J Indian Philos DOI 10.1007/s10781-016-9294-y

Philosophy in the Mahābhārata and the History of Indian Philosophy Angelika Malinar1

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2016

Abstract The study of philosophical terms and doctrines in the Mahābhārata touches not only on important aspects of the contents, composition and the historical contexts of the epic, but also on the historiography of Indian philosophy. General ideas about the textual history of the epic and the distinction between “didactic” and “narrative” parts have influenced the study of epic philosophy no less than academic discussions about what is philosophy in India and how it developed. This results in different evaluations of the place of philosophical texts in the epic and their relationship to the history of Indian philosophy. While some scholars have suggested that there is a “philosophy of the epic” its composers wished to propagate, others have argued that “philosophy” is included in the epic either in a “proto” form or in a variety of doctrines (often presented is “mixed” or “unsystematic” ways) they deemed relevant. The article discusses these views and some of the heuristic assumptions on which they are based. It proposes to widen the scope of analysis by paying more attention to the interplay of narrative and didactic passages, the various ways in which philosophy is presented in the epic, and its connection to a larger spectrum of the reception of philosophy in textual genres and by audiences outside the expert circles of the philosophical schools. Keywords Epic philosophy · Sa¯ṃkhya · Historiography of Indian philosophy · Sanskrit literature · Mokṣadharma

Interpretations of the parts of the Mahābhārata (MBh) generally considered “philosophical” are often embedded in larger debates on the composition of the epic and on the place of “epic philosophy” in the history of Indian philosophy. These & Angelika Malinar [email protected] 1

University of Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland

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debates form the referential framework for the ways in which “philosophy” in the epic has been studied. Consideration of this framework itself will enable a mapping of the current “state of the art” and a highlighting of issues in the study of these texts that have not yet received sufficient attention. Such reflection is set against the background of the substantial work that has already been done on individual philosophical texts of the epic and the path-breaking work that is on the way with the preparation of the translation of the Mokṣadharmaparvan (MDh) in its critical edition by J. L. Fitzgerald, which will advance the understanding of the epic considerably (as have already the translation of the Rājadharmaparvan and his studies on the MDh; Fitzgerald 2002, 2004, 2012). Studies of the philosophical passages are connected to more general issues in the study of the epic: in particular, the interpretation of the relationship between the narrative and the so-called “didactic”1 parts of the epic, and the text-historical questions that have been raised in this connection. While for some scholars the epic was composed in the very same form as it has been transmitted, and thus has always included the didactic parts, others argue that the transmitted epic is the result of a history of composition, in the course of which new parts were added to an old nucleus. Both positions have repercussions for the evaluation of the “philosophical” parts of the epic. From a text-historical point of view, the inclusion of instructions (Lehrreden) about various topics has been taken as a criterion for distinguishing older layers of “true” epic narrative from younger “didactic” layers, what Hopkins (1898, 1902) called the “pseudo-epic.” The function of such didactic episodes was seen as deploying an interpretation of the epic plot either according to Brahminic ideologies or according to specific religious or philosophical doctrines.2 In rejecting these views Dahlmann (1895, 1899, 1902) argued that there was an original connection between the narrative and didactic parts—the epic was always “an epic and a law book.” This “synthetic” view is based on the thesis that the epic text is the product of a single diaskeuasis carried out by a single redactor.3 Although not based on the thesis of a synthesizing “redactional unity,” a similar approach based on structuralist principles was pursued by M. Biardeau (1976, 1978)4 who viewed the epic as being pervaded by a fundamental, ideational unity of meaning. According to 1

The word “didactic” is used here to refer to all instructional episodes contained in the epic, not only the philosophical ones, and comprises not only the Śāntiparvan (of which the Mokṣadharmaparvan is deemed to be the “philosophical” part) but also the Anuśāsanaparvan as well as parts of Books Three and Five and the Bhagavadgītā (BhG) in Book Six and the Anugītā in Book Fourteen.

2

Holtzmann (1892–1895) argued that an originally “heroic poem” was later transformed into an “apologetic” text by Brahminical theologians and philosophers. Fitzgerald (2006) argues that the epic testifies to an attempt by brahmins to reclaim their intellectual and social status after a period of crisis brought about, inter alia, by the rise of Buddhism. According to Ruben (1956) the epic has been transmitted in the available manuscripts in its final Vaiṣṇava redaction.

3

See also Pisani (1939). The thesis of the “single diaskeuasis” was also proposed by Kirste (1900), who dated the extant epic in the second century CE (as does Hopkins 1898). Like Pisani (1939), Dahlmann emphasized the intrinsic connection between the narrative and issues of law (dharma) as can be seen in the title of his monograph Das Mahābhārata als Epos und Rechtsbuch (1895).

4

Dume´zil (1968, 1971) had postulated the “mythic unity” of the epic. The focus in ‘Dume´zil’s studies and with those following his views is on the so-called “tripartite” ideology characteristic of IndoEuropean mythology in general. He does not deal with the didactic parts. Sukthankar (1957) argues for the inner coherence of the epic on three levels by drawing heavily on a psychological perspective. Apart

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Biardeau, the epic as a whole expresses the ideology of what she calls “the universe of bhakti.” The didactic parts were seen as somehow sharing this “unity of meaning,” though this unity was not demonstrated in any greater detail.5 Only Dahlmann— following his “synthetic” perspective—has tried to demonstrate the philosophical unity of the epic in some detail (see below). Most work on the philosophical parts of the epic was done by scholars interested in the intertextual and historical relationships of the philosophical texts, either to other texts within the epic itself or to texts outside the epic, particularly the Upaniṣads and the texts of the philosophical schools. By analyzing the terms and doctrines of individual texts and comparing them with those in these other texts, the epic texts were given a place in the history of Indian philosophy. In this connection the texts were mostly viewed as belonging to different historical periods and social milieus that were characterized by particular intellectual concerns and were included in the epic at different stages of its composition.

Philosophy in the Epic—Philosophy of the Epic Quite early in the academic study of the epic, the term “philosophy” was used for some of the “didactic” texts included in the MBh. The expression “epic philosophy” was used by Hopkins and Dahlmann without much hesitation, but understood by them in two different ways, namely, as “philosophy in the epic” and as “philosophy of the epic” respectively. The majority of scholars follow the first understanding and use the word “philosophy” for identifying and grouping together texts, terms and doctrines as a body of knowledge collectively transmitted in the epic. Paradigmatic for this understanding, and for what is considered to be philosophy in the epic, is the group of texts that were translated by Deussen und Strauss in 1906 as Vier philosophische Texte des Mahābhāratam. It includes the following four texts: Sanatsujātaparvan (5.42–45), Bhagavadgītā (6.23–40), Mokṣadharmaparvan (12.168–353),6 and Anugītā (14.16– 50). The grouping together of these texts suggests that they can be dealt with independently from the epic narrative, as they are primarily connected to each other as “philosophical” texts and not because they are integral to the epic.7 This selection of Footnote 4 continued from the “mundane” level he discusses two “philosophical” levels—one ethical and one metaphysical— but without dealing very much with the philosophical passages themselves. 5

In a brief study of the BhG (Biardeau 1981) argues that the text is of central importance for the epic as it is an outright expression of the idea of bhakti, which is the basis of the epic as a whole. While the importance of bhakti in the BhG can hardly be denied, no close analysis of the whole text is given that takes account of the different levels of argument; for such an analysis, see Malinar (2007a).

