EDUARD HUBER

ON P R O G R E S S ,

VALUES, AND MARX

ABSTRACT. Marx, like many of his contemporaries, uncritically assumed that humanity develops from primitive beginnings to ever more perfect stages. In his theory of human development he measured progress by two main standards: the decrease of all forms of dependence, and the increase of universality in man's relations to nature and to his fellow man. In our century, not only have new structures of power and dependence emerged, but successive movements have also been generated to restore the more ordered and limited relationships of the past. If belief in progress is nowadays no longer self-evident, such a state of affairs can help us reflect on the conditions necessary to realize the values which determined Marx's categorical imperative, or his insistence that we overthrow all relations by which man is made a debased and enslaved being. One of these conditions is the voluntary limitation of our needs: the need to use material goods without regard for others, the need to build up or maintain security even at the cost of violence, and the need to restrict the circle of those with whom we identify to our own particulaz culture, race, class or ways of thinking and acting. In this essay I will first attempt to analyze the idea of human progress as it appears in the works of Karl Marx. In doing so, I will begin with his early writings in order that they might provide the background against which the Grundrisse and Capital can be put into perspective (Part I). Then I will sketch some developments in society which, among other things, have contributed in the more than one hundred years since the publication of the first volume of Capital (1867) to break down the 'belief in progress' which Marx held to be so self-evident (Part II). Finally, I will consider the basic values which underlay Marx's thought on progress, so as to draw some conclusions from his 'categorical imperative' (Part III).

Approximately from the middle of the 18th century onwards, Europeans were convinced for the most part of their superiority over all the other contemporary and past forms of the human race's self-expression and achievement. Moreover, with the emergence of the natural sciences, Europeans began to view nature in an ever more widespread way as a process of development which had its own laws. This opinion led to the dominating role

Studies in Soviet Thought 30 (1985), 365-377. 0039-3797/85.10 © 1985 by D. Reidel Publishing Company.

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which 'belief in progress', as I would like to call this phenomenon, occupied in the minds of Europe's intellectuals. I understand the expression 'belief in progress' as designating a conviction according to which humanity develops from primitive beginnings to ever more perfect stages. This idea, as a matter of fact, entails three distinctive elements: (1) There is one world history (and not many independent histories); (2) The movement of history is ordered (and not random); (3) The direction of this movement is ascending (and not stationary, cyclic, or descending). I designate this conviction a 'belief', insofar as it was uncritically accepted and, precisely as such, could serve as the underpinning of a critical form of thought. Whenever one accepts this idea, the result almost automatically arrived at is that one must either view the present state of human society as the best possible one, an act which is not always entirely easy, or criticize it. To the extent that this 'belief' spread, attempts were made to conceive history in a new light and to present it systematically as a forward.moving development of mankind. I do not need at this point to dwell on the progressive stages through which these attempts moved. 1 Karl Marx was totally enthralled with this 'belief'. It is also quite certain that he knew of two attempts to construe the idea of history in the light of this 'belief', namely those of Saint.Simon and Hegel. In what follows, I will try briefly to outline the concept of history which can be found at various places in the works of Marx. He has in fact left behind no thoroughly worked out view concerning history. His entire theoretical effort served above all to prove that the inner law directing the 'modern bourgeois mode of production' was meant to give birth to a 'new, higher' mode of production and a corresponding form of society. Already in his Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 Marx notes: "We see how the history of industry and the established objective existence of industry are the open book of man's essential powers, the perceptibly existing human psychology. ''2 In this way, history itself becomes a division of the history of nature, and natural science becomes a science of man; and in the end there will be only one science. 3 History, even the entirety of what is called world history, "is nothing but the creation of man through human labor, nothing but the emergence of nature for man". 4 What is hinted at only in a programmatic way in these manuscripts is further thought out in The German Ideology, a work which Marx and Engels co-authored in 1845.

