Philosophy of Religion 23:3-16 (1988) 9 Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht - Printed in the Netherlands

On fideism and Alvin Plantinga *

RICHARD ASKEW Oriel College, University of O x ford

R e c e n t l y T e r e n c e P e n e l h u m has suggested, in God and Skepticism, t h a t Alvin Plantinga's critique o f classical f o u n d a t i o n a l i s m is a version o f fideism. It is a fideism that exemplifies itself in w h a t P e n e l h u m refers to as a "permissive p a r i t y a r g u m e n t . " Plantinga, h o w e v e r , rejects any label o f fideism, w h e t h e r it be o f an extreme o r moderate variety. 1 He maintains t h a t his a p p r o a c h to religious e p i s t e m o l o g y d e m o n s t r a t e s t h a t theistic belief is properly basic and a m o n g the "deliverances o f r e a s o n . " Plantinga writes, ... the R e f o r m e d epistemologist is n o t a fideist at all with respect t o b e l i e f in G o d . He does n o t hold t h a t there is any conflict b e t w e e n faith and reason here, and he does n o t even hold t h a t we c a n n o t attain this f u n d a m e n t a l t r u t h b y reason; he holds instead, t h a t it is a m o n g the deliverances o f reason. 2 T h e aim o f this p a p e r is to e x a m i n e the validity o f P e n e l h u m ' s claim t h a t Plantinga's proposal, c o n c e r n i n g the p r o p e r basicality o f theistic belief, is an e x a m p l e o f c o n t e m p o r a r y "Evangelical F i d e i s m . " As P e n e l h u m sees it, Plantinga's apologetic strategy is similar to that o f the evangelical fideist t r a d i t i o n (e.g., Pascal, * The first version of this paper was presented at a summer workshop on "Skepticism and Fideism" in 1986 at the University of Notre Dame, sponsored by The Society of Christian Philosophers. Subsequent versions have been read at the Mississippi Philosophical Association and the American Academy of Religion. I would like to thank the director of the workshop, Phil L. Quinn, and the participants for providing an intellectual springboard for developing my ideas on the topic of 'fideism and the proper basicality of theistic belief.'

Kierkegaard) in that both the evangelical fideist and Plantinga, employ "Parity Arguments" in their defense of religious belief? In order to appraise this claim, I shall first examine Penelhum's reasons for including Plantinga within the fideist tradition. Second, I shall state Plantinga's argument as to why he believes that his position is not a version of fideism. Finally, I shall argue that while Plantinga makes use of a "permissive parity argument," it would be incorrect to conclude that his argumentative strategy is a brand of fideism.

1. The traditions o f skepticism and fideism

1.1 Skepticism In order to understand why Penelhum includes Plantinga within the tradition o f fideism, one must first mention how skepticism may be construed as being in the "service o f faith." Just as the skeptic views common sense beliefs as being without rational justification, the fideist, in like manner, maintains that religious belief is without rational foundation. Plantinga may appear prima facie to have some affinity with the tradition of skepticism, since he maintains that the necessary and sufficient conditions of rationality are "monumentally difficult" to state. Hence, it may seem that there are no sufficient criteria for the justification of any belief, let alone religious belief. In his discussion of skepticism Penelhum reminds us that skepticism arose historically as a response to the classical model of knowledge a s / u s t i f i e d true belief. 4 Few would disagree that the terminus a quo for the case of philosophical skepticism is the first element of this triadic relationship, that is, the nature of epistemic ]ustification. And I would suggest that the skeptic's objection to the rational justification of belief may be interpreted as a challenge to what has come to be known as the classical foundationalist model of justification, s As Plantinga, 6 Wolterstorff, 7 and others have defined classical foundationalism (CF for short), two central claims are made: 8 (CF I) There are basic beliefs, and these beliefs are either selfevident, or evident to the senses, or incorrigible.

