J Indian Philos (2010) 38:247–259 DOI 10.1007/s10781-010-9097-5 SPECIAL ISSUE

S´a¯likana¯tha’s Criticism of Dharmakı¯rti’s svasam : vedana Theory Taiken Kyuma

Published online: 26 August 2010 Ó Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Abstract The aim of this paper is to clarify how S´a¯likana¯tha’s epistemology can be distinguished from that of Dharmakı¯rti, especially in terms of their respective views on cognitive form (a¯ka¯ra). It has been pointed out that S´a¯likana¯tha’s triput: ¯ı theory and svayam : praka¯s´a theory are very close to Dharmakı¯rti’s epistemology. However, it remains questionable if S´a¯likana¯tha, who belongs to the Pra¯bha¯kara branch of the Mı¯ma¯m : sa¯ and is therefore a nira¯ka¯rava¯din, can subscribe to notions that Dharmakı¯rti developed on the basis of sa¯ka¯rava¯da. The present paper concludes that S´a¯likana¯tha agrees with Dharmakı¯rti in assuming that a single cognition consists of three parts; unlike Dharmakı¯rti, however, S´a¯likana¯tha puts emphasis on the difference between these parts, especially between the cognition and its form, on the ground that the cognitive form belongs to the external thing, and not to the cognition (nira¯ka¯rava¯da). In Dharmakı¯rti’s epistemology, the cognitive form belongs to cognition (sa¯ka¯rava¯da); in the ultimate level, there remains no difference between the three parts. Keywords Dharmakı¯rti  S´a¯likana¯tha  a¯ka¯ra  svasam : vedana  triput: ¯ı  svayam : praka¯s´a Introductory Remarks Dharmakı¯rti and his followers maintain that a cognition possesses a cognitive form (a¯ka¯ra)1 as a part of itself; this position is referred to as sa¯ka¯rava¯da. In the history 1

In this paper I use the term ‘‘cognitive form (a¯ka¯ra)’’ to refer to a form that is ‘being manifested in cognition’ or ‘relating to cognition,’ but neither ‘belonging to cognition’ nor ‘essential to cognition’ (that would be the case with sa¯ka¯rava¯da), since this form is thought of as belonging to external objects in the Mı¯ma¯m : saka view. T. Kyuma (&) Faculty of Humanities, Law and Economics, Mie University, Kurimamachiya-cho 1577, Tsu-shi, Mie-ken 514-8507, Japan e-mail: [email protected]

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of Indian philosophy, it has been in conflict with the opposite position which argues that the cognitive form is not possessed by cognition, but by external objects (nira¯ka¯rava¯da). S´a¯likana¯tha, who belongs to the Pra¯bha¯kara branch of the Mı¯ma¯m : sa¯, subscribed to nira¯ka¯rava¯da and criticized Dharmakı¯rti’s theory of selfcognition (svasam : vedana) from the standpoint of nira¯ka¯rava¯da on its basis. However, as has also been pointed out by B. K. Matilal, in the Prama¯n: apa¯ra¯yan: a section (especially in the Pratyaks: apariccheda) of his Prakaran: apañcika¯ (PrP),2 S´a¯likana¯tha puts forward a theory of self-illumination that prima facie appears to be very close to Dharmakı¯rti’s theory of self-cognition: cognition shines forth by itself 3 (svayam : praka¯s´a). As has been shown by Kuroda, the passage in Dharmakı¯rti’s works that brings out this aspect of his epistemology most clearly is PVin 1.38: na¯nyo ’nubha¯vyo buddhya¯sti tasya¯ na¯nubhavo ’parah: j gra¯hyagra¯hakavaidhurya¯t svayam : saiva praka¯s´ate k There is no other (object) which is to be directly experienced by cognition, and there is no other direct experience of it (i.e., cognition). Since (cognition) lacks cognizer and cognized, nothing but this (i.e., cognition) illuminates itself on its own.4 Matilal distinguishes two theories of perception, T1 and T2, and argues that both the Buddhist and S´a¯likana¯tha (or the Pra¯bha¯kara) accept T1: T1: If an awareness, c1, arises, it apprehends not only the thing, a, or the proposition p, but also c1 itself by the same token. T2: If c1 arises, it apprehends only the thing, a, or the proposition, p, and we need another event, c2 to apprehend c1 . . .5 As Matilal further points out, Pra¯bha¯karas refer to T1 as ‘self-revelation theory of awareness’ (sva-praka¯s´ava¯da), while the Buddhists call their corresponding concept the ‘self-awareness’ of awareness (sva-sam : vedana). In fact, when articulating T1, S´a¯likana¯tha, a later exponent of the Pra¯bha¯kara school, says that each awareness-event apprehends or ‘reveals’ the trio, the object or the fact, the awareness itself and the cognizing self; all three are ‘perceived’ in each 2

As has already been suggested in Yoshimizu (1997, 34, n.13), it remains doubtful if all extant sections of PrP were written by S´a¯likana¯tha himself as constituting an independent work, although a number of cross-references to names of extant (and even non-extant) sections are found throughout in PrP. This is important to bear in mind when we attempt to determine the consistency of S´a¯likana¯tha’s ideas throughout the individual sections, or possible stages in the development of his thought. A general and comprehensive survey of the Prabha¯kara school’s epistemology was first given in Jha (1911); a clear-cut summary is to be found in Hiriyanna (1972, 49–59). A part of the Pratyaks: apariccheda has recently been translated into English in Bandyopadhyay (2003). Pandurangi (2004) also gives an exposition of the whole text of PrP. For Kuma¯rila’s criticism of the Buddhist’s svasam : vedana theory, cf. Taber (2005, esp. 78ff). 3

Kuroda (1982, 39–40).