6 It seems worthwhile noting that the Mokṣadharmaparvan (MDh) is taken and translated as one text without trying to distinguish between different sorts of texts or sub-parvans, such as the Nārāyaṇīyasection, or selecting only the “philosophical” chapters, as is done by Edgerton (1965) in his compilation of texts documenting The Beginnings of Indian Philosophy. Earlier, in 1882, three of those four texts (the MDh was omitted) were translated together in one volume in the “Sacred Books of the East” by Telang (1882). 7

This independence from the epic was recognized by later Indian philosophers only with regard to the Bhagavadgītā, on which exists a commentarial tradition from the seventh century up to the present age. No other texts, to my knowledge, were isolated from the epic text and given separate commentarial

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texts is thus indicative of an early canon of “philosophical” texts which was by and large accepted in subsequent research; only a few other texts (items mainly from the third and fifth book and taking up “ethical” issues) came to be added to this canon. For the most part, these texts were analyzed individually, while considering parallels with other texts within and without the epic and pointing to various historical and thematic connections to the history of Indian philosophy. Secondly, “epic philosophy” has been taken to mean “philosophy of the epic” (Philosophie des Epos). This understanding is in principle implied in all “holistic” interpretations of the epic, postulating a unity of meaning along with a unity of composition. (Dahlmann 1902) argued that this unity is expressed also in a single “philosophy of the epic.” He thought that the variety of philosophical views included in the epic pointed neither to different philosophies nor to different historical stages in the incorporation of philosophical material in the epic. Rather, differences should be viewed as variations of the one philosophy that was accepted by the epic redactor as the authoritative philosophical school of his time: Sa¯ṃkhya. For Dahlmann, Sa¯ṃkhya is the “philosophy of the epic.” This means that the epic redactor not only included philosophy in the epic as an indispensable feature of the text, but that he also had distinct philosophical preferences that he wanted the epic to voice. In so doing, the “diaskeute” selected what suited his intentions from the (older and newer) textual material available to him. He used it freely, without much concern for any over-all coherence, since Sa¯ṃkhya provided the common denominator lending the epic its philosophical unity (Dahlmann 1902, pp. ix–xiv, 19). According to Dahlmann, neither Veda¯nta nor Nya¯ya and Vais´eṣika play any role in the epic; the only other philosophical discourses represented, apart from Sa¯ṃkhya, are “skepticism” and “materialism” (hetuvāda, lokāyata; Dahlmann 1902, pp. xv–xvii). This view is rejected by Hopkins, who not only argues that the “didactic” parts of the epic are later than the old narrative core, but also that there are huge differences between the philosophical doctrines that came to be included in the epic: “its philosophical sections…reflect varied schools and contradictory systems, some of which are as late as our era” (Hopkins 1902, p. 363). In the chapter of his monograph on the MBh entitled “Epic Philosophy” Hopkins discusses the “great systems of philosophy”8 expounded in the epic and explains: To regard them as identical is impossible. To see in them a philosophical chaos, out of which are to arise future systems, is equally impossible. Some of them belong to the latest epic and they have their unity only in the fact that they are all colored by the dominant deistic view of an age that, having passed from pure idealism into dualism, sought to identify the spirit of man with that of a personal God. (Hopkins 1902, p. 85). Footnote 7 continued interpretation. Arguably the Nārāyaṇīya-section could be regarded as another exception, since it became an authoritative text in the Pa¯n˜cara¯tra tradition. 8

According to Hopkins these are: Vedism (orthodox Brahmanism), a¯tmanism (“an idealistic interpretation of life”), Sa¯ṃkhya, Yoga (“the deistic interpretation of Sa¯ṃkhya”), “sectarian interpretations of Yoga” (Bha¯gavata or Pa¯s´upata), and Veda¯nta (Hopkins 1902, pp. 85–86).

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According to Hopkins the only unity that could be said to connect the philosophical parts is not Sa¯ṃkhya, but “deism,” which becomes manifest in what he calls “sectarian interpretations” of Yoga. However, this unity is not dominant, but only appears as an attempt at unification because it is the latest addition. In fact, “some epic writers support Sa¯ṃkhya; some, Yoga; some, the sectarian interpretation …” (ibid., p. 86). Hopkins discusses these various positions by drawing together material from all over the epic according to the schools they belong to. Although Dahlmann’s views on the composition of the epic were generally rejected by other scholars as well (Garbe and Jacobi, for instance), there is some scholarly consensus that, of all philosophical doctrines or schools, Sa¯ṃkhya and Yoga are the ones most often presented in the epic. However, the question is what kinds of Sa¯ṃkhya and Yoga are we dealing with in the epic? And what might this tell us about the place of “epic philosophy” in the history of Indian philosophy? In this respect, Dahlmann and Hopkins share some common ground in that they both accept the existence of philosophical schools and even systems as the basis for the epic presentation of philosophy. This assumption was, and still is, contested, and quite different views exist on the relationship between so-called “epic Sa¯ṃkhya,”9 Sa¯ṃkhya school(s) of philosophy, and the “classical” or “systematic” formulation of this philosophy in the Sāṃkhyakārikā. At the one end of the spectrum we find the view that there is actually nothing like “philosophy” in the epic. According to Edgerton (1924), Yoga and Sa¯ṃkhya are in the epic neither metaphysical nor philosophical doctrines, but “ways of gaining salvation; that and nothing else…. [they do not] imply any ‘teaching’ at all in the sense of any speculative formulation of metaphysical truth, but merely the opinion that man could gain salvation by knowing the supreme truth, however formulated” (Edgerton 1924, p. 6; emphasis in the original). Although this apodictic emphasis10 does not make the statement more convincing, Edgerton does touch upon an important distinction; that between naming a philosophical view-point (such as Sa¯ṃkhya) and presenting it “philosophically,” that is, by means of definitions, arguments and proofs. While this distinction—and thus the possibility that the words yoga and sāṃkhya do not necessarily designate philosophies—must always be kept in mind, most scholars assume that at least Sa¯ṃkhya, in many instances, should be understood in the epic as a distinct metaphysical doctrine. With regard to the question as to whether Sa¯ṃkhya is already understood as the name of a philosophical school, there are again different positions, each having repercussions for determining the place of philosophy as presented in the epic in a history of Indian philosophy.

