ERA Forum (2012) 12:685–711 DOI 10.1007/s12027-011-0243-7 C A S E L AW O F T H E E U RO P E A N U N I O N C O U RT S
Leading Judgments 1 July–30 September 2011 Editor: Karolina Rokicka, M.A., M. Iur. Comp. (KR) · Contributors: Laviero Buono, LL.M. (LB) · Kassiani Christodoulou, LL.M. (KC) · Sophie Horton, LL.B. (SH) · Daniel Gärtner, M.A. (DG) · Florence Hartmann-Vareilles, Avocate (FHV) · Leyre Maiso, LL.M. (LM) · Dr. Michele Messina (MM) · Dr. María Pilar Nuñez Ruiz (MPNR) · Killian O’Brien, LL.M. (KOB) Published online: 17 January 2012 © ERA 2012
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice Brahim Samba Diouf v Ministre du Travail, de l’Emploi et de l’Immigration (Case C-69/10) Judgment of the Court of Justice (Second Chamber): 28 July 2011 Directive 2005/85/EC – Minimum standards on procedures in member states for granting and withdrawing refugee status – ‘Decision taken on [the] application for asylum’ within the meaning of Article 39 of Directive 2005/85 – Application by a third country national for refugee status – Failure to provide reasons justifying the grant of international protection – Application rejected under an accelerated procedure – No remedy to deal with the application under an accelerated procedure – Right to effective judicial review The issue raised before the Court of Justice in this reference for a preliminary ruling by the Tribunal Administratif de Luxembourg on 3 February 2010 concerned the interpretation of the right to an effective remedy as prescribed by Article 39 of Council Directive 2005/85/EC on minimum standards on procedure in member states for granting and withdrawing refugee status1 (hereinafter ‘Directive 2005/85/EC’). Prior to stating the applicable law relevant to this particular reference, the Court drew attention to Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which guarantees the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal established by law. As no further 1 OJ L 326, 13.12.2005, p. 13.
K. Rokicka, Head of Section () European Public Law, Academy of European Law, Metzer Allee 4, Trier, Germany e-mail:
[email protected]
686
K. Rokicka
reference was made to this provision in answering the questions posed by the member state’s court, it is difficult to say whether and to what extent the Charter played a role in the formation of the Court’s opinion and any attempt to do so would amount to mere speculation. The Court instead focused on Directive 2005/85/EC, the aims of which include, inter alia, (a) ensuring that a speedy decision is reached in instances of asylum applications (bearing in mind the discretion to be afforded to member states to organise their national procedures according to domestic needs – including the capacity to make provision for accelerated or prioritised procedures);2 (b) ensuring that the applicant’s rights are satisfactorily recognised and upheld (including his/her right to effective access to procedures and procedural guarantees);3 and (c) providing that the basic principle of Community law that decisions taken on asylum applications must be subject to an effective remedy is upheld.4 The operative provisions of Directive 2005/85/EC provide that examinations of applications may be accelerated in certain instances including situations where the applicant clearly does not qualify as a refugee; the application is unfounded;5 or where the applicant has misled the authorities.6 Article 39 of Directive 2005/85/EC was of particular relevance for the case at hand as it provides for “the right to an effective remedy before a court of tribunal” in instances where “a decision [has been] taken on their application for asylum [. . .].”7 The relevant law of the member state makes provision for decisions to be taken on asylum applications by the competent minister. It allows the minister to employ an accelerated procedure in certain instances, it imposes time limits on the period within which an appeal may be brought and it also excludes the possibility of an appeal against decisions made by the minister to rule on the merits of the application for international protection under the accelerated procedure. This final stipulation is the crux of the procedure for a preliminary ruling. The Court of Justice ruled that Article 39 of Directive 2005/85/EC and the principle of effective judicial protection do not preclude domestic rules which do not allow for an appeal. The Court went on to limit this by holding that this can only be the case where the reasons vindicating the use of the accelerated procedure can themselves be subject to review by a national court. Any determination to this effect is to be made by the referring court. The reference had been made against the backdrop of an application made by the applicant in these proceedings for international protection, which, in the absence of reasons justifying the grant of same, was rejected by the Minister for Labour, Employment and Immigration of Luxembourg. The applicant was a Mauritanian national 2 11th recital of Directive 2005/85/EC. 3 13th recital of Directive 2005/85/EC. 4 27th recital of Directive 2005/85/EC. 5 The application was deemed to be unfounded in instances where the criteria set out in Council Directive
2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the protection granted (OJ L 304, 30.9.2004, p. 12; the so-called Qualification Directive) were not satisfied. 6 Article 23 of Directive 2005/85/EC. 7 Article 39 of Directive 2005/85/EC.
Leading Judgments 1 July–30 September 2011
687
who made statements to the effect that he had fled from slavery with the intention of seeking better conditions for himself and his family. He further asserted his fear of being hunted down and killed as a consequence of the theft of €300, which he used to finance his voyage to Europe. The Luxembourgish Minister for Labour, Employment and Immigration applied the accelerated decision procedure on the bases, first, that the applicant had misled the authorities by using a false passport and, secondly, that he clearly did not qualify for international protection as his primary reasons for fleeing were economic. Moreover, his fear of reprisals was not found to be covered by the Geneva Convention and it was purely hypothetical and not well-grounded. The referring court considered that the decision to use the accelerated procedure was not without consequences for the applicant for asylum as it altered time limits as well as limiting the number of judicial remedies open to the applicant. As such, the referring court considered that this might represent a restriction on access to justice which could undermine the purpose and effect of Directive 2005/85/EC. Based on these considerations of access to justice, the Tribunal Administratif posed two questions to the Court of Justice, asking first whether Article 39 of Directive 2005/85/EC precludes national rules preventing an applicant for asylum from appealing following a decision to rule on the merits of the application under an accelerated procedure. The Court was furthermore asked to clarify, in the event that the first question was answered in the negative, whether such legislation was prohibited by the general principle that there had to be an effective remedy under Community law. In its ruling, the Court of Justice merged the first and second question presented due to their close connection to each other. After noting that the measures implemented by Directive 2005/85/EC are minimum standards only and that the member states have a broad discretion with respect to the organisation of the processing of applications for asylum, the Court reiterated that an accelerated procedure can be used if the grounds justifying the use of such a procedure are given, for example, where all the indications are that the application is unfounded. It also restated the fundamental principle underlying Article 39 of Directive 2005/85/EC that member states must “ensure that applicants for asylum have the right to an effective remedy before a court or tribunal against the decision listed in paragraph 1 [of Article 39].”8 In reaching a determination on the first question, the Court deemed it appropriate to ascertain whether a decision taken under an accelerated procedure constitutes a ‘decision taken on [the] application for asylum’ as that term is to be understood under the terms of Article 39. Due to the non-exhaustive nature of the wording of the provision, a ‘decision taken on [the] application for asylum’ includes a series of decisions and that the applicant must have a remedy with respect to those decisions that entail rejection of the application for substantive reasons. Hence, preparatory or organisational decisions are not covered by the terms of that provision and it does not require a specific remedy in national law against decisions to examine an application by way of an accelerated procedure. As regards whether the rules at issue in the proceedings in Luxembourg were generally inconsistent with the right to an effective judicial remedy, the Court of Justice 8 Paragraph 35 of the judgment.
688
K. Rokicka
focussed on whether the lack of a right to appeal against decisions taken under the accelerated procedure was tantamount to a denial of that right to an effective remedy. Relying on the precedent of the Safalero decision,9 the Court stated that national legislation with the effect of preventing an individual from bringing court proceedings to challenge a decision taken by public authorities was not prohibited as long as there was available to the individual affected a legal remedy which ensured respect for the rights conferred on him by European Union law. Applying this to the present proceedings, it was essential that the reasons advanced as justification for the use of an accelerated procedure must be capable of being effectively challenged at a later stage. It would not be compatible with European Union law for national rules to be construed as precluding all judicial review of the reasons which resulted in the application being examined under an accelerated procedure. The Court also found the time-limits imposed under the provisions effective in Luxembourg were adequate and did not amount to a surreptitious obstacle to the right of access to a judicial remedy. Thus, Article 39 of Directive 2005/85/EC and the principle of effective judicial protection were found not to preclude national rules which do not provide for a separate action against decisions of national authorities to use an accelerated procedure when processing an application for international protection. KOB
Direct taxation Lady & Kid A/S, Direct Nyt ApS, A/S Harald Nyborg Isenkram- og Sportsforretning, KID-Holding A/S contre Skatteministeriet (Affaire C-398/09) Arrêt de la Cour de justice (grande chambre): 6 septembre 2011 Non-remboursement d’une taxe indûment versée – Enrichissement sans cause en raison du lien existant entre l’introduction de cette taxe et la suppression d’autres taxes Dans le litige au principal, quatre entreprises10 qui opéraient toutes dans le commerce de détail s’opposent au refus du Skatteminsteriet (Ministères des Contributions) de leur accorder le remboursement d’une taxe patronale, illégalement perçue, appelée contribution de soutien au marché de l’emploi (arbejsmarkedsbidrag, ci-après l’« AMBI »). Le Skatteministeriet refuse le remboursement au motif que l’économie réalisée par ces entreprises, suite à la suppression des charges sociales pendant la période où elles étaient redevables de l’AMBI a compensé intégralement l’AMBI payée par lesdites entreprises. En effet, la taxe patronale mentionnée est entrée en vigueur en même temps et en contrepartie d’une suppression d’un nombre important de charges sociales, qui avaient certes en commun les assujettis et bénéficiaires respectivement. C’est ainsi que l’Østre Landsret, tribunal qui a été saisi par les demanderesses au principal, a estimé nécessaire d’interroger la Cour de justice sur l’interprétation 9 See the judgment of 11 September 2003 in Case C-13/01 Safalero [2003] ECR I-8679. 10 Lady & Kid A/S, Direct Nyt ApS, A/S Harald Nyborg Isenkram- og Sportsforretning et KID-Holding
A/S.
