Original Article

Prestige in world politics: History, theory, expression Steve Wood Department of Politics and International Relations, Macquarie University, Sydney, NSW 2109, Australia. E-mail: [email protected]

Abstract Prestige recurs through history, in all societies and as a direct, incidental or implicit theme in social and natural sciences. However, aside from relatively few exceptions the academic attention it has attracted as an influence in politics has been sporadic or tangential rather than large scale and intensive. This article argues that: prestige is an enduring and protean feature of political behaviour, compatible with and a potential confluence for diverse approaches and interpretations; if not overlooking it, International Relations tends to treat prestige as subordinate to material and strategic goals, or as an ideational construct for which instrumental aspects are extraneous; prestige resides in the background of many analyses, neither repudiated nor explored; prestige is distinct but not isolated from power: material, social or imagined; and empirical bases to support these claims can be drawn on from almost every age and culture. International Politics (2013) 50, 387–411. doi:10.1057/ip.2013.13; published online 8 March 2013 Keywords: prestige; politics; history; theory

Introduction Prestige is an enduring and protean feature of human behaviour and therefore of politics and international relations. Its universality makes prestige compatible with and a potential confluence for diverse approaches and interpretations. It resides in the background of many analyses, neither repudiated nor explored. The article introduces the concept and delineates different understandings or modes of prestige. Second, it considers prestige as an element in the mutually reinforcing identity edifices of individuals, nations and states. Third, it examines prestige as treated by various theoretical perspectives. Prestige reveals certain orientations as more alike than they are presented and r 2013 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1384-5748 International Politics www.palgrave-journals.com/ip/

Vol. 50, 3, 387–411

Wood

can function as a nexus. Fourth, cases from antiquity, the modern era and the present are used to illustrate the persistence and relevance of prestige as a political factor. A conclusion follows.

What is Prestige? Prestige belongs to an extended conceptual family that includes honour (O’Neill, 1999; Joshi, 2008; Lebow, 2008), status (Weber, 1922; Reinhold, 1969), reputation (Tang, 2005; Sharman, 2007; Wylie, 2009), respect (Wolf, 2008), glory (Slomp, 2000), credibility, pride and legitimacy. Self-esteem and national esteem, also related to prestige, often reflect each other (Greenfeld, 1992). These terms are not synonymous but have abundant, intergenerational connections. They frequently evoke the same underlying sentiment, for which prestige signifies the upper echelon. A minimalist definition of prestige is distilled as recognition of importance. Striving for, conferring of or exulting in prestige is manifested in occupational settings, sporting success, tribal ritual, artistic accomplishment, technical proficiency, financial wealth, inherited or bestowed titles, leadership and international relations. Prestige is ‘mental phenomena’ (Husserl, 1913; Ryle, 1949), projected into and derived from capacities, resources and achievements, or resonating in the belief that these exist. It could be discerned as a lingering sense of greatness, after the attainments or assets that underpinned it have passed or physical access to them is no longer possible. Entities recognised as important and aware that others view them this way are prestige possessors; those that pursue this status are prestige seekers. Napoleon’s confidence in the self-evident nature of his France’s prestige was such that formal acknowledgment by others was unnecessary. ‘The French republic needs no recognition’, he proclaimed, ‘as little as the sun needs to be recognised’ (Hegel, 1995 [1821], p. 499). Prestige is both heterogeneous and replicates core elements. Its positive dimension applies to high regard or desirable status. The negative dimension concerns diminution, loss of face and disrespect. In an accelerated world, the prestige of artefacts, practices and offices alter daily; conversely, a person, object, act or institution could remain prestigious for millennia. Three main interpretations or types are ascertained. Most commonly, prestige is an epiphenomenon of material power. Wealth, advanced technology and military strength are among the resources that can endow this type of prestige (Niebuhr, 1962; Morgenthau, 1978; Gilpin, 1981). Wanting it stimulates the acquisition of relevant assets. Various states and populations consider having a nuclear arsenal to be very prestigious (Kinsella and Chima, 2001; O’Neill, 2006; Frey, 2007; Baktiari, 2010). Political actors will, sooner or later, attempt to correct imbalances between their 388

r 2013 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1384-5748

International Politics

Vol. 50, 3, 387–411

Prestige in world politics

material power and their imputed prestige quotient. An interesting example is Germany, objectively powerful, characterised for decades as having a ‘culture of restraint’, disavowing nuclear weapons, yet striving for a United Nations Security Council seat. A second expression of prestige is an ideational incentive or affirmation. Social context is highlighted: a civil micro-world, a national community or a global network. Prestige can accrue from membership of organisations that focus on the prevention or resolution of conflict. Henrich and Gil-White (2001) distinguish between dominance, a circumstance dependent on the use or threat of force, and prestige, a trigger of ‘freely conferred deference’. The substance is impressive skills and knowledge. These abilities encourage copying, a trait replicated on an international scale (Goldsmith, 2005). Maner and Mead (2010) elaborate on a distinction between dominance as ‘personalized power’ and prestige as ‘socialized power’. They conclude that aspiring to respect and admiration does not equate with wanting dominance. The successful pursuit of prestige, conceived and valorised as an ideational goal, is consonant with obtaining recognition of importance, as is its reception when conferred rather than sought. Cultural or moral attraction and ‘prosocial’ talents impart a cognate form of influence. For states or nations this means having (selfenhancing) effect in the cosmos of international political psychology. ‘Prestige benefits’ are gained though what is granted can be rescinded. According to Hafner-Burton and Montgomery (2006, p. 11), ‘Much like people states hold positions that are more or less prestigious in the social network’: Prestige is proportional to the number of ties received by an actor; an actor has a high prestige if many other actors have ties to that actor. Prestige is a form of social status that extends across clusters and that can serve to reinforce a prestigious actor’s behavior. In the international system, prestigious states have a great deal of social power. States and people are also or aim to become prestigious for reasons that span the types, including military, economic, cultural, diplomatic, intellectual or humanitarian. Instrumental and emotive energies and purposes are interwoven, not mutually exclusive. Prestige informed the identity-forging motives, domestic political goals, and foreign and defence policy that converged to support military and civilian nuclear programmes (Kinsella and Chima, 2001; Hecht, 2009). Some polities inverted these agendas through broadcast abjuration of nuclear projects, despite having the technical and economic capacity (Hiester, 1985; Prosser, 2008). Prestige is also sought and received through the display of physical goods that indicate talent or expertise (Plourde, 2009). This is a variant on Veblen’s (1899) analysis of ‘conspicuous consumption’, a phenomenon combining the excesses of materialism and prestige-seeking egoism. r 2013 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1384-5748

International Politics

Vol. 50, 3, 387–411

389

Wood

A third version of prestige draws on the other two and opens its own space. It has a tautological quality associated with Latin and French denotation of magician’s artifice, where prestige is tantamount to illusion (Schalk, 1971). Misperception, superstition, deification or the pretence of psychological, intellectual or cultural superiority have converted into prestige. The causality could be belief, manipulation or a combination of these. Effective signalling of means and resolve deceives others when the signaller does not dispose of these or faces constraints (Jervis, 1970; Morgenthau, 1978; Kim, 2004; Walsh, 2007). The convinced receiver’s perceptions, comparable with Husserl’s (1913, p. 39) Evidenzgefu¨hl, translate into prestige for the signaller. Prestigious states or individuals have some form or power or influence, though not necessarily that founded on material (military, economic, technological or quantitative demographic) resources. They may have convinced others that they possess certain resources when they do not, or not to the degree evoked. There are many references to a desire for or simultaneous acquisition of ‘prestige and power’. Power has a broader range of manifestations (Morriss, 1987; Barnett and Duvall, 2005; Guzzini, 2005; Lukes, 2005; Nolte, 2006). It can be pursued, gained, exerted and felt without prestige. A state or an individual can be powerful and not prestigious, or not to the extent desired. Being a positional and relational concept or good implies that there is a finite quantum of prestige in any context. This presents a problem for some groups unless there is an observed understanding that all members are equal. If a group and its members attain prestige, it is through their relation to the broader context of which the group is a subset (Cf. Weber, 1922; Wegener, 1992). Entities of the same kind (states, parties, politicians) are not as prestigious as each other and more prestige cannot simply be introduced to ensure that none feels underrated. Sometimes an unsustainable level of prestige is asserted; one or more units claim more than the finite quantum allows. If diverse features and abilities are acknowledged, prestige can be distributed in ways that make equilibrium possible – horizontally rather than vertically. This is a principal challenge of international politics, for which there have only been intermittent solutions.

