Max Weber and Plebiscitarian Democracy: A Critique of the Mommsen Thesis Ernest Kilker

Introduction

The E n g l i s h t r a n s l a t i o n a n d publication of Wolfgang M o m m s e n ' s Max Weber and German Politics 1890-1920 is an i m p o r t a n t event for a n y A m e r i c a n sociologist interested in m a k i n g sense out of Weber's political sociology a n d controversial personal politics. The American critical reception of this volume (including p r o m i n e n t reviews by Guenther Roth, 2 Fritz Ringer, 3 Gianfranco Poggi 4 a n d Steven SeidmanS), h a s been overwhelmingly favorable. However, to fully appreciate a n d evaluate w h a t is regarded as a " s t a n d a r d work" on Weber one m u s t recognize the context in which it was written, n a m e l y in a post-war G e r m a n y (1959) still seeking, as M o m m s e n frankly confesses, to lay down firm democratic roots a n d inspire popular belief in n a t u r a l a n d inalienable rights and democracy. In the preface to the 1984 English edition, M o m m s e n honestly admits t h a t his work was a part of a constellation of G e r m a n historiography whose f u n d a m e n t a l a s s u m p t i o n was t h a t the Holocaust was in part a product of the "alleged value neutrality of Weimar democracy. ''6 Their work was written from a point of view which involved a f u n d a m e n t a l i s t conception of democracy based on the inalienable rights of n a t u r a l law. In the midst of such profound value concerns, the value relevance of Weber's political writings a n d political sociology was obvious. Predictably, given M o m m s e n ' s own value c o m m i t m e n t s , his value j u d g m e n t s , a n d moral evaluations of Weber's "politics" took a loudly negative turn. In such an intellectual a n d political ambience, M o m m s e n ' s work was implicitly a part of t h e process of political r e e d u c a t i o n . Weber w a s d e p i c t e d by M o m m s e n , no m a t t e r how equivocally, as part of a G e r m a n political lineage which climaxed in Hitler a n d the Third Reich. I would like to thank Stephen Kalberg, Johannes Weiss, Gary Abraham, and Godehard Czernik for reading and commenting on an early version of this manuscript. I would also like to thank the members of the Columbia Faculty Seminar on the Contents and Methods of the Social Sciences and the seminar's chairman, Joseph Maier, for their criticisms. Finally, I would like to thank Arthur J. Vidich for his close reading of the manuscript and editorial suggestions. Politics, Culture, and Society Volume 2, N u m b e r 4, S u m m e r 1989

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However, "standard work" or not, there are profound problems and limitations in Mommsen's work. Although in the 1984 preface to the English edition, Mommsen claims that his work is based on "all available sources," this is obviously not the case. For although Mommsen exhaustively researched Weber's political writings, speeches, and correspondence, he selectively utilized Weber's substantive sociology to underline his political points. Mommsen selectively argues that Weber's sociology was decisively shaped by his passionate political involvement and that his political and theoretical view can be seen as a reaction against the political and social order of Wilhelmine Germany. But this one-dimensional and nondialectical view of Weber's work is open to question and in need of revision. One of the burdens of this review essay is to demonstrate that Weber's sociology was not only shaped by his passionate political involvement but also the reverse--his studies in universal history and comparative historical sociology decisively helped shape his own political involvement and personal choices and commitment. At times then, I will be turning Mommsen's argument on its head. In other words, the focus of this work will be on Weber's theoretical view and substantive sociology and on how their logic, evidence, and reasoning can be seen in his personal politics and controversial advocacy of plebiscitarian democracy. In the process, I would hope to contribute toward clearing up a major "muddle" in Weberian scholarship--the political reasoning behind Weber's advocacy of leadership or plebiscitarian democracy.* To date, that reasoning and its sources are anything but clear as Mommsen frankly admitsJ Part of the reason for the continuing muddle is the fact that Mommsen and other interpreters of Weber's position in this regard fail to systematically integrate the logic, evidence and reasoning of Weber's comparative historical sociology as part of their analysis. Instead, they fly from Nietzschean philosophy to the American presidency, to Germany's immediate post-war situation in search of a "plausible" basis for their admittedly speculative analysis. The result has been endless interpretations noteworthy only for their intellectual ingenuity. What these interpretations fail to do is to systematically incorporate the light that Weber's substantive sociology sheds on the questions at issue. Evidence from Weber's own work which incorporates and yet transcends in its logic, evidence and reasoning the problems of the immediate and *Plebiscitarian democracy would involve a directly elected president, with the power to go directly to the people by means of referenda. Parliament could not remove the president. He could be removed by a popular referendum, if 10 percent of the population called for one.

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local historical moment is largely ignored. Weber makes empirical and historical arguments demonstrating the supposed virtues of plebiscitarian democracy in relation to other forms of leadership and legitimate authority. These arguments must be viewed contextually and processually in relation to Weber's view of the crisis in both German and Western culture. These arguments do not include an explicit appeal to Nietzchean philosophy. They do include an analysis of the American Presidency (both pro and con) but this analysis is situated as part of a more general argument in regard to the trends, probabilities, and actualities which have long inhered in Western histories. My work represents a comprehensive interpretative challenge to Mommsen's still dominant thirty-year old interprerive "paradigm." However, the reader should be warned t h a t although I have attempted to systematically introduce and integrate Weber's comparative historical work into an interpretation of his politics that does not m e a n that I will neglect the also generative German context of his political evaluations. To do so would simply be to correct one polemic and interpretative excess by committing yet another. The real object of this review essay is to integrate both Weber's scholarly writings and r e l e v a n t political writings, to demonstrate their dialectical relationship, and in the process produce a new interpretative synthesis of Weber's "politics." Weber and his work were both a product of Western culture and a German culture still in a process of transition and decision as to how it would grapple with the profound institutional and value dilemmas of modernity. In the context of the ongoing debate on the m e a n i n g and significance of Weber's politics, my work represents a radical departure from the still reigning interpretations. My work represents a direct challenge to past historical interpretations of Weber's political sociology and theory of democracy designed to support German and Italian Fascism (i.e., Carl Schmitt and Robert Michels). My work is a direct challenge to neo-Marxist critiques which seek to characterize Weber as an elitist ideologue who promoted the virtues of instrumental reason (i.e., Herbert Marcuse) at the expense of democratic values and who now seek to "overthrow" his theory of legitimation (i.e., J u r g e n Habermas). My work is also a challenge to those who view Weber's scholarly work as a "fragmented oeuvre" and view Weber himself and the legacy of his work as possessing a split intellectual and political personality, a position I refer to as the "two Webers thesis" or perhaps better the "Jekyll and Hyde Weber thesis"=-the "living" Weber of permanent theoretical value to the discipline (i.e., Economy and Society and the Collected Essays in the Sociology of Religion) vs. the flawed and authoritarian nationalist

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political figure only too m u c h a product of his own time. This position is represented by Guenther Roth. Finally m y work is an obvious challenge to liberal critiques of Weber's political sociology a n d personal politics which seek to defend n a t u r a l rights democracy by a t t a c k i n g in a polemical a n d ideological fashion Weber's empirical a n d historical claims, a n d which insist t h a t despite the wider civilizational horizons of Weber's sociological work, politically he was no more t h a n a lifelong " G e r m a n nationalist" (i.e., Wolfgang Mommsen, Stephen Turner a n d Regis Factor). However, m y work also r e p r e s e n t s an interpretative bridge between those who reduce Weber's "sociology" to his "politics" a n d those who a t t e m p t to separate his politics from his substantive sociology. The fact t h a t these factions speak out of different sides of Weber's entire opus was never more obvious t h a n at the f a m o u s Heidelberg conference in 1964 w h e n R a y m o n d Aron, Mommsen, H a b e r m a s , a n d M a r c u s e s q u a r e d off in bitter debate a g a i n s t B e n j a m i n Nelson, R e i n h a r d Bendix a n d Talcott Parsons. 8 My effort to critically appropriate a n d t r a n s c e n d these polarized interpretations involves the recognition t h a t the t h r e a d s in Weber's work which led h i m to the espousal of plebiscitarian democracy run deep into his analysis of the value crisis of modern culture a n d the crisis of l e g i t i m a c y a n d a u t h o r i t y in G e r m a n y only e x a c e r b a t e d after G e r m a n y ' s loss of the First World War a n d the B a v a r i a n a n d Berlin revolutions. The conclusion of m y thesis is t h a t under the pressure of c o n t e m p o r a r y events it was the comparative historical evidence, G e r m a n y ' s particular history, a n d Weber's own values which led h i m to the espousal of plebiscitarian democracy.

Weber's Political and Cultural Values

M o m m s e n argues t h a t from the Freiburg lecture (1895) onwards, Weber never c h a n g e d his views on the supreme value of the nation. 9 Its interests were the key evaluative criteria in the determination of economic or a n y other state policy. Such evaluative criteria, Weber argued, can only be German. According to M o m m s e n , Weber continued to take this position without reservation t h r o u g h o u t his life. 10In the Freiburg lecture, Weber claims t h a t c o n s t a n t struggle is the basis of all h u m a n association. The future does not hold peace a n d h a p p i n e s s but a necessary a n d endless battle to e x p a n d the n a t u r a l culture and its people. The Darwinist m e t a p h o r Weber employed involved a struggle within a n d between nations which would lead to a process of social selection. Those unwilling to face these sober social facts a n d cultivate a will to power (i.e., middle-

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class liberals or Social Democrats) will never be in a position to control the n a t i o n a l political will or help rear the "structure of the future." M o m m s e n argues t h a t Weber never questioned the n a t i o n a l idea as the value which would be the h i g h e s t guiding principle of political life a n d action--he could never "move beyond t h i n k i n g in n a t i o n a l categories. ''11 The n a t i o n r e m a i n e d the n o r m of political action. Weber sought to preserve the G e r m a n people, its cultural uniqueness, a n d its distinctive g o v e r n m e n t a n d social organization. 1~ Weber's theory of power rested on a desire to realize cultural ideals a n d all culture was linked with the national principle. However, by focusing on the Freiburg lecture (1895) to demonstrate Weber's a d v o c a c y of t h e use of social science to f u r t h e r his n a t i o n a l i s t aims, M o m m s e n fails to provide equal space a n d e m p h a s i s to Weber's later discussions on the uses of social science to promote personal a n d cultural values. 13 These later writings do not neatly fit M o m m s e n ' s central thesis a n d n a t i o n a l i s t litany. T h e y no longer beat the nationalist drum. They h a v e a quite different focus a n d e m p h a s i s involving the creation of a "self-responsible h u m a n ity" a n d the self-responsible individual. Weber argues t h a t the fate of an epoch t h a t h a s eaten from the tree of knowledge is t h a t it c a n n o t rationally discover or uncover the " m e a n i n g " of life--it m u s t be in a position to create t h a t m e a n i n g itself.~4 It m u s t decide " w h a t is God a n d w h a t is the Devil." Weber closely identifies his concept of culture with the qualities of a certain kind of being, a cultural being who self-consciously adopts a certain attitude toward the world. This attitude involves t a k i n g a deliberate s t a n d on the n u m e r o u s value alternatives w h i c h are the possible objects of his choices. In Weber's view this is the basis of an autonomous personality. 15 If life is not to r u n on as an event in nature it m u s t be consciously guided by a series of ultimate decisions t h r o u g h which the soul chooses its own f a t e - - t h e m e a n i n g of an individual's activity a n d existence. The dignity of the individual personality depends upon the values a r o u n d which the individual organizes his life. The rational empirical knowledge of social science which aims at the unveiling of causal relationships in the social world m u s t reject the postulate of ethical m e a n i n g derived from an " u n s e e n world" (whether t h a t influence be represented as God, Progress, Spirit, the invisible h a n d of the Market or "Kultur"). These h u m a n conferrals of m e a n i n g are based on m e t a p h y s i c a l presuppositions a n d they reveal n o t h i n g ultimate about the cosmos. 16There is no scientifically verifiable proof t h a t God exists or t h a t the h u m a n species is m o v i n g in an unequivocally positive technological or spiritual direction or t h a t the m a r k e t m e c h a n i s m works for the benefit of all. Such beliefs were acts of faith.

