee was functioning well and that, despite the Farmers’ Association’s claims that it would take more than 18 months for plans to be completed, it would deliver a plan within 9 months of its commencement (Mid-Lachlan Committee, 1998). The letter publicly confirmed that the experiences of the delegates on the committee were different to those foreshadowed by the Association. It also confirmed the second assumption incorrect, as it illustrated that a gap had emerged between the position of the Association and its delegates on local committees. This is itself evidence of the transformative effect of the RVC process. The third assumption, that members of the MidLachlan RVC would comply with leadership directions to withdraw from the process, was also proven incorrect. The threat by the Association to ‘‘pull farmer representatives out’’ of the RVC process proved to be a hollow one (Dick, 1998). Having lost the compliance of its appointees, the NSW Farmers’ Association leadership has been unable to exercise the option of withdrawing support for the implementation of the Act as a way of expressing its opposition.

DISCUSSION The imposition of SEPP-46 by the NSW Government necessitated subsequent measures to reconstitute a stable means of policy development and implementation. In the case of native vegetation management in NSW, the institutional arrangements deployed by government were twofold. The centralized mode involved interest-group mediated bargaining through the Native Vegetation Forum. The decentralized mode involved appointees of those represented on the Native Vegetation Forum participating in Regional Vegetation Committees to develop Regional Vegetation Management Plans. The combination of centralized and decentralized institutions is unique and innovative. The evidence, admittedly only of one case study, suggests that this innovative design has allowed grass roots members of conflicting constituencies to reach an understanding and deliver a draft plan at a decentralized level. However, it also reveals that the initial ‘‘win’’ was jeopardized by interest group politics at the centralized level. As a design for successfully reconstituting a broadened policy network subsequent to an impositional act by Government,

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the coupling of centralized/decentralized requires reflection.

Deliberative Design or Deliberative Drift? What is remarkable about the Mid-Lachlan RVC is that what started off as a ‘‘representative’’ exercise conceived of in very straightforward interest terms, with each interest group being allocated seats, drifted towards a more deliberative exercise. In contrast with liberal notions of the democratic process, deliberative democracy does not emphasize the aggregation of preexisting interests but the transformation of preferences (Femia, 1997). The deliberative model emphasizes a set of procedures by which individuals participate and contest meanings and value positions, the outcome of which is a generalizable position. It also assumes that there is open participation, that participants are not acting as ‘‘representatives’’ of stakeholder groups and that debate is ‘‘free’’ (an absence of coercive power). As Femia sums up, ‘‘Where as the liberal model pictures democracy as a form of negotiation, enabling citizens to further their wants through the strategic deployment of bargaining resources, the dialogical model urges us to engage in a collaborative quest for policies that reflect generally accepted principles’’ (Femia, 1997, p 365). What is salient about the Mid-Lachlan Committee is that while not specifically designed to do so, it operated in a way that bears remarkable resemblance to deliberative forms of democracy. All the members of the Committee interviewed observed that the process of decision making was consensual. This is surprising given that the Committees were closed, participants were appointed by interestgroup organizations (although the exact role of individuals was ambiguous) and the process existed within the larger regulatory framework set firstly by SEPP-46 and then by the NVC Act. These are all factors that are inconsistent with the theoretical preconditions for deliberative exercises to function. Indeed, this one case suggests that there may not be a direct conflict between deliberative-style, decisionmaking institutions and coercive state power. The outcomes of the Mid-Lachlan RVC were in large part accelerated by the existence of threats of state power (via regulation). On this evidence, one could be optimistic about the capacity for weak forms of deliberation to facilitate the accommodation of divergent interests. In the context of processes that are able to foster consideration of interre-

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lationships and multiple perspectives, it signifies a process that is inclusive of all those with a ‘‘stake’’ and engages with, rather than steps around, existing patterns of interests and their ‘‘representative’’ institutions. As such, it provided a venue to consider not just the biophysical definition of health, but also public and socioeconomic health implications of biophysical management. However, there is evidence from individuals working on other committees that the process has not been as ‘‘successful.’’ For instance, one researcher has found that in a neighboring group, the committee was conducted in an open forum where members articulated entrenched positions and counted votes [personal communication, 2002]. This is more reminiscent of a town hall meeting than a deliberative exercise. Clearly, determining how to catalyze deliberative ‘‘drift’’ would benefit from a more thorough examination and comparative analysis of all RVCs.