The expression “epic Sa¯ṃkhya” is unique in that it suggests that there a forms of Sa¯ṃkhya peculiar to the epic and that these form a stage in the history of Indian philosophy (this is why it was also rejected by some authors). In contrast to this, there is no discussion of “epic Yoga,” but plenty on “Yoga in the epic.” 9

10 In his later publications this emphasis seems less pronounced. In the introduction to his selection of texts from the MDh (Edgerton 1965) he considers these texts to be “as speculative or ‘philosophical’ as the Upaniṣads,” and he describes their place in the history of Indian philosophy as follows: “they mark another step, if not a very long one, in the direction of the systematic codification of classical Hindu philosophical systems” (Edgerton 1965, p. 35).

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“Mixed Philosophy,” “Philosophy of Transition,” and the Issue of “Epic Sāṃkhya” There are different positions regarding the place of epic philosophy in the history of Indian philosophy. First of all there is the view that the so-called philosophical texts in the epic are not yet “philosophy,” in the sense of being part of the same field of knowledge constituted in the texts of the philosophical schools. In this view, the epic mirrors a proto-philosophical stage, a “transition to philosophy” which culminates in the composition of the authoritative, systematic texts of the different philosophical schools. This situation explains both the variety of doctrines included in the epic as well as their often unsystematic, “confused” presentation. This view is put forward by Deussen (1908), for whom the epic represents an “Übergangsphilosophie” (“transitional philosophy”) out of which the philosophical systems eventually emerged. The philosophical texts contained in the epic mirror a change in world-view which is characterized by the decline of the original “idealism” of the older Upaniṣads. According to Deussen, the philosophy in the epic is the philosophy of a time “in which the pure idealism of the oldest Upanishads is already strongly clouded over by the overgrowth of realistic leanings such as those which eventually crystallized into the Sa¯ṃkhya system” (Deussen 1908: vii, my translation). The epic composers were no philosophers, but part of the “fermenting und unrefined consciousness of the age in which they were living” (ibid., p. 21, my translation). The general lack of clarity also has repercussions for the presentation of philosophical ideas in the epic, which is sometimes characterized by the mixing of terms and ideas irrespective of their provenance, or by assigning contradictory statements to one and the same teacher. As a consequence, one is left with a “strange jumble, in which older and younger trains of thought are often muddled up in various ways” (ibid., p. 21, my translation). Therefore, Deussen does not arrange the epic texts according to schools or systems, as Hopkins did, but groups them together according to the “special disciplines” typical of Western philosophy such as “ethics” or “psychology.”11 In contrast to Hopkins’s arrangement according to schools, the thematic extraction and rearrangement of text passages here is based on the assumption that they belong together as parts of a single system (in the case of Dahlmann) or of a shared “proto-philosophical” milieu (Deussen). With this interpretation, categories, such as “ethics,” are used for which there are no corresponding terms ready to hand in the epic.12 In any case, while the thematic arrangement is useful for systematic purposes or to gain an overview of the contents, it entails a re-organization and re-contextualization of both the individual

11

See Deussen (1908, 74ff., 38ff.). Although Dahlmann’s view on the philosophy of the epic differs from Deussen’s, he gives a similar presentation of the Sa¯ṃkhya philosophy of the epic, organized by headings such as ethics, etc. (Dahlmann 1902, 113ff., 79ff.).

12 Nevertheless, studies on “ethics” in the MBh have become a “specialization,” although only rarely are they connected to any philosophical understanding of what this would mean. Usually, these studies deal either with the BhG or with “moral issues” or discourses on dharma (“correct behavior, law”), the term being used for all the “practical” aspects of philosophical doctrines or “world-views;” see for instance, the essays in Matilal (1989) and Bailey (1983).

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passages and the doctrines according to categories that are external to the epic as well as to the authoritative texts of the philosophical schools. Against Deussen’s idea of a “transitional philosophy”, Garbe (1917) argued that the epic mirrors an already established philosophical discourse, from which the epic authors draw philosophical terms and doctrines in various combinations.13 According to Garbe, the philosophical systems were already in place when the epic composers began to include philosophy in their text and employed philosophical terms and doctrines for their own purposes. This selective process did not result in the championing of a single philosophy, but in the presentation of combinations of terms and tenets peculiar to the epic, which Garbe called “Mischphilosophie” (“mixed philosophy”). This situation also explains why the Sa¯ṃkhya teachings in the epic are almost identical with the so-called “classical” Sa¯ṃkhya of the Sāṃkhyakārikā, although they are presented in the epic “mixed” with other ideas. According to Garbe, the middle Upaniṣads and the epic do not point to a “preclassical” or “epic” form of Sa¯ṃkhya (both these designations were rejected by Garbe 1917, p. 36), but rather to a fully formulated system which was blended in these texts with other speculations, in particular with Veda¯nta ideas about brahman. In the MBh, “Sa¯ṃkhya” is mixed up with Veda¯nta, in what is often more a “mishmash” (ibid., p. 36) than a synthesis.14 For Garbe the blending of “pantheistic ideas” with Sa¯ṃkhya terminology and the “mythological personification” of the material tattvas (such as buddhi) were characteristic features of the epic appropriation of philosophy (ibid., p. 59). The idea of “mixture” is also employed in order to explain the situation that in the epic, Sa¯ṃkhya is often presented together with Yoga, or is even regarded to be the same as Yoga. This account of the matter does not match exactly the self-presentation in the Yogasūtra and Sāṃkhyakārikā, in which important distinctions between the two schools are discernible. According to Garbe, these differences are not the result of a gradual separation of Yoga and Sa¯ṃkhya, but rather point to the original situation of them being two separate philosophical or religious orientations. At a later point, Yoga has taken much of its philosophical terminology from Sa¯ṃkhya. The “eclectic” Sa¯ṃkhya-Yoga of the epic is another example of mixing and not indicative of an “original” stage in which both schools were still united (as Dahlmann would have it).15 The meaning of the words yoga and sāṃkhya as well as the historical and systematic relationship between Sa¯ṃkhya and Yoga, in both their “epic” and “classical” formulations, have remained important issues also in current research.16 13

On the larger context of the debate between Deussen and Garbe, see Malinar (2016).

