ROGER

QUINE

F. GIBSON,

ON NATURALISM

AND

JR.

EPISTEMOLOGY*

Behaviorism, physicalism, holism, realism, fallibilism, gradualism, and naturalism are all i m p o r t a n t aspects of Quine's philosophy, but of all these '-isms' none plays a larger role in Quine's thought than naturalism. In short, Quine's philosophy is nothing if not naturalistic! But what, precisely, does Quine m e a n by 'naturalism'? H e r e are some samples of his usage: (1)

(2) (3)

(4)

(5)

. . . naturalism: the recognition that it is within science itself, and not in some prior philosophy, that reality is to be identified and described. 1 . . . naturalism: a b a n d o n m e n t of the goal of a first philosophy prior to natural science. 2 . . . naturalism: a b a n d o n m e n t of the goal of a first philosophy. It sees natural science as an inquiry into reality, fallible and corrigible but not answerable to any supra-scientific tribunal, and not in need of any justification b e y o n d observation and the hypothetico-deductive method. 3 naturalism . . . . [a] readiness to see philosophy as natural science trained u p o n itself and permitted free use of scientific findings, a m y position is a naturalistic one; I see philosophy not as an a priori propaedeutic or g r o u n d w o r k for science, but as continuous with science 9 I see philosophy and science as in the same boat - a boat which, to revert to N e u r a t h ' s figure as I so often do, we can rebuild only at sea while staying afloat in it. T h e r e is no external v a n t a g e point, no first philosophy. 5 9

9

This selection of quotations gives some indication of the sense which Quine assigns to his use of 'naturalism' 9 In his negative usage, it amounts to the denial of first philosophy; in his affirmative usage, it amounts to scientism. But if this is the sense of Quine's naturalism, Erkenntnis 27 (1987) 57-78. 9 1987 by D. Reidel Publishing Company

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what is its source? Quine is explicit on the matter: Naturalism has two sources, both negative. O n e of t h e m is despair of being able to define theoretical terms generally in terms of p h e n o m e n a , e v e n by contextual definition. A holistic or system-centered attitude should suffice to induce this despair. T h e other negative source of naturalism is u n r e g e n e r a t e realism, the robust state of mind of the natural scientist who has n e v e r felt any q u a l m s beyond the negotiable uncertainties internal to science. 6

In short, holism and unregenerate realism are Quine's grounds for embracing naturalism. T h e holism argument serves to refute traditional epistemology, rationalistic and empiricistic. However, it also has the consequence of lending plausibility to the realism argument, which serves to establish scientism. Thus do holism and unregenerate realism clear the way for naturalized epistemology, i.e., the scientific investigation of the acquistion of scientific knowledge. In the remainder of this essay, I pursue answers to the following two questions: (1) How does Quine argue for naturalizing epistemology? and (2) Is Quine's argument for naturalizing epistemology sound? 1.

HOW

DOES

QUINE

ARGUE

FOR

NATURALIZING

EPISTEMOLOGY?

As traditionally practiced, epistemology is a normative undertaking. It inquires after the norms, or standards, if any, which might be used to justify beliefs, judgments, and so on. Over the years, epistemologists have sought these norms in the apparently antithetical realms of reason and sense experience. Rationalists (e.g., Descartes) have typically claimed that reason is the sole source of unconditionally accepted truths which supply the norms for justifying all other knowledge claims, while empiricists (e.g., Locke) have typically claimed that sense experience is the sole source of such truths and norms. Despite disagreeing on the source of such norms, traditional rationalists and empiricists do agree that it would be illicit to seek such norms within natural science, for it is the institution of natural science itself which they are seeking to justify! Thus, for traditional epistemolgists, using natural science to justify natural science would be like pulling oneself up by one's own bootstraps. By their lights, justifying science requires norms whose source lies outside of science itself. Quine, however, has argued that the c o m m o n quest of rationalists and empiricists for some privileged class of unconditionally accepted,

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non-scientific, truths is a wild goose chase and, therefore, ought to be abandoned. Of course, the practitioners of traditional epistemology cannot only be classified as rationalists and empiricists, they can also be classified as idealists and realists. Presumably these two pairs of categorical opposites yield four possible classifications of traditional epistemologists: rationalistic-idealists (Hegel?), rationalistic-realists (Descartes?), empiricistic-idealists (Berkeley?), and empiricistic-realists (Locke?). So far as I know, Quine offers no specific argument against rationalistic-idealism, probably because very few, if any, contemporary Anglo-American philosophers take this view seriously. On the other hand, Quine does argue against empiricistic-idealism (viz., Berkeley's), but he does so only because it is a peculiar form of empiricism and not because it is a form of idealism. Even Quine's attack on the "idea idea" is not directed specifically toward any form of idealism. Rather, it is directed toward any theory of linguistic meaning which construes "a man's semantics as somehow determinate in his mind beyond what might be implicit in his dispositions to overt behavior". 7 In short, Quine's attitude toward idealism seems to be that it deserves to be ignored rather than refuted. Thus is Quine's attack on traditional epistemology focused on rationalistic-realism and empiricistic-realism. Let us agree, therefore, for the purposes of this discussion, to construe rationalism and empiricism in their realistic forms. Traditional rationalists contend that reason reveals to them certain a priori, synthetic, non-scientific truths and norms (e.g., Descartes' cogito and its mark of clarity and distinctness) sufficient for deducing all other truths. Quine's argument against rationalism consists first in denying the a priori character of any such alleged truths and norms, and second in denying that even if there were such, they would be sufficient for deducing all other truths. Quine's argument against the rationalists' claim that there are a priori truths is virtually identical with his argument against the empiricists' claim that there are analytic truths, s which will be explained below in discussing traditional empiricism. His argument against the rationalists' claim that all other truths are deducible from a priori truths (supposing there were such truths) is simply to point out that " e v e n the truths of elementary number theory are presumably not

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in general d e r i v a b l e . . , by self-evident steps from self-evident truths. We owe this insight to Godel's theorem, which was not known to the old-time philosophers". 9 So much for traditional rationalists. Traditional empiricists contend that sense experience reveals to them certain a posteriori, synthetic, non-scientific truths and norms from which they can deduce or rationally reconstruct all of the truths of nature. Quine's argument against this form of empiricism, which he calls 'radical empiricism', consists in showing that the truths of nature can neither be deduced from nor rationally reconstructed from such a basis, and, further, that there simply are no analytic truths of the sort envisioned by these empiricists. In "Epistemology Naturalized", Quine identifies two central ambitions of radical empiricism. T h e first is to deduce the truths of nature from sensory evidence, the second is to translate (or define) those truths in terms of observation and logico-mathematical auxiliaries. Using studies in the foundation of mathematics as his model, Quine labels the former ambition the doctrinal side of (empiricistic) epistemology, the latter he labels the conceptual side of (empiricistic) epistemology. T h e primary concern on the doctrinal side is with justifying our knowledge of the truths of nature in sensory terms; the primary concern on the conceptual side is with explaining the notion of body in sensory terms. However, these two central ambitions of radical empiricism remain unfulfilled: there is no successful first philosophy. On the doctrinal side of epistemology the radical empiricists' ambition of deducing all of the truths of nature from sensory evidence has not gotten beyond the position of Hume. Objects understood as bundles of sensory qualities can be known immediately and indubitably, but no statement about "absent matters of fact" can be deduced from statements about such objects. And, as Quine laconically puts the point, "[t]he H u m e a n predicament is the human p r e d i c a m e n t " J ~ Thus, the ambition of deducing all of the truths of nature from immediate, sensory experience, and the Cartesian-like motivation behind this ambition the desire to establish all the truths of nature with a certitude comparable to the certitude attaching to the truths of immediate, sensory experience - must be abandoned. Fallibilism fills the void. What of the conceptual side of radical empiricism? Here, even though the most profound radical empiricist, Rudolf Carnap, readily acknowledged the impossibility of deducing science from immediate

