GeoJournal 5.3 225-234/1981

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© AkademischeVerlagsgesellschaft• Wiesbaden

M u l t i n a t i o n a l C o r p o r a t i o n s in Bendel State o f Nigeria

Abumere, S.I., Dr., Lecturer in Geography, University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria

Abstract: In several developing countries, multinationals have great freedom in deciding not only what to invest but also where to invest. This often leads to a concentration of investments in a few favoured areas to the detriment of others. This paper will attempt to show with regardsto space,the distribution of multinational investments in Bendel State of Nigeria. The presumable economic, social and political problems which such lop-sidedness in the distribution of investments create for developing countries facing the problem of spatial integration will be highlighted. After attempting an explanation of this locational behaviour of multinationals, some suggestions will then be made which might help to achieve a more equitable distribution of multinational investments.

Introduction

Some Background Information on M u l t i n a t i o n a l O p e r a t i o n s in Nigeria

In most developing countries, the scope of multinational activities is so extensive that some of the multinationals not only constitute a government on to themselves but in fact are richer than some of the governments in the countries in which they operate. In Nigeria, for instance, multinational activities span almost all sectors of the economy - petroleum, mining, manufacturing, banking and insurance, construction, distribution, transport, and agriculture (Onimode 1978). The volumes of their investments are therefore not only tremendous but in some cases may even outstrip national government effort. The activities of these multinationals therefore deserve our attention. To date, most studies (Pazos 1967, Streeten 1976, Kappon et al. 1972, McDougall 1960) concentrated on the sectoral activities of these multinationals. The spatial aspects of their activities have long been neglected and have only recently attracted attention (Abumere 1978, Blackborn 1972, De Smidt 1968). This is awkward. The spatial ramifications of multinational investments deserve our attention not just because of the volume of these investments but because of the regional inequality which they create. This aspect will also receive treatment in this paper.

There can be no doubt that the colonial administration policy, from 1900, which placed much emphases on export and import trade led to the proliferation of highly integrated multinational companies in Nigeria. The situation was such that by the 1920s, the Nigerian market came to be dominated by these transnational corporations to the extent that by 1949, according to Kilby (1969), the largest three of these companies accounted for some 49 % of all traded commodities in Nigeria. These expatriate Companies include the John Holt (founded in 1867), the United Africa Company (a Unilever affiliate, founded in 1879), Paterson Zochonis, Compagnie Francaise de Afrique Occidentale (CFAO), Societe Commercial de I'Ouest Africa (SCOA), the Swiss Union Trading Company (UTC), AG Leventis and several others. Most of these companies at first devoted all their investments to the export and import trade but they have now spread out so widely that there is virtually no sector of the Nigerian economy where involvement by the multinationals is not found. With the discovery of oil in this country, in the 1960s, several multinational oil companies

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(ShelI-BP, Mobil, Gulf, Agip, Esso, etc.) joined the investment scene in Nigeria. Indeed, it can be argued that the volume of investments as well as the profits of these multinational oil companies far exceed those of the essentially trading companies mentioned above. These multinational companies constitute the front through which foreign private capital, management, and technology are brought to Nigeria. Recently, Onimode (1978) has levied several criticisms on the multinationals in Nigeria that they not only create structural distortion in production and distribution (for instance, by investing in industries, yielding quickest and highest profits, which may be unrelated to the development priorities of the country) but also in the end lead to a displacement of, rather than addition to, indigenous efforts (for instance, eliminating the markets of Nigerian blacksmiths, iron-smelters, brassworkers, weavers etc., through import of manufactures). These unacceptable faces of multinational operations have been exhaustively treated elsewhere (Mabogunje 1977) and so should not delay us here. What has not received enough attention is the Iocational aspects of these multinational investments. There are really no Iocational guidelines formulated in Nigeria to guide the location of multinational enterprises (Aboyade 1968, Hakam 1966). It can be argued that in the absence of such location policy, multinationals were free to locate their enterprises where they liked. This will usually mean in areas that will ensure least cost and maximum profits. Whether this led to Iop-sidedness in the spatial distribution of these investments should not really worry the multinationals who are in business for profit and not because of equity reasons. Ironically, it may well be that the "industrial incentives" granted to the multinationals in Nigeria have enabled them to concentrate in favoured areas thereby creating further regional imbalance. Gilbert and Goodman (1976) have pointed up the problems arising from the vertical institutional organization of the multinational enterprises receiving incentives and then refusing to identify effectively with the disadvantaged region to the point of having negative, instead of positive, impact on their performance. As a result, spatial inequality in the distribution of multinational investments is to be expected in Nigeria. The next section of the paper examines this with respect to Bendel State of Nigeria. The probable explanatory factors for this maldistribution will be examined and some solutions suggested.

