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lnt J Phil Re114:1 7-23 (1983} Martinus Ni/hoff Publishers, The Hague. Printed in the Netherlands.

OMNIPOTENCE AND CONCURRENCE

JOHN ZEIS AND JONATHAN JACOBS Erie Community College and University o f Pennsylvania

I. Introduction

In this paper, we will provide an explication of the concept of omnipotence. What we intend to provide is a clear notion of omnipotence which satisfies three objectives. First, the explication should remain faithful to the idea of God's almighty power as understood in the Judeo-Christian tradition. It would be easy to formulate a definition of ommpotence while ignoring its conceptual relations with other essential theistic notions, but the worth of such an approach is dubious. Therefore we will rely on some of the essential tenets of theism as boundary conditions for the philosophical investigation. The dogmas which especially fall this role are the doctrines of God's providence and the free choice of creatures. Second, the analysis of omnipotence should show the way clear to dissolving the standard paradoxes of omnipotence One of the ancillary results of the analysis offered here is the contention that these paradoxes are not symptoms of any inconsistency in the concept of omnipotence, but are puzzles of a much more general philosophical issue, viz. the problem of modality. The third objective is the most important from a philosophical point of view. It is to provide a foundation for a coherent theodicy. The concept of omnipotence, being central to such a theodicy, must be carefully delineated before the problem of evil can be clearly presented and confronted. One of the major difficulties in assessing a theodicy is that, typically, discussions of the problem of evil employ either vague or defective notions of omnipotence. Hence the results of such discussions are of little value to the nature and solution of the problem of evil. In summary, the overriding objective is to remain faithful both to a contingency of action compatible with moral responsibility and to the providential nature of the deity. We must walk a tightrope, balancing the two dogmas of providence and freedom so as not to fall into the abyss of

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the absolute contingency of free action where there can be no omnipotent being, while avoiding the tempting fall to postulate a providential being which usurps all power in the universe.

H. The Def'mition of Omnipotence The definition of omnipotence is as follows: An agent, S, is omnipotent if and only if: (1) It is not possible that there be a logically contingent state of affairs, p, such that S wills p to obtain and p does not obtain. (2) For any possible world ~, r obtains if and only ifS effectively chooses

We do not employ the idiom "can-do" in this definition. In this regard we are following the recent analyses of Peter Geach and James Ross. In Providence and Evil, Geach warns against the search for a definition of omnipotence which is expressed in terms of what God can do. 1 Ross, in Philosophical Theology, argues the same point decisively.2 Briefly, Ross's argument is that the "can-do" formulation cannot work because there are certain logically contingent states of affairs which God's power ranges over, but God can't do. For example, any adequate definition of omnipotence must account for God's power over states of affairs like 'Socrates sits' or 'Jezebel fornicates with the heathen'. But God cannot do 'Socrates sits' or 'Jezebel fornicates with the heathen'; these are things which only Socrates and Jezebel can do. Hence Ross suggests abandoning the "can-do" formulation and proposes defining omnipotence in terms of the effective choice of the omnipotent agent and its scope over logically contingent states of affairs. As we see it, the problem o f explicating omnipotence is a problem of grasping the relation between God's effective will and the world. In fact, it seems that understanding the power of any agent amounts to deciphering the relation between that agent's effective will and the world; which amounts to delineating the range and exercise of the agent's choice. This relation is twofold and entails not only what states of affairs actually obtain as a result of the agent's will, but also what states of affairs would obtain if the agent had willed them to obtain. Hence our definition is expressed by two conditions corresponding to this twofold relation. The first condition of the definition specifies the range of states of affairs which would obtain if the omnipotent agent had willed them to obtain and the second condition specifies what states of affairs actually do obtain as a result of the agent's will.

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IlL Power and Effective Choice The first condition of the def'mition is intended to guarantee the absolute unthwartability of the omnipotent agent's will. A necessary condition of any agent's being omnipotent is that there must be a universal and necessary connection between the satisfaction of the agent's will and the world. According to our view, the omnipotent agent's will must range universally over logically contingent states of affairs. Unless it's will in contingent matters is universal in scope, the agent could not maintain almighty power over the world. The status of logically impossible and logically necessary states of affairs is, however, a quite different matter. We adopt the traditional view that even God cannot will logical inconsistencies to be true or necessary truths to be false, for unless we restrict the conception of divine omnipotence in this way, theism itself is doomed to degenerate into nonsense. According to the first condition of the definition, the divine will is necessarily related to the world, for the omnipotent agent's will is not merely unthwarted in it's choice of logically contingent states of affairs, but unthwartable. A being whose will is merely unthwarted may be very powerful, but hardly all-powerful. Furthermore, this condition of unthwartability rules out the possibility of a plurality of nonconcurring omnipotent agents. For if there were two omnipotent agents, say $1 and $2, for any logically contingent state of affairs p, such that $1 wills p, since $1 's willing p would be contingent, it can't be the case that $2 wills that S~ not will p. The wills of omnipotent agents would have to be necessarily concurrent. But absolute unthwartability as expressed in the first clause of the definition, is not a sufficient condition for an agent's being omnipotent. The first clause is incomplete because it does not require that the agent be volitional. Hence any being such that it is logically impossible that it will anything (e.g., a rock) would trivially satisfy the unthwartability condition. And it does no good to attempt to correct this defect ad hoe, for even volitional agent's like McTaggart's selves attain a "heavenly" state in the sense of actively accepting all there is: but since this type of willing is merely a coloring of correct perception ontologically dependent on what is perceived, these selves are clearly not omnipotent, a The second clause of the definition is intended to correct these defects. It specifies the minimum requirement for the exercise of the omnipotent agent's will. In the theistic tradition, the deity is not a mere spectator of the world; the world is ontologically dependent on the will of God. In order to represent this, we employ the notion of possible worlds. The existence and constitution of possible worlds is highly controversial, but we believe it can serve as an illuminating representation of the object of the effective choice of the divine agent. We do not think that this commits us to any atomistic view of the world. Surely the world is not made up of states of affairs, but substances.