Engineering Complementarity between Centralized and Decentralized Decision Making The combination of centralized and decentralized decision making seems intuitively complementary. The former is capable of securing agreement on principles and processes, and directing and legitimating the deployment of governmental authority. The latter is capable of operationalizing and contextualizing abstract principles, and fleshing out the details with an eye to local conditions. It is this latter type of ‘‘perspective sharing’’ arrangement that is viewed as crucial to modes of governance that are capable of fostering consideration of interrelationships and multiple perspectives. However, as the Mid-Lachlan case amply illustrates, there is scope for considerable tension between centralized and decentralized processes. Researchers have noted, in the context of resolving environmental issues, that deliberative forums can ‘‘challenge the power brokered by vested interest groups who may therefore oppose the introduction of deliberative forums or their findings’’ (Niemeyer and Spash, 2001, p 575). The fact that the Mid-Lachlan RVC drifted to a more deliberative format effectively undermined the connection between positions the NSW Farmer’s Association (NSWFA) took on behalf of all farmers within the centralized process and those of the individual members on the committee. The NSW Nature Conservation Council noted this separation of, and tension between, centralized and decentralized levels. They observed: ‘‘Our problem is not with farmers, but with the NSW Farmers’ Association ... con-

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servationists and farmers are already working together despite NSW Farmers’’ (Wright, 1998). The question as to who participants in decentralized deliberative forums could, or do, represent is problematic, and has led to problems of legitimacy in experiments with deliberative democracy. Often participants have not been authorized, and have no way to be accountable to the various groups they have been selected to, or could potentially, represent. ‘‘For that reason, they appear to lack the sources of legitimacy that are appealed to for traditional democratic representative institutions’’ (O’Neill, 2001, p 493). (Although as Eckersley asserts, ‘‘any consensus or compromise that may be reached is likely to carry some measure of contingent legitimacy, at least for so long as circumstances do not change, most social groups are represented and the interests of the marginalised are given proper hearing, and/or no new arguments or information are brought forward’’ [Eckersley, 1999, p 33].) This deficiency is partially addressed by the involvement of interest groups in nominating participants and vetting outcomes. As discussed earlier, the added value of the MidLachlan RVC—indeed the value more generally of decentralized processes—was its ability to transform interests and achieve a local consensus on acceptable modes of vegetation management among diverse interests. This is a more significant contribution to that envisaged by the NSW Farmers’ Association, which regard the RVCs as simply a means of harnessing local expertise in fleshing out the details of preexisting interest-group bargains. If this expanded deliberative outcome is to be promoted within an institutional design that couples centralized and decentralized decision-making forums, then clearly more thought needs to be given to protecting the decentralized mode of operating from being ‘‘colonized’’ by the centralized interest group mode. On the one hand, interest groups have the potential to colonize the decentralized deliberative processes, by revoking sponsorship of the process, asking participants to act as ‘‘delegates’’ (to eschew discursivity and impose a strategic bargaining model) and by asking ‘‘nominated’’ participants to withdraw. On the other hand, centralized interest group processes can potentially add something to decentralized deliberative processes. In attempts to plan, design or manage the interrelationships between environment, health, economy or society in a particular space, it is argued that one needs to acknowledge the importance and existence of centralized representative processes while seeking also to construct parallel decentralized deliberative processes. In this context,

it is crucial that one achieve a balance between the two. The case study suggests attention needs to be directed towards designing institutional ‘‘firewalls’’ between centralized interest-group representation and decentralized weak deliberation. The conclusion here is, paradoxically, that in order to enhance the functioning of decentralized deliberative fora, it is necessary is to study the way the interest group ‘‘sponsors’’ interact with the fora. This is at least one crucial point that has a bearing on the quality of the ultimate public policy outcome.

Representing Different Constituencies The tensions highlighted between the centralized and decentralized processes seem to have been most pronounced within the farming constituency. Considerable pressure was placed on those participants designated as farm and landholder ‘‘representatives’’ to ‘‘abandon’’ the deliberative process or try to make ‘‘bargains.’’ This raises the question why other groups, such as the environment lobby, did not suffer similar organizational problems. There is at least a theoretical difference between the difficulties faced in different constituencies participating in interest-group representative versus deliberative-based, decision-making processes. In interest-group mediated bargaining, representativeness is viewed in relation to the procedures and practices adopted for the represented to authorize and make accountable the representatives. This is to ensure that the ideas and interests of the represented are transferred to the representative, and that the representative complies with the wishes of the represented (see Pitkin, 1967, for a theoretical discussion). By contrast, within a deliberative exercise, individuals are encouraged to step away from, without being indifferent to, their interest positions (Femia, 1997, p 365). The theory implies that deliberative exercises require participants to be relatively autonomous from the groups that nominated them as participants, while interest group ‘‘representative’’ processes require participants to establish that they are not autonomous from those they represent. This tension over levels of autonomy is likely to differ, contingent on the constituency which is being organized and represented. One can usefully distinguish between groups ‘‘acting as a representative of’’ a constituency that has presence and voice (most humans) or ‘‘acting in solidarity’’ with a third-party constituency that lacks voice and presence (nonhumans and the environment) (see discus-

