Higher Education Policy, 2007, 20, (339–360) r 2007 International Association of Universities 0952-8733/07 $30.00 www.palgrave-journals.com/hep

Quality Assurance in Higher Education: Thinking Beyond the English Experience Ourania Filippakoua and Ted Tapperb a

Institute of Education, University of London, 20 Bedford Way, London WC1H 0AL, UK. E-mail: [email protected] b Oxford Centre for Higher Education Policy Studies, New College, Oxford, OX1 3BN, UK. E-mail: [email protected]

Since 1992, the assessment of the quality of the teaching and learning process in the United Kingdom has generated considerable political controversy. This article traces the evolution of the quality regime to the present day, which appears to signify that the contemporary arrangements are underwritten by a measure of political consensus and an emerging interest in moving beyond quality assurance to quality enhancement. The focus of the article is to provide an interpretation of the British quality agenda that recognizes the inevitability that higher education policy will be shaped by compromises arrived at between dominant political interests. And yet policy is also driven by ideas, and the article interprets the shifting quality agenda as a conflict of values about the relationship between state, the wider society and higher education. As interest in creating quality regimes for teaching and learning spreads to other systems of higher education, the question arises as to what, if anything can be learnt from the British, and more especially the English, experience? Higher Education Policy (2007) 20, 339–360. doi:10.1057/palgrave.hep.8300155 Keywords: England; Europe; governance; quality assurance; quality enhancement

Introduction A number of issues have dominated the English higher education policy agenda in recent years of which funding, the assessment of research, the widening of participation and the evaluation of the quality of teaching and learning are the most significant. The focus of this paper is upon the issue of quality in higher education particularly since 1992, the year in which a state-controlled quality regime covering all of higher education was enacted. It is possible to claim a particular significance for each of the four policy issues but the quality agenda impacts directly upon what many would consider to be the core purpose of higher education (its ‘soul’) — the transmission of knowledge.1 The concern with the quality of the teaching and learning process reaches out to incorporate the basic pedagogical issues: what is taught, how it is taught and whether the

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learning process has transmitted knowledge successfully. Moreover, none of these concerns are independent of the endeavours of the academic labour force. In effect, its competence is under scrutiny, hence raising the question of what is the real purpose of the exercise — to ensure quality provision or to regulate the academic profession. While the same point applies to the assessment of research, the critical difference is that the learning process impacts more directly upon the student experience, which brings into focus perhaps the most important relationship in higher education, that between tutor and student. Within this broad setting, our analysis of the quality agenda is organized into three segments: the tradition of academic collegiality, the emergence and continuous reformulation of state-sponsored surveillance, and a review of the current emphasis on quality enhancement along with a recognition of the growing importance of marketplace pressures. The intention is to place the English experience of quality assurance within the context of the political struggles that enveloped it. This is not a descriptive overview of the evolution of the quality agenda (that can be found elsewhere) but rather an attempt to place that development within its political context. The final section of the paper will address what can be learnt from the English experience. In view of the fact that under the long-term impetus of the Bologna Process the European Higher Education Area is taking shape, this is a pertinent issue to address. To the sometimes-aghast amazement of continental Europeans (Harvey, 2005, 271), this is an issue on which the British have led the way. The question to ponder, therefore, is whether a meaningful quality regime — one that can make a valuable contribution to the idea and practices of higher education in the 21st century is really possible? And, if it is, what is to be done to achieve it? It should be stressed that this is a reflective contribution to the debate based upon the fieldwork of one of the authors and an analysis of the documentary evidence. There is no assumption that particular national systems provide an acceptable model for others to follow. Presumably, however, as national systems face the global pressures of the market and the manoeuvring of regional political formations they will want to learn from one another as they address their key policy issues, if only to discover what problems have to be faced and what approaches should be treated with caution.

Academic Collegiality It is critically important, as David Watson has reminded us that any analysis of the British experience needs to be aware of: y of the long, and deep, history of the UK higher education system’s record — through validating universities, academic advisory committees, Higher Education Policy 2007 20

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and external examining, as well as bodies like the CNAA — of taking collective responsibility of quality and standards through expansion and academic ‘enlargement’y (Watson, 2005, 71). This is not simply to set the record straight but rather to recognize that the presence of a particular tradition is likely to have a powerful impact upon perceptions of change. If change is imposed, rather than negotiated consensually, then there is always the possibility that, although the new regime may be obeyed (the state invariably possesses the resources to ensure obedience), it will not be loved. From the outset, at least in the university sector of higher education, the legitimacy of the post-1992 quality regime was fragile. The values that impregnated the pre-1992 arrangements appeared to be widely shared and run counter to the structures and procedures of the new order. Prior to 1992, the primary means in the universities of securing quality assurance was dependent upon the system of external examiners. In effect this was a form of peer review with external examiners usually nominated by departments and, even if reporting formally to the university, their observations were essentially for departmental consideration. The purpose was to sustain comparability in degree classifications with the quality of the teaching and learning process very much a secondary consideration. It was possible to make inferences about the latter but not to offer an informed judgement. A registrar of one of the prestigious universities made the following critical observation regarding academic values: Number one on their list would undoubtedly be external examiners and their reports. And that’s because for many academics in the old sector in particular their primarily loyalty is to their discipline rather than their institutions.2 External examiners, therefore, are integral to a system of evaluation that looks more to professional and disciplinary values rather than to institutional authority to sustain quality. The issue is not simply a question of resisting external authority but rather determining who has the competence to judge such matters. Likewise, the established procedures by which professional bodies (in areas such as law, medicine and engineering) accredited university degree programmes in Britain have been underwritten by similar values and, although there may be tensions between academic and professional value systems, the incentive to reach a mutually agreeable concordat is high. The creation of the public sector of higher education (PSHE) in the form of the polytechnics and colleges instigated an interesting shift in thinking about the maintenance of academic standards. The Council for National Academic Awards (CNAA) was established to approve the degree programmes of the Higher Education Policy 2007 20