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However, there doesn't seem to be any serious difficulties in thinking of states of affairs as logical constructions ontologicaUy parasitic upon the objects which constitute the world. In any case, in the context of our discussion, a possible world can be conceived as a maximal consistent conjunction of logically contingent propositions or states of affairs. We feel it necessary to employ such a notion, for we represent God's power as a function of will and the intentional operator 'wills' or 'effectively chooses' takes a propositional clause as an object. Therefore we model the exercise of God's creative and conserving power as his effective choice of which world is to be actualized. This brings us to the key concept which is employed in the definition, the concept of 'effective choice'. In escbewing the characterization of God's power in terms of what God can do, some have turned to a formulation expressed in terms of what God can bring about, But we feel that this is still too narrow. It seems that the effective choice of an agent has a much broader scope than that which an agent can bring about. As an illustration of the distinction between bringing about and effectively choosing, consider the example of a judge sentencing a criminal to execution. In this case the judge effectively chooses the execution, even though he does not bring it about. This is brought about by the executioner. As we see it, the notion of effective choice is to be glossed as comes about as the result o f the choice of the agent. This appears to be in what sense the judge effectively chooses the execution, and this relation does not entail that the agent actually brings about the state of affairs. Other features of this illustration are notable. First, the judge's effective choice is a function of his position. In law, only the judge can make such a choice. Similarly, when it comes to choosing a world, only the omnipotent agent is in such a position. Second, although it is true that the judge effectively chooses the execution, the bringing about of the execution also involves the cooperation of other free agents, for example the executioner. The judge effectively chooses that the criminal be executed. The executioner also makes an effective choice here, not that the criminal be executed, but that 'I will execute the criminal'. We might say that the same state of affairs is chosen under different descriptions by the two agents. Further discussion of this issue would involve us in the difficulties associated with the identity of states of affairs, which we must bypass. But the crucial points illustrated in this example are: (1) The judge effectively chooses that the criminal be executed even though he does not bring it about. (2) Even though the judge effectively chooses the execution, the executioner freely brings about his executing the criminal. (3) The intentional attitude of the judge toward the free action of the executioner is one of concurrence. In pronouncing sentence on the criminal, the judge does not effectively choose that so-and-so execute the criminal, only that the criminal be executed. And this is so even though in this case the criminal's being executed is identical with so-and-so's

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executing the criminal. We shall return to a similar point in the discussion of concurrence. In summary, what the det~mition specifies is that the omnipotent agent be an agent whose will ranges universally over logically contingent states of affairs and is unthwartable. As a consequence of the exercise of its providential power, a possible world is actualized which is the result of the agent's choice. Some possible world must be actual, and which world is actual is dependent on the effective choice of the omnipotent agent. And since a possible world is a total state description of the universe, each actual state of affairs is in some sense ontologicaUy dependent upon the will of God.

IV. Standard Paradoxes Paradoxes surrounding omnipotence are notably numerous and mutifarious. 'Can God make a stone bigger than he can lift?' 'Can God sin?' 'Can God change the past?' 'Can God bring about his own nonexistence?' These are questions which, given a conception of omnipotence framed in terms of what God can do, lead to insuperable difficulties. What these paradoxes exhibit is that the conception of an onmipotent being as a being who can do everything is inconsistent. 4 But we contend that such paradoxes do not lead to any serious problems for the concept of omnipotence once effective choice is employed as the core concept. According to the first condition of the definition, the effective choice of the onmipotent agent ranges necessarily and universally over logically contingent states of affairs. We interpret this as the intention of Aquinas in his restriction of God's power to the possible, s In connection with these paradoxes, it is absolutely essential to adopt the distinction between logical modality and epistemic modality. Contemporary philosophers have argued for such a distinction and Aquinas seems to have had a similar distinction in mind when he discussed God's self-evident existence.6 Surely the proposition 'God exists' is not a priori, but if true, would presumably be logically necessary; and if false, would be logically impossible. Once this distinction is recognized, the standard paradoxes lose much of their force. The general strategy employed in dealing with the standard paradoxes is this. Either the state of affairs is logically contingent and hence within the range of the omnipotent agent's will, or it is logically impossible and is not within the range of the agent's power. This strategy allows one to avoid adding ad hoc restrictions to the concept of omnipotence. God's ability to change the past is a good example. Changing the past is either logically contingent or logically impossible. If it is contingent, then God can effectively choose to change the past; if it is impossible, God cannot. Whether changing the past is or is not logically contingent is not an issue we need to discuss, for this issue is not one which poses any special problems for the concept of