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sion by O’Neill, 2001). Groups ‘‘representing’’ farmers have members who expect to be able to hold representatives accountable and seek to limit their autonomy. Environment groups, on the other hand, organize individuals who express solidarity with the environment: the environment itself lacks voice and presence. As such, environment spokespeople have a much lower burden of representative proof. Indeed, they often use references to science or expert knowledge, rather than accountability and authorization, to legitimate representative activities which garners spokespeople significant autonomy. As O’Neill observed in the absence of the usual forms of legitimation available to those speaking for various human constituencies, ‘‘the remaining source of legitimacy to claim to speak in such cases is epistemic. Those who claim to speak on behalf of those without voice do so by an appeal to their having knowledge of objective interests of those groups, often combined with special care for them’’ (O’Neill 2001, p 496). For ‘‘solidarity’’ groups, there is only a slight difference between the level of autonomy from members required in deliberative modes of decision making and that already enjoyed in interest-group bargaining. Therefore, when deliberative processes are set within a ‘‘representative’’ interest group process, as occurred in the case under consideration, environmental participants will be able to straddle the different institutional territory easier than farmer representatives. This is demonstrated by the fact that farmer participants on the RVCs had to constantly fend off the demands, of the NSW Farmers’ Association and other farmers, that they adopt the strategic bargaining imperatives of the interest-group process in what was developing as a deliberative process. This largely theoretical interpretation raises some important areas of research. In particular, the need to explore, on the basis of a much broader survey of empirical data, the impact of constituency type on deliberative and interest-group modes of decision making.

SUMMARY

AND

CONCLUSIONS

Accounts of public policy typically revolve around policy participants, such as interest groups, in exchanges with policy makers. Groups attempt to achieve access to policy makers in exchange for assisting policy makers to generate workable policy. This exchange occurs principally between leaders of groups and public servants in the somewhat rarefied atmosphere of formal inquiries, committees, or

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working groups. This makes for stable and relatively incremental policy making. However, in the context of issues where often this incremental approach would lead to preemptive action that would further deteriorate the ecological base, governments may partake in impositional actions. Subsequent to such impositions, policy makers tend to shepherd the expanded cast of stakeholders back towards the stable politics of incremental policy making. In this case, mechanisms such as ‘‘forums’’ or ‘‘task forces’’ of the ‘‘respectable’’ main stakeholders are increasingly common. The NVC Act illustrates an example of an attempt to recreate some policy-making stability after an impositional episode. In so doing, it launched quite an innovate set of decision-making institutions. Specifically, decentralized local decision making fora, which exhibited some characteristics of deliberative decision making, were coupled with centralized interest-group mediation. This combination implicitly promised to create a framework for delivering acceptable principles for vegetation management through centralized interest mediation and workable regional plans through decentralized deliberation. The case study material illustrates the interdependence, in both a negative and positive direction, of centralized interest group mediated processes and decentralized local participatory, even deliberative, processes. It highlights that the potential gain of coupling these two modes and scales of decision making may rely on at least three additional issues being resolved. Firstly, given that the benefit of the coupling itself relies on the decentralized committees drifting to a deliberative mode of decision making—not simply reproducing centralized interest group politics—there is a need to put effort into facilitating that drift. A potential strategy might include providing relevant training for participants and facilitators. Secondly, the case study illustrates that a high level of commitment is required from the relevant interest groups for decentralized processes to be effective. Methods must be developed to partition off the decentralized processes in order to guard against attempts to use these arenas as a continuation of an interest group’s political campaign. The most effective means of so doing, in fact, may be for policy makers to introduce measures that reduce the risks to interest groups where participants in decentralized deliberative processes show autonomy and pursue positions that may differ from the interest groups that sponsored them. Thirdly, in addressing the problems that emerge from the coupling of centralized and decentralized modes of decision making, due attention needs to be given to the different organizational challenges inherent

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in representing different types of constituencies and how these impact on the tension that arises between these modes. In Australia, there is almost a common-sense recognition by both government and academics that there is a need to manage interrelationships between economy, society, environment, and health. However, such endeavors will require attention to modes of governance and institution building. Given their explicit concern with inclusive and deliberative decision-making processes, the set of arrangements reviewed in this article highlight points of discussion in these institution-building efforts.

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