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so-called public sector institutions accompanied by an inspection role undertaken by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate (HMI). CNAA was a national body created in 1964 by Royal Charter and essentially, although not formally part of the state machinery, functioned under the direct auspices of the state. Although it pre-dated the state’s more direct entry into the quality assurance arena and, although it may not have been realized at the time, it was clearly a harbinger of things to come. Within the context of a binary system of higher education, the CNAA posed no threat to the established universities. And, although over time irritation with the CNAA within the public sector institutions would grow, generally they viewed it positively. To some extent this reflected a measure of deference: the polytechnics had acquired the authority to run degree programmes and the CNAA offered the reassurance that these were indeed of degree standard, although it can be argued that it was the role of the Inspectorate as much as that of the CNAA that deflected potential misgivings in official circles (Salter and Tapper, 1994, 144). And Pratt (1997, 228–230, 235–236) has illustrated the underlying tension between the Inspectorate and the CNAA, with sentiment within the polytechnics themselves moving steadily towards being granted the right to award their own degrees. Nonetheless, the CNAA was the major guarantor of quality: it enabled the polytechnics to perform a critical higher education function; it acted as a defence against external scepticism and it provided reassurance for their more faint-hearted members. Whereas in certain quarters the quality process was perceived as a threat to the universities, the CNAA actually enhanced the role of the polytechnics. Although the performance of its functions was dependent upon site visits and evaluation, the potential rewards were significant. It offered opportunities rather than posed a threat. It can be described as the acceptable face of state intervention.

The Regulatory State: Surveillance, Control and Conflict Challenging the old order The instigation of the state’s direct formal involvement in quality assurance is a product of the 1992 Further and Higher Education Act (FHEA). This act amalgamated the responsibilities of the two existing funding councils (FCs), the Universities Funding Council (UFC) and the Polytechnics and Colleges Funding Council (PCFC), and replaced them with three separate FCs each with a national identity, one for England, Wales and Scotland. Each FC was required to: y secure that provision is made for assessing the quality of education provided in institutions for whose activities they provide, or are considering providing, financial support y (FHEA, 1992, 70-1a). Higher Education Policy 2007 20

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And to achieve this they were further required to: y establish a committee, to be known as the ‘Quality Assessment Committee’, with the function of giving them advice on the discharge of their duty under paragraph (a) above and such other functions as may be conferred on the committee by the council (FHEA, 1992, 70-1b). This committee, now known by the more convoluted title of the ‘Quality Assessment Learning and Teaching Strategy Committee’ still retains formal responsibility for the Higher Education Funding Council for England’s (HEFCE) control of quality assurance. In view of the fact that the binary line in higher education was abolished in 1992, there was no further need for the CNAA. Furthermore, a new quality regime had to be created to embrace the universities and the former polytechnics (steadily acquiring the university title) and thus the Teaching Quality Assessment (TQA) period emerged with many of its key staff drawn from HMI. Along with many others, the Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals’ (CVCP) had foreseen the likely direction of government policy and had attempted to forestall action through the creation of its Academic Audit Unit (AAU). With the creation of the AAU, the vice chancellors and principals accepted, with varying degrees of reluctance, the fact that a more rigorous system of quality evaluation was required than that provided by the visits and reports of external examiners. As its name implied, the reviews of the AAU were based on an audit trail incorporating various stages: institutions were required to submit a package of documentation, this was followed by a visit that enabled the auditors to explore issues raised by the documentation, a draft report was drawn up and shown to the institution for comment, which was then followed by a final report. There was no obligation for the institutions to place the reports (which were seen as their property) in the public domain but in fact most of them did so (Williams, 1994, vii). The issue, therefore, is why the government rejected this seemingly conciliatory move on the part of the CVCP? Is there more to the story than the purported need to ensure that the quality of the teaching and learning process in British higher education remained high? Or to put the question conspiratorially, ‘Was there a hidden agenda?’ However, in spite of such suspicion the government reaffirmed its good intentions, and, moreover, as the quality assurance industry slowly spread its tentacles those interests from within the higher education sector — both academics and managers — who became enmeshed in the process, reinforced such sentiments. In effect a cottage industry has sprung up, which even the sceptics have a vested interest in sustaining with activities ranging from active participation in the evaluative regime to becoming a part of the quality production process. Higher Education Policy 2007 20

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But it is critical to keep in mind the political context within these developments occurred. Thatcher Governments were not noted for their sympathy towards professional interests, and were deeply suspicious of the supposed virtues of self-regulation. The creation of the AAU seemed more like an act of desperation to ward off government intervention rather than a considered embracing of the quality agenda. Furthermore, the introduction of the FC model of governance (replacing in 1988 the University Grants Committee and the polytechnics’ National Advisory Body) was a clear manifestation that the regulatory state had penetrated higher education. The political sponsorship of the quality agenda is, therefore, intimately related to the rise of the regulatory state model of governance, and — in the eyes of some — tainted by it. In the context of the early 1990s, it can be reasonably argued that the higher education interests were offering the government too little too late. Too little because the AAU procedures did not incorporate departmental inspection, did not attempt to form judgements that could be expressed in quantitative terms, contained no clear strategy for sanctioning departments and institutions with poor records, and — moreover — there was not even a requirement that reports should be published. And too late because it could be perceived as a move designed to pre-empt government action rather than as a product of a genuine change in conviction.