5 (CF 2) Any justified belief is either basic or derives its justification from its inferential relationship to beliefs which are basic. Given foundationalist claims (CF1) and CF2), it follows that justified beliefs are hierarchically structured with some beliefs being derivative and others being self-justified, requiring no independent justification. Thus, foundationalism stands in a natural opposition to philosophical skepticism since the skeptic 9 (on the basis of CF1 and CF2) denies the possibility of providing epistemic justification for our beliefs, whether they be basic or nonbasic beliefs. For our purposes, then, we shall say that the skeptic makes the following epistemic claim:

(1) Given the classical foundationalist model of justification (CF1 and CF2), S does not have sufficient evidence, e, for the justification of her set, C, of common-sense beliefs C 1 ...Cn; thus, a suspension o f belief is required. From (1) we can see why Penelhum might read Plantinga's proposal as being somewhat analogous to the skeptic's claim. The skeptic maintains that "some of the fundamental philosophical commitments o f secular c o m m o n sense are without rational justification. ''I~ That is to say, on a foundationalist model they cannot be justified because of insufficient or conflicting evidence. Plantinga makes a similar claim regarding the nature of rationality when he says it is difficult to state the necessary and sufficient conditions o f rationality. "It is by no means esay," says Plantinga, "to say what it is for a belief to be rational. ''1~ But Plantinga does not proceed by accepting the classical foundationalist criterion of rationality and then conclude that m a n y o f our fundamental beliefs are irrational or non-rational. Instead he rejects the classical foundationalist model o f justification on the ground that it is self-referentially incoherentJ 2 His next move is to argue that it is epistemically permissible that theism be a properly basic belief and therefore be included "among the deliverances of reason." So with respect to his conclusions about the nature o f epistemic justification, Plantinga is unlike the traditional skeptic. Now we

6 return to the question: How is Plantinga's strategy related to fideism?

1.2 Fideism "Fideism," according to Penelhum, is a theological tradition that has made use o f philosophical skepticism. Considered theologically, a fideist says that theistic truth-claims do not rest on evidence but are justified on the basis o f religious "faith." One could say that it is the Reformation principle of "justification by faith" (sola fide) applied to the epistemic realm. Like the skeptic who maintains that c o m m o n sense belief is without rational foundation, the fideist claims that religious belief is on a par with common sense belief in that it too is without rational justification. The fideist takes advantage of this epistemic 'parity' by suggesting that "the commitments of faith are in no worse a position in relation to reason than those of c o m m o n sense. ''13 Penelhum calls this analogy a permissive "Parity Argument." Considered noetically, both situations are in the same epistemic boat; thus, the fideist maintains that 'fideism' is rationally acceptable on the basis of an epistemic parity, which suggests there is no violation of an epistemic duty. According to Penelhum, Plantinga's critique of classical foundationalism makes use of such a parity argument. For this reason Penelhum includes Plantinga among the contemporary fideists. I want to suggest, on the basis of Penelhum's discussion, that on one level the theological fideist may be understood as accepting the classical foundationalist formula (CF1 and CF2) for the justification of common-sense beliefs, while rejecting this formula when applied to theistic belief. Thus, a dual model o f justification emerges. This type of fideism makes the following claim: (2) Given the classical foundationalist model of justification (CF1 and CF2), S does have sufficient evidence, e, for the justification of her set, C, of common-sense beliefs C1...Cn; but S is not justified in holding her religioug beliefs, R 1 ...Rn, on the basis of e, but on the condition that f (faith) obtains in S.

7 Thus fideism, as construed in (2), is a moderate fideism since reason is given a role in some justifications. Penelhum appears to overlook this important distinction, one which Richard Popkin makes in his essay entitled "Fideism"? 4 But in order to be fair to Penelhum, it may be that he considers Plantinga's version o f the Parity Argument to be a moderate fideist proposal since this is the only approach in evangelical fideism that Penelhum appears (with qualifications) to accept. ~s: More will be said about this in section 2. Considered philosophically, however, fideism may be construed as a form of skepticism that denigrates and disparages reason in f a v o r of faith. The claim here is similar to the claim made by the philosophical skeptic in (1), with the exception of the last clause: (3) Given the classical foundationalist model of justification (CF 1 and CF2), S does not have sufficient evidence, e, for the justification o f her set, C, of common-sense beliefs C1...Cn; but S is justified in holding her religious beliefs, R 1...Rn, on the condition that f (faith) obtains in S. If (2) is an example o f moderate fideism, then (3) is an instance o f extreme fideism. We might say that the crucial difference between moderate and extreme fideism is that the former version sees a role for rational inquiry as "faith seeking understanding" (tides quaerens intellectum), while extreme fideism sees no role for reason. It is the extreme version o f fideism that Penelhum calls "Skeptical Fideism."

