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Overrepresentation of blacks in the armed forces, while not yet an issue of national debate, can be defined as a problem from several perspectives. Thus, some professional military officers and civilian commentators view a large concentration of blacks as exacerbating race tensions and management problems within the services. A few are apprehensive about the internal reliability of such a force, while others--not only blacks--are distressed about the potential disproportion of black casualties in time of war. Trend Data

Racial Composition of the Volunteer Armed Forces

To examine the question of racial composition in the all-volunteer force is to focus on the enlisted personnel of the ground combat units. The trend toward increasing concentration of black personnel is underway in all services and branches, but the crux of the problem rests on the overproportionate number of blacks in the combat arms of the army and Marine Corps. The experiences of the all-volunteer force to date have not indicated a serious shortage in qualified entrants in the air force, navy and noncombatant elements of the ground forces, but there is an underproportionate representation of blacks in most technical military occupations. Moreover, the expectation that the all-volunteer force would essentially be led by an all-white officer corps appears unlikely, but projections of the racial composition of the officer corps have limitations. With the advent of the allvolunteer force, the number of blacks entering the officer corps began to decline. In good part this reflected the broadening of opportunities for college-level blacks in the larger society. But the armed forces have engaged in aggres-

If American society is ever to realize its democratic goals, the direction race relations take in the armed forces will be primary.

by Morris Janowitz and Charles C. Moskos, Jr. all-volunteer force entering its third W ithyear,theit becomes increasingly appropriate to consider the implications of the overrepresentation of blacks in the United States armed forces. Although the armed forces are composed of Mexican-Americans, Puerto Ricans, American Indians, Asian-Americans and others, the high visibility and significant number of blacks entering the military services focuses attention on them. In the ethnically pluralist society of the United States, race constitutes the country's most fundamental cleavage. If American society is ever to realize its democratic goals, the direction race relations take in the armed forces will be a prime factor. May/June 1975

sive recruiting of potential black officers including an increase in the number of black cadets in the service academies. The most pronounced trends in minority officer recruitment, however, are in the marked increase in ROTC (Reserve Officer Training Corps) programs at predominantly black colleges. In fact, by the academic year 1973-74, 18 percent of the cadets in army ROTC were black. There are sufficient grounds to believe that the armed services have instituted programs that will produce the requisite number of black officers. It seems reason~ible to expect that the economic and social advantages of ROTC and a short-term military career will persist to a greater extent for blacks than whites, and that blacks will constitute 5-10 percent of newly commissioned officers in all services for the second half of the 1970s. While blacks are still likely to be underrepre37

sented in the officer corps of the futu~---as they were similarly underrepresented during the era of conscription---this deficit will not produce a profound racial distortion in the officer representativeness of the a/l-volunteer force. The root problem is the overproportionate number of blacks in the enlisted levels, especially in the ground combat forces. The Gates Commission, named after Thomas Gates, chairman of the President's "Commission on an AllVolunteer Force, estimated in 1970 that an equilibrium over the short run for the total force would be approximately 15 percent black, and it even projected a decline to 14.1 percent for the 1980s. The Report of the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Force indicated that "the (racial) composition of the armed forces will not fundamentally change by ending conscription." As was apparent to many students of the United States military establishment during the preparation of the Gates Commission report, there was no sound basis for this projection. Equally unsubstantiated was the Gates Commission estimate that only $2.1 billion in additional pay was required to maintain an all-volunteer force of 2.5 million active-duty personnel. (By 1974 the military force was only 2.1 million and the increase in salary expenditures far exceeded the original cost estimates even without adjustment for the dedining manpower quality.) Private estimates by Department of Defense officials in the spring of 1974 anticipated that the number of blacks will reach about 20 percent for the total military manpower strength with a higher figure for the ground forces. During the period of conscription in the two decades following the Korean War, there was a slow and gradual increase in the proportion of black military personnel, both at the officer and enlisted ranks. As given in Table la, the proportion of blacks for all services was 8 percent in 1955, 8.3 percent in 1962 and 9.8 percent in 1970. The black concentration was highest--13.5 percent in 1970---in the enlisted ranks of the army. The transition to an all-volunteer force, as reported in Table lb, immediately reflected itself in a sharp increase in the concentration of blacks, again especially at the enlisted levels. The overall percentage has risen year by year, from 11.4 percent in 1971 to 14.9 percent by the end of the first half of fiscal year 1974 (December, 1973). The overproportionate black distribution was most noticeable in the ground forces where from 1971 to 1974 the number of blacks increased from 14.3 percent to 19.9 percent in the army, and from 11.4 percent to 17.7 percent in the Marine Corps. Moreover, by September, 1973, 23.6 percent of all army infantrymen were black. A sharper picture of the changing racial composition of the enlisted ranks can be obtained from Table 2, which presents the figures on the number of blacks among the new volunteers in the military establishment. This table requires comment in two respects. First, it highlights the differing numbers of black personnel acquired by each of the services. 38