This is also the position of Jacobi (1895), who also points to the blending of Sa¯ṃkhya and Yoga and then of Sa¯ṃkhya-Yoga with Veda¯nta as the characteristic feature of the epic reception of these philosophical positions. Sa¯ṃkhya is re-modeled in the epic in order to give “popular religion” (i.e. bhakti) a philosophical foundation. 14

15 The difference between the two philosophies was usually defined along the lines of “theism” and “atheism,” with Sa¯ṃkhya being “atheistic” and Yoga “theistic.” Dahlmann (1902, 6ff.) argues against Garbe that the originally theistic Sa¯ṃkhya became atheistic and thereby separated itself from the original unity of epic Sa¯ṃkhya-Yoga. 16 See below for Frauwallner’s reconstruction of this history of the two schools and the separate treatment of both schools by Brockington (1999, 2003), the discussion of priority by Schreiner (1999), the analysis of their interrelated depiction in MBh 12.289–290 by Fitzgerald (2012), the analysis of Sa¯ṃkhya

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These two views on the place of epic philosophy within the history of Indian philosophy need not be mutually exclusive if they are historicized by connecting them to reconstructions of the textual history of the epic. Such historicization has already been undertaken in certain respects by Hopkins, and was later elaborated in greater detail by Frauwallner. Frauwallner argued that the epic contains older texts belonging to a pre-systematic stage and also younger texts that draw on already fully elaborated philosophical systems.17 This historical complexity was demonstrated by Frauwallner in his analysis and reconstruction of the texts he considered to represent the oldest versions of what later developed into the philosophical schools. The oldest versions were identified through their closeness to the Upaniṣads and the absence in them of “theistic” layers. In analyzing the philosophical texts of the epic, Frauwallner proceeded on the assumption of an original text in which the oldest form of a philosophical doctrine is preserved. He divides those oldest texts into socalled “non-sa¯ṃkhyistic” texts that deal with cosmology and Yoga without any reference to Sa¯ṃkhya (Frauwallner 1925a), on the one hand, and, on the other, the oldest versions of Sa¯ṃkhya which lack particular terms and doctrines characteristic of the later system (Frauwallner 1925b). He argues that later versions of these old philosophical doctrines that have been included in the epic at a later stage of its composition show traces of having influenced each other in the intervening period of time. Thus, in some younger texts Sa¯ṃkhya terms have been implemented in the older cosmology and in Yoga doctrines [the latter development corroborates the view put forward by Garbe and others that Yoga was originally separate from Sa¯ṃkhya (Garbe 1925a, p. 66)]. Conversely, Sa¯ṃkhya teachings now include as a new element ideas about the dissolution of the world (ibid., 54f.). In his History of Indian Philosophy (1953) Frauwallner postulates that these three groups of texts (Textgruppen) represent different historical stages and layers in the composition of the MDh. The oldest layers are the non-sa¯ṃkhyistic texts, followed by the oldest versions of Sa¯ṃkhya and then by texts in which Sa¯ṃkhya has become the basis for the formulation of different religious doctrines (Frauwallner 1953, 99ff.). While Frauwallner’s general layering of epic texts was accepted as a referential framework in some subsequent studies (see for instance Hacker 1961; Aramaki 1989; and Brockington 1999), his textual analyses were also criticized. His interpretation of MBh 12.187 and 239–41 as representing the oldest version of Sa¯ṃkhya in the epic was based on the thesis that it lacks the theory of the evolution of the tattvas, a feature typical of “classical” Sa¯ṃkhya. It was only introduced in later additions to the epic, namely in 12.224.18 This view was rejected by van Footnote 16 continued and Yoga in the BhG in Malinar (2007a), and of the influence of Sa¯ṃkhya on the interpretation of Yoga powers in the epic by Malinar (2012a). 17 See Frauwallner (1925a, b, 1926, 1953). Hacker (1961, p. 76) described Frauwallner’s approach as follows: “it is no longer justified now to speak of the philosophy of Mbh as of a body of doctrines exhibiting anything like intrinsic unity. The didactic pieces of the epic reflect several currents of thought belonging to different periods of time, from which no other documents are available, and to some extent developments can be traced within the texts themselves.” Hacker also thought that Frauwallner had actually overcome the opposition between Deussen and Garbe described above. 18

This text was studied by Hacker (1961) in accordance with Frauwallner’s approach.

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Buitenen (1956), who proposed a different reconstruction of the teachings contained in these texts. Both these reconstructions are, however, based on conflations and problematic selections of suitable text passages, as has been pointed out by Bakker and Bisschop (1999). Furthermore, these two suggested the existence of a different historical setting that both echoes and qualifies Garbe’s and Hopkins’s views. They postulated that the epic composer(s) were familiar with different philosophical schools or teacher-traditions and that they selected texts and view-points to be included in the epic for their own particular purposes. With this argument, Bakker and Bisschop rejected not only Frauwallner’s idea of original versions, but also Garbe’s view that the philosophical school of Sa¯ṃkhya was already established. They suggest that plurality rather than unity may better account for what we are dealing with in the epic: the starting point may not have been one ‘Grundtext’ that degenerated into various distorted representations, but rather a plurality of theories and views that found textual expression and was amalgamated in a parvan or sub-parvan, which became gradually more homogenous in a process of composition-intransmission. This process may have been concomitant with the rise of the classical school of Sa¯ṃkhya…. This genetic model would imply that, though the Mokṣadharma as we have it offers already a bewildering diversity of often contradicting views, the historical reality at the time of its first composition was still more complex—each ashram, so to speak, having its own competing version of proto-Sa¯ṃkhya philosophy and being keen on having it canonized in the Smṛti. (Bakker and Bisschop 1999, p. 468.) The emphasis on the plurality of the teaching traditions and the model of incorporation here proposed open up the discussion of epic philosophy anew: they allow for a more flexible approach which invites not only the diachronic tracing of developments, but also the acceptance of different presentations of philosophical doctrines, and elaborations of them as coeval and requiring synchronous examination. Pursuing a more flexible approach entails not only a rethinking of our assumptions with regard to what is identified as “Sa¯ṃkhya,”19 but, more generally, to what is considered to be “philosophy” in the epic. So we must now consider some of the implications of our using the term “philosophy” in the analysis of the epic texts.

Implicit Assumptions in the Study of Epic Philosophy The earlier discussion showed that the term philosophy was generally accepted for the epic texts without much hesitation, but also without much in the way of explanation of what it might mean. This fact seems all the more remarkable since the term “philosophy” carries several important associations connected to the history of western philosophical discourse, associations that in other contexts 19 This question is raised also by Bakker and Bisschop (1999, p. 469); see also my paper on the presentation of Pan˜cas´ikha’s Sa¯ṃkhya in this volume.