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In this text they were less concerned with a presentation of their own concept of history than they were with a polemic refutation of the ideas of Hegel and the Young Hegelians. "We decided", as Marx later said, "to settle accounts with our former pkilosophical conscience. ''s Marx and Engels contrasted two ways of approaching history, the second of which would be theirs: "For the first manner of approach the starting-point is consciousness taken as the living individual; for the second manner of approach, which conforms to real life, it is the real living individuals themselves, and consciousness is considered solely as their consciousness." 6 Such a conception "has not, like the idealist view of history, to look for a category in every period, but remains constantly on the real ground of history". 7 This 'ground' is the development of productive forces and the gradual emergence of division of labor and of forms of property which corresponds to this development. Four such forms of property are indicated: tribal, ancient communal, feudal, and bourgeois. "These various conditions, which appear first as conditions of self-activity, later as fetters upon it, form in the whole development of history a coherent series of forms of intercourse." s The two authors of The German Ideology have chiefly focused their attention, however, on the evolution of the opposition between city and country, and the development of manufacture and large-scale industry along with all their consequences for society. Marx and Engels underscore the fact that now for the first time world history becomes real "insofar as it made all civilized nations and every individual member of them dependent for the satisfaction of their wants on the whole world, thus destroying the former natural exclusiveness of separate nations. ''9 On the other hand, "never in any earlier period, have the productive forces taken on a form so indifferent to the intercourse of individuals as individuals, because their intercourse itself was still a restricted one". And even if the majority of the individuals from whom these forces have been taken away, have become abstract individuals, they are "put into a position to enter into relation with one another as individuals". 1° The destruction of 'natural' bonds and limitations, the emergence of the individual on the one hand and of worldwide trade on the other are the essential elements of Marx understanding of progress. The Manifesto of the Communist Party is also a joint work of Marx and Engels. Its first chapter beings with the pithy statement: "The history

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of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles." 11 This assertion naturally has to be understood in the light of what Marx later said about 'money', 'labor' and similar 'simple categories': "The example of labor strikingly demonstrates how even the most abstract categories, despite their validity in all epochs - precisely because they are abstractions - are equally a product of historical conditions even in the specific form of abstractions, and they retain their full validity only for and within the framework of these conditions." 12 What is true of the category 'labor' is true also at least of the category 'class'. One can apply these terms in their proper sense only to modern society. What the authors of the Manifesto are really aiming at, however, is the fact that our epoch "has simplified the class antagonisms. Society as a whole is more and more splitting up into two great hostile camps." 13 The need to tear down all barriers and to erect a worldwide system of communication, ideas which were already touched on in The German Ideology, are here hn the Manifesto described as the 'most revolutionary part' which the bourgeoisie has played in history, and this role is depicted in a correspondingly emphatic way. But: "The essential condition for the existence and for the sway of the bourgeois class is the formation and augmentation of capital; the condition for capital is wage-labor. Wage-labor rests exclusively on competition between the laborers. The advance of industry . . . replaces the isolation of the laborers, due to competition, by their revolutionary combination, due to association." 14 In The German Ideology Marx and Engels had already spoken of "previous substitutes for the community, in the state, etc." which had made themselves independent over against individuals and which were alliances of one class over against another. These doublings and divisions can only be overcome if "in the real community the individuals obtain their freedom in and through their association", is Thus, the second chapter of the Manifesto closes with an assertion which is no less emphatic than that with which the first had begun: "In the place of the old bourgeois society with its classes and class antagonisms, we shall have an association, in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all." 16 When Marx summarizes in 1859 the results of the studies he had made around the year 1845 and publishes the well-known sketch of what was to be called 'historical materialism', for the first time he gives names to the 'epochs marking progress': "In broad outline, the Asiatic, ancient, feudal

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and modern bourgeois modes of production may be designated as epochs marking progress in the economic development of society. ''17 One can easily see that here only the three customary divisions of history are taken into account which were then described in textbooks: antiquity, middle ages, modern times. The inclusion of 'Asiatic' can be explained, even if not exclusively, as a recollection of Hegel's thought. 18 Marx is not fundamentally concerned, however, with construing the epochs of world history. What he intends to do is point out the essential difference between the 'modern bourgeois mode of production' and all the former modes, and naturally he is interested most of all in those characteristic traits of modern production which would lead to a 'new and higher' form of society. 19 The only text known to me in which Marx offers a somewhat systematic overview of historical progress is the following: "Relationships of personal dependence (which were at first quite spontaneous) are the first forms of society in which human productivity develops, though only to a slight extent and at isolated points. Personal independence founded on material dependence is the second great form: in it there developed for the first time a system of general social interchange, resulting in universal relations, varied requirements and universal capacities. Free individuality, which is founded on the universal development of individuals and the domination of their communal and social productivity, which has become their social power, is the third stage. The second stage creates the conditions for the third. Patriarchal and ancient societies (feudal also) decline as trade, luxury, money and exchange value develop, just as modern society has grown up simultaneously alongside these. ''2° This text needs some explanation. First let me make two observations about the translation. (1) The word "spontaneous" in the first parenthesis is a rendition of the German 'naturwiichsig'. The best aid in understanding the text which is cited here is Section 4, Chapter 1 of the first volume of Capital; it is entitled 'The Fetishism of Commodities and the Secret Thereof'. There we find that in Marx's description of patriarchal industries of a peasant family as an example of 'directly associated labor', 21 the word 'naturwiichsig' is used twice. From the context it is quite clear that Marx is speaking on the one hand about forms of labor which could be found at the threshold of history and on the other hand about a division of labor which is greatly influenced by natural differences such as age and sex. 'Spontaneous' here