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This is a Ci’e-passage of PV 3.327. For the sigla that are used in this article to characterize the relationship between passages, cf. PVin 1 (introduction, xxxv–xxxvi).

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Matilal (1986, 142–143). Matilal also points out that the view of earlier Pra¯bha¯karas seems to have been quite different, maintaining that ‘‘the awareness, c1, apprehends or reveals (to the self) the object only, neither itself nor the cognizing self . . . .’’ For this question cf. further below n. 27. An informative survey of the distinction between old and new Pra¯bha¯karas is given in Kuroda (1989).

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cognitive act or awareness-event. He accordingly divides a single cognition into three parts (triput: ¯ı), i.e., cognizer (prama¯tr: ), object of cognition (prameya) and the 6 resulting cognition (pramiti/sam : vitti/sam : vid). This division, too, reminds us of Dharmakı¯rti who famously argues that cognition consists of the cognized object 7 (gra¯hya), the cognizer (gra¯haka), and cognition (sam : vitti) as a result. ´ But can Sa¯likana¯tha, who is a nira¯ka¯rava¯din, really subscribe to notions that Dharmakı¯rti developed on the basis of sa¯ka¯rava¯da?8 This paper will, it is hoped, clarify how S´a¯likana¯tha’s epistemology can be distinguished from that of Dharmakı¯rti, especially in terms of their respective views on cognitive form (a¯ka¯ra). I am going to first outline S´a¯likana¯tha’s attitude to Dharmakı¯rti’s theory of selfcognition and then highlight some crucial points in S´a¯likana¯tha’s criticism of it. Finally, S´a¯likana¯tha’s theories of svayam : praka¯s´a and triput: ¯ı will be examined in greater detail, so that we can distinguish them more clearly from seemingly similar concepts in Dharmakı¯rti’s epistemology. S´a¯likana¯tha’s Attitude to Dharmakı¯rti’s svasam : vedana Theory In the Pratyaks: apariccheda of the Prama¯n: apa¯ra¯yan: a section, S´a¯likana¯tha presents Dharmakı¯rti’s definition of self-cognition before expounding his own triput: ¯ı theory. S´a¯likana¯tha here presupposes self-cognition as a perceptual awareness that all cognitions have of themselves.9 But the only Buddhist reasoning for self-cognition that 6

It has been pointed out (cf. Shastri 1967; Chatterjee 1979; Kuroda 1982) that jña¯na should be differentiated from sam : vid in S´a¯likana¯tha’s terminology; jña¯na is to be seen as ‘the process beginning with the connection of a¯tman with manas and resulting in cognition,’ the existence of which is inferred merely by sam : vid, which in turn means, in contrast to jña¯na, ‘(the resulting) cognition.’ Cf. R: V 80,20–23: katham ida¯nı¯m : jña¯nasiddhih: ? ucyate – phalabhu¯ta¯ya¯h: sam : vidah: ka¯ryaru¯patva¯t, ka¯ryasya ca ka¯ran: am antaren: a¯nupapatteh: , nityaka¯ryodaya¯pattya¯ ca¯tmanah: sthirasya ka¯ran: atve niraste, ka¯da¯citkam : jña¯nam anumı¯yate j ‘‘(Question:) Then, how can (the existence of) cognition be established? (Answer:) Cognition, being a result, is of the nature of an effect, and no effect can be produced without a cause. Therefore, (the existence of) transitory cognition is inferred, as it is rejected that the permanent self is the cause (of cognition as an effect), for otherwise the effect (i.e. cognition) would be perpetually produced.’’ When I refer to sam : vid as ‘‘cognition’’ in this paper, this should therefore be understood as the result of the cognitive process. 7 Cf. PV 3.353 (quoted below in n. 32). As is well-known, the three parts of cognition in S´a¯likana¯tha’s triput: ¯ı theory are illustrated through sentences like ‘‘I know this (idam aham : gr: hn: a¯mi).’’ While sam : vid (or pramiti) as one part of cognition is said to be represented in the expression ‘(I) know,’ the term sam : vid is also used for the entire cognition which consists of these three parts. Cf. Kuroda (1982, 40). As we shall see below, this ambiguity is rooted in the following epistemological situation: sam : vid shines forth by itself and illuminates meya and ma¯tr: , which are both distinct from sam : vid. At the same time, however, both meya and ma¯tr: are considered as ‘part of’ sam : vid or as ‘connected to’ sam : vid. 8 This question has been indirectly raised by Kuroda (1982, 90–91). Kuroda thinks that S´a¯likana¯tha’s epistemology is close to that of Dharmakı¯rti, and that S´a¯likana¯tha does not pay much attention to the role of external objects in his epistemology, inspite of his nira¯ka¯rava¯da. Kuroda further implies that this tendency leads S´a¯likana¯tha’s epistemology to a kind of self-contradiction. 9

Cf. PrP(EB) 138,5–6: sarvajña¯na¯na¯m : svasam : vedanam : vikalpaviraha¯t pratyaks: am.‘‘The self-cognition with regard to all cognitions is (a kind of) perception, since (it) lacks conceptualization.’’ As suggested by the editor of PrP(EB), Subrahmanya (cf. PrP(EB) 138, n. 1), some passages from Dharmottara’s Nya¯yabindut: ¯ıka¯ (NBT: ) are reported in the Nya¯yasiddhi (NS) , a commentary on PrP (e.g. NS 138,17–19, a Re-passage of NBT: 64,3–4). In connection with the concept of cognitive form, we may also notice the Cie of PVin 1 2,7–8 in PrP(EB) 139,9–10.