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occasioned serious doubts about the applicability of the term to the Indian intellectual tradition.20 Although the exact meaning of “philosophy” with regard to the epic was rarely discussed, many of its texts were nevertheless approached with certain assumptions about what is “philosophical.” These assumptions were rarely made explicit, even though they influenced what in the epic is identified as “philosophy” in the first place and then studied as such. While such implicit assumptions are certainly part of any hermeneutical enterprise, they should be made explicit with regard to the key terminology applied to the texts and then, if necessary, modified when analyzing the texts and the cultural-historical contexts in which they are embedded. Some of the implicit assumptions have been particularly relevant for the study of epic philosophy and shall be discussed briefly. Firstly, “philosophy” has often been seen as distinct from “religion” or “theology,” and is thus preferably located in texts devoid of “theistic” or “religious” overtones or re-workings. With respect to the epic material, this understanding of philosophy was sometimes taken for granted, as can be seen, for instance, when “theistic” and “non-theistic” forms of a doctrine were historically and generically separated from each other, as discussed before with regard to Yoga and Sa¯ṃkhya. The unqualified application of the distinction between philosophy and religion in the Indian source texts may result in the outright exclusion of some texts as documents of the history of Indian philosophy. Frauwallner, for instance, is emphatic that the “oldest and most valuable” (Frauwallner 1953, p. 99) philosophical texts are to be found in the MDh only. This decision results in the verdict that the Bhagavadgītā is a totally overrated text without “real” value for the intellectual history of India and was influential only because of its theistic doctrines (ibid., p. 100). An important aspect of the application of the distinction between philosophy and religion is the interpretation of their historical relationship. With regard to the epic, philosophy is often seen to precede its religious reformulations. Thus, doctrinal expositions referring to or centering on the idea of god (as creator and, or, the transcendent “Highest”) are considered to be late-comers in the epic, to belong to “theistic thought” or “religion.” The opposite view has been proposed as well, namely, that philosophy unfolds when thought became independent from religion, marking a more advanced stage of human and historical development. Seen from this perspective, the mixing of “true” philosophy with religious ideas can be seen as a sign that a text does belong to an older stratum of thought, when philosophy and religion were not yet separate. (Ruben 1956) held this position when he pointed out that epic philosophy is generally characterized by the “mingling” of religion and philosophy, which is typical for the time in which the epic was composed. Yet, there are some passages in the epic in which Sa¯ṃkhya is presented as “pure” philosophy, that is, as a doctrine of correct practice without the over-all concern for liberation; it is a Sa¯ṃkhya “minus mokṣa” (Ruben 1956, p. 187).21 20 For some aspects of the debate over the applicability of the term “philosophy” to the intellectual history of India, see Halbfass (1988); for the connection of this debate to similar discussions about the legitimacy of applying the term “religion” to Hinduism, see Malinar (2006). 21

According to Ruben, liberation is “in itself a religious conception” (Ruben 1956, p. 187) and must therefore be distinguished from true philosophical discourse, which is, according to his Marxist approach, characterized by materialism; see also Ruben (1971).

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Irrespective of the view one takes on this question, it needs to be kept in mind that the distinction between philosophy and religion is characteristic of the modern understanding of both the history of philosophy and of philosophy as a discipline.22 It is however questionable whether this distinction can and should be applied to the Indian sources without caveats. Indian philosophical discourse is apparently not generally based on its being distinct from what is called “theology” in other cultures. Nor should the idea of “liberation” or a “highest good” be seen as the exclusive hallmark of what is now called “religion.” In the case of the epic such suppositions could well be misleading when one is studying its “philosophical” doctrines comprehensively, because more often than not these doctrines are intrinsically connected to notions of something that is “highest” and to other metaphysical entities (which is the case in many of the later philosophical schools as well).23 A second assumption which pervades the study of philosophy in the epic is the idea that “philosophy” is connected to systematic presentation and argumentative discourse and finds its fullest and “highest” expression in a “system.” In this case, the label “philosophy” for the epic material produces the expectation that topics deemed “philosophical” are presented “philosophically”—that is in a coherent, systematic way in which one argument builds upon another, technical terms are carefully defined, and so on. In this case, such expectations are present not only because one may have in mind certain (nowadays by and large outdated) standards of classical Western “Systemphilososophie” (“system-philosophy”) such as Hegel’s, but also because one may be aware that similar standards apply to authoritative expositions of the doctrines of the Indian philosophical schools. It appears that Indian philosophers did not compose commentaries on texts from the MDh, nor did they regularly quote stanzas from this part of the epic when expounding their own doctrines or rejecting their opponents’ doctrines, both of which they did with the Upaniṣads, for instance.24 These facts may indicate that these texts were not regarded as being particularly relevant to “expert” philosophical discourse (further inquiry is necessary here, however). On the other hand, the epic texts were partially transmitted in the Pura¯ṇas, the genre which, in the following centuries, continued this manner of presenting philosophy in spite of the fact that the philosophical schools and the scholastic exposition of their tenets were well established. The epic may, perhaps, be seen as the paradigm for this (see below). 22 Deussen’s work can be seen as an exception to this rule; his not sharing this view-point is indicated in the title of his multi-volume Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Religionen [“General History of Philosophy with special consideration of religions” (Deussen 1884– 1914)]. As a consequence he does not distinguish between religious and philosophical texts in the MDh and uses philosophical categories in his treatment of the Bhagavadgītā. 23 It is precisely these difficulties that have occasioned doubts about whether Indian philosophy is “truly” philosophy; see footnote 20 above. 24 This lack of attention can be asserted at least with regard to the majority of the classical sūtra texts and the earlier commentaries on them (especially of the Sa¯ṃkhya and Yoga schools). This point needs further elaboration, especially with regard to later philosophical texts. The contrasting example from the epic is of course the Bhagavadgītā, which did enter the specialist philosophical discourse through various commentaries written on it.

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Thirdly, in the context of academic studies, the classification of some epic texts as “philosophy” seems to imply a general acknowledgement of the value of these for the reconstruction of the history of Indian philosophy generally. In this case, “philosophy” does not mean much more than regarding texts as “philosophical” when they contain information about terms, teachers, and doctrines that also play a role in the Indian philosophical schools. They are important and worth studying as historical documents, rather than because they have a “philosophical” value of their own. On the contrary, in comparison with the systematic and technical philosophical discourse of the schools, the epic texts were more often than not considered to be “deficient” with regard to the way in which they present philosophical tenets. By virtue of this comparison, the term “philosophy” was applied to the epic texts with certain expectations of a systematic, clear, coherent, etc.,—in brief, “philosophical”—form of presentation; these expectations were rarely, if ever, met. As mentioned earlier, scholars have pointed to the unsystematic, confused, meandering, “muddled” treatment of doctrines, which sometimes appears to prevent any understanding at all.25 The views on the place of the epic in the history of Indian philosophy discussed earlier serve to provide possible explanations for this situation. The “confusion” has been seen as the result of philosophy being still “in statu nascendi” at the time of the composition of the epic, or as indicative of the textual history of the epic, in which terms and doctrines belonging to different times were added or juxtaposed to one another with greater or lesser degrees of skill. The implicit assumptions about philosophy in the epic discussed just above have influenced and sometimes even directed the study of epic texts when such study has focused on the relationships between the epic texts and the later texts of the philosophical schools. While this matter is certainly an important one, pursuing it becomes even more problematic when the basic approach to it employs the same historiographic models used to reconstruct the history of Western philosophy.26 Such problems occur, for instance, when a study seeks to distinguish philosophical from theological discourse, or takes “system-building philosophy” as the paradigm of philosophy as such. These hermeneutic filters need to be made explicit, and beyond that, they must also be adjusted and enhanced in order to deal with the ways philosophy is included and presented in the Indian epic. The Indian traditions distinguished quite early on between different forms of instruction and debate which also applied to philosophical discourse. These distinctions should also be considered when dealing with epic philosophy. Thus, focused research on the epic texts could fruitfully be enhanced by further reflection on the historiography of Indian philosophy; for instance by further exploring the ways the historical context might have been characterized by doctrinal pluralism and multiple versions of a philosophical doctrine (as suggested by Bakker and Bisschop 1999). Furthermore, as shall be discussed in what follows, more research is necessary on how philosophy is presented in the epic. 25

Another important reason for the difficulties in interpreting some of the texts lies in the state in which they have been preserved in the available manuscripts. Frauwallner, for instance, pointed out that they were not always transmitted carefully and that one should be prepared for “Verderbnisse jeder Art” (“corruptions of all kinds,” Frauwallner 1925, p. 183). 26

On the historiography of Indian philosophy, see the essays in Franco (2013).