Individuals, Nations, States Along with its relatives, dignity, status and honour, prestige is an attribute wanted by discrete entities, and earned, obtained or denied in collective contexts. O’Neill’s (1999, p. 98) answer to whether honour, a sibling and conduit of prestige, is personal or societal is that it is both. Honour is a ‘shell that can be filled in various ways’: Honor, face, prestige, and moral authority determine whose interests are respected or who prevails in a confrontation y they often become the 390

r 2013 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1384-5748

International Politics

Vol. 50, 3, 387–411

Prestige in world politics

causes of conflict when they are fought over for the benefits they yield y honor refers to a quality within the individual as perceived by the group; face is the group’s expectation of how everyone else will treat the individual; prestige is the group’s perception of its own attitude toward the individual, based on something the person is or did; and moral authority is the group’s self-fullling expectation that someone ... can set future norms. (O’Neill, 1999, p. 244) Status issues among individuals reappear in magnified form between collectives. All members need not concur exactly in their understanding of identity, or which aspects should be prioritised, for groups to retain coherence (Tajfel, 1981; Hogg and Abrams, 2001). The same applies to nations (Huddy, 2001), which can survive defections. National prestige pertains to a nation’s self-image, what it radiates and how other nations regard it. These are consequences of mass impact over time. The metaphor is geological, a form of layering. The nation, also when remote and imagined, is a macrocosm and the individual a constituent microcosm (Anderson, 1983; Smith, 1991). Affirmation or affront results from perceptions about how a nation’s store or deficiency of prestige is construed externally. Etzioni (1962, p. 21) observed that ‘most citizens derive symbolic gratifications and deprivations from changes in the international status of their nation’ and ‘prestige becomes a major factor: when a loss of prestige adds to a severe crisis y and when national leaders fan y a prestige obsession’. States are the principal political representatives of most nations. A nation’s prestige is drawn on by ‘its’ state; the state’s prestige reflects on the nation. Although the sovereignty principle holds that states are formally equal, they are hierarchically ordered. Prestige conferment accompanies these informal ranking mechanisms. Dore (1975, p. 192) apprised that ‘the Japanese concern with international standing y involve[s] a presumption that there exists a prestige hierarchy of nations’. Studies aiming to quantify prestige and rank Japan’s derived level (Shimbori et al, 1963; Shunsuke, 2009) underscore this. The stoicism of ordinary Japanese in response to severe challenges reflects commitment to upholding personal and national honour. If states reflect characteristics of persons (Wendt, 2004), persons are, through their citizenship of, reliance on, identification with, payments to and potential sacrifice for it, components of the state. Publics and political elites want the states and nations to which they belong and represent to be favourably perceived. This is one font of nationalism. Merging the nation and its political container (Taylor, 1994), Breiner (2004, p. 290) argued that ‘state prestige and nationalism y overcome the limited solidarities generated by classes, status groups, and parties. This drive for state prestige will have a profound effect on domestic politics’. Motivations are located in overlapping international and domestic spheres. National pride, derived from features that bring ‘credit and r 2013 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1384-5748

International Politics

Vol. 50, 3, 387–411

391

Wood

prestige to a nation in the eyes of its citizens’, remains important (Evans and Kelley, 2002). What ‘others’ think of ‘us’ influences psyches and policy (Korte, 1997; Canetti, 2006). States generally do not try to diminish another’s prestige. Rather, prestige steers diplomacy’s concern to avoid offence, or with how ‘we’ treat ‘them’ and are perceived to. Lack or loss of prestige incites resentment and occasionally extreme reaction. ‘The prestige-deprivation inflicted by the Versailles treaty’, Etzioni (1962) argued, ‘is commonly seen as a factor contributing to the emergence of Nazism, a movement obsessed with national status’. Although upheaval and attenuation of individual and national fortune instigate heighten sensitivity, ‘In periods of peace, stable economies and integrated social relations, frustrations of national prestige rarely lead to aggressive behavior except student demonstrations before the embassies of the countries which inflict the prestige loss’ (Etzioni, 1962, p. 22). People tend to privilege their own nation; the feats and qualities of others are compared with their own. Norkus (2004, p. 397) contends that ‘ “cultural achievements” or “cultural contributions” indicated by the number of famous scientists, writers, architectural monuments’ bestow prestige on the nation from which these virtuosi or symbolic structures originate. Thus, ‘the basis for the feeling of belonging to the world “elite” can be the conviction of the extraordinary value of the culture of “one’s own” nation or of its extraordinary contribution to “world culture.” ’ The members or rulers of a nation may consider it as imbued with greatness, whereas others regard it as ordinary, eccentric or overstated, in any case not as something to aspire to. Prestige often correlates with being liked and ‘nation brands’ marketing links favourable reception to global economic success (Anholt, 2009). Nations regarded as most prestigious are not always most preferred. Perceived prestige can be a source of envy and resentment. For Lebow (2008), prestige is bound with beliefs about cultural eminence, heroism and honour. National identity and sentiment permeate his account, through periods that precede the modern phenomenon of nationalism. He argues that ‘People seek self-esteem not only through their personal activities, but vicariously through the achievements of social units to which they feel attached, such as sports teams and nations’. Lasswell and Morgenthau are among those said to ‘argue that nationalism involves a degree of transference by individuals of their aspirations on to states’. This is not a one-way process, at least not in the present. Instead, symbiosis occurs. For citizenry and rulers, organic and abstract identities merge for performances in which ‘standing and honor can be very important and interrelated’ (Lebow, 2008, pp. 122–123). Prestige can induce hubris, an exaggerated or deluded belief by a person, a group or a nation in its capacities. Superficial, if spectacular, display has an appeal that lends a transient prestige. Humility generates a more durable kind. 392

r 2013 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1384-5748

International Politics

Vol. 50, 3, 387–411

Prestige in world politics

Henrich and Gil-White (2001, p. 179) note that ‘Self-deprecation is also common in prestige’. High achievers are often humble in response to praise. Modern nations do the same if they are confident in their accomplishments and inferred status in the world. Political leaders must promote and personify collective prestige. Accent on charismatic features that elevate an individual above the mass is contrasted with an alternative view of the leader’s position being sustainable as long as he or she is embedded in the group and fulfils its aspirations. ‘The stature of the leader’, argued Moos and Koslin (1952), ‘is dependent not upon his embodiment of special traits as such, but rather the extent to which a group is aware of those “special qualities” ’. Henry Kissinger reportedly said that ‘as a professor’ he considered ‘history as run by impersonal forces. But when you see it in practice, you see the difference personalities make’ (cf. Kissinger, 1995; de Gaulle, 2000; Byman and Pollack, 2001, p. 108). In one ‘nation brand’ index, the United States rose from eighth in 2008 to first in 2009. The rise was attributed to the change in presidents (Anholt, 2009). Nicolson (1939) was sceptical about the participation of politicians in routine international affairs. They were likely to cause problems through interference in negotiation. This was better left to ‘professional diplomatists’, who must themselves convey prestige. Morgenthau (1978, p. 79) agreed, observing that ‘diplomats lend themselves naturally as instruments for a policy of prestige y respect shown them is really shown their countries y insult they give or receive is really given or received by their countries’. These accounts pertain chiefly to liberal democracies. Authoritarian regimes take greater offence to slights, and prestige-seeking assumes pathological dimensions. Attempts to generate it often entail effusive display of military might. Collins (2011) impresses connections between endogenous legitimacy and exogenous power-prestige, drawing together realist and historical–sociological interpretations to explain the collapse of the Soviet bloc. For those statedominated societies, prestige reliant on coercion was exposed as illusory and eroded during the Cold War. Similar fates later befell Ben Ali, Mubarak, Gaddafi and Assad.

