PHILOSOPHY, SOCIOLOGY OF AND PROFESSOR REVISITED MICHAEL

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KNOWLEDGE, EDGERTON

SIMMONS,

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In "Sociology of Knowledge Revisited," 1 Professor Stephenie Edgerton treats briefly several issues basic to an understanding of the relation of sociology of knowledge and epistemology. In this paper I shall argue that Professor Edgerton has presented us with a distorted view of the assumptions, conclusions, and problems inherent in the sociology of knowledge; that she has treated in misleading fashion the meaning of the concepts, the relatavism of knowledge and the relation of ignorance to knowledge; and that she has used in an epistemoiogical context, without sui~cient attention to their many other contextual meanings, the terms authoritarian and arbitrary in such manner as to increase the possibility that her readers may draw unwarranted conclusions about the nature of knowledge, method, and the authority of method. Because the issues treated are of vital importance, I shall risk stating the obvious, or, restating it, in the attempt to achieve some degree of clarity. Professor Edgerton asks if we can "pursue knowledge rationally without being authoritarian?" (p. 888) I dare say that some of us can, and some of us cannot. The issues here are really several: what do we mean ,by a rational pursuit of knowledge; how do we go a'bout resolving differences of opinion and judgment with respect to the criteria to be used in establishing the rational as opposed to the irrational, or non-rational, pursuit of knowledge; what is the relation between personality types (authoritarian, etc.) and different methods of defining and demonstrating truth and knowledge; and under what conditions a consistent use of method is to be termed authoritarian. In the form that Professor Edgerton raises the question she does suggest, quite inadvertantly, what is ultimately the case with respect to the historical setting of the pursuit of knowledge, i.e., that 1Stephenie G. Edgerton, "The Sociology of Knowledge Revisited," STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY AND EDUCATION, IV (Spring, 1966), 333-38. Each reference to some part of this essay is followed by the number of the page on which it appears.

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empirical and logical factors are inseparable. Professor Edgerton's approach and analysis are clearly not psychological in nature, and the use of the term authoritarian confuses several dimensions of the issue. Professor Edgerton tells us (with tongue in cheek?) that one is dogmatist (authoritarian) When acting on his theory of rationality (putting his theory into practice). (p. 886) What she really wants to get at (should get at) is whether some 359 methods, some means of arriving at knowledge claims and then testing them, are more deserving of our belief than others. She should be asking whether there is better reason .for calling the plumber, and not the dentist, when the sink does not work. She implicitly asks us whether the combination of observational data and reasoning that leads us to call the plumber is reliable. Given the state of affairs of my sink and my plumber there may be no perfect answer. If there is a "best" answer, given the dimensions of the problem, are we authoritarian to stand by the methods used to reach this answer? Put in more academic terms, we can ask if there are better reasons for using the combination of observation and logic generally known as the method of science than for relying upon intuition ff we are desirous of establishing the truth of claims made about the age of the earth. Professor Edgerton tells us that "to date we have no intellectual authority" (p. 884) but she also believes that we can hold "all of our beliefs, our standards, open to criticism." (p. 888) The best conclusion to draw from the above beliefs might well be to forego the pursuit of .kncrMedge rather than get involved in what appears at the outset to be a hopelessly confused endeavor which seems to permit of no success. But perhaps what she means is that the methods of science, generally accepted to be the most reliable way of achieving knowledge ~bout the world, involve the use of inductive logic which in turn poses problems s philosophers and scientists (the problem of the black swan, and all that). But ff this is the case, let her so state rather than equate this state of affairs with the assertion that to date we .have no seat of intellectual authorityOn the other hand .one might ask just what she looks for in the way of authority. The candidates for this high office, we are told, have been numerous. They include: intuition, reason, kings, God, sense, and experience. (p. 884) Each of the claimants has shortcomings, and at least some combinations of the above have shortcomings according to Professor Edgerton. Exactly what her method of separating out the statements that deserve our belief from those that do not she does not make clear at the