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Forms of Presenting Philosophical Discourse in the Epic Only rarely did scholars take up the matter of “style” at a more fundamental level. O. Strauss took it up in a short article “Über den Stil der philosophischen Partien des Mahābhārata” (1908) after facing persistently, and at length, the very real difficulties these texts present (Strauss translated the whole Mokṣadharmaparvan and other epic philosophical texts into German together with P. Deussen). Strauss detected the lack of a genuine philosophical interest and expertise on the part of the “epic bards,” something that prevented them from delivering sound and systematic philosophical instruction (Strauss 1908, p. 667). Although they were able to voice criticism and skeptical reflections on the established (Vedic) tradition, and were capable of raising philosophical questions occasionally, they were not (yet) able to give satisfying, that is, real philosophical answers.27 In his view, the ways philosophy is presented in the epic can only be regarded as deficient when compared to the systematic style of the scholastic discourse.28 While Strauss’s frustration arises from expectations of “systematicity” lingering in the term “philosophy,” he points as well to a discrepancy between the critical, argumentative quality of the issues raised and the lack of argument in the answers. This is worthy of further reflection. Strauss sees in this discrepancy nothing more than that the authors were not yet able dialectically to defend or present the positions they supported. Indeed, the often purely assertive style of instruction and the terminological fluctuations are central issues that do have to be addressed constantly when analyzing the epic material. It is often difficult to discern the structure in a chapter or a sequence of chapters on the basis of the assumption that an argument or an instruction about a specific doctrine or philosophy is contained therein. Yet, it seems rather improbable that the epic composers raised questions to which their answers were unclear, or became available only hundreds of years later, as Strauss suggests. This idea defies not only the self-representation of the epic as a reputable text but also the self-representation of the epic bards as skillful reciters and of their audience as competent listeners. An alternative approach to the issue is to view the ways in which philosophical topics are presented in the epic as the result of a deliberate, purposeful reception of philosophical discourse by the epic composer(s) or redactor(s).29 In order to pursue this approach further, it seems necessary to rethink some of the previously discussed assumptions implied in the term “philosophy” when approaching the epic texts. In addition to analyzing the texts with respect to their place in the history of Indian philosophy, the way in which “philosophy” is presented in the epic corpus 27 See Strauss (1908, p. 668): “Schärfe der Argumentation finden wir dabei wesentlich auf skeptischer Seite, zur dialektischen Verteidigung der auf dem vedischen Dogma oder auf metaphysischen Überzeugungen ruhenden Lehren sind die epischen Denker noch nicht reif.” 28 Strauss suggests that it was against the “Zeitgeist” to present a philosophical system for its own sake; instead, philosophical texts were “framed” with often superficial questions (ibid., 1906, p. 662; my translation). 29

This does not exclude the fact that some of the texts included in the MDh have been transmitted in a form which seems to defy any attempts to distil from them an argument or doctrine (as was pointed out by Frauwallner 1925; see above footnote 25). Yet, their number is limited and these were not the texts Strauss had in mind, when he diagnosed intellectual shortcomings on the side of the epic bards.

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should also be studied. Doing this would mean inquiring into the place and the function of these texts within the epic. In this way, the analysis of these texts may offer information about the purposes, intentions and choices of textual genre which accompanied the inclusion of “philosophy” in the epic. Questions of function, purpose and style should accompany the analysis of epic philosophical texts more often. Doing so would mean allowing for a variety of intentions and purposes that may have motivated the epic redactor(s) to include a text in the epic. The plurality of views present in the intellectual discourse and historical environment of the epic composer(s) or redactor(s) has been rightfully highlighted by Bakker and Bisschop (1999). Furthermore, they hint at a possible interest on the part of the philosophical circles and individual teacher-lineages to have their teachings included in a text which had already gained a high reputation. Such interests must have been matched by the composer-transmitters of the epic and their patrons as well. A plurality of interests and styles of presentation may very plausibly be assumed on their side as well, rather than a single purpose and style. Thus the motive for including certain philosophical texts or discussions in the epic was, perhaps, not primarily “philosophical” in a technical sense (as would have been the case when they were dealt with by the experts of the philosophical schools), but rather “didactic,” “narrative” or “encyclopedic” and perhaps also motivated by issues of reputation or patronage. Some of the philosophical texts can even be regarded as narratives about philosophical doctrines, something philosophical texts usually lack, though “narrative” devices like metaphor and comparison may be also recognized as components of philosophical discourse. Viewed from this perspective, some of the epic texts can be seen as dealing with philosophy at a level and in a form purposefully different from that of the philosophical sūtras and commentaries. They present philosophy transposed and enacted in specific contexts (narrative, aporetic, educational, etc.) and these contexts lend both the epic and the philosophical doctrines additional levels of significance and appeal. Such forms of dealing with philosophy are mentioned in the texts of the “experts” of the philosophical schools as well. For instance, I¯s´varakṛṣṇa in his Sāṃkhyakārikā points out that the Ṣaṣṭitantra, of which the Sāṃkhyakārikā is an abridgment, contained ākhyāyikās, narratives illustrating the philosophical doctrines, which he has omitted.30 The ways in which philosophy is included in textual genres that are not philosophical discourse proper is an important, though not much studied,31 aspect of both epic philosophy and the history of Indian philosophy. In this regard, the epic can be regarded as a seminal text,32 in that it popularized not only certain philosophical doctrines and teachers, but also allowed “nonexperts” to gain insights into the ways philosophy and philosophical teachers deal 30 See Sāṃkhyakārikā (72). The author of the Yuktidīpikā in his commentary on SK 70 points out that the teacher Pan˜cas´ikha has popularized Sa¯ṃkhya by instructing Janaka, Vas´iṣṭha and others; see also my article “Narrating Sa¯ṃkhya Philosophy” in this volume. 31

See, however Fitzgerald (1980, pp. 336–360) on the rhetorics of MDh texts (distinguishing between exhortatory and expository texts.

32 The Upaniṣads as well as Buddhist canonical texts have certainly set examples for such presentations of philosophical tenets, while the epic has probably been the paradigm for the Pura¯ṇas, which often present philosophical doctrines as well.