Leading Judgments 1 July–30 September 2011
689
du droit de l’Union en matière de répétition de l’indu, plus exactement en ce qui concerne les critères d’appréciation de l’exception pour répercussion et en général pour un enrichissement sans cause. Étant donné les faits de l’affaire au principal, la Cour se penche sur la question de savoir s’il existe un enrichissement sans cause engendré par une augmentation du prix de la vente des produits lors de la période pendant laquelle la taxe en cause a été perçue, ou bien s’il existe un tel enrichissement suite à la suppression concomitante d’autres prélèvements perçus sur une assiette différente, sans modification des prix de vente de la part de l’assujetti. La Cour rappelle, comme il a déjà été constaté dans sa jurisprudence antérieure,11 qu’un Etat membre est obligé de rembourser les impositions perçues en violation du droit de l’Union, et que la seule exception à ce principe de remboursement est la répercussion directe de la taxe indue sur l’acheteur ; c’est-à-dire, lorsque l’opérateur répercute la charge de la taxe indûment perçue sur l’acheteur. Il est important de signaler que même avec cette répercussion, le remboursement de la taxe indue à l’opérateur n’entraîne pas nécessairement l’enrichissement sans cause de celui-ci, car la répercussion à travers les prix pratiqués, peut lui occasionner un préjudice lié à la diminution du volume des ventes. En conséquence, un Etat membre ne peut pas refuser le remboursement d’une taxe illégalement perçue au seul motif que le montant dû de la taxe a été économiquement compensé par la suppression d’un prélèvement licite d’un montant équivalent. En effet, cette suppression est un choix opéré par l’État membre qui peut impliquer des conséquences très diverses, mais pas nécessairement comporter un enrichissement sans cause. Ainsi, une fois tous ces raisonnements établis, la Cour affirme que le droit de l’Union s’oppose clairement à un refus de remboursement d’une taxe illicite au motif que les montants indûment versés para l’assujetti ont été compensés par une économie suite à la suppression concomitante d’autres prélèvements, dès lors qu’une telle compensation ne peut pas être regardée comme une enrichissement sans cause par rapport à cette taxe. MPNR
European Citizenship Secretary of State for Work and Pensions v Maria Dias (Case C-325/09) Judgment of the Court of Justice (Third Chamber): 21 July 2011 Free movement of persons – Directive 2004/38/EC – Article 16 – Right of permanent residence – Periods completed before the date of transposition of that directive – Legal residence – Residence based solely on a residence permit issued pursuant to Directive 68/360/EEC, without the conditions governing eligibility for any right of residence having been satisfied 11 Arrêt du 9 novembre 1983, San Giorgio, C-199/82, parr. 12; arrêt du 21 septembre 2000, Michaïlidis,
C-441/98 et C-442/98, parr. 30; arrêt du 10 avril 2008, Marks & Spencer, C-309/06, parr. 35 ; arrêt du 28 janvier 2010, Direct Parcel Distribution Belgium, C-264/08, parr. 45.
690
K. Rokicka
This preliminary reference from the British Court of Appeal concerned the ability of Maria Dias, a Portuguese national to access social security benefits in the United Kingdom. The Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act 1992 and the Income Support (General) Regulations 1987 are the pieces of legislation which apply to income support in England. Under this legislation an individual who can be described as ‘a person from abroad’ is not entitled to have access to these social benefits. However ‘a person from abroad’ can gain access to income support if they are granted a ‘right to reside’ in the United Kingdom. Such a ‘right to reside’ is not clearly defined in the statutes governing social security, but in can be gained in various ways, of most relevance here, under Article 16 of Directive 2004/38/EC,12 by residing and working for five years in another European Union member state. With regards to citizens of the European Union, certain rights of residence, granted in accordance with Article 6 of Directive 2004/38/EC are excluded and the payment of income support in this context is disallowed. However among other groups of persons, workers or self-employed persons within the meaning of the directive, and members of their families within the meaning of the directive are not regarded as ‘persons from abroad’ for the purposes of income support and are as such entitled to have access to benefits. Mrs Dias’ claim to social security benefits depended upon the extent to which she could demonstrate that she had fulfilled the criteria needed for her to gain a permanent ‘right of residence’ within the context of Article 16(1) of Directive 2004/38/EC. Article 16(4) was also of relevance to her case in that it states that once acquired the right of permanent residence shall be lost only through absence from the host member state for a period exceeding two consecutive years (the rationale being that once an individual has been absent from the member state for a period of two consecutive years, their links with the state have as such been ‘loosened’). Mrs Dias’ ability to claim that she had a ‘right to reside’ in the United Kingdom was dependent upon whether the periods of residence – which ended before the transposition period for Directive 2004/38/EC expired in April 2006 – should be taken into accounting when determining whether an individual possesses a ‘right to reside’. If Mrs Dias was unable to demonstrate that she fell within the Article 16 right to permanent residence, then she would have fallen within Article 7(1) of the Directive which provides that all Union citizens shall have the right of residence on the territory of another member state for a period of longer than three months if they: a. are workers or self employed persons in the host Member State, b. have sufficient resources for themselves and their family members not to become a burden on the social assistance system of the host member state during their period of residence and have comprehensive sickness insurance cover in the host member state. [. . .] 12 Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of
citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC (OJ L 158, 30.4.2004, p. 77; hereinafter ‘Directive 2004/38/EC’ or ‘the Directive’).
Leading Judgments 1 July–30 September 2011
691
However, permanent residence brings with it certain benefits, most notably exemption from conditions concerning sufficient resources. Once an individual can demonstrate that they have the status of permanent residence, they should have an equal opportunity to access state assistance as a national of the member state. This has been confirmed in cases such as Martínez Sala13 in which German authorities demanded of a Spanish woman that she produce a particular residence document. She was unable to provide this document and the German authorities therefore denied her access to child benefits. The Court of Justice took a strict approach to the situation, holding that the German authorities were not entitled to ask for this residence document from Mrs Sala because they would not have asked for it, or an equivalent, from a German citizen. This approach was confirmed in the case of Trojani.14 Any status less than that of permanent residence will not bring with it access to state assistance, however. That Directive 2004/38/EC protects the right of the state to refuse assistance in situations where the ‘person from abroad’ does not enjoy this status as is clear from Article 7(1) of the Directive (which is set out above). In the Court of Appeal It was argued that although Mrs Dias had completed five years with the status of a worker, she was unable to rely on this fact because Directive 2004/38/EC had not been in force at the time. It was contended by the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions that she could rely on years of work completed before the Directive came into force, if this period finished whilst the Directive was in force. In the Court of Justice The Court of Justice, relying on their previous judgment in the Lassal case,15 in which it was decided that periods of continuous residence of five years, completed before the date of transposition of Directive 2004/38/EC, in accordance with earlier European law instruments must be taken into account for the purposes of the acquisition of the right of permanent residence pursuant to Article 16(1) of the Directive. The Court then went on to question whether, in the light of this, the periods of residence of a Union citizen in a host member state which were (a) completed on the basis solely of a residence permit validly issued pursuant to an earlier directive16 without the conditions governing the entitlement to any right of residence having been met and which were (b) completed before 30 April 2006 could affect the acquisition of the right of permanent residence. Mrs Dias argued that the residence permit that she was issued by the government, because it was not revoked during her third period of residence when she was not 13 See the judgment of 12 May 1998 in Case C-85/96 Sala [1998] ECR I-02691. 14 See the judgment of 7 September 2004 in Case C-456/02 Trojani [2004] ECR I-07573. 15 See the judgment of 7 October 2010 in Case C-162/09 Lassal, not yet reported. 16 Council Directive 68/360/EEC of 15 October 1968 on the abolition of restrictions on movement and
residence within the Community for workers of Member States and their families (OJ L 257, 19.10.1968, p. 13; hereinafter ‘Directive 68/360/EEC’).
