69

MAX WEBER AS A C R I T I C A L T H E O R I S T

DONALDMCINTOSH

Despite the enormous and enduring influence of the work of Max Weber, doubts have been expressed about his ultimate status as a theorist.1 His thought, it is argued, fails a key test of first rank theory, that it have critical impact. At bottom it amounts to a defense of traditional bourgeois values and institutions. Its implications are conservative and even reactionary. 2 By "critical theory" we do not mean here only the special blend of Marx and Kant characteristic of the Frankfurt school. Instead we see three broad criteria: 1) Points of view are analyzed in their own terms, for the consistency and coherence of their standards and how well these standards are met. The criticism is interior to the analysis. 2) The approach is self reflective, hence self critical. 3) The critique at least by implication points the way to avenues of constructive change. This article is an evaluation of Max Weber as a critical thinker in this sense. Our conclusion will be that while some of the charges leveled against him miss the mark, there is a sense in which his thought does indeed fail the test. The problem, it will be argued, lies in Weber's conception of the nature of rational action and the basic typology of social action which derives from this conception. Indeed, this typology fails to meet the very criteria which he himself laid down. An examination of the Weberian typology in the light of his own standards of theoretical analysis leads to a suggested revision which makes it more adequate from a purely theoretical point of view, and opens the way for its more fully critical use. We will conclude by using this revised typology to restate some aspects of Weber's conclusions about the course of world history, and his critique of Modernity. The Sense in Which Weber Is Not a Critical Theorist

Some of the attacks on Weber's thought as lacking critical force are without foundation. The claim that his approach is essentially positivistic, and hence open to the familiar charges against positivism - that of making a radical split between fact and value statements, leading to a bogus value neutrality and Smith College, Massachusetts

70 objectivity which conceals a conservative or even reactionary bias - fails to do justice to the subtlety and complexity of Weber's views on these issues. 3 Another unwarranted charge concerns not the methodology but the substance of Weber's thought, which is held to amount to a justification of European liberal-democratic (bourgeois) values and institutions. Certainly this is true of Weber's political activity, and very possibly much of the animus towards his thought from some of those on the left springs from 'bitter memories of the political struggles in Germany in which Weber took part. But such partisan struggles were left behind when Weber closed the door of his study. Far from defending bourgeois liberalism, his scholarly works contain much that is critical of it. The famous passage near the end of The Protestant Ethic and the

Spirit of Capitalism is perhaps the most striking instance, and worth quoting at length here, since it introduces several of the themes which will occupy this article. Weber asserts that the cloak of asceticism which gave rise to capitalism may have been lightly worn at first, but by now it has become an "iron cage." Since asceticism undertook to remodel the world and to work out its ideals in the world, material goods have gained an increasing and finally an inexorable power over the lives of men as at no previous period of history. Today the spirit of religious asceticism - whether finally who knows? - has escaped from the cage. But victorious capitalism, since it rests on mechanical foundations, needs its support no longer. The rosy blush of its laughing heir, the Enlightenment, seems also to be irretrievably fading, and the idea of duty in one's calling prowls about in our lives like the ghost of dead religious beliefs. Where the fulfdment of the calling cannot directly be related to the highest spiritual and cultural values, or when, on the other hand, it need not be felt simply as economic compulsion, the individual generally abandons any attempt to justify it at all. In the field of its highest development, in the United States, the pursuit of wealth, stripped of its religious and ethical meaning, tends to become associated with purely mundane passions, which often actually give it the character of sport. No one knows who will live in this cage in the future, or whether at the end of this tremendous development entirely new prophets will arise, or there will be a great rebirth of old ideas and ideals, or, if neither, mechanized petrification, embellished with a sort of convulsive self importance. For in the last stage of this cultural development, it might well be truly said: "Specialists without spirit, sensualists without heart; this nullity imagines that it has attained a level of civilization never before achieved.'4 One would be hard put to find a more searing indictment of capitalism than this since Marx. Two features of this passage are worth special notice. First, the criticism is not tacked on, but emerges naturally and appropriately from Weber's work, and makes clear its implicit value relevance, just as, for example, Marx's apparently neutral treatment of surplus value leads naturally to a denunciation of the exploitation of the proletariat, and in so doing articulates a value position implicit from the start. Second, as is made clear by the context of this passage, as well as the whole thrust of the Weberian corpus, his

71 target here is not just capitalism, but ascetic rationalism as a whole. The ultimate result of this orientation, when carried through systematically and pervasively to the whole life of society, is the bureaucratization of all social action, which more and more is engaged in the narrow, rigid, and self important performance of meaningless tasts. Weber's target is not only capitalism but Modern advanced industrial society in all of its forms, capitalistic and socialistic. The criticism applies to the heirs of Lenin, Mao, and Castro as fully as to the heirs of Benjamin Franklin and Andrew Carnegie. Weber's thought, in fact, contains the most powerful, penetrating, and comprehensive indictment of modern industrial civilization so far advanced, even though the indictment is mostly implicit, cropping up in explicit form only in occasional passages, such as the one just quoted. The problem is, however, that the criticism does not lead anywhere. After having shown in detail how we are caught in an iron cage, he proceeds to show not how we can get out, but that there is not exit. In this respect the truest disciple of Weber is Robert Michels. Michels'sPolitical Parties contains a detailed analysis of the German Social Democratic Party along Weberian lines. The result is a devastating critique, not only of the SPD, but of modern bureaucratic organization in general. But Michels's final paragraph completely pulls the teeth of the critique. Bureaucratic organization inevitably results in the acquisition of power by those who run the machine, who always turn the organization away from its original purpose. When they are overthrown in the name of this original purpose, the whole process starts over again. "It is probable," Michels concludes, "that this cruel game will continue without end. ''s Michels's pessimism concerns not only bureaucratic organization but rational action as a whole. In this he is following the drift of the central paradox of Weber's thought, that rational action tends to undermine the very ends which motivate it. From there it is only a step to question the worth of rational action itself, and to retreat to unreason - a step which Michels took but Weber did not. We seek here to reaffirm the worth of human reason against Weberian pessimism, and to use Weber's own thought as the basis of this reaffirmation. To do so, we must first examine how it is that for Weber rational action leads to a series of dead ends. This in turn requires a treatment of Weber's main analytic categories, to which we now proceed. The Foundational Ideas

Social Action and Rationality Weber saw the subject matter of the human sciences (Geistwissensehaften) as

72 social action, defined as conduct which has meaning for the actors. The idea of rationality is intrinsic to the very nature of social action, for insofar as action lacks meaning it is irrational. Thus, two of his four basic categories of social action are defined as rational (Zweckrationalitat and Wertrationalitat). The other two, traditional and affectual action, are asserted to be marginal or residual categories because they are on the "borderline" of what constitutes meaningful conduct, and are hence irrational. 6 (Nevertheless, traditional action is the subject of a good deal of analysis in Weber's work.) The theory of rational action is thus at the very center of Weber's thought, and this theory will provide the main focus of our critique. It is by now widely recognized that on this issue Weber's views are not wholly adequate. This is more than a matter of the complexity of his theory and of his shifting and often careless usage. Beneath this, the meanings of the various senses of "rationality" and the interrelations between these senses are not clearly and consistently worked out. As a result, any attempt to formulate Weber's theory of rational action must of necessity be a reformulation: an interpretive reconstruction. What distinguishes the reformulation presented here is the attempt to use Weber's own method on his thought, that is, to subject his thought to an ideal-typical analysis, which aims at adequacy both at the level of meaning and at the level of understanding. Even to make a simple list of the senses in which Weber used the term "rationality" already involves one in interpretation. Four terms, of course, must be on any list. They are goal rationality (Zweekrationalitat), value rationality (Wertrationalitat), formal rationality, and substantive rationality. Much of this article will be concerned with an analysis and reformulation of these concepts. Weber used the term in other senses, two of which will find a place in our discussions: rational thought ("theoretical rationality") and systematic rationality. Rational thought is conceptually clear, self consistent, and realistic. Rational action typically involves rational thought processes. Systematic rationality is the organization of a number of thoughts or actions into a coherent, consistent, and complete whole. The major historical worldviews have all been more or less systematically rationalized wholes of thought. An organized institution consists of the (more or less) systematic rationalization of social action. The recurring term, "rationalization" (making something progessively more rational) must be understood in terms of this list, for thought or action can be rationalized in any of the six senses just distinguished. 7 The most important member of this list is goal rationality, or instrumental rationality, defined as conduct whose meaning to the actor is that it is a means to some intended end. The centrality of this idea is indicated by Weber's assertion that "all serious reflection about the ultimate elements of meaning-

73 ful human conduct is oriented primarily in terms of the categories 'ends' and 'means'. ''8 This seems to indicate that goal rationality is the very defining property of human action. 9 But if this is so the idea of Wertrationalitat as a separate category becomes problematical, and indeed Weber often treats value rational action in terms of ends and means, which seems to place it as a subcategory of goal rational action. 1~ I will reserve a discussion of this issue for later, and for the time being take at face value Weber's most common practice, that of analyzing all human action in terms of the ends intended and the means employed. From that point of view one can discern a Weberian typology of social action which is more pervasive, though not more fundamental, than his fourfold typology of goal rational, value rational, traditional, and affectual action.

Types of Social Action Weber distinguished three main types of ends, often called "interests": ideal, status, and material. An ideal interest is a desire to achieve a goal or "cause" defined in religious, ethical, or esthetic terms. Status interests concern esteem, deference, or rank. Material interests seek the attainment of goods or services which have a utilitarian value. While status interests play an important role in Weber's substantive analyses, in his theoretical remarks he usually reduces the list to two, ideal and material interests, and we will follow this practice here.l~ For Weber by far the most important source of ideal interests is religion. He appears to have believed that esthetic interests have not been historically important, though not always negligible, 12 and regarded ethical ideas which have become divorced from religion as easily undermined or diverted, as in the case of Modern natural law; ~3 or as quasi- or crypto-religious, as in the case of communism. Therefore the division between ideal and material interests is mainly between otherworldly (religious) and worldly (material or practical) interests, a distinction which crops up over and over in his writings. The division between worldly and otherworldly applies to means as well as ends. Thus Weber treats magic as the attempt to achieve material (worldly) ends by supernatural (otherworldly) means. 14 The basic distinction between ends and means, coupled with the division of both ends and means into worldly and otherworldly, produces a fourfold typology by which all social action can be categorized. The types are ideal and polar. In practice action is usually motivated by a combination.IS

74 Orientations to Action orientation to means: otherworldly worldly (ideal) (material) orientation to ends: otherworldly (ideal) worldly (material)

mysticism

asceticism

magic

materialism

The three types of religious orientation - mystical, ascetic, and magical - are central categories and receive extended treatments in a number of places, ~6 while the concept of materialism, as the pursuit of practical ends such as wealth, pleasure, comfort, or security, with material means, crops up repeatedly in Weber's economic and political analyses, even if it does not receive a separate discussion. Although he did not explicitly develop it, the paradigm is thus implicit in his thought. We will use it to organize our treatment of Weber's views of the paradoxical consequences of rational action.

The Paradoxes of Reason A central thesis and a central theme pervade the Weberian corpus. The thesis, on which nearly all of this historical analysis bears, is that what characterizes western (now modern) civilization and differentiates it from the others is the progressive instrumental rationalization of all forms of social action. The theme, which occurs over and over in a wide variety of forms, is that the rationalization of action tends to turn it against the very purposes which it is intended to serve. He calls this "the paradox of unintended consequences: i.e., the relation of man and fate, of what he intended by his acts and what actually came of them. ''17 This paradoxical relation, he says, is "fundamental to all history. ''18. The juxtaposition of the thesis of the unique rationality of western civilization and the theme of the self defeating nature of rational action creates the Weberian iron cage. We will begin our development of this conclusion by describing how the Weberian paradoxes and dilemmas of reason arise for three of the types of social action distinguished above. (We will not treat mysticism, a topic important in itself but peripheral to the concerns of this article.) Since most of this material is relatively well known, our treatment will be brief, serving mainly to lay the groundwork for a more careful consideration of the two most problematic areas in the Weberian theory of rational action: the relation of substantive to formal rationality, and of goal rationality to value rationality.