Prestige as Nexus Prestige is compatible with realist, rationalist, sociological and normative interpretations of international politics. It is a nexus for differing emphases, though largely neglected by scholarship seeking commonalities or convergence (Barkin, 2003; Hellmann, 2003; Barkin, 2004; Jackson and Nexon, 2004; Lebow, 2004; Beardsworth, 2008). The international society school was representative of the endeavour to discover intersections between paradigms (Wight, 1991; Watson, r 2013 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1384-5748

International Politics

Vol. 50, 3, 387–411

393

Wood

1992; Alderson and Hurrell, 2000; Linklater and Suganami, 2006), without much focus on prestige. Its tacit presence is weightier than the passing references to it. There are exceptions to this general lack of direct attention. O’Neill (1999) demonstrates how an expansive historiography, symbolic interaction, linguistic analysis and game theory can be effectively combined and applied to illuminate the influence of prestige and honour. Wegener (1992) argued that ‘rational and normative foundations of prestige are possible’. He delineated its alignment with achievement, esteem, honour or charisma, and exposition by functionalist, normative and transcendent accounts. Wegener drew on Weber, alternatively a realist (Hobson and Seabrooke, 2001), a ‘bourgeois Marx’ (Salomon, 1926) or a sociological institutionalist. Weber’s understanding of politics went beyond realism and ‘various counterpositions based on norms, self-understood social constructions, or cooperative international society’ (Breiner, 2004, p. 290). Although he elucidated a predominance of instrumental rationality (Zweckrational) in modernity, his fusion of prestige and interests (Prestigeinteressen) also comprises value rationality (Wertrational) and traditional and affective motivations for action (Weber, 1922). Machtprestige was stimulated by urges for esteem, honour, standing and concerns about relative worth linked to power: All ‘power’ of political entities [Gebilde] carries in itself a specific dynamic: it can be the basis for a specific ‘prestige’-pretension of those who belong to them, which influences their externally focused behaviour y prestige pretensions have always had a difficult to estimate, generally not precisely definable, but very perceptible impact in the genesis of wars: an empire of ‘honour’, comparable with the ordering of status groups [‘sta¨ndischer’ Ordnung], extends itself across relations among political entities; feudal rulers, likewise modern military officers or state bureaucrats, are the natural primary bearers of this ‘prestige’-striving, oriented purely to the power of its own political entity as such. For the power of their political entity determines their own power and their own power-based feelings of prestige y . (Weber, 1922, p. 619) Lebow (2008, pp. 487–488) notes that for Weber, ‘Acquiring prestige is essential for being a great power, just as becoming a great power confers prestige y prestige is equivalent to status or standing’. In Breiner’s (2004, p. 299) reading, prestige is the potential trigger and protractor of a security dilemma: ‘all political communities seek prestige y large political communities y aspire to have their superior prestige recognized’: their demand for power to enhance their prestige threatens their neighboring political communities, and so they too are always threatened in return. This threat in turn prompts the state to compel others to 394

r 2013 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1384-5748

International Politics

Vol. 50, 3, 387–411

Prestige in world politics

recognize its honor or high standing by amassing more power against its neighbors. This demand by large political communities unleashes a recurrent struggle between states for prestige. Thus when a large state asserts its claim to prestige in the face of a threat to peace, all other states claiming prestige as well join the ‘competition’ for dominance. And this in turn generates new threats y Reinforced by evidence from earlier, contemporaneous and later societies, prestige is imparted as an intrinsic need or motivation, regardless of the fact that only some attain it to the extent they wish. A large corpus of literature indirectly impresses that prestige may not dictate but is a constant in national and international affairs, connected realms of perceptions, interactions, frailties, interests and power. If prestige is an innate ingredient of human psychology and behaviour (cf. Brown, 1991; 2004), links to classical realist claims about recurrence in these domains emerge. Observed through the filter of prestige, realism and constructivism are more alike than portrayed by their respective adherents. Lebow (2001) challenged the conventional representation of Thucydides as the prototype ‘realist’, arguing that he was a ‘founding father of constructivism’. However, Lebow notes that some ‘nuanced’ realist readings present a more accurate picture. These readings comprehended that humans had psychologies and that variation in conditions affected responses and judgements. Lebow (2001, p. 559) concluded that ‘Thucydides is both a realist and a constructivist’, an entirely plausible observation. Prestige is a binding element between these schools and the different drives they are inclined to prioritise. In the History of the Peloponnesian War, ‘People appear driven by their needs for self-preservation, pleasure, recognition, and power but also by needs for love, honor, and esteem’ (Lebow, 2001, p. 554). For Morgenthau (1978, pp. 32–33), ‘a tendency to reduce political power to the actual application of force or y successful threats of force’ and ‘the neglect of prestige as an independent element in international politics’ were untenable. Elsewhere (1978, p. 77), he presents prestige as a companion of power, ‘rarely an end in itself’ but ‘one of the instrumentalities’ used to pursue ‘policies of the status quo and of imperialism’. Markey (1999) investigates the ‘mechanics of the prestige motive and conflict’ and argues it has been misinterpreted or ignored by most realists. His analysis, conducted among a familiar assemblage of states, anarchy and conflict, finds that Thucydides ‘interchangeably employs prestige in both its instrumental and intrinsic variants’ and ‘Rousseau’s prestige begins as an instrumental end and mutates into an intrinsic one’: prestige in Rousseau’s work holds a possible clue for understanding the (material) objects of prestige motivated behavior y the types of objects man is likely to seek as instruments of prestige. The character of these r 2013 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1384-5748

International Politics

Vol. 50, 3, 387–411

395

Wood

objects is ‘historically’ as well as socially conditioned y in the earliest stages of social interaction and economic dependence, [man] seeks whatever constitutes an obvious sign of strength, power, or eminence. As society ‘flourishes’, y signs of prestige may no longer possess a material value in any concrete sense. (Markey, 1999, pp. 153–154) Compare this with Morgenthau’s (1978, pp. 77–78) assessment that: ‘the policy of prestige’: is as intrinsic an element of the relations between nations as the desire for prestige is of the relations between individuals y international and domestic politics are but different manifestations of y the same social fact y the desire for social recognition is a potent dynamic force determining social relations and creating social institutions y what others think about us is as important as what we actually are. The image in the mirror of our fellows’ minds (that is, our prestige) y determines what we are as members of society. It is not obvious which passage is that of a ‘constructivist’ and which is that of a ‘classical realist’. Lebow (2008, p. 24) claims Markey ‘never effectively distinguishes [prestige] from power’. Yet military victory and defeat, and a warrior ethos that rewards physical prowess with prestige, feature prominently in Lebow’s ‘cultural theory of international relations’. He writes (2008, p. 101) that ‘As external competition becomes more acute, or its material benefits more obvious, warriors increase their standing and authority in the society’ and explains (2008, p. 126) that the Greek psyche had three domains or drives: reason, appetite and spirit. Reason has the ‘capability to distinguish good from bad’ and is contrasted with ‘appetite and spirit which can only engage in instrumental reasoning’. These drives are not easy to disentangle. Intuitively, prestige belongs, with honour and esteem, to the spirit domain, but it is also a goal of appetite or calculating reason. Kim’s (2004) critique of neorealism suggests that prestige is not independent of the political use of force but supplementary to it. An ‘important positive source of prestige is the successful use of power in war’ and the ‘prestige of the US belatedly caught up with its actual power after the victory in World War II’. Moreover, ‘Regardless of the nature of sources states employ to gain prestige, they seek to influence how other states define their interests’ (Kim, 2004, pp. 42–44). Lebow, Kim and Markey address prestige and its linguistic confreres in diverse geographic, cultural and historical contexts. Despite wanting to situate prestige and power in different paradigms, these works reveal that discounting the connections between them is erroneous. Wight (1979, p. 97), in contrast, characterised prestige as an ‘imponderable’ of politics, ‘too closely connected 396

