PAUL SANTILLI
MARX
ON SPECIES-BEING
AND SOCIAL ESSENCE
In the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts Marx explains what he means by the term 'species-being' (Gattungswesen), which he uses to describe human nature. Although Marx situates his definition of man within the broader context of alienation, we will focus upon the positive aspects of his definition rather than upon the nature of alienation itself. The definition of 'species-being' that Erich Fromm offers us is both confusing and incomplete. He says, "What Marx means by 'species-character' is the essence of man: it is that which is universally human and which is realized in the process of history by man through his productive activity. ''1 Let us be more specific about this matter. The species-character of man is his consciousness of being in a practical-organic relationship with the totality of nature. Man is above all the one who produces himself objectively and who is conscious of doing so, both in the activity itself and in the works produced. This notion is of course taken from Hegel, but Marx, as is well known, operates from a perspective which places more emphasis on man as a corporeal and sensuous being and as a practical active being, rather than as a self-conscious contemplative being. The differences between Hegel and Marx may be less than the latter supposed, but Marx certainly felt that the articulation of the concept'species-being' constituted a restoration of man to his fundamental and proper sphere of existence, life itself. He says of species-being that "It is life-begetting life. In the mode of life activity lies the entire character of a species, its species-character, and free conscious activity is the species-character of man. Life itself appears only as a means of life." 2 Man is "fundamentally a part of nature", 3 expressing himself in objective works and retrieving that self in a consciousness that embraces man's senses as well as his intellect. The genuine species-character of consciousness lies in its orientation towards praxis. To fully comprehend the natural aspect of species-being or species-activity one must understand it in terms of its universal or totalizing character. Through his immediate, concrete, practical activity man engages the totality of his capacities in a dialectical transaction with the totality of Studies in Soviet Thought 13 (1973) 76-88. All Rights Reserved. Copyright © 1973 by D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht-Holland
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nature. In this trait of h u m a n life, it may be suggested, Marx believed he had found the original and unsurpassable sensuous universal, for it is here that the productive power of an individual joins with a natural world that subsists in its totality as a sort of second body to man, a webbing which imparts to him as much as it receives from him: The universality of man appears in practice in the universality which makes the whole of nature his inorganic body (1) as a direct means of life, and (2) as the matter, object, and instrument of his life-activity.4 The Marxian man like the Hegelian subject is infused with a desire to 'reproduce the whole of nature', to overcome all objective barriers to the spectra of his self-activity and self-fulfillment, to see himself in an objective world that he himself has made. 5 Thus the individual is through and through a natural being, but unlike any other natural creature man alone, through the entire range of his capacities, has a relationship to all of nature. We must now wonder what the connection is between m a n ' s natural universality, or his species-being, and his social being. That there is such a connection, indeed an inseparable bond between the two, will be made clear; but it would be a mistake to think that it is immediately evident. Species-being and social being are not, in the Manuscripts at least, strictly speaking, synonymous; although, as we shall see, Marx intended them to mean two aspects of the same thing. In so far as Marx discusses species-being in the Manuscripts it is simply one of four features of m a n ' s existence from which he has been alienated by externalized labor - the other three being the process of labor, the product of labor, and his co-existence with other men. After having dealt with species-being per se and its alienated form in labor, Marx then proceeds to discuss the intersubjective dimension of alienation. He makes the transition in this statement: " I n general the statement that man is alienated f r o m his species-existence means that one m a n is alienated f r o m another just as each man is alienated from human nature. The alienation of man, the relation of m a n to himself is realized and expressed in the relation between man and other men. ''6 Given the immediate impression that Marx is making some sort of distinction between self-alienation and social alienation, must we then suppose that there are here two intrinsically different kinds of alienation, such that the sequence in which he deals with them is meant to refer to a sort of causal series in which one kind follows