1.3 Skeptical versions of fideism Penelhum defines "Skeptical Fideism" in general as a form o f fideism that combines theological fideism with philosophical skepticism. 16 While theological fideism appeals typically to such criteria as the noetic effects o f sin and the hiddeness of God as barriers to theistic belief, skeptical fideism goes a step further by joining theological criteria with the skeptical assessment of reason regarding our c o m m o n sense beliefs. Penelhum outlines for us two versions o f skeptical fideism: "Conformist Skeptical Fideism" (or

8 Conformist Fideism) and "Evangelical Skeptical Fideism" (or Evangelical Fideism). 17 He includes Plantinga within the evangelical tradition of fideism. In order to clearly understand why Penelhum places Plantinga within the evangelical branch of fideism, it is important to contrast this second form of skeptical fideism with Conformist Fideism. First, following Penelhum's account, the Conformist Fideist recommends "the wholesale importation of Skeptical attitudes into Christian thought. ''18 The approach here is one of faith in the service o f skepticism. The claim is identical in form to (3) above. The difference is that (4) qualifies one type of extreme fideism in terms of 'conformist' faith. (4) Given the classical foundationalist model of justification (CF1 and CF2), S does not have sufficient evidence, e, for the justification of her set, C, of common-sense beliefs C1...Cn; but S is justified in holding her religious beliefs, R1...Rn, holding on the condition that fc ('conformist' faith) obtains in S. On fideist claim (4), S accepts the skeptic's appraisal of reason and concludes on the basis of insufficient evidence (or not-e) for common-sense belief that theistic belief is therefore warranted. On this model 'faith' is given a special non-cognitive status which allows for the justification of religious belief. The privileged status that is given to such a belief is usually warranted through a religious form of life. Thus, one could as easily refer to this brand of fideism as a "form-of-life" fideism. It is a fideism that conforms itself to a given religious tradition as a way of escaping the consequences of skepticism. Second, in contrast to Conformist Fideism, Evangelical Fideism may be viewed as skepticism in the service o f faith. The evangelical fideist rejects the skeptic's appraisal of belief but sees skepticism as a "tradition which has, unintentionally, served the cause of faith by exposing the inability of human reason to provide grounds for the commitment faith embodies. In doing this, [s] kepticism has ... prepared the way for divine grace to generate faith without philosophical obstacles. ''a9 The strategy involved in this type of fideism is one of pointing out the inconsistency of the skeptic who claims that theistic belief lacks evidence when, by definition, the skeptic has no evidential sup-