The Regional Distribution of Multinational Investments in Bendel The main focus of multinational investments in Bendel are in such sectors as Mining (especially petroleum), Agriculture (Palm produce, Rubber and Timber), Construction and Retail Trade. Data on the volumes of investments

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according to areas and sectors are not available for the period earlier than 1963. However, data exist for the 1963-1969 period. It is possible to argue that the spatial pattern exhibited by the multinational investments in the 1963-69 period will be remarkably similar to that of earlier and later periods. Tab 1 shows percentages of total Bendel State investments accounted for by the different sources and divisions in 1963. The first important thing to note about this Tab is that multinational (private non-Nigerian) investments account for some 62.2 % of total investments in Bendel in that period. Indigenous private investment accounted for 26.S % while Bendel State Government accounted for only 7 %. The low figure for the State Government may be accounted for by the fact that the government had only just taken off in that year when Bendel State was carved out of the former Western Region of Nigeria. It may be unfair to discuss Federal Government investments in comparison with other sources since the Federal Government, until recently, seldomly engaged in direct investments in the states. What is remarkable about multinational investments in Tab 1 is not really the magnitude of these investments but their regional distribution. About 91.1% of total investment bv multinationals (which is 56.7 % of entire investments in Bendel) went to Delta Province while only 8.9 % (which is 5.6 % of total investments in Bendel) went to Benin Province. On the other hand, the State Government invested more in Benin Province than in Delta Province. In Delta Province, the divisions that received the multinational investments are Urhobo West (probably mainly Sapele), Warri and Western Ijaw (mainly on oil). Only Benin West Division (certainly mainly Benin City) received any appreciable multinational investment in Benin Province. Multinational investments enabled Delta Province to have some 84.6% of total investments in Bendel in 1963 as compared with 15.4% for Benin Province even though Benin Province has a higher population figure (1,354,986 in 1963 as compared with 1,180,853 for the Delta) and a higher geographical area (22,404 km 2 compared with 17,099 kin2). Tab 2 contains the same type of information as contained in Tab 1 but for the 196S period. This time, multinational investments account for 72 % of the entire investments in Bendel. The percentage accounted for by State Government has now risen to 16.8% while that of indigenous private effort has declined. Delta Province received the greater proportion of multinational investment just as in Tab .1 - 81.6 % (which 58.7 % of entire state investment) as compared with 18.4 % (which is 13.3 % of total state investment) received by Benin Province. The proportion of total state investment accounted for by Benin Province has now risen to 33.3 % while that of Delta Province declined to some 66.7 %. The divisions that got most of the multinational investments in Benin (Benin

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Tab 1 Percentages of Total Investments in Bendel State Accounted for by Sources and Divisions, 1963

Source: Computed from "Bendel State Industrial Survey", vol. 1, 1964, Published by the Statistics Division of the Ministry of Economic Development, Benin City

Tab 2 Percentages of Total Investments in Bendel State Accounted for by Sources and Divisions, 1965

Source: Computed from "Bendel State Industrial Survey", vol. 2, 1966, Published by the Statistics Division of the Ministry of Economic Development, Benin City

West) and Delta (Western Urhobo, Warri and Western l jaw) Provinces also got the most of the 1963 investments, Tab I. In this way, those favoured continue to be favoured as far as multinational investments are concerned. The high state

investments in Asaba and Etsako divisions in this period may be due to the State Government establishment of the textile and cement factories respectively in these areas during this period.