75

The Paradox of Materialism Weber believed that materialism as a pure type rarely if ever occurs, at least in a stable and enduring form, because such action is meaningless, not in the literal sense of being without motive or reason, but rather as lacking any higher justification - religious, ethical, or esthetic. The need to find or infuse such a higher meaning in human action is universal, he thought; so the pursuit of material ends is always more or less combined with the pursuit of ideal ends.19 As a result, the attempt to rationalize action in the material mode (i.e., the attempt to pursue practical ends by the most effective available means) is presented with a dilemma. On the one hand, such a rationalization will run against the ideal interests with which economic activity is normally infused. On the other hand, to abandon these ideal interests is to leave economic action without sufficiently strong motivations to sustain the strenuous efforts which full scale rationalization involves. Normally, therefore, we find that religious and ethical factors both support and undermine the rationalization of the pursuit of material interests. Only in the case of capitalism do ideal interests act unequivocally to advance the rationalization of practical action. In the Protestant ethic, or its secularized version, we have a set of ideal interests which supply the needed motivation for the full scale rationalization of the pursuit of material interests. Paradoxically, materialism assumes its most rational form as asceticism.

The Paradox of Magical Action The magical orientation seeks to achieve worldly ends by supernatural means. The otherworldly powers are controlled by symbolic conduct: words or deeds whose symbolic meaning is the effective agency. What matters is that this symbolic activity be carried out in exactly the prescribed way; i.e., that it be ritually correct. Weber does not treat magic as irrational per se. 2~ Paradoxically, the systematic rationalization of magical action makes it irrational. He worked this idea out in detail for China, where the systematic spread of ritualized symbolic behavior throughout the practical culture had heavily adverse practical effects. 21 For Weber not a primitive society but only a high culture is capable of such rationalization, and hence of such irrationality.

The Paradox of Asceticism The category of action which seeks to attain otherworldly ends by worldly means receives by far the fullest analysis in Weber's thought. Here action occurs in this world, uses material means, and aims at material results - whose meaning, however, is otherworldly. For example, a system of criminal justice

76 involves police, judges, jailers, etc., who engage in worldly and often coercive activity. The purpose is to enforce a set of moral principles which typically are seen as an expression of the divine will, or, if secularization has occurred, of a universal law of reason. Material results are in themselves meaningless, and the desire for material results for themselves a hindrance to otherworldly purposes. Hence the characteristic asceticism of this orientation. Three main respects in which asceticism has paradoxical results may be briefly indicated. = First, in order to achieve an ideal interest in this world a movement is needed. But the leader o f such a movement cannot wholly rely on otherworldly interests, at least of a higher sort, to motivate his followers. Baser incentives are needed: either ignoble ideal interests such as revenge, or material interests such as booty and loot. But in mobilizing such base interests, the leader sets in motion an undertow against which he must henceforth struggle, never wholly successfully. This is the dilemma of the politician: either appeal solely to true belief, in which case the movement will be ineffective, or appeal to baser motives as well, in which case the movement will be diverted from its true end. Second, the regular and dependable service of an ideal interest requires an organization, and the organization must reliably obtain the means of its subsistence, material and coercive. But the maintenance of the security and power of the organization regularly requires that the ideal interests it is supposed to serve be diverted, modified, or "temporarily" set aside. This is the dilemma of the official: to maintain the goals of the organization at the expense of its effectiveness or to maintain its effectiveness at the expense of its goals. Third, organizational effectiveness is maximized when activity is systematically rationalized. This requires the routinization of organizational action and its direction by a set of systematic formalized general rules. But routinized behavior becomes habitual and loses its inner meaning (as in the "routinization of charisma"). In addition, the strict application of general rules often acts against the very purposes for which the roles were established. This problem receives its most extensive discussion in connection with the administration of justice. Here we have a facet of the more general Weberian theme of the paradoxical consequences of formal rationalization.

The Paradox of Formal Rationality Weber's distinction between formal and substantive rationality is not wholly coherent, and we shall attempt a reformulation later. Here we will present a preliminary discussion, in order to develop the point that for Weber the forreal rationalization of action has paradoxical consequences. Weber discusses the formal rationalization of action in three main contexts: the formalization of the law, the formalization of or~nnizational action, and the development

77 of capitalism. 23 The third topic combines the first two, for capitalism entails the formal organization of economic production, and presupposes a formally rationalized legal system. The central point is that formal rationalization makes the results of economic action calculable, and the systematic calculation of the results of economic action for the sake of the maximization of the return on capital is the very heart of capitalism. These discussions by Weber make the meaning of formal rationalization relatively clear and unproblematic. (The nature of substantive rationality and its relation to formalization present interpretive problems.) First, formalization concerns means, as against ends. Second, the means are organized into a system. It is not the result of any single action which counts, but the overall result of a system of action. Third, formalization typically involves rational thought processes. Action is organized according to a conceptually clear and coherent set of categories. Fourth, action is directed by a set of systematic rationally thought out general rules. Decision making consists of the application of these general rules to particular cases. Fifth, these rules govern the behavioral aspect of the act, as against its meaning to the actors. Finally, there are two types of formalization, "extrinsic" and "logical." In extrinsic formalism, the rules concern the "external characteristics of the facts," which are "perceptible as sense data." Traditional magical and ceremonial ritualism are formalistic in this sense. (For example, to be truly binding a contract might have to be signed in blood.) For logical formalism it is not the external characteristics of behavior but the logical category under which it falls which is decisive. 24 (For example, a contract might be binding if assented to in the presence of witnesses. The assent might take the form of a signature, a verbal assent, a nod, or even a failure to disavow.) Modern formalism is of this kind, and this is what the term will be taken to mean in the following discussion. In principle action towards any end can be formally rationalized, and at various points Weber treats the formalization of action which seeks economic gain, political power, justice, and salvation. In contrast to formal rationality, the meaning Weber assigns to "substantive" rationality is far from clear. In different contexts he appears to use the term in three different senses. At times it seems to be synonomous with rational action itself, where the focus is on whether or not the goals of action are attained, regardless of the means employed. Here the implication is that formal rationality is a subcategory of substantive rationality. This usage shades over into the idea of an unsystematic, ad hoc, case by case approach to means, so that the distinction delineates two distinct and correlative types, cutting across the distinction between goal and value rationality. Finally, substantive rationality is sometimes apparently used as synonomous with value rationality, in which case formal rationality

78 would emerge as a subcategory of goal rationality. For the time being we will avoid these problems by developing our exposition of Weber's views in terms of the idea that formal rationalization tends to be counterproductive of the very ends which motivnt~d the formalization. First, this conclusion applies to the area of law. While in primitive societies law has a heavily magical meaning, in more advanced societies the ethical basis comes to predominate. Some of the main ideal (ethical) interests which underlie modern law are the desire to punish moral infractions which are deemed repugnant to and destructive of society (criminal law), the desire to establish and enforce certain standards of fairness and equity in the dealings which people have with each other (civil law), and the desire to insure the observance of certain basic individual rights (constitutional law). Such ideal interests were an important part of the constellation of interests out of which modern formally rational law developed. 2s The process described by Weber whereby formal legality is progressively divorced from ethical considerations is too well known to require summary here. As it develops, not only does formal justice become more and more meaningless from an ethical point of view, but in many cases it also acts against ethical principles, as where formal equality before the law acts to perpetuate substantive injustices. 26 Moving to another area, bureaucracy, understood as the formal rationalization of organizational action, is initially developed because of its efficiency: its ability" to maximize goal attainment at minimum cost. 27 But as bureaucratization proceeds, the original goals are more and more abandoned, and the organization increasingly devotes itself to the perpetuation of its own existence. 2s A similar paradox infects modern political organization, where formalization is undertaken as a means of democratization. The fate of modern political parties reflects the fate of the whole. "Formally," he says, "a fargoing democratization takes place." But in substance just the opposite occurs. 29 The paradox of formalization is also traced by Weber for capitalism. Formally rationalized law, especially modern laws of contract and property and the laws defining and enforcing the (formally) "free" market are a necessary prerequisite for capitalism, mainly because they provide an environment within which the capitalist can calculate the results of economic action. 3~ Eventually, however, this legal framework becomes a hindrance instead Of a support to rational economic action. 31 For Weber the leitmotiv - i n d e e d the very defining characteristic - o f western civilization was the progressive formal (and instrumental) rationalization of social action: in politics, economics, war, law, organizational action in general, and even music. But in nearly every case the consequences of this formal

79 rationalization have been self defeating, acting paradoxically against the very ends the rationalization was intended to serve. In this section we have attempted to show the depth and pervasiveness of the Weberian pessimism. All human action is seen as purposive. But the results of purposive action tend to undermine the very purposes which inspire it, the more so as action is rationalized, i.e., as the means are fitted efficiently and systematically to the end. The problem is especially acute for modern civilization because here for the first time in history we find the rationalization of social action carried through in a thoroughgoing and comprehensive way. Thus the very same set of considerations leads both to a condemnation of Modernity and to a radical doubt that human reason can find a way out.

The Weberian Method of Interpretive Ideal Typical Analysis The next topic in the Weberian theory of rational action is the distinction between goal and value rationality. In this discussion we will move from interpretive exposition to critique, by applying Weber's method of analysis to his own thought. First, however, it is necessary to explain our conception of this method, since we have our own views on this much discussed topic. These views have been presented in detail elsewhere; so we will confine ourselves here to a brief summary. 32 Weber's method of analysis and explanation rests on two basic principles. The first is his "method of understanding" (Verstehen). The social scientist and historian describe and explain human action in terms of the subjective meaning of the action to the actors. The thrust of this approach is essentially hermeneutical, which opens Weber's method to the charges of subjectivism and relativism commonly leveled against hermeneutical and phenomenological approaches. The second principle is that the concepts and categories of analysis used to describe and explain social action must be "adequate at the level of meaning," that is, clear, consistent, coherent, and logically organized. These two principles appear to stand at odds with each other, for the meaning which action has for the actors is almost always more or less unclear, incoherent, inconsistent, and poorly integrated. Hence to treat social action in terms adequate at the level of meaning would seem to require a departure from understanding such action in terms of its meaning to the actors. This difficulty is resolved, and the two basic principles integrated, by Weber's method of ideal typical analysis. In this matter Weber's own methodological writings are misleading at some points, and it is necessary to turn to an examination of how he employed his ideal types in practice. When this is done it emerges that Weber's ideal types reflect for him certain basic categories of human understanding which are given to or inherent in human thought and the human

80 situation. Thus the three types of authority ( l e g i t i m e H e r r s c h a f t ) - rationallegel, charismatic, and traditional - rest on the three ways in which human knowledge can claim to be validated - via reason, faith (revelation), and convention (custom or tradition). Throughout history these three are the only ones we ever find utilized, and no others seem possible. Therefore any attempt to justify the power to command must perforce draw on one or more of these three categories. The actual justification of authority usually draws on these basic types in a more or less confused and incoherent way; i.e., such justifications are usually inadequate at the level of meaning. It is the task of the historian and sociologist to understand and explain legitimate authority in the same terms in which the actors themselves understand it, but at a more adequate level of meaning, by employing the three ideal types in a clear, coherent, and consistent way. To take another major example, the attempt to find meaning in the world leads to religion and hence eventually to theology. Among the welter of religious conceptions of God and the world only three, for Weber, have been fully adequate at the level of meaning: the Indian doctrine of Karma, Zoroastrian dualism, and Calvinistic predestination. In practice the religious interests which motivate action are more or less garbled versions of such idealtypical solutions. Nevertheless these garbled versions, and through them the ideal types, have had a major and sometimes decisive influence on the course of history. 33 In sum, for Weber the constellations of interest which motivate social action are always more or less imperfect expressions of a limited number of basic underlying ideas, which can be grasped by the scientist and used as the conceptual basis of inquiry. In that way scientific analysis can be adequate both at the level of understanding and at the level of meaning. We will now apply this approach to Weber's own thought.