9 port for her c o m m o n sense beliefs. Hence an epistemic parity exists between the skeptic and the fideist according to Penelhum. Penelhum says that "... the Skeptic shows us that our commonsense beliefs lack intellectual foundations, and in showing us this makes it clear that the assent that faith requires is analogous to the assent we give, without resistance, to the tenets of c o m m o n sense. '':~ The epistemic claim made by the evangelical fideist, then, is: (5) Given the classical foundationalist model of justification (CF1 and CF2), the skeptic, S, does n o t have sufficient evidence, e, for the justification of her set, C, of commonsense beliefs C 1... Cn; and the religious believer, B, is in an analogous situation, yet B is justified in holding her religious beliefs, R 1...Rn, on the condition that fe ('evangelical' faith) obtains in S. Penelhum points out that evangelical fideism is a " m u c h more influential" form o f fideism. 21 Its contemporary version shows up in Plantinga (and Norman Malcolm) according to Penelhum. The net effect o f this alliance for the evangelical fideist is that the apologetic arsenal is thought to be doubly strengthened by having skepticism as an ally. Penelhum, however, questions the legitimacy o f this skeptical fideist approach in religious apologetics. 22 So now we return to the question: What is it about fideism in (4) and (5) that is similar to Plantinga's proposal? Penelhum suggests that a c o m m o n feature in conformist and evangelical fideism that is similar to Plantinga's approach is the use o f a Parity Argument. And it is the evangelical fideist who (in the tradition of Pascal and Kierkegaard) has made particular use of it by pointing out the analogy between the unbeliever's common-sense commitments and the believer's commitment to God. The argument actually turns on an 'analogy of faith'. The evangelical fideist claims that 'faith' or 'non-intellectual' factors are the only basis for our secular common-sense commitments as well as our religious commitments. Both the former and the latter are on an epistemic par. The apologetic effect o f this maneuver is that the unbeliever, who has no rational basis for his day-to-day beliefs, is acting inconsistently when he rejects religious commitment, since the notion of 'rationality' (in religious belief) is just as elusive. According to Penelhum, Plantinga uses a "permissive" version o f

10 the Parity Argument, which claims that it is allowable or permissible for the believer to be committed to belief in God as properly basic or self-evident since we hold many common sense beliefs that are basic and are not founded on prior evidence or reason. This brings us to a discussion of Plantinga's use of the parity argument, which we will reserve for a later section. I will turn now to Plantinga's rejection of the label "fideism" before we examine Penelhum's claim that Plantinga employs a parity argument.

2. Plantinga's rejection of the label "fideism" Before we consider Plantinga's use of a parity argument, let us turn to his remarks concerning the possibility that his proposal is one of fideism. Is it possible that Plantinga's approach to the nature of reason and justification resembles the strategy taken in skeptical fideism? If the skeptical fideist is correct, then it would seem that the only avenue open for the justification of religious belief is the avenue of faith, a condition which goes against reason or evidence according to skeptical fideism. But we may ask: Does Plantinga take this avenue? Is his view of the nature of reason dependent upon the appraisal of justification as it is construed in skeptical fideism, in either its conformist or evangelical versions? The obvious answer is no with respect to the conformist version. Plantinga is not saying that w e s h o u l d accept the skeptic's appraisal of the nature o f justification; that is, he is not saying that reason is so ill-defined that one must suspend one's judgments. But when we consider evangelical fideism, the answer may not be as obvious since faith may appear to function as a properly basic belief. This is a difficult problem that we shall examine when we consider Plantinga's use of a permissive parity argument. For now, however, let us consider the applicability of the labels extreme fideism (Skeptical Fideism) and moderate fideism (Non-Skeptical Fideism) to Plantinga's approach to the justification of theistic belief. First, Plantinga is not unaware of the fact that one might claim that there is a possible world in which his thesis could be labeled as extreme fideism. So he asks if "the Reformed epistemologist is obliged to be an extreme fideist. ''23 The answer is an emphatic

11

No, says Plantinga. The belief that God is properly basic does not entail the claim that reason and faith are in opposition to one another. I concur with Plantinga that the Reformed epistemologist is not claiming that the belief, that p i.e., that God exists) is an absurd or contradictory proposition as in the proposition 7 + 7 = 77. The Reformed epistemologist is not saying that there is a deliverance of faith such that faith can make contradictory mathematical propositions or the proposition that God exists rationally acceptable. But the question o f concern is whether the Reformed epistemologist is saying that the belief that God exists is a deliverance of faith or a deliverance of reason. If the Reformed epistemologist is saying the former, then he is a fideist; if the latter, then the label o f fideism cannot be made to stick. Second, let us consider another version o f fideism that may apply to Plantinga. This version is not as extreme or anti-rational as Skeptical Fideism, so I shall call this type of fideism "NonSkeptical Fideism." It is a fideism that pays no homage (or is not aware that it does) to the tradition of skepticism. If Plantinga's proposal is indebted to any version o f fideism, I maintain that it will be due to a non-skeptical fideism. Popkin refers to this brand o f fideism, as "moderate fideism. ''24 It is worth noting Popkin's comments here: Rather than insisting that all ultimate certitude rests on faith in contrast to reason, this tradition has admitted that faith precedes reason in establishing certain fundamental truths but that reason and evidence can play some role b o t h in the search for these truths and in the explanation and comprehension of them. ~s I take the claim of non-skeptical fideism to be something like the following: (6) Given a modified foundationalist model of justification, S is justified in her acceptance o f t (theism) as a properly basic befief on the basis that f (faith) obtains in S; all subsequent beliefs that justify t are non-basic beliefs based on evidence or reason. Given the above formulation o f moderate fideism, is it fair to say