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Tab 3 shows the percentages of total investments in Bende[ accounted for by sources and divisions in 1969. The multinationals account for a massive 88.8 % of the total investments with the State Government accounting for a mere 5.8 %. Delta Province got 92.1% (which is 81.2 % of entire state investments) of multinational investments compared with 7.9 % of multinational investments received by Benin Province. The same division that got most of the multinational investments in the earlier periods also got them in Tab 3. The fact that the volume of multinational

investments is overwhelming and mainly distributed in Delta Province has enabled this Province to record some 84.9 % of total Bendel State investments in 1969 compared with 15.1% for Benin Province. Certain summaries can now be made from the descriptive statistics in Tab I to 3. Firstly, multinational investments are far and away higher than that of any other source or indeed other sources combined. Secondly, an overwhelming proportion of the multinational investments are made in Delta Province. Thirdly, the divisions that got the multinational investments in earlier period also got them in later periods thereby creating a parable-of-thetalent-type of situation, Fourthly, in all the periods (Tab I to 3), the State Government invested more in Benin than Delta Province which is directly opposite to the behaviour of the multinationals. Although the descriptive information in Tab I to 3 has shown clearly the regional imbalance in the distribution of multinational investments, yet it may be worthwhile to employ simple statistical measures to try and highlight the regional imbalance. The measures employed are location quotients and regional relatives.

E x a m i n i n g the Regional D i s t r i b u t i o n o f M u l t i national Investments Using Location Q u o t i e n t s and Regional Relatives The location quotients computed here (Tab 4) are simply devices for comparing a division's (region's) share of total Tab 3 Percentages o f Total Investments in Bendel State Accounted f o r by Sources and Divisions, 1969

Source: Computed f r o m "Bendel State Industrial Survey", vol. 3, 1969, Published by the Statistics Division o f the Ministry o f Economic Development, Benin City

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Tab 4 Location Quotients of Multinational Investmentsin Bendel

A = Quotients derived after Isard9 (seetext for computational formula) B = Quotients with population as base (seetext) C = Quotients with areaas base (seetext) Sources: Computed from samesourcesas for Tab 1-3

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shows the reverse. In the same way, under column C, a figure greater than 1 shows that the division's share in the entire state multinational investments is greater than is suggested by its share of the areal size of the state while a figure less than 1 shows it has less. The other simple measure used as indication of regional inequality in the distribution of multinational investment is regional relative (Hanna 1959, Hoover 1971) (Tab 5 and 6). This is given by:

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(state) multinational investments with its percentage share of some basic aggregate like population and areal size. The equations for obtaining the quotients under columns A, B and C in Tab 4 are given by: (1)

where Si = Value of multinational investment in division i S = Value of all investments in the division Ni = Value of all multinational investments in the state N = Value of all investments in the state Pi = Population of division i P = Total population of the state Ai = Areal size in km 2 of division i A = Total areal size of the state. For the interpretation of the quotients in column A, any figure greater than 1 shows that the division or region is doing better with regards to multinational investments than is suggested by the share of multinational investment in the total investment of the state while divisions having quotients less than 1 show that the divisions are doing less well. For the quotients under B, a figure greater than 1 shows that the share of the division in the state's multinational investments is higher than is suggested by its share in the population of the state while a figure less than 1