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as an effect upon another? If this supposition were granted then the alienation of man from himself as a species being would be primary and social alienation only a secondary phenomenon. This is exactly the contention of one author, Robert Tucker, who, in his book Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx, characterizes Marx's description of self-alienation as "a recognizable psychiatric phenomenon, a sickness of the self," which only subsequently through a form of neurotic projection or transference of the divided existence of the self, becomes an alienation of man from other men. 7 Says Tucker, "The intra-personal situation inescapably remains the primary fact, and the alienated social relation is only a derivative fact and a result;" it is Marx's belief, he continues, "that the fundamental fact is the alienated self-relation. ''s With this assumption in mind, il is no wonder that Tucker can question the means whereby Marx, who rarely mentions self-alienation after 1844, concentrating instead upon class struggle and social divisions, can skip from the 'primary' to the 'derivative fact', from species-alienation to its consequences and results in the social order: "Marx realizes that he is doing something questionable in transforming man's alienated relationship to himself into a social relationship of 'man to man. "9 This last statement is simply tossed out by Tucker without any sort of adequate textual verification. 10 In fact there is little in Marx to substantiate anything of Tucker's position in this matter. The claim that there is a primacy of the individual being of the self over its social being is established by nothing more than the sequence in which they are taken up in the Manuscripts. On the other hand, there is a great deal of evidence which implies that Marx viewed the self-relation as already being a social relation. In his species-life man creates, articulates, and perceives himself in his work and in the objective results of that work, but Marx adds, "the relationship of man to himself is objective and actual to him only through his relationship to other men." 11 This suggests to us that Marx, in talking about alienation in terms of process, product, species, and sociality, is not dealing with four different facts, which can be designated as 'primary' or 'derivative', but rather with four aspects of the same human essence. Thus he says, to repeat a text already cited, "that man is alienated from his species existence means that one man is alienated from another... ,"12 (italics mine), not that one leads to or is the result of the other. If the alienated self-relation is equally and at the same time an alienated
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social relation, if "when a man confronts himself he confronts other men, 'ua and if "in the real world self-alienation can appear only in the practical real relationship to other men .... -14 it is because, for Marx, there is a social foundation to the ego and, hence, to whatever seemingly autonomous relation it may have to itself. Man for Marx is in an open and receptive as well as in an active and practical relationship to the world, a world which we must now understand to include not only the immediate material of nature, i.e., the objective correlate of species-being, but also the works and products of other men. In a sense the species-character of the individual makes not only the universality of nature his 'inorganic body', but also the entire history of the instruments and works of production become a source and field which he requires for his life-activity, the activity by which he realizes himself. Even before the German Ideology, where he fully takes hold of its material and economic base, Marx will point out that in his need and in his passion man discovers that it is the world, both the human and natural world, which 'really fills'. 1~ In the Excerpt Notes of 1844, Marx says that what he means by human nature is simply a "common life, a social essence which is no abstract universal power opposed to the individual, but is the essence or nature of every single individual, his own activity, his own life, his own spirit, his own wealth. ''16 One does not go looking for this common life via the path of abstraction and speculation; it is not by feats of metaphysics that intersubjective life is guaranteed as penetrating to the very core of what it means to be an individual. Rather one sees it in the need that extends out to the totality of nature and to the totality of the objects, works, and products of other men; it is this need that emerges in the very 'activation' and in the very activity of man's existence which establishes that the individual's self-being is also his social being: " M e n as actual, living, particular individuals, not in abstraction, constitute this common life. It is, therefore, what men are. ''17 We begin to see that the authentic communal life which Marx has opposed to the Hegelian State is nothing less than an aspect of man's essence, defined as 'free conscious activity' which needs, makes use of, expresses, and finds itself in a totality of objective being, a being that bears not only the index of nature pure and simple, but an index of nature worked on and cultivated by a history of human production and labor. The self-relation that is articulated in a relationship to the individual's universal natural body is necessarily one that is articulated in