692
K. Rokicka
working, conferred upon her a right of residence. Mrs Dias submitted that this was so because the government of the host member state was free to revoke the residence permit but it did not do so. The United Kingdom and Danish Governments and the European Commission however argued for a contrary position – that the residence permit was purely a symbol of the right and did not, of itself, confer such a right. Ms Dias’ contention was rejected: the residence permit, as had been held by the Court of Justice on numerous occasions was not to be regarded as a measure giving rise to rights but as a measure to prove the position of the individual. As such it could not be held that residence permits issued pursuant to Directive 68/360/EEC were capable of establishing rights for their holders. As such it could not be concluded that periods of residence completed before the transposition of Directive 2004/38/EC solely on the basis of a residence permit which had been validly issued, but the conditions for which had not been met must be regarded as having been completed legally for the purposes of the acquisition of a right of residence under Article 16(1) of Directive 2004/38/EC. Despite this, because Maria Dias had already completed five years of permanent residence and this could be taken into account even if it ended before the end of the transposition period for the directive, she still had a right to permanent residence and as such access to state benefits. SH
Freedom to Provide Services Telefónica de España SA v Administración del Estado (Case C-284/10) Judgment of the Court (Seventh Chamber): 21 July 2011 Directive 97/13/EC – Common framework for general authorisations and individual licences in the field of telecommunications services – Fees and charges applicable to undertakings holding general authorisations – Article 6 – Interpretation – National legislation imposing an annual fee calculated on the basis of a percentage of gross operating income The reference for a preliminary ruling concerned the interpretation of Article 6 of Directive 97/13/EC which established a common framework for general authorisations and individual licences in the field of telecommunications services.17 The main aim of the Directive was the complete liberalisation of telecommunications services and infrastructures by 1 January 1998. Undoubtedly, the new European Union legislation made a significant contribution to the entry of new operators into the market, as part of the overall development of the information society. Regarding charges imposed on undertakings for authorisation procedures, the Directive indicated that all fees had to be based on objective, non-discriminatory and transparent criteria. To this extent, 17 Directive 97/13/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 April 1997 on a common
framework for general authorisations and individual licences in the field of telecommunications services (OJ L 117, 7.5.1997, p. 15; hereinafter ‘Directive 97/13/EC’ or ‘the Directive’).
Leading Judgments 1 July–30 September 2011
693
Article 6 of Directive 97/13/EC provided that such fees should only cover the administrative costs incurred in the issue, management, control and enforcement of the applicable general authorisation scheme. The reference in this case was made in the course of proceedings between Telefónica de España SA (‘Telefónica’) and Administración del Estado concerning assessments issued by the Comisión del Mercado de las Telecomunicaciones (Telecommunications Market Commission, henceforth ‘TMC’) in respect of a fee payable by the holders for the supply of telecommunications services to third parties. After having brought an administrative appeal before the Audiencia Nacional (National High Court) against the assessments issued against it by the TMC, which was then dismissed, Telefónica lodged a second appeal before the Tribunal Supremo (Supreme Court). Since the outcome of the proceedings before it depended on the interpretation of Directive 97/13/EC, the Tribunal Supremo decided to stay the proceedings and to refer a question to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling. The national court asked whether Article 6 of Directive 97/13/EC must be interpreted as precluding member state legislation imposing a fee on holders of general authorisations, which was calculated annually on the basis of the gross operating income of the chargeable operators and was applied for the purpose of defraying the administrative costs connected with the implementation of the scheme of general authorisations and individual licences. The Court of Justice argued that since the main goal of the Directive was the achievement of a complete liberalisation of telecommunication services and infrastructures, it would be rendered redundant if member states were free to establish the financial charges to be borne by undertakings in the sector. Payments, based as they must be on objective, non-discriminatory and transparent criteria, must not conflict with the objective of the complete liberalisation of the market, which implies opening it completely to competition. Fees imposed by member states should seek only to cover the administrative costs relating to the general authorisations procedures. They might cover, however, only the costs incurred for general administrative activities such as the issue, management, control and enforcement of the applicable general authorisation scheme. These fees should not include expenditure relating to other tasks such as the general supervisory activities of the national regulatory authority and, in particular, monitoring possible abuses of a dominant position. Indeed, that form of monitoring went beyond the work strictly generated by the implementation of general authorisations. In those circumstances, Directive 97/13/EC did not preclude member states from determining the amount of a fee under Article 6 of the Directive on the basis of the gross operating income of the chargeable persons. Such an interpretation was, moreover, borne out by recital 31 of the Directive, under which turnover can be considered to be a fair, simple and transparent criterion of attribution of such a fee between the holders of general authorisations. In the light of all of the foregoing considerations, the Court held that the answer to the question referred was that Article 6 of Directive 97/13/EC must be interpreted as not precluding legislation of a member state introducing a fee imposed on holders of general authorisations, calculated annually and on the basis of the gross operating income of the chargeable operators, which seeks to cover the administrative costs
694
K. Rokicka
relating to the issue, management, control and enforcement of those authorisations, to the extent that the combined revenue received by that member state by way of such a fee does not exceed all of those administrative costs, which, the Court held, is a matter for the national court to ascertain. LB
Intellectual property L’Oréal SA, Lancôme parfums et beauté & Cie SNC, Laboratoire Garnier & Cie, L’Oréal (UK) Ltd contre eBay International AG, eBay Europe SARL, eBay (UK) Ltd, Stephen Potts, Tracy Ratchford, Marie Ormsby, James Clarke, Joanna Clarke, Glen Fox, Rukhsana Bi (Affaire C-324/09) Arrêt de la Cour de justice (grande chambre) : 12 juillet 2011 Marques – Internet – Offre à la vente, sur une place de marché en ligne destinée à des consommateurs dans l’Union, de produits de marque destinés, par le titulaire, à la vente dans des États tiers – Retrait de l’emballage desdits produits – Directive 89/104/CEE – Règlement (CE) n◦ 40/94 – Responsabilité de l’exploitant de la place de marché en ligne – Directive 2000/31/CE (‘directive sur le commerce électronique’) – Injonctions judiciaires audit exploitant – Directive 2004/48/CE (‘directive sur le respect des droits de propriété intellectuelle) Dans cette affaire, le litige oppose L’Oréal, fabricant et titulaire de marques nationales et communautaires connues de produits cosmétiques et parfums, à eBay, lequel exploite une place de marché en ligne sur laquelle sont présentées des annonces pour des produits mis en vente par des personnes y ayant enregistré un compte vendeur. Le rôle d’eBay est également d’aider, le cas échéant, les vendeurs à optimiser leurs offres, créer leurs boutiques en ligne, promouvoir et augmenter leurs ventes. La rémunération d’eBay provient d’un prélèvement d’un pourcentage sur les transactions effectuées. Estimant que la vente de certains produits portait atteinte à ses droits de marque, L’Oréal a exercé un recours contre eBay devant la High Court of Justice (England &Wales) laquelle a formé un recours préjudiciel devant la Cour de justice de l’UE afin d’obtenir un certain nombre de clarifications sur l’application de la législation de l’UE applicable au droit des marques (Directive 89/104/CEE18 et Règlement 40/9419 ), au respect des droits de propriété intellectuelle (Directive 2004/48/CE20 ) et enfin au commerce électronique (Directive 2000/31/CE21 ). Les questions préjudicielles devant la Cour de justice portent d’une part sur les produits cosmétiques 18 Première directive 89/104/CEE du Conseil du 21 décembre 1988 rapprochant les législations des États
membres sur les marques (JO L 40 du 11.2.1989, p. 1). 19 Règlement (CE) n◦ 40/94 du Conseil, du 20 décembre 1993, sur la marque communautaire (JO L 11
du 14.1.1994, p. 1). 20 Directive 2004/48/CE du Parlement européen et du Conseil du 29 avril 2004 relative au respect des
droits de propriété intellectuelle (JO L 157 du 30.4.2004, p. 45; ci-après l’« Directive 2004/48/CE »). 21 Directive 2000/31/CE du Parlement européen et du Conseil du 8 juin 2000 relative à certains aspects
juridiques des services de la société de l’information, et notamment du commerce électronique, dans le marché intérieur (JO L 178 du 17.7.2000, p. 1; ci-après l’« Directive 2000/31/CE »).