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However, a n d this is an all too often neglected e m a n c i p a t o r y m o m e n t in Weber's work, social science can provide a m e a n s for the individual to give himself an account of the ultimate m e a n i n g a n d consequences of his own actions. According to Weber, the very conditions under which an a u t h e n t i c personality is possible are linked to the choice between the various possible "gods," the final selection of which provides the individual personality with continuity and ultimate direction. Weber's own h i g h e s t ideal is an individual capable of giving m e a n i n g and order to existence by theoretically g r a s p i n g his own interests a n d avenues of action along the lines of a c o n s t a n t a n d internally consistent image of the world. Social science in the service of self-clarification can indicate the m e a n s to achieve personal ideals a n d the possible effects of such m e a n s on competing ideals, but it c a n n o t prescribe those ideals themselves. This is no small service, for it is precisely this exercise of rationality which constitutes for Weber the area of h u m a n freedom. 17 Social scientific self-criticism a n d self-reflection can bring to consciousness an individual's ultimate s t a n d a r d s a n d can facilitate a discussion a n d disputation of their nature. It can aid the individual in d e t e r m i n i n g w h a t he really w a n t s a n d how he can get it, w h a t he " m e a n s " a n d how he can place h i m s e l f in a position to create t h a t m e a n i n g himself. If great prophets a n d prophetic communities still existed, universal values would also exist. In their absence, we m u s t do the best we can without illusions. There can be no universally valid values, no perfect forms of government, no a r c h i m e d i a n point or ultimate criteria of legitimation for political regimes. It is little wonder t h a t Weber's typology of legitimate rulership, in which the persistence of regimes is explained in terms of the people's belief (however formed) in their legitimacy, leaves the ultimate axiological question of a regime's validity a n d legitimacy to go begging for individual answers based on personal values. Those who would embrace the state itself as their ultimate value, Weber argues, h a v e a m i s t a k e n view of the n a t u r e of the state. At the end of the essay, "The M e a n i n g of Ethical Neutrality ''is (1917), he notes t h a t in the " p a s t few decades," a n d especially during the c u r r e n t t i m e of war, t h e p r e s t i g e of t h e s t a t e h a s i n c r e a s e d tremendously. It alone "of all the various associations" is given "legitimate" power over "life, death, a n d liberty. ''19 Its agencies use this power a g a i n s t external a n d internal enemies. In peacetime, it is the "greatest entrepreneur in economic life." In wartime it h a s complete power over available economic goods. Inevitably, people conclude t h a t it is the "ultimate value," a n d t h a t all social action should be evaluated in terms of its interests. However, Weber insists t h a t the state is not an ultimate value but a technical instrument. It

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has no intrinsic value. It is an i n s t r u m e n t for the realization of other values from which alone it derives value. Its status is an auxiliary one. 20 In l i g h t of this it is n e c e s s a r y to c h a l l e n g e a n d c o n f r o n t Mommsen's conventional wisdom concerning Weber's own alleged ultimate v a l u e - - G e r m a n n a t i o n a l i s m - - a n a r g u m e n t t h a t through sheer force of repetition is still conventional leftist wisdom. It trivializes and distorts Weber's politics and political sociology. Although understandable in terms of the desire of German scholars to find historical precursors to Naziism, Mommsen inflates Weber's nationalism out of all proportion to his articulation of other ultimate values--including his own scholarly work. Can one really claim that Weber's scholarly work was simply at the service of his nationalist political commitment? Obviously, Weber's politics and his sociology sometimes took divergent, sometimes convergent paths. That, of course, does not m e a n t h a t Weber, at times, does not put his nation first. Of course he did. At different moments in his life, different "life spheres" were p a r a m o u n t and dominated his energy, activity, and devotion. As he put it during the War in 1916: Man must choose which one of these gods he wants to serve, or perhaps, at what time he should serve the one and at what time the other.. 71 "Nationalism," however, was not an end in itself but a m e a n s to accomplish higher cultural "ends" such as the preservation of t r a d i t i o n s of freedom, i n d i v i d u a l i t y a n d self-responsibility in j e o p a r d y because of the w o r l d - t h r e a t e n i n g d o m i n a n c e of the ordinances of Russian officials, Anglo-Saxon materialism and Latin "raison." It was G e r m a n y ' s task to carve out and m a i n t a i n a cultural interstitial space in the midst of a culture contest t h a t was international. What was at stake was "the determination of the character of the civilization of the future." Weber viewed the world historical predicament of the early 20th century as a turning point no less momentous t h a n the Battle of Marathon. The outcome of the Battle between the Russian Knout, Anglo-Saxon materialism, constitutionalism and popular sovereignty and a still emerging German alternative would help to decide the future of the West. If Russia were to emerge victorious then one would expect the domination of the West by bureaucratic collectivism. Such a prediction and probability were grounded in the historical "rules of experience" of Russian culture and political power as well as its emerging status as a superpower. Weber viewed the ongoing contest between Russia, Germany, and the United States as a theatre of world history.

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G e r m a n y ' s internal answers to a series of potentially universal cultural p r o b l e m s - - i n c l u d i n g land distribution a n d reform, class conflict, the outcome of the struggle between different cultural spheres a n d character types, a n d the bases of a new legitimate order--could conceivably lead the way for others to follow. Weber s t a u n c h l y opposed the adoption of current a n d past G e r m a n institutions, traditions, a n d values by the "civilization of the future." He spent a great deal of his political life s w i m m i n g against the current of G e r m a n h i s t o r y - - t h e lack of asceticism, the absence of a m o d e r n p a r l i a m e n t a r y tradition, the lack of institutionally a n d politically secured civil liberties, a quasi-mystical view of the Volkstaat, the idealist distortion of philosophy a n d social science. According to Weber the idea of a n a t i o n s t a n d s in close proximity to prestige interests a n d often the "legend of a providential mission. ''22 This culture mission a n d ideal of a n a t i o n is p r o p a g a t e d by intellectuals "predestined" to "usurp" the leadership of the culture community. 23 They develop a r o u n d a n d expound the idea of the n a t i o n just as power holders develop a n d expound the idea of the state. T h e y m a y develop a n d expound c o m m o n cultural values which help provide a unifying n a t i o n a l bond. Obviously, Weber himself periodically a t t e m p t e d to play such a "culture bearer" role. As a concept, the n a t i o n belongs in the sphere of values. The rationally organized state is an i n s t r u m e n t of the ultimately nonrational values of a nation. A n a t i o n is a c o m m u n i t y of s e n t i m e n t in which there are objective c o m m o n factors a m o n g people t h a t distinguishes t h e m from others. 24 These c o m m o n factors are regarded as a source of value which produces a feeling of solidarity which finds expression in a u t o n o m o u s political institutions. 25 Nations are historical individuals whose complex of characteristics form their unique "Kultur. ''28 The latter includes not only art a n d literature but m a n n e r s , patterns of t h o u g h t and a n y other phen o m e n a considered the unique property of its members. But w h a t content, according to Mommsen, was contained in Weber's cultural ideal? The ideal involved a belief in the professional m a n who was the bearer of the values of freedom, individuality, a n d self-responsibility found in the P r o t e s t a n t tradition. 27This character type, in order to flourish, required a d y n a m i c economic system a n d open social structure. The alternative was "universal bureaucratization" w h i c h would render the spiritual m e a n i n g of "vocation" null a n d void. It is crucial here to u n d e r s t a n d the decisive gap in M o m m s e n ' s interpretation in t h a t he links Weber's nationalist c o m m i t m e n t to his cultural ideal as if there was not a profound p a r a d o x a n d logical problem in doing so. What M o m m s e n h a s labeled Weber's cultural ideal involves values which h a d little or

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n o t h i n g to do with the development of G e r m a n tradition, G e r m a n values, "the uniqueness of G e r m a n culture" or the "distinciveness of its g o v e r n m e n t a n d social organization." Of course, Weber sought to "preserve" G e r m a n y ' s integrity as a n a t i o n state, art, language, a n d "spirit." But w h a t were the distinctively G e r m a n values t h a t Weber sought to preserve? Weber never clearly formulated w h a t aspects of G e r m a n culture were worth fighting for--except for perhaps its distinctive potentiality. 2s A n y a t t e m p t to resolve this issue is at best conjectural. 29What is curious about " G e r m a n nationalist" interpretations of Weber's politics is t h a t they share a c o m m o n blindness toward Weber's inner identification with the cultural history of the West. Certainly Weber was a m b i v a l e n t about aspects of his Western heritage (i.e., rationalization, bureaucracy, democracy, universalization, etc.). But Weber's cultural ideal of the ethic of the professional is a Western ideal. Weber's ideal of an open a n d d y n a m i c class structure is a Western ideal. Weber's ideal of science free from ecclesiastical a n d governm e n t a l dictate is a Western ideal. Further, one of the last s t a t e m e n t s from Weber's hand, written in 1920, which was an introduction to his "Collected Essays in the Sociology of Religion" matter-of-factly compares his value concerns a n d value preferences to those of other cultures. 3~ These are the cultural ideals a n d values which gave his work purpose a n d direction (recall his writings on the connection between values, concepts, a n d historical research). These ideals include m o d e r n science, entrepreneural capitalism, citizenship, formal legal rationality, etc.--in the context of this essay no mention is m a d e of " G e r m a n nationalism." It is similarly claimed t h a t Weber h a d no real c o m m i t m e n t to the Rights of Man (despite his claims to the contrary). 31 If such a c o m m i t m e n t conflicted in the slightest with the national interest a n d nation-building it would be sacrificed in a m o m e n t . Weber was not a "true believer" in n a t u r a l rights d e m o c r a c y - - h e debunked and demystified its ideological foundation. But even in the absence of an ideological justification of such rights, it is obvious t h a t Weber's ethic of the professional (e.g., the scientist) a n d his ideal of an open, m o d e r n a n d d y n a m i c class structure depended upon the routine enforcement of such rights, This is not to say t h a t in a " n a t i o n a l e m e r g e n c y " or state of war he would hesitate to advocate their t e m p o r a r y suspension. However, his position in this regard is no different or more nefarious t h a n the practice of other Western democracies. Further, it is curious a n d s y m p t o m a t i c of the interpretative bias I h a v e been illustrating t h a t conjecture is preferred to h i g h l i g h t i n g the explicit connections Weber draws between his own ideals a n d the