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he refers to is an argument about the nature of pleasure, etc. (sukha¯di): pleasure, etc., are identical with cognition because they arise from the same complex of causes (hetusa¯magrı¯) that also causes cognition.10 More importantly, in the same context S´a¯likana¯tha also concisely presents a Buddhist argument for sa¯ka¯rava¯da, as well as the sahopalambhaniyama-inference which appeals to the necessary joint cognition of cognition and its form. The former argument, according to S´a¯likana¯tha, maintains that only sa¯ka¯rava¯da can explain the manifestation of a cognitive form, even in the case of a dream, where external objects are evidently not present in our consciousness; if we would not accept sa¯ka¯rava¯da, the cognitive form would be excluded from cognition and therefore could not be illuminated.11 The sahopalambhaniyamainference seems to be presented in the form it was articulated by Dharmottara, who uses it to prove the non-difference (abheda) of cognition and its form.12 S´a¯likana¯tha’s succinct refutations of these arguments can be summarized as follows:13 even if cognition is different from its object (i.e., cognitive form), it can connect itself to the object, so that we can cognize it.14 The act of illumination is exclusively directed at (external) objects that are not of cognitive nature (jad: a). For S´a¯likana¯tha, this is the reason why the sahopalambhaniyama-inference is not acceptable. He also denies that pleasure, etc. arise from the same complex of causes as cognition. The cause of cognition is the (external) object, and that of pleasure, etc. is cognition. As their causes are therefore different, pleasure is not the same as cognition. Even though S´a¯likana¯tha criticizes Dharmakı¯rti’s concept of self-cognition on the grounds of his own different position on the cognitive form, he expresses a kind of sympathy for it: 10

Cf. PrP(EB) 138,6–139,1: sukha¯dayas´ ca (ca MM, MN, EC, EP : tu EB) vijña¯na¯bhinnahetukataya¯ na tasma¯d bhidyanta (bhidyanta MM, EB, EC, EP : bhidyata MN) iti te ’pi svasam : vidita¯ eva. ‘‘Further, pleasure etc. are not different from it (i.e., cognition), since their cause is not different from that of cognition. Therefore, they too are certainly cognized by themselves.’’ Cf. Dharmakı¯rti’s argument in PV 3.251 ¼ PVin 1.22: tadatadru¯pin: o bha¯va¯s tadatadru¯pahetuja¯h: j tat sukha¯di kim ajña¯nam : vijña¯na¯bhinnahetujam k ‘‘Existent things have this or that characteristic because they arise from causes that have this or that characteristic. Why, then, should pleasure, etc., which arise from causes that do not differ from the causes of cognition, not be cognition?’’ 11

Cf. PrP(EB) 140,1–3. Cf. PrP(EB) 140,4–6. S´a¯likana¯tha regards the reason in this proof as vya¯pakaviruddhopalabdhi; this expression appears later in PrP(EB) 175,2–3; 181,4–182,1; 317,4f. Its source is probably Dharmottara’s formulation mentioned in Iwata (1991, 128, n. 173). Cf. also the Prama¯n: avinis´cayat: ¯ıka¯ fragment in DAT: 71,18–19. 12

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Cf. PrP(EB) 143,12–144,8. Here it should be added that S´a¯likana¯tha also refers to the sa¯ka¯rava¯din’s argument of pratikarmavyavastha¯ which the latter uses to prove that cognition itself has the object’s form (cf. PrP(EB) 174,1–7): in the case of nira¯ka¯rava¯da, there would be no difference between cognitions, since the content of cognition, i.e., cognitive form, belongs only to external objects. But if we adopt sa¯ka¯rava¯da, the difference between cognitions is easy to explain, since each cognition has its own content. The argument can be traced back to PV 3.302: tatra¯nubhavama¯tren: a jña¯nasya sadr: s´a¯tmanah: j bha¯vyam : tena¯tmana¯ yena pratikarma vibhajyate k ‘‘For cognition, which is the same for them (i.e., for all objects) in terms of (being) mere experience, there should exist a nature which distinguishes (one cognition from the other) according to their object.’’ Cf. also PVin 1 31,4–5 as Ce’e of this verse. This argument is, however, rejected by S´a¯likana¯tha, who insists that the difference between cognitions is based on that between the external objects with which they are connected. 14