Conflicting systems In his foreword to Brown’s overview of quality assurance in the UK since 1992, John Stoddart (former Chairman of the now defunct Higher Education Quality Council (HEQC)) wrote: The issue at the heart of the quality debate, therefore, is not whether higher education should be subject to evaluation and assessment but who should do it, how it should be done, what criteria should be used and what sanctions might be deployed if what is assessed is found wanting (Stoddart, in Brown, 2004, x). In effect the central thrust of Brown’s book is to provide us with a particular approach for addressing those issues: that any quality regime if it is to be effective needs to be firmly under the control of the representative bodies of the higher education institutions. However, with the passage of the 1992 FHEA the government of the day decided otherwise. The authority was to reside in the Quality Assessment Committees (QACs) that the FCs (one each for England, Scotland and Wales) had a statutory obligation to create, with each committee Higher Education Policy 2007 20

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reporting back to its FC, which could use this information to guide decisions on resource distribution. But the dominant institutional interests in higher education (the CVCP, the Standing Conference of Principals — SCOP, and the Committee of the Directors of Polytechnics — CDP) had not given up hope.3 Building on the AAU experience, they created the HEQC, which was designed to follow a rigorous audit trail resulting in: Reports, usually about 10,000 to 12,000 words long, have both formative and judgemental elements, but do not offer categorical judgements of the ‘satisfactory/unsatisfactory’ type. They are published by HEQC (Williams, 1994, vii). The higher education representative bodies were obviously hoping for an agreement that would sanction its newly created quality assurance body to perform the regulatory task on behalf of the FCs. But clearly given its very different guiding principles (audit as opposed to assessment, no ranking of departmental performance and certainly no punitive financial sanctions), it was never going to be given the blessing of the QACs. The key constraint was the statutory obligation of the FCs to assess the quality of education. Consequently, the most evident feature of the post-1992 structure was its division into two different camps. Under the auspices of the HEQC, the universities undertook their periodic audits while they were also required to submit to the investigative gaze of the TQA process. Notwithstanding the revelation of particular problems (e.g., collaboration with overseas partners) and isolated examples of poor standards in certain institutions, overall neither process found very much to complain about which, not surprisingly, led some to wonder whether there had been any real need for the exercise in the first place. Certainly the cost effectiveness of the monitoring process was perceived as highly questionable — an issue that was about to generate even greater concern. The quality assurance agency: at last consensus? The big political push after 1992 was the attempt to create a structure that would amalgamate the two quality assurance models and, thanks to the work of the Joint Planning Group (JPG), the end product was the creation of the Quality Assurance Agency (QAA). This outcome can only be described as a politically constructed masterpiece: the representative higher education bodies would constitute the company (i.e., the QAA), while its board of directors was not only to be a mixture of members drawn from those representative bodies and the FCs, but also to incorporate six so-called ‘independent’ directors who would be ‘representative of the wider community with an interest in quality and Higher Education Policy 2007 20

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standards in higher education’ (CVCP/HEFCE, September 1996, 21). Moreover, according to the JPG’s Final Report: The new agency will also review the arrangements made by each institution for assuring academic standards in the institution as a whole. This acknowledges that responsibility for quality and standards, and the means by which they are assured, resides ultimately with an institution corporately, and not with its constituent elements (CVCP/HEFCE, September 1996, 3 — stress added). The icing on the cake was the recognition that the QAA should function according to a service agreement arrived at by negotiation between itself and the FCs (with the education departments clearly keeping an eye on proceedings). Evidently, it was important for the departments to be assured that the QAA would conduct its affairs in a manner that enabled the FCs to fulfil their statutory obligations. In effect, the QAA was embalmed in a structure that apparently gave something to all the interested parties: government and the FCs thanks to the service agreements (moreover, at the same time, they could distance themselves from the minutiae of policy implementation), the representative institutions because the QAA was formally their company, and the HEIs thanks to the enhanced role of their representative bodies and the recognition that ultimately responsibility for quality control rested in their hands. The debate generated by the juxtaposition of the decentralized model of quality assurance as represented by the tradition of external examiners and the centralized state model created by the statutory authority of the government was apparently no longer relevant. At first glance, the circle appeared to have been squared. So what went so disastrously wrong? Stoddart claims that within higher education there is a general acceptance of the need for quality assurance coupled with a considerable conflict as to how it should be achieved. The post-1992 experience of the quality agenda suggests, however, that both of these assertions need to be refined. While there may be a universal acceptance within higher education of the need for ‘evaluation and assessment’, undoubtedly there was a widespread antipathy with the 1992 legislative imposition of a state-regulated structure, which was not mitigated by the implementation of the JPG’s subsequent recommendations, indeed hostility intensified post-1997. Secondly, it is critical to think about the complexity in the character of this so-called universal approval. Many individual academics were bitterly opposed to the QAA regime even though it was a product of institutional agreement, which included the representative bodies of the higher education sector. The hostility is most vividly illustrated by the vituperative response of Warwick University’s Economics Department to its QAA Higher Education Policy 2007 20