12 that Plantinga's strategy fits this approach? It does seem that moderate fideism (as I have construed it) claims that theistic belief is a basic belief. Even so, in order for an objector to find a possible world in which the proper basicality o f theism is moderately fideist, every proposition that is accepted as basic must be accepted on faith. Thus, if propositions like "l had breakfast this morning" or "I see a blue pen on m y desk" are basic propositions, then they are justified by faith, not by reason. But Plantinga's thesis that belief in God is properly basic is intended to show that basic beliefs are themselves among the deliverances of reason. If the belief that God exists may be included within the foundations of one's noetic structure, 26 then it is a deliverance of reason and not a deliverance of faith. Hence, if Plantinga's religious epistemology demonstrates that the proper basicality of theism is among the deliverances o f reason then it is not an example o f Non-Skeptical (moderate) Fideism. In order to appraise the success of Plantinga's claim that theistic belief is itself foundational we have to look more closely at his use of the parity argument.

3. Plantinga and the permissive parity argument We have noted that Penelhum associates Plantinga's apologetic strategy with the tradition of evangelical fideism. He does this b y pointing out that the skeptic and the evangelical fideist are in a similar epistemic situation such that a parity exists between the two. That is to say, since the skeptic cannot justify commonsense beliefs on evidential (classical foundationalist) grounds, and the fideist cannot justify religious beliefs by appealing to the same grounds, they are in a situation of episternic parity. Both the skeptic and the fideist must appeal, therefore, to faith in order to justify their beliefs. Penelhum says that the "force of the Parity Argument is of a very restricted kind. It suggests only that the commitments of faith are in no worse a position in relation to reason than those of c o m m o n sense. ''27 But while the evangelical fideist can make this move consistently, the skeptic holds her beliefs inconsistently since it is psychologically impossible to suspend all beliefs. Thus, the ground that is gained from this approach in religious epistemology is that the apologist claims to

13 have demonstrated that the skeptic acts inconsistently in holding her beliefs. Penelhum is accurate, I think, in suggesting that Plantinga incorporates a 'permissive parity' argument in his defence o f the rationality of religious belief) s The 'permissive' version of the parity argument, given b y Plantinga, argues that many of our comm o n sense beliefs are taken as "properly basic" (not groundless), 29 such as the belief that "I see a computer in front of me," or "I had lunch this afternoon," or "There are other minds." According to Plantinga, theistic belief is on an epistemic par; thus a condition of parity exists between certain religious and non-religious beliefs. Belief in God, for example, may be just as much o f a basic belief as belief in other minds. Thus, if our epistemic situation is such that some c o m m o n sense beliefs are properly basic, it is permissible to include belief in God as 'properly basic'. I think Penelhum is correct in seeing Plantinga's proposal as a type of permissive parity argument. My objection is that he considers this approach to be a version of fideism. If we accept Plantinga's critique of classical foundationalism 3~ and his alternative proposal that belief in God is 'properly basic', then must we accept some form o f fideism? I have indicated that the answer is No. But for those who maintain that fideism follows from Plantinga's proposal, I suggest that their disagreement rests on at least one fundamental confusion. It is a confusion resulting from the ambiguity surrounding the use of the term 'faith' as it occurs in parity arguments. According to the evangelical fideist tradition, as Penelhum presents it, both the unbeliever and the believer make fundamental non-intellectual commitments, that is, faith commitments. As considered here, 'faith' is disassociated from reason since it is characteristically non-cognitive in nature.* Plantinga's permissive parity argument, however, claims that the parity is not due to nonintellectual factors. Basic beliefs, according to Plantinga, are selfjustifying and carry conferring characteristics such that they can be said to be rational. Plantinga points this out when he says that there are " m a n y conditions and circumstances that call forth belief in God: guilt, gratitude, danger, a sense o f God's presence, a sense that he speaks, perception o f various parts o f the universe. ''31 * Of course those who hold that faith is a type of belief will disagree with this characterization.