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Further, it is stated (by Dharmakı¯rti) that self-cognition with regard to all cognitions is (a kind of) perception. We do accept this.15 S´a¯likana¯tha’s sympathy seems to be related to one facet of his triput: ¯ı theory, i.e., the notion that both cognizer and cognized are to be seen as parts of cognition; it might also be related to the fact that both S´a¯likana¯tha and Dharmakı¯rti accept three elements in a single cognition.16 The issue of cognitive form, which is involved in Dharmakı¯rti’s theory of selfcognition, comes up for discussion again in the context of S´a¯likana¯tha’s theories 17 of svayam : praka¯s´a and triput: ¯ı. Immediately after presenting his own theories, S´a¯likana¯tha gives an account of the arguments of both Sautra¯ntika and Vijn˜a¯nava¯din, which he presents as objections.18 These arguments will now be examined in greater detail. S´a¯likana¯tha’s Criticism of sa¯ka¯rava¯da S´a¯likana¯tha’s concept of cognitive form seems to be explicit in the following statement, where he rejects the objection that his theories of svayam : praka¯s´a and triput: ¯ı would inevitably entail sa¯ka¯rava¯da: ‘‘Further, the following is said: cognition, which is admitted to be selfilluminating, should have a cognitive form such as ‘blue’ (as belonging to itself). That too is not reasonable, since it is impossible that a cognitive form, which manifests itself as different from cognition, should be based on the nature of cognition.’’19 15 Cf. PrP(EB) 144,5: yac ca svasam : vedanam : (svasam : vedanam : MM, EB, EC, EP : svayam : vedanam : MN) sarvavittı¯na¯m : EP : sarvasya vittı¯na¯m : EC) pratyaks: am : (sarvavittı¯na¯m : MM, MN, EB : sarvasanvittı¯na¯m uktam. tad (tad MM, EB, EC, EP : tad apy MN) anumanya¯maha eva (eva MN, EB : n. e. MM, EC, EP). For _ ¯kriyata the reading eva, cf. also NS 144,22: vittı¯na¯m : NS) svasam : vedanam angı : (vittı¯na¯m : em. : vr: ttı¯na¯m eva. 16 Of course, from this it does not follow that S´a¯likana¯tha himself accepts sa¯ka¯rava¯da; rather, the cognized is, in a more or less loose way, connected to cognition or counted as its ‘part’ in his epistemological scheme. 17

Cf. PrP(EB) 167,3–173,7.

Cf. PrP(EB) 173,8ff. Both names are mentioned by S´a¯likana¯tha himself (e.g., the Sautra¯ntika in PrP(EB) 177,4; the Vijn˜a¯nava¯din in PrP(EB) 178,4). Having traced the manner in which the Vijn˜a¯nava¯din rejects the Sautra¯ntika’s theory of an external world, S´a¯likana¯tha criticizes both of them as based on sa¯ka¯rava¯da. Significantly enough, he also uses the name sa¯ka¯ravijña¯nava¯din in PrP(EB) 179,13. In this article I simply follow S´a¯likana¯tha in the usage of these names. 19 Cf. PrP(EB) 183,6–8: yac cedam uktam – svayam : praka¯s´a¯ya¯h: sam : vido ’bhyupagata¯ya¯ nı¯la¯dya¯ka¯ro (nı¯la¯dya¯ka¯ro MM, EB, EC, EP : nı¯la¯dika a¯ka¯ro MN) ’stv iti (’stv iti MM, MN, EC, EP : ’stı¯ti EB). tad apy ayuktam. sam : vidbhinnataya¯ ca : vidbhinnataya¯vabha¯sama¯nasya¯ka¯rasya (sam : vid . . . a¯ka¯rasya em. : sam bha¯sama¯nasya¯ka¯rasya MN : sam : vidabhinnataya¯vabha¯sama¯nasya¯ka¯rasya EB : sam : vidbhinnasya¯rthasya bha¯sama¯nasya¯ka¯rasya EC, EP : sam : vidbhinnasya¯ ca(!) bha¯sama¯nasya¯ka¯rasya MM) sam : vidru¯pa¯s´rayan: a¯nupapatteh: (sam : vidru¯patva¯s´rayan: a¯nupapatteh: MN : sam : vidru¯: vid. . .anupapatteh: MM, EC, EP : sam patva¯nupapatteh: EB). In this paragraph, S´a¯likana¯tha seems to rephrase the Sautra¯ntika’s counterargument against his svayam : vidbhinnasya¯rthasya . . .with EC, : praka¯s´a theory in PrP(EB) 173,9–11. If we read sam EP (and perhaps MM), it remains uncertain whether artha refers to a cognitive form or an external object. The former is possible because S´a¯likana¯tha identifies a¯ka¯ra with artha in another place; cf. n. 24. 18

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Even though S´a¯likana¯tha in his triput: ¯ı theory considers the cognitive form to be a part of the single cognition, he unlike Dharmakı¯rti lays stress on the distinction between the cognition and its form. For this reason, as indicated above, S´a¯likana¯tha insists that the necessary joint perception of cognition and its object (sahopalambhaniyama) is possible even when both are essentially different, whereas his Buddhist opponent thinks it establishes that the two are non-different.20 This point will be made clearer in the following two arguments. The Cognitive Form in Dreams is Derived from External Objects The first argument centers on the status of the cognitive form in dreams. As is wellknown, dream-cognition is frequently used by the Vijn˜a¯nava¯din in order to detach the cognitive form, which they believe is inherent in cognition, from external objects. S´a¯likana¯tha’s rejoinder is as follows: ‘‘Further, the following was said: in a dream, only the form of a cognition appears (and not that of an external object). That too is unreasonable, since in that case, too, cognition has the manifestation of external (things). Moreover, it (i.e., a cognition in a dream) certainly does have external (things) as its object because (it has external) things that have been directly experienced before as its object, in that mental imprints that were placed in (the mind) by previous direct experience are awakened.’’21 According to S´a¯likana¯tha, even the cognitive form appearing in a dream originates from an external object that was directly experienced before. S´a¯likana¯tha here seems to be trying to keep up the position of nira¯ka¯rava¯da even in the case of dreams, in order to consistently present the cognitive form as belonging to external objects.