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a relationship to the individual's universal social body. In the Manuscripts, for example, Marx refers specifically, albeit briefly, to sexuality and language as indices of the unity between man's species-being, that is, his natural, practical, and totalizing character, and his social being. For instance, he calls the relationship of man to woman a species-relationship in which "man's relationship to nature is immediately his relationship to man, as his relationship to man is immediately his relationship to nature. ''is Praxis, the activity by which man expresses and knows himself in producing himself objectively in an objective world, is born out of a need and passion that draws the individual out of himself into the empirical reality of nature and of other men. Thus, every expression of man's life, including thought itself, says Marx, even if it does not immediately and explicitly reflect an association with other men is, nevertheless, "an expression and assertion of social life.-19 The task is, therefore, to so change reality that this expression of sociality that defines human existence does immediately manifest itself in the production and products of everyday life. If we turn to the German Ideology we find a shift in perspective, from human nature and the essence of man to the history of man. History, not philosophy, is now considered by Marx to be the one true science. This shift is not as r~tdical as some seem to believe. For example, Eugene Kamenka has said that in the ldeology Marx "turns viciously on his earlier concepts of 'Human Nature', of 'Man in general', who belongs to no class, has no reality, who exists only in the misty reality of philosophical fantasy. ''z° But the truth is that, in the first place, human nature was so defined by Marx as to be the most empirical and concrete expression of man's sensuous, active, and universal being. Furthermore, when Marx finally eliminates from usage such terms as human nature and human essence, we find not a reversal of an earlier position, but instead a transposition of the attributes of the human essence to the 'empirical premises of history'. These three premises are that man begins to have a history (1) in the production of the means of subsistence and fulfillment of needs, (2) in the production of new needs, and (3) in social interaction (Verkehr). ~1 And just as man's practical species-existence could not be separated from his social existence, so also is it that none of these premises are to be given the status of a primary fact:
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These three aspects of social activity are not to be taken as three different stages, but just for what they are, three aspects. To make it clear for the Germans we might call them three 'moments' which have existed simultaneously ever since the dawn of history and the first men, and still exist today.22 Marx's original definition of man has been broadened to encompass a 'scientific' view of human history. He now has a viewpoint and a terminology by which he can clarify notions that remained undeveloped and disconnected in his earlier writings. To recognize that the total demand and need of a species-being and of a social being are united, is now to recognize that the immediate and real bond between man and man is established through their material life and productive activity, just as production and the material instruments of individual activity are determined by social interaction: It is obvious at the outset that there is a materialistic connection among men determined by their needs and their modes of production and as old as men themselves. This connection is forever assuming new forms and thus presents a 'history' even in the absence of any political or religious nonsense which might hold men together in addition.22 Marx thus joins man's communal life to his natural material life, to the emergence and development of new needs, and to the history of productive forces created to satisfy those needs. That man is, consequently, a citizen of the natural and historical world is a much more primordial fact than his citizenship in a political or religious kingdom. Above all else, it is through his needs and the objective character of his work that man is a social being; and if the individual himself is a manifestation of his needs and works, then what he is can only be realized in a social context. In the Ideology, Marx restates insights that were already implicit in the Manuscripts: "As individuals express their life so they are. What they are, therefore, coincides with what they produce and how they produce." 24 Both what men produce and how they produce are determined by man's relationship to nature and to other men. The relationship of man to nature (species-being) and his relationship to other men, as we have been stressing, are aspects of the same thing; the 'restriction' in one, says Marx, means a restriction in the other; 25 they are mutually determined. As an example, Marx asserts that "the production of life, of one's own life in labor and of another in procreation, now appears as a double relationship, on the one hand as a natural relationship, on the other as a social one. ''26 We can understand now that when Marx had defined the species-character