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history of the West. At the s a m e time how Weber interprets a n d critically appropriates certain Western traditions (e.g., democracy) is distinctively " G e r m a n " a n d "nationalistic." Weber appropriates a n d constructs aspects of the Western tradition in part to serve the G e r m a n cultural needs of the moment. For example, the relationship a n d connection Weber m a k e s between inner freedom, individualism, a n d nationalist c o m m i t m e n t are not m a d e in terms of past or present G e r m a n political or intellectual history but r a t h e r are m a d e in terms of the history of E n g l i s h Puritanism. Weber draws connections between Protestantism, capitalism, a n d the inner freedom of the individual a n d contrasts t h a t with a bureaucratic mode of life. Weber's extraordinary comparative chapter in the Religion of China 32 graphically h i g h l i g h t s the contrasting personalities produced a n d inspired by positive religious asceticism versus a bureaucratic mode of life leading toward " m e c h a n i c a l petrifaction," a n d "intellectual ossification." Confucianism typified for Weber an ethos which emphasized the simple pleasures of consumption, accommodation, a n d a d a p t a t i o n to the world rather t h a n m a s t e r y of it. In fact, Weber c o n s t a n t l y used C h i n a as a n a n a l o g y for the c o n t e m p o r a r y West a n d especially c o n t e m p o r a r y G e r m a n y 2 3 Since there was little or no prospect now of the emergence of religious sect discipline, w h a t substitute could overcome the political a n d economic traditions so firmly p l a n t e d in G e r m a n soil, in part by its quasi-state church--Lutheranism? The power of ascetic P r o t e s t a n t i s m s t e m m e d from its unification of the individual's ethical relationship to the world, resulting in a m o t i v a t i o n to m a s t e r it r a t h e r t h a n naively affirm or adjust to it. An ethic of affirmation a n d a d j u s t m e n t would not produce an auton o m o u s moral inner personality. In C h i n a such an ethic produced an a t t a c h m e n t to the habitual, slowness to respond to u n u s u a l stimuli especially in the intellectual sphere, lack of passion, a n d b o n d a g e toward i n n u m e r a b l e outward conventions. 34 Such an ethos lacked an i n n e r core, a unified way of life flowing from a central a n d a u t o n o m o u s value position. Such a "guiding h a n d " can partially unite otherwise disparate a n d a u t o n o m o u s value spheres (e.g., the family, the polity, the economy) a n d subject t h e m to its discipline. In Weber's view, such an ethic is usually the result of prophecy which creates a n d systematically orients conduct toward one measure of value, a n d t h e n seeks to fashion the world to its ethical n o r m s r a t h e r t h a n to adjust to the world's "objective" conditions. Confucianism, on the other h a n d , viewed life n o t as a whole in relation to some t r a n s c e n d e n t a l goal, but r a t h e r as a series of occurrences. 3~As such, it never mobilized those inner forces which were t h e n systematically e m a n c i p a t e d from tradition a n d convention. In contrast, once the

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endless t a s k of m a s t e r i n g the world h a s been enthusiastically embraced, w h a t is swept a w a y are all obstacles blocking the success of such a calling--especially the "unholiness of tradition." Overc o m i n g tradition, "the stone wall of habit," was a central condition for establishing the modern capitalist industrial order. The Calvinist created his own salvation, or at least his conviction of it. 36 He did so t h r o u g h systematic self-control which extended to laborer a n d capitalist alike, a n d gave their lives an ethical significance. In line with liberal tradition, to know oneself was accomplished n o t by observation but by action. Self-discovery was a question of doing one's duty a n d a c c o m p l i s h i n g one's daily task. It was a m a t t e r of soberly meeting the d e m a n d s of the day. Worldly asceticism formed the individual personality by allowing the individual to act consistently with his fixed inner motives. 3~ In the absence of a n y possibility of the renewal of sect discipline the only obvious value alternatives which performed such a magical feat of u n i t i n g otherwise disparate value spheres a n d subjecting t h e m to its discipline were socialism a n d nationalism. But socialism according to Weber would not end in the dictatorship of the proletariat but the dictatorship of the official (for Weber the worst of all possible worlds). It was doubly d a n g e r o u s precisely because it claimed to be able to ethically inspire the workers, to unify their r e l a t i o n s h i p to the world a n d destroy the tensions a n d contradictions between competing value orders and life spheres. Socialism was capable of utilizing a n d s u b s u m i n g the family, the economy, the polity, the nation, art, a n d sex as m e a n s to its own ends. The need for "pie in the sky" would disappear when h e a v e n was b r o u g h t to earth in the utopian socialist community. Such a total solution, a l t h o u g h according to Weber, doomed to fail in practice, seemed to offer the possibility, the hope, of depriving the moral conduct of the average m a n of its r a n d o m character, a n d instead subjecting it to a consistent m e t h o d which would c h a n g e the whole m e a n i n g of life at every m o m e n t a n d in every action2 8 What political m o v e m e n t offering w h a t in the way of salvation could compete with such a this worldly promise? 39 For Weber the a n s w e r was clear. A n a t i o n a l sect-like ethic, a cornerstone of which would have to be equal suffrage, could be the basis of n a t i o n a l reconstruction a n d n a t i o n building. Such an ethic would help win the loyalty a n d allegiance of the working class a n d the soldiers r e t u r n i n g h o m e from the front. It could help to provide the basis of honor a n d solidarity for the broad m a s s of people. For reconstruction to be possible, national honor, solidarity and discipline would h a v e to be put in front of mere i m m e d i a t e self i n t e r e s t - - t h e long-term goals of restoring a n d building the nation

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would have to dominate political debate. But who could set such goals and propagate successfully such a sect-like national ethic? It is from the rock bottom of political despair t h a t Weber raises the plebiscitarian leader. This ancient, medieval, and modern historical type born of class and status ridden Western democracies had independent sources of legitimacy and was not strongly integrated into the reigning hierarchical order. Such a demagogic leader would be in a position both to push a national ethic 4~ in the face of the disastrous German defeat and to defend freedom and individualism in the face of the collective socialist assault. Hopefully, he would be able to retain an independent role for the entrepreneuraI capitalist, research scientist and artist, even as he convinced the rest of the population to enter that "house of bondage" upon which their welfare depended. He would be in a position to influence youth a w a y from flights into mysticism and pleasures of the flesh, and toward the "sober demands of the day." The political leader with an independent power base grounded in the mass vote of the people would transcend both class interests and diverse cultural groups and interests and provide the focal point of national and cultural unity. He could provide compelling new national goals for the otherwise s t a g n a n t bureaucratic apparatus by inspiring the population's internal reorientation and reformation toward "a single measure of value." Other cultural "gods" which did not serve the immediate cultural tasks of the nation would be forced, at least for this transitional period, to take a back seat to compelling national goals and values. In regards to Germany, Weber's cultural ideal represented an ideal to be achieved rather t h a n an ideal to be preserved. It represented a cultural aspiration for the future rather t h a n a present reality. It represented Weber's cultural ideal for Germany, but also represented aspects of the Western cultural ideal, long in decay elsewhere. It was Weber's hope to revivify its spirit in Germany so t h a t the German nation would then become a "carrier" of aspects of Western culture, modified to fit Germany's unique historical and cultural circumstances and traditions and e m a n a t i n g its "spirit." Such Western cultural ideals crossed national boundaries and, as Weber pointed out, at least claimed universal significance and value for world history. It is therefore a distortion for Mommsen to claim t h a t Weber "could not move beyond t h i n k i n g in national categories" or t h a t his evaluative criteria for political action were German and only German. In fact, within this new constellation of meaning, Weber's virulent "nationalism" can be seen in a quite different light. Of course, he was committed to the "national idea" but a national idea

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not separated from the cultural ideals it embodies or aspires to embody. Weber repeatedly rejected "noisy patriotism" as divorced from all cultural ideals. However, in a world dominated by competing nation states in which the content of Weber's own cultural ideal was in a state of universal deterioration, the only w a y to achieve and preserve t h a t ideal in G e r m a n y was by use of national power. In the midst of such an apparently p e r m a n e n t international culture contest, only through the unsentimental and even evil exercise of the power of the nation state could G e r m a n y have a role and voice in shaping the future structure of the world. P a r t of the problem for those who misunderstood Weber in this regard lies in the fact t h a t Weber was both a "product of modern European civilization" and a product of a G e r m a n y still in the process of "deciding" to w h a t extent it would institutionalize p h e n o m e n a already taken for granted elsewhere in the "West." The opening sentence of the "Author's Introduction of 1920" is a declaration of methodological intent. But it is also a declaration of faith in specific values which Weber labels "Western." A product of modern European civilization, studying any problem of universal history is bound to ask himself to what combination of circumstances the fact should be attributed that in Western civilization and in Western civilization only cultural phenomena have appeared which (as we like to think) lie in a line of development having Universal significance and value. 41 However, these values lay in a "line of development" that did not necessarily include Germany. G e r m a n y h a d never successfully institutionalized entrepreneurial capitalism and democracy as cultural ideals. Germany's political, economic, and religious institutions retained a decisively traditional cast. The principle current German "culture bearers" provided the population with character models which, in Weber's view, were inappropriate for universal emulation in a modern nation state (i.e., the Lutheran traditionalist concept of the calling, J u n k e r aristocratic warriors, the culturally conservative literati, the new "socialist man," and the followers of various mystical a n d / o r orgiastic cults such as those led by Stefan George and Otto Gross). Weber's sometimes coldblooded and ruthless statements on the issue of power, his RealPolitik, were not intended to suggest a c o m m i t m e n t to power as an end in itself but only as a m e a n s to the achievement of cultural ends. To realize Weber's cultural ends would require the exercise of national power externally and internally. It would require the destruction (not the preservation) of traditional German values and institutional forms as Weber noted as early as

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1893. 42 The national idea no longer had the same motivating power t h a t it h a d for the founding fathers of the Reich. In fact, the key status group amongst the founding fathers, the aristocratic Junkers, now represented for Weber a political power t h a t had to be destroyed. Their feudal life style stood in the w a y of political and economic modernization. The tariff policies which supported them threatened the Reich with being reduced to a welfare agency for suffering agrarians. 43 In 1894, Weber stated unequivocally w h a t he hoped his generation's contribution would be to the future of G e r m a n y and the world.

I believe that we must avoid seeking to produce positive feelings of contentment through social legislation. We wish and can only wish something else; that which is worthy in man, self responsibility, aspiration for humanity's spiritual and moral legacy, this is what we wish to preserve and support. 44

Distortions in Mommsen's Defense of Himself

In the Afterward to his book, Max Weber and German Politics 1890-1920 ("Toward a New Interpretation of Weber" written in 1974) Mommsen recognizes t h a t the objection can be made t h a t "insufficient connections" have been d r a w n to Weber's theoretical ideas, but he insists t h a t his "scientific positions" have been thoroughly examined in regard to "individual problems" of interpretation. 4~ This is a curious claim, since on m a n y hotly contested issues on which there is no consensus, Mommsen's work has been a n y t h i n g but thorough. Mommsen's efforts at a partial mea culpa in this regard have involved an u n a b a s h e d admission that: "If I had to write this book again I would choose a more comprehensive format, giving equal balance to the theoretical work . . . . " However, when he has attempted to develop a more "catholic orientation" on Weber's politics the result has been a theoretical and scholarly failure. The Age of Bureaucracy: Perspectives on the Political Sociology of M a x Weber, 46 is obviously an effort by Mommsen to integrate Weber the universal historian and social scientist with Weber the power politician. However, the actual effect of the book is to underline their separation. In addition, Mommsen commits scholarly and interpretative errors which further underline the i n a d e q u a c y of his overall approach. For example, when he attempts to unravel Weber's discussion of legitimate and illegitimate domination he states:

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Before we embark upon this difficult problem, the question must be raised why Weber throughout his work, always spoke of "legitimate domination." What is the position with regard to classical tyranny, or the various authoritarian systems of his own day or even the modern totalitarian systems of the Fascist or Communist varieties? The concept of illegitimate rule turns up in Weber's sociology only once and there it refers to the medieval city state that has emancipated itself from the political control of a former overlord, who--speaking in terms of the medieval tradition--was the only source which could confer legitimacy on another political authority . . . . In fact, one cannot escape the conclusion that in the context ofWeber's sociological theory of "legitimate rule" there was no room for illegitimate forms of domination. 47 N o t only does M o m m s e n fail to d r a w the a p p r o p r i a t e a s s o c i a t i o n (as Weber did) b e t w e e n the m e d i e v a l case a n d the Western tradition of p l e b i s c i t a r i a n leadership, b u t he also omits altogether Weber's discussions of the "illegitimate" forms of d o m i n a t i o n in the a n c i e n t world. As a result, his discussion of Weber's position on plebiscit a r i a n d e m o c r a c y t a k e s on a falsely N i e t z c h e a n ring a n d pivots on the crude d i c h o t o m y of c h a r i s m a v e r s u s b u r e a u c r a t i z a t i o n d e t a c h e d from the empirical a n d theoretical subleties of Weber's argument.