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inspection, which resulted in the award of the maximum score of 24 — ‘We have to stop the QAA monster or it will eat us alive’! (Macleod, 30 January 2001). It was clearly of little comfort to many academics that their representative institutional bodies were prepared to do a deal. The QAA was just as remote to them as the previous state-controlled regime. Moreover, the QAA process was perceived widely in academic circles as unnecessarily bureaucratic, consuming too much time and money. Furthermore, and perhaps most critically, it had refined the process of departmental inspection and instigated a quantitative measure of quality (six competencies to be evaluated each with a scale of 1–4), which some alleged still failed to provide an acceptable measure of quality. But, in political terms, more important than the opposition of individual academics was the profound disquiet (to put it mildly) at the institutional level. It has to be recognized that there are different institutional relationships to the quality assurance process. For some HEIs, particularly those that acquired the university title after 1992, the quality regime gave them a measure of reassurance — that they were indeed delivering a teaching and learning experience that was of a university standard. Moreover, high scores offered comfort to their students and, more importantly, their prospective (especially overseas) students. It was a convenient way of ascertaining the quality of the institution; state regulation that aided market choice. Moreover, it is important to bring the internal balance of authority within individual institutions into the equation. For all the tension potentially generated by departmental inspections, a good review could give a department an important resource in its dealings with the institutional structures that would be denied to it by a quality regime dependent only upon institutional audit. In their overview of the impact of the quality assurance regime upon the character of British higher education, Brennan and Shah (2000, 37) have argued that it threatened institutions with established reputations. Were they really as good as their reputations suggested? While this was a theoretical possibility, many prestigious institutions thought they had proven track records and were quite prepared to resist what they considered to be unwarranted and burdensome external intrusion. In other words, it was not that they feared the impact of the quality assurance regime but it had little to offer them and, at the same time, subjected them to a time-consuming bureaucratic process. Thus, some universities moved beyond criticism to actually resisting requests from the QAA to fulfil its obligation ‘to scrutinise their arrangements for maintaining quality and standards’ (Tysome, 10 July 1998, 2). And even in the era of the so-called ‘light-touch’ regime that emerged after 2002, the University of Cambridge (which has the fiercest record of university opposition to the QAA) was prepared to rebut criticism with Higher Education Policy 2007 20

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considerable venom (Baty, 24 October 2003, 56). The Warwick attack was by no means an isolated case. What Stoddart needed to address (and in fairness to him, he could scarcely have done so in the context of writing a foreword to someone else’s book) was how many universities were prepared to embrace a quality regime that went much beyond the traditional system of external examiners. The issue has even greater significance given the persistence of one critically important (if frequently overlooked) variable in the structural matrix consisting of the QAA, QAC, FCs and HEIs. The QAA reports back to the QAC (now with a more convoluted title), which in turn provides HEFCE with information that can be used to guide its funding decisions. Moreover, there have been repeated political statements (as most clearly expressed in the annual grant letters that the now Department of Education and Skills issues to the FC) that a linkage should be established between funding and the outcomes of the quality assurance process. For example, the letter from the then Secretary of State (John Patten) to the then Chairman of HEFCE (Ron Dearing), which established the broad guidelines that the Government expected the FC to follow, stated that the funding methodology should ‘maintain and enhance quality by relating funding to the Council’s assessments of teaching quality’ (DES, 2 June 1992, 5). Although the wording is ambivalent, the implication is that the more positive the evaluations the higher the level of funding. But there is no statutory obligation on the FC to go down this route. Ultimately, therefore, while undoubtedly taking the pertinent quality record into account, the FC makes its own judgement on whether to withhold funding or not. The point is stark — if an institution was sufficiently confident about its quality standards (or its overall status) it could simply resist the QAA. The QAA could appeal to the FC to assist in breaking the institutional resistance, and the FC could in turn ask the Secretary of State to invoke those legislative clauses that grant the minister reserve powers. But this would open up questions about the competence of the QAA and there was no guarantee that the Secretary of State would be prepared to intervene given that the Department would then be embroiled in a political struggle. Consequently, the QAA wisely adopted the strategy of persistent persuasion rather than open confrontation. It is difficult to penetrate with any degree of certainty the reasons for the failure to link funding to quality assurance scores, and it is interesting to contrast this with the outcomes of the Research Assessment Exercises (RAEs) in which the Government has intervened because it felt that HEFCE was not making a sufficiently sharp connection between evaluation and resource distribution. But it is easy to offer a sensible surmise. By and large the institutions receiving the lowest quality scores (justly or unjustly) Higher Education Policy 2007 20