20 In this context, the well-known half-verse PVin 1.54ab is quoted in both R: V and PrP, cf. R: V 79,6; PrP(EB) 175,4: sahopalambhaniyama¯d abhedo nı¯lataddhiyoh: j ‘‘There is no difference between ‘blue’ and its cognition because of the necessary joint cognition (of both).’’ It is interesting to note that this verse is coupled with PV 3.388ab in R: V 79,6–7: bhedas´ ca bhra¯ntivijña¯nair dr: s´yetenda¯v iva¯dvaye j ‘‘However, a difference (between cognition and its object) would be seen by those whose cognition is erroneous, just like in the case of the non-dual moon (which people with erroneous cognition see as two moons).’’ A coupling of PVin 1 and PV verses is also found in NS 140,15, which should have been borrowed from R: V 79,6–7. Cf. also the Ci of PV 3.388ab in PrP(EB) 175,8 and 183,2. 21 PrP(EB) 184,3–5: yac coktam – svapne jña¯nasyaiva¯ka¯ro (jña¯nasyaiva¯ka¯ro MM, EC, EP : jña¯nasya¯ka¯ro MN, EB) ’vabha¯sata iti. tad apy ayuktam (ayuktam MN, EB, EC, EP : uktam MM). tatra¯pi (tatra¯pi EB : tatra¯pi hi EC, EP : tatha¯pi MN : tas´api hir(!) MM ; NS’s pratı¯ka follows EB) bahiravabha¯sitva¯t (bahiravabha¯sitva¯t MN, EB : bahiravabha¯satva¯t EC, EP : avabha¯satva¯t MM) sam : vidah: . na (na MM, EB, EC, EP : nanu MN) ca sa¯ bahirvis: aya¯ na bhavati (na bhavati MN, EB : na sambhavati EC, EP : sambhavati MM). tasya¯h: (tasya¯h: EB : n. e. MM, MN, EC, EP) pu¯rva¯nubhava¯hitasam : ska¯rodbodhavas´ena (-sam : ska¯raEB : -bha¯vana¯- MM, MN, EC, EP ; NS’s pratı¯ka reads -sam : ska¯ra-) pu¯rva¯nubhu¯tavastuvis: ayatva¯t. Against the majority of witnesses, -sam : ska¯ra- seems to be preferable to -bha¯vana¯-, since the term sam : ska¯rodbodha is repeatedly used in the same paragraph.

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The Non-Existence of the Cognitive Form on the Ultimate Level Another argument that S´a¯likana¯tha offers in defense of nira¯ka¯rava¯da concerns itself with an argument by Dharmakı¯rti which became considered as establishing the theory that cognition is variegated, yet non-dual (citra¯dvaitava¯da): ‘‘Moreover, since variegated cognitive forms in the cognition of a multicoloured painting are incompatible with (the idea that cognition has) the nature of a single illumination, only the non-existence (of these forms) is admitted.’’22 After this statement, S´a¯likana¯tha quotes PV 3.208 and 209 for the purpose of rejecting the existence of a cognitive form. ‘‘‘If objects which have variegated manifestations cannot be one, how of all things should a cognition which has variegated manifestations be one?’ (PV 3.208) After raising (this doubting question, Dharmakı¯rti) says as follows: ‘What the wise teaches is attained by the force of real entities. The more objects are taken into consideration, the more they fall asunder.’ (PV 3.209) (In other words,) the more cognitive forms are taken into consideration, the more they are divided asunder as incoherent, (i.e.,) become empty; it means that (they) become non-existent.’’23 While PV 3.208 puts forward an anonymous objection against citra¯dvaitava¯da, Dharmakı¯rti’s response to this in 209 is understood by S´a¯likana¯tha as indicating his position from the perspective of ultimate truth, where even the existence of cognitive forms is to be abandoned. The point to be observed here is that S´a¯likana¯tha interprets Dharmakı¯rti’s statement in PV 3.209 as subscribing to the position of nira¯ka¯ravijña¯nava¯da, taking it to the advantage of his own nira¯ka¯rava¯da.24 The cognitive form is then regarded as ultimately non-existent on the basis of Dharmakı¯rti’s own statement; thus it is removed from cognition.

22

Cf. PrP(EB) 185,1–2: kim : ca citrapat: ajña¯ne (citrapat: ajña¯ne EB, EC, EP : citrajña¯ne MN) na¯na¯bhu¯ta¯na¯m a¯ka¯ra¯n: a¯m (kim : . . . a¯ka¯ra¯n: a¯m MN, EB, EC, EP : n. e. MM) ekapraka¯s´a¯tmakatvavirodha¯d (ekapraka¯s´a¯tmakatvavirodha¯d EB, EC, EP : ekapraka¯s´a¯tmakatvam : virodha¯d MN : apraka¯s´a¯tmakatvavirodha¯d MM) asadbhu¯tatvam eva¯bhyupagatam. 23 PrP(EB) 185,3–10: citra¯vabha¯ses: v (citra¯vabha¯ses: v MM, EB, EC, EP : citra¯vabha¯sis: v MN) arthes: u yady ekatvam : na yujyate j saiva ta¯vat katham : buddhir eka¯ citra¯vabha¯sinı¯ k (PV 3.208) iti codayitvoktam. idam : vastubala¯ya¯tam : yad vadanti vipas´citah: j yatha¯ (yatha¯ MM, EB, EC, EP : tatha¯ MN) yatha¯rtha¯s´ cintyante vivicyante (vivicyante MM, EB, EC, EP : gı¯yante te MN; the testimony of witnesses for PV seems to be still inconclusive, although Tosaki follows vis´¯ıryante; cf. Tosaki 1979, 310, n. 40) tatha¯ tatha¯ k (PV 3.209) iti (iti MN, EB : n. e. MM, EC, EP). yatha¯ yatha¯ka¯ra¯ vica¯ryante tatha¯ tatha¯ghat: ama¯na¯ vivicyante (aghat: ama¯na¯ vivicyante MM, EB, EC, EP : at: ama¯na¯ vidhı¯yante MN) – s´u¯nya¯ bhavanti – asadbhu¯ta¯ bhavantı¯ty (asadbhu¯ta¯ bhavantı¯ty MM, MN, EB : asadbhavantı¯ty EC, EP) arthah: . For the last part, cf. also PVP ad PV 3.209d (P 225a8-225b1 ¼ D 193a4): . . . rnam par bral z´in_ ston_ par ’gyur te j ran_ bz´in ’ga’ z´ig la yan_ rnam par mi gnas so z´es bya ba’i tha tshig go j ‘‘. . . (they) are divided asunder, (i.e.,) become empty; it means that (they) are never settled in any kind of nature.’’ 24 Note that S´a¯likana¯tha replaces artha in PV 3.209c with a¯ka¯ra.In another place, he refers to the object as vedya. Cf. n. 26.