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outset, though ultimately she issues a call for "criticism" and the study of error. Professor Edgerton does tell us that she has rejected the claims of the inductive-verificationists. On the other hand, she paraphrases Sir Karl R. Popper who tells us that we refute conjecture with the assistance of observation. Whatever their logical problems the inductivist-veri,ficationists do wish to 360 bring observational data and logic together in deciding whether an assertion is true or false, to be accepted or rejected, confirmed or disconfirmed. Is Popper not doing the same thing when he says that we refute (reason, think, use logic) conjecture with the assistance of observation? In a concluding section Professor Edgerton does recommend that we hold all of our statements open to criticism. No one can disagree with this recommendation. At times we must question what we think is fact; at other times we focus a critical eye on the methods used to establish conclusions, and we must constantly ask if our value judgments and insights are appropriate to our assumptions, for example. But obviously criticism which is to lead to intellectually defensible conclusions is 'based on assumptions regarding method and criteria and their place in the world ,we live in. And though our method of analysis, or criticism, will vary in style and technique according to the problem we face, there is in all method an implicit, ff not explicit, authority, the authority lent, or established, by method and criteria themselves which enable us to draw conclusions and thus bring criticism to a halt. Let me suggest at this point that much of Professor Edgerton's difficulty stems from the fact that she does not m~ke the distinction 'between a definition or concept of truth and the methods used to ascertain whether or not a statement is true, or to put it more succinctly, she does not distinguish between the nature and test of truth. She dissolves rather than develops her d~alectie and gets into serious difficulty when she makes her brief comments about the doctrine of the sociology of knowledge. We can avoid the problem of reification if we understand the term true, and then truth, to refer to. language, to be the property of certain kinds of sentences (assertions, if you will); truth we shall say can be applied to, is a property of, those sentences that accurately describe a state of affairs, or say of that which is the case, that it is the case. The question then becomes which method of proof, demonstration, verification, etc., best does the job. The .quest for truth or .certainty (ff we understand the limitations imposed upon us by the world, and thus

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philosophy) need not lead to an authoritarian mode of existence, though of course it may. Historically the commitment o~ "truth" has involved a great variety of approaches, all attempting to bring our knowledge, our statements, even our feelings, about the world and .the world itself into a form of unity. The extreme case will involve the equation of "truth" with "reality" and the assertion that both are "out there" in the sense that common 361 sense is correct in telling us that there is a world "out there" existing independently of us. To see the shortcomings of the equation of "truth" and "reality," .or of any .other specific epistemologieal claim does not entail the rejection of the implicit goal of epistemology, i.e., to enable us to bring our knowledge of the world into .closest possible approximation of the world. More important here, then, are the reasons given for the test for which we opt. The existence, or non-existence, of an authoritarian dimension in the people pursuing truth and knowledge presents us interesting empirical problems, ones that lead ultimately beyond psychology, and into the sociology of knowledge. History makes clear how dittlcult the pursuit of rationality is and has always been. But the distinction between the nature and test of truth, ff kept clearly in mind, suggests to me that the real prc~blems ,found in the logic of the sciences are not as devastatingly destructive to rational authority as Professor Edgerton would have us believe. Let me now bring some of the above material into a discussion of the sociology of knowledge as treated by Professor Edgerton. The doctrine of the sociology of knowledge, we are told, is that knowledge is culture-bound. (p. 333) This statement is guilty of suggesting much too much by saying much too little. Leaving aside momentarily a more accurate statement about the doctrine of sociology ,of knowledge we can note that the thrust of Pro~essor Edgerton's discussion is that sociology of knowledge leads to a total relativism of knowledge. Though Professor Edgerton does not use the phrase "total relativism" her discussion implies it - in part because she gives no attention to possible exceptions to relativism. The claim of total relativism is, I believe, ~alse, and one can too. easily be led to accepting it due to the use of the unfortunate phrase "~nowledge is culture-bound" and the verbal legerdemain on age 335, in which the relativist is said to find himself in a paradoxical position, because ff he says, "'Truth is relative to the social environment of its originators' and we assume his statement is true, then it follows that it is not true but 'relative to the social environment of its origina-