Leading Judgments 1 July–30 September 2011
695
de démonstration et bouteilles échantillons non destinés à la vente aux consommateurs mais livrés par L’Oréal à ses distributeurs agréés dans le cadre d’un réseau fermé de distribution, ainsi que de produits vendus sans emballage ou destinés à la vente en dehors de l’UE et de L’EEE. D’autre part, à l’appui de son recours devant la juridiction interne, L’Oréal soutient qu’eBay est responsable de l’utilisation de marques de L’Oréal en raison de l’affichage de celles-ci sur son site Internet ainsi que de l’affichage sur le site d’opérateurs de moteurs de recherche, tels que Google « AdWords », de liens sponsorisés déclenchés par l’utilisation de mots-clés correspondant à ses marques. Selon L’Oréal, ce système dirige l’utilisateur directement vers des publicités ou des offres à la vente se rapportant à des produits identiques à ceux de la marque enregistrée par L’Oréal et dont certains portent atteinte à cette marque. Les questions préjudicielles peuvent être regroupées en deux catégories distinctes. Une première partie d’entre elles porte sur la question de savoir si, en tant que titulaire de la marque, L’Oréal peut s’opposer à la vente des produits revêtant sa marque sur la place de marché en ligne organisée par eBay. Sur ce point, la Cour de justice fait une distinction entre les différentes caractéristiques des ventes opérées sur eBay. En ce qui concerne tout d’abord la vente de produits de marque sur une place de marchés en ligne, la Cour de justice rappelle à titre liminaire que les droits exclusifs conférés par des marques ne peuvent en principe être invoqués que vis à vis d’opérateurs économiques (Affaire C-245/02, Anheuser-Busch22 ). Une opération en ligne faite par un opérateur privé sur eBay ne peut pas être considérée comme revêtant un caractère commercial, sauf à démontrer qu’en raison de leur volume ou de leur fréquence, les ventes dépassent la sphère d’une activité privée, ce qui semble être le cas en l’espèce. La Cour de justice rappelle que l’activité d’eBay doit être considérée comme une prestation de services au sens du Règlement et de la Directive sur les marques car les annonces publicitaires qu’elle organise créent une association évidente entre les produits de marque L’Oréal mentionnés dans ces annonces et la possibilité de les acheter via eBay. La question est alors de savoir si l’usage du motclé correspondant à une marque est susceptible de porter atteinte à l’une des fonctions de la marque. La Cour de justice a déjà précisé dans ses arrêts antérieurs (Affaires C236/08 à C-238/08, Google France et Google,23 C-558/08, Portakabin24 ) qu’il existe une telle atteinte lorsque la publicité ne permet pas ou permet seulement difficilement à l’internaute normalement informé et raisonnablement attentif de savoir si les produits ou les services visés par l’annonce proviennent du titulaire de la marque ou d’une entreprise économiquement liée à celui-ci ou, au contraire, d’un tiers. Le Règlement sur les marques communautaires confère à son titulaire un droit exclusif lui permettant d’interdire à tout tiers d’importer, sans son consentement, des produits revêtus de cette marque dans les territoires couverts par la marque, mais une fois les produits placés sur le territoire de l’espace EEE ou de l’UE avec le consentement du titulaire, ce droit se voit épuisé. S’agissant de produits de marque se 22 Voir arrêt du 16 novembre 2004, Anheuser-Busch, C-245/02, Rec. p. I-10989. 23 Voir arrêts du 23 mars 2010, Google France et Google, C-236/08 à C-238/08, non encore publié au
Recueil. 24 Voir arrêts du 8 juillet 2010, Portakabin et Portakabin, C-558/08, non encore publié au Recueil.
696
K. Rokicka
trouvant dans des Etats tiers, la Cour de Justice précise que les règles de la Directive et du Règlement sur les marques s’appliquent, dès lors que l’on peut constater que des offres sont destinées à des consommateurs de l’Union. Ce principe étant posé, il appartient ensuite aux juridictions nationales d’apprécier au cas par cas s’il existe des indices pertinents pour conclure qu’une offre à la vente, affichée sur une place de marché électronique accessible sur le territoire couvert par la marque, est destinée à des consommateurs situés sur celui-ci. Le site www.eBay.co.uk dans cette affaire indique que vraisemblablement les produits sont destinés à la vente au Royaume-Uni, voire de l’UE, territoires protégés par l’enregistrement de la marque L’Oréal. En ce qui concerne ensuite l’offre à la vente d’objets de démonstration et d’échantillons, la Cour de justice ne fait que rappeler sa jurisprudence développée dans l’affaire Silberquelle25 dans laquelle elle avait estimé que la fourniture gratuite de tels objets ne constitue pas une mise dans le commerce de ceux-ci par leur titulaire. La protection par le droit des marques est donc exclue. En ce qui concerne enfin la commercialisation des produits sans emballage, La Cour de justice rappelle sa jurisprudence constante selon laquelle le titulaire de la marque peut s’y opposer à condition qu’il démontre que ce déconditionnement porte atteinte à l’image de sa marque. Il appartient à la juridiction nationale au cas par cas d’analyser ce risque d’atteinte en fonction du rôle plus ou moins important joué par l’emballage dans la présentation de l’image du produit. Il est également possible que l’absence de certaines informations exigées par la législation sur les produits cosmétiques (Directive 76/768/CEE26 ), par exemple le nom et l’adresse du fabricant ou les précautions particulières d’emploi, porte préjudice à l’image du produit et habilite ainsi le titulaire de la marque à s’opposer à la vente de ces produits dans la mesure où il est porté atteinte à la fonction d’indication d’origine de la marque. Une deuxième partie des questions préjudicielles posées à la Cour de justice porte sur la responsabilité d’eBay en tant qu’exploitant d’une place de marché sur Internet. Sur la base de la réglementation sur les marques, pour être considéré comme responsable, il doit être établi que l’exploitant fait usage de la marque dans la vie des affaires. L’affichage, sur le site de l’exploitant d’une place de marché en ligne des offres de vente par les clients vendeurs ne suffit pas à conclure que l’exploitant soit responsable de l’usage de la marque. Selon la Cour de justice en effet, il conviendra de démontrer que l’utilisation du signe se fait dans le cadre de la propre communication commerciale de l’exploitant, ce qui n’est pas le cas en l’espèce. En effet, selon la Cour de justice, ce sont les clients vendeurs de l’exploitant et non l’exploitant lui-même qui font un usage de ce signe dans le cadre de la promotion de leurs produits. Par conséquent, la responsabilité d’eBay ne peut pas être engagée sur le fondement de la législation sur les marques. La question est alors de savoir si sa responsabilité peut être engagée sur la base d’autres dispositions de la législation de l’UE et notamment sur celle de la Directive 2000/31/CE dont la Cour de justice rappelle qu’elle est applicable à un service sur Internet comme celui offert par eBay consistant à faciliter les relations entre les vendeurs et les acheteurs de produits par le biais d’un système électronique 25 Voir arrêt du 15 janvier 2009, Silberquelle, C-495/07, Rec. p. I-137. 26 Directive 76/768/CEE du Conseil, du 27 juillet 1976, concernant le rapprochement des législations des
États membres relatives aux produits cosmétiques (JO L 262 du 27.9.1976, p. 169).
Leading Judgments 1 July–30 September 2011
697
de traitement et de stockage de données, à la demande individuelle d’un destinataire de service et, normalement contre rémunération. Cependant, la Directive 2000/31/CE ne met pas à la charge du prestataire une obligation générale de surveillance active. Pour être considéré comme responsable au sens de la Directive, il doit pouvoir être considéré comme un prestataire intermédiaire, c’est à dire qu’il doit jouer un rôle actif de nature à lui confier une connaissance ou un contrôle de ces données. Il sera par exemple considéré comme ayant joué ce rôle lorsqu’il aura prêté son assistance pour optimiser la présentation des offres à la vente en cause. S’il ne peut être démontré qu’il a joué un rôle actif, sa responsabilité ne pourra donc pas être engagée, à moins de démontrer qu’il a eu effectivement connaissance de l’activité ou de l’information illicite. Dans cette hypothèse, il pourra alors lui être demandé de payer des dommages et intérêts. Quant aux pouvoirs des juridictions nationales, celles-ci ont la faculté sur la base de la Directive 2004/48/CE de prononcer des injonctions afin de faire cesser ou de prévenir une telle atteinte aux droits des marques. Les modalités de ces injonctions, pourvu qu’elles soient proportionnées, dissuasives et ne créent pas d’obstacles au commerce légitime, relèvent du droit national. Serait considérée comme une entrave au commerce légitime, une interdiction générale permanente de mise en vente, sur une place de marchés, des produits de la marque litigieuse. Il serait en revanche considéré comme légitime et proportionné d’enjoindre à eBay de prendre des mesures permettant de faciliter l’identification de ses clients vendeurs. FHV
Social policy Reinhard Prigge, Michael Fromm, Volker Lambach (Rechtssache C-447/09) Urteil des Gerichtshofs (Große Kammer): 13. September 2011 Richtlinie 2000/78/EG – Art. 2 Abs. 5, 4 Abs. 1 und 6 Abs. 1 – Verbot der Diskriminierung wegen des Alters – Verkehrsflugzeugführer – Tarifvertrag – Klausel zur automatischen Beendigung der Arbeitsverträge bei Vollendung des 60. Lebensjahres Der Gerichtshof hatte sich im vorliegenden Verfahren im Rahmen eines vom deutschen Bundesarbeitsgericht vorgelegten Vorabentscheidungsersuchens mit der Auslegung der Artt. 2 Abs. 5, 4 Abs. 1 und 6 Abs. 1 der Richtlinie 2000/78/EG des Rates vom 27. November 2000 zur Festlegung eines allgemeinen Rahmens für die Verwirklichung der Gleichbehandlung in Beschäftigung und Beruf (ABl. L 303 vom 2.12.2000, S. 16; im Folgenden ,Richtlinie 2000/78/EG‘ oder ,die Richtlinie‘) zu beschäftigen. Die Richtlinie untersagt jegliche Diskriminierung in Beschäftigung und Beruf aufgrund des Alters, es sei denn, eine solche Ungleichbehandlung kann ordnungsgemäß gerechtfertigt werden. So kann beispielsweise das einzelstaatliche Recht Maßnahmen vorsehen, welche zur Gewährleistung der öffentlichen Sicherheit, zum Schutz der Gesundheit oder der Rechte und Freiheiten anderer notwendig sind (Art. 2 Abs. 5). Des Weiteren können die Mitgliedstaaten vorsehen, dass eine Ungleichbehandlung dann keine Diskriminierung bedeutet, wenn ein mit dem Diskriminierungsgrund in Zusammenhang stehendes Merkmal eine „ wesentliche und entscheidende “ berufliche Anforderung darstellt und es sich um einen rechtmäßigen Zweck und eine