14 Such conditions can confer the rational justification o f belief in God to the one who accepts them as basic. Given such warrants for theism as a properly basic belief, it does not follow that Plantinga's position implies that it is necessarily "non-intellectual factors" and "evil ones at t h a t " which keep us from belief in God. Here we can make a distinction between a natural conferring characteristic and a supernatural one. Plantinga alludes to this first type o f characteristic when he refers to Calvin's comments on the natural awareness o f God. Calvin maintains that, "There is within the human mind, and indeed b y natural instinct, an awareness of divinity .... To prevent anyone from taking refuge in the pretense o f ignorance, God Himself has implanted in all men a certain understanding of his divine majesty ... men one and all perceive that there is a God and that he is their Maker." (Calvin's Institutes 1.3.1). As a Reformed epistemologist, Plantinga has argued that there is a natural conference o f theistic belief such that belief in God may be taken as properly basic. On the natural or commonsense level it is a conferred capacity to believe that God exists; this natural capacity is not necessarily hindered by non-intellectual or corrupting influences. Thus, on this level there is no retreat to a supernatural faith that brings about a conflict between faith and reason. Although there may be a natural awareness of God that can count as a basic belief, the belief in or personal commitment to God can be hindered by the noetic effects of sin according to Calvin and the Reformed tradition. That is why "faith," in Reformed theology, is properly understood as supernatural divine disclosure, or special relevation. There is no distinction between formed and unformed faith as in the tradition of Thomistic apologetics? 2 Faith is always formed or supernaturally revealed according to the Reformed tradition. Thus there is no need for the Reformed epistemologist to retreat to a fideist apologetic if belief in God is conferred via the natural order. In sum, I think it is fair to say that while Plantinga makes use of an apologetic strategy that may resemble, in some ways, the fideist tradition in apologetics, he is not a fideist. The fideist tradition, according to Penelhum's analysis, relies upon an epistemic parity that is established on the basis of an 'analogy of faith'. And faith, according to the fideist, is a non-intellectual or non-rational factor that is not among the deliverances of reason. Thus faith is indeed a "leap" from reason, as in the case o f

15 K i e r k e g a a r d . P l a n t i n g a ' s claim, o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , is t h a t p r o p e r l y basic beliefs are r a t i o n a l l y justified since t h e y have c o n f e r r i n g c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s t h a t m a k e t h e m e p i s t e m i c a l l y a c c e p t a b l e . A n d if it is i n c o n s i s t e n t to k e e p b e l i e f in G o d o u t o f t h e f o u n d a t i o n s o f o n e ' s n o e t i c s t r u c t u r e , b e c a u s e it t o o can have c o n f e r r i n g characteristics like a n y c o m m o n - s e n s e b e l i e f (as in "I see a t r e e " ) , t h e n b e l i e f in G o d m a y be a m o n g t h e deliverances o f reason. T h u s , P l a n t i n g a ' s permissive p a r i t y a r g u m e n t is m o r e o f an a n a l o g y f r o m " r e a s o n " r a t h e r t h a n an a n a l o g y f r o m " f a i t h . "

