"IS THERE A GOD?" R. D A V I D B R O I L E S * The question " I s there a God ? " has been central to philosophical discussions of the problems or religious belief. A r g u m e n t s have been advanced for the existence of God, against the existence of God, and for the position t h a t no sound arguments can be given either for or against the existence of Gid. While I do not intend to deny the i m p o r t a n c e of the question asked, I do w a n t to deny its position as the p r i m a r y question for philosophers to deal with in discussino_: religious beliefs. I shall a r g u e t h a t before one can answer the question " I s t h e r e a G o d ? " certain other questions, which I shall call religious questions, have to be raised and answered. These questions, and the answers given, will have a direct bearing' on the t y p e of answer one would o'ive to the question of whether God exists or not. My comments are p r o m p t e d by Professor B o w m a n L. C l a r k e ' s article, " P h i l o s o p h i c a l A r g u m e n t s for G o d . " (1) In this article Professor Clarke makes three points that are r e l e v a n t to the thesis of this paper. F i r s t of all, he criticizes those who a t t e m p t to t r e a t theolo~.,'ical expressions as merely emotive expressions, or as disguised m o r a l discourse or as some unique type of discourse. He points out that such a t t e m p t s " t e l l people they have been using language in a w a y which they would d e n y . " (P. 3) Then he adds this i m p o r t a n t criticism : To t r e a t theological discourse as something other t h a n descriptive discourse results in a radical b r e a k between religious u t t e r a n c e s and the o r d i n a r y descriptive s t a t e m e n t s of our daily lives as well as the descriptive l a n g u a g e of science. Such a b r e a k tends to isolate religion f r o m our intellectual culture in general. One m a y wish to maintain t h a t the God of Abraham, Isaac, and J a c o b is not the God of the philosophers, but to m a i n t a i n t h a t we use an entirely different type of discourse in t a l k i n g about Him, results in a m a j o r b r e a k between religion and some of the m a j o r aspects of h u m a n life. (Pp. 3-4) I shall a r g u e t h a t C l a r k e ' s own analysis of the a r g u m e n t s for the existence of God is subject to essentially this same criticism of m a k i n g a m a j o r b r e a k between religion and some of * U n i v e r s i t y of Georgia~ U.S.A. 1 SOohia, I I I , no. 3 (1964), pp. 3-14. S u b s e q u e n t p a g e r e f e r e n c e s a r e to t h i s a r t i c l e .

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the major aspects of human life. The second point I wish to stress in Clarke's article has to do with his analysis of the arguments for the existence o f God. Clarke contends that " w h a t St. Anselm has demonstrated in his proof is that if it is possible to formulate an adequate definite description for God, then God necessarily exists." (I'. 6) But what would constitute an " a d e q u a t e definite desc r i p t i o n " of God? Clarke lays down three conditions: First, it must be a consistent definite description. Otherwise, the existence of God would be an impossibility.. Secondly, the definite description must be formulated in terms of predicates which are descriptively meaningful. If not, there would be a question as to whether or not it was a "possible c o n c e p t . " Thirdly, the definite description must be such that the individual described is a necessary, not a contingent individual. (P. 6) But what is meant b y " n e c e s s a r y individual ? " Clarke believes that St. Thomas' Five Ways deal with this question. Aquinas' arguments fulfill the three conditions laid down for an adequate concept of God by pointing out that " t h e statement asserting the existence of God follows solely from the axioms which were used to characterize the common spatio-temporal world disclosed in e x p e r i e n c e . " (P. 10) This explication of God p o r t r a y s God as the creator of the world in that God is a necessary condition for the existence of any spatio-temporal individuals whatever, or for the existence of any possible world. The third point of this article is the reformulation of the classical theological arguments in terms of contemporary linguistic studies. This involves the construction of a language for describing adequately the common world disclosed to us in experience. Such a language would involve syntactical rules, dealing with the logical structure of the language, and semantical rules for interpretation of the signs of the language. A n y adequate linguistic f r a m e w o r k for making true statements about the common world disclosed in experience should~ include the logical axioms, axioms of set theory, and the axioms for a calculus of individuals. Given these axioms there will be some statements whose t r u t h conditions can be determined solely by examining the rules or axioms, e.g. " i t is either raining or it is not r a i n i n g " and " 2 + 2 = 4 . " Such statements are necessary statements, and they are true or f a l s e " no m a t t e r what we observe about the things which make up our w o r l d . " (P. 13) With this language in mind Professor Clarke then asserts that " t h e theological problem becomes the problem of constructing an adequfite definite des-