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of man, in the Manuscripts, as 'Life begetting life', he did not have in mind simply an isolated relationship of the individual to his own essence; rather, he had grasped that this relationship is already social, that there is no production of life without a form of social interaction, a point which Tucker and Kamenka seem not to have grasped. The social basis for the ego extends, finally, even to the conscious and reflective relation of self to self. In both the Manuscripts and the Ideology we discover that all consciousness, both in content and form, is rooted in a social substructure. In the more philosophically oriented terminology of the earlier work, Marx says, "Thinking and being, to be sure, are thus distinct, but at the same time in unity with one another." 97 This seems in the writings to be mentioned as a sort of afterthought and is not terribly informative. But he is trying to show by this statement that all consciousness repeats man's actual existence, that theory is articulated along the lines of man's practical and social relationships to nature: "As generic consciousness man asserts his real social life and merely repeats his actual existence in thought." zs When Marx establishes in more detail the materialistic basis of history, we find again that consciousness is as much social and universal as it is particular, because like language, it "only arises from the need and necessity of relationships with other men ... and is thus from the very beginning a social product and will remain so as long as men exist." z9 Consciousness is originally directed towards practice, towards the other, and towards nature. Only when it has become estranged from these relations through the division of labor does it become capable of producing fantasies, of fashioning ideological caricatures of man's actual social, practical, and natural life, in the illusion that it is self-subsistent. 80 Marx envisions man as enmeshed in a totality; the individual life, in need, in praxis, and in consciousness is a cross-section of vectors that shoot out to past and future history, to nature, to the communal body of men. My world, the world whose materials I require for the support and exercise of my life, whose objective character I require in order to create and perceive my own nature, already possesses, as Marx pointed out to Feurbach, in its sensuous appearance the mark of industry, the history of communal production, al It is not surprising, therefore, that Marx will see in the division of labor the source of the history of man's alienated, isolated, desolated, and enslaved existence. It goes against everything which per-
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tains to the meaning of man. Divided labor, labor "naturally and not voluntarily divided," disrupts the total content of human existence, by severing man from his natural universal inorganic body, because he has no longer any control over the instruments of production; from his social body, because his own work does not belong to him, and thus he has no means to express his life to others and to himself, nor to satisfy the needs of another human life; and finally, with the rise of modern capitalism and modern monopolies and machineries, the division of labor cuts man off from the power to sustain the life of his own organic body, because it is now the abstract demands and forces of production which regulate the the manner in which his vital needs are or are not to be met. The separation and fixation of activities which in their very nature are meant to reflect a total capacity for life, consolidates " o u r own products into an objective power above us, growing out of our control, thwarting our expectations and nullifying our calculations." 32 When the division of labor becomes, in the form of the class, the empirical reality of man's social existence, then conscious life takes flight from actual life, and finds refuge in abstract totalities disassociated from praxis and nature. For example, the State, "the social illusion in a condition of divided labor, becomes a necessity to man's personal being, while actual social existence, the class structure, becomes a barrier to the life of the individual, an antagonistic and accidental facet of his personality, instead of the essential milieu of his freedom and growth." a8 The social nexus of productive forces, in being subordinated to the demands of private interest and capital, becomes estranged from the life of the individual, and sustains his life only by 'stunting it'. 34 The 'stunting' or the 'restriction' a5 of man's practical relationship to nature that is just as much his relationship to other men, which Marx mentions in the Ideology, is nothing else than the 'alienation' of the Manuscripts. For if the human essence is to be a total need and capacity for action which is directed towards the totality of the external world, then the forced separation of man from this totality represents a cleavage in the self itself. The definition that Marx has given of man can be summed up in the cry of the proletarian at the point of revolution, "I am nothing and I should be everything." a6 This fundamental capacity of man to 'be everything' is, as we have maintained in this paper, the reason why, for Marx, the indi-
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vidual essence is the social essence, for it is in this capacity that the natural, the universal, the practical, and the conscious, become 'aspects' of the same thing. To be alienated from one aspect means to be alienated from all the others; to be restricted in regard to one is to be restricted in regard to another. We find a further confirmation of our position in Marx's views on the necessary conditions for revolution and on communist society itself, and it is with this in mind that we shall briefly deal with them. The contradiction in history has been the subordination of the total to the power of individual and egoistic interests; its resolution can only be the liberation of the individual through a restoration to the total. The capacity of the individual to 'be everything' was incapable of being realized in previous history because it was only in the time of Marx that there had appeared an interdependent world market and economy, a complete poverty in a universal proletariat, and a machinery and