r 2013 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1384-5748

International Politics

Vol. 50, 3, 387–411

Prestige in world politics

with power to be considered as belonging to the moral order. It is the influence derived from power. And unless the power is present power there can be little prestige’. Prestige can be attained without great quantities of the power Wight denotes. Canada, Switzerland and Sweden have developed particular reputations and accrued associated ‘prestige capital’. They may be among those that Dore (1975, p. 207) suggests are ‘susceptible to the attractions of prestige-as-an-end-in-itself’ and ‘likely to be constrained to obey whatever norms of international conduct the subterranean movements of world opinion may gradually bring forth’. But is prestige really such a cul-de-sac? Canadian policymakers and society want recognition as a ‘good international citizen’ and for Canada to derive benefits beyond the affective: improved security, an enhanced capacity to set agendas and reliability from others (Jockel and Sokolsky, 2000; Baktiari, 2010, p. 21). Wylie (2009, p. 124) proposes that ‘powers such as Canada are concerned with their international reputations, and desire prestige both for the influence it might translate into and for its own sake y Canadians do believe in the rule of law, global governance, and human rights y it is debatable whether we care even more that others see us promoting these values’. Hafner-Burton and Montgomery (2006, p. 11) posit that ‘whether prestige hinders or promotes conflict may depend on the type of social network’ and ‘if states are like students the more prestigious will expect to receive more social support when they resort to military threats or the use of force in a dispute y’. However, aggression is a method of gaining or maintaining prestige in these networks. By contrast, in the international system, high-prestige states may be able to get what they need without reverting to aggression since prestige is decoupled from aggression. The extent to which nations will go to defend their prestige and honour has changed in the ‘post-heroic’ West, and before all in Europe. Some can attain prestige without aggression. But aggression has been used to exact revenge for the attenuation of prestige, honour and reputation (Elster, 1990; Lebow, 2008, p. 130). These motivations can still incite advanced liberal democracies to the ultimate in risk and sacrifice, Britain’s military reclaiming of the Falkland Islands being one example. Their symbolic importance had been canvassed in a 1952 Cabinet memo (NA, 1953, p. 5), which considered disposing of the ‘commitment’ to the United States, before determining that ‘public admission of our inability to maintain these traditional possessions would cause a loss of prestige wholly out of proportion to the saving in money obtained. It might precipitate a scramble by the numerous claimants to various parts of British territory’. In the following sections, a diverse historical selection impresses that prestige is a universal motivation and effect. r 2013 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1384-5748

International Politics

Vol. 50, 3, 387–411

397

Wood

Other periods, national and regional examples, personalities or events could also be deployed.

The ancient world Interplay between prestige’s internal and external political dimensions, an early two-level game, was present in the Mesopotamia of 1500 BC. Rulers believed that ‘Great prestige with the inner public is necessary in order to negotiate from strength, and success in negotiations increases inner prestige’ (Liverani, 2001, p. 10). For the same reasons, Ramses II of Egypt, aided by a poet, the ‘official record’ and pictorial reliefs, presented a defeat at the battle of Kadesh in 1274 BC as an implausible stunning victory. Ramses wanted the ‘prodigies of personal valor’ recounted (Breasted, 1903; 1906). As Pharaoh, Ramses represented the peak of the Egyptian hierarchy. A level below were priests and magicians, closely linked categories, who practiced ‘ritual magic y on behalf of the state for three thousand years’, enhancing its and their prestige. One consequence was the reproduction of Egyptian texts, jewellery and artefacts in Greek, Roman and other Mediterranean societies (Pinch, 1994). Lemche (1985, p. 120) characterised prestige as the ‘central concept’ explaining leadership in tribal groups in the area of today’s Israel and Palestine. Prestige was acquired and sustained by, among other factors and qualities, ‘wealth, warlike accomplishments, and eloquence’. Without them, a leader would lose prestige and be deposed. Pfoh’s (2008, p. 104) intriguing study of the same region and era elaborates on patronage arrangements that formed a ‘pyramidal socio-political network’. Networks were and to some extent are the ‘formal expression of a cluster of values that characterizes traditional Mediterranean societies, among others honor and prestige’. This period was contemporaneous to the subject matter of Homer’s Iliad and Odyssey, works that embedded battlefield prestige in the Greek world. A distinction can be made between the glory Achilles won as a warrior, and honour, which he did not exhibit in his (initial) treatment of the dead Hector (Homer: Iliad XXIII). Only when Priam comes to his camp as a ‘supplicant’ does Achilles return Hector’s body ‘with all honourable courtesy’ (Homer: Iliad XXIII; Crotty, 1994). Cornell (2002) vividly illustrates the ritualised conduct of warfare, frequently ‘occasioned by the need to exact vengeance for a perceived insult or wrong y men engage in war for personal and private motives rather than public and political ones y the aim of the exercise is to obtain prestige and honour, rather than any political or material advantage’. But this form of prestige-seeking did have a political element. Wars are not apolitical events, even if the range of experience and effect transcends politics. Greek warriors were engaged in a political contest as well as one of honour. Lebow (2008, pp. 195–96) 398

r 2013 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1384-5748

International Politics

Vol. 50, 3, 387–411

Prestige in world politics

suggests the same. Material advantages were not irrelevant. Rather, ‘gains y function as part of the honour system because they are expended in conspicuous displays of rewards to followers, feasting and gift-giving and therefore serve to reinforce’: the prestige and standing of successful warriors y heroes are engaged in an incessant competition for honour and prestige both on and off the battlefield. (Cornell, 2002, p. 32) The Peloponnesian War had material-strategic and ideational-emotive impulses, among which prestige and honour, resentment and indignation are prominent. Preceding military hostilities, Corinth complains of Corcyrea that ‘we did not found the colony to be insulted by them, but to be their head and to be regarded with a proper respect. At any rate our other colonies honour us’ (Thucydides, 1.38; cf. Kagan, 1969, pp. 219–221). Prestige figures in transgressions of protocol, such as the wrong cut of meat being offered to Corinthians, or as influencing alliances with Sparta. Crane (1992, p. 8) conveys its elastic qualities: The symbolic performance of rank was an end in itself, and the accumulation of wealth and allies can properly be seen as a means to attain such public signs of prestige. Material and symbolic power are symbiotic and reinforce each other y . The relationship of the great tyrants of Sicily with mainland Greece reveals clearly enough the complex relationship between material power and intangible prestige. And, ‘even those on the “margins” of the Greek world, whose prestige may be lower than their material power would suggest, manipulate the existing value system to legitimate and establish themselves’ (Crane, 1992, pp. 9–10). For some participants, prestige was sought through conspicuous heroism or sacrifice, but not only via these means. Here a distinction between prestige and honour emerges. The former is portrayed as standing, the latter as a convention and duty. As the war drags on, honour is threatened and even overwhelmed. So much that ‘The ancient simplicity into which honour so largely entered was laughed down and disappeared; and society became divided into camps in which no man trusted his fellow’ (Thucydides 3.83). For imperial Rome, Greek civilisation inspired qualified reverence. The Romans introduced other perspectives on war. In contrast to the Greeks, for whom ‘the measure of warrior prestige was not actual victory but ideological valour, not the result of the warrior’s action but the quality and spirit of his person’, ‘pure physical strength now has a low valuation, and high esteem is reserved for superior technical skill and static dignity’ (Ho¨lscher, 2003, p. 9, 15). r 2013 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1384-5748

International Politics

Vol. 50, 3, 387–411

399

Wood

In Rome, ‘war was not a social and cultural experience but a matter for the state y Romans do not much care for their fallen dead, because death in war – except for some great heroes of the past – was not glorious but shameful. Only victories counted’. These attitudes were transmitted in art, where ‘Life and power’ meant ‘dignity and status, while defeat and death mean the systematic destruction of such dignity and status’; and religion, which, other than in Greece, ‘played a significant role in the conversion of prestige in war into political power’ (Ho¨lscher, 2003, pp. 12–14). These passages both preview the force of religion in Christendom, driven by and dependent on a mystical prestige, and glimpse the unsentimental modernity that was to challenge and relegate church prestige below that of the state. Reinhold, following Rousseau, maintains that the Romans were the ‘most status-symbol-conscious people of the ancient world’ (1969, p. 300). Ambitious social climbers attempted to appropriate status associated with purple, ostensibly reserved for nobility, even when dyes and garments were of inferior quality. This early version of upwardly mobile aspiration was galvanised by a socio-political reform under Augustus. Romans also wanted prestige to escort them in death. Political importance and social status were reiterated in the imago, which was to ensure immortality for departed aristocrats and public figures (Flower, 1996). The prosopography (Martindale et al, 1971; 1980; 1992) records the standing ascribed and sought across the empire. It presaged later concerns with ‘occupational prestige’ (Treiman, 1977; Parcel and Mueller, 1983). Rome had military and civilisational bases for considering itself prestigious. An innovation intended to reflect this to domestic audiences was the triumph, a precursor to modern manifestations of political prestige transmission. When its armies returned victorious, Rome celebrated. The centrepiece was a procession featuring the principal general, the vir triumphalis, and officers, soldiers and captives, cheered by onlookers anticipating the spectaculars that would follow. Beard (2007) suggests that for all its pomp, the triumph masked republican Rome’s frailty, that the prestige it revelled in was shallow and insecure. Miller (2001) describes how the triumph was copied in the age of Elizabeth I and Oliver Cromwell, used by royal and roundhead alike, intent on raising England’s and their own prestige at the cost of Spain.