cription for God in t e r m s of our p r i m i t i v e symbols and dem o n s t r a t i n g t h a t the statement asserting his existence is necessarily t r u e - - t h a t is, t h a t the s t a t e m e n t follows f r o m the rules of the l a n g u a g e . " (P. 14) The three points in C l a r k e ' s article t h a t I have stressed are (1) a n y analysis of religious discourse should not divorce religious statements f r o m other m a j o r aspects of h u m a n a c t i v i t y ; (2) t h a t the a r g u m e n t s f o r the existence of God a t t e m p t to explicate God as a necessary condition of a n y possible existent thing (a necessary b e i n g ) ; and (3) t h a t this can be best u n d e r s t o o d b y showing t h a t the s t a t e m e n t " G o d e x i s t s " is a necessary statement which follows ~rom the rules of descriptive discourse. My c o m m e n t s on Professor C l a r k e ' s p a p e r center a r o u n d ~hese three points. Since he does not construct such a l a n g u a g e and does not present the a r g u m e n t for the existence of God it would be s o m e w h a t beside the point to criticize the proposed plan by criticizino' a would-be a r g u m e n t . I would, rather, like to grant that such an a r g u m e n t can be formulated, for m y criticism will be directed against w h a t can be concluded f r o m such an a r g u m e n t r a t h e r than against the possibility of constructing the a r g u m e n t . My question is this: Granted t h a t one can prove " G o d e x i s t s " is a necessary statement and therefore t h a t God necessarily exists, w h a t has one said when he has said this in t e r m s of the p r o g r a m outlined? I shall ar~'ue that the conclusion of such an a r g u m e n t would be of little significance. C l a r k e ' s first point was t h a t a n y analysis of religious beliefs should not " r e s u l t in a m a j o r b r e a k between religion and some of the m a j o r aspects of h u m a n l i f e . " While Clarke seems to have in mind scientific activities, I would like to stress another aspect of h u m a n activity which a p p e a r s to me to be v e r y closely associated with religious belief. I should t h i n k it an incontestable claim t h a t religions beliefs are r e l a t e d to decisions a b o u t w h a t course of action one should follow. T h a t is, in decisions about the direction of one's activities, of right and wrono' and good and bad, the religious m a n would not separate these decisions f r o m his religious beliefs. Religious beliefs are tied up with n o r m a t i v e considerations about w h a t course of action a religious m a n ought to pursue. I take this to b e an empirical claim about religions, and not a definition of w h a t a religious belief is, or w h a t religious men are.

]f one grants that religious beliefs have to do with the actions of men, then certainly this would be true of the statement "There is a God." I would suppose then that a religious man, ~vhen attempting to justify some decision he has made, would,