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omnipotence. The problem is of a much more general philosophical problem, i.e., the problem of modality. Of course, since the definition of omnipotence does employ a modal notion, insofar as that notion is unclear, so is our concept of omnipotence. And more seriously, if there are no distinctions among the logical modes, the concept of omnipotence would turn out to be philosophical nonsense. But so would many other less controversial concepts, like the concept of implication. Hence we think it is justified to adopt the assumption that there is a rigid distinction of logical modalities, even though insofar as this is objectionable, so is our conception of omnipotence.

V. Concurrence Is the free choice of rational creatures consistent with this definition of omnipotence? It appears not. The second clause of the definition entails that the omnipotent agent effectively choose which possible world is actual. But the actual world contains each logically contingent state of affairs that obtains. But if God, in choosing the actual world, chooses each logically contingent state of affairs that is a constituent of that world, wouldn't his unthwartability imply a divine determinism? We think it would. However, we also think that there is a way out of this dilemma, consistent with the definition. The definition implies a divine determinism only if the operator 'effectively chooses' distributes over each of the conjuncts which together constitute the actual world. Our contention is that effective choice need not be distributive. Let us say that the actual world is constituted by the states of affairs p and q. The definition of omnipotence then entails that the omnipotent agent chooses the conjunction of p and q. But this does not entail that the omnipotent agent chooses p and chooses q. This is not a mere logical slight of hand, but is something which seems to follow from the nature of choice itself. For example, I may choose to have roast pork and sauerkraut. But in doing so I need not choose roast pork and choose sauerkraut. For if I select roast pork and sauerkraut from a menu and the waitress brings me lobster and sauerkraut because the kitchen has run out of roast pork, I am fully justified in complaining that I do not want the sauerkraut. If I can't have roast pork and sauerkraut, then I'll choose lobster and a baked potato. I may have chosen roast pork and sauerkraut not because I wanted roast pork and I wanted sauerkraut (this is the way children typically order from a menu); but chose the conjunction of the two items because of the way the elements complement each other, or because I really wanted roast pork and knew that roast pork is best supplemented with sauerkraut. Now it seems to us quite plausible, and consistent with the theistic tradition regarding God' concurring will, to argue that God, in choosing the actual world, makes a similar kind of selection. He does not choose a con-

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junction by individually choosing each one of the components of that conjunction. Rather, He chooses the conjunction as a whole, maybe because of the way the elements complement each other, or because He effectively chooses some of the conjuncts individually and the others He concurs with because of the manner in which they supplement the state of affairs He chooses individually. Specifically, what we have in mind is something like this. God chooses a world in which it is true that Adam is free to fall and Adam falls. And if free choices are contingent, then in choosing such a world, God must refrain from effectively choosing either that Adam falls or that Adam doesn't fail. For if He chooses that Adam falls or chooses that Adam doesn't fall, since God's will is unthwartable, Adam would not be free to fall or not fall. But above all, God wants Adam to be free. So in order to choose a world in which Adam is free to fall or not fall, God must refrain from effectively choosing the fall. And if Adam freely falls, God, in preserving Adam's freedom, concurs with the fall. Surely since God's will is unthwartable, in concurring with the fall God in some sense wills Adam's fall. But concurrence, unlike God's effective choice, does not imply the kind of causal necessity of a determinism repugnant to the contingency of free choice. Theists have long recognized the need to clarify the notion of God's concurring will in order to defend the consistency of God's almighty power and the freedom and moral responsibility of created agents. 7 We believe that the conception of omnipotence offered here helps provide a basis for understanding the concurring will of an omnipotent agent. If God's effective choice of the actual world is not distributive or closed with respect to conjunction elimination (and we have argued that it need not be), God's concurrence with the free actions of creatures is possible. And such a notion of concurrence is the foundation of any consistent theodicy. NOTES 1. Peter Geach, Providence and Evil (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp. 3-4. 2. James Ross, Philosophical Theology (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1969), pp. 202210. 3. Professor Geaeh brought this example to my attention. 4. See Geach, Chapter I. 5. Summa Theologica I q. 25 q. 3, respondeo. 6. Ibid., I q. 2 a. 1, respondeo. 7. In the Encyclopedia o f Theology: The Concise Sacramentum Mundi, ed. K. Rahner (New York: Seabury, 1975), there are a number of articles in which the history and theology of this problem are outlined. For example, see the articles entitled "Grace and Freedom", "Providence", and "Predestination". Jarosiav Pelikan's The Christian Tradition, a History o f the Development o f Doctrine (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971), Vol. III, includes a short but excellent discussion of the problem; see pp. 80-95 and 270-277.