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have been those institutions that have embraced the Government’s widening participation policy (with particular emphasis upon recruiting students from working-class families and state schools). Consequently, financial penalties incurred because of judgements about quality would penalize disproportionately the post-1992 universities, also in general the universities with the fewest resources. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that a political charade was taking place. The government called for a linkage of funding and yet was conscious of the fact that the political repercussions of going down this route were simply too high. Thus the Secretary of State repeatedly uttered the mantra of the need for a link but did little to enforce it. The post-1997 QAA model was therefore in part undermined by the growing realization that it had feet of clay. But of greater significance were substantive developments within both the system of higher education and the surrounding political context. Historically interests in higher education were represented by broad umbrella organizations — the CVCP, SCOP, CDP, AUT (Association of University Teachers) and NUS (National Union of Students). But over time we have seen the fragmentation of the higher education policy network and, in particular, the fracturing of the CVCP (since 1 December 2000 renamed as Universities UK (UUK)) into three organizations each representing somewhat different interests: the Campaign for Mainstream Universities (CMU), the 94 Group and the Russell Group. UUK continues to exist but one suspects that it will become increasingly a ceremonial and service organization rather than one that makes a significant input into the policy-making process.4 In retrospect, therefore, the initial acceptance of the JPG’s recommendations leading to the creation of the QAA in 1997 seems surprising. That decision clearly represented dominant opinion within the CVCP but as the splinter groups emerged so the revelation of opposition to the QAA became more explicit. And it is no surprise that the strongest opposition came from some universities in the elite Russell Group, which describes itself as made up of ’19 [now 20] major research-intensive universities of the United Kingdom’ (http://www. russellgroup.ac.uk/index1.html). The problem faced by the QAA was that although all its customers were equal, the unpalatable fact is that some were more equal than others. Brown’s description of the move in 2002 from ‘universal assessment in favour of institutional audit’ as ‘the Russell Group’s putsch’ may be an oversimplification (Tapper, 2006, 183–184), but his central point is undoubtedly correct — the pressure for change came from above. In fact there has been a two-stage process of change — from quality assessment to a light-touch regime (post-2001) consisting of institutional audit and selected departmental inspection to a lighter light-touch model (post-2005) which essentially consists of institutional audit alone, a move that has been endorsed by all three of the FCs. Higher Education Policy 2007 20

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The internal divisions within the higher education policy networks were reinforced by three very important political developments. Firstly, the state’s institutional control of higher education policy also fragmented. The relationship between the Department for Education and Skills and HEFCE was always open to interpretation. The FC model of governance may have accorded HEFCE a minor role in the policy-making process but, as we have argued, the impact of quality assurance was critically dependent upon whether the FC was prepared to act on the QAA’s reports. Moreover, the Department lost control of the Office of Science and Technology (which was relocated in the Department of Trade and Industry), the Treasury started to move beyond issues of financial probity and to question whether higher education really was providing value for money, and even the Prime Minister’s office was not above intervening as the variable fees policy demonstrates. This was a perfect context for well-organized policy networks and wellconnected individuals to make their influence felt, and there is every reason to believe this is precisely what happened with respect to quality assurance. Secondly, the priorities of government were changing (in effect the political environment was very different from 1992). Following the publication of the White Paper (The Future of Higher Education) in 2003 the move towards variable fees gathered pace and it was critically important for the Government that the elite universities remained supportive. There is no reason to suspect that there was an explicit political deal but it was mutually convenient for the key parties to support the move towards a light-touch quality assurance model. This was especially so given that the change could be placed within the context of another government policy initiative — the desire to whittle down the bureaucratic burden of state regulation. The quality regime was a very convenient, target. The third significant change was the devolution of political responsibility for quality issues to the Scottish Parliament and to the Welsh Assembly. It was inevitable that both Scotland and Wales would create their distinctive quality regimes reflecting the different characters of their systems of higher education (especially so in the case of Scotland) and their different needs. Indeed, it can be argued that Scotland in particular has been an instigator of change: moving away from departmental inspections, embracing quality enhancement and operating a more inclusive corporatist model (Tapper, 2006, 69–89). In 1997 John Randall, at the time Chief Executive of the QAA, wrote: The Quality Assurance Agency is the last and only chance to have a quality assurance regime that is owned by the higher education sector and at the same time to develop a system which will meet the expectations Higher Education Policy 2007 20

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of other audiences, notably students, employers and the Government (as quoted in Brown, 2004, 121). In the sense that the QAA is still with us it could be argued that we are still in the last-chance saloon. But this is to ignore the radical evolution in recent years of the quality assurance process. Indeed it could be argued that it was the QAA itself that was drinking in the last-chance saloon and, notwithstanding all the posturing of its current Chief Executive (Peter Williams) about the Agency working with a light touch rather than being a soft touch (Williams, 30 September 2005, 14), the quality regime as we had known it since 1992 was by 2002 under serious threat. The critical problem for the 1997 settlement was its focus upon structure and ownership rather than process and purpose. However, the accumulated lack of trust between government and the higher education sector was likely to poison any settlement. The quality agenda was pursued in such a way to suggest to many that the purpose of the exercise was not so much to ascertain the level of quality within the teaching and learning process (and most certainly not to suggest strategies for its enhancement) but rather to impose regulation in order to increase state control of higher education, and to do so in such a way as to stimulate a combination of fear and loathing across much of the academic profession. It was little comfort to know that the structural arrangements emerged out of a negotiated settlement between all the key institutional players and, moreover, that the evaluating body, the QAA, was formally a company under the control of higher education’s representative institutions. From the outset certain universities had little sympathy with the agreement, and probably not much more sympathy for the negotiating parties. And those under surveillance, as the Warwick case illustrates, frequently felt that they were coping with an inordinately burdensome process that was incapable of fulfilling its own purported goals, and would undermine, not enhance, their own commitment to teaching and learning. In the context of a changing political environment these sentiments found increasing institutional support as the corporatist model of governance was replaced by one in which pressure group politics became more dominant. The state–university axis fragmented and the search for broad policy consensus on key issues became more fraught.