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Cognitive Form in S´a¯likana¯tha’s Epistemology As mentioned above, in his criticism of sa¯ka¯rava¯da S´a¯likana¯tha emphasizes the difference between cognition and cognitive form, since the latter belongs to external objects. Let us now examine further S´a¯likana¯tha’s own theories of svayam : praka¯s´a and triput: ¯ı in terms of how they deal with cognitive form. The svayam : praka¯s´a Theory: Cognitive Form as Belonging to External Objects The Mı¯ma¯m : saka’s most definite statement on nira¯ka¯rava¯da is found in the S´a¯barabha¯s: ya’s (S´Bh) refutation of the Buddhist sa¯ka¯rava¯da: ‘‘According to us, it is not cognition but the external object which has the cognitive form, since it (i.e., the external object) is cognized before the eyes as connected to an external place.’’25 In his commentary, the Br: hatı¯, Prabha¯kara explains this statement as follows: ‘‘Indeed, cognition is to be cognized as cognition, but not as the object of cognition. (Question:) What is this eminently logical way of speaking: ‘. . . to be cognized . . . not to be cognized . . .?’ (Answer:) This is (the meaning of) this eminently logical way of speaking: of this (cognition), being the object of action (karmabha¯va) is not cognized. And the object of action is to be denoted with the word ‘to be cognized’ (sam : vedya), not cognition (is to be denoted with this word).’’26 The beginning of the passage means that cognition is cognized as such, that is, as cognition, but not as the object that is to be cognized. As its wording appears to be a little bit confusing, Prabha¯kara further introduces the concept of being the object of action (karmabha¯va), in order to stress that cognition itself is not cognized as an object of cognition. In this regard, it should not be overlooked that S´a¯likana¯tha,

Cf. S´Bh 28,17–18: nira¯ka¯ra¯ tu no buddhih: , a¯ka¯rava¯n ba¯hyo ’rthah: , sa hi bahirdes´asambaddhah: pratyaks: am upalabhyate. 26 Cf. B 82,8–10: sam : vittaya¯ hi sam : vit sam : vedya¯ na sam : vedyataya¯. keyam : va¯coyuktih: , sam : vedya¯ na sam : vedyeti. iyam iyam : va¯coyuktih: , na¯sya¯h: karmabha¯vo vidyata iti. karma ca sam : vedya¯bhidheyam, na sam : vit. The underlined part is paraphrased by S´a¯likana¯tha when he emphasizes the difference between (sam : ) vitti and vedya (here vedya is equated with a¯ka¯ra). Cf. PrP(EB) 143, 2–4: na ca¯yam a¯ka¯ro vitter eva (eva MN, EB, EC, EP : ava MM) , vedyataya¯ vitteh: pr: thag avabha¯sana¯t (avabha¯sana¯t MM, EB, EC, EP : anavabha¯sana¯t MN). vittir hi (vittir hi MN, EB, EC, EP : vittir vvi MM) vittitaya¯ (vittitaya¯ MM, EB, EC, EP : vitaya¯ MN) vedyas´ ca¯yam a¯ka¯ro (ca¯yam a¯ka¯ro MN : ca¯ka¯ro MM, EB, EC, EP) vedyataya¯vabha¯tı¯ty (vedyataya¯vabha¯tı¯ty EB : vedyataya¯vabha¯ti MM, EC, EP : vedyatayaiva bha¯tı¯ti MN) ato (ato MM, EC, EP : n. e. MN, EB) na tayos ta¯da¯tmyam (ta¯da¯tmyam MM, MN, EC, EP : tada¯tmakata¯ EB) upapadyate. ‘‘Further, this cognitive form does not belong to cognition at all, since (it) manifests itself as distinct from cognition, as the cognized (object). That is to say, cognition manifests itself as cognition, and the object of cognition, i.e., this cognitive form, (manifests itself) as the object of cognition. Thus, the identity of both is not suitable.’’ 25