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tors,'" which suggests that logic is larger than (and prior to?) life itself. Let me offer here three ,bits of 'knowledge, three true statements, the truths of which are not culture-bond. "My father is older than I am." "I am taller than my wife." "The desk in my study is made of wood." The ~rst sentence is not offered as an 362 example of an analytic truth. ~I refer to the man who fathered me, the date he entered this veil of tears, the date of my entry, and the relationship of the dates. The statement is true. It accurately describes, refers to, "reflects," a state of affairs in the world. So do the other two statements. Anyone who cares to investigate the states of affairs I refer to above will be .hard pressed to deny the three "truths" I have presented. Are they culture-bound? With respect to their knowledge, their truth? Certainly they are culture-bound if by this we mean that I reflect something of my own culture with the language I write in, the examples I choose, the methods of testing the truth of these statements that I would offer. But in this sense nothing escapes being culture-bound and nothing is said above and ~beyond the fact that we are all culture-bound. ,Obviously so, we would not be what we call human were we raised (miraculously) outside of a culture. But more importantly, what is the nature of the relativism of the knowledge I have conveyed to the reader, of the truth of the three sentences, especially with respect to their cultural limitations? I would suggest .that the truth of these statements, the knowledge contained in them, is such that it can transcend the various cultures found on the earth. Given that we .can make any man understand what we mean by "taller than" he cannot claim that my wife is taller than I am and also claim that his statement is true. Am I authoritarian for so stating? I do not think So, or if I am, ~I do not think the claim is worth much. The authority of yardsticks, tape measures, and so forth, in the instance I refer to, is overwhelming. Are we authoritarian for heeding it? If the question is to be considered meaningful it must refer to a set o~ .factors not treated above nor in Professor Edgerton's article. And with respect to the "arbitrary" element involved in the use of inductive logic can we not argue in the same vein? If finally we feel forced to say we must use inductive logic in evaluating the ela/ms of my three sentences a~bove it makes little sense to say inductive logic is an arbitrary element, especially when there are so many other unreasoned, irrational, and "arbitrary" thought patterns to be found in current use.

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The issue here should focus on the reasons one gives for saying that he feels forced to use inductive logic. And, further, we must as~ what "arbitrary" means in the example Professor Edgerton cites. The choice of inductive logic is arbitrary on the part of the man who has not considered the alternatives. This does not apply to Bertrand Russell, nor to Professor Edgerton, I dare say, when she relies on induction. It may well appear "arbitrary" to 363 choose to use inductive logic but only if one forgets that philosophy must deal with man in the world. I~f inductive logic has been forced on us by the critical examination of the world and our place in it, it may not be the arbitrary choice that has been suggested. The logical dittlculties encountered in the analysis of inductive logic suggest to me, in part, a recognition o~ the fact that the world (and thus, human existence) has a temporal dimension and that our idealized conceptions of "perfect truth" are atemporal, ahistorical. And, further, to return to the "authoritarian" dimension of the search for knowledge, we must recognize that to commit oneself to the authority o~ method should not be confused with being an authoritarian, or more clearly, the method as authority is not the same as the method as authoritarian. I already can see two responses to the above. First, I do know that l~rofessor Edgerton has called no one an authoritarian, especially not me. And, secondly, in a sense there will always seem to be an arbitrary element in finally saying we must use inductive logic, in the sense that ~nally we must make a choice to get on with it. Perhaps, at this point a more concrete statement about the assumptions and methods of the sociology of knowledge can help, and save us from seemingly going on in circles. What the sociology of knowledge tells us is that many statements and theories which purport to be objective and "value free" are loaded with value-laden assumptions. It suggests to us that there is a systematic relation between the content in thought and sociohistorical factors. It urges us to attempt to get at the context in which statements are made and theories are ,developed, to. analyze statements with respect to their soeiohistorical content, their causes, their function as well as their truth. It does not claim that the knowledge of the source of a statement is the same as knowledge of the truth or falsity of a statement. But the concept can be said to. 'be built, and rest, upon the belief that men can and do ~know the world; that there are sociohistorical factors .determining the methods and criteria men will use to know the world; that the sources of error are many,