Weber's Theory of Democracy and Germany's Political and Cultural Crisis W e b e r a r g u e s t h a t the u n i v e r s a l political subject of direct d e m o c r a c y is n o t possible except in small closed c o m m u n i t i e s of social equals. 4s Once a group g r o w s b e y o n d a certain size a n d degree of economic differentiation, D e m o c r a c y as a v a l u e r a t i o n a l f a i t h gives w a y u n d e r the s i m u l t a n e o u s strain of class a n d s t a t u s struggle a n d the need for c o n t i n u o u s a d m i n i s t r a t i o n to the " l a w of the small n u m b e r " - - m o s t notably, plebiscitarian authority. This is true despite otherwise d r a m a t i c a l l y different objective historical conditions. It w a s true of D e m o c r a t i c A t h e n s u n d e r Pericles. It w a s true also of t h e I t a l i a n m e d i e v a l c o m m u n e s , 49the Swiss cantons, "Democratic" Zurich a n d m o d e r n m a s s democracies. In Weber's w o r d s - " M a s s d e m o c r a c y a l w a y s b o u g h t its successes since Pericles' time with m a j o r concessions to the C a e s a r i s t principle of leadership selection b e g i n n i n g at the time of Pericles. ''~~ D e m o c r a c y w a s a m e t h o d a n d a m e a n s ; it w a s n o t an end in itself. It w a s a m e t h o d of selecting leaders, a n d it w a s a m e a n s b o t h of giving their rule an a u r a of legitimacy a n d of including all significant s e g m e n t s of the p o p u l a t i o n in the political affairs of the nation. H o w e v e r , t h e classical D e m o c r a t i c doctrine w a s h a r d l y one Weber could "believe" in. The t h e o r y of t h e " S o v e r e i g n t y of the People," the

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"Will of the People," the "Wisdom of the People," were all utopian fictions whose desire was the abolition of the d o m i n a n c e of m e n over m e n - - i n Weber's view, a this-worldly impossibility. However, for Weber, democracy was not simply a m e a n s for selecting leaders but also a D a r w i n i a n m e t h o d of choosing between w a r r i n g v a l u e s - - a m e a n s to provide a suitable model of conduct for the "whole n a t i o n down to the lowest strata." Democracy was a political necessity because it offered at least the possibility of the creation of new cultural forms a n d a "decision" between competing cultural models. Weber's concern t h a t the working class not take an uncompromisingly hostile a n d disruptive attitude toward the G e r m a n nation state links up neatly with his now famous sociological distinction between class a n d status. As Weber argued, classes are not communities, t h o u g h they m a y be the basis for c o m m u n a l action. The likelihood of such action is increased if exploitation is t r a n s p a r e n t enough. In contrast, status groups are n o r m a l l y communities, although of an " a m o r p h o u s kind." A c o m m o n status situation involves the fate of m e n being linked t h r o u g h the positive or negative social estimation of h o n o r a n d a c o m m o n style of life. Status can cross class lines, u n i t i n g the propertied a n d propertyless. 51 The decisive role of a "style of life" in status honor m e a n s t h a t the leading status groups are the specific bearers of all conventions a n d values (that is, AngloSaxon self-governing gentlemen, J u n k e r aristocrats) a n d typical cultural traits. 52 Weber argued t h a t G e r m a n y ' s leading groups have exhibited certain traits a n d styles of life which are not appropriate for universalization in the m o d e r n nation-state. What is required are new cultural forms a n d the d o m i n a n c e of new cultural forces. Democratization is the necessary condition for even the possibility of such new cultural forms. G e r m a n y ' s cultural past, w h e t h e r represented in the Junkers, G e r m a n y ' s literary classics a n d classicists, or the status honor of bureaucrats does not speak to the cultural needs of the m o m e n t . It c a n n o t provide the necessary cultural solutions. Democracy provides both the arena for the struggle over new cultural forms as well as a shared status for all G e r m a n s which cuts across class a n d regional lines--all are citizens with the right to vote. Democracy offered the prospect of restoring some m e a s u r e of cultural vitality to G e r m a n y ' s cultural future-otherwise faced with the bleak prospect of "total bureaucratization" a n d " m e c h a n i c a l petrifaction." It also offered the prospect of m o v e m e n t in a definitive cultural direction; a collective decision with regard to the " w a r r i n g gods" seeking cultural h e g e m o n y in Germany.

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Weber and Plebiscitarian Democracy

Weber's advocacy of plebiscitarian democracy m u s t be situated in relation to the political a n d cultural crisis in G e r m a n y which was exacerbated after the loss of the War a n d the B a v a r i a n a n d Berlin revolutions and in terms of Weber's view of the overall trajectory of all Western democratic polities. J u s t as the emergence of bureaucracy a n d the bureaucratic type is not r a n d o m at all but a result of the process of social selection in response to real societal needs a n d complexities, so too does the plebiscitarian type emerge. His "social selection" in the Occident is the result of the needs of political a d m i n i s t r a t i o n which follow their own "laws" in democratic " m a s s " states. To situate Weber's a r g u m e n t properly his earlier advocacy of p a r l i a m e n t a r y democracy should be seen not as a leap from it to plebiscitarian democracy but merely a c h a n g e in the w a y Weber structures his "leadership" bias. The political c h a s m h a s been created by Weber's interpreters who h a v e been all too eager to use Weber as one scapegoat for Hitler a n d the Holocaust. Weber can a n d should be accused of not t h i n k i n g t h r o u g h or t a k i n g seriously e n o u g h the potential " u n a n t i c i p a t e d consequences" of his position. However, if you situate carefully Weber's a r g u m e n t in the political a n d intellectual context in which he makes it, an ideological dismissal (i.e., Mommsen) simply won't do (no matter t h a t the goal is a "noble one," w h e t h e r liberal or Marxist in terms of political reorientation and reeducation). The scientific a r g u m e n t over Weber's work should not focus on w h e t h e r or not he possessed the "correct" political values but whether his historical claims and generalizations are valid or not (regardless of the interpreters own political values). In other words, Weber constructs a set of political generalizations out of the comparative evidence as he reads it. These generalizations are fed by w h a t Weber claims are the actual trajectories of ancient, medieval, a n d m o d e r n democracies. It is Weber's empirical claim t h a t the trajectory of these democracies are similar even if their historical a n d institutional conditions are a n y t h i n g but identical. Similar forms of political leadership and administration are not necessarily the result of identical superstructures over identical economic foundations. 53 There are only a limited n u m b e r of k n o w n historical solutions a n d a d m i n i s t r a t i v e techniques available for effecting compromises between class a n d status groups. These things, as Weber put it more t h a n once, obey their own laws. 54 According to his E n g l i s h t r a n s l a t o r Guenther Roth, Weber's extensive discussion of the types of legitimate d o m i n a t i o n in

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Economy and Society 55 was written between 1918 a n d 1920--a fact m a d e t r a n s p a r e n t by Weber's frequent references to the G e r m a n revolutions, a n d the Russian revolution a n d its aftermath. Yet, Roth argues t h a t Weber gradually shifted his opinion in favor of a popularly elected President, who would serve as a mediator between the Reichstag a n d states, as if his political r e a s o n i n g in this regard was completely divorced from his academic work. To situate and characterize Weber's c h a n g e of position as Roth does, distorts Weber's recognition, from the point of view of his personal values, in the sections of Economy and Society on the types of legitimate domination, of the political a d v a n t a g e s a n d even "necessity" of the plebiscitarian element in democratic politics. Further, to characterize Weber as first a p a r l i a m e n t a r i a n and then a plebiscitarian ignores Weber's effort prior to 1918 to bluntly demonstrate the d o m i n a n t plebiscitarian influence within p a r l i a m e n t a r y politics. Weber does not s h r i n k in d i s m a y from this reality, but celebrates its virtues a n d recognizes w h a t he regards as its political necessity. The only t h i n g he shies a w a y from prior to 1918 is the direct election of the Reich P r e s i d e n t - - w h a t is often referred to as the " A m e r i c a n model." What appalled h i m m o s t about A m e r i c a n politics was the p a t r o n a g e system which smacked of a patrimonial system of personal favorites r a t h e r t h a n an a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of trained officials. The p a t r o n a g e system as Weber was well aware, was wide open to the most venal forms of corruption. However, in his evaluation of the A m e r i c a n system Weber was prone after 1918 to sometimes emphasize civil service reforms which seemed to suggest t h a t even in America plebiscitarian democracy would not come at the expense of administrative rationality a n d an expert officialdom. The a r g u m e n t I have outlined so far can be brought into clear relief if a close comparison is m a d e between the essay " P a r l i a m e n t a n d G o v e r n m e n t in a Reconstructed G e r m a n y " compiled from articles published in the F r a n k f u r t e r Zeitung during the s u m m e r of 1917, the sections of Economy and Society on legitimate d o m i n a t i o n written between 1918-1920, a n d the lecture/speech "Politics As a Vocation" which was delivered in 1919 a n d was later revised for publication. The essay " P a r l i a m e n t a n d G o v e r n m e n t in a Reconstructed G e r m a n y ''56 is an effort to influence opinion on the constitutional question. In it Weber again powerfully illustrates the use he makes of his sociological work in the formulation a n d logic of his political reasoning. The essay ostensibly is outlining the preconditions for effective p a r l i a m e n t s but it also is a clarion call in favor of a system which allows room for a considerable degree of plebiscitarian leadership. Weber's switch the following year in favor of plebiscit a r i a n democracy is less a switch in kind t h a n it is a switch in the

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degree of freedom to be afforded the plebiscitarian politician as reflected in the kinds of procedural constraints a n d the form of accountability which was d e m a n d e d of him. In other words, less t h a n a year later, Weber, seeing G e r m a n y in the midst of Parliam e n t a r y paralysis at a time of national crisis, was concerned with giving the plebiscitarian leader more political room to maneuveur. Weber opens with a plea for universal democratization--the n a t i o n is obligated he argued to give r e t u r n i n g soldiers the ballot. He emphasizes t h a t in discussing constitutional techniques for a m a s s state there are only a limited n u m b e r of alternatives a n d t h a t the form of g o v e r n m e n t depends upon the cultural tasks of the n a t i o n Y Borrowing such techniques from other n a t i o n s will not e n d a n g e r the " G e r m a n spirit." At the same time, the vital interests of the n a t i o n as a w h o l e s t a n d above t h e i s s u e s of d e m o c r a c y a n d parlim e n t a r i a n i s m . Regardless, the current constitutional set-up m u s t go. Bismarck's political policies, which included facilitating the disintegration of the National Liberals, an inability to tolerate a u t o n o m o u s powers, a n d a policy of co-opting party leaders into g o v e r n m e n t ministries while stripping t h e m in the process of their party power bases in the Reichstag m a d e it impossible to develop individuals capable of i n d e p e n d e n t political judgement. In Bismarck's absence, the bureaucracy alone rules. True p a r l i a m e n t a r y g o v e r n m e n t would involve a p a r l i a m e n t which not only discusses the great issues of the day, but also decisively influences t h e m rather t h a n simply being the rubber s t a m p of the bureaucracy. How t h e n r e a r r a n g e the state to allow the emergence of such i n d e p e n d e n t p a r l i a m e n t a r y political judgement? In arguing for a constitutional p a r l i a m e n t a r y state, Weber never suggests t h a t on a daily basis, such a body could rule. In the m o d e r n state, the p e r m a n e n t government, the actual ruler, is the bureaucracy a n d its power is exercised in the daily routines of administration. 5s Similarly, power in parties goes to those who h a n d l e the daily b u s i n e s s m t h e interested h a r d core. Voters have an influence only w h e n p r o g r a m s h a v e to be adopted or promised in the hope of luring votes. Regardless, typically parties in the West are at least to some degree p a t r o n a g e parties a n d parties which represent a certain world view. Typically also, p a r t y m a c h i n e politics is d o m i n a n t , the Social Democratic Party being no exception in this regard. According to Weber, its democratic credo only speeds up this form of the concentration of power. Those literati who t h i n k t h a t real self-government is possible are only fooling themselves. Governing a m e d i u m sized city is not like g o v e r n i n g a large m a s s state. Guilds of notables won't do, trained officials are necessary. 59 In fact, it is G e r m a n y t h a t h a s perfected