The British century and the transition to US predominance Britain’s tangible technological, economic and military achievements stimulated a pride and confidence that percolated into the popular consciousness. By the nineteenth Century, British influence was manifested by its global empire and role as a balancer of European rivals. Colonies provided raw materials, purchasers, transport routes and transit points for a commercial network. 400

r 2013 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1384-5748

International Politics

Vol. 50, 3, 387–411

Prestige in world politics

The empire was not established and sustained through trade or intellect, psychological devices and other ‘invisible’ factors alone. In industrial, economic and naval terms, Britain was the world’s most powerful entity. Otte (2001, p. 13) observes that ‘Britain’s prestige and her international position had rested on her willingness to intervene in European affairs diplomatically or by force’. Nicolson (1937, p. 31) argued, ‘Our unchallenged security during the course of the nineteenth century enabled us to build up our Empire’: and to create our prestige with a minimum expenditure of force. Yet to contend that we acquired our Empire merely by the exercise of our more agreeable qualities would be to advance a contention which is untrue y our own navalism was as excessive as it could be. In Savage’s (2011) account, prestige is the unstated property that accompanies a superior military and technology to ensure the stability of ‘informal empire’. Halvorson (2010, p. 439) claims that ‘for a status quo imperial power, the maintenance of prestige is the fundamental interest from which security and wealth flow’. For Kelly (2003), ‘Britain’s Imperial system had long relied on “prestige” to counter its often chronic material weakness’. Spurred by the British example, competitors, including the Dutch (Kogure, 2008), French (Israeli, 1992) and the unified German state (Wehler, 1970; Hildebrand, 1989), also sought goods, territories and aligned prestige. As challenges mounted, the British genius for prestige projection became crucial. When material power wanes, the importance of prestige increases. When prestige wanes, empires end. British diplomatic dispatches, cabinet papers and Foreign Office memos of the later nineteenth and the twentieth centuries are peppered with references to the maintaining, improving or restoring of British prestige and occasionally to the condition of others’ prestige (National Archives (NA), 1914; 1950; 1952; 1953). Despite vast losses during the First World War, Britain and France still had reservoirs of prestige accumulated through economic and industrial capacity, long histories and political–diplomatic standing. Hitler knew this but demoted it below superior war-fighting resources and the will to deploy them. Nicolson (1937, p. 30 emphases in original) had considered that power and reputation were essential for a state to possess prestige, but that ‘although you cannot acquire prestige without power, you cannot retain prestige without reputation’. Twenty years later, he declared it ‘evident that prestige is based on force alone’ (Drinkwater, 2005, p. 73). As Britain’s material power declined, its governments were increasingly reliant on the United States to reflate its concomitantly waning prestige. France’s similar relative decline encouraged European integration, and embrace of Erbfeind (west) Germany as its main and subordinate partner, as a means to restore prestige. During the Suez crisis, Britain and France were incapable of withstanding their now far more powerful ally, the United States. r 2013 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1384-5748

International Politics

Vol. 50, 3, 387–411

401

Wood

The then Prime Minister of Australia, Robert Menzies, spoke nostalgically that ‘It is apparently not fashionable to speak of prestige’, Yet y peace in the world and the efficacy of the United Nations Charter y require that the British Commonwealth and in particular its greatest and most experienced member, the United Kingdom, should retain power, prestige and moral influence. (Menzies, 1958) Meanwhile, United States’ policy was guided by calculations of its own geostrategic interest and prestige. The weakening of European influence in the Middle East resulted in a shift to and intensification of pressures on the United States. Israel demonstrated itself capable of defeating the Arab states in war; however, if a Soviet threat was to be averted or needed to be repelled, the United States had to provide that guarantee. A CIA report articulated the dilemma that the United States and the Soviet Union became embroiled in. In the region for strategic reasons, prestige was an affiliated motivation and snare for both: continuous engagement would result if the Israelis should ever decide that they must attack Soviet airfields in Egypt or resume the assault on Egyptian facilities y the USSR would find its prestige more and more heavily pledged on the outcome of this contest and therefore would feel severe pressure to keep funneling more and more air defense forces into Egypt so long as the issue was in doubt. This, in turn, would place increasing pressure on the US to furnish greater and greater assistance to Israel. (CIA, 1971, p. 150) Castro’s Cuba had presented a similar problem, exacerbated by the failed Bay of Pigs invasion. Morgenthau (1967) argued that the United States had interests in eliminating Soviet power, especially as it might be projected from Cuba, and in ‘avoiding whatever would jeopardize its standing in the new and emerging nations’. But US policymakers and decision makers did not accurately perceive when prestige was most crucial: in order to minimize the loss of prestige, the United States jeopardized the success of the intervention. Instead of using concern for prestige as a datum among others in the political equation – that is, as an interest among others – it submitted to it as though it were an abstract principle imposing absolute limits upon the actions necessary to achieve success y we lost much prestige as a great nation able to use its power successfully. Thus, prioritising prestige in the short term resulted in a loss of prestige in the longer term. If the Cuba problem had been addressed ‘in a rational fashion’, 402

r 2013 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1384-5748

International Politics

Vol. 50, 3, 387–411

Prestige in world politics

US policymakers would have calculated that succeeding in the intervention was more important than preventing ‘a temporary loss of prestige among the new and emerging nations’ (Morgenthau, 1967, p. 98). The inference is that shortterm prestige-seeking is ‘non-rational’, whereas possessing it in the long term is rational. With advantages of hindsight and sources, Johnson and Tierney (2003) interpret the US policy somewhat differently to Morgenthau but also impress the central role of prestige in the Cuba crisis. In their view, ‘Kennedy and the United States subsequently emerged with enhanced prestige: in many ways the factor that mattered most in the Cold War’.

China and Russia Like change in the international balance of influence, prestige is generally a stronger impetus for revisionist actors than those satisfied with the status quo. Chinese and Russian concerns about status in the world permeate the respective national psychologies (Sun, 2002; Callahan, 2004; Tsygankov, 2008; Larson and Schevchenko, 2010a, b; Tsygankov and Tsygankov, 2010). For China, boosting industrial, technological and military capacity is presumed to result in prestige dividends. Martel and Yoshihara (2003) write that ‘China’s obsession with national prestige, which forms the backdrop for its commercial and military interests, also animates the country’s space policy’. This is one example of direct competition with the United States, which is simultaneously resented for not paying China adequate tribute, and the benchmark against which international status and prestige is measured. For the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), economic progress and display enable the Chinese state and nation to inspire awe in outsiders, and thereby strengthens the party’s internal position. Presentation of itself as China’s manifest destiny makes the CCP highly sensitive to criticism of the state or nation (Fitzgerald, 1999; Shambaugh, 2008; McGregor, 2010). Setbacks to domestic or international performance are felt as humiliation. Gries (2005) shows how ‘rationalist and social psychological variables y help explain why Chinese diplomats were unable to resolve the Belgrade bombing incident through cool diplomacy – the instrumental stakes were too high, and the assault on Chinese self-esteem was too acute’. Consequently, ‘rejecting America’s repeated apologies was one of the few ways China’s leadership could seek to restore Chinese self-esteem in the eyes of the Chinese people’. A recent instance of attempted face-saving was a cover-up by regime authorities after a high-speed train tragedy (Asian Correspondent, 2011; Hilton, 2011; The Economist, 2011). Vladimir Putin’s incumbency as President and Prime Minister is featured by a reassertion of Russia’s global standing. Geopolitical and economic interests and ressentiment at western treatment drive a nationalisation agenda and r 2013 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1384-5748