TABLE l a Blacks In the Armed Forces as a Percentage of Total Officer and Enlisted Personnel, Selected Years 1954.-1970. Year

All Services

Officer

Enlletad

1955 1962 1965 1968 1970

8.0 8.3 9.5 9.3 9.8

1.4 1.7 1.9 2.1 2.2

9.0 9.2 10.5 10.2 11.0

Table lb Black Enlleted Personnel as a Percentage of Total Enlisted Strength by Service, R~?,al Years 1971-1974. Fiscal Year

All Services

Army

Navy

Madne Corps

Air Force

1971

11.4 12.6 14.1 14.9

14.3 17.0 18.6 19.9

5.4 6.4 7.7 8.1

11.4 13.7 16.9 17.7

12.3 12.6 13.4 13.8

1972 1973 1974"

"First half. Source: Departmentof Defense statistics.

Thus, in April, 1974, the army recruited 3,390 new black enlistees contrasted with 840 for the air force and 560 for the navy. Second, the percentage of blacks among those entering the military for the first time in April, 1974, reached 27 percent for the army, 20 percent for the Marine Corps, 16 percent for the air force, and only 11 percent for the navy. April of 1974 is atypical as can be seen by comparable black percentages for the cumulative period July, 1973, to April, 1974. Moreover, the indications of growing black concentration at the enlisted levels are compounded by the fact that the reenlistment rates among blacks remains distinctly higher than among whites. Thus in fiscal year 1973, the reenlistment rate among first-term army enlisted men was 52 percent for blacks compared with 35.1 percent for whites. The paramount trend in the racial composition of the ground forces since the end of conscription is toward a heavily disproportionate concentration of blacks. In purely statistical terms, one could project a point at which a racial equilibrium would be reached; for example, 30 percent black throughout the ground forces. But such an approach encounters two problems. A 30 percent black distribution throughout the ground forces would probably not be random; some units would have a greater numbers of blacks than the overall percentage. By the summer of 1974, there were already combat units in the ground forces which were over 35 percent black. Such an equilibrium model also avoids the qualitative issue of "tipping," the point at which the proportion of blacks becomes so high that large numbers SOCIETY