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bureaucracy and this "form of life" is triumphing world wide--the future belongs to it. This reality is "escape proof," it won't disappear unless there is a total collapse of Western culture. Indeed, the whole organization of w a n t satisfaction in the West is geared to its model of operation. The prospect of total bureaucratization means that "order" m a y be the sole and ultimate value in the determination of the quality of everyday life. Every individual as in Ancient Egypt could be fettered to their job, to their class, or forced to do work at the state's bidding. How, then, rescue " r e m n a n t s of freedom" from this otherwise bleak prospect? What powers can check the power of the bureaucratic stratum? The key is to devise a system in which there is room for leadership--leadership which doesn't operate on the basis of dutiful compliance to instruction. What is necessary is the creation of positions with a different responsibility and a different ethos--an ethos of self-responsibility in working toward goals and values. 6~ The then current political situation involved a monarch (i.e., Kaiser Wilhelm) who had irresponsibly attempted to govern a mass state on the basis of amateur knowledge. However, the actual ruler was the bureaucracy which in hiding behind the traditional legitimacy of the monarch, has been allowed to rule without being effectively accountable to anyone. An effective parliament would require that administrative heads of bureaucratic departments be recruited from its midst and have its confidence, while such heads would not be forced to give up their power base in the Reichstag. An effective parliament would choose those who would hold the highest position of leadership. An effective parliament would secure the means to hold those leaders accountable for their actions. An effective parliament would have the right of inquiry into the bureaucratic administration assuring t h a t politicians without a calling would not have free reign in determining political policy. The right of inquiry would eliminate the bureaucratic monopoly on information and it would also help generate leaders who prove themselves capable of rooting out official corruption and influencing administrative policies. 61The right of inquiry would also protect political minorities from the t y r a n n y of the majority who might otherwise find themselves helpless to cope with the realities of bureaucratic power. 62 The key issue is the process of selection of a system of legitimate order. Different systems of legitimate order have quite distinct and disparate influence in determining w h a t kind of individual the culture produces. Why in Germany should men with talent and an instinct for power go into politics? They would be better served and better utilized if they would go into an area of life which would allow

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them at least some room to move (e.g., industry). In fact, such men (e.g., Krupp) gravitate to private capitalism by a process of negative selection. Why should men with leadership qualities be attracted to politics if the only power they have is to change a few budget items or secure minor jobs for a few followers? Despite arguing that a m o n g Germany's political needs is an effective parliament, Weber never suggests t h a t parliament, even when effective, would hold decisive political power. Nowhere in the world does a parliamentary body as such govern and determine politics. What they typically involve is a mass of deputies who follow their leader "blindly" as long as he is successful. As far as Weber is concerned, "this is the way it should be." In mass states, the Caesarist elements are ineradicable and pose no threat as long as the leader's public accountability is clear and assured. Every mass democracy moves toward a Caesarist mode of selection, which is not an ordinary vote but a profession of faith in the calling of an individual who demands acclamation. Even with this overall Caesarist direction, parliament still has important functions including the preservation of civil rights, providing political continuity, playing the role of "watchdog" with regard to the bureaucratic administration, providing a proving ground for leaders, as well as a s s u m i n g the responsibility of peacefully eliminating the "dictator" once he has lost the faith of the masses (i.e., a vote of no confidence).63 Weber is explicit, however, in pointing out t h a t the existing parties in G e r m a n y are a n y t h i n g but innovative, holding to stereotyped positions and fixed ideas. Ironically, it is pure patronage parties (e.g., the U.S.) who make no pretense in representing a consistent world view who tend to be the most open to new ideas when in pursuit of votes. There is no "guild resentment" a g a i n s t the new men who carry new ideas. The bosses of political machines m a y actually endorse such "new m e n " as a means of diverting attention from their own questionable political practices. However, apparently for Weber at this point, the abuses of a patronage system (versus a trained officialdom) makes the American system neither "transferable nor desirable. ''64 The American system emphasized the plebiscitarian element which Weber applauded, but at the expense of another value t h a t Weber also insisted o n m a trained officialdom. At this point Weber is arguing in favor of the English model which combines plebiscitarian and parliamentary elements while avoiding the abuses of a pure patronage system. The English model is preferable because it offers opportunities for men of power and responsibility to come up through the p a r l i a m e n t a r y ranks via the

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committee system, gain a respect for the constitutional a r r a n g e m e n t of power, a n d at the same time, prove themselves adept at manipulating the i n s t r u m e n t s of power. However, by 1918, Weber moved politically in favor of plebiscit a r i a n rather t h a n p a r l i a m e n t a r y democracy a n d this is reflected in his sometimes quite different formulation of the p a t r o n a g e situation in the U.S. I n s t e a d of e m p h a s i z i n g the still considerable a m o u n t of p a t r o n a g e involved, Weber instead emphasizes civil service reforms which are b e g i n n i n g to bring the "democracy of dilettantes" in America to an e n d m s u b s t i t u t i n g a system d o m i n a t e d by specialists who g a i n their positions t h r o u g h the e x a m i n a t i o n system. This development m a d e it easier for Weber to celebrate the plebiscitarian element of A m e r i c a n politics without h a v i n g to constantly apologize t h a t it comes at the expense of a trained officialdom. ~5 When Weber defines the type of the plebiscitarian leader, in Economy and Society, he is f a s h i o n i n g an ideal type like a n y other in his sociological w o r k - - e m p h a s i z i n g a n d isolating certain characteristics while d e e m p h a s i z i n g or eliminating others. In constructing the plebiscitarian type Weber is isolating both the historical a n d political conditions under which the type emerges a n d the typical motives, values, and action m a x i m s which inform his behavior. However, in assembling this type, Weber seemed especially intent on isolating the contrary a n d even contradictory characteristics which distinguished different actual historical plebiscitarian leaders a n d the courses of action they pursued. Such a m e n t a l construct of this leadership form also allows Weber to predict w h a t social forces will seek to resist this form of leadership as well as to hypothetically project "objectively possible" alternative historical a n d institutional courses if such a leader is allowed to rise to a position of power. In other words, Weber is able to isolate different points of view a n d evaluative attitudes (positive a n d negative evaluations) toward the plebiscitarian type especially in relation to Weber's own ultimate values and the values of his political opponents. He is able to evaluate the possible effects of this leadership form versus its alternatives on the realization of his political a n d cultural ends. In e v a l u a t i n g the plebiscitarian leader Weber suggests t h a t his own preferred outcomes are not the only possible ones. In fact, he m a n a g e s , at least in this context, to m a i n t a i n some measure of intellectual honesty in relation to his opponents' values, even t h o u g h it is clear t h a t he is primarily isolating a n d extolling the virtues of monocratic bureaucratic authority a n d plebiscitarian democracy. Weber argued t h a t to move c h a r i s m a in a "democratic" direction involves an act of recognition a n d a c o n c o m m i t a n t duty to obey; this

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is the real a n d p r i m a r y basis of the ruler's legitimacy a n d not a consequence of the "legality" of his election. 66 At the h e i g h t of his revolutionary legitimacy a n d popularity he m a y ignore both traditional legitimacy a n d formal legality. 67 Power m a y go, Weber frankly admits, to the type of individual who is the most spectacular, promises the most, or h a s the best p r o p a g a n d a m a c h i n e in the competition for leadership. Inevitably, such a process of selection limits the level of rationality this type of administration can attain: "even in America it h a s not always come up to expectations. ''6a Weber argued t h a t it is possible for monocratic authority to be limited by a more democratic collegial principle of consultation and vote but such an a r r a n g e m e n t flew in the face of technical rationality. 69 Collegial bodies were "rapidly decreasing in importance" in favor of types of organizations subject to the authority of a single head. Only the monocratic leader could act rapidly a n d decisively, free from the necessity of compromise between different opinions a n d free from shifting majorities. Foreign policy is impossible to carry out vigorously a n d consistently on a collegial basis. The principle of collegiality obstructs the p r o m p t n e s s of decisionm a k i n g , threatens the consistency of policy, muddles the lines of responsibility and u n d e r m i n e s the need for retaliatory ruthlessness a g a i n s t outsiders a n d the m a i n t e n a n c e of discipline within the group. The principle of collegiality which h a d ostensibly been a d v a n c e d to promote integrity in leadership had, as Weber saw it, everywhere given w a y to the technical superiority of monocratic bureaucratic organization. The constitutional separation of powers, Weber argued, is an inherently unstable structure because the question of who decides in an emergency is left unanswered. 7~ But w h a t is the potential power of the average individual political subject in the categorical framework of Weber's political sociology? It is fair to say t h a t the possibility of such a subject is eclipsed from the outset. R a t h e r there are only inactive a n d n o r m a l l y inert masses who, in terms of party politics and the play of interests, are merely objects of solicitation--so m a n y votes on election day. 71 In Weber's view, the " m a s s e s " are capable of only irrational feelings based on petty personal interests, a n d their cries for substantive justice instigated by the press a n d party leaders can only disrupt the formal rationality of ~he political a n d legal systems. 72 Weber recognized but was willing to accept the risks a n d possible u n i n t e n d e d consequences (from the point of view of his personal values) of plebiscitarian leadership. In Weber's own terms, the m o n o c r a t sometimes introduced substantive ideas of justice into the economic a n d judicial spheres, was open to influence by large capitalist interests a n d was not adverse to s u s p e n d i n g civil liberties

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and placing himself above (or at least outside) the law. Weber draws a striking analogy between the party system and capitalist enterprise. In the new political market, the power of the seller as compared with the buyer was tremendously increased by use of the suggestive appeal of advertisingJ 3 Such irrationality, from Weber's point of view, could be as disturbing as the star chamber practices of the absolute m o n a r c h J 4 However, plebiscitarian leadership normally leads in the path of rationality. The leader dependent on recognition by plebiscite will usually create a bureaucratic organization which functions promptly and efficiently. His "first aim" according to Weber, "will be the destruction of traditional, feudal, patrimonial, and other types of authoritarian powers and privileges. ''75 His "second aim" would be to create economic interests which are tied to his regime as the source of their legitimacy. In accomplishing these aims, Weber argues, the plebiscitarian leader would likely use the instrument of formal legality, contributing to the rationalization of economic activity in the process. 76

Pofitics As a Vocation

The lecture/speech and essay "Politics As a Vocation" has never been given the close reconstruction and interpretation it deserves in relation to the issues under discussion here. It brings into sharp focus the logic and reasoning behind Weber's espousal of plebiscitarian democracy. It has been argued that the "Author's Introduction of 1920" is the final and ultimate statement of Weber's scientific intent. It can be argued just as persuasively that "Politics As a Vocation" (1919) and "Science As a Vocation" (1917) represent the final and ultimate statements of Weber's political and philosophical positions in relation to those two daimons, politics and science, which absorbed most of his own life. Although Weber explained at the outset to his audience t h a t they were going to be disappointed because his lecture was not on the actual problems of the day or w h a t the everyday practical content of political activity ought to be, this disclaimer belied the content of his "lecture," which included both a scholarly (if brief) presentation of the history of the modern state and the forms of legitimate authority and a demogogic evaluation of the practical possibilities of the moment and a clear outline of Weber's preferred political solution. In this speech Weber dramatically brings together his comparative historical method, substantive sociology, "scientific" value analysis, and practical politics.