International Politics

Vol. 50, 3, 387–411

403

Wood

assertive foreign policy. Feelings of ‘Bonapartist revanchism’ (Rasizade, 2008) were vehemently expressed in a speech (Putin, 2007) attacking American unipolar assumptions and encroachment in Russia’s rightful sphere of influence. The speech was a demand for respect and acknowledgment of status. The same year, 9 per cent of Russians, the third and fourth highest response in successive surveys, considered that the principal objective of ‘Putin’s Plan’ was to ‘increase Russia’s prestige’ (VCIOM, 2007). Baek (2009, p. 457) argues that ‘Ideational factors are particularly important for the decision-making of the Russian leadership, which is preoccupied with national identity, national status, and prestige in the international system, Russia’s historical mission’. These ‘ideational factors’ coalesce with strategic influence. Energy resources are one means of wielding leverage; the possession and occasional deployment of still substantial military force another. Ambrosio (2006) accents the rise in significance of ‘non-material values’ in the post-Cold War era. His analysis is applied to Russia–US relations, especially regarding conflict in and over Yugoslavia. He locates the source of Russian policy as ‘dominant beliefs’ in its domestic society and political establishment; that Russia had to regain and maintain the status of a ‘great power’. This propelled a contrarian response to the United States and its allies, despite Yugoslavia (or Serbia) not being a ‘matter of Russia’s direct, significant security interests’. Emotional reactions were generated and exacerbated because the world was viewed through a realist prism. Similar attitudes and policy have continued in various phases of intensity since. The political elite round Putin wants esteem domestically and status with commensurate respect internationally. These are necessary parts of a virtuous circle that serves ideational and material goals: prestige, status and respect endow influence, which underpins recognition, which enhances prestige, status and respect. Larson and Schevchenko (2010b) put it simply ‘prestige matters’. China and Russia share serious ‘concerns for recognition and status, always central to their historic identities’. These concerns were ‘intensified by the end of the Cold War’ after which both ‘experienced major blows to their prestige’. The authors advocate a ‘status-enhancement strategy’ to draw them into cooperative global governance. The United States, in particular, ‘should refrain from actions that undermine China’s and Russia’s prestige’.

Sport International sport is an activity bound with prestige (Allison and Monnington, 2002). The Olympic Games manifest a purpose that Lebow (2008, p. 127) shows Aristotle divined in linking spirit with ‘honor through victory in competition y pleasing because it produces an image of superiority which all humans desire’. 404

r 2013 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1384-5748

International Politics

Vol. 50, 3, 387–411

Prestige in world politics

Accompanied by a grand narrative of peace, fraternity and intercultural communication, the Olympics are, in part, intended to divert potential for conflict into sporting rivalry. Etzioni (1962, pp. 28–29) argued that ‘providing a larger number of contests rather than focusing on one will be less predisposing to violence’: one sphere of competion [sic] channels all the involvement of each group’s members into one race. All the spectators watch one game; losing the one race means losing all y having many concomitant matches makes for a distribution of ego involvement; it reduces the emotional investment and prestige stake in each competition. The lower the emotional stake, the less the temptation to resort to violence. Prestige is not just relevant to the arena. The host nation is imbued with emotional and, usually, economic gains. Greece’s prestige derived from being the origin of the Olympiad. Australia earned prestige for the 2000 Games. China’s leaders, and broader population, were offended that it did not obtain hosting rights. The ‘low politics of sport’ was ‘conspicuously connected with the high politics of national identities and international relations’ (Xu, 2006, p. 90). China’s intensified obsession was driven by the presumed prestige gain associated with staging successful games and winning the medal count (Cha, 2008). In the weeks before the start of the 2008 Beijing Olympics, rockets were fired into the atmosphere to precipitate rain and reduce the likelihood of it during the opening ceremony. Britain’s prestige revived during the 2012 London games and prestige is prominent as a consideration in Russia before the Sochi Winter Olympics in 2014. Fifty-two per cent of respondents to surveys rated ‘raising the prestige of the country, strengthening its position in the world’ as the most likely consequence of hosting the Games. Twenty-six per cent said it would result in a ‘rise in national consciousness’ and ‘patriotism’ (VCIOM, 2009). Putin’s role in the bid was judged as positively affecting his own prestige and political ambitions (Pravda, 2007; Ostapenko, 2010).

Conclusion Prestige demonstrates universality and persistence as a motivation and informal ordering principle in international affairs. Gaining prestige or avoiding its loss has rational and non-rational drives and expressions. Possessed or sought, prestige emerges from and contributes to the shaping of identities and interests. The cognition and transmission of something as prestigious is inextricable from actual or perceived achievement or capacity. The subjectivities and tangents involved – admiration, envy, astonishment, anger, resentment, curiosity, competitive urge, r 2013 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1384-5748

International Politics

Vol. 50, 3, 387–411

405

Wood

deference, imitation – are interrelated with these achievements or capacities and compared with those of others. Sometimes the basis for purported prestige is overestimated or illusory. Prestige can be an effective psychological device – until the illusion is exposed. Oliver’s contemplations (1931, pp. 123–124) quoted by Wight, 1979, p. 97) convey something of the three types noted above. It could be: an effect produced upon the international imagination – in other words, an illusion. It is, however, far from being a mere bubble of vanity; for the nation that possesses great prestige is thereby enabled to have its way, and to bring things to pass which it could never hope to achieve by its own forces. Prestige draws material benefits mysteriously in its train. Political wisdom will never despise it.

Acknowledgements The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of the Alexander von Humboldt Stiftung and the Politische Akademie, Tutzing.

About the Author Steve Wood is a senior lecturer in Politics and International Relations at Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia. His publications include The New European Union: Confronting the Challenges of Integration (2008 – with Wolfgang Quaisser), Germany and East-Central Europe: Political, Economic and Socio-cultural Relations in the Era of EU Enlargement (Ashgate 2004), EU Member Turkey? (Forost 2004 – with Wolfgang Quaisser), Germany, Europe and the Persistence of Nations (Ashgate 1998), and articles in Political Science Quarterly, Politics and Policy, European Foreign Affairs Review, Geopolitics, Global Society, Journal of European Integration, Government and Opposition, International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society, and German Politics.

References Alderson, K. and Hurrell, A. (2000) Hedley Bull on International Society. Houndmills, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. Allison, L. and Monnington, T. (2002) Sport, prestige and international relations. Government and Opposition 37(1): 106–134. Ambrosio, T. (2006) The non-material cost of bandwagoning: The Yugoslav Crisis and the transformation of Russian security policy. Contemporary Security Policy 27(2): 258–281. 406

