Int J Philos Relig (2010) 67:37–48 DOI 10.1007/s11153-009-9212-2

Response to: divine responsibility without divine freedom William L. Rowe

Received: 12 March 2009 / Accepted: 16 April 2009 / Published online: 5 August 2009 © Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009

Abstract Michael Bergmann and Jan Cover summarize the essence of their paper as follows: “We argue that divine responsibility is sufficient for divine thankworthiness and consistent with the absence of divine freedom. We do this while insisting on the view that both freedom and responsibility are incompatible with causal determinism.” In this response I argue that while it makes sense for believers to be thankful that God exists, it makes no sense for them to thank him for doing the best act he can, given the circumstances. Keywords Brute necessity · Freedom · Perfectly good · Responsible · Thankworthy

Introduction In their important paper: “Divine Responsibility without Divine Freedom”, two very able philosophers, Bergmann and Cover, present some significant criticisms of a view that I have argued for both in Rowe (2002) and in Rowe (2004). In their paper, Bergmann and Cover (2006) [hereafter: BC] defend two central claims in western theistic religions, claims they describe as CONJUNCTION: (G) God is essentially perfectly good, and (T) God is thankworthy for the good acts he performs. Against the claim that both (G) and (T) are true, they note the following argument. (G –> –F): God’s being essentially perfectly good precludes God’s good acts from being free. (–F > –T): God isn’t thankworthy for an act that he was unable not to perform.

W. L. Rowe (B) 342 Overlook Drive, West Lafayette, IN 47906, USA e-mail: [email protected]

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They consider two distinct ways of responding to this argument. One way is to deny the first premise: (G –> –F). The second way is to deny the second premise (–F –> –T). In each case, they present two ways for the defender of (G) (God is essentially perfectly good) and (T) (God is thankworthy for the good acts he performs), to respond. That is, they present two ways for the defender of (G) & (T) to respond to (G –> –F), and two ways for the defender of (G) & (T) to respond to (–F > –T). In this paper, I will critically examine the first way in which they endeavor to respond to (–F > –T). The BC response consists of two claims: (RG) God can be responsible for the good acts he performs even if he is essentially perfectly good. (TR) A person is thankworthy for performing a good act so long as that person is responsible for the act in question and it is performed for the right reasons. The question I wish to raise is this: What if God’s necessary perfections are such that He could not refrain from choosing to do a particular good act? If so, then God was not free to choose to refrain from doing that good act. He chooses to do that act of necessity, and does that act of necessity, not freely. Nevertheless, we should be thankful for the fact that there necessarily exists an omnipotent, morally perfect being whose nature is such that it is impossible for Him not to choose to do that good act. But it makes no sense, I believe, to be thankful to that being for his doing an act that, given his nature, he couldn’t refrain from doing. For he is in no way responsible for the fact that his essential nature (being omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good) is such that he is unable to refrain from choosing to do and, therefore, doing that good act. Consider a case where a human being cannot refrain from doing an act his nature requires. The person in question has a broken leg and is confined to a bed in a hospital. He has been told that if he needs to urinate, he should press a button that will alert the person on duty some distance away, and that person will bring a urinal and assist him. Unknown to him and the hospital staff, the electronic device is presently defective. The person needs to urinate and cannot alert the person on duty, even though he presses the button a number of times. After verbally calling for help to no avail, he cannot but urinate in his bed. Is he blameworthy for urinating in his bed? Of course not, no more than God is thankworthy for his good act that his nature necessitates that he do. Each is such that given his nature he cannot do otherwise in the situation he is in. Moreover, each (God and the human being) is such that he is not responsible for the nature he has. The problem of divine perfection and freedom BC consider a view I’ve advanced which they describe as: “A Rowe-Inspired Defense of the No-Freedom Thesis” They note Rowe’s argument that God cannot do an evil act, as well as his claim that God cannot perform an act than which there is a better act, all things considered, that God can perform instead. (G –> ∼P): God’s being essentially perfectly good prevents God from having it in his power to bring it about that he performs an act than which there is a better act, all things considered, that God can perform instead.