in the course of justification, introduce the reason " B e c a u s e there is a G o d . " This statement, " B e c a u s e there is a G o d , " is a n answer the religious man would give to certain questions, e.g. " W h y do you believe that y o u r life has a n y significance?," or " W h y do you believe that good t r i m n p h s over e v i l ? " Of course, the question t h a t this s t a t e m e n t would be an answer to would v a r y with different religions and different religiou~ men. I certainly do not propose to specify w h a t the " r e l i g i o u s q u e s t i o n " might be. B u t I would like to raise this question with r e g a r d to C l a r k e ' s a r g u m e n t s : G r a n t e d you can p r o v e t h a t the s t a t e m e n t "God e x i s t s " is necessarily true, w h a t question have you answered? My objection to C l a r k e ' s thesis is t h a t w h a t e v e r m a y be the question to the answer, the question will have v e r y little, if anything, to do with h m n a n action,~ and thus he too is guilty of m a k i n g a b r e a k between religion and other activities of h n m a n life which certainly are associated with religions belief. My criticism t u r n s on the claim " G o d e x i s t s " is a necessary statement. Necessary s t a t e m e n t s are those whose t r u t h can be d e t e r m i n e d solely on the basis of our axioms and rules. Their t r u t h or falsity is i n d e p e n d e n t of w h a t we observe about the things which m a k e up our world, i.e. n o t h i n g could possibly h a p p e n that would falsify these necessary statements. I t has been argued by P r o f e s s o r Clarke t h a t the s t a t e m e n t " G o d exi s t s " both denies nothing, that is, is compatible with a n y s t a t e of affairs, and y e t asserts something, just as tautologies are assertions about necessary states of affairs. Thus " G o d e x i s t s " is necessarily true. L e t us g r a n t that necessary s t a t e m e n t s do assert necessary states of affairs. And let us g r a n t that "God e x i s t s " is necessarily true. Then the s t a t e m e n t " G o d e x i s t s " is compatible with the occurrence of a n y state of affairs. Then the statement " G o d e x i s t s " is really like the statement " I t is either raining or it is not r a i n i n g . " Both would be true a n d both are compatible with a n y state of affairs, f o r both deny nothing. But, and w h a t seems equally i m p o r t a n t , both are insignificant. If, in r e p l y to m y question " S h o u l d I t a k e an umbrella to the g a m e ? , " m y companion were to r e p l y " I t i s either going to rain or it is not going to r a i n , " I should not feel obliged to t h a n k him for this u n i m p o r t a n t bit of information. I should not h a v e m y plans affected b y such a reply, a n d would still not k n o w w h a t to do. I f G o d ' s existence is compatible with a n y state of affairs, then t h a t he exists is of little or no concern to mortals, for we shall h a v e no cause to a l t e r o u r plans in light of the t r u t h of the necessary s t a t e m e n t " G o d exists." In answer to the question " H o w would I live m y l i f e ? , " I would find the r e p l y " W e l l , t h e r e is a God you k n o w " of little significance if this s t a t e m e n t were like " I t is

7 either raining or it is not, r a i n i n g . " Possibly there is some w a y the s t a t e m e n t " G o d e x i s t s , " on C l a r k e ' s analysis, is related to other aotivities than those associated with n o r m a t i v e considerations about w h a t course of action should be followed. Possibly " G o d e x i s t s " is related to o u r descriptive or scientific knowledo'e r a t h e r t h a n m o r a l knowledge. But I t h i n k not. Let us again tzrant the answer " G o d exists." Now, w h a t is the question: One can say of Clarke, as he says of Aquinas, " i f his proof is successful, then the existence of God is a necessary condition for the existence of a n y moving i n d i v i d u a l . " (P. 8) But does this give us the question to the answer? I t h i n k not. Surely the questmn cannot be " W h y do things move : " The answer, " B e c a u s e there is a G o d , " would not be totally s a t i s f a c t o r y because this answer would only tell us a necessary condition for motion, not the necessary a n d sufficient conditions. I would suppose t h a t a more s a t i f a e t o r y answer to the question " W h y do things m o v e ? " would be " T h i n g s move for a lot of different reasons; which things are you talking about :~" In other words, the most fruitful response to the question would p r o b a b l y be to ask w h a t changes w e r e in need of explanation. One would then explain the motion of the object in question by statino' those conditions which are necessary and sufficient to bring about the change in question. One of the necessary conditions, if Aquinas and Clarke a r e right, would be " B e c a u s e there is a G o d . " But since this would be a necessary condition of a n y p a r t i c u l a r change, then it would be a p a r t of all explanations of change or motion. B u t since this s t a t e m e n t would be a p a r t of all explanation it would be irrelevsmt to include it as a point in the explanation of a n y p a r t i c u l a r change. I f one w e r e t r y i n g to explain w h y object A w e n t to the right r a t h e r t h a n to the left, it would explain n o t h i n g to say " B e c a u s e God exists," for if object A had gone to the left, one would still be able to state t h a t a necessary condition of it ~'oing t h a t w a y was " B e c a u s e God exists." Therefore, since " B e c a u s e God e x i s t s " could be a p a r t of all explanations of change, then it need not be included in a n y e x p l a n a t i o n of some p a r t i c u l a r change, because it in effect explains nothing. I have been t r y i n g to point out t h a t it is certainly not obvious w h a t question " B e c a u s e God e x i s t s " answers. G r a n t e d t h a t one can p r o v e " G o d e x i s t s " is a necessary statement, m y question is simply, so w h a t have y o u p r o v e d ? One could r e p l y t h a t G o d ' s existence has been proved, and while it a d m i t t e d l y m a k e s no difference to either our n o r m a t i v e j u d g m e n t s or descriptive or scientific j u d g m e n t s w h e t h e r God exists or not, i f he does, then we should acknowledge it. To this I can only-