Goal Rationality versus Value Rationality The relationship of value rationality to goal rationality is the most vexing area in Weber's theory of rational action. The central problem concerns whether and in what sense value rational action can be understood in terms of ends and means. Weber often uses the term "ethic of ultimate ends" for this orientation, and the idea of an end of course implies the idea of a means. Indeed, for Weber what distinguishes the ethic of ultimate ends from the ethic of goal rationality (the "ethic of responsibility") is not its goals but its stance towards means. The ethic of ultimate ends rules out ethically bad or doubtful means, no matter how valid their eventual results. In contrast the ethic of responsibility is willing to use such base means, at least up to a point, if this is the only way to achieve ethically valuable ends - and hence is forced to struggle with

81 the moral dilemmas which flow from this willingness. 34 The issue Weber poses here is familiar, but one cannot make sense of it in terms of the categories of ends and means. From a purely analytic perspective, the end always justifies the means. This follows simply from the meaning of the terms. A means cannot, per se, be ethically good or bad, for then it would be an end, not a means. To say that "a bad means has been productive of a good end" must mean either that a means has been counterproductive of one good but productive of another, or that the immediate effect of a means has been bad but its longer run effect good. Purely from the point of view of ends and means there is no dilemma. The ethical person simply chooses the course of action whose total consequences, immediate and long run, with one end balanced against another, are judged to be best, insofar as they can be calculated. 3s It seems to follow that the ethic of ultimate ends fails at the level of meaning, i.e., that it is inherently incoherent or inconsistent. Weber's treatment supports this conclusion - up to a point. He argues that the refusal of the proponents of the ethic of ultimate ends to adopt base means no matter how worthwhile the end amounts to an abandonment of responsibility, because one is as responsible for the results of inaction as of action, and because what counts are the total results, not just those immediately associated with the means employed. For these reasons, he says, "the ethic of ultimate ends apparently must go to pieces on the problem of the justification of means by ends. "36 Yet Weber refuses to carry this conclusion all the way through. He is unwilling to assert that a saintly person who adopts an ethic of ultimate ends, like "Jesus, the apostles, St. Francis, and the like," is nothing more than intellectually confused - a person who has not thought matters through. On the contrary, he says that provided it is adopted consistently and without illusion, "this ethic makes sense and expresses a kind of dignity. ''37 Here Weber is asserting that the ethic of ultimate ends is not inadequate at the level of meaning. If we couple this assertion with the fact that we cannot make sense of this ethic in terms of ends and means, the implication is clear: the inadequacy lies not in the action itself but in the categories by which it is being understood. If so, we must reconsider Weber's claim that "all serious reflection about the ultimate elements of meaningful human conduct is oriented primarily in terms of the categories 'ends' and 'means'." Such a conclusion lurks under the surface of Weber's discussions at some points. In Economy and Society he says that the meaning of value rational action (and affectual action as well) "does not lie in the achievement of a result ulterior to it, but in carrying out the specific type of action for its own sake. ''38 In "Politics as a Vocation," he says that "the absolute ethic just does not ask for ' c o n s e q u e n c e s ' . . . . 'The Christian does rightly and leaves the

82 results with the Lord'." This, he continues, is in contrast to the ethic of responsibility, where "one has to give an account of the foreseeable results of one's actions. ''39 But to adopt an action for its own sake and without regard to its foreseeable results would appear to abandon entirely any orientation in terms of ends and means. As these and similar passages imply, it is impossible adequately to characterize value rational action in terms of ends and means, either on the level of meaning or on the level of Understanding. The employment of Weber's own criteria shows that it is necessary to enlarge his basic categories of action, as his own treatment suggests at points. We will argue that there are two dimensions along which action can coherently be said to be rational which Weber did not take into account: action can be not only instrumentally but also expressively rational; and it can be rational not only "practically" but also interpretively. When these additional categories are developed, "value rational" action can indeed be understood as rational. Moreover, Weber's paradoxes of reason will be seen to be generated not by the human condition but by a set of unduly narrow categories. From the point of view of a more adequate formulation, the paradoxes vanish.

First Reconstruction: Instrumental and Expressive Rationality The distinction between instrumental and expressive action is a familiar one. It derives from Hegel and was used by Dilthey. It plays an important role, for example, in the sociology of Talcott Parsons. Yet the category of expressive (affectual) action occurs in Weber only to be dismissed as at best "on the borderline" of meaningful conduct. 4~ Its explanation must look to psychological, not social, causes, and it enters into meaningful conduct only as it is "rationalized" into one of the other categories. 41 But as long as we do not insist on the categories of ends and means there is a sense in which affectual action can be said to be rational in its own right. 42 Suppose for example that A slaps B in the face. On the instrumental level we might say that the end of A's action is to cause B pain or humiliation, and that the slap was a means to this end. Such an action might have an instrumental meaning of this kind, but very likely the more important meaning is expressive. The act of slapping is a physical manifestation, i.e., an objectification, of the emotion of anger. This is the meaning which it expresses, a meaning which is quite independent of any results which the act might have. Here it is not accurate to say that the act is the m e a n s by which the emotion is expressed. Rather the act/s the emotion as expressed, i.e., the emotion as object. Furthermore, an act can be judged as a more or less adequate expression of an emotion. This provides us with a criterion of rationality: an expressive act is rational to the degree that the conduct accurately expresses (objectifies) the emotion which motivates it.

83 This point may perhaps become clearer if we move from emotional to artistic expressivity. While it is possible to some extent to look at artistic production as a matter of ends and means, this can never do more than partial justice to its meaning to the artist (or to the audience, for that matter). For the artist the work of art is the expression of an artistic impulse, vision, or insight: it is a physical manifestation (objectification) of this esthetic meaning. We may judge a work of art according to the worth of its esthetic message, or according to the degree to which this esthetic meaning has been successfully objectified in the finished product. In the second case we can speak of a work of art as "rational" to the degree to which the handling of the medium reflects (expresses) the message. The same idea can be applied to the ethical sphere. The most important case is ethical religion. From the religious point of view, this is a world in which man proposes but God disposes. The divine omnipotence stands wholly in contrast to human powerlessness. Mortals can neither foresee nor control the results of their conduct; indeed the attempt to do so exhibits the sin of pride: the wish to usurp the divine powers. Only one's personal conduct is directly within deliberate control, and hence it alone is subject to an evaluation of the ethical content of its intentions. Thus an act which has murderous intentions is no less reprehensible if it fails to have this result, while an act which is well intentioned does not lose its moral standing if it inadvertently results in harm. What matters is the ethical meaning of the act - the moral standing of the intention which it expresses. In sum, an act can be looked on as the expression or objectification of a moral (or immoral) will. On the expressive level, the rationality of such an act depends on the adequacy with which conduct expresses its intention. This is value rationality: the accurate behavioral expression of a value. For a fully developed ethical religion, an act is value rational, first if it is f a i t h f u l , i.e., motivated solely by the desire to obey the divine will, and second if it i s p i o u s , i.e., if the act accurately objectifies this faith, as a "praxis pietas. ''43 The ideal typical category precisely captures, on the level of understanding, the meaning of the action of truly saintly persons, those whom Weber cites as exemplars of value rationality. The outward behavior manifests - indeed r a d i a t e s - an inner sanctity, visibly symbolized as a halo or aura of light. There are thus two basic standards by which the ethical character of an act can be judged. First it can be judged according to the moral standing of the state of mind which the act itself expresses, regardless of the results of the act. Second, it can be judged according to the ethical worth of the intended results of the act. To this there correspond two basic standards of rationality. An act is expressively rational to the extent that it accurately expresses the state of mind of the actor, without regard to its net results. An act is instrumentally rational to the extent that the results of the action accurately reflect the intended results (the end).

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An Analytic Digression: Action and Its Results It is necessary at this point to develop a distinction which so far has been used unreflectively: between an action and its result. 44 At first glance this distinction would seem difficult to maintain. Take an example used by Weber, that of chopping down a tree. In the first place, action consists of meaningful behavior; so the physical activity of the woodsman, insofar as it is intentional, constitutes the action. But the activity of the arms flows smoothly into the motion of the ax; so the latter must be considered part of the act as well. By further extension the fall of the tree is also a part of the act of "chopping down the tree." However if the fall of the tree accidentally kills a rabbit, that is an unintended result and so not a part of the action. This example suggests that the concept of an action must include not only the actual behavior of the actor, but also the intended results of the behavior. However, when we come to social interaction We find a very different picture. Suppose for example that a judge orders a prisoner executed, and the order is carried out. Here the action of the judge in giving the order might seem to flow into the execution of the prisoner in the same sense that the activity of the woodsman flows into the fall of the tree. But strictly speaking the execution of the prisoner is not the result of this action; rather it is the result of the joint actions of many actors: judge, warden, guards, etc., as well as those who passed the law under which the prisoner was executed, those who appointed the judge, etc. In short the execution is a social, not an individual, product; the result of a complex nexus of social interaction. To say that the execution is the result of the judge's act is to ignore the social embeddedness of this act. The judge intends the result, and once the order is given the outcome may be predictable, but what is intended and predicted is the result of a social interaction, of which the judge's action is only a part. The point is that the woodsman's ax and the tree are not actors. Hence their behavior can be regarded as extensions of the woodsman's action. But not so the behavior of those who obey the judge's order. They are actors, and their behavior is intentional. The judge's actions may influence their intentions, but such influence is of a wholly different kind than the influence the woodsman has on the behavior of the ax. Even more to the point, the judge's order is only one factor in the total nexus of circumstance out of which the intentions of the other actors are formed. Hence in social action there are coherent grounds for distinguishing between conduct (as that which is directly under the intentional control of the individual, including speech, motility, and the physical extensions of motility) and the result of social interaction, which is the product of the intentional behavior of all of the actors in the situation. This provides the ground for the distinction between instrumental and expres-

85 sive action. While instrumental action seeks to match result to intention, value expressive action seeks to match conduct to intention. Conduct is valued to the extent that it accurately expresses a worthy intention. Value rationality is precisely the successful matching of conduct to intention, without regard to the result of the social interaction of which the conduct is a part. As Weber says, it "does not ask of consequences." For instrumental action, in contrast, conduct is a means. It is not valued in itself but only in terms of the results (of social interaction) which will predictably ensue. The aim is to bring the result of social interaction into conformity with the intention of the actor, via the correct choice of conduct - i.e., to fit the means to the end.