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experience, he nevertheless kept pursuing the other primary aim of radical empiricism, namely, the defining of the concepts of science in sensory and logico-mathematical terms. H o w e v e r , according to Quine, Carnap's heroic attempt at rationally reconstructing scientific discourse in observation terms and logicomathematical auxiliaries was d o o m e d to fail because not e v e r y statement of scientific theories has a fund of experiential implications it can call its own. When this observation is coupled with the verificationist theory of meaning, the result is that not e v e r y statement of scientific theories has a meaning it can call its own. And, if this is so, then it is clear that Carnap's program of rationally reconstructing theoretical discourse on the basis of observation terms and logico-mathematical auxiliaries is hopeless. Thus, just as the central ambition of the doctrinal side of radical empiricism must be abandoned, so must the central ambition of the conceptual side be abandoned. This same holism - not e v e r y sentence of scientific theories has its own unique empirical content - also serves to refute the radical empiricists' claim of analyticity (and the rationalists' claim of a priority). Analytic (and other kinds of a priori) statements were said to be just those that a theorist could hold true in the face of all experiences. But, if holism is true, then it is misleading to speak of the empirical c o n t e n t of an individual s t a t e m e n t - especially if it is a s t a t e m e n t at all r e m o t e from the experiential periphery of the field. F u r t h e r m o r e it b e c o m e s folly to seek a b o u n d a r y between synthetic statements, which hold contingently on experience, and analytic statements, which hold c o m e what may. A n y s t a t e m e n t can be held true c o m e what may, if we m a k e drastic e n o u g h a d j u s t m e n t s elsewhere in the system. 11

Thus, not only is it impossible to deduce the truths of nature from truths of immediate experience, it is also impossible to translate (or define) the former, individually, in terms of the latter. Furthermore, it is impossible to segregate the statements of scientific theories in terms of analyticity and synthenticity in any absolute (as opposed to arbitrary) manner. Such is the fate of the two dogmas of empiricism, viz., radical reductionism and the analytic-synthetic distinction: they must go. More generally, we may say that the traditional epistemological program, empiricistic or rationalistic, must be abandoned, for it has foundered on the rock of holism.

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JR.

However, and perhaps surprisingly, Quine does not advocate aband o n i n g e p i s t e m o l o g y a l t o g e t h e r . R a t h e r , he a d v o c a t e s " a n e n l i g h t e n e d p e r s i s t e n c e . . , in t h e o r i g i n a l e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l p r o b l e m " . 12 U n b u r d e n e d of t h e i m p o s s i b l e t a s k of p r o p o u n d i n g a first p h i l o s o p h y (i.e., a class of u n c o n d i t i o n a l l y a c c e p t e d , n o n - s c i e n t i f i c , t r u t h s u p o n w h i c h to justify s c i e n c e ) , t h e " e n l i g h t e n e d " e p i s t e m o l o g i s t is to t u r n to p s y c h o l o g y a n d a l l i e d s c i e n c e s for a n a n s w e r to t h e c e n t r a l q u e s t i o n of t h e new e p i s t e m o l o g y , n a m e l y , ' H o w d o we a c q u i r e o u r o v e r a l l t h e o r y of t h e w o r l d a n d w h y d o e s it w o r k so w e l l ? ' . A s w e h a v e seen, r a d i c a l e m p i r i c i s m fails o n b o t h its d o c t r i n a l a n d c o n c e p t u a l sides. N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e r e a r e still t w o c a r d i n a l t e n e t s of e m p i r i c i s m t h a t Q u i n e b e l i e v e s r e m a i n i n t a c t : " O n e is t h a t w h a t e v e r e v i d e n c e t h a t is for s c i e n c e is s e n s o r y e v i d e n c e . T h e o t h e r . . , is t h a t all i n c u l c a t i o n of m e a n i n g s of w o r d s m u s t rest u l t i m a t e l y o n s e n s o r y e v i d e n c e " . 13 I s u g g e s t t h a t t h e s e two t e n e t s are, r e s p e c t i v e l y , t h e doctrinal a n d conceptual sides of t h e n e w e m p i r i c i s m t h a t Q u i n e is forging. A c c o r d i n g to this n e w e m p i r i c i s m , e p i s t e m o l o g y is to r e m a i n a l e g i t i m a t e e n t e r p r i s e , e x c e p t t h a t n o w its g o a l is to p r o v i d e a factual account of t h e l i n k b e t w e e n o b s e r v a t i o n a n d t h e o r y , " b e t w e e n t h e meager input and the torrential output...,,.14 The chief difference b e t w e e n t h e o l d a n d t h e n e w e m p i r i c i s t i c e m p i s t e m o l o g y is just t h a t this f a c t u a l a c c o u n t is to b e p u r s u e d n a t u r a l i s t i c a l l y , within the

framework of natural science itself. Naturalism does not repudiate epistemology, but assimilates it to empirical psychology. Science itself tells us that our information about the world is limited to irritations of our surfaces, and then the epistemological question is in turn a question within science: the question how we human animals can have managed to arrive at science from such limited information. Our scientific epistemologist pursues this inquiry and comes out with an account that has a good deal to do with the learning of language and with the neurology of perception. He talks of how men posit bodies and hypothetical particles, but he does not mean to suggest that the things thus posited do not exist. Evolution and natural selection will doubtless figure in this account, and he will feel free to apply physics if he sees a way. The naturalistic philosopher begins his reasoning within the inherited world theory as a going concern. He tentatively believes all of it, but believes also that some unidentified portions are wrong. He tries to improve, clarify, and understand the system from within. He is the busy sailor adrift on Neurath's boat. 15 Even