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refers to the term svayam : praka¯s´a when he comments on the concept of karmabha¯va27: ‘‘. . . For cognition is self-illuminating. Further, it is not an object of action, since its illumination is not dependent on anything else, yet it does not follow that (cognition) has no illumination. Further, it is said to exist as (self-) illuminating, yet (its) being an object of action is not intended.’’28 What is meant by svayam : praka¯s´a in the above passage is that cognition shines forth by itself, not having the nature of the object of cognition. Viewed in this light, this term should be differentiated from Dharmakı¯rti’s notion of self-cognition, in which case cognition knows itself on the premise that there is no difference between the object of cognition, cognizer and cognition.29 Turning to the object of cognition (meya) and cognizer (ma¯tr: ), S´a¯likana¯tha maintains that neither of them has the nature of illumination. This is most explicitly stated in the following passage: ‘‘Further, the objects of cognition, the essence of which is non-illumination, and the cognizer are to be dependent on illumination. Illumination is, however, not dependent on anything else, since its essence is illumination. Indeed, the objects of cognition, as well as the cognizer, are illuminated in (the cognition of) those who are awake, while both of them are not being illuminated in (the cognition of) those who are sound asleep.’’30 27

There is no consensus of opinion as regards whether Prabha¯kara already advocated the svayam : praka¯s´a theory. According to Chatterjee (1979), it is not reasonable to say that Prabha¯kara already advocated the same epistemological scheme as S´a¯likana¯tha, since the meaning of the term sam : vid differs remarkably between them. In other words, Prabha¯kara’s sam : vid has not yet obtained the function that S´a¯likana¯tha’s triput: ¯ı theory presupposes. On the other hand, Kuroda assumes that S´a¯likana¯tha’s theory of svayam :praka¯s´a had already been prepared in Prabha¯kara’s Br: hatı¯, even though Prabha¯kara himself does not employ the term svayam : praka¯s´a. Cf. Kuroda (1982, 39). 28 Cf. R: V 83,10–12: svayam : praka¯s´atva¯t sam : vidah: . na ca para¯dhı¯napraka¯s´a iti na karmata¯, na ca praka¯s´a¯bha¯vah: . praka¯s´ama¯nam : ca¯stı¯ty ucyate, na punah: karmataiva vivaks: ita¯. 29 Cf. Hiriyanna (1972, 52–53). According to Hiriyanna, S´a¯likana¯tha’s svayam : praka¯s´a should be understood as meaning ‘not requiring to be revealed,’ whereas the Buddhist theory of self-cognition means that ‘it is knowable by itself and not by another jña¯na.’ Unlike the former, however, the latter involves ‘the absurdity of one and the same thing being simultaneously the knower as well as the known.’ Hiriyanna’s distinction seems to be persuasive, even though Matilal regards both as belonging to the same type of cognition (T1), which is not in need of being cognized by another cognition (cf. above, n. 5). To put it another way, S´a¯likana¯tha’s epistemology and that of Dharmakı¯rti differ from each other with regard to ‘the reason’ why they are both classified into T1 in Matilal’s classification. It is true that the expression svayam : praka¯s´a is also used by Dhamakı¯rti himself (cf. PVin 1.38 and PV 3.327 as mentioned above in n. 4), but its usage seems not to be the same as that of S´a¯likana¯tha. Cf. PVin 1 35,13–14 ad 1.38: sa¯ ca ta¯da¯tmya¯t svayam : praka¯s´ate. ‘‘Consequently, it (i.e., cognition) illuminates itself because of the identity (between the object of cognition, cognizer and cognition).’’ 30 PrP(EB) 172,1–3: kim : ca¯praka¯s´asvabha¯va¯ni (kim : ca¯pra. . . MN, EB, EC, EP : kim : ca j pra. . . MM) meya¯ni ma¯ta¯ (meya¯ni ma¯ta¯ MM, EB, EC, EP : prameya¯ni prama¯ta¯ MN) ca praka¯s´am apeks: anta¯m. praka¯s´as tu praka¯s´a¯tmakatva¯n na¯nyam (praka¯s´a¯tmakatva¯n na¯nyam EB, EC, EP : tada¯tmakatva¯n na¯nyam MN : praka¯s´a¯tmakatva¯nyam MM) apeks: ate. ja¯grato hi meya¯ni (meya¯ni MM, EB, EC, EP : maya¯ni MN) ma¯ta¯ ca praka¯s´ante (praka¯s´ante MN, EB, EC, EP : praka¯s´ate MM). sus: uptasya tu na tad (tu na tad em. : tu na MN : ca na MM, EC, EP : tada¯ na tad EB) dvayam api praka¯s´ate (api praka¯s´ate MM, EB, EC, EP : api pi prathate MN).

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In this passage, S´a¯likana¯tha states that either the object of cognition or the cognizer cannot shine forth by themselves, since both are dependent on the illumination of cognition. Thus, from the perspective of the nature of illumination too, it is clear that S´a¯likana¯tha distinguishes cognition from its form, i.e., the object of cognition.31 This is in stark contrast to Dharmakı¯rti, who insists on the non-difference between the object of cognition, the cognizer and cognition on the ultimate level. The triput: ¯ı Theory: the Difference Between the Three Parts is Non-Illusory How does S´a¯likana¯tha himself evaluate Dharmakı¯rti’s theory of self-cognition? The following statement in the Mı¯ma¯m : sa¯bha¯s: yaparis´is: :ta (MBhP) is helpful in this regard: ‘‘Further, even those who hold that cognition has the cognitive form as its own part do not despise the manifestation of three parts (of cognition). Even they say so: ‘Although cognition itself is undivided, those who hold perverse views regard it as if it had the difference between the object of cognition, cognizer and the result of cognition.’’’32 Quoting PV 3.353 (or PVin 1.44), S´a¯likana¯tha claims that cognition can be regarded as consisting of three parts even in Dharmakı¯rti’s sa¯ka¯rajña¯nava¯da. Nevertheless, he was also clearly conscious of the fundamental difference between his own epistemology and that of Dharmakı¯rti: ‘‘However, (they) maintain that the manifestation of the difference (between three parts of cognition) is illusory. Consequently, (the following) is said (by them): ‘The manifestation of the different (three parts of cognition) in the cognition which has the non-difference (between them) is, indeed, illusory.’’’33 As discussed above, the difference between the three parts of cognition, especially between cognition and its form, is not illusory in S´a¯likana¯tha’s epistemology, inasmuch as the cognitive form belongs to external objects.