Summarizing the English Experience In the previous sections, we have identified the quality assurance structures and examined some of their articulations. It is now time, therefore, to set out in Higher Education Policy 2007 20

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schematic form the major elements of methodologies that constitute ‘the English experience’ (to create a ‘Quality Assurance’ matrix), and then to reflect on what, if anything, can be learnt from our analysis. The institutional structures were as follows:

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

Institution

Remit

The CNAA (1965–1992) The AAU (1990–1992) HEQC (1992–1997) FCs/QAC (1992–1997)a Old style QAA (1997–2002) Light-touch QAA (2002–2005) Lighter light-touch QAA (2005 to present)

PSHE Pre-1992 universities All HEIs All HEIs All HEIs All HEIs All HEIs

a

The Funding Councils, with their Quality Assessment Committees, have been formally responsible for quality assurance in Britain since 1992. As the text makes clear, after 1997 this function was fulfilled by the QAA on their behalf.

The quality assurance process undertaken by these various institutions incorporated the following major elements: Focus: Institutional audit Departmental inspection Methods Collection/analysis of institutional data Observation of teaching Direct interaction with course team/institutional managers Interaction (directly or indirectly) with significant others: external examiners, students/ex-students and employers

Outcomes Reports primarily for internal consumption Qualitative evaluations Quantitative evaluations Public reports Higher Education Policy 2007 20

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353 The quality assurance matrix5 CNAA AAU HEQC FC/QAC QAA QAAa (LT) Institutional audit

O

O

O

Departmental inspection O

O

O

Interaction with course team/managers

O

O

O

External examiners and significant others

O

Qualitative evaluation

O

Institutional documentary evidence Teaching observation

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

Reports formally for internal consumption

O O

O

O

O

O

O

O

Quantitative evaluation Public reports

QAAa Europe? (LLT)

O

O

O

a

As explained in the text, the distinction between the ‘light-touch’ (LT) and ‘lighter light-touch’ (LLT) regimes is that the latter consists of only institutional audit, abandoning departmental reviews that were undertaken selectively under the previous regime.

The Move towards Quality Enhancement The above analysis suggests that the steady erosion of the 1997 deal that led to the creation of the QAA was the consequence of a highly convenient political fix. It was important for the Government to sustain a creditable interpretation of its statutory obligations while at the same time placating the increasing hostility of important interests within the higher education lobby. So, although the departmental inspections would disappear, there would be institutional audit (with the possibility that institutional managers could impose very demanding quality regimes upon their academic units). Furthermore, this was reinforced by the creation of Teaching Quality Information (TQI), which was responsible for placing in the public domain a considerable range of information about quality standards across the system as a whole as well as within individual institutions. Thus, a new agreement was established, which the various parties could at least live with, if not embrace. Moreover, the model was reinforced by the fact that there were broadly parallel developments in Scotland and Wales as well as England. Although the policy agenda evolved in response to the political developments we have analysed, it is critical to remember that at the same time a very important Higher Education Policy 2007 20

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parallel shift in the quality debate — the emergence of quality enhancement — was occurring. In institutional terms, quality enhancement is supported by both the QAA (quality enhancement has become an integral part of the Agency’s audit trail) and the comparatively new quango, the Higher Education Academy (HEA) (created in 2004 and amalgamating other institutions which formed part of the regulatory state). Ostensibly the purpose of the HEA is not to sustain the regulatory state but rather to fulfil one of the other roles of the New Public Management model of governance that the FCs represent, that is the promotion of what is euphemistically known as ‘good practice’. It is a classic example of the state, while responding to political pressure (thus the shift to institutional audit) also deflected it by embracing quality enhancement, and a perusal of the HEA’s Strategic Plan, 2005–10 (HEA, 2005) illustrates the wide range of ‘quality enhancement practices’ it intends to promote. The unanswered question is how the quality enhancement agenda will evolve. Can it be a force that really attempts to move beyond assessment and evaluation to enhancement? Will it be defined from below, in particular by those most involved in the teaching and learning process — that is tutors and students? Or does its inevitable institutionalization mean the imposition of a bureaucratic framework that could seem as alien to many academics as the old quality assurance model? In spite of raising the possibility of a constructive outcome (Harvey and Newton, 2004, 149–165), subsequently Harvey has reached a more pessimistic conclusion (Harvey, 2005, 271–274). Perhaps the most interesting development to watch out for is the relationship between the QAA and the HEA. Will the QAA, through the fulfilment of its audit responsibilities, define what constitutes an acceptable quality enhancement model with the HEA assisting higher education institutions to comply with those definitions? Or will the process be reversed with the HEA sponsoring how quality enhancement is to be understood with the QAA auditing the extent to which the universities have complied? Who, in effect, will swallow whom?

Thinking Beyond the English Experience Our narrative demonstrates that the quality agenda in English higher education has been characterized by considerable instability. The continuous power struggles between the different interests within English higher education since the establishment of the first national quality body in 1992 are the clearest manifestation of that instability. However, for all the ensuing conflict we have witnessed the expansion of a quality discourse accompanied by the incorporation of quality practices into the life of the university. So, for better or worse, the interest in the quality of the teaching and learning process has taken root and, indeed, is starting to be developed within other systems of higher Higher Education Policy 2007 20