though

Quine's naturalized epistemologist seeks a factual

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a c c o u n t of the link b e t w e e n o b s e r v a t i o n a n d t h e o r y , n e v e r t h e l e s s , [s]uch a study could still include, even, something like the old rational reconstruction, to whatever degree such reconstruction is practicable; for imaginative constructions can afford hints of actual psychological processes, in much the way that mechanical simulations can. But a conspicuous difference between old epistemology and the epistemological enterprise in this new psychological setting is that we can now make free use of empirical psychology.16 B u t h o w d o e s Q u i n e p r o p o s e to j u s t i f y t a k i n g this scientistic t u r n in e p i s t e m o l o g y ? H o w c a n t h e n e w e p i s t e m o l o g i s t l e g i t i m a t e l y use t h e findings of s c i e n c e to j u s t i f y s c i e n c e ? W o u l d this n o t b e v i c i o u s l y c i r c u l a r ? T h e a n s w e r s to t h e s e q u e s t i o n s a r e to b e f o u n d in an e x a m i n a t i o n of Q u i n e ' s a t t i t u d e of u n r e g e n e r a t e r e a l i s m , " t h e r o b u s t s t a t e of m i n d of t h e n a t u r a l s c i e n t i s t w h o has n e v e r felt a n y q u a l m s b e y o n d t h e n e g o t i a b l e u n c e r t a i n t i e s i n t e r n a l to s c i e n c e " . 17 Q u i n e ' s r e s p o n s e to t h e q u e s t i o n of h o w t h e n e w e p i s t e m o l o g i s t c a n l e g i t i m a t e l y use t h e f i n d i n g s of s c i e n c e to j u s t i f y s c i e n c e has, I b e l i e v e , t w o p a r t s . First, he a r g u e s t h a t s c e p t i c i s m a b o u t s c i e n c e p r e s u p p o s e s s c i e n c e . S e c o n d , he a r g u e s t h a t s c i e n c e n e e d s no j u s t i f i c a t i o n b e y o n d m e a s u r i n g u p to t h e d e m a n d s of o b s e r v a t i o n a n d t h e h y p o t h e t i c o deductive method. T r a d i t i o n a l l y , s c e p t i c s l a u n c h e d t h e i r assaults on s c i e n c e b y m e a n s of illusions. P u r p o r t e d p h y s i c a l o b j e c t s w e r e s h o w n n o t to be p h y s i c a l o b j e c t s , a f t e r all. H o w e v e r , illusions a r e k n o w n as illusions o n l y b e c a u s e t h e y a r e k n o w n to b e o t h e r t h a n t h e y a p p e a r - t h e y a p p e a r to b e m a t e r i a l o b j e c t s , b u t t h e y a r e not. T h e i d e a h e r e is t h a t illusions a r e r e c o g n i z a b l e as illusions o n l y r e l a t i v e to a p r i o r a c c e p t a n c e of g e n u i n e b o d i e s with w h i c h to c o n t r a s t t h e m . " R u d i m e n t a r y p h y s i c a l s c i e n c e , t h a t is, c o m m o n s e n s e a b o u t b o d i e s , is thus n e e d e d as a s p r i n g b o a r d for s c e p t i c i s m . ''18 A m o r e u p - t o - d a t e v e r s i o n of t h e s c e p t i c ' s c h a l l e n g e to s c i e n c e m i g h t b e p u t as follows: Science itself teaches that there is no clairvoyance; that the only information that can reach our sensory surfaces from external objects must be limited to two-dimensional optical projections and various impacts of air waves on the eardrums and some gaseous reactions in the nasal passages and a few kindred odds and ends. How, the challenge proceeds, could one hope to find out about that external world from such meager traces? ~9 H e r e , as b e f o r e , t h e s c e p t i c ' s c h a l l e n g e t u r n s s c i e n c e u p o n itself.

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Quine does not make the mistake of arguing that the sceptic's use of science against itself is illegitimate. Rather, his point is that because the sceptic makes essential use of scientific claims in his assault upon science, the defender of science is therefore free to use scientific claims in his defense of science. Moreover, the defender of science will have made his case if he can show .that his science measures up to observation and the hypothetico-deductive method. " O u r overall scientific theory demands of the world only that it be so structured as to assure the sequences of stimulation that our theory gives us to expect. More concrete demands are empty...,,.20 Thus, the naturalized epistemologist's " p r o b l e m is that of finding ways, in keeping with natural science, whereby the human animal can have projected this same science from the sensory information that could reach him according to this science". 21 " A far cry, this, from old epistemology. Yet it is no gratuitous change of subject matter, but an enlightened persistance rather in the original epistemological problem". 22 T h e new epistemologist's undertaking is enlightened because he recognizes that the sceptical challenge to science springs from within science itself and, therefore, that in coping with this challenge the epistemologist is free to use whatever scientific knowledge is available. Thus the charge of vicious circularity is deflected: " T h e crucial logical point is that the [new] epistemologist is confronting a challenge to natural science that arises from within natural science. ''23 Thus does Quine justify his scientism. Another noteworthy source of Quine's naturalism that is closely related to his attitude of unregenerate realism is what might be called his "epistemic priority argument". Traditional epistemologists disagree over how to construe the epistemological given, over whether sensory atoms or, say, Gestalten are to be accorded epistemic priority in a proper account of knowledge of the external world. However, once we recognize that the positions of both the sensory atomist and the Gesalt psychologist presuppose the scientific finding "that all information about the external world reaches us through the impact of external forces on our sensory s t u ' ~ a c e s " , 24 w e ought thereby to recognize as well a way out of this quandry. "Obscurity about the nature of the given, or epistemic priority, is dissipated by talking frankly of the triggering of nerve endings. W e then find ourselves engaged in an internal question within the framework of natural

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science", 25 that is, we find ourselves doing epistemology naturalistically. So, we h a v e seen how Quine uses holism, u n r e g e n e r a t e realism, and talk of n e r v e endings to support his naturalizing epistemology. Holism ushers out first philosophy: theoretical terms can neither be defined nor translated into terms of immediate experience, and neither the analytic nor the a priori (in general) can be isolated in any absolute m a n n e r - any sentence can be held true c o m e what may. Unregenerate realism ushers in naturalized epistemology: sceptical doubts about science are themselves sciencific doubts; fear of cricularity is misplaced, once hope for a first philosophy is abandoned. Finally, talking of n e r v e endings resolves the quandry o v e r epistemic priority. H a v i n g thus explained Quine's a r g u m e n t for naturalizing epistemology, we must now inquire whether his a r g u m e n t is sound. 2. is QUINE'S ARGUMENT FOR N A T U R A L I Z I N G EPISTEMOLOGY SOUND? T h e question of whether Quine's a r g u m e n t for naturalizing epist e m o l o g y is sound divides into three others (I shall ignore Quine's "epistemic priority a r g u m e n t " ) : (a) Is Quine's a r g u m e n t for holism sound? (b) Is Quine's a r g u m e n t for u n r e g e n e r a t e realism sound? and (c) Is naturalized epistemology really epistemology? In the r e m a i n d e r of this essay, I shall respond to (a) and (b), only - leaving (c) for a planned sequel to this paper. (a) Is Quine' s holism argument sound? Before inquiring into the soundness of Quine's a r g u m e n t for holism, we might first get clear about exactly what Quine's holism is: " I t is holism that has rightly b e e n called the D u h e m thesis and also, rather generously, the D u h e m - Q u i n e thesis. It says that scientific statements are not separately vulnerable to adverse observations, because it is only jointly as a theory that they imply their observable consequences". 26 H o w e v e r , this thesis is one that must be a c c e p t e d with reservations: One reservation has to do with the fact that some statements are closely linked to observation, by the process of language learning. These statements are indeed

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separately susceptible to tests of observation; and at the same time they do not stand free of theory, for they share much of the vocabulary of the more remotely theoretical statements. They are what link theory to observation, affording theory its empirical content. Now the Duhem thesis still holds, in a somewhat literalistic way, even for these observation statements. For the scientist does occasionally revoke even an observation statement, when it conflicts with a well attested body of theory and when he has tried in vain to reproduce the experiment. But the Duhem thesis would be wrong if understood as imposing an equal status on all the statements in a scientific theory and thus denying the strong presumption in favor of the observation statements. It is this bias that makes science empirical. Another reservation regarding the Duhem thesis has to do with breadth. If it is only jointly as a theory that the scientific statements imply their observable consequences, how inclusive does that theory have to be? Does it have to be the whole of science, taken as a comprehensive theory of the world?