industry which provided, for the first time, the sufficient means and goods for fulfilling each man's vital needs, even as they had reduced man to nothing by imposing the harshest restrictions upon his activity. The ideal of man as having everything was allowed to dominate existence as long as there was not in empirical history the prerequisite subjective and objective universalities for an individual to be everything. According to Marx, the universality of a proletariat which can no longer be certain of its very existence, 37 can become through revolution a realization of a genuine social existence, and not simply a resurrection of another form of a state or ideological community, because the proletarian, through his suffering and an isolation that extends even to his family relations, 3s presents the possibility of an utter purge of a self-interest in the collective expression of the state, in private property, and in any relationship with other men that is mediated by anything other than their own humanity and human activity. The communist revolution will bring about the rational resolution of the divisions inherent in all sectors of society because it will place under the control of man the collective nature of production, which has been present since the birth of history. By transforming existing modes of production into communal modes of production communism as a 'community of individuals' "puts the conditions of the free development and movement of individuals under their control, conditions which were previously abandoned to chance and had acquired independent existence over against separate individuals .... ,, 89 But again, although this idea of
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community and sociality is, of course, prominent in Marx's vision of communism, still it has no meaning unless it is understood in reference to man's total capacity for practical activity and to the status of objectivity and its relation to man. There are two complementary goals of communist society, a development of a total and free range of practical activity and a development of a sense of union with all objectivity; this is shown by two passages, one from the Manuscripts and one from the Ideology: On the one hand, therefore, it is only when objective actuality generally becomes for man in society the actuality of essential human capacities, human actuality, and thus the actuality of his own capacities, that all objects become for him the objectification of
himself, become objects which confirm and realize his individuality as his objects, that is, he himself becomes the object.4° The appropriation of these forces is itself nothing more than the development of individual capacities corresponding to the material instruments of production. For this very reason, the appropriation of a totality of instruments of production is the development of a totality of capabilities in the individuals themselves.41 If the individual is able to produce in such a manner that the instruments, process, and products of his labor mirror his proper being, his human being, then he becomes a whole and unified individual, whose relationships to the world are not dominated by chance circumstances and false powers, but by his conscious and free direction. It is because man's relationship to himself and to nature are so intertwined with the condition of his position in the interhuman historical world that the community is the only form of society which will allow his species-being to be realized. In order to feel at home with the natural world and with himself the individual must have a share in and a control over the forces of production; likewise, he must see himself in every product of production. This can occur only if the T is transposed to the level of the 'We', or rather, if it is brought into accord with the 'We'. Hegel had recognized this in the Phenomenology of Mind; but for him objectivityis grasped in its general human significance only when it is no longer merely a fact or a thing, but is die Sache selbst, an ethical-spiritual object in relation to an ethical-spiritual consciousness. 42 As long as there is not an ethical concern, self-interest and mutual deception will prevail in human relationships and in activities which seek objectification in facts. 43 For Marx, however, if objects are humanly produced, that is by community control o f the forces of production, then the human and social significance of its coming-to-be will also
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be present in its being as a fact (Sache). There is no need to postulate an ethical basis for social unity, as long as that unity can be immediately 'read off' the face of objectivity itself. Divided labor and wage labor cause man to be spelt-bound by the object, to be captivated in his greed and in his desire to have it, because it conveys to him nothing of his own being; 44 the object becomes an abstract power, which in its most reified form is money, and like other abstractions it becomes the medium of human interaction without, for that, any real reference to human life. In the Phenomenology, Hegel had not really considered the possibility of immediate practical activity being, at the same time, social activity; and instead treats the former as merely a moment of self-conscious individuality, which takes itself to be real in and for itself. For Marx, when the latent and enslaved social content of productive activity is taken from the hands of the few and placed in the hands of the community, when social activity becomes the real fact instead of