Second Reconstruction: "Practical" and Interpretive Rationality 4s Both instrumental and expressive action are "practical" modes. They seek to mold the world so that it matches what is in the mind of the actor. But there is an alternative: to seek to form the contents of the mind in such a way that they match the world. Insofar as this involves action, the action is interpretive. Our starting point in Considering this type will be Weber's category of traditional action. In Weber's terms, social action is traditional when it is carried out according to the sacred timeless group ways. Traditional rules prescribe behavior, and their sacredness requires rigid and literal conformity. Hence traditional action characteristically becomes stereotyped, ritualized, and habitual. 46 One conforms simply because it is required and after a thousand repetitions even this motive fades out, and the action supports itself. Hence, Weber asserts, ritualized and habitual traditional action stands on the borderline of what constitutes social action, since it is almost without meaning or m otive.47 Here Weber shows a profound lack of understanding of such action from the point of view of the actors (i.e., his approach is inadequate on the level of Verstehen), for as even a glance at the abundant anthropological literature on the subject will show, the ritualized, habituated forms of action found in traditional societies overflow with a deep and rich meaning to the actors. Weber has been led astray by his categories. From a "practical" (instrumental or expressive) point of view much ritual action is indeed meaningless, for it does not involve the shaping of conduct so that it or its results will match something in the mind of the actor. The behavior is dictated by tradition, and when fully habituated is not deliberately chosen by the actor, as Weber points out. Such behavior becomes action, however, when it or its results are invested with meaning by the actor. If the meaning is fitted to the behavior, we have "ceremonial" action; if it is fitted to the result of the behavior, we have "magical" action. Ritual mourning is an example of ceremonial action. When

86 a close relative dies, tradition prescribes the performance of various acts, such as the donning of ritual mourning garb. This action is not purposive in either an instrumental or an expressive sense. Insofar as any motive at all is present, one performs the act simply because it is prescribed. However, in the collective consciousness of the community, the mourning garb both symbolizes and objectifies the emotion of mourning, i.e., the conduct contains this meaning within itself. This socially defined meaning may or may not exist in the mind of the bereaved, for as Durkheim has pointed out, one dons the mourning garb regardless of one's subjective state of mind. 4s But the ceremonial form constitutes an invitation, so to speak, for the actor to fill it with a socially and psychologically appropriate emotional content. When this happens, we may speak of the action as being rational on the interpretive level: the prescribed conduct has been invested with a meaning which matches or fits it. 49 Turning to our final category, Weber's conception of magic as an instrumental mode (the attempt to produce worldly results by otherworldly means) was in accord with the received opinion of his time. In contrast, recent works in anthropology and social theory have emphasized what we would call itsceremonial and expressive features, as well as its cognitive dimension, s~ These will be stressed here. We see magic as an interpretive, not an instrumental, mode of action. The prototypical magical act consists of arriving at an explanation of a significant event (good or bad fortune, important natural events, etc.) via augury, omen, divination, soothsaying, or a similar interpretive practice. The magician is essentially a seer, not a doer. Magical action is a product of the mythic orientation to the world, whose defining feature is to understand significant worldly events as produced by the intervention of supernatural powers. Such events are explained as motivated: as the result of intentional supernatural agency. Thus the motive is fitted to the result, not the result to the motive. Following Freud, Levi-Strauss, and Turner, we may recognize the supernatural intentions which determine significant worldly events as the projections of the (often unconscious) motives and feelings of the human actors. This is especially clear in the case of shamanistic curing, st Hence, on the level of unconscious symbolism magical interpretation is an indirect way of understanding significant events as the product of human intentions. Once the supernatural motive which produced the significant event is known, one is in a position to determine the correct course of human action. Suppose that X has fallen ill. The soothsayer (augur, oracle) is consulted and determines that the illness is the result of an act of pollution, which triggered off a magical causative process. Once the meaning of the event is known, tradition prescribes the proper course of action: X must undergo a ritual purification. Or suppose it is determined that the illness is the result of an offense by

87 X against Y. In that case, X must atone with a gift of cattle to Y. Given the interpretation of the event as a result (i.e., as intended), action is taken which is appropriate to this result. Those who practice magic do not always believe in its instrumental effectiveness. Sometimes it is confidently expected that a magical act will reliably harness supernatural forces and produce a desired result. Alternatively it may merely be hoped that the act will have such a result. Sometimes the suggestion that magic might be causally effective in producing a desired result is greeted by its practitioners with derision, s2 The point is that the causal relation between the magical act and what ensues is not the central issue. Instead, in essence magic is a response t o a n event which has already taken place, and constitutes either an attempt to discern the meaning of the event (to interpret it as supernaturally motivated) or else is a response which is ritually proper in the light of such an interpretation. This is why failure of a magical act to have the desired result does not undermine faith in the act. s3 What ensues after the magical act is itself subject to the same interpretive process. Suppose that there is a drought, and it is determined that this is because the gods are angry. The required ritual dance of atonement is then performed, and shortly thereafter it starts to rain. This means that the gods have been mollified. If it does not rain, this means that they have not been mollified. Magical explanation is thus postdictive and anthropomorphic. Given the result, one finds the motive which produced the result. Instrumental explanation (as exemplified by modern science) is on the other hand predictive in its main significance. One seeks for the means which will predictably produce the desired result. If the means do not produce the result, they are at fault, and must be changed. Nothing could be farther from the magical approach, where the magical act is the traditionally required response to the situation, and is not to be changed on any account. In summary, magic is akin to instrumentalism in treating worldly events in their relation to human purposes. Both are goal oriented. In another respect, however, they are polar opposites. Instrumentalism posits the intention (end) as given, and the problem is to find the conduct (the means) whose result will best realize (objectify) this purpose. In that way the result is fitted to the intention. For magic, however, to understand the meaning of action we must first know its results. The problem then is to find the motivation which has produced these results. The intention is thus fitted to the result. When this has been done, in turn, the appropriate conduct can be prescribed, s4 A Paradigm of Social Action Our reconstruction of Weber's categories has introduced distinctions only

88 marginally developed by him: between instrumental and expressive action, and between "practical" and interpretive action. Crossing these two divisions, we get a fourfold paradigm of social action:

Types of Social Action

"practical": objective fitted to subjective interpretive: subjective fitted to objective

goal oriented (result is valued)

conduct oriented (conduct is valued)

instrumental: practical or ethical

expressive: emotional, esthetic, or ethical

magical

ceremonial

If we understand rational action as the fitting together of the subjective and objective aspects of action, then each of these four categories has its own distinctive mode of reason. Instrumental action and instrumental rationality are preserved exactly as formulated by Weber. The categories of ethically expressive action and rationality owe their main inspiration to Weber's "value rationality," but are worked out in what we believe to be a more adequate fashion, according to Weber's own standards for ideal typical categories: that they be clear, coherent, and consistent (adequate at the level of meaning), and that they accurately reflect the meaning of the action to the actors (adequate at the level of understanding). The categories of ceremonial and magical action derive from Weber's "traditional" action, but have been developed into full fledged types, capable of being rationalized in their own right, rather than being relegated to the "borderline" of goal rational or value rational action.

Third Reconstruction: Substantive and Formal Rationality In our earlier treatment of this theme, we concluded that Weber's distinction between formal and substantive rationality was not wholly coherent. We are now in a position to restate the substance of this distinction in a conceptually more adequate way. In terms of our paradigm, Weber uses the idea of "substantive rationality" sometimes in an instrumental, sometimes in an expressive sense. This point is most evident in his treatment of substantive legal rationality. Sometimes the term refers to the adjudication of a case according to the ethical standing of the motive which the act expresses, ss This is most visible in criminal law, where an act constitutes a crime only if it is motivated by a criminal intent. Weber frequently uses the term "Khadi justice" for this idea.

89 (The term also signifies an ad hoc and pragmatic stance towards how one reasons from behavior to motive.) s6 Here substantive rationality is in the expressive mode. At other times he uses the term to draw a connection between the legal decision and the interests of those who make or influence these decisions. Here we have an instrumental use of the term: the administration of justice is substantively rational with respect to, and to the extent it serves, the interests of a ruler, status group, or class, s7 The idea thus cuts across the instrumental-expressive distinction. It would seem most in keeping with Weber's treatment to understand substantive rationality to be "practical" in the broad sense, as the fitting of either conduct or the results of conduct to the subjective meaning of the act, i.e., as instrumental and/or expressive. We retain Weber's central idea that the fitting is done on a case by case basis, rather than via a general rule. As was argued above, Weber's conception of formal rationality seems fully coherent, and we will retain it unchanged, as the regulation of conduct by a set of systematically organized general rules. Action can be formally rationalized in any of the four modes. Following Weber, formalization in the interpretive modes (magic and ceremony) is "extrinsic": the rule concerns the concrete sensory quality of the act. "Logical" formalism, when the rule concerns the logical category under which conduct falls, applies to the "practical" modes, s8 In the instrumental mode, formal rationalization consists of the regulation of the means by which ends are pursued, according to a set of general logically coherent and systematic rules of behavior. For expressive action, formalization is intended to produce the fullest and most complete possible expression of ethical, emotional, or esthetic meaning not of a single act, but of a series or system of such acts.

Fourth Reconstruction: The Differentiation of Action Before using our paragidm to restate some of Weber's central conclusions it is necessary to develop an additional theme: the idea of the differentiation of action. Weber held that in practice action often combines more than one ideal typical orientation, and the same point can be made about our paradigm. However, an important qualification must be made. To say that action "combines" two orientations implies that a separation has been made, but in fact such an implication may be unjustified. While an observer may see an action as combining two distinct orientations, the actors themselves may not have made the distinction at all. This represents a failure of the method of Verstehen, for from the point of view of the actor the elements are not combined but undifferentiated, s9 The evidence we have about prehistoric societies seems to suggest that action was there very little differentiated, at least along

90 the categories developed here. 6~ With the emergence of early "traditional" societies we seem to find only a modest amount of differentiation. Instrumental, expressive, magical, and ceremonial modes of action are close to each other or even fused. Differentiation is the child of rationalization, especially of systematic rationalization. To put this point another way, rationalization tends to proceed along only one of the dimensions of action, which then becomes increasingly differentiated from the other dimensions. Thus in traditional society interpretive action is rationalized as ritual (the systematic organization of behavior in the interpretive modes). Where advanced ethical religion predominates, the rationalization of behavior in the ethical expressive mode is most fully carried through by what Weber called the "religious virtuosi." In the modern era, of course, rationalization has been predominantly instrumental.

From Paradox to Critique The paradox of reason, which Weber saw as "fundamental to all history," is instead the consequence of an unduly narrow set of categories, which do not do justice to the manifold complexity of the human condition and the ways in which humans attempt to come to terms with this condition. In the perspective of our wider paradigm, what Weber saw as paradoxes emerge as problems, which admit at least the abstract possibility of solutions, however difficult the attainment of such solutions may be in practice. The central point is that as action is differentiated and then rationalized in one of the modalities, it becomes more and more difficult to integrate this dominant modality with the others. The meaning of action tends to disintegrate into conflicting components with the growing rationalization in the one mode accompanied by increasing irrationality in the others. Since increasing differentiation has been an overall trend of world history, the problem of the integration of social action into a coherent whole has in turn become increasingly difficult. In this final section we will apply this theory to Weber's conception of the course of world history. This conception is for the most part only implicitly worked out in his writings. The closest he came to an explicit treatment was his hastily written and often elliptic "Introduction" and "Intermediary Reflections" in The Economic-Ethic o f the World Religions. 61 The importance of these essays lies, we believe, in the light they throw on his other work, and it is in this spirit that we will make use of them in the following discussion. 62 Considerations of space require that our account take the form of a highly schematic outline.