So far as S´abarasva¯min is concerned, he might possibly imply that the external object which possesses its cognitive form is considered as that which is to be cognized. In the case of S´a¯likana¯tha, however, we may suppose that the object of cognition is, at least in its primary sense, the cognitive form. Cf. above, n. 24 and n. 26. 31

32

Cf. MBhP 18,7–10: api ca sa¯ka¯rajña¯nava¯dino ’pi tritaya¯vabha¯sam : naiva¯vaja¯nate. te ’py evam a¯huh: avibha¯go ’pi buddhya¯tma¯ viparya¯sitadars´anaih: j gra¯hyagra¯hakasam : vittibhedava¯n iva laks: yate k (PV 3.353 ¼ PVin 1.44) For this passage, cf. also Kuroda (1982, 40). In spite of the fact that S´a¯likana¯tha often quotes Dharmakı¯rti’s works, it seems to be unclear to what extent S´a¯likana¯tha as nira¯ka¯rava¯din had been influenced by Dharmakı¯rti as sa¯ka¯rava¯din with regard to his epistemological scheme, i.e., his triput: ¯ı theory, since it is quite common for Indian thinkers to suppose these components in a single cognition.

33

Cf. MBhP 18,11–12: kin tu bhedapratibha¯sam imam aupaplavikam icchanti. tatha¯ coktam – jña¯nasya¯bhedino bhinnapratibha¯so (bhinnapratibha¯so em. : nityam : pratibha¯so MBhP; PV reads bhedapratibha¯so) hy upaplavah: j (PV 3.212cd) The basis of the above emendation is the same verse quoted in PrP 176, 3, which has bhinnapratibha¯so as a variant of bhedapratibha¯so.

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Concluding Remarks With regard to the distinction between S´a¯likana¯tha’s epistemology and that of Dharmakı¯rti, I would like to draw the following conclusions: (1)

(2)

As is shown in his MBhP, S´a¯likana¯tha agrees with Dharmakı¯rti in assuming that a single cognition consists of three parts. Unlike Dharmakı¯rti, however, S´a¯likana¯tha puts emphasis on the difference between these parts, especially between the cognition and its form, on the ground that the cognitive form belongs to the external thing, and not to the cognition (nira¯ka¯rava¯da). In Dharmakı¯rti’s epistemology, the cognitive form belongs to cognition (sa¯ka¯ra va¯da) and in the ultimate level, there remains no difference between the three parts. Even if Dharmakı¯rti thinks that each entity (vastu) has the ability to produce its own cognition or to throw its own form into cognition (a¯ka¯rasa marpan: a), the cognitive form cannot belong to external objects; from the viewpoint of sa¯ka¯rava¯da, it should be thrown into or handed over to cognition. The first point is relevant to a delicate difference between ‘‘self-illumination’’ (svayam : praka¯s´a) and self-cognition (svasam : vedana), although Matilal considers both as part of the same type of theory of perception: according to the svayam : praka¯s´a theory, cognition shines forth by itself, whereas the cognizer or the object of cognition (i.e., the cognitive form belonging to external objects) do not shine forth by themselves. This would be the reason why cognition is distinguished from the cognizer and the object of cognition in S´a¯likana¯tha’s epistemology. On the other hand, Dharmakı¯rti asserts that cognition illuminates a cognitive form as a part of itself. This results from Dharmakı¯rti’s epistemological position that there is no ultimate difference between cognizer, object of cognition and result of cognition.

Within the confines of his triput: ¯ı theory, S´a¯likana¯tha obviously accepts that the cognitive form belongs to external objects and is therefore distinct from cognition. As mentioned above in n. 8, it has been suggested by Kuroda that S´a¯likana¯tha’s triput: ¯ı theory leads to a kind of self-contradiction in terms of the relationship between cognition and cognitive form, since his epistemology is very close to that of Dharmakı¯rti. On the basis of the above reflections, however, it seems that S´a¯likana¯tha is consistent at least in maintaining that the cognitive form belongs to external objects, even though he counts the cognitive form also as a part of cognition. Acknowledgement I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Dr. Birgit Kellner, who not only proposed to include my article into this volume, but also improved my English and made valuable comments and suggestions. I am also much obliged to my younger colleagues in a research group in Japan that has been working on the Prama¯n: apa¯ra¯yan: a section of S´a¯likana¯tha’s Prakaran: apañcika¯ (PrP) for several years. The precious experience of working with them promoted my interest in the present issue, although it goes without saying that any errors or misunderstandings in this article are my own responsibility. My corrections given to the text of PrP in the footnotes of this article are still preliminary, and I am planning to publish a critical edition of the Prama¯n: apa¯ra¯yan: a section in cooperation with this research group. I am especially indebted to Dr. Taisei Shida, a member of the group, who helped me to get access to manuscripts from ORI and NGMPP. The present study is supported in part by a Grantin-Aid for Scientific Research (A) (Head Investigator: Prof. Dr. Akira Saito) from the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science.

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References General Abbreviations em.: emended n. e.: not existent

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