698
K. Rokicka
angemessene Anforderung handelt (Art. 4 Abs. 1). Ferner wird eine Diskriminierung verneint, wenn die Ungleichbehandlung objektiv und angemessen ist und im Rahmen des nationalen Rechts durch ein legitimes Ziel, insbesondere aus den Bereichen Beschäftigungspolitik, Arbeitsmarkt und berufliche Bildung, gerechtfertigt ist und die Mittel zur Erreichung dieses Ziels angemessen und erforderlich sind (Art. 6 Abs. 1). Dem Verfahren liegt ein Rechtsstreit zwischen den zuletzt als Flugkapitänen beschäftigten Klägern Prigge, Fromm und Lambach und ihrer Arbeitgeberin Deutsche Lufthansa AG zugrunde, in welchem sich die Kläger gegen die mit Vollendung des 60. Lebensjahres automatisch eintretende Beendigung ihrer Arbeitsverhältnisse wenden. Eine solche automatische Beendigung sieht der auf die betreffenden Arbeitsverhältnisse anzuwendende Manteltarifvertrag (MTV) vor (§19 Abs. 1 MTV Nr. 5a). Die ehemaligen Flugkapitäne fühlten sich durch diese Regelung aufgrund ihres Alters diskriminiert und erhoben Klage bei den zuständigen deutschen Gerichten auf Feststellung, dass ihre Arbeitsverhältnisse nicht mit Ablauf des 60. Lebensjahres endeten, und weiter auf Anordnung, die Arbeitsverträge fortzusetzen. Das deutsche Bundesarbeitsgericht erkannte einen unionsrechtlichen Bezug und wandte sich an den Gerichtshof mit der Frage, ob Regelungen des nationalen Rechts, welche eine auf Gründen der Gewährleistung der Flugsicherheit beruhende tarifliche Altersgrenzenregelung von 60 Jahren für Piloten vorsehen, mit dem Unionsrecht, und hier speziell mit Richtlinie 2000/78/EG und dem allgemeinen Grundsatz über das Verbot der Diskriminierung, vereinbar seien. Der Gerichtshof stellt in seiner Entscheidung zunächst fest, dass die fragliche tarifvertragliche Klausel (§19 Abs. 1 MTV Nr. 5a) in den Geltungsbereich von Richtlinie 2000/78/EG fällt, da diese mit Vollendung des 60. Lebensjahres die automatische Beendigung des Arbeitsverhältnisses vorsieht und damit die in Art. 3 Abs. 1 Buchst. c der Richtlinie genannten Beschäftigungsbedingungen betrifft. Zudem erkennt das Gericht im konkreten Fall eine unmittelbar auf dem Alter beruhende Ungleichbehandlung im Sinne von Art. 1 in Verbindung mit Art. 2 Abs. 2 Buchst. a der Richtlinie an. Ferner erinnert der Gerichtshof mit Verweis auf die Rechtssache Enderby27 daran, dass Maßnahmen, die von Sozialpartnern im Geltungsbereich der Richtlinie 2000/78/EG getroffen werden, deren Bestimmungen auch entsprechend beachten müssen. Für Art. 2 Abs. 5 der Richtlinie 2000/78/EG verlangt der Gerichthof eine enge Auslegung, da die Norm eine Abweichung vom Grundsatz des Verbots der Diskriminierung begründet. Der Gerichtshof akzeptiert in der Folge zunächst, dass Maßnahmen zur Gewährleistung der Flugsicherheit wie die Kontrolle der Eignung und physischen Fähigkeiten der Piloten als Maßnahmen zur Gewährleistung der öffentlichen Sicherheit im Sinn von Art. 2 Abs. 5 der Richtlinie anzusehen sind und dass zudem die Sozialpartner auch grundsätzlich berechtigt waren, tarifvertraglich Regelungen im Sinne dieser Vorschrift zu treffen. Unter Verweis auf die einschlägigen internationalen („ Joint Aviation Requirements – Flight Crew Licensing 1.060 “) und nationalen Regelungen (§4 der Ersten Durchführungsverordnung zur Verordnung über 27 Vgl. Urteil vom 27. Oktober 1993, Enderby, C-127/92, Slg. 1993, I-5535.
Leading Judgments 1 July–30 September 2011
699
Luftfahrtpersonal), die die Tätigkeit von Piloten nach Vollendung ihres 60. Lebensjahres lediglich beschränken und nicht untersagen, verneint der Gerichtshof jedoch die Notwendigkeit der im Manteltarifvertrag vorgesehenen ausnahmslosen und vollständigen Untersagung nach dem 60. Lebensjahr. Ähnlich argumentiert der Gerichtshof auch bei der Auslegung des Art. 4 Abs. 1 der Richtlinie 2000/78/EG. Danach liegt eine Ungleichbehandlung wegen eines Merkmals der in Art. 1 aufgeführten Gründe nicht vor, wenn dieses Merkmal eine wesentliche und entscheidende berufliche Anforderung darstellt und es sich um einen rechtmäßigen Zweck und eine angemessene Anforderung handelt. Nach Ansicht des Gerichtshofs ist es für die Ausübung ihres Berufes unerlässlich, dass Piloten über besondere körperliche Fähigkeiten verfügen, die mit zunehmendem Alter abnehmen. Folglich stellt das Merkmal eine altersabhängige „ wesentliche und entscheidende berufliche Anforderung “ im Sinne von Art. 4 Abs. 1 der Richtlinie 2000/78/EG dar. Zudem ist das verfolgte Ziel, nämlich die Gewährleistung der Sicherheit des Flugverkehrs, als ein rechtmäßiger Zweck im Sinne der Vorschrift anzusehen. Jedoch konnte der Gerichtshof weder aus den vorgelegten Akten noch aus den eingereichten Erklärungen erkennen, warum die besonderen körperlichen Fähigkeiten bereits mit Vollendung des 60. Lebensjahres nicht mehr vorhanden sein sollten. Auch hier wird zur Begründung auf die oben bereits genannten internationalen und nationalen Regelungen verwiesen. Folglich haben die Sozialpartner durch die Festlegung der Altersgrenze auf 60 Jahre den Piloten eine im Sinne von Art. 4 Abs. 1 der Richtlinie 2000/78/EG unverhältnismäßige Anforderung auferlegt und somit eine den Vorgaben der Richtlinie entgegenstehende Regelung erlassen. Abschließend äußert sich der Gerichtshof kurz zur Auslegung des Art. 6 Abs. 1 der Richtlinie 2000/78/EG, wonach eine Ungleichbehandlung dann keine Diskriminierung darstellt, wenn diese unter anderem durch ein legitimes Ziel gerechtfertigt ist, worunter insbesondere rechtmäßige Ziele aus den Bereichen Beschäftigungspolitik, Arbeitsmarkt und berufliche Bildung zu verstehen sind. Zu diesen rechtmäßigen Zielen zählt der Gerichtshof, auch wenn die Aufzählung nicht erschöpfend ist, jedoch nur solche, die tatsächlich mit der Beschäftigungspolitik, dem Arbeitsmarkt und der beruflichen Bildung in Zusammenhang stehen. Folglich ist die Gewährleistung der Flugsicherheit kein legitimes Ziel im Sinne der Vorschrift. DG Patrick Kelly v National University of Ireland (University College, Dublin) (Case C-104/10) Judgment of the Court of Justice (Second Chamber): 21 July 2011 Directives 76/207/EEC, 97/80/EC and 2002/73/EC – Access to vocational training – Equal treatment for men and women – Rejection of candidature – Access of an applicant for vocational training to information on the qualifications of the other applicants In its judgment in this case, the Court of Justice dealt with questions relating to the burden of proof in discrimination cases in the light of European Union legislation on equality between women and men. The dispute arose when the application of Mr Kelly to a programme of vocational training in the University was not upheld. Mr Kelly considered that this was a result of discriminatory treatment on grounds of
700
K. Rokicka
sex and that less qualified female candidates were favoured over him. The complaint was initially rejected by the institution, a decision that led Mr Kelly to pursue legal action and to request, during the legal proceedings, copies of documents relating to the other candidates’ qualifications and their evaluation. The High Court refused Mr Kelly access to the documents, but decided to refer a number of questions to the Court of Justice of the European Union in order to establish whether such a refusal was contrary to European Law. The first question referred to the Court of Justice was whether such a right to information on the qualifications of those accepted to a vocational training program is given to an applicant who was excluded from this training by Article 4(1) of Council Directive 97/80/EC of 15 December 1997 on the burden of proof in sex discrimination cases,28 when the applicant wants to establish an infringement of the principle of equal treatment. According to this provision, which introduces a shift of the burden of proof, member states shall ensure that once a case of discrimination has been prima facie established, it should be for the respondent to prove that this has not been the case. The Court explained that it is for the party who considers himself or herself discriminated against to establish facts indicating that discrimination has taken place and that the assessment of these facts will have to be realised according to national provisions and following national proceedings. The objective of the Directive in question is to ensure that there are sufficient means available for establishing a discrimination case, but it is for the member state to determine how exactly this may be done. For this reason, a right of access to documents with information on the other candidates does not derive from the provisions of the Directive. The national court should however still examine whether the refusal to provide the applicant with access to such information could deprive him of the possibility of establishing his case and thus also impede the achievement of the Directive’s objective. The national court had inquired whether such right to information on the qualifications of the other applicants was provided to the complainant by Article 4 of Council Directive 76/207/EEC of 9 February 1976 on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment between women and men as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working conditions29 or by Article 1(3) of Directive 2002/73/EC which subsequently amended it.30 Both articles provide that there should be no discrimination on grounds of sex in the areas of employment, vocational training, guidance etc. and that member states have the obligation to ensure that no national provisions impede the application of this principle of equality. The Court of Justice concluded that such a right to information does not derive from the two provisions. The obligation set by the two provisions for the member states is to guarantee that private establishments providing vocational training do so without discriminating on grounds of sex. The two articles seek to ensure the implementation of the principle in access to training, but leave it to the member states to define 28 OJ L 14, 20.1.1998, p. 6; hereinafter ‘Directive 97/80/EC’ or ‘the Directive’ or ‘the Directive on the
burden of proof’. 29 OJ L 39, 14.2.1976, p. 40; hereinafter ‘Directive 76/207/EEC’. 30 Directive 2002/73/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2002 amending
Directive 76/207/EEC (OJ L 269, 5.10.2002, p. 15; hereinafter ‘Directive 2002/73/EC’).