Science is neither discontinuous nor monolithic. It is variously jointed, and loose in the joints in varying degrees. In the face of a recalcitrant observation we are free to choose what statements to revise and what ones to hold fast, and these alternatives will disrupt various stretches of scientific theory in various ways, varying in severity. Little is gained by saying that the unit is in principle the whole of science, however defensible this claim may be in a legalistic way2 7 So, t h e t wo i m p o r t a n t " r e s e r v a t i o n s " to k e e p in m i n d r e g a r d i n g Q u i n e ' s v e r s i o n of D u h e m i a n h o l i s m are: (i) s o m e s t a t e m e n t s (or s e n t e n c e s ) are s e p a r a t e l y s u s c e p t i b l e to t h e test of o b s e r v a t i o n , n a m e l y , o b s e r v a t i o n s e n t e n c e s - i n d e e d , a s e n t e n c e s ' s s u s c e p t i b i l i t y to o b s e r v a t i o n is a m a t t e r of d e g r e e f o r Q u i n e ; a n d (ii) w h i l e s c i e n c e is n e i t h e r d i s c o n t i n u o u s n o r m o n o l i t h i c , it is m o r e a c c u r a t e of c u r r e n t scientific p r a c t i c e (legalisms aside) to t h i n k of si g n i f i can t s t r e t c h e s of s c i e n c e , r a t h e r t h a n th e w h o l e of s c i e n c e , as h a v i n g o b s e r v a b l e c o n sequences. W h a t are Q u i n e ' s a r g u m e n t s in f a v o r of h o l i s m ? I b e l i e v e t h e r e ar e t h r e e : t h e scientific p r a c t i c e s a r g u m e n t , t h e l a n g u a g e l e a r n i n g a r g u m e n t , a n d th e reductio a r g u m e n t . T h e scientific practices argument is s i m p l y t h e c l a i m that, as a m a t t e r of e m p i r i c a l fact, a scientist i n v o l v e d in t e s t i n g s o m e h y p o t h e s i s , H , m u s t a s s u m e t h e t r u t h of a set of auxiliary a s s u m p t i o n s , A , a n d t h e h y p o t h e s i s c a n always b e s a v e d by m a k i n g d ras t i c e n o u g h a d j u s t m e n t s in A . T h e language learning argument c l a i m s t h a t t h e b u l k of scientific, o r r e f e r e n t i a l , l a n g u a g e is l e a r n e d v i a i r r e d u c i b l e l e a p s of a n a l o g y (viz., a n a l o g i c a l synthesis). T h e s e a n a l o g i c a l links are so t e n u o u s as to al l o w t h e k i n d of g e r r y m a n d e r i n g of t r u t h v a l u e s of s e n t e n c e s , o r e m p i r i c a l slack, t h a t h o l i s m

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evinces. T h e reductio argument goes as follows: If every sentence of a theory had its own unique sets of confirming and infirming experiential conditions, then we ought to be able to arrive at an acceptable theory of the confirmation of individual sentences, and we ought to be able to draw an absolute analytic-synthetic distinction. However, we have not been able to do either of these two things. Therefore, not every sentence of a theory has its own unique sets of confirming and infirming experiential conditions (i.e., therefore holism). Conversely, if holism is true, then epistemological reductionism is impossible and the quest for an absolute analytic-synthetic distinction is folly. 28 Let us examine each of these three arguments for holism. (i) The scientific practices argument. Not e v e r y o n e has been convinced by Quine's arguments. Adolf G r u n b a u m has been among the leading critics of the D u h e m - Q u i n e thesis. With respect to the scientifc practices argument, G r u n b a u m has argued that when Quine's formulation of Duhem's thesis (hereafter called the "D-thesis") is construed as a restricted claim, disallowing revisions of a theory that alter the meaning of any of the theory's terms, then it is both a non-sequitur and false; and when the D-thesis is construed as an unrestricted claim, allowing revisions of a theory that alter the meanings of some of a theory's terms, then it is true but trivial. Suppose, for example, that we have a theory composed of some hypothesis, H , and a set of auxiliary assumptions, A, and that this theory has certain observational consequences, O. Now, according to the substantive, restricted, version of the D-thesis, the failure of O, say, O', is not sufficient to refute H , for there always exists some alternative set of auxiliary assumptions, A', such that the conjunction of /-/ and A' entails O'. In other words, without changing the meanings of any terms in the theory, any hypothesis, H , can always be saved because A' always exists. This argument is a non-sequitur because, as G r u n b a u m points out, there is no logical g u a r a n t e e at all of the existence of the required kind of revised set A ' of auxiliary assumptions such that ( H . A ' ) ~ O' for any one c o m p o n e n t hypothesis H and any O'. Instead of being g u a r a n t e e d logically, the existence of the required set A ' needs separate and concrete d e m o n s t r a t i o n for each particular context. In the absence of the latter kind of empirical support for Q u i n e ' s

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unrestricted Duhemian claim, that claim is an unempirical dogma or article of faith . . . . ~9 Furthermore, Grunbaum suggests a case drawn from the history of p h y s i c s w h e r e n o s u c h A' d o e s exist, a n d h e c o n c l u d e s f r o m this c o u n t e r - e x a m p l e t h a t t h e r e s t r i c t e d D - t h e s i s is false. 3~ O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , so far as t h e u n r e s t r i c t e d D - t h e s i s is c o n c e r n e d , unless Quine restricts in very specific ways what he understands by 'drastic enough adjustments elsewhere in the (theoretical) system' the D-thesis is a thoroughly unenlightening truism. For if someone were to put forward the false empirical hypothesis H that 'Ordinary buttermilk is highly toxic to humans', this hypothesis could be saved from refutation in the face of the observed wholesomeness of ordinary buttermilk by making the following 'drastic enough' adjustment in our system: changing the rules of English usage so that the intention of the term 'ordinary buttermilk' is that of the term 'arsenic' in its customary usage. 31 In short, Grunbaum