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Weber doesn't hesitate to assert t h a t he is most interested in charismatic leadership in relation especially to the historical examples we h a v e already alluded to. The true demogogue, he argues, grew out of the soil of the Greek city state and such a politician embodies the idea of a calling in its h i g h e s t expression. 77 The same is true of the political leader of a p a r l i a m e n t a r y party grown in the soil of the constitutional state, also indigenous and peculiar to the Occident. Whether one is talking of the "great d e m a g o g u e in ecclesia or p a r l i a m e n t " w h a t is involved is an individual who is personally recognized as i n w a r d l y called to be a leader of men. Such politicians also emerged, Weber argues, in the medieval "free c o m m u n e s " whose historical h o m e was the Occident a n d whose m e m b e r s formed political associations which abolished or restricted princely power. 78 In all these cases, Weber continues, w h e n politics was pursued as a vocation, life was given m e a n i n g only in the service of a cause. In the modern era all party struggles are struggles for p a t r o n a g e as well as objective goals. The American parties were the closest historical cases of pure p a t r o n a g e parties who h a n d e d out jobs a n d "willy nilly" c h a n g e d programs in order to e n h a n c e the chances of g r a b b i n g votes. This t e n d e n c y a n d t e m p t a t i o n to give out positions on the basis of party loyalty r a t h e r t h a n achievement or merit m i g h t well increase as a result of general bureaucratization (i.e., increase in g o v e r n m e n t jobs). The t h r e a t of such "vulgar philistinism" endangers the technical functions of the state apparatus. However, even the U.S. "spoils" system h a s been p u n c t u r e d by Civil Service Reform a n d by the technological a n d irrefrageable needs of administration. Weber outlines the development of expect officialdon underlying once again the importance of the Italian cities and the seignories as representing the b e g i n n i n g s of this process while e m p h a s i z i n g t h a t the decisive steps were taken in connection with the technical requirements of the finances of the Prince. With the ascendency of princely absolutism over the estates, there was simultaneously a slow dissolution of the Prince's autocratic rule in favor of expert officialdom. In line with the claim t h a t the needs of political administration follow their own "laws" in democracies t h a t are also m a s s states resulting in similar political outcomes despite clearly disparate historical conditions, 79 Weber m a k e s a c o m p a r i s o n between E n g l a n d , the United States a n d G e r m a n y in regard to the developm e n t of monocratic bureaucratic and plebiscitarian leadership. In E n g l a n d , the m o v e m e n t in the direction of a single cabinet head from the P a r l i a m e n t a r y majority who directs officialdom in a

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unified w a y was in p a r t the result of the need for a leader responsible for all decisions even t h o u g h this position of leadership was officially ignored by law. s~The d e v e l o p m e n t of the "caucus system" increased decentralization, a n d the need to develop a political m a c h i n e or a p p a r a t u s to mobilize necessary votes further quickened the plebiscitary c o m p o n e n t in English leadership. This development was climaxed by Gladstone's ascent to power which reflected popular belief in the ethical s u b s t a n c e of both his politics a n d personality. According to Weber, this reached the point t h a t in regard to "home rule" his following did not consult their own feelings on the issue before supporting his p o s i t i o n - - " r i g h t or wrong we follow h i m " was the d o m i n a n t credo, sl What h a s been the overall effect of such plebiscitarian evolution? P a r l i a m e n t is now largely an assembly of "yes" men. The plebiscit a r i a n "dictator" s t a n d s above P a r l i a m e n t a n d brings the masses b e h i n d h i m by use of the party's political machine. A l t h o u g h the current political climate involves a "dictatorship based on m a s s emotionality," the future Prime Minister m u s t nevertheless rise t h r o u g h the P a r l i a m e n t a r y committee s y s t e m first proving his mettle on the basis of rational a r g u m e n t in the process, s2 In contrast, according to Weber, in America s3 the plebiscitarian principle h a s found an even purer expression. Initially ruled by " g e n t l e m e n " a n d "great P a r l i a m e n t a r i a n s " America succumbed early to m a c h i n e politics. The separation of power m a d e the president i n d e p e n d e n t of " P a r l i a m e n t " (i.e., the Congress) in the conduct of his office a n d provided h i m with unlimited office p a t r o n a g e jobs to fill. The result was the development of opportunistic parties which, in a country of seemingly unlimited riches, could at least in the historical short-term afford dilettante m a n a g e m e n t . The "boss" of a political m a c h i n e was willing to back whatever candidates a n d w h a t e v e r principles would capture votes. The result was t h a t "extra p a r t y " intellectuals a n d political outsiders with new ideas were given a chance. Paradoxically, able m e n were sometimes allowed to rise--even those whose "anti"-corruption c a m p a i g n s posed a potential t h r e a t to the party m a c h i n e ' s money a n d power. G e r m a n y ' s p a r l i a m e n t a r y history was one of impotence by virtue of rule by the Iron Chancellor. s4 Its current situation involved a numerically d o m i n a n t Social Democratic p a r t y run by professional officials with no political calling a n d bourgeois parties w h i c h continued to be r u n by guilds of notables. New ideas a n d charismatic figures can h a r d l y emerge in a situation in which party orthodoxy leads speeches to be censored before t h e y are delivered. However, G e r m a n y ' s internal collapse, signaled by revolutionary takeovers in Munich a n d Berlin, themselves the product of C h a r i s m a t i c leader-

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ship, m i g h t indicate t h a t a t r a n s f o r m a t i o n is under way. The collapse itself is s y m p t o m a t i c of a lack of strong national leadership. However, this current fluid situation offered the prospect of the emergence of new charismatic leaders. Weber's political problem appears to be how to find the best possible m e a n s to facilitate the emergence of such leadership. What would be the best possible political a r r a n g e m e n t if the value of leadership is primary? Weber argues t h a t the P r u s s i a n d o m i n a t e d B u n d e s t r a t would most likely "rise again," d o m i n a t e the Reichstag, a n d compromise its ability to s p a w n a n d test potential leaders. The system of proportional representation also has led to a "horsetrading of notables" in which interest groups h a v e insisted t h a t their m e m b e r s find their way on to the lists a n d into Parliament. In such a set of circumstances, leadership which transcends local particularism a n d class, status, a n d party interests h a s no place. Only a popularly elected Reich President could provide a "safety valve" for leadership in the face of a hopelessly divided Parliament. 85However, how could such a figure emerge a n d retain his objectivity and integrity if the political scene is d o m i n a t e d by parties m a n a g e d by interest groups which control political machines which are necessary to win a m a s s election? Weber's vague hopes in this regard are here pinned on the appearance of leaders in the "great municipalities" who have proved themselves as "plebiscitarian city m a n a g e r s " and who h a v e organized loyal bureaucratic staffs i n d e p e n d e n t of parties in the process of tackling corruption (as in the United States). However, such potential leaders would still require a party m a c h i n e to gain office. How could this be possible considering the current hostility of all parties to leaders? Weber admits t h a t the chances of such leadership r e m a i n "completely in the dark. ''s~ Weber's ideal politician presents one of the most extraordinary fusions of attitudes ever assembled in one a n d the same m a n . We are told t h a t a popularly elected charismatic leader m u s t above all h a v e passion, a feeling of responsibility, a n d a sense of proportion. The passion m u s t not r u n h o t but cold. It m u s t be a cerebral passion for "objectivity" a n d for " m a t t e r of factness," involving the utmost sobriety. On the other h a n d , to possess c h a r i s m a t i c qualities at all, such a leader m u s t h a v e a b u r n i n g devotion to a cause, a God or daimon, w h i c h is his master. However, devotion to t h a t cause m u s t be a t t e n u a t e d by an acceptance of "facts" a n d the frequent need to sacrifice the ideal to the real. At the same time t h a t the cause r e m a i n s "in the saddle," there m u s t be a cultivation of distance from the h e a t of the moment. In such a relative state of withdrawal, the leader can let political realities of the day work on h i m with inner concentration a n d calmness. He m u s t be inwardly calm and relaxed,

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even t h o u g h he m u s t be outwardly e n g a g e d a n d capable of arousing powerful excitement a n d allegiance in his followers. According to Weber, the leading politician m u s t be capable of m a k i n g ascetic d e m a n d s on h i m s e l f a n d the rest of the population in the n a m e of the nation. He m u s t be both an exemplary and an ethical "prophet." In his personality he m u s t exhibit heroic, "divine," a n d exemplary attributes while a d a p t i n g his superior "musicality" to the average deficiencies of the great u n m u s i c a l m a s s of men. The ethical d e m a n d s he imposes upon t h e m m u s t be ones they can reach. He m u s t inspire trust a n d devotion as well as fear a n d respect. As a "mystic" with political intent, he is a vessel to be filled by his cause and the political realities of the day. He m u s t also, at the same time, be able to consciously utilize his talents as an ascetic tool, a n d an i n s t r u m e n t in t h e service of his cause. He m u s t be able to p u t h i m s e l f in a position to create the m e a n i n g s (against the most powerful opposition of all sorts) t h a t represent his personal value positions. At the s a m e time, in yielding to the realities of the day, he m u s t stay within the limits of the possible (i.e., capitalism, formal legal rationality, a n d bureaucracy), while also realizing the possible negative effects his value positions have on other competing orders of the day. He m u s t be both in the fray a n d above it. He m u s t accept responsibility for both the intended a n d the unintended consequences of his actions; all of which, no m a t t e r how conscientiously he tries, c a n n o t be anticipated in advance, even if he, like Weber, possesses universal historical knowledge of the empirical regularities u p o n which to m a k e his political j u d g m e n t s . Knowledge of the past, no m a t t e r how deep, c a n n o t wholly justify or legitimate present or future action. Whether to act, when, or where, for Weber was a decisive m o m e n t of self-determination for which one h a d to be responsible to the self a n d to the self alone. A leading politician m u s t above all else have a subjective sense of certitude, a faith b e y o n d all guilt, if he is to be able to act freely. Without such a faith, the reality of the "curse of the creature's worthlessness overshadows even the externally strongest political successes. ''sT Inevitably, in acting at all, he will h a r m one or a n o t h e r group or value. A l t h o u g h at h o m e h i m s e l f with his subjective sense of faith, he m u s t also realize t h a t the great m a s s of m e n c a n n o t live by such a prescription. They require objective signs of certainty which the leader provides by his "success." Such signs are provided by his ability for which he is tested daily, to relieve their distress (spiritual, material, etc.) a n d improve their fortune a n d sense of well-being here a n d now in this world, even as he m a y also promise salvation in the next (i.e., a return to G e r m a n "greatness" etc.). He does not do this "magically," but he does so in large part by