Si/Pi Ni/P

x 100

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(4)

where RR is Regional Relative and other terms are as defined above. Regional relatives provide means for direct comparisons of the changes in the multinational investment per caput of a division (region) relative to the changes in that of the state. If the per caput multinational investment of a division increases more between two periods than does that of the nation, the regional relative increases. Movements in the regional relatives thus reflect changes in a division (region) which are not proportional to the changes in the state average of the divisions. Tab 4 shows the location quotients of multinational investments for the 1963, 1965 and 1969 periods computed using equations 1 - 3 above. Tab 4, column A, for the 1963 period, shows that Delta Province has done rather better (quotient greater than 1), with regards to multinational investment, than is suggested by the level of multinational investments in Bendel but Benin Province has done rather worse (quotient far less than 1). Looking down this column A, the districts that have done very well are all

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in Delta Province (Urhobo West and Warri). The same general pattern may be discerned from columns A for 1965 and 1969. Tab 4, column B for the 1963 period, shows that the share of Benin Province of the multinational investments is far below (quotient only 0.105) what is suggested by its share of the total population of Bendel. On the other hand, the share of Delta Province is far higher (quotient = 1.217) than is suggested by its share of the state population. The entire column B of this 1963 period shows that all Benin Province divisions faired badly while uo to three divisions (Urhobo West, Warri and Western ljaw) in Delta Province did far better than their population sizes suggest. The same general picture is true for the B columns for the 1965 and 1969 periods. Column C (Tab 4) for the 1963 period shows again that Delta P'rovince has done far better (quotient = 1.875) than its area suggests. Benin Province and its divisions have all done worse than their areas suggest. In the words of Isard (1960), this would mean that the entire Benin Province is quite "vulnerable" with regards to multinational investments. This pattern again is also true of the C columns for the 1965 and 1969 periods. The location quotients in Tab 4 all show that Delta Province is extremely favoured with regards to multinational investments. The same conclusion can clearly be

reached from an examination of the regional relatives in Tab 5 and 6. Tab 5 shows the regional relatives for Bendel state districts based on multinational investment. From this Tab, any district scoring more than 100 has done better than the average performance of the state while any district scoring less than 100 has done worse. All the relatives for Benin Province for the 1963, 1965 and 1969 periods are less than 100 while all those for Delta Province have also done very well for the three periods but only Benin West (which includes Benin City) got more than 100 in Benin Province and for the 1965 period only. The picture presented by the relatives in Tab 5 is therefore similar to those already discussed. The relatives in Tab 5 will also enable us to determine whether the regional inequalita in the distribution of multinational investments is increasing or decreasing over time. Since the Bendel State relative is 100, a trend towards convergence on 100 of the division relatives over the periods will indicate that the inequality is decreasing while the reverse will show that it is increasing. This could come about by rises, over the periods, of the Benin Province relatives towards 100 and/or declines of Delta Province relatives towards 100. However, Tab 5 shows that there is no evidence of such convergence. Indeed, it shows that the favoured areas in the initial period continue to be favoured in later periods hence the parable of the Talent. If multinational investments far exceed other investments and if, as we have seen, these are concentrated in Delta Province, then we would expect this to have implications for the regional distribution of employment and

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Tab 6

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Regional Relatives Based on Multinational Investments, Employment and Income in Bendel State

I. Multinational investment but this time with state average as base instead of investment per caput as in Tab 3 2. Employment arising from the investments in Tab 1 - 3 3. Income of the employees in this Tab Sources: Computed from same sources as Tab I --3

income in Bendel. Tab 6 shows relatives for multinational investments (this time with state average as base instead of investment per head as in Tab 5), employment and income in Bendel. The columns on investment relatives should not delay us here since they depict the same general pattern as before. The employment relatives show that generally, Delta Province has done better than state average employment while Benin Province (the only exception is Benin West which includes Benin City, the capital of the state) has clone worse than the state average employment. The same picture is true of the income relatives. The outstanding performance of Western Ijaw in 1969 is probably due to oil exploration activities, especially offshore, in the area. We can then say that multinational investments as well as the concomitant employment and income figures generally tend to favour Delta Province more than Benin Province. Since investment data after 1969 are not available for the state, it might be useful to hazard some informed guesses as to what might now be the spatial pattern of the distribution of multinational investments in Bendel. There can be no doubt that the concentration in Delta Province of multinational investments will even be much higher now. This is because, since the end of the Nigerian Civil War in 1970, Delta Province has received tremendous amounts of investments from multinational oil companies and several others doing jobs for the oil companies. This again will