Leading Judgments 1 July–30 September 2011
701
the measures through which this may be achieved. It resulted from this that concrete procedural obligations regulating access of an applicant to certain information could not be derived from the Directives’ provisions, but were dependent on the applicable national rules of procedure. The next issue raised was whether any possible right to information on the successful candidates had to be addressed in the light of national or European confidentiality rules. The Court of Justice rephrased the question to correspond with its jurisdiction and considered if a right to such information granted by the Directives mentioned in the request for a preliminary ruling would be affected by European Union confidentiality rules. The Court recalled that Article 4(1) of the Directive on the burden of proof does not give a direct right to information on the other applicants’ qualifications to a non-successful applicant whishing to establish a discrimination case. Such refusal may, however, constitute an obstacle in the realisation of the Directive’s objective, limiting the latter’s effectiveness. In its assessment on whether this is the case, a national court was required to take into account the Data Protection Directive31 and Directives 2002/58/EC32 and 2009/136/EC33 on data protection in electronic communications. The protection of personal data provided for in Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and completing the European Union data protection framework should be considered as well in this assessment, according to the Court. Last, the Court of Justice dealt with a question related to the preliminary ruling procedure. More concretely, it had been asked to examine whether the nature of the obligation to refer a preliminary question according to Article 267(3) TFEU is different in adversarial and inquisitorial legal systems. The applicant claimed that this obligation is wider in adversarial systems, where the content of a preliminary reference is defined by the parties and not by the court, which is the case in adversarial proceedings. The Court recalled that the function of the preliminary reference procedure is to ensure the uniform application of European Union Law throughout the Union. Article 267 TFEU provides national courts with the possibility – or obligation, in the case of last instance courts – to make a reference to the Court of Justice of the European Union, if they find themselves confronted with an issue requiring the interpretation of European Union Law to be resolved. This procedure, according to settled case-law, is not affected by the parties to the dispute, but creates a system of cooperation between national and the European court (see inter alia, the judgment of the Court of Justice of 16 December 2008 in Case C-210/06 Cartesio [2008] ECR I9641). The decision on whether there is a need for a preliminary reference, and on the 31 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection
of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (OJ L 281, 23.11.1995, p. 31). 32 Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the
processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (OJ L 201, 31.7.2002, p. 37). 33 Directive 2009/136/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009 amending
Directive 2002/22/EC on universal service and users’ rights relating to electronic communications networks and services, Directive 2002/58/EC concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 on cooperation between national authorities responsible for the enforcement of consumer protection laws (OJ L 337, 18.12.2009, p. 11).
702
K. Rokicka
content and formulation of the question belong to the national court, which decides independently. The Court held that the parties may, if they wish or if they are invited to do so by the national court, propose referring a preliminary question or suggest possible formulations. These however are in no case binding on the national court. KC Ivana Scattolon v Ministero dell’Istruzione, dell’Università e della Ricerca (Case C108/10) Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber): 6 September 2011 Social policy – Directive 77/187/EEC – Maintenance of the rights of workers in the event of a transfer of an undertaking – Meaning of ‘undertaking’ and ‘transfer’ – Transferor and transferee governed by public law – Application, from the date of transfer, of the collective agreement in force with the transferee – Salary treatment – Whether length of service completed with the transferor to be taken into account This case dealt with the question of whether a transferee is required by the Transfer of Undertakings Directive34 to take account of the full period of service with the transferor, when calculating the transferring employees’ salary scale. The claimant, Ivana Scattolon, worked from 1980 to 1999 as a cleaner in state schools, employed by the municipality of Scorzè as a local authority ATA (administrative, technical and auxiliary) employee. By Law No 124/99, local authority ATA employees in state schools were transferred onto the lists of state ATA employees, from 1 January 2000. Ms Scattolon was placed on a salary scale corresponding to nine years of service, rather than the twenty years of her actual service. First of all, the Court of Justice verified whether these facts constituted ‘the transfer of an undertaking, business or part of a business to another employer as a result of a legal transfer or merger’, as according to Article 1(1) of Directive 77/187/EEC. The Court of Justice replied in the affirmative, since: • according to previous case-law, “any grouping of persons and assets enabling the exercise of an economic activity pursuing a specific objective and which is sufficiently structured and independent” constitutes an undertaking, and in this case: – the activities carried out by the transferred workers were of an economic nature (such services are in some cases subcontracted to private operators and do not fall within the exercise of public powers) despite the absence of significant material or immaterial assets; – those activities pursue a specific objective, that is, the provision of necessary technical and administrative services to schools; – the ATA staff of local authorities employed in schools constituted an entity capable, relatively freely and independently, of organising and carrying out their tasks 34 Council Directive 77/187/EEC of 14 February 1977 on the approximation of the laws of the Member
States relating to the safeguarding of employees’ rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of businesses (OJ L 61, 5.3.1977, p. 26; hereinafter ‘Directive 77/187/EEC’); currently replaced by Council Directive 2001/23/EC of 12 March 2001 (OJ L 82, 22.3.2001, p. 16).
Leading Judgments 1 July–30 September 2011
703
• in order to determine whether there is a ‘transfer’, the decisive criterion is whether the entity keeps its identity after being taken over by the new employer, and in this case, it was found that the identity was kept because the new employer took over a major part of the workers. Secondly, the Court of Justice went on to examine whether the transferee must take account of length of service completed by the workers with the transferor, in order to calculate their remuneration. It first observed that the rights and obligations of the transferred employees and the transferor were contained in a collective agreement, namely the CCNL for local authority employees. The application of this collective agreement was replaced, from the date of the transfer, by that of the collective agreement in force with the transferee, namely the CCNL for schools. According to Article 3(2) of Directive 77/187/EEC, it is lawful for the transferee to apply, from the date of the transfer, the working conditions laid down by the collective agreement applicable to the transferor under that agreement, including those concerning remuneration. However, the Court pointed out that the arrangements chosen must be in conformity with the aim of the directive, which consists of preventing workers from being placed in a less favourable position solely as a result of the transfer. The Court of Justice concluded that, taking into account that the conditions for remuneration were linked in particular to length of service, Directive 77/187/EEC precludes transferred workers from suffering, in comparison with their situation immediately before the transfer, a substantial loss of salary by reason of the fact that their length of service with the transferor, equivalent to that completed by workers in the service of the transferee, is not taken into account when determining their starting salary position with the latter. It was for the national court to examine whether, at the time of the transfer at issue, there was such a loss of salary. LM
Law governing the institutions Kingdom of Sweden v My Travel and the European Commission (Case C-506/08 P) Court of Justice (First Chamber): 21 July 2011 Appeal – Access to documents of the institutions – Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 – Article 4(2), second indent, Article 4(3), second subparagraph – Exceptions to the right of access concerning the protection of court proceedings and legal advice and the decision-making process – Control of concentrations – Commission documents drawn up in the context of a procedure which led to a decision declaring a concentration operation incompatible with the common market – Documents drafted following the annulment of that decision by the General Court The case being commented on here originated from a judgment delivered by the General Court on 6 June 2002 in the, Airtours case,35 whereby the court annulled 35 See the judgment of 6 June 2002 in Case T-342/99 Airtours v Commission [2002] ECR II-2585.