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education. One would expect external policy ideas to be re-interpreted by national systems that have their own identities shaped by their particular histories and cultures. For example, a critical variable in the English debate has been the strong tradition, which is not replicated everywhere, of the university as an autonomous, self-governing corporation that shapes its own development. Nonetheless, the question of ‘what, if anything, can be learnt from the English experience?’ remains pertinent. The English political story demonstrates conclusively that the implementation of quality assurance is not a value free policy. The initial quality assurance regime was an early vehicle for state intervention designed not only to shape the teaching and learning practices of higher education but also ultimately to influence the core understanding of higher education itself. A quality agenda, therefore, cannot be implemented without political struggle. Quality regimes are reflective of contested values with the implemented structures and procedures reflecting the outcomes of a political process. However, the political context evolves over time releasing the potential to reformulate the quality structures and the concomitant quality mechanisms. In the above table we see that different elements constitute the methodology of the various quality institutions. In England, for example, inspection was a dominant feature of the QAA’s methodology (in the mid-1990s), but under political pressure, generated in part from within higher education itself, institutional audit as opposed to departmental inspection is now in favour. Thus, although dominant interests may determine the shape of institutional practices, higher education is a policy field in which it is difficult for particular parties to secure permanent, and especially uncontested, control. On the pedagogical front the English experience suggests that within itself a quality assurance regime is a limited means of ensuring high quality in the teaching and learning process. The current light-tough methodology of the QAA is perhaps indicative of this realization. The move in favour of quality enhancement suggests that a more pro-active model of quality is required than one that simply measures and evaluates current practices. Moreover, it is also essential to take into account that higher education in England increasingly operates within a market-oriented system. Consequently the state may feel that there is less need for it to exert direct control for in the context of the market it is students, their parents and perhaps even employers who will decide what counts as quality. If this is the reality then a more meaningful role for the state is to use its resources to enable universities to enhance, and to publicize, their quality with the market measuring whether they have succeeded. In spite of all the hostility it generated it is possible to conclude that the quality assurance regime made a positive contribution to teaching awareness. The QAA has required institutions and academics to think more carefully about their teaching standards. Whereas it may not have restored the status Higher Education Policy 2007 20

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imbalance between teaching and research in contemporary English academic life, it has meant that the teaching and learning processes cannot simply be ignored. This is not to suggest that there were being ignored prior to 1992, or that the mechanisms of the quality assurance regime were the best way forward, but there is little doubt that without a powerful counterweight to the incessant and intensifying academic value placed on research (encouraged by the research assessment exercises) the perceived importance of teaching (especially at the undergraduate level) would have declined irrevocably. This is a contentious claim but in support we offer the views of two distinguished people who, although critical of the English quality procedures adopted between 1992 and 2002, have identified some really positive elements. In the opinion of one eminent professor: [Quality assurance procedures] have been too costly, too much bureaucracy, a tremendous burden on universitiesy . And it is just a gamey [However], I think in the early 1990’s a lot of sloppy teaching was tolerated in too many British universities. By sloppy I mean out of date reading lists, a defective pedagogy taught by uninspiring teachers and it’s very difficult to measure this but my anecdotal impression is that there has been some improvement there. That there is the greater awareness in university departments, certainly in my own subject that there were certain things you have to do year after a year and they are a bit of a drudgery, like keeping your booklist up to date and making sure that your scholarship is absolutely current. And in the word of the registrar of a pre-1992 university: [Our institution] is probably at the most extreme wing of resistance to the whole quality movement and it had tried to ignore it in the hope that it would go away and then when it didn’t it realised it had to try to deal with it — and in a sense while I was there in that particular role — the objectives were primarily defensive: how to stop the quality regime and particularly the inspection regime actually doing damage to the institutions. So in a sense it was largely a defensive, reactive exercise tinkering with assimilation without doing damage to the fundamentals of the schooly . I actually think that that was one of the best things to have emerged out of subject review, because it actually forced people to review their teaching styles, their teaching materials, their communication with the student. We have therefore returned to Stoddart’s technical questions — if a quality regime is necessary, how best then to construct it? This is where the peculiarities of national systems are most likely to come into play. However, the English Higher Education Policy 2007 20

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experience does suggest some tentative guidelines. Firstly, any regime should be based upon as broad a consensus of academic opinion as possible, and in constructing that consensus it is critical to think beyond the views of the institutional actors. Secondly, while structures and ownership are not unimportant issues it is more critical to think in terms of purposes (the aim really is to ascertain, even enhance quality) and processes (that they are not heavily bureaucratic and time-consuming, and they do not convey the impression that they are increasing the authority of academic managers over those most directly responsible for the delivery of teaching and learning). Thirdly, central control should be limited to institutional audit and that, if institutional audit is to incorporate a quality enhancement agenda, then the character of that agenda should not be determined by the auditing body but by those most directly involved in the teaching and learning process — tutors and students. Fourthly, while institutional audit carries (rightly) the threat of sanctions being imposed from the centre upon institutions hopefully, in a more market-oriented system, the institutions themselves will be persuaded of the need to take their quality procedures very seriously.