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They object that this point does not “show that God lacks freedom in doing the good acts he does (one might be free if one can do otherwise even though one can’t do better).” I suppose they mean that if two acts are equally good, all things considered, God may still be free to choose which of the two he will do. If this is what they mean, I concede the point. But, at best, we have a very limited degree of freedom: God is free to choose between two acts so long as both can’t be done and neither act is better or worse than the other, all things considered. This limited degree of freedom allows God to choose which of two acts he will do so long as it really doesn’t matter very much, if at all, which of the two acts he chooses to do. Suppose you have a single dollar bill in your pocket that you want to give to someone who has no money. You see two beggars on the street, and have good reason to believe that each is pennyless. You are free to give the dollar bill to one of the two, but you are not free to give it to neither of them without feeling very guilty—something your moral nature, let us suppose, precludes you from experiencing, given that it costs only a dollar to avoid feeling guilty. This sort of limited freedom may apply even to God when there are two acts equally good and it is logically impossible for God to do both, although it isn’t possible for him to choose to do neither. God is then free to choose between two good acts when he cannot do both and neither is judged by God, an omniscience being, to be better than the other, all things considered. I suspect we will all agree that this minimal degree of freedom is, at best, rather insignificant. BC next consider what they call: “No-Power-No-Freedom” (–P –> –F) : God’s good acts are free only if God has it in his power (to choose) to bring it about that he performs an act than which there is a better (act, all things considered that he can choose to do instead).1 and note that (–P –> –F) and the no power conclusion (G –> –P) together entail No-Freedom: (G –> –F) : God’s being essentially perfectly good prevents God’s good acts from being free. After considering what appear (to me) to be rather weak responses to (G –> –F), BC turn to what I consider to be the major section of their important paper. Thankworthiness without freedom If the theist concedes that God does not freely do the best act he can in the circumstances, they ask: Is there any way for an incompatibilist to defend the coherence of gratitude to God for his good acts?2 1 I’ve taken the liberty of adding the material in parentheses so as to make it clear that the issue under consideration is not whether there are actions that God lacks the power to do (should he will to do them), but whether God’s essential perfections preclude him from being free to will to do an act when there is a morally better act (all things considered) he can do instead—granted that it is impossible for both to be done. 2 As they state in an endnote: “Recall again why this premise seems plausible: If God is not free in performing an act, then it seems he was constrained or forced in which case he is neither responsible nor thankworthy for performing it.”

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Their response, of course, is to fall back on both (RG) God can be responsible for the good acts he performs even if he is essentially perfectly good. and (TR) A person is thankworthy for performing a good act so long as that person is responsible for the act in question and it is performed for the right reason. A thought experiment Consider an enormously talented brain surgeon who has somehow managed to create a small device that, if implanted in the human brain, will result in that human being always choosing to do what he/she has good reason to believe is the morally best act he/she is able to do in the circumstances, all things considered. He then secretly manages to implant it in his own brain. After some time, his wife is so impressed by his current willingness to do, even at some cost to himself, what he believes is the morally best act he can do in the circumstances, that he tells her what he has done and, at her request, plants such a device in her brain. From then on both lead exceptionally good lives, and eventually have a child. Unknown to them, the device has so changed them that the child, a boy, somehow inherits the trait of “always choosing to do what he has good reason to believe is the morally best act he can do in the circumstances, all things considered”, even though no such mechanism has been implanted in him. Indeed, as the child reaches the age of intelligence and knowledge, he discovers that his nature is, and always has been, such that he cannot choose to do something less than the best act he can do in the circumstances, all things considered. In this case, does it make sense for the child, knowing what he does, to praise himself for doing the good act he does, even though he knows that he is incapable of not doing that act? I believe that given what he knows, the child should, at best, be thankful for his having the nature he has, a nature that prevents him from choosing to do an act that is less good than another act that he can do instead. Similarly, I suspect that if Anselm’s God does exist, he knows that he is not thankworthy for doing the best he can since, given his nature, it is impossible for him to choose to do any act less than the best act he can do, all things considered. However, as I’ve indicated, this doesn’t mean that if Anselm’s God does exist, we shouldn’t be grateful for the fact that he exists and is such that it is impossible for him to choose to do what he knows is less than the best he can do in the circumstances, all things considered. But we should also realize, that since he had no choice about the nature he has, and, given that nature, is unable to choose to do any act other than what he reasonably believes Footnote 2 continued ROWE: I would say that what makes this premise plausible is simply this: given his nature, a nature that he had no part in choosing, forming, or shaping, God is not free to choose to do anything other than what his nature necessitates that he choose to do in the situation in which he finds himself; baring a situation in which there are two or more equally good acts and none better, in which case, if only one can be done he is free to choose which one he will do.