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with the problems they were asked to address or even solve. These epic presentations of philosophy range from open polemics against fruitless philosophical reasoning that only undermines established authorities to philosophically styled reflections on how to establish valid knowledge, and whole treatises on individual doctrines and also narratives that present a philosophical teaching as the “moral of the tale.” Rather than viewing the forms of presentation of philosophy in the epic as merely “deficient” when compared to the systematic style of the scholastic discourse, it may be fruitful to analyze the ways in which epic philosophy is presented as a result of choices made regarding genre, rhetoric and discourse style.33 What may be called the “epic” form of presenting philosophy and theology persisted in the Pura¯ṇas—that is, at a time when there can be no doubt that “systematic” philosophy was well established. This fact suggests that the epic style of presentation is not necessarily rooted in a lack of systematization or philosophical skills, or in its presenting a “proto-form” of later systematic philosophy. Even when contents are “updated” continuously in the Pura¯ṇic texts, the “epic” style persists, while the philosophical terms and doctrines are employed according to the purposes of the composer(s) of this or that Pura¯ṇa.34 This persistence of the ways that epic and Pura¯ṇic texts used philosophical discourse suggests that philosophy in the epic was also connected to already established scholastic forms for the formulation of philosophical doctrines and to a plurality of teaching-lineages (as suggested by Bakker and Bisschop 1999). Such teaching contexts are depicted in the epic; and there are references to earlier teachers as well as to “lost” schools in the later literature of the philosophical schools. While the composition of authoritative texts of philosophical schools is an important factor in establishing “philosophy” as a field of knowledge in Indian intellectual discourse, this does not mean that serious philosophical debates were absent or “in statu nascendi” only. The epic, like the Pali Canon, are evidence to the contrary and they also point to the situation that philosophical doctrines and teachers were connected not only to each other, but also to other social contexts and non-expert audiences. It must also be borne in mind that the expert philosophical discourse of a philosophical school, consolidated by the development of authoritative texts, would not necessarily imply unity, let alone univocality, within the teacher-traditions, not to mention unanimity of interpretation among users of the text. The commentaries on the Sāṃkhyakārikā give evidence of various understandings of Sa¯ṃkhya by different teachers of the school. Analyzing epic philosophy requires dealing not only with versions of Sa¯ṃkhya and Yoga that often differ from those presented in the classical philosophical texts; one must also deal with philosophical topics and terms that are used for framing or interpreting epistemological issues that are important in the epic, such as doubt and dilemmas regarding established authorities and forms of knowledge (such as Vedic rituals, rules of kinship, etc.). At the center of criticism were two areas of Vedabased knowledge, firstly, the assertion of invisible things such as an “immortal self” (ātman) or the working of the law of karman (the law of retribution). Furthermore, doubts and dilemmas are voiced regarding established ideas about divinity and 33

See also Fitzgerald (2012) when interpreting 12.289–90 as a “manifesto.”

34

This has been demonstrated by Hacker (1961) in one of the rare studies on this topic.

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power as well as about dharma, the socio-ritual norms and right practices for obtaining legitimate as well as desired goals. In several instances the validity of the traditional teachings is questioned and the notion of pramāṇa, “authority” or “means of knowledge” (one of the key terms of the expert philosophical discourse) becomes important. This is the case, for instance, in the debates about the justification for war in the Udyogaparvan and the Bhagavadgītā (see Malinar 2007a for an analysis), in the conversation between Draupadī and Yudhisthira about dharma in 3.28–33 (see ˙˙ Malinar 2007b for an analysis of the whole dialogue), in Duryodhana’s arguments about kingship and divinity in 5.60 (see Malinar 2012b), Sulabha¯’s discourse on karman in 12.308 (see Fitzgerald 2002), or Yudhiṣṭhira’s arguments with respect to the validity of the Veda in 12.251–252. These examples show that the composers of an epic text that does not primarily address philosophical experts did deliberately include “philosophical” doctrines and forms of philosophical debates and arguments in order to deal with normative, epistemological or metaphysical doubts arising in the epic plot. In doing so, they were, on the one hand, drawing on the philosophical knowledge traditions available to or preferred by them, and, on the other hand, were developing a “bardic” repertoire of techniques for dealing with complex, philosophical issues in literary contexts, that is, in the textual genre to which the epic belongs. One of these techniques is that philosophical queries and arguments are addressed by telling a story. This is the case, for instance, in 12.252, when Bhīsma answers Yudhiṣṭhira’s ˙ inconclusive reasoning about the validity of the Veda with a long story about the merchant Tula¯dha¯ra. This technique of addressing a problem that was formulated by drawing on reasoning of a philosophical sort by telling a story instead of giving a sophisticated answer has been felt by some scholars to be “unphilosophical” (see above with regard to Strauss). But instead of regarding this technique to be an indication of a lack of sophistication, it might be fruitful to explore it as part of a “bardic” repertoire for handling arguments and instructions. I suggest that such techniques were employed as a matter of choice—as narrative, didactic or rhetorical devices; and I suggest further that they were able to be employed because they were accepted by audiences as legitimate forms of dealing with such issues. Furthermore, apart from the various dilemmas arising in the course of the epic narrative, the epic composers and redactors included, in the MDh, texts dealing with terms and topics as well as various interpretations of them reflecting various ideological concerns. In so doing they seem to have been interested in “updating” their presentation by including new terms and forms of inquiry. The evidence of both the epic and other contemporary sources confirm the likelihood that the epic composers were (1) connected to a plurality of views and teachers35 and not to an original text nor to one dominant philosophical school, (2) were living in a context in which skillful debates on terms and doctrines were already well established, and (3) were interested in (or had patrons interested in) 35 This has been emphasized by Hopkins (1902, p. 363) with regard to the numerous Vedic schools and by Bakker and Bisschop (1999) with regard to teaching-traditions which they apparently see as evolving together with the philosophical discourse. It should be noticed that Frauwallner (1925, p. 192) also emphasized the variety of Sa¯ṃkhya and non-Sa¯ṃkhya teachings and allowed for independent developments of ideas apart from any teleology that might be implied in the idea of the “classical” texts.