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d e m a n d i n g from the population certain ethical obligations of work, duty, a n d honor which are calculated to keep the wheels of the economy, bureaucracy, a n d a r m y spinning. However, certain segm e n t s of the population m a y view his success as " m a g i c a l ' - - t h e better to keep t h e m politically in step. He is the m o t i v a t i n g force which prevents the entire operation from drifting into a state of " m e c h a n i c a l petrifaction." He uses the state as an i n s t r u m e n t in building the s t r e n g t h a n d character of the n a t i o n on the basis of his ultimately irrational personal values. By succeeding, he convinces h i m s e l f a n d the rest of the population daily t h a t they are living out their historical mission a n d destiny. The leader's passion m u s t be devoted to Sachlichkeit--a matter-offact c o m m i t m e n t to the tasks at hand, not to a r o m a n t i c i s m devoid of all objective responsibility. He m u s t have a sense of proportion a n d " a n h a b i t u a t i o n to d e t a c h m e n t " which is the result of a "firm t a m i n g of the soul." Power m u s t not be cultivated for its own sake, but in the service of a cause. However, in acting at all, a politician m u s t also have a sense of tragedy to which all action, especially political action, is interwoven. The results of political action are often in paradoxical relation to their original meaning. 88 But because of this fact, the service of a cause m u s t not be absent if action is to have inner strength. What specific cause the politician strives for is a m a t t e r of personal faith. However, such an ethic of ultimate ends m u s t be tempered by an ethic of responsibility which attempts to foresee the social consequences of adhering to one cause rather t h a n a n o t h e r a n d which takes into account the "average deficiencies" of the population. It is not e n o u g h to satisfy the flame of your own good intentions. According to Weber, if a cause is really taken seriously, then it m u s t be realized t h a t the "good end" the actor seeks m a y require dubious moral m e a n s which themselves m i g h t entail evil consequences. This is especially likely since the decisive means of politics is violence. Followers of an ethic of ultimate ends t h a t c a n n o t s t a n d up in the face of the "ethical irrationality of the world," t h a t good does not necessarily follow good nor evil precipitate evil, are doomed to r e m a i n "political i n f a n t s " - - i n a d e q u a t e to the task of realizing their self-chosen cause, s9 The ethic of responsibility a n d the ethic of ultimate ends are c o m p l i m e n t a r y for a m a n who truly has a "calling for politics. ''9~ Weber's final leadership scheme is not simply a v a r i a n t of c h a r i s m a t i c rule, but a mix which includes elements of all four historically possible forms of legitimation. The charismatic leader would be honor-bound a n d legally required to follow the procedural rules of the g a m e (i.e., formal legality). In v a l i d a t i n g his c h a r i s m a a n d achieving power at all, he would h a v e to submit to the formally

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free and Democratic election (i.e., acclamation) of the entire public. At the same time, capitalism and bureaucracy would be seen as objective necessities. The personal rule of the political leader would of course preserve the authoritarian German political tradition. 9 it has to be clearly realized that plebiscitarian leadership of parties entails the "soullessness" of the following, their intellectual proletarianization, one might s a y . . . This is simply the price paid for guidance by leaders. 9~ Such an a r r a n g e m e n t would help secure mass discipline because it is inwardly more satisfying to work for a leader, and because the leader would provide the population with impersonal goals (i.e., the resurrection of the nation) toward which to work. Weber's scheme seems intent on allowing the routine injection of charismatic leaders into an otherwise s t a g n a n t political process. It is also designed to facilitate the re-formation of the individual personality upon w h i c h the r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of G e r m a n y m u s t ultimately be based. Charismatic leadership revolutionizes "from within," it involves a central " m e t a n o i a " (change) of the followers' attitudes, a f u n d a m e n t a l change of heart2 2 It imposes new ethical obligations, and shapes material and social conditions to its revolutionary will. 9~ In a G e r m a n y still emerging from the shackles of tradition, in Weber's final view, it was potentially a great revolutionary force2 4

Conclusion

Mommsen's Weberian catechism inherited by a new generation of American and European scholars is f u n d a m e n t a l l y wrong on the most important theoretical issues it attempts to conceptualize 9 Mommsen does not sufficiently grasp or emphasize the wider civilizational, moral, and cultural motives and m e a n i n g s behind Weber's nationalist aims. Mommsen still seems unable or unwilling to fully recognize the historical sources of Weber's advocacy of plebiscitarian democracy. He distorts the relationship between Weber's politics and social science. Finally, Mommsen criticizes Weber's view of democracy on the basis of Mommsen's own ideological c o m m i t m e n t to n a t u r a l law democracy, rather t h a n directly confronting, evaluating and refuting Weber's historical and empirical claims.

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However, Weber's position on the "impossibility" of Democracy as a result of the "law of small n u m b e r s " is open to criticism on methodological grounds. Weber was too m u c h the strict empiricist a n d h a r d l y self-critical e n o u g h in his use of such a "law." In fact, in his capable h a n d s , it became a weapon wielded especially a g a i n s t the democratic socialists. It is, of course, an extremely powerful historical a r g u m e n t to show t h a t all previous historical cases beyond a certain size a n d degree of complexity h a v e ended in oligarchy or plebiscitarian rule. However, it is methodologically illicit to use these historical outcomes as " p r o o f ' of the working of an absolute historical law of p a s t a n d future development. Such an equation neglects the infinite n u m b e r of possible future worlds, a n d their as yet u n k n o w n composition which m a y once again tilt the historical situation in favor of Democracy. In rejecting the dialectical concept of potentiality in favor of the "real forces" of history, Weber's future vision too often became as static as the necessarily u n c h a n g i n g past. Weber never seemed to entertain the possibility t h a t m e n a n d women a m o n g themselves could decide to subordinate the technical a d v a n t a g e s of bureaucracy to other h u m a n values, even at the sake of a loss in efficiency. Indeed, t h a t they m i g h t be willing to forsake efficiency for the right a n d opportunity to participate authentically in the s h a p i n g of their collective destiny. Weber's theory of democracy suffers from another i m p o r t a n t deficiency. It is precisely the intangible "spirit" of Western democracies t h a t Weber can not grasp. He h a s no "feel" or e m p a t h y (to t u r n the concept of verstehen a g a i n s t him) for the notion t h a t A m e r i c a n s do believe t h a t ultimate state power resides in We the People, or t h a t the Constitution is more t h a n a bureaucratic d o c u m e n t outlining the structure of power but also a "sacred," inviolable, a n d "eternal" e m b o d i m e n t of political a n d moral n o r m s which supposedly reflect an ideal moral and political universe. His claim t h a t such ideas h a v e been destroyed by the political, economic, a n d intellectual realities is belied by the democratic ideals which ignited the black m o v e m e n t in the U.S., a n d student a n d womens' m o v e m e n t s a r o u n d the globe. The reason of course t h a t such ideals r e m a i n e d illusions for Weber, cultural intangibles he couldn't grasp, was primarily because of the fact t h a t he was a product of German a n d Western culture. How he appropriated the political aspects of Western culture was distinctively G e r m a n a n d related to G e r m a n history a n d political traditions. Consequently, democracy is reduced to a m e t h o d of selecting leaders a n d a constitution is viewed primarily as a m e a n s to m a s s political indoctrination a n d resocialization. Predictably, too, in terms of G e r m a n political traditions, democratic leadership is redefined as f u n d a m e n t a l l y authoritarian

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charismatic leadership ("that is the way it should be") and support for this position is mobilized by the claim that such is the case any way in all Western democracies. However, Englishmen, Americans, and Greeks in the Age of Pericles would be hard pressed to recognize much less agree with Weber's deliberately skewed selective depiction of their systems and leaders. Future interpreters of Weber's politics would be better served if they recognized his explicit Western value preferences and how his German origins led him to appropriate certain Western values in a distinctly German way. Current research as demonstrating the affinities and differences between Weber and his German contemporaries in the political, intellectual, religious and erotic spheres is valuable only if they also recognize the generative Western civilizational context of many of Weber's values. Too much conjecture and speculation already has dominated the research effort to root Weber primarily in the German cultural context. If the precautions I suggest are followed, instead of a Janus faced Weber or a hopelessly fragmented Weber, what will emerge will be a mosaic whose primary pieces fit together in a meaningful picture of the most important figure in the history of sociology.

Notes Wolfgang Mommsen, Max Weber and German Politics 1890-1920, translated by Michael Steinberg (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984). 2. Guenther Roth review of Max Weber and German Politics 1890-1920 by Wolfgang Mommsen, N.Y. Times Book Review, August 11, 1985, Vol. 12:1, Roth typifies what I have dubbed the "Jekyl and Hyde Weber Thesis" contrasting the "living Weber" whose continuing significance lies in his great works--"Economy and Society" and the "Economic Ethics of the World Religion" with the "remarkable but flawed political figure" all too much a product of his own time (the dead Weber?). I will argue that Roth's position is fundamentally mistaken. 3. Fritz Ringer review of Max Weber and German Politics 1890-1920 by Wolfgang Mommsen, American Journal of Sociology, 92:449-4515/86. Ringer argues that the "main lines of Mommsen's argument are justified by his evidence," but believes that a more "favorable view" of Weber's politics is possible if the "intellectual context" in which he lived is underlined. Namely, that none of his academic colleagues were able to moderate their own nationalist obsessions as dramatically as Weber himself did. To acknowledge that "once and for all," Ringer suggests, would "indirectly shift the interpretative emphasis to the comparative moderation, rationality, and even the humanity of Weber's position." But to suggest that Weber was more rational than other ardent "nationalists" does not begin to suggest that Weber's "nationalism" was in fact a means to cultural ends and concerns that were civilizational in scope. Weber did not check his civilizational concerns at the door in the process of promoting German nationalism. Germany's mission as a nation, as Weber saw it, was to embody a civilizational alternative for the future development of the West. It would only be 1.

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i n a p o s i t i o n to do so as a power state. R i n g e r ' s n a r r o w i n g of t h e " i n t e l l e c t u a l c o n t e x t " of Weber's work to a c o m p a r i s o n w i t h t h e political views of h i s c o n t e m p o r a r i e s belies t h e v a l u e of directly s h i f t i n g t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i v e e m p h a s i s of Weber's politics so t h a t it also includes t h e " i n t e l l e c t u a l c o n t e x t " of h i s sociological work. T h i s would lead i m m e d i a t e l y to a more complex, complete, b a l a n c e d , scientific a n d d i s p a s s i o n a t e a n a l y s i s of t h e r e a s o n i n g , evidence, a n d logic b e h i n d h i s c o n t r o v e r s i a l political views. It would also u n d o u b t e d l y u n d e r l i n e t h e " c o m p a r a t i v e m o d e r a t i o n , r a t i o n a l i t y , a n d even h u m a n i t y of Weber's position." 4. G i a n f r a n c o Poggi review of Max Weber and German Politics 1890-1920, b y W o l f g a n g M o m m s e n , British Journal of Sociology, 38: 131-2. Poggi unconditionally embraces Mommsen's argument. 5. S t e v e n S e i d m a n review of Max Weber and German Politics 1890-1920 by W o l f g a n g M o m m s e n in Society Vol. 23, No. 3, M a r c h / A p r i l 1986, p. 86-88. I came u p o n S e i d m a n ' s review a f t e r f i n i s h i n g t h e first d r a f t of t h i s essay. Only S e i d m a n ' s review of M o m m s e n is a remotely critical one. I n addition, S e i d m a n a p p e a r s to agree w i t h a n u m b e r of t h e criticisms I will offer on M o m m s e n ' s book. As S e i d m a n writes: Weber held that the exercise of state power is justified only as a necessary means to preserve that nation as a unique sociocultural u n i t . . . Political struggle made sense only in the service of ethical and cultural ideals. (p. 87). I n a d d i t i o n S e i d m a n argues: The plausibility of Mommsen's argument presupposes a separation between Weber's political ideology narrowly identified with his response to the political issues of the day and his politicalideology as articulated in his sociological work--a division which is inconsistent with Mommsen's insistence that Weber's sociology not be divorced from his politics. (p. 87). However, despite t h e s e t r e n c h a n t criticisms, S e i d m a n concludes: The descriptive richness of Max Weberand German Politics is impossible to convey here. Its appearance marks a major event for Weberian scholarship in the English speaking world. The immensely detailed historical approach to Weber will surely stand as a model for the kind of contextual analysis that is sorely needed in the history of sociology. (p. 87). 6. M o m m s e n , Max Weber and German Politics, p. vii. 7. Ibid., pp. 420-426. 8. Otto S t a m m e r ed., Max Weber and Sociology Today t r a n s l a t e d b y K a t h l e e n Morris, (N.Y.: H a r p e r a n d Row, 1971). 9. M o m m s e n , Max Weber and German Politics, p. 38. 10. M o m m s e n ' s o c c a s i o n a l efforts a t a p a r t i a l m e a culpa in t h i s r e g a r d i n v o l v e a n effort to describe Weber as a liberal and a n a t i o n a l i s t a n d to depict t h e irresolveable conflict b e t w e e n t h e s e two " u l t i m a t e " v a l u e positions. However e v e n w h e n a d v a n c i n g t h i s t h e s i s i n a s h a r p l y r e a s o n e d a n d otherwise wonderful e s s a y , " T h e A n t i n o m i a n S t r u c t u r e of M a x W e b e r ' s P o l i t i c a l T h o u g h t , " M o m m s e n ' s own i n t e r p r e t a t i o n r e m a i n s u n r e p e n t a n t in its n a t i o n a l i s t focus. M o m m s e n writes: It is true that Max Weber did not always present his nationalistic goals as emphatically as in the 1890's, but in principle, the ideal of a strong nation state remained a dominant lietmotiv in his political thought throughout his life. Weber

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pointed out explicitly and repeatedly that in his personal hierarchy of values the national idea took precedence over questions of a liberal constitutional order.