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The Sway of the Magical World View Weber distinguished three main kinds of stable social order: patriarchical, patrimonial, and rational4egal. (Charismatically based orders are transitional, while feudalism and sultanism are variants of patrimonialism.) We may associate patriarchical orders with small agricultural societies, with a relatively simple division of labor and mode of production. Patrimonial societies are typically large agriculturally based empires, which have evolved from patriarchical systems, and have a more elaborate division of labor and technical base (often hydraulic). Modern civilization is the only full scale rational-legal order. Weber also mentions an early "animistic" stage, which we may perhaps associate with aboriginal hunter-gatherer societies. It has become a commonplace to trace the line of world historical development of social orders as one of the increasing differentiation of action. Following Durkheim, this is usually understood as the increasingly elaborate division of labor. Here, however, we are using the idea in a more general sense: action is increasingly differentiated as it increasingly separates into the four modalities, each with its characteristic meaning and form of action. This theme must be kept in mind when it is asserted that the magical mode predominates in patriarchical society. Here the worldview is mythic: significant events are interpreted as the result of intentional supernatural action, and magical action springs naturally and appropriately from this worldview. We have argued above that magic is not an instrumental mode, as Weber supposed. But it must be understood that in primitive societies the modes o f action are not sharply differentiated. (In fact, this is what defines the term "primitive.") An act can have both an instrumental and a magical meaning, without any clear distinction between the two. For example, consider the practice of burying a fish under each hill o f corn. On the instrumental level, this may be done in the hope that it will induce the spirits to produce a good crop, because of the mana (magical power) in the fish. On the magical level, if there is a good crop, it means that the fish mana has been effective; while if the crop is poor, the fish mana is held not to have been effective, perhaps because of a countervailing mana. Here the instrumental and the magical meanings are hardly to be distinguished. Such a lack of differentiation is most compatible with a ritualized society, at a relatively simple technical level, without technological innovation, embedded in an environment which does not pose novel problems. To these considerations we may add that in primitive societies magic typically does not permeate the whole of action. Much everyday practical activity is without magical significance, so that magical and instrumental action can exist side by side with-

92 out interfering with each other. In a primitive society one also finds that the magical and the ethical modes are also typically not sharply differentiated. The primacy of the magical mode thus does not exclude the ethical dimension. For example, the distinction between the magical idea of pollution and the ethical idea of sin, which is entirely clear from the point of view of a differentiated and rationalized ethical stance, is hardly to be made in many primitive societies, not because the idea of sin does not enter, but because it is not sharply distinguished from pollution. 63 In light of these points, the dominance of magical action and the mythic worldview is not at all irrational per se. In the context of a primitive (traditional patriarchical) society, it is capable of infusing worldly life with a deep meaning and a rich satisfaction, as anthropologists have repeatedly pointed out, often comparing this life favorably with life in modern industrial society. In addition, since the modalities of action are not sharply differentiated, the way is open for action to be rational simultaneously on the magical, instrumental, ethical-expressive, and ceremonial levels. The rationality of the magical worldview comes into question, however, if action becomes increasingly differentiated and rationalized. For example, suppose that the process of production advances to the hydraulic level, with large scale waterworks and centralized planning, requiring flexible and expert direction, while at the same time magical action is systematically rationalized throughout the practical culture. This would put the instrumental and the magical modes on a collision course. If the magical worldview remained dominant, there would be severe consequences for the practic~il culture, i.e., action would become irrational on the practical-instrumental level. By Weber's account this is what happened inancient China. 64

The Sway of the Ethical World View Most of the span of world history is occupied by the slow evolution of patriarchical village and nomadic societies into large scale patrimonial systems, and the vicissitudes of these systems. In the process the mode of production and the relations of production undergo little change, and the form of authority remains traditional. The advance in technical capability is relatively modest. The scale of society and the division of labor increase sharply. Finally there occurs a basic shift in the orientation which human beings take to the world in which they live: the transition from the magical to the ethical worldview, as exemplified by the rise of the five great world religions - Confucianism, Hinduism, Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam - as well as by Judiasm. This shift in worldview, and its consequences for social lif% are the main foci of Weber's historical analysis.

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1. The Rationality of Ethical Religion. Weber repeatedly calls these ethical religions and the way of life which they preach "rational," although his discussions do not always make entirely clear that he uses the term in several senses. First, a fully developed ethical religion is a rational system of thought, in the sense that it provides a consistent and comprehensive account of the meaning of human life, and its relation to the divine. The rationality of an ethical religion at the level of thought especially depends on its success in dealing with the theodicy problem: how to reconcile the idea of an omnipotent and just God with the pervasiveness of suffering and injustice in this world. Weber thought that only three religious doctrines have fully met this problem and hence achieved full rationality at the level of thought: the Hindu concept of Karma, Zoroastrian dualism, and the Calvinist doctrine of predestination. 65 As they develop, ethical religions also show increasing systematic rationality. There are two aspects to this. First, they are increasingly universalistic: moving towards the idea of a single God who rules the whole world, and who promulgates a set of ethical commandments which are general rules applying equally to all individuals. Second, these rules apply to the entire conduct of life, including everyday practical activity. Weber's application of the term "rational" to advanced ethical religion must be understood in the context of his frequent qualifications. Such religion, for example, is far more rational at the hands of the religious virtuosi - those who think hard and seriously about religious questions and attempt to put their religious beliefs rigorously into action - than it is at the hands of the rank and file, where ethical ideas are vulgarized by the infusion of magical practices and worldly interests. 2. Ethical Religion and Practical-Instrumental Action. Weber held that ethical religion stands potentially in opposition to practical economic action, the more so as the two are rationalized. (Only Puritanism is an exception.) In practice, however, the overall picture in patrimonial systems was one of accommodation between the two. The potential conflicts were usually not actualized because neither economic nor religious action was sufficiently rationalized. 66 While it was clear to many advanced religious thinkers that all activity motivated by the desire for worldly gain was ethically base, such ideas worked their way only partially into the actual religious interests which motivated believers, including the religious leadership, who had to face the fact that the maintenance of a religious organization or movement and the furtherance of its purposes requires the acquisition and employment of material means. Moreover, the economic systems of patrimonial societies were not highly rationalized. The technical basis of such societies was only moderately advanced, and technological innovation was rare and usually slow. For Weber the instrumental rationalization of economic action requires formalization,

94 and in antiquity such formalization did not occur, for two reasons. First, Weber held that material interests by themselves cannot supply a sufficiently intense motivation to carry through full scale practical-instrumental rationalization. Second, ethical-religious interests are opposed in an especially strong way to formalization. The overall picture in patrimonial society, therefore, was one of somewhat uneasy accommodation between ethical-religious and practical interests, enabled to a considerable extent by the fact that each served to inhibit the rationalization of the other. Weber drew essentially the same picture for the relation between ethical religion and politics. 67 The essence of politics is the use of force, which in principle stands wholly in opposition to an uncompromisingly ethical stance. In practice, however, organized religion was only too happy to call on the state to enforce true belief and slay the infidel. Only occasionally did the potentially revolutionary stance of ethical and especially prophetic religion manifest itself. The political systems of patrimonial societies achieved at best only a low level of (formal) rationalization compared to the modern state. The accommodation of political and religious interests was enabled by and acted to perpetuate the fact that neither was highly rationalized.

3. Ethical Religion and Magic. In patrimonial systems, the stance of the ethical religion towards magic is even more equivocal than it is to the practicalinstrumental mode. On the one hand, as Weber stresses, the rise of ethical religion means the decline of magic. As the ethical aspects come to the fore and are theoretically and systematically'rationalized they come more and more into conflict with (ethically) irrational magical beliefs and in the end overcome them. This is the demagicification (Entzauberung) of religion. On the other hand, the actual practice of ethical religion by the masses is always strongly infused with magical elements. More than this, important magical elements remain even in the true (non-vulgar) practice of highly rationalized ethical religions. Indeed, the basic worldviews of ethical religions, including their answers to the theodicy problem, are expressed in mythic terms: the character of the world is revealed (interpreted) as the result of the unfolding of a divine purpose. For Weber, only Confucianism is wholly free of magical ideas; therefore, he says, it stands on the borderline of being a religion. 6s Here we seem to have another Weberian paradox. Magic appears to be both antithetical to and necessary to ethical religion. But the paradox vanishes as soon as it is grasped that the secret of the success of the great ethical religions lies in their ability to integrate important magical elements into a basically ethical worldview. We will amplify and reinforce this point by a brief glance at Weber's theory of

95 charismatic authority. Weber used "charisma" in a broad and a narrow sense. In the broad sense, "charisma" is synonomous with "magical power. ''69 In that sense, all political authority is charismatic, i.e., magical, in character. 7~ In the narrow sense, "charisma" refers to "prophetic charisma." Here ethical and magical elements are combined. The prophet is a person with an ethical message, but he is also a person who is believed to have magical powers. Successful prophecy integrates these two elements into a consistent and unified whole, vl Precisely this integration produces the amazing power of prophetic charisma to inspire human action with a meaning and motivation which sweeps all before it. In the process of integration, the magical component may become highly sublimated. The Judaic prophets are the most striking instance. They are never portrayed as performing the supernatural acts which are elsewhere the typical proof of charisma. Rather, their charisma is manifested in the magical force of their personalities and the uncanny power of their words to move the minds and souls of their listeners: proof enough that God is speaking through them when they prophesy. The fact that for Weber the force of prophetic charisma lies in its ability to integrate magical and ethical elements is illustrated by his treatment of the fate of charismatic authority in Western Christendom after the fall of Rome. Here, he says, charismatic authority suffered a split. Priestly authority, as institutionalized charisma, retained ethical force, but lost its magical character. Kingship, as hereditary charisma, retained its magical, but lost its ethical elements. Both thereby lost much of their power to sway the minds of their followers. 72

4. Instrumental and Expressive Ethical Religion. In his treatments of ethical religion, Weber operates within the central polarity of mysticism and ascetism. The trouble with mysticism as an ideal type is that strictly speaking it is not a form of action, as Weber recognized. 73 This is why it is not included in our typology of action. Mysticism involves a retreat from worldly activity into a life of contemplation and/or spiritual purification, leading to an ecstatic or blissful union with the divine. The Hindu concept of Nirvana comes closest to this ideal type. Conduct in the world is at best meaningless, and hence to be avoided, even to the point of death. 74 In contrast, Weber says, for asceticism "salvation was always regarded as having an ethical justification before God, which ultimately could be accomplished and maintained by some sort of active conduct within the world. ''v5 At one point in Economy and Society, Weber distinguished two broad types of religious asceticism, depending on whether the true believer understands himself as the "instrument" or the "vessel" of the divine purpose. In the former case, the believer attempts to shape the world into conformity with the divine purpose. In the latter case, which he terms "ethical inwardness," the focus is on "good works" where what counts is the intention of the act (Intentio), understood as "the 'signifi-

96 cance' (Meinung) in the mind of the person (in the sense of the bona tides, mala tides, culpa and dolus of the Roman law) which leads him to perform any particular action. ''76 This distinction would seem to correspond exactly to the one we have drawn between ethical-instrumental and ethical-expressive action, and not by accident, for our own views have been influenced by passages such as the one just cited. However, Weber more frequently understands the ethic of good works (ethical inwardness) in instrumental terms. One performs good actions in order to purify one's character, and hence attain salvation. 77 But, as Weber recognized, such a conception of salvation is irrational from an ethical point of view. It follows that the "ethic of inwardness" is only a partially rationalized stance. As ethical rationalization proceeds, it must give way to other conceptions. This, we think, explains why elsewhere in Economy and Society, and even more strongly in The Economic Ethics of the WorldReligions, Weber works in terms of the simple polarity of ethical instrumentalism (missionary prophecy, which is concerned with the salvation of souls, and in some cases, with social and political justice) versus mysticism (exemplary prophecy which is most consistent when it leads to withdrawal from the world). The clear implication is that when rationalized, the ethic of inwardness must move towards one of these two ideal typical poles. TM On the contrary, however, as we have argued above, the ethic of inwardness (ethical expressivity) can be perfectly rational as long as it is not understood in instrumental terms. Here salvation is not a goal to be achieved through conduct, but a sanctified inner state, in which the divine spirit enters the soul of the believer. The wordly activity of such a blessed person gives a concrete behavioral expression to this sanctified state. This is how God acts in the world. We see nothing irrational about such a conception. It is a coherent ideal typical pole of ascetic religion, the other being the ethical-instrumental. Christianity, as an ascetic religion (despite some mystical elements) combines both elements in a complex and shifting historical progression. At times the two ideas are accommodated to each other, usually more or less uneasily. At times the contrast is quite sharp, as in the differences between the Jesuits and the Franciscans. The Jesus of the Gospels seems to us predominantly an exemplary prophet, 79 but with the development of the Church and its worldly mission, instrumental elements came to the fore, especially with Paul. From this perspective, we would see the ideological struggles within Christianity primarily as a question of the relation of the ethical-expressive to the ethicalinstrumental modes, as well as the relation of these two to the practicalinstrumental question of the maintanence of the worldly presence and position of the Church; while we would assign the theme of the relation of asceti-