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and in several ways systematically related to the way men live and hold ideals and desires; and that an understanding of the above dimensions of the context in which knowledge is gained and claimed will help men understand with increasing clarity the meaning of these claims. Sociology of knowledge does not claim that the natural or physical sciences as opposed to social 364 sciences are immune to the distortion stemming ~rom sociohistorical factors. The history of physics and astronomy immediately scotch that hope. But it asks us to a.ecount for the distortions in thought, as I have said, and it does so in the belief that men can get closer to the truth, e an malke increasingly more accurate statements about the world as they become increasingly more sophisticated with respect to their methods. A question that must be asked is whether the claims of sociology of knowledge are worthy of our belief. In one sense this is an extremely difficult question to answer for it is quite similar to asking whether one should hold to one school of philosophy or another, should one be a thorough-going naturalist or a Thomist? The question is sometimes seen as being further eomplicated by the fact that sociology of knowledge tells us that the claims we may make in support of sociology of knowledge can, and must, themselves ,be subjected *o sociological analysis. That the methods of sociology of knowledge .can be focused on themselves leads some to claim that we are hereby involved in an endless regress or that we invalidate, or weaken, the results of the method itself. Implicit in this claim, it appears to me is the belief (if not the wish) that some ,kind of pristine, ahuman, truth exists that can somehow 'be grasped by mortals. To put it gently, such claims have had difficulty in demonstrating their validity. If sociology of knowledge is a valuable tool why claim that it hurts the pursuit of truth and 'knowledge? That use of its methods will in all probatbility insert some value-laden factors into the quest for objective truth is doubtless the .ease, but this is no more a destruction of rational authority in epistemology than is the fact that tools and instruments used in the physical sciences can also ,be the source of distortion. We must consider the positive contributions of microscopes before we discard them due to the fact that their use may introduce some distortion in our view of the subject studied. The question remains, is sociology of knowledge a valuable fool? Here, as I have suggested, we come to a basic judgment one must make with respect to the nature of thought, belief, and knowledge, and their plaee and function in the world. ,One must ask whether the specific analyses

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made about the function and role of man's beliefs, past and present, actually cast light upon the topics ,considered, Do we find evidence for the claims made about systematic relations between the content of thought and sociohistorical factors? To be more specific at this point would be to. write a paper on the specific methods of sociology o~ knowledge itself. In the claims of those who assert there is an indispensi, ble value in the knowl- 365 edge gained through sociohistorica] analysis of thought there will be found the circularity inherent in all reasoning which attempts to justify our basic assumptions. But ultimately some "circles" (that we must start our critical thinking with some form of thought with all it implies), some modes of thought and approach to the world can be seen to demonstrate their power and authority to us as individuals, and to men in general. And so, with respect to the sociology of knowledge, our ~nal decision for or against it will follow ,from our judgment whether it helps us clarify the questions we must raise about human thought, truth, knowledge, and error if we desire a comprehensive view of man's place in the world. Though I treat the issue as ff it were completely open (treat it in its logical form) this obviously is not the case. Cultural anthropology whether examining the religious belief of "primitive peoples," or subjecting movies to content analysis accepts as necessary the methods rooted in sociology of knowledge. Comment must .here ,be made about Professor Edgerton's discussion of the relativism of knowledge, It can be seen that a basic dimension of the problem 'has been ignored. The truth of the three rather simple assertions I offered above indicate that the culture-bound aspect of knowledge is not quite what it appears to ~be at first glance. It might be more accurate to say that the claim that these statements are true begins to clarify the meaning of the claim that 'knowledge a n d truth are relative. Relative to what, we must ask. Though consensus among those who put my .claims to the test of truth is generally considered necessary, the truth of the sentences is not relative only to the men who check them out. Thus Professor Edgerton's point that relativism ,becomes absolutism is not quite accurate with respect to these specific issues. There is also the relation between the sentences and the world, to those states of affairs to which they refer. With respect to rather simple events and states o~ affairs, e.g., my height and my wife's height, we can meaningfully say that the states of affairs themselves force agreement among the observers. (I speak metaphorically. There actually is an eight inch difference here; it is hard to miss it.)