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means: arising directly from and determined by nature, in contrast to a determination resulting from an historical development or a free decision. 22 (2) For 'material dependence' Marx wrote "dependence on things" (sachliche Abhgmgigkeit), and meant dependence on the world of objects, the world of things and goods made by man. These constitute a state of reality which he chiefly described and analyzed under the heading "fetishism of commodities". We can now treat the above-quoted text as a whole. The three "forms" or "stages" are characterized as "personal dependence", "personal independence founded on material dependence", and "free individuality". One of the two standards by which Marx measures progress in the development of mankind is the disappearance of all forms of dependence. Moreover, we notice that in the second and third stages the word "universal" or equivalents are repeated. Marx continually makes use of "universality" as contrasted to "limitation", as related to "totality", and as in opposition to "determination". In the Manuscripts of 1844, universality appears as an anthropological attribute by which man can be distinguished from animals, 23 whereas in the later works of Marx universality becomes the second standard by which he measures progress. 24 Marx applies "universality" not only to the unfolding of individual potential but also to the relationship between man and nature, which, though in traditional forms of society has always been a determined and limited one, has now become a universal relationship through the advances of modern science and technology. Furthermore, Marx applies the term "universality" to the relationship of human beings among themselves. Previously human beings were divided from one another by political, national, religious, etc. barriers. Now the existence of the world market is destroying all these barriers and binding human beings to each other in a universal way. To achieve this type of universality, it is necessary to provide some distance between human beings and the production of material goods. Marx foresaw, as a condition for man's distance from production, an eventual shortening of the time needed for work, a topic to which he gave so much prominence that 'free time' can be characterized as the key concept in Capital. 2s Marx also foresaw a change in the process itself by which work is achieved, a state of affairs which the present phenomenon of automation was to realize. The worker previously inserted transformed natural objects, that is tools, as intermediaries between material and himself. Now the worker

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'inserts' the natural process that he has transformed into an industrial one between himself and nature. The worker thus steps aside from the process of production: "The human factor is restricted to watching and supervising the production process." 26 In this way, work, that is the production of material goods, although always determined by external necessity, becomes in a certain sense 'free'. Work becomes free "if it ceases to be human effort as a definite, trained natural force, gives up its purely natural, primitive aspects and becomes the activity of a subject controlling all forces of nature in the production process", if it receives a social, scientific and general characterY II In the modern world, the human being does not want to remain, according to Marx, something that has become fixed, something which continues to reproduce itself in a determined way. Rather, modern man takes part in the 'absolute movement of becoming' and 'produces his totality'. As a result, however, the old world can at times seem like a higher stage, and it also is such according to Marx, wherever satisfaction is being sought in a closed system, form and given limitation. The new world, in contrast, leaves man unsatisfied, or, wherever it seems to be satisified with itself, it is banal. 28 Marx realized, despite all his enthusiasm for the modern age, for universal and developing relationships - in short, for the shedding of fixed forms of society which indeed are always confining - that the freedom from confinement, which marks the modern age, is necessarily accompanied by a deep unease. Yet, since Marx was enthralled with 'belief in progress', he nevertheless maintained that this unease only would contribute all the more to strengthen the human drive towards freedom, and that the uneasiness would be thoroughly compensated by the 'realm of freedom'. 29 It was for Marx precisely the modern world which for the first time in history created the conditions for such a dawn of freedom. These observations are in no way meant to be a reproach of Marx. How many thinkers of the past two centuries would have been terribly disappointed if they had to witness how much evil, which they believed basically to have been already overcome, has had the upper hand in our century: the exploitation of man by man, 3° wars, genocide, the suppression of minorities, and political and ideological terror - j u s t to name a few examples.