97 cism to mysticism a secondary place. Since the rationalization of ethically expressive asceticism does not lead to withdrawal from the world, it remains always an orientation to action in the world, and hence must come to terms with the material and social conditions in which it finds itself, influencing and being influenced by them. We surmise that Weber's account of the interaction between religious ideas and socioeconomic factors, and the constellations of interest which arise therefrom and push history "along its tracks" - complex though this account is - will on examination be found to be oversimplified and in some respects inadequate, because he operates primarily with the ideational dichotomy of ethical-instrumental versus mystical. Such questions, however, are beyond the scope of this article. The Rise o f the Instrumental Mode In the process of formation of the constellations of interest which generated the modern era, Weber singled out two religious ideas as crucial: religious asceticism, as exemplified by the Protestant sects, and a wholly nonmagical view of salvation, most clearly expressed within Protestantism by Calvinism. a~ In terms of our revised categories, the Calvinistic doctrine of predestination, in the context of an ascetic orientation, played such a key role because it succeeded in producing an orientation to action which integrated ethical-expressive, ethical-instrumental, and practical-instrumental interests. By a "magical" approach to salvation, Weber means the idea that one can achieve salvation by means of acting in comformity with God's will. In our terminology, this is an ethical-instrumental approach. The ethical inadequacy of such a conception of salvation has long been recognized by advanced religious thinkers; what is striking here is the thoroughness of the demolition effected by the Calvinist doctrine of predestination, in the face of which any trace of instrumentalism is out of the question. The conjunction of the doctrines of predestination and original sin also undermines an ethical-expressive conception of salvation as a sanctified inner state which leads to good works. As Calvin and Luther both stressed, there is no necessary connection between salvation and good works in either direction: good works do not assure salvation, nor does salvation insure good works. Weber brilliantly shows how, in the face of the doctrines of predestination and original sin religious asceticism is led inexorably to the Protestant ethic. Of course the Catholic ethic was an ethic of intentions. But the concrete intentio of the single act determined its value . . . . [In contrast:] The God of Calvinism demanded of his believers not single good works, but a life of good works combined into a unified system. 81

98 This meant systematic self control, rigid adherence to ethical standards, total devotion to a worldly calling, and complete rejection of worldly and sensuous enjoyment. This rationalized ethical-expressive orientation fits in perfectly with ethical instrumentalism, for worldly asceticism is not only righteous in itself, it is the way in which one pursues one's divinely appointed mission: success in one' calling. In the economic realm, this orientation is summarized by such phrases as "the work ethic," "the market ethic," and "good faith dealing." In the context of early capitalist society such an orientation was indeed very likely to produce economic successY It is not necessary here to describe Weber's analysis of how this ethic fitted in with, reinforced, and helped create the "spirit of capitalism," understood as the drive towards the complete practical-instrumental rationalization of economic action, via the systematic calculation and utilization of the means of production to maximize the return on capital, and the reinvestment of this return to achieve the ever more efficient productive utilization of capital. What we are adding to this analysis is the point that in this syndrome the practical-instrumental, ethical-instrumental, and ethical-expressive modes are differentiated, rationalized, and integrated in the most thoroughgoing fashion. Despite Weber's assertions, Calvinism retained important magical elements. As mentioned earlier, he himself recognized that there is no such thing as a nonmagical religion: it is a contradiction in terms. Calvinist theology, as with all theology, is mythic: it interprets the world as the carrying out of divine intentions, and thereby invests human life with meaning and a center of orientation for action. Religion enchants the world, and Calvinism is no exception. It is true that in official Calvinist doctrine the concept of salvation took a nonmagical form in its relation to human action, but in the popular culture a magical dimension emerged: worldly success was taken as a sign of salvation. As usual, Weber makes this point in instrumental terms: Thus, however useless good works might be as a means of attaining salvation . . . . nevertheless, they are indispensable as a sign of election. They are a technical means, nor of purchasing salvation but of getting rid of the fear of damnation, s3 Such a conception is irrational from an instrumental point of view, for it is just as unworthy to act well as a means of spiritual reassurance as it is as a means of salvation. We suggest instead that the popular conception in question here is magical in the non-instrumental sense developed above. First, as Weber recognized elsewhere, it is the result of action (worldly success) and not the action itself (good works) that is significant for salvation. 84 The true believer who follows the ethic of worldly asceticism to the letter but does not achieve worldly success knows in his heart that he has not been saved. He

99 nevertheless continues to endeavor to act well, because that is God's commandment. If, however, success does arrive, this is taken to mean that Godhas aided one's efforts and hence that one is a member of the elect. The meaning flows from the results of the action, and so comes, reassuringly, to be reflected in the mind of the actor as a "certitudio salutis." Understood this way, the popular view that success is a sign of salvation adds a magical dimension to action. This magic has been shorn of its instrumental meaning (differentiated), rationalized, and at the same time integrates well with the other modes. In sum, here is a system in which the various modes of action are relatively differentiated, highly rationalized, and fully integrated. This is historically unique. Throughout the sweep of world history we find instead that, insofar as they are differentiated and rationalized, ideas and material interests, instrumental, expressive, and interpretive modes of action, have a complex and shifting relation to each other, partly of conflict and mutual inhibition, partly of uneasy accommodation, partly of integration and mutual cooperation. Here alone do these modes point unequivocally in the same direction. Instead of partly cancelling each other out, they synergistically reinforce each other in a unified system of motivation. This, we suggest, is the source of the amazing dynamism of the west: the reason why rational capitalism was able to achieve its full unfolding and its extraordinary success. The Decline o f the Instrumental Mode While at the outset of the modern era the dominant mode of action, the practical-instrumental, was well integrated with the ethical-instrumental, ethicalexpressive, and magical modes, the ever increasing rationalization in the dominant mode and the resulting institutional changes eventually broke through this integration, so that further practical-instrumental rationalization was accomplished more and more at the cost of increasing irrationality in the other modes. Alternatively, rationalization in the other modes is more and more at the expense of practical-instrumental effectiveness. To spell this conclusion out in detail would be to trace out nothing less than the main lines of the historical development of the modern era. We must continue to confine ourselves to a schematic overview of some of the main themes. 1. Ethical-Expressive versus Practical-Instrumental Rationafity. We noted above the fit, in the initial phase of the modern era, between the ethicalexpressive mode (the work ethic, the market ethic, and good faith dealing) and the practical-instrumental mode (the systematic calculation and organization of action with the goal of maximum economic gain, or, more broadly, worldly success). The person who has the reputation for practicing this ethic

100 finds ready credit and trusting customers, and so is likely to succeed# This presupposed a community in which one is known, personally or by reputation. But as capitalism advances, the units of economic interaction become larger, and social mobility within and between such units increases. More and more, one cannot evaluate in advance the good faith of the person with whom one is dealing. The result of this situation in which neither party can rely on the good faith of the other is the proliferation of formally rational legal regulations whereby one can be assured of the proper performance of the other, or find redress if such performance is lacking. In the next section we will trace the process whereby legal formalism undermines the very ethical impetus which gave it birth. Here we point out the importance of the reverse process: formal legalism proliferates because the parties cannot trust each other to act ethically. The consequence is that ethical behavior becomes less and less a guarantor of success. The classic analysis of this topic is Robert Merton's "Social Structure and Anomie. ''86 We will here restate his conclusions in our own terminology. Merton puts the matter as a "dissociation" between culturally defined goals and the institutional norms which prescribe the approved means of reaching these goals (i.e., culturally defined means). We would submit, however, that these institutional norms initially prescribe behavior believed to morally good "in itself": i.e., which expresses a worthy motivation. It is only gradually, in response to a combination of circumstances, that the ethical-expressive support for good faith behavior is eroded. As Merton points out, the most important destabilizing factor is undoubtedly a heavy emphasis on the goal of worldly success in a situation where the opportunities to achieve such success by good faith action are restricted, s7 In such a situation, the perception that one can more readily succeed by the adoption of means which are unethical or illegal constitutes a strong temptation to what sociologists call "innovation." Merton equates such innovation with lawbreaking, but this ignores the subtler scoundrel, who reaches the top by means which are legal but unethical. A second way to handle the dilemma created by the dissociation of culturally defined goals and institutional norms is to abandon the goal of success but remain loyal to the institutional norms. Since the goal has been abandoned, such behavior is no longer regarded as a means of success. It can, however, retain its ethical expressive character. The actor continues to adhere to the institutional norms because such action is morally right, quite apart from its results. He is the "nice guy who finishes last." Merton's paradigm does not include this type. This omission, we suggest, is justified or at least explained by the fact that by the time the contradictions within the modern ethos have become well developed, this stance is difficult

101 to maintain and hence unstable as a widespread form of action. One would expect a tendency to shift to one of Merton's final three ideal typical responses: ritualism, retreatism, or rebellion. We will here briefly mention two reasons why in the advanced stages of the modern era, to abandon the practicalinstrumental element while retaining the ethical expressive is not in general a viable solution. First, in religious terms, if one has abandoned hope of salvation (as signified by worldly success), it is difficult to continue to act faithfully. In secular terms, lack of success means lack of personal worth, and it is difficult to continue to act worthily if one is convinced that one is worthless. In Calvinism, as in any other religion, hope of salvation is an indispensable moral support for faithful conduct, quite apart from any instrumental considerations. Second, as the modern era advances, a purely ethical-expressive stance finds itself in an increasingly equivocal position vis-a-vis the formal rationality of the legal-institutional system. The legal system and the institutions which operate within this system are (rightly) perceived from the ethicalexpressive point of view either as meaningless (which leads to retreatism) or as ethically wrong (which leads to rebellion). The third alternative is to abandon the ethical-expressive stance in favor of a ritualistic adherence to the letter of the law (Merton's "ritualism"). We will analyze this third alternative in the context of the split between substantive and formal rationality.