a r g u e s t h a t t h e D - t h e s i s is e i t h e r substantive but

false, o r true but trivial. A n d h o w d o e s all this a f f e c t Q u i n e ? L i k e w a t e r off a d u c k ' s b a c k ! I n a 1 9 6 2 l e t t e r to P r o f e s s o r G r u n b a u m , Q u i n e says: Your claim that the Duhem-Quine thesis, as you call it, is untenable if taken nontrivially, strikes me as persuasive. Certainly it is carefully argued. For my own part I would say that the thesis as I have used it is probably trivial. I haven't advanced it as an interesting thesis as such. I bring it in only in the course of arguing against such notions as that the empirical content of sentences can in general be sorted out distributively, sentence by sentence, or that the understanding of a term can be segregated from collateral information regarding the object. For such purposes I am not concerned even to avoid the trivial extreme of sustaining a law by changing a meaning; for the cleavage between meaning and fact is part of what, in such contexts, I am questioning. 32 It i s f a i r l y o b v i o u s f r o m t h e s e r e m a r k s t h a t as l a t e as 1 9 6 2 Q u i n e ' s p r i m a r y i n t e r e s t in t h e D - t h e s i s lay in its s e r v i c e in t h e c a u s e o f u s h e r i n g o u t t r a d i t i o n a l e p i s t e m o l o g y , a n d n o t in t h e D - t h e s i s itself as, say, a s u b s t a n t i v e c l a i m a b o u t s c i e n t i f i c t h e o r i e s . N e v e r t h e l e s s , it s e e m s to m e t h a t Q u i n e h a s s u b s e q u e n t l y c o m e to r e g a r d t h e D - t h e s i s as a s u b s t a n t i v e ( a n d t r u e ) c l a i m a b o u t s c i e n t i f i c t h e o r i e s . (ii) The language learning argument. B u t w h a t k i n d o f c l a i m is t h e D - t h e s i s , t h a t is, w h a t is its c o g n i t i v e s t a t u s ? I w a n t t o u r g e t h a t Q u i n e r e g a r d s t h e D - t h e s i s as a n empirical c l a i m n o t o n l y a b o u t t h e a c t u a l p r a c t i c e of s c i e n t i s t s b u t a b o u t t h e l a n g u a g e o f t h e o r y . I n p a r t i c u l a r , I w a n t to u r g e t h a t t h e D - t h e s i s d o e s not e n j o y s o m e s p e c i a l a p r i o r i ,

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transcendental, or quasi-empirical status in Quine's philosophical system, as some of his commentators and critics have suggested. 33 T h e following quotation from Quine's " R e p l y to Robert Nozick" indicates pretty clearly that Quine does not regard the D-thesis as, for example, some kind of Kantian precondition for the possibility of any human language: Turning to holism, he [Nozick] asks whether a non-Duhemian language would be impossible for us. Let me say that the observation sentences, in my behaviorally defined sense, constitute already a rudimentary language of the kind. It admits of nonDuhemian enlargement, moreover, without clear limits. The tight-fitting sort of science that I speculated on at one point in my paper 'On Empirically Equivalent Systems of the World' would be non-Duhemian. But I see no hope of a science comparable in power to our own that would not be subject to holism, at least of my moderate sort. Holism sets in when simple induction develops into the full hypothetical-deductive method. 34

T h e last sentence of the above quotation is extremely important for understanding Quine's advocacy of holism, for it helps to explain why holism occurs. How is this so? T h e answer lies with Quine's theory of language learning. H e believes that some elementary parts of language (e.g., observation sentences) can be learned by extrapolation along the lines of observed similarities. However, most of language - and certainly most of scientific theory - goes beyond the realm of observable things and their similarities. Such language is mastered, Quine claims, by means of analogical synthesis, i.e., by means of analogies. This "ponderous linguistic structure [viz., scientific theory], fabricated of theoretical terms linked by fabricated hypotheses, and keyed to observable events here and there ''35 stands as a remarkable improvement over simple induction as a means for anticipating experience. But there is a price to be paid for this advance. In acquiring habits by simple induction over instances, if some anticipated experience fails to meterialize, that very habit (i.e., expectation) will wither. But now, with the hypothetico-deductive method in full force, when some expected or predicted event implied by some part of a theory fails to materialize, there is a choice to be made as to how to revise the theory (i.e., holism occurs) so that such false predictions will not be made in the future. T h a t there is a choice as to what to revise (i.e., holism) in the face of a falsified prediction is a consequence of the fact that the language of theory goes beyond occasion sentences to include sentences that are not directly linked to

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observation and that can be learned only by dint of irreducible leaps of analogy, leaps which if traced backwards would not yield a smooth derivation of theoretical language on the basis of observational language. 36 Such is Quine's naturalistic explanation of why holism occurs. So, the D-thesis is a scientific claim about scientific theories, and it is explained scientifically within the science of linguistics. It is not some a priori or transcendental or quasi-empirical claim. On the contrary, it is merely another naturalistic plank in Neurath's boat. However, if, in time, Quine's theory of language learning proves to be radically wrong, then this plank may very well give way. (iii) The reductio argument. We have said that Quine argues that if the holism thesis (H) were false, then one ought to be able to arrive at an acceptable theory of confirmation for individual sentences of theories (C), and one ought to be able to distinguish absolutely the analytic sentences of theories from the synthetic sentences of theories (D). However, Quine claims we are unable to do either and that the holism thesis ( H ) is therefore true. Schematically (and condensed), the reductio is as follows: - H - - > ( C & D)

- C & -D/.'. H However, and conversely, Quine also claims that if the holism thesis is true (H), then epistemological reductionism is but an impossible dream ( - C ) and the seeking of an aboslute (as opposed to arbitrary) analytic-synthetic distinction is but folly ( - D ) ; schematically:

H--->(-C & ~D) H/.'.-C & - D Thus are Quine's reductio argument in favor of holism and his argument against analyticity and reductionism inextricably intertwined. Indeed, it would appear that Quine is guilty of arguing in a vicious circle: he seems to use the rejection of the analytic synthetic distinction ( - D ) to establish the holism thesis (H) (re: first schema given above), and he uses the holism thesis (H) to establish the rejection of the analytic-synthetic distinction ( - D ) (re: second schema given above). In the remainder of this section, our task will be to uncover the details of Quine's reductio argument and to answer the question of