mean that the concomitant advantages which Delta Province has with respect to employment and income will even be much enhanced now. This will be true since the State Government has not, up to now, evolved any policy to ensure redistribution of multinational investments. As for Benin Province, it is probably the case now that State Government investment will have increased tremendously, mainly as a result of investments in Benin City, the state capital. It might also be the case that employment and income will have risen a little bit as a result of employment of public servants in Benin City. This will probably now result in some kind of duality with the private sector dominating the investment and employment scene in Delta Province while the public sector dominates that of Benin Province. Possible E x p l a n a t i o n f o r t h e Spatial Pattern o f

Multinational Investments in Bendel The most important single factor in the explanation of the spatial pattern of multinational investments in Bendel is historical. The fact is that British colonial administration's emphasis on the export and import trade gave coastal areas initial developmental advantages not just in Nigeria alone but in several other former colonial territories. These coastal areas with their ports served as collecting centres for exports and imports and therefore got colonial govern-

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ment infrastructure to facilitate these. Evidences abound (Mabogunje 1968) in Nigeria to show that the colonial government had a strong bias for coastal areas in the location of amenities and the classification of settlements. It is then possible to argue that during the colonial era in Nigeria, the only areas with basic infrastructure necessary for the location of industries were mainly the coastal areas. This initial advantage, with time, aquired cumulative advantages later culminating in the pattern we have exposed in this paper whereby Delta Province (near the coast) has done better with regards to multinational investments than Benin Province (further inland). In addition to this initial advantage is the fact that because most multinational companies invest in enterprises for which the markets are usually external (for instance on raw materials, crude oil and natural gas), they probably require coastal sites. This factor of proximity to the coast in the location of multinational investments has been tested statistically (Abumere 1978) and found to be significant but market size as measured by population size was found not to be so significant. This in itself will have been obvious from Tab 4 - 6 where multinational investment figures bore no relationship to the population sizes of the districts. However, it may well be that if market sizes were measured as effective demand or purchasing power, it would probably have emerged significant. Another major explanatory factor is probably the presence in Delta Province of economic crops which were of early interest to colonial administrators and traders in greater quantity than Benin Province (timber, palm produce, rubber, etc.). The discovery of petroleum in Delta Province merely reinforced these advantages. We can then say that initial advantage, proximity to the coast, presence of economic crops and petroleum are among the factors which enabled Delta Province to attract higher multinational investments than Benin Province. The factor of market size as measured not by sheer population size but by effective demand is probably also important. It can be said that without government intervention, Delta Province will continue to accumulate more of the multinational investments. Granting that, for political reasons, governments are usually interested in equitable distribution of welfare, the problem now is highlighting what can be done with respect to attaining equitable distribution of multinational investments in Bendel. This in itself is not going to be easy since it has been found difficult in the economically advanced countries, not to talk of in the less developed countries, to divert multinational investments away from their most favoured or profitable areas.

Some Suggestions to A c h i e v e E q u i t a b l e Distribution of Multinational Investments in Bendel Geographic literature is replete with solutions to the problem of spatial inequality. Two schools may be dis-