Notes 1. Alvin Plantinga, "Reason and Belief in God," in Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff, eds., Faith and Rationality: Reason and Belief in God (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983), pp. 87-91. 2. Alvin Plantinga, "Reason and Belief in God," p. 90. 3. Terence Penelhum, God and Skepticism: A Study in Skepticism and Fideism, Philosophical Studies Series in Philosophy, Vol. 28 (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1983), pp. 146-58. 4. For more on this, see Stanley Cavell, The Claim of Reason (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979); James W. Cornman, Skepticism, Justification and Explanation, (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1980); Peter Klein, Certainty: A Refutation of Skepticism (Minnesota: The University of Minnesota Press, 1981); Richard Popkin, The Hig Road to Pyrrhonism (San Diego: Austin Hill Press, 1980). 5. See Jonathan Dancy's treatment of "classical foundationalism" in his An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985), pp. 53-65. 6. "Reason and Belief in God," pp. 16-93. 7. Nicholas Wolterstorff, "Can Belief in God Be Rational If It Has No Foundations?," in Faith and Rationality: Reason and Belief in God, pp. 135-86. 8. For further elaboration on what I take to be CF see, for example, Laurence BonJour's The Structure of Empirical Knowledge (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 17. 9. Here I have in mind the Humean skeptic, that is, one who adheres to a classical foundationalist model of justification but concludes that it is insufficient as a model for knowledge and justification. For the purpose of this paper, I am not considering the position of a skeptic who is not working from a foundationalist model of justification. 10. God and Skeptieism, p. 139. 11. Alvin Planfinga, "Rationality and Religious Belief," in Steven M. Cahn and David Shatz, eds., Contemporary Philosophy of Religion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 257.

16 12. F o r Plantinga's most thorough critique of classical foundationalism, see "Reason and Belief in G o d . " 13. Penelhum, Godand Skepticism, p. 116. 14. Richard Popkin, "Fideism," in Paul Edwards, ed., The Encyclopedia of PhzTosophy (New York: Macmillan & The Free Press, 1967), Vol. 3, p. 201. 15. Penelhum, God and Skepticism, p. 152. 16. Ibid., pp. i x - x . 17. Ibid., pp. 1 4 - 1 7 . 18. I b i d . , p . 15. 19. Ibid. 20. Ibid., p. x. 21. Ibid. 22. Note that Penelhum classifies Pascal as an Evangelical Fideist, which m a y be interpreted as an extreme form of fideisrn rather than the more moderate position that Popkin suggests. See Richard Popkin's essay, "Fideism," for further discussion. 23. Plantinga, "Reason and Belief in G o d , " p. 87. 24. Richard Popkin, "Fideism," p. 201. 25. Ibid. 26. As Plantinga has argued in "Reason and Belief in God." Although he has many critics of claim that belief in God is properly basic, I can find no logical problem with the notion that belief in God (or more exactly the belief that God exists) may count as a basic belief. Such a conclusion is consistent ff one is willing to accept Plantinga's critique of classical foundationalism. 27. Penelhum, God and Skepticism, p. 116. 28. This seems to be quite explicit in Plantinga's God and Other Minds, in which his argument for the rationality of theistic belief is analogous to one's belief in other minds. Thus a parity is established via analogy. However, a parity argument may be more implicit in Plantinga's later essays, "Is Belief in God Rational," in C.F. Delaney, ed., Rationality and Religious Belief, University of Notre Dame Studies in the Philosophy of Religion, No. 1 (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1979), pp. 7 - 2 7 ; "Rationality and Religious Belief" [ 1982] ; and "Reason and Belief in G o d " [1983]. In these later papers, especially "Reason and Belief in God," Plantinga is seeking to demonstrate that it is epistemically permissible to maintain belief in God as a basic belief since there is no clear violation of any epistemic duty. Even here, however, I argue that Plantinga is making use of a type of parity argument. 29. Plantinga, "Reason and Belief in G o d , " pp. 7 8 - 9 1 . 30. Ibid., pp. 6 3 - 9 1 . 31. Alvin Plantinga, "Rationality and Religious Belief," p. 273. 32. F o r further discussion of this point, see Armin Vos, Aquinas, Calvin, and Contemporary Protestant Thought, (Washington, DC: Christian University Press, 1985).