an ideology, then the individual interests and needs will become true social interests and needs. He says, in a very interesting manner, that in communist society the particular senses, desires, and needs, in their immediate 'praMs', will reach out for a 'subject matter (Sache)' for its own sake, that is, for its sheer value as an object. But if the object has been produced in a human way, then without ethical reflection or theoretical contemplation, the senses in fact will take hold, not of a thing, but of an object which is an "objective human relation to itself and to man. ''~s Only if man's object, we have seen, becomes for him a human object or objective man, is he not lost in it. This is possible only when the object becomes social and he himself becomes social just as society becomes essential for him in this object,a6 Marx is, therefore, suggesting that the vertigo of greed and egoistic interest, in which the individual seeks to certify his own existence, can be overcome practically and transcended historically by another world than the one Hegel studied, one where nature and man are so altered that selfcertainty can be achieved only and explicitly by a social certainty. If it is the case in the present-day world, that each man sees in his product only "his own objectified self-interest, and in the product of another person, another self-interest, which is independent, alien, and objectified,''a7 as Hegel demonstrated in the dialectic of the 'work', 48 then the task is to implant by socialized production the index of humanity in the very 'sen-
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suous appearance' of objects, and by so doing, transform man's senses themselves, so that in their immediate 'seeing' they grasp a relationship to a totality. Thus, we can understand how Marx can call communism the "complete emancipation of all the human senses." If the object is humanly, that is socially, made, then it is humanly seen: "The eye has become a human eye, just as its object has become a social, human object derived from and for man." 49 It has been said by others, that in the mind of the young Marx, the society of communism will be analogous to a society of artists. In a sense this is true, not necessarily because the laborer in a steel mill, for example, will find the same creative satisfaction as a poet, but because the objectively manufactured world will be like a world of art objects. Man will confront objects in an immediate and 'sensuous' awareness that there is a reason for their being, that they are humanly made or made by human beings, and finally, that he himself, his meaning as a man and as a total being, is woven into the tissue of his relationship to objectivity. One can detect Heideggerian overtones to Marx's writings. I f everything we touch shows itself as a work of man, as a creation which is related to the 'collective wealth of human history', then we discover ourselves in an immediate relationship to a totality of nature, of history, and of men. It is in this sense that we cannot use an object without 'giving thanks' to its being there, for we come upon not only its being, but also the being of others and, hence, of our own being. ABSTRACT.We see in the early texts of Marx a continuity of thought, where the individual essence of man is likewise regarded to be social. This conce19tis for Marx not abstract; that is, it is not to be understood in isolation from nature or other men. NOTES 1 Erich Fromm, Marx's Concept of Man, N.Y., 1971, p. 34. Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, in Easton and Guddat (eds.), Writing of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society, Doubleday, N.Y., 1967. p. 294 (unless otherwise specified, all Marx quotes are from this edition). 3 Ibid., p. 325. 4 Ibid., 19. 293. 5 1bid., p. 295. 1bid., 19. 296. 7 Robert Tucker, Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1967, 19. 144. 8 Ibid., pp. 149, 148.
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9 Ibid., pp. 147-148. io Ibid., cf. p. 149. What he does offer is a complete misreading of a text from the Manuscripts. 11 1bid., p. 297. 12 Ibid., p. 296. 18 Ibid., p. 295. 14 Ibid., p. 297. 15 The Holy Family, FLPH, Moscow, 1956, p. 162. is Excerpt Notes o f 1844, p. 271 in Easton and Guddat (eds.). 17 Ibid., p. 271-272. 18 Manuscripts, p. 303. 19 Ibid., p. 306. 20 Eugene Kamenka, The Ethical Foundations o f Marxism, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962, p. 123. 21 The German Ideology, pp. 409, 419--420, in Easton and Guddat (eds.). 22 Ibid., p. 420. 23 Ibid., p. 421. 24 Ibid., p. 409. 25 Ibid., p. 422. 26 Ibid., p. 421. 27 Manuscripts, p. 307. 28 Ibid., pp. 306-307. 29 Ideology, pp. 421-422. so Ibid., p. 423, (cf. Louis Dupr6, The Philosophical Foundations o f Marxism, N.Y., 1966, p. 156). sl Ibid., p. 418. 82 Ibid., p. 425. 28 Ibid., pp. 457, 459 (cf. Dupr6 p. 151). 84 Ibid., p. 466. 85 Ibid., p. 422. 86 D-EL, 'Toward the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law: Introduction', p. 261. 87 Ideology, p. 467. 88 cf., The Communist Manifesto, pp. 76, 88-89. " T h e bourgeoisie has torn away from the family its sentimental veil, and has reduced the family relation to a mere, money relation." p. 62. s9 Ideology, p. 460. 40 Manuscripts, p. 309. 41 Ideology, p. 467. 42 cf. The Phenomenology o f M i n d (tr. by J. B. Baillie), Harper and Row, N.Y., 1967, pp. 437-440. 48 Ibid., p. 427; pp. 435-437. 44 Excerpt Notes, p. 280. as Manuscripts, p. 308. 4s Ibid., p. 308. 47 Excerpt Notes, p. 278. 48 Hegel, op. cir., pp. 419-438. 48 Manuscripts, p. 308.