11. 12. 13.

14. 15. 16.

Wolfgang Mommsen, "The Antinomian Structure of Max Weber's Political T h o u g h t " t r a n s l a t e d by Jose C a s a n o v a in Scott McNall (ed.), Current Perspectives in Social Theory, Vol. 4,1983 (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press Inc., 1983), p. 290. Mommsen, Max Weber and German Politics, p. 63. Ibid., p. 64. Max Weber, The Methodology of the Social Sciences (New York: The Free Press, 1949), esp. "The Meaning of 'Ethical Neutrality' in Sociology and Economics" (1919), pp. 1-47 and "Objectivity in Social Science and Social Policy" (1904), p. 49-112. Ibid., p. 57. Ibid., p. 18. Ibid., p. 81. See also Karl Loewith, "Max Weber's Interpretation of the Bourgeois Capitalistic World in Terms of the Guiding Principle of Rationalization" in Max Weber, Dennis Wrong (ed.), (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1970), p. 111. Max Weber, The Methodology of the Social Sciences, p. 18. Ibid., p. 1-47. Ibid., p. 46-47. Ibid., p. 47.

17. 18. 19. 20. 21. Max Weber, Gesmmelte Politische Schriften, 2d edition, (Tubingen, J.C.B. Mohr, 1958), p. 142. 22. Max Weber "Structures of Power" in From Max Weber, Hans Gerth and C.W. Mills, eds. (NY: Oxford Univ. Press, 1968), p. 176. 23. Ibid., p. 176. 24. David Beetham, Max Weber and the Theory of Modern Politics (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1974), p. 122. 25. Ibid., p. 122. 26. Ibid., p. 125. 27. Wolfgang Mommsen, Max Weber and German Politics 1890-1920, p. 66. 28. Stephen Turner and Regis Factor, Max Weber and the Dispute Over Reason and Value: A Study in Philosophy, Ethics, and Politics (London: Routledge, Kegan and Paul, 1984), p. 70-89. 29. Ibid., Stephen Turner and Regis Factor in recognizing this dilemma argue that Weber never clearly formulated what aspects of German culture were worth fighting for--except for perhaps its distinctive potentiality. Any attempt to resolve this issue they suggest is at best conjectural. Their own conjectures emphasize the connection between Weber's linking of inner freedom, individualism, and nationalist commitment (to which I have already alluded) and certain ambient "German" ideas of the period advanced by Von Humboldt which were part of the ideological foundation of German liberalism. The concept of Bildung informed by Rousseau and Shaftesbury coupled a devotion to self-development with a spontaneous, voluntary, and passionate commitment and subordination to the development of the nation state. One is immediately struck by the curious reasoning by these authors that this ideal of the individual and its fusion with the ideal of the nation state is uniquely German. Besides its admitted parentage-i.e., Rousseau, Shaftesbury--the theme itself runs from the Renaissance (i.e., reread Jacob Burckhardt) to the French Revolution. Of course, Germany would put a "unique" historical and cultural gloss on these fundamentally Western ideas and ideals in line with their own historical traditions and circumstances. But does that make them "uniquely German?" The suggestion is that although Weber admired the functional achievement of Western values, he, like Germans in general, had an antipathy toward Western culture. Of course, such an interpretation would pose no problems if what is referred to is the current state of Western culture. However, if as seems to be the case, this antipathy supposedly

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30. 31.

32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38.

39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46.

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involves Weber's lack of inner identification with the cultural history of the "West," one is again at a loss to make sense out of the claim. For a different view of the origins of "Bildung" see George Mosse "Jewish Emancipation: Between Bildung and Respectability" in The Jewish Response to German Culture, J. Reinharz and W. Schatzberg (eds.), (Univ. Press of New England, 1985). p. 1-16. I would like to thank my friend and fellow Weberian traveler Gary Abraham for pushing me to confront this issue directly. Abraham and I agree that Webeffs cultural ideal represented an ideal to be achieved. See Gary Abraham, "Max Weber on Jewish Rationalism and the Jewish Question" in International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society, A. J. Vidich, S. M. Lyman, and M. W. Hughey (eds.), Vol. 2, No. 3, Spring 1988. However, I am not ready to agree with him that Weber's desire to build a national culture would have led him to seek to eliminate identification with all subcultures (e.g., religious) which stood in the way of national identification and citizenship and which represented "premodern values." I am perfectly prepared to agree, however, that Weber would advocate that such subcultural identification should be subordinated to the values and goals of the modern nation state. In fact, Weber sometimes argued that this was the case anyway in everyday life regardless of one's ostensibly professed primary religious identification. See Max Weber, "Religious Rejections of the World and their Directions" in H. Gerth and C. W. Mills, eds., From Max Weber, p. 323-362. Max Weber, "Author's Introduction" in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (NY: Charles Scribner, 1958), p. 13. Weber writes in "Parliament and Government in a Reconstructed Germany": "How can one possibly save any remnants of 'individualist' freedom in any sense? After all, it is gross self-deception to believe that without the achievements of the age of the Rights of man any one of us including the most conservative, can go on living his life." Max Weber, Economy and Society, translated by Guenther Roth (Berkeley: University of California Press), p. 1403. See also Max Weber "Prospects for Democracy in Tsarist Russia" in W.G. Runciman (ed.), Weber: Selections in Translation (N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 1978), p. 282-284. Max Weber, The Religion of China (NY: The Free Press, 1968), p. 226-249. Max Weber, The Methodology of the Social Sciences, p. 13. Max Weber, The Religion of China, p. 231. Ibid., p. 237. Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic, p. 115. Ibid., p. 119. Weber' s occasional attraction to some form of national socialism was primarily a matter of appreciating its claim to ethically inspire and regulate its members. Apparently, he hoped that its ethical power might be used in service of the nation. See G. Roth and R. Bendix, Scholarship and Partisanship (L.A.: Univ. of Cal. Press, 1971), p. 18. See also E. Kilker, "Weber on Socialism, Bureaucracy and Freedom" in State, Culture and Society, Vol. 1, No. 1, A. Vidich and S. Lyman (eds.), Fall 1984, pp. 76-98 and E. Kilker "Max Weber and the Possibilities for Socialism" in R. Glassman, P. Rosen, and W. Swatos (eds.) Bureaucracy Against Democracy and Socialism (Greenwood Press, NY, 1987), pp. 31-38. Weber felt the deterministic component of Marxism undermined its ethical intentions. Roth and Bendix, Scholarship and Partisanship, p. 240. Marianne Weber, Max Weber: A Biography, trans, by Harry Zohn (NY: Wiley and Sons, 1975), p. 631. Max Weber, "Author's Introduction," p. 13-31. See also Benjamin Nelson, "Max Weber's 'Author's Introduction' (1920): A Master Clue to his Main Aims," Sociological Inquiry, 44, No. 4, (1974), pp. 269-278. Wolfgang Mommsen, Max Weber and German Politics, p. 31. Ibid., p. 135. Ibid., p. 101. Ibid., p. 420. Wolfgang Mommsen, The Age of Bureaucracy (New York: Harper and Row,

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47. 48. 49. 50. 51.

52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65.

66. 67. 68. 69.

70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89.

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1974). See also Wolfgang Mommsen "Max Weber's Political Sociology and His Philosophy of World History," International Science Journal, 17, No. 1 (1965), p. 40. Mommsen, The Age of Bureaucracy, p. 83. Max Weber, Economy and Society. Ibid., pp. 289-291. See also pp. 1274-1275 and p. 1314. Mommsen, Max Weber and German Politics 1890-1920, p. 186-187. Max Weber, "Class, Status, and Party" in From Max Weber, p. 187. Ibid., p. 191. Max Weber, Economy and Society, p. 1309. Ibid., p. 1309. Ibid., pp. 212-301. Ibid., pp. 1381-1469. Ibid., pp. 1383-1384. Ibid., p. 1393. Ibid., p. 1399. Ibid., p. 1404. Ibid., p. 1419-20. Ibid., p. 1423. Ibid., p. 1452. Ibid., p. 1458. Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation," in From Max Weber C. W. Mills and H. Gerth (eds.), p. 88. Even so at one moment in the constitutional debate Weber, undoubtedly following the daimon of intellectual integrity, apparently ended up arguing (lecturing) at length against the past abuses of the American system, undermining his own repeated desire for a strong plebiscitarian authority in the process. Mommsen, Max Weber and German Politics, p. 373. Max Weber, Economy and Society, p. 266. Ibid., p. 268. Ibid., p. 269. Max Weber, The Theory of Economic and Social Organization, (NY: The Free Press, 1964), p. 402. See also E. Kilker, "Max Weber and the Possibilities for Democracy" in R. Glassman and V. Murvar (eds.) Max Weber's Political Sociology: A Pessimistic Vision of a Rationalized World (Greenwood Press: NY, 1984), pp. 55-68. Max Weber, The Theory of Economic and Social Organization, p. 405. Ibid., p. 408. Max Weber, On Law in Economy and Society (NY: Simon and Schuster, 1954), p. 356. Max Weber, The Theory of Economic and Social Organization, pp. 411-412. Max Weber, On Law in Economy and Society, p. 356. Max Weber, Economy and Society, p, 269. Ibid., p. 269. Max Weber, "Politics As a Vocation" in H. Gerth and C. W. Mills, From Max Weber, p. 80. Ibid., p. 84. Ibid., p. 89. Ibid., p. 90. See also pp. 104-107. Ibid., p. 106. Ibid., p. 107. Ibid., p. 107-110. Ibid., p. 111-114. Ibid., p. 114. Ibid., p. 114. Ibid., p. 117. Ibid., p. 117. Ibid., p. 122.

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90. Ibid., p. 127. 91. Ibid., p. 113. See also, E. Kilker, "Max Weber and the Possibilities for Democracy." 92. Max Weber, Economy and Society, p. 1117, 245. 93. Ibid., p. 243. 94. Ibid., p. 245. 95. Wolfgang J. Mommsen and Jurgen Osterhammel (ed.) Max Weber and his Contemporaries (London: Allen and Unwin Inc., 1987).