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w h e t h e r Q u i n e is g u i l t y of a r g u i n g in a v i c i o u s c i r c l e as s u g g e s t e d a b o v e . O u r t a s k r e q u i r e s , t h e n , t h a t w e e x a m i n e , in g e n e r a l , Q u i n e ' s argument against analyticity and reductionism. In Word and Object, Q u i n e says: My misgivings over the notion [of an analytic-synthetic dichotomy] came out in a limited way in 'Truth by convention' (1936), and figured increasingly in my lectures at Harvard. Tarski and I long argued the point with Carnap there in 1939-40. Soon [Morton] White was pursuing the matter with [Nelson] Goodman and me in triangular correspondence. Essays questioning the distinction issued from a number of pens, sometimes independently of the Harvard discussions... Carnap and White mentioned my position in their 1950 papers, but my published allusions to it were slight.., until in 1950 [when] I was invited to address the American Philosophical Association on the issue, and so wrote 'Two dogmas'. 37 " T w o D o g m a s of E m p i r i c i s m " , is n o t t h e o n l y p l a c e w h e r e Q u i n e a r g u e s a g a i n s t t h e a n a l y t i c - s y n t h e t i c d i s t i n c t i o n , b u t it is t h e m a i n p l a c e . F u r t h e r m o r e , w h i l e h e has c a s h e d - o u t s o m e of t h e k e y m e t a p h o r s of " T w o D o g m a s " in Word and Object a n d The Roots of Reference, 38 a n d w h i l e he n o w c l a i m s t h a t t h e h o l i s m a d u m b r a t e d in " T w o D o g m a s " e x c e e d s w h a t is r e q u i r e d in c o n t r o v e r s i o n of the d o g m a s of r e d u c t i o n i s m a n d a n a l y t i c i t y , still, he has n o t a b a n d o n e d a n y of the a r g u m e n t s of " T w o D o g m a s " . 39 I n s h o r t , " T w o D o g m a s " r e m a i n s t h e l o c u s classicus of Q u i n e ' s a t t a c k o n t h e a n a l y t i c - s y n t h e t i c d i s t i n c t i o n . I n t h a t essay, his a t t a c k a g a i n s t t h e a n a l y t i c - s y n t h e t i c d i s t i n c t i o n is t w o - p r o n g e d . O n e p r o n g is t h e a r g u m e n t c l a i m i n g t h a t n o o n e has e v e r s u c c e e d e d in m a k i n g c l e a r p r e c i s e l y w h a t t h e a n a l y t i c - s y n t h e t i c d i s t i n c t i o n c o m e s to, a n d t h a t a n y f u r t h e r a t t e m p t a l o n g t h e s a m e g e n e r a l lines is l i k e w i s e d o o m e d to f a i l I shall, h o w e v e r , i g n o r e this a r g u m e n t . T h e other, p r o n g is t h e a r g u m e n t c l a i m i n g t h e e m p i r i c i s t s ' a t t e m p t s at s e g r e g a t i n g the s e n t e n c e s of t h e o r i e s into t h o s e t h a t a r e a n a l y t i c a n d t h o s e t h a t a r e s y n t h e t i c is p r e d i c a t e d u p o n a f u n d a m e n t a l m i s c o n c e p t i o n (viz., a n o n - h o l i s t i c c o n c e p t i o n ) of t h e w a y t h a t s e n t e n c e s of scientific t h e o r i e s r e l a t e to t h e w o r l d . I n c o n n e c t i o n with this p o i n t , Q u i n e says: If this view [i.e., holism] is right, it is misleading to speak of the empirical content of an individual statement - especially if it is a statement at all remote from the experiential periphery of the field [Dogma of Reductionism]. Furthermore it becomes folly to seek a boundary between synthetic statements, which hold contingently on experience, and analytic statements, which hold come what may [Dogma of Analytic-Synthetic Distinction]. Any statement can be held true come what may, if we make drastic enough adjustments elsewhere in the system [Holism]. 4~

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This is the argument briefly schematized above thusly:

H'--~(-C & - D ) H/.'.-C & -D Clearly, the above argument against the analytic-synthetic distinction begins with, and presupposes the truth of, the holism thesis. Is there an argument in " T w o D o g m a s " for the truth of the holism thesis? I believe that there is, but it is scant. Furthermore, what argument there is is embedded in this broader reductio of Quine's: 41 PI: P2: .'.CI:

.'.C2:

P3: .'.C3: P4: .'. C4: .'. C5:

T h e truth/falsity of each statement of a theory is analyzable into a linguistic c o m p o n e n t and a factual component. As empiricists, we construe the factual c o m p o n e n t of each statement as confirmed/infirmed by experience. Each statement of a theory, considered separately, has associated with it a unique range of confirming experiences and a unique range of infirming experiences (Dogma of Reductionism). Those statements of a theory whose truth depends solely upon the linguistic c o m p o n e n t (i.e., which are true in the face of all possible experiences) are analytic (Dogma of Analytic-Synthetic Distinction). T h e r e is no acceptable theory of empirical confirmation for individual synthetic statements. C1 is false. T h e r e is no acceptable analytic-synthetic distinction. C2 is false. P1 is false.

Within this general argument is Quine's argument for holism. It occurs at P3, which is intended as a refutation of C1, the D o g m a of Reductionism. C1 tells us that each individual synthetic statement of a theory has its own unique ranges of confirming and infirming experiences associated with it. But if this is so, then we ought to be able to work out an acceptable theory of the confirmation of individual statements of theories. However, P3 asserts that this has not occurred. (Quine's actual words are: "I am impressed also, apart from prefabricated examples of black and white balls in an urn, with how baffling the problem has always been of arriving at any explicit theory of the empirical confirmation of a synthetic statement". 42) T h e r e -

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fore, Quine concludes, C1 is false, i.e., the holism thesis is true (C3). T h e relevant portion of this broader reductio (P1-C5) was schematized above thusly: -H---~ ( C & D) - C & -D/.'.H Now, what are we to make of the apparent viscious circularity that arises from taking Quine's two arguments in tandem? Apparently, Quine argues in favor of rejecting the analytic-synthetic distinction ( - D ) on the basis of the holism thesis ( H ) and, simultaneously, he argues in favor of the holism thesis (H) on the basis of the rejection of the analytic-synthetic distinction ( - D ) . Now if the only evidence that Quine can muster for - D is H and vice versa, then surely he is guilty of arguing in a vicious circle. In responding to this charge of vicious circularity, we should note first that Quine argues for the truth of - D in the early pages of " T w o D o g m a s " without recourse to holism, i.e., he argues that no one has ever succeeded in making clear what the analytic-synthetic distinction comes to, and that any further attempt along the same general lines is likewise d o o m e d to fall - this is the prong of his attack that I have chosen to ignore. However, if this argument is successful, then Quine's overall argument is not open to the charge of vicious circularity; for while he may be understood as arguing for - D on the basis of the holism thesis (H), he also argues for it on grounds logically independent of that thesis. So, even if he used - D to support H , which I shall deny momentarily, such a m a n o e u v r e would not be vicious. Similarly, as we have already seen, Quine has arguments for the holism thesis in addition to his reductio argument - arguments that do not presuppose the rejection of the analytic-synthetic distinction ( - D ) . So, even if Quine used - D to establish H he, again, would be acquitted of vicious circularity. Furthermore, even if Quine's arguments for - D which are logically independent of H were to fail, and even if his aforementioned arguments for H which are logically independent of - D were to fail, still, he would not be guilty of arguing in a vicious circle. T h e reason for this is that his reductio argument for holism does not, appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, rely upon - D : it is a simple matter to derive H from - H - - ~ C & D, given only - C ; - D of the second premiss of the reductio is superfluous. This is only to say again what was said earlier: Quine's argument (in " T w o

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D o g m a s " ) for the holism thesis is P3. - D plays no role in the argument. So, e v e n though Quine does argue for - D on the basis of H (but not only on that basis), he does not argue for H on the basis of - D . Rather, he argues for H on the basis of - C (P3). So, while this a r g u m e n t for H is rather a weak one (weaker than either the Scientific Practices A r g u m e n t or the L a n g u a g e Learning Argument), and while it is the only a r g u m e n t that Quine provides for H in all of " T w o D o g m a s " , still, it does not render his overall a r g u m e n t viciously circular. 43 Let us now return to the question posed earlier regarding the soundness of Quine's a r g u m e n t for realism.