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It does appear, then, that there are certain facts, certain aeeurate descriptions of the world, e.g., that I am taller than my wife, which transcend culture. Obviously they are not all as simple as the three examples I offered above; their simplicity had original value as a means to open the counter argument I have offered. The conelusion, or recommendation, I draw from 366 the argument regarding the "relativism" of knoMedge is not novel; it is that we overcome it with scientifie fact. The three facts I have cited in this paper qualify as scientific fact in the sense that the methods and logic of seienee are to be seen as sophisticated refinements and extensions of the methods used to demonstrate the truth of the claims that I am indeed younger than my father, taller than my wife, and that the desk in my study is made of wood. 2 To say that it is scientific fact that transeends cultural relativism is not to say that scientific theories have been and are immune to cultural influences. Astronomy with man at the eenter of the universe, the "idea of progress," psychologies and sociologies which defend political and economie systems are examples of the .cultural impact on science which .eome readily to mind. What we can see is that the existence of seientitlc facts helps clarify the meaning of the assertion that knowledge is relative. And further, we can see that the simple assertion that knowledge is culture-bound, unless treated in depth, actually 2Professor Marvin Farber has dealt with a number of the issues treated in this article. The following paragraphs are relevant to the issue treated: above. "How much merit is there in contemplating the world of immediate experience on a prescientific level? The interpretations of the periods of magic and religion are a worthy theme for scientific study, but that is not what is in question. If scientific interpretations are to be extruded, then so must the prescientlflc interpretations that are applied to the materials of experience. It should be noted, however, that the characterization of scientific interpretations as a kind of ideal coverlng applied to the world and experience does not apply to scientific knowledge generally. Confirmed scientifc knowledge is not to be regarded as something imposed upon reality, with the suggestion of falsification through the conceptual means employed by the sciences. Despite the methodological caution in the use o~: explanatory devices, as well as in the treatment of evidence, illustrated, by science itself, it is the knowledge of facts that is most decisive. That knowledge bears upon the startlng-point for philosophy, and upon the nature of man and his experience, the nature of the physical world, and the nature of the cultural world. The high probability, amounting to practical certainty, of that knowledge, cannot fail to have bearing upon the startlng-polnt and direction of philosophical inquiry. The wrong point of departure has resulted in failure to take account of the problems of our world, except by way of criticism of those who proceed from the real place of man in the world." Marvin Farber, "The Philosophical Interest in Existence," PROCEEDINGS AND ADDRESSES OF THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION, • (Oct. 1964).

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obscures the nature of both the difficulties and the successes men have met in the quest for knowledge, At this point let me consider Professor Edgerton's statements about the relation of ignorance and knowledge. This is a relation that cannot afford to ,be ignored for the simple reason that the historical site of all knowledge has been ignorance, and the relationship holds today, though in a modified fashion. It is 367 fortunate that Professor Edgerton raises the issue but she leaves unstated an important aspect of the relationship, and in so doing might well leave the reader with an unwarranted negative attitude toward the possibilities of achieving knowledge in the world. It is tempting to suggest that it is Professor Edgerton's reliance on Hayek, who obviously undercuts the concepts of knowledge and truth, not in the abstract, but to make political capital, that leads her astray. But in order to make such a suggestion one would need to analyze much more data than her brief article provides, and so the suggestion is herewith withdrawn. Professor Edgerton tells us that, in a sense, ignorance increases through the advance of knowledge. And, in a sense, one can agree with Professor Edgerton. But consider, there is ignorance, and there is ignorance. With increased knowledge of the physical world, for example, we do become aware that there are more areas to be explored than we had once dreamed of. We learn that there are new questions that must now be asked and answered. And these are questions we had not thought of before. With respect to our increased knowledge about society we realize that when we put plans into action unanticipated results generally follow. (Did Henry Ford know he would help bring about a change in adolescent sexual behavior when 'he first figured out how to mass produce cars?) As Professor Edgerton tells us, we do get an "increased awareness" of the limitations of our knowledge. We get an awareness of our ignorance. And this is knowledge of a sort. It is an increase in our ,knowledge about the nature of the human condition with respect to gaining knowledge. In specific fields and disciplines this kind of ignorance is frequently an early pre-statement about the nature of the world we live in. What constantly stands before us is the need to make concrete statements about these new areas of knowledge-ignorance, to coin a phrase. But another kind of ignorance has a much longer history than the ignorance that accompanies the success of science. An example would be the ignorance of the man who thilift,s praying to rain gods will make the rain fall. (]~he Indians are not well