of whites are no longer prepared to enter the particular service or branch involved. Such an occurrence could be engendered by factors including the perceived status decline of units overproportionately black or the very real fear of black "hooliganism" on the part of many lower-ranking white enlisted men. The tipping point will operate gradually in the military, rather than in the dramatic fashion of residential communities. But the end result could well be a significant diminishment of white recruits for the ground force units involved. The Sociopolitical Context Oddly enough, there has been a lack of public debate on a subject as controversial as the racial composition of the all-volunteer force. Undoubtedly, the underlying crisis in political leadership associated with the Watergate scandals and related matters have overshadowed the issue. The academic community, which typically opposes conscription, if not the military system, may not want to address the question in anticipation of egalitarian arguments to restore the draft. That a generalized racial tolerance accounts for the low concern of the composition of the armed forces seems naive. Indifference is probably the most adequate explanation. Generally, elected officials have avoided public statements on the problem. Excepting a few news stories and columns, the mass media have also eschewed coverage of the growing concentration of black service personnel. One would expect the media, with its increased identification with the adversary role, to oppose conscription when it was operative and in turn to be critical of the all-volunteer force when it came into being. Within the black community, public leaders and elected officials in general have also been indifferent to the issue. In the main, views of black leaders reflect a widespread belief among black adults that the armed forces represent an important source of job opportunities for blacks. Military service appeals to young blacks who have the highest rate of unemployment, and is seen as a desirable alternative to life on the streets. Only on rare occasions have black leaders questioned the legitimacy of the manpower system which disproportionately recruited from minority races. Table 2 Black Proportions of New Enlisted Volunteers (no prior service) April 1974

July 1973April 1974

Service

Number

%

%

Army Navy Marine Corps Air Force

3,390 560 300 840

27 11 20 16

27 10 21 16

All Services

5,090

21

20

Source: Departmentof Defensestatistics. May/June 1975

The absence of public discussion on the racial makeup of the military does not necessarily demonstrate a lack of concern within the defense establishment. But even there the concern is stronger among uniformed personnel than civilian officials. Among military officers, discussion on the black concentration in the services is sporadic and muted. A few military officers believe that the point of no return has already been reached in the combat arms of the ground forces; others view the emerging situation with a deep sense of personal frustration. The typical attitude is that there is a problem, but somehow a solution will be found. Concurrently, there is some resentment in military circles toward congressmen and senators who frequently issue pronouncements supporting the all-volunteer concept without mentioning the difficulties the services are encountering. Many military officers feel that national legislators voted to end conscription for political reasons, but these same legislators are reluctant to confront the unpopular problems associated with the all-volunteer force.

Military service appeals to young blacks as a desirable alternative to life on the streets. Nevertheless, the principle of civilian control over the military is so powerful that generally the professional military officer has made an unquestioning effort to make the volunteer system work. Indeed, the response of the military professional could be described as excessive professionalism, i.e., the uncritical acceptance of a mission without sufficient professional dissent. No military officer has made a single major statement about the racial composition of the armed forces which raised the fundamental issues involved, not has there been a single token resignation from active duty on this matter. Instead, the military officially has sought to minimize the issue. The fact that the military is an equal opportunity employer has been stressed repeatedly. There have also been repeated statements that racial quotas would probably be unconstitutional and, in any event, would not be considered a policy alternative. Strenuous effort has been devoted to meeting immediate enlistment goals, rather than questioning the demographic premises of the all-volunteer force. By the spring of 1974, however, there were indications that civilian political leaders were becoming aware of the dimensions of the racial and ethnic composition of the armed forces. Howard H. Callaway, shortly after becoming secretary of the army, boldly and clearly stated the army goal to recruit from a relatively representative cross section of the civilian population. In 1973, in the name of quality control, Congress passed legislation requiring 55 percent of new enlistments to be high school graduates. The Marine Corps was subsequently denied permission by Congress to reduce 39

their educational standards for new enlisted personnel. Also in 1973, for six months the army implemented a recruiting policy requiring 70 percent of its new recruits to be high school graduates, but this standard proved to be unrealistic and was dropped in the wake of declining enlistments. Unofficialarmy recruitment data show thatracialcomposition has consistently been most balanced among those choosing the shortest possible enlistment tour--two years.