Conclusions We have outlined in this paper some of the political history of the quality agenda in England, the various forms it has assumed and the implied value systems upon which it has been dependent. While drawing upon the existing literature, we have tried to establish what will hopefully be seen as a distinctive position in the quality debate. Like Brown (2004), we have adopted a strong political perspective but not one that is committed either to advocating a particular policy agenda (that responsibility for the assessment of quality should be controlled by the higher education institutions) or to the promotion of the virtues of one quality agency (the HEQC). Brennan and Shah (2000) have attempted to draw out the wider implications for British universities and the British university system necessitated by the need to manage quality regimes, whereas our focus is both narrower (to understand the changes in the quality agenda itself) and broader (to argue that the character of a quality regime impacts significantly upon the idea of the university). Harvey’s work comes closest to our position but he is less sympathetic (like Brown in this respect) of the inevitable need to incorporate different political perspectives into policy outcomes, and seemingly less optimistic (or at least more sceptical) about the future of quality regimes in Britain. Thus, the debate over quality reflects a complex power struggle with potentially equally complex outcomes (Barnett, 1992). The unfolding of the quality agenda in England reflects the power struggles between different interest groups and inscribes itself tacitly within them. It has Higher Education Policy 2007 20

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been an arena for active political struggle both within the higher education lobby and in direct confrontation with the power of the state. Our view is that these quality mechanisms have their own meanings, and that a quality regime represents how the wider society understands the purposes of higher education and perceives its relationship to the state. Currently, the quality agenda in England is in a transitional period with the QAA changing its focus and moving towards quality enhancement as espoused by the HEA. By a tortuous process, we have reached a consensus that includes institutional audit, places responsibility for quality (including the exercise of possible sanctions) at the institutional level, embraces quality enhancement as a cause worthy of promotion in its own right rather than as a component of quality assurance while placing more information about institutional quality and quality procedures in the public domain. To us this represents a model that should be given serious consideration, although whether it should be emulated is very much a matter for internal national debates. As a final reflection, it is worth posing two questions. Is a new political struggle about to commence as the power of the market intensifies? And will the current tentative British consensus evaporate as the QAA and HEA jostle to establish their respective authority over quality enhancement?

Acronyms AAU AUT CDP CMU CNAA CVCP DES FCs FHEA HEA HEFCE HEIs HEQC HMI JPG NUS PCFC PSHE QAA

Academic Audit Unit Association of University Teachers Committee of the Directors of Polytechnics Campaign for Mainstream Universities Council for National Academic Awards Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals Department of Education and Science Funding Councils Further and Higher Education Act Higher Education Academy Higher Education Funding Council for England Higher Education Institutions Higher Education Quality Council Her Majesty’s Inspectorate Joint Planning Group National Union of Students Polytechnics and Colleges Funding Council Public Sector of Higher Education Quality Assurance Agency

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QAC RAE SCOP TQA TQI UFC UUK UGC

Quality Assessment Committee Research Assessment Exercise Standing Conference of Principals Teaching Quality Assessment Teaching Quality Information Universities Funding Council Universities UK University Grants Committee

Notes 1 Even if one wishes to accord research (the expansion of knowledge) the primary role, there are many who perceive a symbiotic relationship in which teaching and research feed off of one another. 2 Unless noted otherwise the indented quotes are from the interviews conducted by Ourania for her doctoral research, ‘The Legitimation of Quality in Higher Education’, Institute of Education, University of London. 3 The Committee of the Directors of Polytechnics was evaporating as the polytechnics joined the university sector and their directors became vice-chancellors and took up membership of the CVCP. 4 This is a somewhat ironic conclusion given the view expressed in Tapper and Salter (1997). 5 The matrix is an adaptation of a table in Ourania’s Thesis.

References Barnett, R. (1992) Improving Higher Education: Total Quality Care, Buckingham: SRHE/Open University Press. Baty, P. (2003) ‘Watchdog mauls LBS and Cambridge quality’, Times Higher Education Supplement, 24 October. Brennan, J. and Shah, T. (2000) Managing Quality in Higher Education, Buckingham: SRHE/Open University Press. Brown, R. (2004) Quality Assurance in Higher Education: The UK Experience in 1992, London: Routledge/Falmer Press. Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals/Higher Education Funding Council for England. (1996) ‘Final report of the Joint Planning Group for Quality Assurance in Higher Education’, CVCP/HEFCE, London. Department of Education and Science. (1992) ‘Letter to the Chairman of the Higher Education Funding Council for England from the Secretary of State’, DES, London. Further and Higher Education Act. (1992) Public Acts of Parliament, Chapter c.13. Harvey, L. (2005) ‘A history and critique of quality evaluation in the UK’, Quality Assurance in Education 13: 263–276. Harvey, L. and Newton, J. (2004) ‘Transforming quality evaluation’, Quality in Higher Education 10: 149–165. Higher Education Academy. (2005) Strategic Plan, 2005–10, York: HEA. Macleod, D. (2001) ‘Trial by Ordeal’, The Guardian, 30 January. Pratt, J. (1997) The Polytechnic Experiment, 1965–1992, Buckingham: SRHE/Open University Press. Higher Education Policy 2007 20

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360 Salter, B. and Tapper, T. (1994) The State and Higher Education, Ilford: Woburn Press. Tapper, T. (2006) The Governance of British Higher Education: The Struggle for Policy Control, Dordrecht: Springer Press. Tapper, T. and Salter, B. (1997) ‘Who will speak for the universities? The Committee of ViceChancellors and Principals in the age of mass higher education’, Higher Education Quarterly 51: 113–133. Tysome, T. (1998) ‘Quality lockout’, Times Higher Education Supplement, 10 July. Watson, D. (2005) ‘A Whitehall Turf war’, Higher Education Review 37: 69–73. Williams, P. (1994) ‘Introduction’, in Higher Education Quality Council (ed.) Learning from Audit, London: Higher Education Quality Council. Williams, P. (2005) ‘Make no mistake, the QAA will tell it like it is’, Times Higher Education Supplement, 30 September.

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