(b) Is Quine's realism argument sound? Quine's " u n r e g e n e r a t e realism, the robust state of mind of the natural sciei~tist who has n e v e r felt any qualms beyond the negotiable uncertainties internal to science ''44 is, as we have seen, logically grounded on the recognition that the sceptical challenge to science presupposes science. Quine's point here is not that the sceptic is begging the question: I am not accusing the sceptic of begging the question. He is quite within his rights in a s s u m i n g science in order to refute science; this, if carried out, would be a straightforward a r g u m e n t by reductio ad absurdum. I am only making the point that sceptical doubts are scientific doubts. 45

In short, Quine plausibly insists that the epistemologist and the sceptic be armed equally before their battle: if the sceptic is free to use the findings of science in his attack on science, then the epistemologist is free to use the findings of science in his defense of science. Add to-this the two points noted earlier, namely, that the holism a r g u m e n t lends plausibility to the realism a r g u m e n t by way of eliminating first philosophy as a valid way of doing epistemology, and that the quandry o v e r epistemic priority is resolved by talking of nerve endings, and then it can be seen that Quine has solid grounds for his unregenerate realism. It would seem, then, that the two negative sources of naturalism, holism and u n r e g e n e r a t e realism, are well grounded, if not conclusively confirmed. F r o m this perspective: Epistemology is best looked upon, then, as an enterprise within natural science.

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Cartesian doubt is not the way to begin. Retaining our present beliefs about nature, we can still ask how we can have arrived at them. Science tells us that our only source of information about the external world is through the impact of light rays and molecules upon our sensory surfaces. Stimulated in these ways, we somehow evolve an elaborate and useful science. How do we do this, and why does the resulting science work so well? These are genuine questions, and no feigning of doubt is needed to appreciate them. They are scientific questions about a species of primates, and they are open to investigation in natural science, the very science whose acquisition is being investigated. 46 A s the a b o v e q u o t a t i o n m a k e s a b u n d a n t l y clear, a c c o r d i n g to O u i n e ' s p r o g r a m of naturalized e p i s t e m o l o g y epistemological questions r e g a r d i n g the relation of e v i d e n c e to t h e o r y are to b e c o m e scientific questions a b o u t the acquisition of science. Philosophers there are, h o w e v e r , w h o believe that O u i n e ' s p r o g r a m for e p i s t e m o l o g y is m i s c o n c e i v e d . S o m e of these philosophers r e g a r d O u i n e ' s p r o p o s a l as constituting too radical a b r e a k with traditional e p i s t e m o l o g y . T h e y believe that e p i s t e m o l o g y simply c a n n o t be naturalized; such an a t t e m p t w o u l d be t a n t a m o u n t to a b a n d o n i n g e p i s t e m o l o g y altogether. T h e y believe this b e c a u s e they r e g a r d psyc h o l o g y to be a descriptive discipline and e p i s t e m o l o g y to be a n o r m a t i v e one. T h u s p s y c h o l o g y c a n n o t do the j o b of e p i s t e m o l o g y the j o b of p r o v i d i n g an anlaysis of justified true belief. O t h e r philosophers, h o w e v e r , r e g a r d Q u i n e ' s proposal as constituting an insufficiently radical b r e a k with traditional epistemologicai practices. T h e s e philosophers a p p l a u d Q u i n e ' s rejection of traditional epist e m o l o g y , but they disagree that this rejection should be followed by the installation of any s u c c e s s o r subject at all. T h e y a r g u e that the quest for e p i s t e m o l o g y in the traditional sense is p r e d i c a t e d u p o n g r a v e m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g s r e g a r d i n g m a n ' s nature and the nature of the h u m a n mind, while at the same time (ironically) a g r e e i n g with Q u i n e ' s m o r e traditionally m i n d e d critics that p s y c h o l o g y c a n n o t do the w o r k w h i c h traditional e p i s t e m o l o g y was i n t e n d e d to do. T h u s is Q u i n e ' s p r o p o s a l for naturalizing e p i s t e m o l o g y c a u g h t in a crossfire b e t w e e n an unlikely coalition of traditionally m i n d e d epistcmologists and philosophers of a m o r e radical bent of mind. T h e traditionalists' attack is m o t i v a t e d by their fear that Q u i n e has g o n e too far; the radicals' attack is m o t i v a t e d by their d i s a p p o i n t m e n t that Q u i n e has not g o n e far e n o u g h . As interesting as this topic is, h o w e v e r , further e x a m i n a tion of it must be p o s t p o n e d .

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* Work on this essay was supported by the National Endowment for the Humanities, to whom my thanks are extended. I am also grateful to Paul A. Roth and, especially, to Robert B. Barrett for helpful recommendations for improving this essay, many of which I have adopted. 1 W. V. Quine, 'Things and Their Place in Theories', in W. V. Quine (ed.), Theories and Things, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1981, p. 21. 2 W. V. Quine, 'Five Milestones of Empiricism', in W. V. Quine (ed.), Theories and Things, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1981, p. 67. 3 Ibid., p. 72. 4 W. V. Quine, 'Russell's Ontological Development', in W. V. Quine (ed.), Theories and Things, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1981, p. 85. 5 W. V. Quine, 'Natural Kinds', in W. V. Quine (ed.), Ontological Relativity and Other Essay, Columbia University Press, New York, 1969, pp. 126-127. 6 Quine, 'Five Milestones of Empiricism', p. 72. 7 W. V. Quine, 'Ontological Relativity', in W. V. Quine (ed.), Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, Columbia University Press, New York, 1969, p. 27. s Cf. W. V. Quine, 'Reply to Hilary Putnam', in Lewis E. Hahn and Paul A. Schilpp (eds.), The Philosophy of W. V. Quine, The Library of Living Philosophers Series, Open Court Pub. Co., La Salle, IL, 1986, pp. 427-431. 9 W. V. Quine and J. S. Ullian, The Web of Belief, New York: Random House, 1978, second edition, paperback, p. 65. ,i W. V. Quine, 'Epistemology Naturalized', in W. V. Quine (ed.), Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, Columbia University Press, New York, 1969, p. 72. Jl W. V. Quine, 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism', in W. V. Quine (ed.), From a Logical Point of View, Harper and Row, New York, 1963, second edition, revised, p. 43. 12 W. V. Quine, The Roots of Reference, Open Court Pub. Co., La Salle, IL, 1974, p. 3. 13 Quine, 'Epistemology Naturalized', p. 75. ~4 Ibid., p. 83. 15 Quine, 'Five Milestones of Empiricism', p. 72. 16 Quine, 'Epistemology Naturalized', p. 83. 17 Quine, 'Five Milestones of Empiricism', p. 72. 18 W. V. Quine, 'The Nature of Natural Knowledge', in Samuel Guttenplan (ed.), Mind and Language, The Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1975, pp. 67--68. 19 Quine, The Roots of Reference, p. 2. 20 Quine, 'Things and Their Place in Theories', p. 22. 21 Quine, The Roots of Reference, p. 2. 22 Ibid., p. 3 23 Ibid., p. 2. 24 W. V. Quine, 'The Sensory Support of Science', typescript, read at Department of Philosophy Colloquium, Washington University, Saint Louis, MO, 22 April 1986. 25 Ibid. 26 W. V. Quine, 'On Empirically Equivalent Systems of the World', Erkenntnis, 9, 1975, p. 313.