Poficy Strategies The steps required to make the United States armed services--and especially the ground forces--effective in their emerging politico-military role of deterrence and constabulary professionalism are precisely the same factors which will contribute to a resolution of the problems of racial and ethnic imbalance. The disruptive potential of the race issue supplies pressure for internal reform. The character of this needed reform is not embodied in the report of the Gates Commission which programmed the all-volunteer force by emphasizing visible and competitive monetary compensation. Rather, a series of steps and strategies dealing with the organizational climate and professional integrity of the military as a social institution must be specified. These strategies are based on the presumption of the constitutional authorities who have asserted without reservation that a formal quota limiting the number of blacks would be illegal and unconstitutional (although congressional statutes raising or lowering educational standards will have indirect but important consequr on the proportions of entering black personnel). Such a quota system ought to be mo~ally objectionable to the citizenry at large as well as an affront to minority groups. It is therefore doubly essential to propose and examine critically a variety of positive steps which aim toward recruitment and maintenance of an all-volunteer force broadly representative of the larger society.

being explored to reduce the number of personnel stationed in Western Em'ope without reducing their presumed military effectiveness. The numbers of American military personnel abroad have been interpreted by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (N ATO) allies as indicators of the stability and credibility of United States intentions. Conceivably, even small reductions overseas might be seen as an initial step toward longer term withdrawal. However, with proper restructuring and diplomatic groundwork, force reductions could be accomplished to satisfy the political requirements of Western Europe, e.g., reratification of NATO, new budgetary arrangements, innovative force structures and the establishment of a NATO rear headquarters in the continental United States. Moreover, it is becoming evident that race and strategy are fusing, inasmuch as our allies in Western Europe am hardly predisposed to accept an increasingly black ground force as the appropriate instrument of United States foreign policy. In the event of further reductions of total United States forces, a higher percentage of the American military will be stationed within the United States. This would entail redeployment from the Far East and elsewhere as well as Western Europe. Until recently, it was generally assumed that reduced likelihoodof overseas assignments would decrease the appeal of a volunteer force with accompanying heavier reliance on minority soldicrs.But the evidence to date suggests the reverse. Overseas duty-----partlyas a result of the diminished purchasing power of the dollar,of less willingness to put up with family disruptionsand changing evaluations of foreign assignments per se--has lost much of its traditional appeal. The attractivenessof military service for a wider representation of the American population will probably increase to the degree United States forces arc stationed at home.

Reduction of Forces

Manpower Substitution

The most direct approach to handling racial imbalance would be to reduce the size of the military establishment and especially the size of the ground forces. Already, the overall size of the all-volunteer force has been reduced to well below that estimated by the Gates Commission. The basic issue is the extent and timing of such reductions and the restraints that operate for an effective foreign policy. A Smaller military ~stablishment would have higher educational standards and thereby less of a concentration of minority group members. In part, the short-term success of the recruitment drives of the navy and air force since the introduction of the allvolunteer force is to some degree related to the reduction in the overall size of these two services. During the same period, the manpower requirements of the ground forces were not reduced; in fact, they were slightly expanded for the next fiscal year, 1975. The United States is already in a position in which manpower requirements restrain its politico-military posture in Western Europe. Therefore, a great variety of approaches are

Starting as early as the McNamara era, but becoming increasingly pronounced since the advent of the all-volunteer force, more and more uniformed male personnel in military occupational slots are being replaced by female uniformed personnel and civilians. This trend will generally work toward more racial balance in the total defense st~cture. But inasmuch as virtually all of the civilian replacements for formerly uniformed positions will occur in noncombat occupations, such a trend will not in itself directly affect the racial imbalance in the combat ground forces. Indirectly, to the extent that the demand for uniformed personnel decreases, there could be some shifting of volunteers from noncombat to combat occupations. Thus, it is especially important that "civilianization" be monitored for its precise impact upon the racial composition of uniformed military personnel. Many positionspreviously the exclusive preserve of males have opened up for female military personnel in the allvolunteer force. Female recruitment goals have changed from the traditionalless than 2 percent to a projected 6-8