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Despite all these phenomena, modern society is subject - with or without Marx and whether we may want it or not - to a constant process of change which is chiefly propelled by the so-called scientific-technical revolutions. The insecurity, impermanence, and restlessness which these produce have led to various manifestations which would very much have surprised not only Marx but also many of his contemporaries. The notion of the 'withering away of the state 'al was by no means a discovery of Marx and Engels. It was quite a familiar idea in their time. a2 The opposite has now occurred. The shape of the state and its role in social life has increased everywhere to extraordinary dimensions. Even 'totalitarian' states have arisen, and Marx's erroneous teaching on the revolutionary dictatorship certainly has had some influence on their emergence, a3 Moreover, Marx thought that the general costs of administration would be considerably reduced in the f u t u r e . 34 Here too the opposite has come about. All countries, whether they want to realize the ideas of Marx or not, are straining under the burden of constantly higher costs of administration and of a bureaucracy which is steadily expanding. Modern society has in addition brought forth some peculiar features which are worthy of quite serious reflection. Precisely because this modern world necessarily leaves man unsatisfied, this condition has again and again led mankind to search for 'satisfaction in a limited point of view', as This search has fostered movements, of which I would designate some as marked by a 'flight into a lost world of order' and others as motivated by a 'flight into the private sphere'. As examples of the first type of flight, I could list, in the order in which they became politically significant, the following: back to the unity of social order and world-view, back to the Pax Romana, back to race and kin, back to the literal meaning of holy books. I do not need to mention names here. Such movements can attract masses of people, even youth, in their wake, and create terrifying fanatics. Some examples of the second type of flight are, besides the still most sympathetic 'back to nature' movement which since the beginning of this century has cropped up repeated. ly in ever new forms, some others which cause great destruction to human beings, such as the waves of sexual abuse, drug addiction and suicide. III When the contributions to this congress appear in print, we will have passed the one-hundredth anniversary of the death of Karl Marx. Much has changed

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in these past hundred years. Much that has happened we would not want to have missed; yet other events we would have preferred not to have experienced. In any case, we can no longer simply and unquestioningly believe in an idea of progress which, driven by a necessary development whose inner laws we can ascertain, 36 would lead us to freedom and to a form of social life that is devoid of violence, manipulation, and ignorance. Where do we stand, then? This question actually opens up onto the area o f human values. No matter which type of theory of progress one derives, even if it is as scientific as possible, it cannot be conceived without making value judgments. 'Progress' is necessarily a category which is bound up with human values. At the beginning of his Critiques, that is, in the Introduction to his intended but never written Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law, Marx comes upon the notion 'categorical imperative': "The criticism o f religion ends with the teaching that man is the highest being for man, hence with the categorical imperative to overthrow all relations in which man is a debased, enslaved, forsaken, despicable being." 37 It is patent that the value which underlay Marx' writings was in fact the liberation of human beings from such relations. And the theoretical efforts of his entire life can be understood as attempts to demonstrate that the realization of this imperative is possible today. That this imperative, which Marx derived from his critique of religion, can be viewed independently of its original source does not need to be proven here. Even if 'belief in progress' were to pass away, this imperative would remain. It can indeed prove to be a substantial advantage if this 'belief in progress' were to slip away. This might be the case for at least two reasons. First, it might result in lessening the danger of a 'despotism based on science', a possibility which in this present century seems not at all as absurd and ridiculous as Saint-Simon made it out to be. 38 Second, leaving behind the 'belief in progress' might force us to reflect on the conditions of possibility necessary to realize the imperative of freedom. In what follows I would like to close this essay by briefly outlining one such condition of possibility which strikes m e as essential. I maintain that the 'categorical imperative' of Marx cannot be realized if we do not learn to limit some of our needs. At least three such needs can be identified. The first of these is our need to use material goods. Marx never wanted to entertain the thought of either equalizing or limiting this need. 39 Even a system of distribution, somewhat according to the formula of the followers