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27 Ibid., pp. 314-15. 28 Cf. Quine, 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism', pp. 41f. 29 Adolf Grunbaum, "The Falsifiability of Theories: Total or Partial? A Contemporary Evaluation of the Duhem-Quine Thesis", Synthese, XIV, No. 1, (March, 1962), p. 19. 3o Cf. ibid. 31 Ibid., p. 20. 32 W. V. Quine, 'Letters to Professor Grunbaum', in Sandra G. Harding (ed.), Can Theories by Refuted: Essays on the Duhem-Quine Thesis, D. Reidel Pub. Co., Dol"drecht-Holland, 1976, p. 131. 33 Cf. Paul A. Roth's 'Theories of Nature and the Nature of Theories', Mind, LXXXlX, No. 355, (July, 1980), pp. 431-38, and Harvey Siegei's 'Empirical Psychology, Naturalized Epistemology, and First Philosophy', Philosophy of Science, 51, (December, 1984), pp. 667-76. 34 W. V. Quine, 'Reply to Robert Nozick', in The Philosophy o[ W. V. Quine, ed. by Lewis E. Hahn and Paul A. Schiipp, The Library of Living Philosophers Series, Open Court Pub. Co., La Salle, IL, 1986, p. 364. 35 Quine, 'The Nature of Natural Knowledge', p. 71. 36 El. ibid., pp. 77-78. 37 W. V. Quine, Word and Object, The M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, MA, 1960, pp. 67-68, n.7. 38 Cf. W. V. Quine 'Responses', in W. V. Quine (ed.), Theories and Things, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, p. 180. 39 Cf. W. V. Quine, 'Reply to Jules Vuillemin', in Lewis E. Hahn and Paul A. Schilpp, (eds.), The Philosophy of W. V. Quine, The Library of Living Philosophers Series, Open Court Pub. Co., La Salle, IL, 1986, pp. 619-622. 40 Quine 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism', p. 43. 41 In my The Philosophy of W. V. Quine: An Expository Essay, University Presses of Florida, Gainesville, FL, 1982, I argued that this reductio - called therein Quine's pragmatic reductio - is wanting. The chief difficulty with it is that P3 and P4 are not, conjunctively, logically inconsistent with P1. Thus the argument, while a reductio ad absurdum, does not culminate in an "absurdity" of the strictest sort, viz., logical inconsistency. Nevertheless, the argument is not without force. See my Expository Essay, pp. 103-6 for further discussion of this point. 42 Quine 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism', pp. 41-42. 43 I count this argument weakest among the three that Quine rolls out in defense of the holism thesis. Of the remaining two arguments, I believe the scientific practices argument is somewhat more plausible - if only because clearer - than the language learning argument. The advantage of the language learning argument is that it provides something of an explanation of why holism occurs. Whatever the relative merits of Quine's three arguments, it is important to realize that the holism thesis is an empirical claim (about how physical theories are related to their evidence) insofar as it is supported by considerations drawn from the history of philosophy, the history of science, and the science of linguistics. Thus is Quine's commitment to the holism thesis fully consistent with his naturalistic scruples. ~4 Quine, 'Five Milestones of Empiricism', p. 72. 4s Quine, 'The Nature of Natural Knowledge', p. 68. ~6 Ibid., For a discussion of Quine's view of the the mutual containment of ontology and

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epistemology, see my 'Translation, Physics, and Facts of the Matter', in Lewis E. Hahn and Paul A. Schilpp, (eds.), The Philosophy of W. V. Quine, The Library of Living Philosophers Series, Open Court Pub. Co., La Salle, IL, 1986. REFERENCES Gibson, R. F.: 1986, 'Translation, Physics, and Facts of the Matter', in L. E. Hahn and P. A. Schilpp (eds.), The Philosophy of W. V. Quine, Open Court, La Salle, IL. Gibson, R. F.: 1982, The Philosophy of W. V. Quinc: An Expository Essay, University Presses of Florida, Gainesville, FL. Grunbaum, A.: 1962, 'The Falsifiability of Theories: Total or Partial? A Contemporary Evaluation of the Duhem-Quine Thesis', Synthese, XIV, No. 1. Quine, W. V.: 1986, 'Reply to Hilary Putnam', in L. E. Hahn and P. A. Schilpp (eds.), The Philosophy of W. V. Quine, Open Court, La Salle, IL. Quine, W. V.: 1986, 'Reply to Jules VuiUemin', in L. E. Hahn and P. A. Schilpp (eds.), The Philosophy of W. V. Quinc, Open Court, La Salle, IL. Quine, W. V.: 1986, 'Reply to Robert Nozick', in L. E. Hahn and P. A. Schilpp (eds.), The Philosophy of W. V. Quine, Open Court, La Salle, IL. Quine, W. V.: 1981, Theories and Things, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. Quine, W. V.: 1976, 'Letter to Professor Grunbaum', in S. G. Harding (ed.), Can Theories be Refuted: Essays on the Duhem-Quine Thesis, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, Holland. Quine, W. V.: 1975, 'On Empirically Equivalent Systemos of the World', Erkenntnis, 9. Quine, W. V.: 1975, 'The Nature of Natural Knowledge', in S. Guttenplan, (ed.), Mind and Language, The Clarendon Press, Oxford. Quine, W. V.: 1974, The Roots of Reference, Open Court, La Salle, IL. Quine, W. V.: 1969, Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, Columbia University Press, New York. Quine, W. V.: 1963, From a Logical Point of View, Second ed., revised, Harper and Row, New York. Quine, W. V.: 1960, Word and Object, The M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, MA. Quine, W. V.: unpublished, 'The Sensory Support of Science', typescript. Quine, W. V. and Ullian, J. S.: 1978, The Web of Belief,, Second ed., Random House, New York. Roth, P. A.: 1980, "Theories of Nature and the Nature of Theories", Mind, LXXlX, No. 355. Siegel, H.: 1984, 'Empirical Psychology, Naturalized Epistemology, and First Philosophy', Philosophy of Science, 51. Manuscript submitted 18 December 1985 Final version received 6 May 1986 Department of Philosophy Washington University St. Louis, MO 63130 U.S.A.