r 2013 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1384-5748

International Politics

Vol. 50, 3, 387–411

Prestige in world politics

Anderson, B. (1983) Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso. Anholt, S. (2009) The Anholt-GfK Roper Nation Brands Index. New York: GfK Roper. Asian Correspondent. (2011) China orders safety inspection after train crash. 26 July, available at http://asiancorrespondent.com/60975/china-orders-safety-inspection-after-train-crash/. Baek, J. (2009) Medvedev’s Russia, a ‘revisionist power’ or ‘architect of a new world order? The evolution of ideational factors and its cases. Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 21(4): 455–484. Baktiari, B. (2010) Seeking international legitimacy: Understanding the dynamics of nuclear nationalism in Iran. In: J. Yaphe (ed.) Nuclear Politics in Iran. Washington: Institute for National Strategic Studies, pp. 19–35. Barkin, J. (2003) Realist constructivism. International Studies Review 5(3): 325–342. Barkin, J. (2004) Realist constructivism and realist-constructivisms. International Studies Review 6(2): 349–351. Barnett, M. and Duvall., R. (2005) Power in international politics. International Organization 59(1): 39–75. Beard, M. (2007) The Roman Triumph. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Beardsworth, R. (2008) Cosmopolitanism and realism: Towards theoretical convergence? Millennium 37(1): 69–96. Breasted, J. (1903) The Battle of Kadesh: A Study in the Earliest Known Military Strategy. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Breasted, J. (ed. and trans.) (1906) Ancient Records of Egypt: Historical Documents, Vol. III, The Nineteenth Dynasty. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Breiner, P. (2004) Unnatural selection: Max Weber’s concept of Auslese and his criticism of the reduction of political conflict to economics. International Relations 18(3): 289–307. Brown, D. (1991) Human Universals. New York: McGraw Hill. Brown, D. (2004) Human universals, human nature, human culture. Daedelus 133(4): 47–54. Byman, D. and Pollack, K. (2001) Let us now praise great men: Bringing the Statesman back in. International Security 25(4): 107–146. Callahan, W. (2004) National insecurities: Humiliation, salvation, and Chinese nationalism. Alternatives 29(2): 199–218. Canetti, E. (2006 [1960]) Masse und Macht, 30th edn. Frankfurt, Germany: Fischer. Central Intelligence Agency. (1971) The Growth of the Soviet Commitment in the Middle East. Intelligence Report, ESAU XLIX. No City: CIA. Cha, V. (2008) Beijing’s Olympic-sized catch 22. Washington Quarterly 31(3): 105–123. Collins, R. (2011) Explaining the anti-soviet revolutions by state breakdown theory and geopolitical theory. International Politics 48(4/5): 575–590. Cornell, T. (2002) On war and games in the ancient world. In: K. Wamsley , R. Barney and S. Martyn (eds.) The Global Nexus Engaged: Past, Present, Future Interdisciplinary Olympic Studies: Sixth International Symposium for Olympic Research. London, Ontario: International Centre for Olympic Studies, University of Western Ontario, pp. 29–40. Crane, R. (1992) Power, prestige, and the Corcyrean affair in Thucydides 1. Classical Antiquity 11(1): 1–27. Crotty, K. (1994) The Poetics of Supplication: Homer’s Iliad and Odyssey. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. De Gaulle, C. (2000) Me´moires. Paris: Gallimard. Dore, R. (1975) The prestige factor in international affairs. International Affairs 51(2): 190–207. Drinkwater, D. (2005) Sir Harold Nicolson and International Relations: The Practitioner as Theorist. Oxford: Oxford University Press. The Economist. (2011) China’s high-speed train crash: Interrogating the party. 25 July, available at http://www.economist.com/blogs/banyan/2011/07/chinas-high-speed-train-crash. r 2013 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1384-5748

International Politics

Vol. 50, 3, 387–411

407

Wood

Elster, J. (1990) Norms of revenge. Ethics 100(3): 862–885. Etzioni, A. (1962) International prestige, competition and peaceful coexistence. Archives Europeenees de Sociologie 3(1): 21–41. Evans, M. and Kelley, J. (2002) National pride in the developed world: Survey data from 24 nations. International Journal of Public Opinion Research 14(3): 303–338. Fitzgerald, J. (1999) China and the quest for national dignity. The National Interest 55(Spring): 47–59. Flower, H. (1996) Ancestor Masks and Aristocratic Power in Roman Culture. Oxford: Clarendon. Frey, K. (2007) The psychology of nuclear choice. Journal of Genocide Research 9(3): 369–387. Gilpin, R. (1981) War and Change in World Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Goldsmith, B. (2005) Imitation in International Relations: Observational Learning, Analogies, and Foreign Policy in Russia and Ukraine. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Greenfeld, L. (1992) Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Gries, P. (2005) Social psychology and the identity-conflict debate: Is a ‘China threat’ inevitable? European Journal of International Relations 11(2): 235–265. Guzzini, S. (2005) The concept of power: A constructivist analysis. Millenium 33(3): 495–521. Hafner-Burton, E. and Montgomery, A. (2006) Power positions: International organizations, social networks, and conflict. Journal of Conflict Resolution 50(1): 3–27. Halvorson, D. (2010) Prestige, prudence and public opinion in the 1882 British occupation of Egypt. Australian Journal of Politics and History 56(3): 423–440. Hecht, G. (2009) Radiance of France: Nuclear Power and National Identity After World War II. Cambridge: MIT. Hegel, G.W.F. (1995 [1821]) Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse. In: E. Moldenhauer and K. Michel (eds.) 4th edn. Frankfurt am Main, Germany: Suhrkamp. Hellmann, G. (ed.) (2003) Are dialogue and synthesis possible in international relations? International Studies Review 5(1): 123–153. Henrich, J. and Gil-White, F. (2001) The evolution of prestige: Freely conferred deference as a mechanism for enhancing the benefits of cultural transmission. Evolution and Human Behavior 22(2): 165–196. Hiester, D. (1985) Nuclear proliferation: A cause for optimism? International Relations 8(2): 213–225. Hildebrand, K. (1989) Saturierheit und Prestige: Das Deutsche Reich als Staat im Staatensystem 1871–1918. Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht 40(4): 193–202. Hilton, I. (2011) China is on the fast train to disaster. The Guardian, 28 July. Hobson, J. and Seabrooke, L. (2001) Reimagining Weber: Constructing international society and the social balance of power. European Journal of International Relations 7(2): 239–274. Hogg, M. and Abrams, D. (eds.) (2001) Intergroup Relations. Philadelphia, PA: Taylor and Francis. Ho¨lscher, T. (2003) Images of war in Greece and Rome: Between military practice, public memory, and cultural symbolism. Journal of Roman Studies 93(1): 1–25. Huddy, L. (2001) From social to political identity: A critical examination of social identity theory. Political Psychology 22(1): 127–156. Husserl., E. (1913) Ideen zu einer reinen Pha¨nomenologie und pha¨nomenologischen Philosophie. Halle, Germany: Niemeyer. Israeli, R. (1992) Diplomacy of contempt: French consuls and the mandarins in nineteenth-century China. Modern Asian Studies 26(2): 363–394. Jackson, P. and Nexon, D. (2004) Constructivist realism or realist-constructivism? International Studies Review 6(3): 337–341. Jervis, R. (1970) The Logic of Images in International Relations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 408

r 2013 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1384-5748

International Politics

Vol. 50, 3, 387–411

Prestige in world politics

Jockel, J. and Sokolky, J. (2000-2001) Lloyd Axworthy’s legacy: Human security and the rescue of Canadian Defence policy. International Journal 56(1): 1–18. Johnson, D. and Tierney, D. (2003) Essence of victory: Winning and losing international crises. Security Studies 13(2): 350–381. Joshi, S. (2008) Honor in International Relations. Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University. Working Paper 2008-0146. Kagan, D. (1969) The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Kelly, S. (2003) Britannia has ruled here Transcaucasia and Considerations of Imperial Defence in Lord Curzon’s Search for a Near Eastern Settlement, 1918–1923. MA Thesis, Simon Fraser University. Kim, Y. (2004) Does prestige matter in international politics? Journal of International and Area Studies 11(1): 39–55. Kinsella, D. and Chima, J. (2001) Symbols of statehood: Military industrialization and public discourse in India. Review of International Studies 27(3): 353–373. Kissinger, H. (1995) Diplomacy. New York: Touchstone. Kogure, M. (2008) National Prestige and Economic Interest: Dutch Diplomacy towards Japan 1850–1863. Maastricht, The Netherlands: Shaker. Korte, K-R. (1997) Was denken die anderen u¨ber uns? Fremdbilder als notwendiges Korrektiv der deutschen Außenpolitik. Internationale Politik 52(2): 47–54. Larson, D. and Schevchenko, A. (2010a) Status seekers: Chinese and Russian responses to U.S primacy. International Security 34(4): 63–95. Larson, D. and Schevchenko, A. (2010b) Prestige matters: Chinese and Russian status concerns and U.S. foreign policy. Belfer Center Policy Brief, April. Lebow, R. (2001) Thuycidides the constructivist. American Political Science Review 95(3): 547–560. Lebow, R. (2004) Constructive realism. International Studies Review 6(2): 346–348. Lebow, R. (2008) A Cultural Theory of International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lemche, N. (1985) Early Israel: Anthropological and Historical Studies on the Israelite Society before the Monarchy. Leiden: Brill. Linklater, A. and Suganami, H. (2006) The English School of International Relations: A Contemporary Reassessment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Liverani, M. (2001) International Relations in the Ancient Near East 1600–1100 BC. Houndmills, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. Lukes, S. (2005) Power: A Radical View, 2nd edn. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Maner, J. and Mead, N. (2010) The essential tension between leadership and power: When leaders sacrifice group goals for the sake of self-interest. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 99(3): 482–497. Markey, D. (1999) Prestige and the origins of war: Returning to realism’s roots. Security Studies 8(4): 126–172. Martel, W. and Yoshihara, T. (2003) Averting a Sino-US space race. Washington Quarterly 26(4): 19–35. McGregor, R. (2010) The Party: The Secret World of China’s Communist Rulers. New York: Harper Collins. Martindale, J., Jones, A. and Morris, J. (eds.) (1971/1980/1992) The Prosopography of the Later Roman Empire, III Vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Menzies, R. (1958) Nationalization of the Suez Canal, Television broadcast, London, 13 August 1956 in R. Menzies Speech is of Time, Selected Speeches and Writings. London: Cassell and Co. Miller, A. (2001) Roman Triumphs and Early Modern English Culture. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan. Moos, M. and Koslin, B. (1952) Prestige suggestion and political leadership. Public Opinion Quarterly 16(1): 77–93. Morgenthau, H. (1967) To intervene or not to intervene. Foreign Affairs 45(3): 92–103. r 2013 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1384-5748