2. Formal versus Substantive Rationality. Up to now we have treated modern rationalism in its instrumental aspect (Zweekrationalitat). Even more important for Weber, however, is the theme of formal rationalization. He sees formalization as the unique and distinctive feature of modern social action and organization. (Characteristically, he mostly treats formalization in its instrumental aspect.) His central critique of modernity is that this formal rationalization has everywhere had paradoxical results. a) Formal rationality versus ethical expressivity. The fact that formal rationalization acts to undermine the very ethical impulse which gives it birth is supported in detail by Weber, and is in addition generally recognized. We will content ourselves here with pointing out the main reason for the disparity, using the context of legal formalism. 88 In its initial stages of rationalization, formal justice, like substantive justice, attempts to judge the act in accordance with the moral standing of its intentions. One reasons from the overt behavior to the motivation which may reasonably be supposed to have produced this behavior. In the case of formal justice one reasons via a general rule: a given syndrome of behavior is assigned a given motive. Obviously there will be exceptions: cases where the application of the general rule will result in substantive injustice. In principle any

102 instance might be such an exception, but one can determine whether or not this is so only by a careful analysis of the substantive merits of the case, i.e., by abandoning formal criteria. While the principle of equity may allow waiver of the formal rule in the case of flagrant inappropriateness, there are undoubtedly many subtler cases, where the inappropriateness of the general rule would be evident only after a careful substantive analysis. The principle of equity thus runs counter to the principle of equality under law. m In sum, both the rigid application of the general rule and the admission of exceptions are irrational from the ethical-expressive perspective. The way out of this dilemma is to make the distinction between the unethical and the illegal. One is punished by the law not for acting unethically but for acting illegally. Illegal action is not a question of motive but of conduct deliberate behavior. For example, when Jean Valjean stole a loaf of bread from the bakery window, his motives for doing so were irrelevant. The act was illegal; he knew it was illegal, and that was that. Thus, insofar as it is consistently carried through, formal legality is antithetical to an ethical-expressive conception of justice. 9~ So far we are on familiar ground. The ethical irrationality of formalized law is widely recognized, for essentially the reasons just given. Now, however, we go a step further. Formally rational law is given as a rule of behavior. One is supposed to obey simply because that is the law, and because the law has issued from a duly constituted rational-legal authority. Action pursuant to law thus has no meaning in itself: one obeys simply because that is the rule. Thus, scrupulous compliance with formally legal rules constitutes ritual behavior in the strict sense of the term developed above. The difference between traditional and modern ritualism lies in the source of authority (traditional versus rational-legal) and the type of formalism ("extrinsive" versus "logical"). In both cases, compliance with the law is in itself meaningless. It is up to the actor to endow the action with meaning, i.e., to fit a meaning to the behavior. As it is developed and rationalized, therefore, modern formalism becomes more and more an interpretive, and less and less an instrumental or expressive, mode of action. b) Formal versus instrumental rationality. While formal rationalization comes into conflict with the expressive mode almost from the start, its conflict with instrumental rationality is much slower in developing. In fact the initial instrumental efficiency of formalism is mainly responsible for its emergence as dominant in the modern era. The reasons for the long term shift in the relationship of formal to instrumental rationality can be most clearly seen in the evolution of modern bureaucracy, which Weber defines as the formal rationalization of organizational action. 91 The decisive advantage of bureaucracy, says Weber, is its efficiency. 92 Here, in contrast to the expressive dimension,

103 it is not the individual act which counts - singly or in the aggregate - but the net result of many acts, i.e., the result of a system of social interaction. When all action is carried out in conformity to general rules, that some individual instances may be counterproductive to organizational goals is irrelevant: what counts is the net effect of the whole interaction system. It is quite common for action which is perceived to be irrational from the perspective of one point within the system to be wholly rational when viewed from the perspective of the whole. In this respect the general reputation which bureaucracy has for inefficiency is partly undeserved, because the abandonment of formalism and the reintroduction of substantively rational principles will often rectify specific instances of "bureaucratic inefficiency" only at the cost of a loss of efficiency of the system as a whole. From the Weberian point of view, inefficiency in the overall result is a sign of incomplete or improper (irrational) bureaucratization. But there is more to be said on this subject. Post-Weberian studies of bureaucracy have shown that an "informal structure" (of interaction) always grows up within the formal organization of action. This informal system sometimes acts to enhance the instrumental effectiveness of the organization, or is neutral in this respect. More typically, however, it acts to limit organizational efficiency. 93 To a considerable extent, then, action in the informal system is not instrumental but interpretive. This point is already evident in the first important empirical study of informal structure, the "Bank Observation Wiring Room" study. 94 Here the structure of interaction imposed by the technical requirements of production took on a symbolic (interpretive) meaning in the minds of the workers, which in turn strongly influenced their modes of activity. For example, the simple fact that some worked in the front of the workroom and some in the back was interpreted as meaning that those in front had a higher status ranking. A rudimentary status system emerged, and the workers exhibited behavior and attitudes characteristic of the status ranking which they had assigned themselves. 95 Such interpretive transformation of instrumentally imposed action is pervasive in modern bureaucracy, where the rubber stamp becomes a badge of authority and personal worth, a slightly larger office means a higher status ranking, and so on. The modern large scale bureaucracy presents to the individuals working within it an environment analogous to the natural environment of members of a primitive society. It is a world of arbitrary, impersonal, and uncontrollable forces, both meaningless and inexplicable, to which one must adapt or perish. The solution is to endow this world with a symbolic meaning which provides a framework of cognitive and motivational orientation for the individual. Our point is perfectly reflected in the title and much of the contents of a recent

104 article by Meyer and Rowan, "Formal Organization as Myth and Ceremony. ''96 While bureaucratic ritualism may be an aberration from the point of view of the instrumental purpose of the organization, from the point of view of the human situation of the members of the organization it is a perfectly rational response: the rationalization of organizational action in the interpretive mode. The archenemy of ritualism is innovation. Bureaucratic ritualism thus constitutes a sclerosis of the main artery of instrumental progress in the modern system: technological innovation. But the positive side must also be recognized. Bureaucratic ritualism is an at least partly constructive answer to the problem of the meaninglessness of action which the members of a bureaucracy face. By endowing action with meaning, bureaucratic ritualism provides the motivational support necessary to the continued existence and operation of the organization. At the cost of the slow choking off of further instrumental rationalization, the organization continues to survive. As a further consequence, the original instrumental purpose of the organization falls more and more from sight, and the organization becomes increasingly preoccupied with maintaining its own existence. In sum, while the formal rationalization of organizational action has the initial result of greatly enhancing its instrumental effectiveness, in the longer run it results in the rationalization of organizational behavior in the interpretive mode (bureaucratic ritualism). This rationalization is increasingly at odds with further instrumental rationalization. 97

Conclusion Our conclusion will take the form of a restatement of the famous "iron cage" passage from The Protestant Ethic which was the starting point of our discussion, put into the terms of the categories and conclusions developed in this article. First, a prefatory remark about the term "capitalism." Weber understood capitalism not in terms of the ownership of capital or a specific mode of production, but in a more general sense - as the formal practical-instrumental rationalization of economic action. If one accepts this definition, one can distinguish three main forms of capitalism: entrepreneurial capitalism; corporate capitalism, as exemplified by the present United States; and State capitalism, as exemplified by the Soviet Union. The "iron cage" passage was written when corporate capitalism was at an early stage of development, and State capitalism had not yet appeared on the scene. Yet his critique seems to apply with especial force to corporate capitalism, and to be germane to State capitalism as weU. 98 Our restatement follows. Worldly asceticism incorporated capitalism into an integrated worldview. The mythic interpretation of human life in relation to this world and the next

105 developed by Protestantism led to the idea of a calling: total devotion of one's life to a worldly mission. In whatever field the calling lay, it served and was motivated by a set of ideal interests which found expression in the ethical ideals of the Enlightenment: the goal of the progressive spiritual, moral, and material betterment of mankind (the ethical-instrumental dimension), and the conduct of one's life according to the principles of fairness, rectitude, industriousness, prudence, and self control (the ethical-expressive dimension). In addition, the pursuit of one's calling had a magical dimension: worldly success was taken to be a sign of divine favor. In terms of this orientation, the life of the capitalist m a d e s e n s e in a multifaceted and integrated way. Today, however, all this has changed. The preoccupation with material success has weakened the original religious impulse and the ethical constraints on the means employed. The instrumental rationalization of economic activity has been pursued via ever increasing formalization, and formalization has undermined both the ethical-expressive and the ethical-instrumental meaning of economic action. The old ideals linger only as ghosts which haunt a system of action which is more and more alien to them. Shorn of its ideal interests, the pursuit of ever greater material advancement no longer makes sense, at least in the advanced capitalist countries, where the standard of living is already absurdly (and in relation to the rest of the world, unconscionably) high. It is an age of specialization, but the specialist has lost sight of the ethical spirit which led to the specialization in the first place. The profession no longer professes anything but its own advancement. It is an age of material enjoyment which is less and less an expression of the inner life of the individual. The pleasure is empty, the enjoyment joyless. The Weberian "iron cage" is a formally rationalized system of action which has become rigid and stereotyped, drained of its ethical and even its practical meaning. This is not to say, however, that life in modern bureaucratic society is meaningless, as Weber believed. He made the same mistake here that he made with respect to traditional ritualism. In both cases life is full of interpretive significance. The point is rather that in modern society this interpretive meaning is at odds with both the instrumental and the expressive dimensions of human action. The distintegration of action it/advanced industrial society has produced not an iron cage but a dilemma. On the one hand the maintenance of instrumental effectiveness requires the suppression of both the ethical and the interpretive significance of action. We are left with m e r e technical rationality. But an advanced civilization cannot sustain itself on such a narrow motivational base. An adequate motivational base can be achieved, on the other hand, by the ritualization of formally rationalized action: by its investment with interpretive meaning. Such a rationalization must, however, be at

106 the expense o f the instrumental m o d e : it threatens to u n w i n d the very mainspring of advanced industrial society, continual technological innovation. Thus we are faced, n o t with the ossified p e r p e t u a t i o n o f advanced industrial society, but with its i m m i n e n t demise. Capitalism owes its success to its ability to integrate the m o d e s o f action into a synthesis o f overwhelming motivational power. It c a n n o t long survive the disintegration o f this synthesis. NOTES 1. Frequently cited works by Max Weber will be abbreviated below as follows: E & S: Economy and Society, ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (Bedminster, 1968); Pol. Voc. : "Politics as a Vocation," 77-128 in H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, tr. and ed., From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (Oxford University Press, 1946);Pr. Eth.: The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, tr. Talcott Parsons (Free Press, 1958); Pr. Sct. : "The Protestant Sects and the Spirit of Capitalism," 302-322 in From Max Weber; Soc. Psych. : "The Social Psychology of the World Religions," 267-301, ibid., Rel. Re].: "Religious Rejections of the World and Their Directions," 323-358, ibid. 2. Herbert Marcuse, "Industrialization and Capitalism in the Work of Max Weber," in Negations: Essays in Critical Theory (Beacon Press, 1968), 201-226; Jiirgen Habermas, "Technology and Science as Ideology," in Toward a Rational Society, tr. Jeremy J. Shapiro (Beacon Press, 1970), 91-122; Leo Strauss, "Natural Right and the Distinction Between Fact and Value," in Maurice Natanson, ed., Philosophy of the Social Sciences (Random House, 1963), 419-457. 3. For the epistemological aspects, see David Goddard, "Max Weber and the Objectivity of Social Science," History and Theory (1973), 1-21. For the institutional dimensions, see Wolfgang Schluchter, "Value Neutrality and the Ethic of Responsibility," in Guenther Rotli and Wolfgang Schluchter, Max Weber's Vision of History: Ethics and Methods (University of California Press, 1979), 65-116. 4. Pr. Eth., 181-182. 5. Robert Michels, Political Parties, tr. Eden and Cedar Paul (Free Press, 1949), 408. 6. E & S, 24-26. 7. Compare the above list with those used in Wolfgang Schluchter, "The Paradox of Rationalization: On the Relation of Ethics and the World," in Roth and Schluchter, 13-15; and Stephen Kalberg, "Max Weber's Types of Rationality: Cornerstones for the Analysis of Rationalization Processes in History," American Journal o f Sociology (1980) 1145-1179. The term ~'technical rationality," as used by Schluchter and others, corresponds to the idea of "practical formal instrumental rationality" to be used here later. Kalberg and Tenbruck have (rightly) laid stress on the idea of "theoretical rationality". Friedrich H. Tenbruck, "The Problem of Thematic Unity in the Works of Max Weber," British Journal of Sociology (Sep., 1980) 316-351. See also Arnold Eisen, "The Meanings and Confusions of Weberian Rationality," British Journal of Sociology (Mar., 1978) 57-70; and Gert H. Mueller, "Rationality in the Work of Max Weber," Archives Europdenes De Sociologie (1979), 149-171. 8. Max Weber, The Methodology of the Social Sciences, tr. and ed., Edward A. Shils and Henry A. Finch (Free Press, 1949) 52. 9. Sahey has made this point. Aron Sahey, ed., Max Weber and Modern Sociology (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1971) 5. 10. Weber introduced the term Wertrationalitat only in his later writings, but the concept itself is used as early as 1904, for example in the sentence following the one just quoted, as well as in a number of passages in Pr. Eth. 11. Weber uses the term "interests" predominantly in the broad sense of the cognitivemotivational mental states which govern conduct, rather than in the narrow sense of material self interest. 12. E & S, 607-610.13.1bid., 866-875.14. Ibid., 399-407. 15. The following typology (in a slightly different terminology) is developed and discussed more fully in Donald Mclntosh, "The Objective Bases of Max Weber's Ideal Types," History and Theory (1977), 265-279. 16. Notably in E & S, 399-439, 541-556, and in Soc. Psych. and Rel. Rej. See also Talcott Parsons' discussion in his Introduction to Max Weber, The Sociology of Religion, tr. Ephraim Fisehoff (Beacon Press, 1964), 1-1ix. 17. Max Weber, The Religion of China, tr. and ed. Hans H. Gerth (Free Press, 1951), 238.