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organized and thus we can insult them freely.) This second 'kind of ignorance, which I shall call ignorant-ignorance, is in its truest form the possession of the man who holds false beliefs about the nature of the world, who does not know they are false, who does not ,know that questions can be asked about the content of his belief, who does not even know there are other possible 368 beliefs, including a true one. Such a man is not aware of his ignorance. He is therefore more ignorant than the scientist or philosopher who is conscious of the relation of knowledge and ignorance. The question to be asked is whether it is reasonable to believe that .our store of knowledge has increased through time. And ff the answer to this question is yes, and what else can it be, then let us ask how we can best explain this fact. In the simple sense, we can agree, knowledge is culture-bound. In a more complex sense we must ask which aspects of culture have aided or impeded the growth of knowledge. To ask the question is not to suggest the answer is as simple as saying "science". And if we are concerned with the socMogy of knowledge we must ask, as I have indicated in the body of this paper exactly what it means to claim that knowledge is culture-bound, who so ciaims, who will d e n y it, what are the causes for maMng the assertion, what are the reasons given for claiming the truth of the assertion, what is the function of the claim. Similar questions might well be asked of the Hayek quotation which Professor Edgerton has presented us. Speaking of prideful man, Hayek states: Man prides himself on the increase in his knowledge. But as a result of what he himself has created, the limitations o~ ,his conscious knowledge and therefore the range o~ ignorance significant for his conscious action have constantly increased. Ever since the .beginning of modern science, ,the best minds 'have recognized ~that "the range of acknowledged ignorance will grow with the advance o~ science." Unfortunately the popular effect of this scientific ~advance has been a belief, seemingly shared by many scientists~ that the range of our ignorance is steadily diminishing and that we can therefore aim at more comprehensive and deliberate cor~trol of all humma activities. It is for this reason ,that those intoxicated by the advance of knowledge so often become the enemies of freedom. 3

This is a fairly simple statement to analyze for we can ask whether Hayek's concern is primarily with epistemology or with 8 F. A. Hayek, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY (London: RoutIedge and Kegan Paul, 1963), p. 26, as cited in Stephenie Edgerton, "Sociology of Knowledge Revisited," STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY AND EDUCATION, IV (Spring, '1966), 337.

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the difficulties encountered in applying knowledge to social problems. Obviously his concern is with the latter. Hayek speaks of the range of ignorance which is significant for man's conscious actions. Just any action? I should think not. The political overtones are there, obviously so, and underscored by his use of the nasty term all when he speaks of the comprehensive and deliberate control of human affairs. The term all neatly does no less than 369 implicitly falsify the historical intent and coneern of the parties of the left. But what shall we make of the truth of Hayek's assertion? The question cannot be discussed in the abstract. Concrete examples of the conscious applieation of knowledge to human problems must be evaluated. The answer cannot possibly emerge in a value-free robe. Somewhere along the line each of us deeides whether a plan of action is or was worth risking. Our final decision (shall we build a TVA?) is doubtless aided by every bit .of knowledge we can gain about the nature of such applieations of knowledge in the socio-politieal-eeonomic realm. But ultimately we decide. The facts themselves do not make the decision for us. And in our decisions our values ultimately assert themselves. Can the sociology of knowledge damage the interests and theories of the reconstructivists? Not if they are intellectually sophisticated and interested in the best knowledge man can eome by. If the values, the moral positions, supported by them are phrased in universal terms this must ,be seen, in part, as a function of value language and in part as a function of political discourse. If they spe~k as if their values are rooted in the logical necessity of the world, as a synthetic a priori statement would be, this mode of speech must be analyzed. Obviously values do not exist in this form. That people have chosen so. to believe, or, perhaps more accurately, have so believed is part of human history and must be understood- That the reeonstructivists are seeking moral ideals for which a universal validity can be claimed is eertainly not to be faulted in the abstract. How they go about making and justifying the claims they make must be analyzed and compared and contrasted with the claims and methods of others speaking to the same issues. If one wants to lay out the reconstructivists (social reeonstrnctionists?) in education one will do better to analyze their treatment of social conflict, the hopes they have for consensus, even the hope for rationality in an irrational society. The difficulty with Professor Edgerton's paper is that she revisits a sociology of knowledge that never was, obscures the dimensions of meaning to be

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connected with the phrase "knowledge is culture-bound," maltreats the "relativism of knowledge," and treats the term "authoritarian" outside a context which places philosohy in the real world. 4

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4My treatment of the "relativism of knowledge" and the sociohistoric analysis of ideas has been influenced by the work of Professor Abraham Edel. See especially his ETHICAL JUDGMENT (Glencoe: The Free Press, 195,~, 282-87, and his chapter, "Context and Content in the Theory of Ideas" in Roy Wood Sellars, V. J. McGill, and Marvin Farber (eds.) PHILOSOPHY FOR THE FUTURE (New York: Macmillan, 1949). Herewith, the usual disclaimer regarding Professor Edel's responslbility for my use and interpretation of his ideas. Appreciation is expressed to my colleague William Greene who, in the best tradition of friendship, has refused through the years to accept my position as gospel.