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expressing the drama of the dynastic-cum-cosmic crisis narrated in the epic at an additional level of intellectual discourse that questioned, transformed, or restored the validity and functionality of the well-established doctrines and practices. Such a situation made it likely that the epic composer(s) noticed further doctrinal developments that they accepted or criticized, and that they became inclined (or had patrons who became inclined) to give preference to certain doctrines such as Sa¯ṃkhya, Sa¯ṃkhya-based Yoga or Sa¯ṃkhya-based religious doctrines. But such possibilities have to be determined and demonstrated in each case in a close study of the individual texts.36 This view does not require assuming that the “classical” schools were already in place, as Garbe postulated, but that there were teachingtraditions with stable terminologies, identifiable tenets and defined modes of argument. While the chronology of the texts of both the philosophical schools and the epic cannot be fixed at the moment either absolutely or relatively, the existence of structured expert debates is amply attested in different sources from around the 3rd c. BCE onwards. The epic poets responded to this existing philosophical discourse in different ways that must all be taken into account when dealing with this material. Seen from this perspective, philosophy in the epic is addressed, expressed and called upon in different formats or textual forms; here is a general overview of the most important of them. Philosophy in the epic is presented as: (1) (2) (3)

(4) (5)

Instructional presentations of particular philosophical doctrines as topics in themselves. Narratives about philosophical teachers which may or may not include their instructions. Philosophical terms and doctrines employed as arguments or elements of instruction in “dialogs” (saṃvāda-s) about issues or problems that, for the most part, arise from events narrated in the epic or from particular requests for instruction (in these the interlocutors are “peers” [two or more “wise men,” ṛṣis], relatives [husband–wife, father–son, brother–brother-in-law, etc.] or individuals in one or another social relationship [teacher–disciple, king– ascetic, etc.]). Tales about philosophical problems or doctrines (e.g. karman, valid knowledge about dharma). Polemics against philosophical reasoning and criticism of traditional authorities by drawing on “philosophical” methods.

This rough sketch of the levels of epic engagement with contemporaneous philosophical discourse suggests that the epic material needs to be explored with regard to the function of philosophically informed discussions and instructions within the various contexts of their appearance in the epic, in addition to their historical connections to the philosophical schools. While there is certainly some overlap among these different epic forms, their different purposes and contexts are 36 This task was undertaken only relatively lately, because the thematic arrangement of the philosophical material dominated scholarship on epic philosophy for a long time. It began with Frauwallner’s analyses of text-groups in 1925, but has, by and large, been continued only since the 1950s.

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discernible. Given the over-all importance of embedding instructions in narrative settings and of presenting narratives as instructions, the functions and types of such settings need to be considered when analyzing philosophy in the epic, as these settings contain potentially important information about the kind of debate or instruction presented in a text-passage.37 Philosophical terms and teachers are presented in a peculiar blending of narrative setting, inquiry and style of reasoning. Carefully attending to such rapprochement of narrative, argumentative and didactic levels in studying these texts may enhance significantly our understanding of the scope of the philosophical material and the forms of their presentation in the epic.38 This approach seems all the more important as such rapprochement is not confined to the epic, but is also present in the Pura¯ṇas and is thus not displaced by the expertdebates in later philosophical and commentarial literature. This approach calls for us to widen our sense of the context of epic philosophy from the almost exclusive focus on the relationship of the epic to the expert discourse of the philosophical schools to the epic’s relationship to the presentation of philosophy in later non-expert text genres such as the Pura¯ṇas. While it seems probable that the Pura¯ṇic texts were by and large “up to date” doctrinally, it would be helpful for the interpretation of the epic presentation of philosophy if it could be demonstrated that there existed characteristic non-expert forms of philosophical exposition that persisted even after the texts and commentaries of the philosophical schools were very well established. Furthermore, in order to study comprehensively how philosophical discourse is presented in the epic, it seems important also to include general characteristic features of philosophical discourse in the analysis. Up to now, terms and topics that refer specifically to philosophy in a technical sense have not received much attention—questions such as when an argument or teaching is regarded as “valid” or when a discussion or instruction about “true” knowledge touches upon what is a reliable means of knowledge.39 So in addition to studying the doctrinal contents of philosophical teachings, it seems worthwhile to take a closer look at the different ways or styles in which philosophical terms, teachers and doctrines are presented in the epic; how they are connected to structures of narration and argument; and in which respects these texts share certain features that make them “epic” texts—for instance in their taking up aspects of the epic tale at a philosophical or didactic level. The epic uses of philosophy attest to the attention given to these issues outside the “circles” of the discipline of philosophy itself, and they point to an interest on the part of some to be informed about, and perhaps even educated in, terms and tenets of philosophical teachers and schools. There is not much interest in the epic in the technicalities and commentarial disputes through which these doctrines are formally established in the expert discourse; nor in the specific arrangement of the philosophical texts. Rather, the epic use of philosophy seeks to learn what it is that philosophical doctrines have 37

Such contextualization has been carried out for the Bhagavadgītā, demonstrating the importance of arguments in this “religious” text and, conversely, the importance of the epic narrative context for the presentation of its doctrines (Malinar 2007a). 38

For such a study see my article on “Narrating Sa¯ṃkhya Philosophy” in this volume.

39

The epic use of important terms demarcating the field of scholarly debate of the philosophical schools, such as pramāṇa, hetu, tarka, etc. will be dealt with in a separate study.

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to say to specific issues, and, sometimes, how they affirm or reject certain arguments and prove their points or fail to do so. Moreover, in the epic, philosophy and philosophers are also suitable for literary treatment—tales of teachers and philosophical terms and ideas occur and they need not necessarily be serious moral or didactic tales. Some epic philosophical texts also have critical and even satirical undertones, or are constructed to furnish an occasion for criticizing aspects of philosophical reasoning deemed detrimental to “well-being” (śreyas or niḥśreyas, the aim of philosophical discourse according to quite a number of schools), or to threaten established (chiefly Brahminic) authority. Strong counter-criticism is voiced against criticism and doubt that result in rejections of the validity of received knowledge and the authority of cherished texts and traditions (see, for instance, MBh 13.37.11–16). Yet, by the inclusion of texts in which such doubts are voiced and taken seriously to some extent—and by the recognition extended to the arguments of so-called “heretics”—the epic also demonstrates its sense that authority and traditional knowledge were in need of validation and “means of proof” (pramāṇa). The central philosophical issue of pramāṇas, the means of knowledge, has echoes in the epic. As discussed above, certain issues of the epic tale are already reflected upon in meta-discourses of doubt and in scenarios of “alternative” action. Arguing these issues implies drawing upon metaphysical and epistemological positions that require explanation and argument, as they cannot just be taken for granted on the basis of the apparent or traditionally established authority (seniority, status, etc.) of the teaching figure(s) present. The epic offers a broad spectrum of philosophical teaching situations as well of philosophical doctrines. All this points to an array of different styles and techniques that epic composers deliberately used in order to deal with different types of questions, queries and dilemmas raised by different types of characters in different social environments. These issues are reflected upon and elaborated in ways characteristic of the epic treatment of philosophic discourse, that is, by means of narration and didactic deployment. This style of presentation can be seen as belonging to a larger spectrum of the reception of philosophy in textual genres and by audiences outside the expert circles of the philosophical schools. In this connection it was not only terms and doctrines, but also philosophical tales and tales about philosophy that were regarded by the epic composer(s) as belonging to the field of philosophical knowledge. The different ways in which philosophy is presented in the epic need not be connected to the history of Indian philosophy and other fields of knowledge that emerged in this period in an exclusively diachronic way. In addition to examining how epic philosophical texts reflect a certain state of the art at a given point in time, they should also be studied as ways of exploring philosophy in textual genres that address a non-expert audience. Acknowledgments I am very grateful to James L. Fitzgerald for his many important comments and suggestions on this paper.

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