107

18. Pol. Voc., 117. The paradoxical nature of rational action in Weber's theory has been

19. 20. 21. 22. 23, 25. 27. 29. 30, 31,

32. 33. 34. 35.

36. 39. 40. 42.

43. 44. 45.

46. 48. 49. 50. 51.

stressed in Wolfgang Schluchter, "The Paradox of Rationalization." We are in agreement with Schluchter's view that Weber's thought has a critical potential that is not actualized because of a faulty typology of (rational) social action. Schluchter's proposed reconstruction is, however, at odds with the one presented here. E & S, 150-151. See E. B. Portis, "Max Weber's Theory of Personality," SociologicalInquiry, 48/2 (1968), 113-120, esp. 116. For the pros and cons of this question see Bryan R. Wilson, ed., Rationality (Basil Blackweli, 1970). The Religion of China, 196-203. The following discussion is based mainly on Pol. Voc. E & S , Pt. 1, Ch. 2;Pt. 2, Chs. 8, 11.24. Ibicl., 6 5 6 - 6 5 7 . 1bid., 327-329, 6 4 7 - 6 4 8 , 8 1 1 - 8 1 3 , 8 6 6 - 8 6 8 . 2 6 . Ibid., 882-895. Ibid., 9 7 3 - 9 7 5 . 2 8 . Ibid., 987,994, 1002. Pol. Voc., 1 0 2 - 1 0 3 (quotation from 102). See also E & S, 9 8 4 - 9 8 5 . Max Weber, General Economic History, tr. Frank H. Knight (Allen and Unwin, 1927), 2 7 5 - 2 7 8 ; E & S, 107-109. This idea is emphasized in Stephen Siedman and Michael Gruber, "Capitalism and Individuation in the Sociology of Max Weber," British Journal of Sociology (Dec. 1977), 498-508. See also Eldridge's discussion in J.E.T. Eldridge, ed., Max Weber: The Interpretation of Social Reality (Michael Joseph, 1971), 6 0 - 6 9 . Mclntosh. While this central idea seems to us to pervade the entire body of Weber's work, it is clearly and explicitly expressed only in the late essays, Soc. Psych. and Rel. Re]. Compare our view with Tenbruck. The most important discussions of these recurrent themes are in E & S, 2 4 - 2 6 and Pol. Voc., 117-127. We take this to be essentially the sense of Schluchter's reformulation of Weber's "ethic of responsibility". Schluchter, "The Paradox of Rationalization". In philosophy, this position is known as "consequentialism". For a recent defense, see Joel Kupperman, "Vulgar Consequentialism," Mind (July 1980), 321-337. Pol. Voc., 122. 37. Ibid., 119.38. E & S , 25. Pol. Voc., 120. See also Methodology , 16. E & S , 24. 41.1bid., 8 - 9 , 2 4 - 2 6 . Talcott Parsons has criticized Weber's relegation of affectual (expressive) action to a borderline or residual category, and in his own work developed and used the idea as a major category of social action. His treatments retain Weber's underlying conception, for by expressivity Parsons means emotional expressivity: action which expresses an emotion. We are here instead returning to the classic formulation of Hegel and Dilthey, in treating expressive action as "objective mind": the expression (reflection, transformation) of the subjective contents of the mind into concrete action. Emotional expressivity is a subcategory of this more general idea. For Parsons' critique of Weber, see his Introduction to Max Weber: The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, tr. A.M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons, ed. (Oxford University Press, 1947), 27; and Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action (Free Press, 1949), 6 4 7 - 6 4 9 , 6 7 1 - 6 7 2 . For his own development of the category, see Talcott Parsons, The Social System (Free Press, 1951), 4 8 - 5 0 , 6 9 - 8 8 . SeePr. Eth., 129. For a fuller and more formal treatment of this distinction, see Donald Mclntosh, The Foundations of Human Society (University of Chicago Press, 1969), 3 1 - 5 5 , 87-116. The term "practical" has two meanings: a broad sense, applied to all purposive activity in the world (as in Kant's Critique o f Practical Reason), and a narrow sense, applied to the pursuit of material interests, such as economic gain, pleasure, or security. The predominant usage in Weber and thi~ essay is the narrow sense. The occasional use of the broad sense will be indicated by the use of quotation marks. E & S, 25, 3 7 , 3 2 7 . 4 7 . Ibid., 25. Emile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms o f Religious Life, tr. Joseph Ward Swain (Crowell Collier, 1961), 4 3 4 - 4 4 9 , esp. 4 4 2 - 4 4 3 . Levy-Bruhl has noted "the strenuous efforts made to bring inward heart and mind into line with public act." L. Levy-Bruhl, Primitive Mentality (MacMillan, 1923), 186. E. E. Evans-Pritchard, Witchcraft, Oracles, and Magic Among the Azende (Oxford University Press, 1937); Paul Radin, The World of Primitive Man (Abelard Schuman, 1953); Mary Douglas, Purity and Danger (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969). Sigmund Freud, Totem and Taboo, in The Standard Edition o f the Complete Psychological Works, Vol. 13 (Hogarth, 1958); 1 - 1 6 1 ; Claude Levi-Strauss, Structural

108

Anthropology, tr. Claire Jacobson and Brooke Grundfest Schoepf (Basic Books, 1963), 1 6 1 - 2 0 1 ; V. W. Turner, "A Ndembu Doctor in Practice," in Magic Faith and Healing: Studies in Primitive Psychiatry Today, ed. Ari Kiev (Free Press, 1974). 52. Douglas, 58. 53. Peter Winch, "Understanding a Primitive Society," Philosophical Quarterly (1964), 308-324; Douglas, 90, 110,112. 54. Compare the above discussion with Winch; J. H. M. Beattie, "Ritual and Social Change," Man (1966), 6 0 - 7 4 ; I. C. Jarvis and Joseph Agassi, "The Problem of the Rationality of Magic," in Wilson, 172-193. 55. E & S, 6 4 7 - 6 5 3 . 5 6 . Ibid., 976-979. 57. 1bid., 8 1 0 , 8 1 2 , 8 6 8 - 8 7 3 . 5 8 . Ibid., 657. 59. We are here utilizing the familiar sociological idea of the progressive differentiation of social action. See Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society, tr. George Simpson (Free Press, 1964); Talcott Parsons, "A Revised Analytic Approach to the Theory of Social Stratification," in Essays in Sociological Theory, rev. ed. (Free Press, 1954), 386-439; S. M. Eisenstadt, "Social Change, Differentiation, and Evolution," American SociologicalReview (1964), 375-386. 60. Alexander Marshack, The Roots of Civilization (McGraw Hill, 1972); Marshal Sahlins, Stone Age Economics (Aldine Atherton, 1972). 61. English translations rifled Soc. Psych. and Rel. Re]. 62. Thus we do not regard these two essays as marking a decisive turn in Weber's thinking, as does Tenbruck, but as the (relatively) clearest expression of his views on how ideas indirectly influence history via their formative influence on ideal interests, which in turn are a component of the constellations of interest which govern social action. These essays place little emphasis on the other side of the coin, stressed elsewhere by Weber: how material conditions also indirectly influence history via their formative influence on material interests. We have discussed these issues elsewhere in Mclntosh, "Objective Bases". 63. Douglas, 1 2 9 - 1 3 9 . 6 4 . The Religion of China, 196-203. 65. ReL Re]., 3 5 8 - 3 5 9 ; E & S, 518-529. 66. The following is based on Rel. Re]., 327-333, a n d E & S, 576-589. 67. The following is based on Rel. Re]., 333-340, and E & S, 590-601. 68. Soc. Psych., 293.69. E & S, 4 0 0 - 4 0 1 . 70. Donald Mclntosh, "Weber and Freud: On the Nature and Sources of Authority," American Sociological Review (Oct. 1970), 901-911. 71. E & S , 439-451. 72. This point has been made by Reinhard Bendix, Max Weber:An lntellectualPortrait (DoubledaY,, 1962)~ 312. See E & S, 1121-1143, 1158-1159. 73. Rel. Re]., 325. 74. Max Weber, The Religion of India, tr. and ed. Hans H. Gerth and Don Martindale (Free Press, 1958), 195. 75. E & S, 552. 76.]bid.,533. 77.lbid.,534. 78. Ibid., 541-557;Rei. Re]., 324-326. 79. We w o u l d p u t St. Francis of Assisi almost at the ideal typical pole of the ethicalexpressive religious orientation, with the Jesus of the Gospels not far off. Of the message of Jesus, Weber says, "The entire content of the law and the prophets was condensed into the simple commandment to love God and one's fellow man, to which was added the one far-reaching conception that the true religious mood is to be judged by its fruits, by its faithful demonstration (Bewd'hrung)." (E & S, 633.) This, we submit, puts the matter in a nutshell. 80. Soc. Psych., 290.81.Pr. Eth., 116-117. 82. E & S, 6 3 5 - 6 4 0 . 8 3 . Pr. Eth., 115.84. Pr. Eth., 1 6 3 - 1 6 4 . 8 5 . Pr. Sct. 86. Robert Merton, "Social Structure and Anomie," in Social Theory and Social Structure (Free Press, 1949), 125-149. 87. Ibid., 128-130. 88. The following discussion draws mainly from E & S, Pt. 2, Ch. 8. 89. E & S , 812. 90. As Weber emphasized, however, the formal rationalization of modern law has not been fully carried through. Substantively rational elements remain important, especially in criminal law. E & S, 882-895. 91. Ibid., 9 5 6 - 9 6 3 . 9 2 . Ibid., 973-974. 93. These issues are discussed, for example, in Peter M. Blau and W. Richard Scott, Formal Organizations (Chandler, 1962). 94. Described and analyzed in George Homans, The Human Group (Harcourt, Brace, 1950), 4 7 - 1 5 5 . 95. Ibid., 7 0 - 7 4 , 138-145. q6. John W. Meyer and Brian Rowan, "Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony," American Journal of Sociology (1978), 340-363.

109 97. The point that formal rationalization initially serves instrumental effectiveness but in the long run undermines it can also be developed in connection with Weber's treatment of law (E & S, 8 0 9 - 8 1 4 , 8 7 1 - 8 7 6 , 892-895) and of capitalism (see Seidman and Gruber, and Eldridge). 98. As Weber was well aware: E & S, 1401-1402.

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