704
K. Rokicka
the Commission decision declaring the concentration between the British tour operator Airtours (subsequently MyTravel) and its competitor First Choice as incompatible with the common market.36 The judgment in Airtours, together with other two landmark cases delivered by the General Court later that year,37 constituted a turning point for the European Commission and its way of assessing concentrations. In fact, in these judgments the General Court, while acknowledging that the Commission enjoys a wide margin of appreciation when dealing with complex economic matters, nevertheless demonstrated that it was prepared to look quite deeply into both the Commission’s findings on primary facts and into the inferences drawn from them when determining whether its analysis was vitiated by manifest error of assessment. Those judgments collectively sent a strong signal to the Commission that it needed to be more rigorous in its investigations.38 This was one of the reasons which brought the Commission to create the Chief Competition Economist Team, within the Directorate-General for Competition, in order to carry out a more appropriate economic analysis during its investigations on alleged competition law infringements. Following the judgment from the General Court in Airtours, the Commission established a working group comprising officials of the Directorate-General for Competition and the legal service in order to consider whether it was appropriate to bring an appeal against that judgment and to assess its implications for the procedures for the control of concentrations or in other areas. The report of the working group in question was presented to the Commissioner responsible for Competition on 25 July 2002, prior to the expiry of the period allowed for bringing an appeal. By letter of 23 May 2005, MyTravel made a request to the Commission, pursuant to Regulation 1049/2001,39 for access to the report, to the documents relating to its preparation (hereinafter “working papers”) and the documents contained in the file relating to the Airtours/FirstChoice case on which the report was based (hereinafter “the other internal documents”). The Commission replied to that request by adopting two decisions (hereinafter “the contested decisions”). By the first,40 the Commission refused to communicate to MyTravel the report and the working papers on the grounds that they were covered by at least one of the exceptions to the right to access set out in Article 4(2), second and third indents, and Article 4(3), second subparagraph, of Regulation 1049/2001, namely the protection of court proceedings and legal advice, the purpose of inspections, investigations and the decision-making process. By the second decision,41 the Commission refused access to some of the other internal 36 See Commission Decision 2000/276/EC of 22 September 1999 (Case IV/M.1524 – Airtours/
FirstChoice), OJ 2000 L 93, p. 1. 37 Reference was made here to the judgment of 22 October 2002 in Case T-310/01 Schneider Electric v.
Commission [2002] ECR II-4071; and the judgment of 25 October 2002 in Case T-5/02 Tetra Laval v. Commission [2002] ECR II-4381. 38 See R. Whish, Competition Law (Oxford University Press, 6th edn., 2009), p. 879. 39 See Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 re-
garding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents (OJ L 145, 31.5.2001, p. 43; hereinafter ‘Regulation 1049/2001’). 40 See Commission Decision D (2005) 8461 of 5 September 2005. 41 See Commission Decision D (2005) 9763 of 12 October 2005.
Leading Judgments 1 July–30 September 2011
705
documents by invoking the exceptions provided in Article 4(2), third indent, and Article 4(3), second subparagraph, of Regulation 1049/2001. Moreover, the Commission emphasised that MyTravel had not submitted any argument capable of establishing an overriding public interest to justify the disclosure of such documents in any event. On 15 November 2005, MyTravel brought an action before the General Court for the annulment of both decisions, relying on an alleged erroneous assessment by the Commission of the second and third indents of Article 4(2) and the second subparagraph of Article 4(3) of Regulation 1049/2001, concerning the exceptions to the right of access for protecting court proceedings and legal advice, inspections, investigations and audits, and the decision-making process. The General Court, in its judgment of 9 September 2008,42 took the view that the Commission had not committed an error of assessment in refusing access to the documents it had been requested to communicate, relying on the exceptions set out above. In particular, as regards the exception concerning the protection of decision-making process, the General Court held that the report itself fell within the scope of the purely administrative functions of the Commission, where the public interest for disclosure, pursuant to the principle of transparency, might not carry the same weight as in the case of a document relating to a procedure in which the European Union institution acts in its capacity as legislator. According to the General Court, the same exception would apply to the so called “working papers” as they comprised the documents, the preparatory assessments and the provisional conclusions for internal use only which enabled the production of the report. As for the “other internal documents”, namely the notes to the Commissioner and the notes to the other services, the General Court held that the Commission was right in submitting that the partial or total disclosure of those documents would reduce the ability of its services to express their point of view, thus risking seriously undermining its decision-making process in the field of the control of concentrations. The General Court further held that the risk of the decision-making process being seriously undermined was reasonably foreseeable and not purely hypothetical. The General Court also ruled on the question of whether an overriding public interest, within the meaning of the last sentence of Article 4(2) of Regulation 1049/2001, could justify the documents in question being disclosed in any event. The court essentially took the view that the arguments brought forward by MyTravel did not allow the overriding public interest to be established to the requisite legal standard.43 The General Court went even further, finding that the private interest of MyTravel in obtaining the documents in question could not, as a purely private interest, be relevant to assessing the balance of public interests. The Court reached the same conclusions as regards the exception concerning the protection of legal advice. In particular, it took the view that disclosure of the notes between DG Competition and the legal service would risk communicating to the public information on the state of internal discussions between them on the lawfulness of the assessment of the compatibility of the Airtours/First Choice concentration with the common market. In such circumstances, 42 See the judgment of 9 September 2008 in Case T-403/05 MyTravel v. Commission [2008] ECR II-2027. 43 MyTravel had claimed that “the need to understand what took place and what was done by the Com-
mission, as well as the need to ensure the sound administration of justice” constituted overriding public interests justifying disclosure of the documents. See ibidem, at paragraph 61.
706
K. Rokicka
the risk of undermining the protection of legal advice was not purely hypothetical but reasonably foreseeable.44 The Kingdom of Sweden appealed the General Court’s judgment to the Court of Justice. It put forward three legal pleas. In particular, it claimed, first, the infringement of the second subparagraph of Article 4(3) of Regulation 1049/2001; secondly, the infringement of the second indent of Article 4(2) of Regulation 1049/2001; and, thirdly, the infringement of the final parts of Article 4(2) and the second subparagraph of Article 4(3) of the same regulation. Before addressing the first plea, the Court of Justice, in the judgment under comment, established a necessary premise by noting that Article 4(3) draws a clear distinction precisely by reference to whether a procedure has been closed or not. In fact, according to the first subparagraph of Article 4(3), any document drawn up by an institution for internal use or received by an institution, which relates to a matter where the decision has not been taken by the institution falls within the scope of the exception for protecting the decision-making process; whereas, according to the second subparagraph, after the decision has been taken, the exception at issue covers only documents containing opinions for internal use as part of deliberations and preliminary consultations within the institution concerned. According to the Court of Justice, it is only in respect of some of the documents for internal use, namely those containing opinions for internal use as part of deliberations and preliminary consultations within the institution concerned, that the second subparagraph of Article 4(3) allows access to be refused even after the decision has been taken. In that case, their disclosure would seriously undermine the decision-making process of the institution.45 The Court of Justice, therefore, concluded that the reasons invoked by an institution and capable of justifying refusal of access to such a document before the end of the administrative procedure might not be sufficient for refusing disclosure of the same document after the adoption of the decision, without that institution explaining the specific reasons why the end of the procedure did not exclude the possibility that the refusal of access may remain justified having regard to the risk of a serious undermining of its decision-making process.46 Furthermore, although the exception provided in the second subparagraph of Article 4(3) was not in any way affected by the fact that the decision had been adopted, that did not mean that the assessment which the institution was called upon to make must not take account of the fact that the administrative procedure had been closed.47 The Court arrived at that preliminary conclusion by interpreting the intention of the European Union legislature in adopting Regulation 1049/2001, guaranteeing less acute protection to the decision-making process, once a decision was adopted, so that disclosure of any document other than
44 Ibidem, at paragraphs 124 to 126. 45 See the judgment of 21 July 2011 in Case C-506/08 P Kingdom of Sweden v. MyTravel and the Com-
mission [2011] not yet reported, at paragraphs 78–79. 46 Ibidem, at paragraph 82. 47 Ibidem, at paragraph 81.