International Politics

Vol. 50, 3, 387–411

409

Wood

Morgenthau, H. (1978) Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 5th edn. New York: Knopf. Morriss, P. (1987) Power: A Philosophical Analysis. Manchester: Manchester University Press. National Archives (NA). (1914) British interests in the Yangste and prestige in China. Admiralty 20 April. ADM 1/8376/109. Kew, UK. National Archives. (1950) Report on the Prestige of the French Army. FO 371/89248. Kew, UK. National Archives. (1952) British Responsibilities in the Persian Gulf States and the Future Policy. FO 371/98358. Kew, UK. National Archives. (1953) British overseas obligations. Cabinet Memorandum, 18 June 1952. CAB/ 129/53. Kew, UK. Nicolson, H. (1937) The Meaning of Prestige. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Nicolson, H. (1939) Diplomacy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Niebuhr, R. (1962) American hegemony and the prospects for peace. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 342(1): 154–160. Nolte, D. (2006) Macht und Machthierarchien in den internationalen Beziehungen: Eine Analysekonzept fu¨r die Forschung u¨ber Regionale Fu¨hrungsma¨chte. Hamburg: GIGA. GIGA Working Paper 29. Norkus, Z. (2004) Max Weber on nations and nationalism: Political economy before political sociology. Canadian Journal of Sociology 29(3): 389–418. Oliver, F. (1931) The Endless Adventure, Vol. II. London: Palgrave Macmillan. O’Neill, B. (1999) Honor, Symbols and War. Michigan: University of Michigan Press. O’Neill, B. (2006) Nuclear Weapons and National Prestige. Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper 1560, New Haven: Yale University. Ostapenko, N. (2010) Nation branding of Russia through the Sochi Olympic Games of 2014. Journal of Management Policy and Practice 11(4): 60–63. Otte, T. (ed.) (2001) ‘It’s what made Britain great’: Reflections on British foreign policy, from Malplaquet to Maastricht. The Makers of British Foreign Policy. From Pitt to Thatcher. Houndmills, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 1–35. Parcel, T. and Mueller, C. (1983) Occupational differentiation, prestige, and socioeconomic status. Work and Occupations 10(1): 49–80. Pfoh, E. (2008) Dealing with tribes and states in ancient Palestine. Scandinavian Journal of the Old Testament 22(1): 86–113. Pinch, G. (1994) Magic in Ancient Egypt. London: British Museum Press. Plourde, A. (2009) Prestige goods and the formation of a political hierarchy – A costly signalling model. In: Shennen S (ed.) Pattern and Process in Cultural Evolution. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, pp. 265–276. Pravda. (2007) Russia’s Sochi to host winter Olympics in 2014 owing to Putin’s efforts, http:// english.pravda.ru/russia/politics/05-07-2007/94561-sochi_olympics-0/&num. Prosser, A. (2008) Nuclearisation and its discontents: Status, security, and pathways to nuclear reversal. Paper prepared for the Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, San Francisco, March. Putin, V. (2007) Speech at the 43rd Munich conference on security policy, www.securityconference .de/archive/konferenzen/rede.php?menu_2007=&menu_konferenzen=&sprache=en&id= 179&. Rasizade, A. (2008) Putin’s place in Russian history. International Politics 45(5): 531–553. Reinhold, M. (1969) Status symbols in the ancient world. The Classical Journal 64(7): 300–304. Ryle, G. (1949) The Concept of Mind. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Salomon, A. (1926) Max Weber. Die Gesellschaft 3(2): 131–153. Savage, J. (2011) The stability and breakdown of empire: European informal empire in China, the Ottoman Empire and Egypt. European Journal of International Relations 17(2): 161–185. 410

r 2013 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1384-5748

International Politics

Vol. 50, 3, 387–411

Prestige in world politics

Schalk, F. (1971) Praestigium – Prestige. Romanische Forschungen 83(2): 288–305. Shambaugh, D. (2008) China’s Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Sharman, J. (2007) Rationalist and constructivist perspectives on reputation. Political Studies 55(1): 20–37. Shimbori, M., Ikeda, H., Ishida, T. and Kond, M. (1963) Measuring a nation’s prestige. American Journal of Sociology 69(1): 63–68. Shunsuke, T. (2009) An exploratory analysis of national prestige scores. Social Science Japan Journal 12(2): 267–275. Slomp, G. (2000) Thomas Hobbes and the Political Philosophy of Glory. Houndmills, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. Smith, A. (1991) National Identity. London: Penguin. Sun, L-K. (2002) The Chinese National Character: From Nationhood to Individuality. New York: M.E. Sharpe. Tajfel, H. (1981) Human Groups and Social Categories. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Tang, S. (2005) Reputation, cult of reputation, and international conflict. Security Studies 14(1): 34–62. Taylor, P. (1994) The state as container: Territoriality in the modern world-system. Progress in Human Geography 18(2): 151–162. Thucydides (1903) History of the Peloponnesian War, Translated by R. Crawley, 2nd edn. London: Dent. Treiman, D. (1977) Occupational Prestige in Comparative Perspective. New York: Academic Press. Tsygankov, A. (2008) Self and other in international relations theory: Learning from Russian civilizational debates. International Studies Review 10(4): 762–775. Tsygankov, A. and Tsygankov, P. (2010) National ideology and IR theory: Three incarnations of the Russian idea. European Journal of International Relations 16(4): 663–686. VCIOM (Russian Public Opinion Research Centre). (2007) ‘Putin’s Plan’: Evaluation of Russians. Press Release No.794, Moscow: VCOIM, 18 October. VCIOM (Russian Public Opinion Research Centre). (2009) Sochi Olympics – 2014: Conduct or cancel?. Press Release No.1168, Moscow: VCIOM, 24 April. Veblen, T. (2003 [1899]) Theory of the Leisure Class. Hazleton, PA: Pennsylvania State University. Walsh, J. (2007) Do states play signalling games? Cooperation and Conflict 42(4): 441–459. Watson, A. (1992) The Evolution of International Society: A Comparative Historical Analysis. New York: Routledge. Weber, M. (1922) Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Tu¨bingen, Germany: Mohr. Wegener, B. (1992) Concepts and measurement of prestige. Annual Review of Sociology 18(2): 253–280. Wehler, H-U. (1970) Bismarck’s imperialism 1862–1890. Past and Present 48(1): 119–155. Wendt, A. (2004) The state as person in international theory. Review of International Studies 30(3): 289–316. Wight, M. (1979) Power Politics, In: Bull H. and Holbraad C. (eds.) Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin. Wight, M. (1991) International Theory: The Three Traditions, In: Wight G. and Porter B. (eds.) Leicester, UK: Leicester University Press. Wolf, R. (2008) Respekt: Ein unterscha¨tzter Faktor in den Internationalen Beziehungen. Zeitschrift fur Internationalen Beziehungen 15(1): 5–42. Wylie, L. (2009) Valuing reputation and prestige: Canadian foreign policy and the international criminal court. American Review of Canadian Studies 39(2): 112–130. Xu, X. (2006) Modernizing China in the Olympic spotlight: China’s national identity and the Beijing Olympiad. The Sociological Review 54(s2): 90–107. r 2013 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1384-5748

International Politics

Vol. 50, 3, 387–411

411