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of Saint-Simon, 4° was permissible for Marx only as a transitional measure. 41 A distribution of goods along the lines of the principle 'from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs', as much as it attracted Marx, 42 only seems possible, even in the case of a society possessing great wealth, if the material needs of individuals are not limited by external but by internal forces, that is, through the predominance of non-material interests. Marx seems to have held that such a limitation from within individuals themselves was to be taken for granted, since he presupposed that shortening the time needed for work would result in the 'artistic, scientific, etc. formation of individuals'. 43 An interior limitation of material needs, stemming from whatever motives, seems to be one of the prerequisites for overcoming the 'exploitation of man by man'. Furthermore, without such limitation, we risk making this planet unlivable in a rather short time. A second need which must be limited is that for security. Admittedly, we can totally renounce our need for security just as little as we can renounce the need for material goods. It is only a matter of limiting these needs. I would judge the need for security as being the chief reason why different structures of power are accepted and even why some of them are seen to be desirable. Revolutionary and counter-revolutionary terror and other forms of blatant misuse of power can all be traced back to the same root from which the excessive bureaucracy of modern society stems: excessive need for security. Unfortunately, there are forms of violence which can only be checked through the use of a counterforce. But, especially in this matter, all depends on the practice of restraint. Otherwise, the resistance itself would only lead to an escalation of violence. The 'categorical imperative' also imposes the obligation of giving preference, in situations where a violent resistance to aggression or oppression has to be undertaken, to those means which are relatively less violent. A third need which should be limited is that which seeks conformity in cultural and ideological matters as well as in custom and appearance. We often demand such conformity of those with whom we identify, to whom we belong, about whom we say 'we'. It is obvious that we cannot identify ourselves in the same way with all different types of persons. There must always exist graduated rings of identification, some more intense than others. Yet, if we want to do something against the oppression of minorities, against wars, and on behalf of international understanding, we will have to work in two directions against the need for conformity.

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First, we will have to overcome the tendency to identify ourselves with those who are more or less the same as we and who stand with us over against 'those others there'. Second, we will have to learn to accept ever greater differences within those circles of people whom we call 'we'. This will entail broadening our horizon of identification and even extending it to include all of mankind. Such a goal demands earnest efforts at mutual understanding on the part of human beings of different colors, cultures, points of view, etc. Without these efforts at understanding, aggressive stances and the polarization of the world into friends and enemies cannot be overcome. Without these efforts to broaden our horizon, the acceptance of others with all their uniqueness would not be more than mere tolerance. The 'universality of relations' which has been made possible through modern technology challenges us at the present time to take up a most urgent task.

NOTES 1 For the history of this concept, cf. the entry 'progress' in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. by Paul Edwards (New York, Macmillan, 1967) or in Marxism, Communism and Western Society: A Comparative Encyclopedia, ed. by C. D. Kernig (New York, Herder and Herder, 1973). Both these works offer an extensive bibliography. 2 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Collected Works, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1975. In referring to the already published texts of this edition, I will use the abbreviation CW, followed by the volume and page numbers; here: CW 3,302. 3 CW 3,303-304. 4 CW 3,305. s Karl Marx, A Contribution to the Critique o f Political Economy, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1977, p. 22. 6 CW5, 37. 7 CW 5, 53-54. 8 CW5, 82. 9 CW5, 73. lo CW5, 86-87. 11 CW6,482. 12 Karl Marx, A Contribution to the Critique o f Political Economy, p. 210. 13 CW6,485. 14 CW 6, 496; cf. the chapters on Co-operation, Division of Labor, Machinery and Modern Industry, in Karl Marx, Capital (Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1977, I 305475. 15 CW5, 78. 16 CW 6,506. 17 Karl Marx, A Contribution to the Critique o f Political Economy, p. 21.