Leading Judgments 1 July–30 September 2011
707
those mentioned in the second subparagraph of Article 4(3), could never undermine that process and that refusal of access to such a document could not be permitted.48 On the basis of the foregoing, the Court of Justice addressed the first plea by preliminarily affirming that, although the administrative activity of the Commission does not require as extensive an access to documents as that concerning the legislative activity of a European Union institution, this does not in any way mean that such an activity falls outside the scope of Regulation 1049/2001. It then concluded that the General Court erred in law by holding that the Commission could, in the circumstances of the case at issue, refuse access to the whole of the report. In fact, according to the Court of Justice, the General Court should have required the Commission to indicate the specific reasons why it considered that the closure of the administrative procedure did not affect the lawfulness of the refusal of access to the report based on the serious undermining of the decision-making process. The Court of Justice identified the same error, from the General Court’s side, with regard to the “working papers” and the “other internal documents”.49 As far as the second plea was concerned, namely the one claiming infringement of the second indent of Article 4(2) of Regulation 1049/2001, the Court of Justice stressed once again the fact that the administrative activity of the institutions did not escape in any way from the scope of this regulation, and that, in order to allow the exception for protecting legal advice, contained in the second intent of Article 4(2), it was necessary to verify whether the considerations adopted by the General Court at first instance were actually sufficient to support the conclusion that the Commission was right to refuse access to the notes in reply from the legal service.50 The Court of Justice upheld the second plea against non-disclosure by affirming that it is precisely openness in this regard that contributes to conferring greater legitimacy on the institutions in the eyes of European citizens and increasing their confidence in them by allowing divergences between various points of view to be openly debated. It was in fact rather a lack of information and debate which was capable of giving rise to doubts in the minds of citizens as regards the legitimacy of the decision-making process as a whole, and not only as regards the lawfulness of an isolated act.51 The Court of Justice, therefore, considered the arguments upheld by the General Court of such a general nature that they could not justify an exception to the transparency required by Regulation 1049/2001. This was all the more so in considering the circumstances 48 Ibidem, at paragraph 80. 49 Ibidem, at paragraphs 98 and 100. 50 For these purposes, it is worth recalling that the General Court had held that the disclosure of those notes
would risk communicating to the public information on the state of internal discussions between DG Competition and the legal service on the lawfulness of the assessment of the compatibility of the Airtours/First Choice concentration with the common market. This would be liable to lead the legal service to display reticence and caution in the future in the drafting of such notes in order not to affect the Commission’s decision-making capacity. Moreover, disclosure would risk putting the Commission in the difficult position in which its legal service might see itself required to defend a position before the Court which was not the same as the position which it had argued for internally in its role as adviser to the services responsible for the file. (See the judgment of 9 September 2008 in Case T-403/05 MyTravel v. Commission [2008] ECR II-2027, at paragraphs 124–126.) 51 See the judgment of 21 July 2011 in Case C-506/08 P Kingdom of Sweden v. MyTravel and the Com-
mission [2011] not yet reported, at paragraph 113.
708
K. Rokicka
of this case, where MyTravel had requested the access to those documents after the Airtours decision had been annulled by the General Court, and after the time-limit for appealing against that judgment had expired. Therefore, the argument concerning the protection of legal advice could not be upheld, as no further action on the legality of the decision concerning the compatibility of the concentration with the common market could be envisaged before the Union judicature. Having upheld the first two pleas, the Court of Justice decided not to examine the third one concerning the overriding public interest in disclosing the relevant documents. In setting aside part of the General Court’s judgment, the Court of Justice decided it had enough information and elements to give a final judgment on the pleas raised and annulled the contested decisions because the Commission had not correctly applied the exception for protecting its own decision-making process, while also misapplying the exception for the protection of legal advice. At the same time, the Court of Justice decided to refer the case back to the General Court for it to rule on the pleas on which it did not give a ruling in the first instance, namely those relating to the other exceptions concerning protection of the purpose of the inspections, investigations and audits. As the law stands, the Court of Justice could not have drawn different conclusions. The European Union legislature made a precise policy choice when it adopted Regulation 1049/2001, which was that of giving the fullest possible public access to documents of the institutions. While that access was nonetheless subject to certain limitations, those derogations from the principle of the widest possible public access to documents must be interpreted and applied strictly. For that purpose, if an institution decided to refuse access to a document which it had been asked to disclose, it must, in principle, explain how disclosure of that document could specifically and effectively undermine the interest protected by the exception. MM
Law Governing the Institutions Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami, Nattivak Hunters and Trappers Association, Pangnirtung Hunters’ and Trappers’ Association, Jaypootie Moesesie, Allen Kooneeliusie, Toomasie Newkingnak, David Kuptana, Karliin Aariak, Efstathios Andreas Agathos, Canadian Seal Marketing Group, Ta Ma Su Seal Products, Inc., Fur Institute of Canada, NuTan Furs, Inc., GC Rieber Skinn AS, Inuit Circumpolar Conference Greenland (ICC), Johannes Egede, Kalaallit Nunaanni Aalisartut Piniartullu Kattuffiat (KNAPK) v European Parliament and Council of the European Union (Case T-18/10) Judgment of the General Court (Seventh Chamber, Extended Composition): 6 September 2011 Actions for annulment – Regulation (EC) No 1007/2009 – Trade in seal products – Ban on import and sale – Exception in favour of Inuit communities – Application of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU – Meaning of ‘regulatory act’ – Absence of direct or individual concern – Inadmissibility
Leading Judgments 1 July–30 September 2011
709
This case concerned the interpretation of Article 263 TFEU with regard to the meaning of ‘regulatory act’ and, as a consequence, the right of individuals to bring an action before the General Court. On 11 January 2010 an action seeking the annulment of Regulation (EC) of the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union No 1007/2009 on trade in seal products52 (hereinafter ‘contested regulation’) was lodged at the General Court. The European Parliament and the Council of the European Union raised objections on the question of admissibility. The General Court decided to pronounce itself on the question of admissibility before dealing with the substance of the case. First of all, it was pointed out that the new Article 263 TFEU introduced a change from the EC Treaty so far as it concerned access to the courts of the European Union. Now, a natural or legal person might bring an action against a regulatory act which was of direct concern to them and did not entail implementing measures. The meaning of ‘regulatory act’, however, was not defined in the Treaty. So, for that reason the General Court had to carry out a literal, historical and teleological interpretation of that provision. The fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU permitted the institutions of proceedings (i) against individual acts, (ii) against acts of general application which were of direct and individual concern to a natural or legal person and (iii) against a regulatory act which was of direct concern to them and did not entail implementing measures. From the ordinary meaning of the word ‘regulatory’ it was clear that the acts covered by that third possibility were also of general application. According to the first paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, legislative acts and other binding acts intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties, which could be individual acts or acts of general application, could be subject to a review of legality. From both above-mentioned paragraphs it could be concluded that it was permitted to a natural or legal person to bring an action against an act addressed to that person and also (i) against a legislative or regulatory act of general application which was of direct and individual concern to them and (ii) against certain acts of general application (viz., regulatory acts which are of direct concern to them and do not entail implementing measures). Furthermore, according to the General Court such an interpretation of the word ‘regulatory’ (as apposed to the word ‘legislative’) was apparent from a number of other provisions of the Treaty (for example, Article 114 TFEU). Moreover, the General Court recalled the history of the process which led to the adoption of that provision. It could be read in the cover note of the Presidium of the Convention of 12 May 2003 that the wording of Article 263 TFEU enabled ‘a distinction to be made between legislative acts and regulatory acts, maintaining a restrictive approach in relation to actions by individuals against legislative acts (for which the “of direct and individual concern” condition remains applicable)’. In addition, the General Court emphasised the purpose of that provision – which was to allow a natural or legal person to institute proceedings against an act of general application which was not a legislative act, which was of direct concern to them and 52 OJ L 286, 31.10.2009, p. 36.
710
K. Rokicka
did not entail implementing measures, so to avoid a situation in which such a person would have to infringe the law to have access to the court. As a result, the General Court came to the conclusion that the wording of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU did not allow proceedings to be instituted against all acts which satisfied the criteria of direct concern and which were not implementing measures or against all acts of general application which satisfied those criteria, but only against a specific category of acts of general application, namely regulatory acts. Consequently, the conditions of admissibility of an action for annulment of a legislative act were still more restrictive than in the case of proceedings instituted against a regulatory act. In view of the foregoing, it was held that the meaning of ‘regulatory act’ for the purposes of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU must be understood as covering all acts of general application apart from legislative acts. Consequently, a legislative act might form the subject-matter of an action for annulment brought by a natural or legal person only if it was of direct and individual concern to them. Secondly, the General Court discussed whether in the case, the contested regulation had to be categorised as a legislative act or as a regulatory act. The contested regulation had been adopted on the basis of Article 95 EC Treaty, in accordance with the co-decision procedure referred to in Article 251 EC Treaty. In that regard, it was clear from Article 289(1) and (3) TFEU that legal acts adopted according to the procedure defined in Article 294 TFEU, referred to as ‘the ordinary legislative procedure’, constituted legislative acts. As the procedure defined in Article 294 TFEU reproduced, in essence, the one which had been defined in Article 251 of the EC Treaty, it was concluded that the contested regulation must be categorised as a legislative act and not a regulatory act. Thirdly, the General Court proceeded to a discussion of whether the applicants were directly concerned. According to the settled case-law, for an individual to be directly concerned by a European Union measure, first, that measure must directly affect the legal situation of that individual and, secondly, there must be no discretion left to the addressees of that measure who were responsible for its implementation, that implementation being purely automatic and resulting from European Union rules alone without the application of other intermediate rules. It followed clearly from the case-law that these two cumulative conditions must be met. According to the General Court, the applicants – with the exception of four of them53 – were not directly concerned by the contested regulation. Finally, the General Court discussed whether the four above-mentioned applicants were individually concerned. It was recalled that in order for a contested act to be of individual concern to natural or legal persons other than the addressee of a decision, the act must affect those persons by reason of certain attributes specific to them or by reason of a factual situation which differentiates them from all other persons and distinguishes them individually in the same way as the addressee of a decision. 53 Ta Ma Su Seal Products, NuTan Furs, GC Rieber Skinn and the Canadian Seal Marketing Group.
Leading Judgments 1 July–30 September 2011
711
According to the General Court four applicants (who were directly concerned) were not individually concerned by the contested regulation. As a result, the action for annulment was declared inadmissible by the General Court. Consequently, there was no need to rule on the substance of the case. KR