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cerned here - interventionist and non-interventionist schools. It is probably better to start with the latter. The Non-Interventionist School. This school argues that given, for instance, the regional inequality in the distribution of multinational investment in Bendel, the best solution is for government not to try and intervene but to leave things as they are. This is because such maldistribution is only temporary. The argument draws support from various sources. Firstly from neo-classical economic theory which states that factor mobility will equalize returns to various inputs over a period of time. Indeed, Borts and Stein (1964) have argued that capital will flow to whereever the rate of return is highest; this process will continue until rates of return are equalized over all areas and so presumably, spatial inequality in the distribution of investment will disappear. Secondly from Johnson's (1958) argument which states that the best remedy for maldistribution of investment is to allow market forces to have free play in the allocation of investments. The efficiency of the market as an allocator is usually pointed up to be seen in the evidence of convergence in regional incomes in the advantaged economies over long periods during which no direct government intervention occurred. Williamson's (1965) paper on historical trends in regional incomes is usually cited as showing up this convergence evidence. Thirdly from the reasoning that if governments in the developing countries want economic growth, then intervention is a luxury they cannot afford. This is because, regulating against the Iocational preferences of multinational enterprises might scare them away. All these arguments have been adduced to buttress the point that the best cure for the maldistribution of investment is nonintervention. The InvertentionBt School. The first argument here is that the neo-classical economic theory prediction of equalization of returns to inputs in the long run does not hold for spatial inputs simply because they are not homogeneous. For instance, regions have different and varying advantages with respect to manpower, natural resources especially minerals, size of market and so on. This means that regions have different abilities and powers to attract investments. It is therefore unlikely that equitable distribution of investments will be achieved without government intervention. Secondly, to rely on market forces to help achieve equitable distribution of investments will be probably misplaced. This is because the general equilibrium theory, on which it is based, tends to be static whereas the regional process is dynamic (Richardson 1969). Again, it rests on or assumes perfect competition which is not very relevant to the space economy. All these mean that to reduce regional inequality in the distribution of investments, government has to intervene: market forces may not help to achieve the goal.

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Thirdly, government has to intervene to ensure that investments are being made in desirable sectors. This will help to avoid the emergence of the "secondary circuit of capital" phenomenon that is now beginning to take place in the advanced Capitalist Countries. According to Lefebvre (1970), the proportion of global profit formed and realized in industry declines while the proportion realized in speculation, construction and real estate development grows. This thesis that the "secondary circuit of capital" is supplanting the "primary circuit of capital" in production has important implications, one of which is that investment is put where the rate of return is highest irrespective of whether productive activity is involved or not. This, in a way, may be regarded as undesirable. Lastly is the argument that serious regional inequality in the distribution of investment may work against national or state integration. As a result of this political argument, government has to come in to direct the flow of investments.

Specific Instruments to Reduce Regional Inequality in the Distribution of Multinational Investments in Bendel There can be no doubt that government has to intervene to influence the flow of investments by multinational and national enterprises. The problem is the form the intervention should take. It has been argued that policies to achieve equitable distribution in private investments (foreign or indigenous) cannot really be discussed without mention of the economic system - whether market, centrally planned or mixed economy. It is emphasized that, for example, it is futile to try and correct maldistribution of investment within a capitalist framework because, in that way, we are seeking to alter distribution without altering the capitalist market structure within which income and wealth are generated and distributed and this is difficult. For instance, Frank (I 969) has argued that international, national and local capitalist systems always generate economic development for the few and underdevelopment for the many. This is because capitalist ethic is built essentially on the principle of survival of the fittest. In such survival game, unattractive areas lose out. The argument has been extended to mean that real equitable distribution of investments can only be achieved in a centrally planned economy. It is possible that this argument is valid but we must also remember that some measure of equitable distribution has been achieved in several capitalist countries through government intervention. Over the last two decades or so, the British government has attained some measure of success in diverting the flow of investments from London and into the less favoured areas in the north of the country. It is therefore possible to argue that given suitable policies, equitable distribution of investment