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18 Cf. G. W. F. Hegel, The Philosophy of History, trans, b y J. Sibree, New York, Dover Publications, 1956, p. 104. 19 Cf. Karl Marx, Capital, III 819. 20 Karl Marx, Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Okonomie, Berlin, Dietz Verlag, 1953, pp. 7 5 - 7 6 . This is a reprint o f t h e Moscow edition of 1 9 3 9 - 1 9 4 1 . I m a k e use here o f an English translation o f some extracts: Karl Marx, The Grundrisse ed. and trans, b y David McLellan, New York, Harper & Row, 1971, p. 67. 21 Karl Marx, Capital, I 82. 'Directly' should be clarified. It stands for t h e German unmittelbar, and m e a n s in this case ' w i t h o u t any mediation'. With regard to this concept, cf. t h e following critique o f Feuerbach which Marx makes in his Thesis Six: Feuerbach is obliged to abstract from t h e historical process. The essence o f man, "therefore, can be regarded only as 'species', as an inner, m u t e , general character which unites t h e m a n y individuals in a natural way". CW 5, 4. 22 In The German Ideology Marx uses t h e term 'naturally' as t h e counterpart o f 'voluntarily'. Cf. CW 5 , 4 7 . 23 CW3,276-277. 24 Cf., for example: Grundrisse, G e r m a n ed., p. 387. 25 Karl Marx, Capital, III 2 4 1 - 2 6 6 ; 8 1 8 - 8 2 0 . 26 Grundrisse, German ed., pp. 5 9 2 - 5 9 4 ; McLellan ed., pp. 141 --143. 27 1bid., German ed., p. 505; McLellan ed., p. 124. 28 Ibid., German ed., pp. 3 8 7 - 3 8 8 . 29 Karl Marx, Capital, III 820. 30 This often-used expression stems from the followers o f Saint-Simon: "L'exploitation de l ' h o m m e par l ' h o m m e , voilh l'~tat des relations h u m a i n e s dans le passe: l'exploitation de la nature par l ' h o m m e associ~ ~ l ' h o m m e , tel est le tableau que prbsente l'avenir . . . . En d'autres termes, la guerre et la paix, tels sont les caract~res distinctifs du passb et de l'avenir consid~r~s du point de vue o5 Saint-Simon nous a places." 'Exposition de la doctrine Saint-Simonienne ( 1 8 2 8 - 1 8 3 0 ) ' in Oeuvres de Saint-Simon et d'Enfantin, a reprint o f t h e original French, Aalen: Otto Zeller, 1964, XLI 206; cf. also: pp. 113 and 190. 31 " T h e state is n o t 'abolished'. It withers away." Friedrich Engels, Anti-Diihring: Herr Eugen Diihring's Revolution in Science, Moscow Progress Publishers, 1969, p. 333. 32 Cf. T h o m a s Paine, Common Sense and Other Political Writings, ed. N. F. Adkins, New York, The Liberal Arts Press, 1953, p. 4: " S o m e writers have so c o n f o u n d e d society with government as to leave little or no distinction b e t w e e n t h e m , whereas t h e y are n o t only different b u t have different origins. Society is produced b y our wants, and government by our wickedness; t h e former p r o m o t e s our happiness positively b y uniting our affections, t h e latter negatively b y restraining our vices. The one encourages intercourse, t h e other creates distinctions. The first is a patron, t h e last a punisher." If o n e accepts this position, and at t h e same time maintains that in a n e w social order wickedness and vice will decrease, one m u s t necessarily c o m e to t h e conclusion that one day t h e f u n c t i o n s o f government will to a great extent have lost their original purpose. 33 This teaching is erroneous at least to the degree that one accepts the idea that the revolution should lead to the emergence o f a greater freedom t h a n existed before it. Mme. de Stael, for one, has made this point quite eloquently: " L ' o n a souvent r6p~t~ dans la r~volution de France, qu'il falloit du despotisme pour ~tablir la libertY. On a li6 par des m o t s u n contre-sens dont on a fait u n e phrase; mais cette phrase ne change

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rien a la v~rit~ des choses. Les institutions ~tablies par la force, imiteroient tout de la libert6, except~ son mouvement naturel; les formes y seroient comme dans ces modbles qui vous effraient par leur ressemblance: vous y retrouvez tout, hors la vie." Madame de Stall, De la littbrature consid~rbe clans ses rapports avec les institutions sociales (1800), ed. by P. van Tieghem, Geneva, Libraixie Droz, 1959, pp. 36-37. 34 Karl Marx, Critique of the Gotha Programme, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1978, p. 15. 35 Grundrisse, German ed., p. 388. 36 Cf. Karl Marx, Capital, I 20; G. W. F. Hegel, The Philosophy o f History, pp. 19 and 715. 37 Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law: Introduction, in CW 3, 182. 38 Cf. C1. H. de Saint-Simon, L 'Organisateur (1819-1820), in Oeuvres de Saint-Simon et d'Enfantin, xx, 157-158. 39 Marx's valid argument against the equalization of material goods is that it would make envy, which indeed is the fundamental condition for competition, become a mere general principle. Moreover, Marx feared that a limitation of material needs would also do harm to a culture and would deprive modern man of his heritage from the past. Cf. CW 3,295. 40 "Dans l'organisation sociale de l'avenir, chacun . . . devra se trouver class~ selon sa capacitY, r~tribu~ suivant ses oeuvres" in 'Exposition de la doctrine Saint-Simonienne', Oeuvres de Saint-Simon et d'Enfantin, xli, 237. 41 Critique o f the Gotha Programme, pp. 16-17. 42 Ibid., p. 18. 43 Grundrisse, German ed., p. 593;McLellan ed., p. 142.

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