8 m a k e an analogy. I t is an analogy between one who m a k e s proofs for the existence of God and the m a n who calls the numbers at a bingo parlor. The bingo caller has his cage, and it contains numbers. As he draws them out of the cage he m e r e l y looks at them and calls out w h a t he sees. It m a k e s no difference to him w h e t h e r it is B - - 4 or 0--72. Now the philosopher is like the bingo caller. He starts out with his constructed language. This is his cage. And it contains various items - - syntactical rules, semantical rules, primitive terms, etc. And reaching into the cage, by deduction, of course, he d r a w s out the conclusions as the bingo caller draws out the balls of wood. The conclusion is noted and r e a d out by the philosopher much as the bingo caller does. A n d just as all the numbers are a l r e a d y in the bingo cage, so all the conclusions are in the p h i l o s o p h e r ' s language cage. B u t this is where the a n a l o g y ends. F o r while the bino'o caller does not care which n u m b e r comes up, the players do. Which n u m b e r is called can mean winning or losing for the players. So the n u m b e r called means a lot. Now the philosopher, with his neat set of axioms, definitions, and rules reaches into his giant cao'e and plucks out a theorem. And in a loud voice he announces - - " T h e r e is a G o d . " But nobody will " b i n g o " on t h a t p a r t i c u l a r call. " T h e r e is a G o d " is a free space on every card, which is to say it m a k e s no difference to the players whether it is called or not. All the cards remain unchanged. I have tried to point out that C l a r k e ' s analysis of the ar~'uments for the existence of God would give us a conclusion the significance of which is not altogether clear. But I use C l a r k e ' s a r g m n e n t s only as an illustration of a more a'eneral point. While philosophers have stewed over the a r g u m e n t s for or against the existence of God. it is usually not obvious w h a t issue will be settled if one side is victorious over the other. W h a t if there is a God? W h a t has one p r o v e n if he proves t h a t God exists'! The question " I s there a G o d " is like any other question. I t is an i m p o r t a n t question only within the context of a p r o b l e m t h a t i'equires f o r its solution the affirmation of the existence of God. Let me illustrate this point. Suppose someone asked " I s y o u r son five feet tall ~" We would be able to answer this question by m e a s u r i n g y o u r son. F u r t h e r , the answer to this question could be i m p o r t a n t , for example, w h e n you are b u y i n g clothes for y o u r son. W e would k n o w w h a t size to get if we k n o w how tall he is. So it is with the question " I s there a G o d ? " I t seems to me v e r y difficult to go about answering this question w i t h o u t first s t a t i n g w h a t p r o b l e m will be solved if the question is answered. W h a t is the question t h a t " T h e r e is a G o d " answers? W i t h o u t the question, the a n s w e r becomes somewhat vacuous - - or at least

of little significance. I f the question "Is there a G o d ? " is to be of any significance f o r the philosopher to answer, it will be of significance only in light of other questions which will be answered as a result of answering' it. L e t us call these prim a r y questions religious questions. My point, then, is t h a t unless one keeps these religious questions in mind ( w h a t e v e r t h e y m a y be) the philosophical question " I s there a G o d ? " or " C a n you prove there is a G o d ? " becomes little more t h a n the drone mumble of the bingo caller announcing " O - - 7 5 " to an: e m p t y house.

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