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is attainable even in a capitalist system although there is no denying the fact that the goal is much easier to attain within a centrally planned economy. The most important policy instrument available consists of both negative and positive inducements to direct investments to desired or deprived places. The positive inducements here include capital grants and concessions to foreign firms which locate in the less favourable areas while the negative inducements consist of controls and penalties (higher taxes, legal restrictions and so on) for foreign firms attempting to locate their investments in certain undesired areas. These are mainly the policy instruments that have been used in such countries as Britain. There are reasons why these may not be quite as effective in Nigeria or any other developing country. Firstly, multinational companies that make a considerable proportion of investments in the developing countries are always usually in a strong bargaining position since they can threaten host government by declaring to take their investments to other countries (Streeten 1976). Granted that most governments in the developing countries want these multinational investments, they then find it difficult to regulate the locational preferences of the multinationals. Secondly, there appears to be a built-in tendency for capitalist market system to counteract any attempt to divert funds from the most profitable areas (Harvey 1973). Given the negative and positive inducements above and given the difficulties of directing multinational investments, it would appear that the best way forward for Bendel to achieve some equitable distribution of investments will be the use of the so-called "infrastructure instrument". Logan (1972) has argued that a way of achieving some measure of redistribution of investments is for government to invest heavily on infrastructure in the less privileged areas, for instance, in most of the areas in Benin Province of Bendel. This infrastructure will include the provision of roads, water supply, electricity, houses or industrial estates where all these facilities are provided as a package. It is here argued that one of the major locational constraints in the developing countries is the nonavailability, in most areas, of these basic infrastructure necessary for the location of investments. This usually meant that private investments (both foreign and indigenous) go to the few areas where such facilities exist, a situation which soon leads to a concentration of investments in the few areas and an intensification of regional inequality. It is therefore argued that if basic infrastructure is available in most places, especially in the deprived areas, private investments will be more mobile. In this way, we can probably achieve Rawl's proposition quoted in Harvey (I 973), that the prospects of the least advantaged territory should be as great as they can be. If these are attained, then we can hope to avoid the lesson of the parable of the Talent with respect to Bendel State in which the most advantaged has more benefits added and the least advantaged get less.

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Conclusion Multinational corporations often seek profitable sectors and areas. In some cases, the sectors might be undesirable or indeed go against national priorities, for instance, investing on the mass cultivation of tobacco by the Nigerian Tobacco Company and Phillip Morris on rich agricultural land while there is acute food shortage in Nigeria (On[mode 1978) to the extent that the country now has to import a lot of food[ Perhaps much more serious is the fact that investments by multinationals are almost always concentrated in a few favoured areas. This creates regional inequality in

References Aboyade, O.: Industrial Location and Development Policy: the Nigerian Case. Nigerian Journal Econ. Soc. Studies 10, 275302 (1968) Abumere, S.I.: Multinationals, Location Theory and Regional Development: Case Study of Bendel State of Nigeria. Regional Studies 12,651-664 (1978) Blackborn, A.: The Location of Foreign-Owned Manufacturing Plants in the Republic of Ireland. Tijdschr. voor Econ. en Soc. Geogr. 63,438-443 (1972) Borts, G.H. et al.: Economic Growth in a Free Market. New York 1964. De Smidt, M.: Foreign Industrial Establishments Located in the Netherlands. Tijdschr. voor Econ. en Soc. Geogr. 57~ 1--19

(1966) Frank, A.G.: Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America. New York, 31 --32, 1969. Gilbert, A. et al.: Regional Income Disparities and Economic Development: A Critique. In: Gilbert, A. (ed.),Development Planning and Spatial Structure, 113-141, London 1976. Hakam, A.N.: The Motivation to Invest and the Location Pattern of Foreign Private Industrial Investments in Nigeria. Nigerian Journal Econ. Soc. Studies 8, 49--65 (1966) Isard, W.: Methods of Regional Analysis: An Introduction to Regional Science. Cambridge, MIT Press, 123-126, 1960. Johnson, H.G.: Planning and the Market in Economic Development. Pakistan Economic Journal 8, 2 (1958)

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development. If this regional inequality also happens to follow ethnic lines, it can work against national unity and integration. It is therefore not sufficient, when discussing investments by multinationals in the developing countries, to restrict analysis to such gains as capital and man-power supplies or such losses as displacement of domestic efforts; the spatial implications of such investments need our attention. Perhaps, to solve the problem of maldistribution caused by multinational investments calls for a more humane approach which will enhance the ability of the deprived areas to attract investments.

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