40

SOCIETY

percent by 1977. But as with civilianization, female military personnel are concentrated in the noncombat occupations. Moreover, the proportion of black and other minority women in the army is slightly higher than the proportion of minority male military personnel----despite the higher education entrance standards required of women as compared to men. In any event, the impact of greater employment of either civilians or female military personnel appears to be limited in terms of alleviating racial imbalance in the ground forces. Internal organizational reform for a military establishment requires strengthening the social cohesion of units. This is especially mandatory for the ground forces. The constant rotation and lack of personal integration decreases the attractiveness of military service and leads to deviant behavior. Soldierly dissatisfaction and manpower management issues can only he effectively confronted by a greater sense of group cohesion and less personnel rotation. Military life and young people can be compatible without sacrificing required organizational discipline. Such a proposition implies that Qrganizational change is consistent--indeed a requirement---of military institutional integrity. The ground forces have taken the first limited steps in this direction by pern~tting men to volunteer for specific units of their own choice. This procedure has had some measure of success. The next step would he to permit group recruitment and the handling of training and assignment on a group, rather than individual basis. Another aspect of this approach is to allow individual units to recruit more of their own personnel directly. To some extent this is already being done, but the scope for decentralization is much greater than presently envisioned. Once assignment to a permanent unit is made, personnel turnover must be reduced. These internal reforms can be thought of as efforts to develop in American ground combat units a modern equivalent of the British regimental system. Not only would steps in these directions increase soldierly satisfaction and thereby military effectiveness, but, and most important, these developments would lead to an increased ability to recruit more broadly for the all-volunteer force. The Military as Educator

From the viewpoint of minorities, especially those deprived of social advantage in civilian society, the appeal of the armed forces is intimately connected with the opportunites the militar)f,offers for education and skill trainifig. From the viewpoint of the military establishment, training is emphasized to recruit manpower and to serve military occupational needs. Regarding civil-military relations and the integration of the armed forces into the larger society, trained personnel must be seen as a national resource who, to an appropriate degree, ought to be encouraged to return to civilian life. Although the armed services constitute a vast training institution, military leaders have resisted recognition of this role, fearing that it would divert their attention from their primary mission. But the pressures of the all-volunteer May/June 1975

force have compelled the military to accept this role, albeit reluctantly, and to stress education and training in their recruitment appeals. Nevertheless, there is a great deal of uncertainty and ambiguity about this task among professional officers. Clearer recognition of the secondary functions of the military in education and skill training should iead to policies which facilitate the return of trained individuals to civilian society and thereby reduce the racial imbalances within the armed forces, i.e., lowering black reenlistment rates.

The end of black overconcentration in the ground combat forces necessitates effective racial equality and dignity in the larger society. Certain required organizational changes are evident. These demand further study and even experimentation and can only be tentatively proposed here: alternating unit assignments---especially in the ground combat forces---between field training and purposive civilian training; pre-separation assignments where education and skill training would be a primary function; and job counseling on the most individual and personalized level. It is important to emphasize that usable civilian skills are least likely to be acquired in the ground combat forces, the very units which are overproportionately black. The ground forces must be opened up to potential civilian employers including black advancement groups such as the Urban League. To facilitate the training and outward flow of black servicemen, it would be appropriate to receive budgetary allocations from the Departments of Labor, and Health, Education and Welfare. More Balanced Recruitment

The growing racial imbalance in the enlisted ranks of the all-volunteer force is one outcome of the adoption of the monetary incentives advocated by the Gates Commission. Perhaps the ultimate in monetary recruitment has been reached in the "bonus" ($2,500 as of June, 1974) used to induce young men to join the ground combat forces. In March, 1974, one-third of those who signed up for the combat enlistment bonus were black. That this outcome was not anticipated is surprising in light of conclusive studies which have shown that military earnings for minorities with less than a high school education will exceed their earnings in the civilian labor force. The fact that the all-volunteer force significantly overdraws its membership from America's underclasses simply reflects the tendency of social groups to behave generally in their material self-interest. Until recently the military followed a recruitment policy not geared to attracting young people oriented toward posthigh school education--either technical, vocational or collegiate. But the military establishment, in the spring of 1974, 41

began to recognize that an important source of personnel are young people who are prepared to serve in the armed forces---relatively short terms, two to four years---as part of their transition into adult life. Social surveys indicate that one of the most powerful incentives for these persons is not immediate pay, but deferred pay in the form of educational benefits. In this regard, a rough rule of equity might he the exchange of one year of military service for one year of post-high school education. Recruiting single-term enlistments from youth with educational plans beyond high school would obviously make for a more racially representative military constituency. The counseling system of American high schools---not just military recruiters---must become alert to the possible civilian educational benefits of military service. Even under the present financial situation, existing G.I. Bill benefits combined with an appropriate fraction of savings from military pay (feasible owing to the military's provision of food and housing) would enable a recruit to afford two years of post-high school education after two years of military service. It would be more desirable if this arrangement were made explicit by means of a contract enlistment in which the terms of compensation were oriented toward educational benefits, rather than monthly pay. The military is favorable to arrangements as outlined here, but the resistance to such programs is difficult to understand except in terms of organizational inertia. One important element in such arrangement is that the college-bound recruit actually be accepted for admission to a college and his entrance postponed for the period of his military service.

The impact of the Vietnam War and the difficulty of clarifying military goals have a negative influence on the climate of recruitment. Another variant of linking military service with advanced civilian education is the establishment of a program in which a college education partly underwritten by the military would precede entry into the armed forces. Such considerations would be particularly relevant for middle-class families for whom the financial costs of a college education are becoming increasingly heavy burdens. Certainly, it can be argued that large expenditures will be required to institute such a scholarship program. But it must be remembered that the present combat enlistment bonus alone could pay the tuition for one year at many of the most expensive private colleges. Also, the present financial plight of many colleges is such that they would be amenable to intermeshing their curriculum with a military-sponsored scholarship program, e.g., two years of military service between sophomore and junior years. Such a program would coincide with the present trend toward abolishing the lock-step educational system. 42

Financially, it might be well to consider Wading offprojected El-E4 (the first four and lowest ranks in the enlisted structure) pay increases to fund such a scholarship program --whether pre- or post-service. Another alternative is granting student loans which would be canceled upon completion of a specified tour of duty. In return for such educational benefits---whether contract enlistments, scholarships or loans---youths would be assigned to whatever capacity required by the military, especially the ground combat forces. Whatever the details of such a civilian educational program, a major outcome would be the reintroduction of white middle-class males into the ground combat forces. Moreover, there would be a concentration of single-term enlistments in the military occupations where such short enlistments are most practical the lower ranks of the combat arms. Such an infusion of white middleclass males into the combat arms could also serve to improve the chances for black representation in the more technical and support components of the armed forces. In this way, rectification of racial imbalance in the combat arms would meet the criteria of both practical efficiency and democratic representation. Military and National Purpose Clearly, the impact of the Vietnam War and the difficulty of clarifying military goals have a negative influence on the climate of recruitment, especially among young men and women from better educated families. Even though minority groups seem prepared to accept the occupational advantages of military service---both short- and long-term--the broader issue concerns the legitimacy of the military for the majority and more advantaged groups. That American foreign and military policy must become clearer is obvious. But the core question inheres in the definition of the worthwhileness of public--including military--services. A reconstruction of military legitimacy requires considerations that are more normative than monetary. The wider the range of definitions of military service---educational, athletic, disaster relief, environment control---the more broadly representative and racially balanced an all-volunteer force can be. It is misleading to regard the all-volunteer military service as a long-term occupation; most military personnel, even in the all-volunteer format, will only serve single terms. In pursuing alternative modes of entrance into adult roles, almost 400,000 young people will be directly affected by the volunteer military. Currently, it is in danger of being defined as suitable only for depressed minorities seeking to enter the larger society. In the long run, the end of black overconcentration in the ground combat forces necessitates effective racial equality and dignity in the larger society. To some extent the armed forces have contributed and will continue to contribute to this goal. But for the immediate future, the basic goal is to prevent the military from becoming a racially distinct enclave. [] SOCIETY