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to be the best act he can do in the circumstances, it makes no sense to thank him or praise him for doing the best act he can in the circumstances, all things considered. For, given his nature, a nature that he is in no way responsible for having, he is incapable of choosing to do any act less than the best act he can do, all things considered. BC, however, maintain that “S is responsible for an act A so long as S is the agentcause of A”, and they define “X is the agent-cause of e iff each of the following conditions is satisfied: 1. X is a substance that had the power to bring about e. 2. X exerted its power to bring about e. 3. Nothing distinct from X (not even X’s character) caused X to exert its power to bring about e.”3 What then should we say about the question of whether God is or isn’t responsible for doing the best act he can in the circumstances, all things considered? If we substitute ‘God’ for ‘X’, the only question that we must consider concerns Proposition 3. ‘Nothing distinct from God (not even God’s character) caused X to exert its power to bring about e.’ Allow me to substitute ‘God’s essential attributes’ (omnipotence, omniscience, and perfect goodness) for their rather awkward phrase ‘God’s character’. The issue, then, is whether God is morally responsible for exerting his power to bring about e when God knows that e is the morally best act that can be done in the circumstances. Assume with me that God also knows that doing that best act is better, all things considered, than not doing it. Now consider the question of whether, given his necessary perfections, it is even possible for God to refrain from exerting his power to bring about e. The answer, I believe, is clearly ‘No’. For if he failed to do that act, given that he knows that it is a morally good act and the morally best act he can do in the circumstances, as well as the best act he can do all things considered, he would not be the perfect being he necessarily is. And granted that even God, an omnipotent being, cannot bring about an impossible state of affairs such as 2 + 2 = 5, even God cannot bring it about that he ceases to be what he necessarily is, a morally perfect being. So, while we may agree that God’s essential properties leave him free to choose between doing either of two good acts when they are equally good all things considered and it is logically impossible for both acts to be done, he is not free to fail to do the best act he can in the circumstances, all things considered. He does that act of necessity, and not freely. Having rejected the idea that “God can be responsible for his nature” BC argue instead that God can be agent-causally responsible for the good acts he performs even if his nature entails that he perform them. They note an objection to this conclusion: the objection that their commitment to 3 I assume here (although it may be somewhat puzzling to do so) that BC mean to say that although God’s essential properties (omnipotence, omniscience, perfect goodness) do not cause God to do certain particular acts, they do render it logically necessary that God chooses to do those particular acts.

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NT: At every possible world God always agent-causes his bringing it about that he performs an act than which none is better. [their brute necessity] ‘confronts an embarrassment:’ refusing as we do to grant the most plausible explanation of this modal fact in terms of God’s essential nature causing him to bring it about that he perform the good acts he performs, we are left to say that the modal fact has no explanation whatever. Their response is simply to say: “there is good reason to think not only that there are brute necessities, but also that NT is one of them.” Unfortunately, BC provide no “good reason” to think that NT is a “brute necessity”. For the plain fact is that there is a perfectly clear explanation of the modal fact that: NT: [At every possible world God always agent-causes his bringing it about that he performs an act than which none is better.] The perfectly clear explanation of NT is this: God’s essential properties (omnipotence, omniscience, and perfect goodness) logically entail and explain his always, at every possible world, performing an act than which none is better—provided that among possible acts there is an act than which none is better. For, if God, per impossible, were to perform an act than which there is a better act, all things considered, that he could have performed instead; he would not be the being he necessarily is: a being than which a greater being is not possible. Indeed, should he perform an act than which there is a better act, all things considered, that he could have performed instead; he would be a being than which a greater being is possible. In my judgment, if there is a brute necessity it is this: There necessarily exists an omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good being. BC are careful to note that some necessities are ‘brute necessities’ and some are not. By a brute necessity BC mean a necessity that has no explanation. Assuming that some necessities are brute and some are not, they say: It may emerge that we are forced to say: Here we have a brute necessary truth:[whenever God agent-causes anything, he agent-causes his bringing it about that he performs good acts than which none are better.] This brute necessity is what NT reports. About NT, they say “Surely the easiest and most natural way to explain NT is to appeal to the following truth about what—necessarily—his nature causes: [Rowe: about what—necessarily—his nature entails] (NC) At every possible world, whenever God agent-causes anything, his nature causes him to bring it about that he performs an act than which none is better. [Rowe: his nature, (i.e. his essential properties—omnipotence, omniscience, and perfect goodness) entail (i.e., logically necessitate) his bringing it about that he performs an act than which none is better.] But they reject NC. They then ask themselves: “What do you offer in its place?” and note that “one cannot explain the truth of NT by appealing to NC. For if God’s nature were to cause him to bring it about that he performs an act than which none is better, then NT wouldn’t be true: NT says that at every world God agent-causes his bringing it about that he performs acts of that sort. And if God agent-causes it, then his nature

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doesn’t cause him to cause it. Still the objector is right to isolate NT, to note that the position we are defending is committed to the modal fact it reports, and to note that we’ve offered no explanation for it. What do we have to say for ourselves?” (p. 22) They consider the notion “that all necessities are brute, that it never makes sense to ask of some necessary truth why it is true, at any rate not if one is fishing for an explanatory sense of ‘because’ running deeper than “because it must be”. “Perhaps every necessity entails every other, all are true and can’t be false, and none is true because another is” (p. 22) However, proceeding “on the assumption that some necessities are brute and some are not” they consider NT. Given PN [God has a perfect nature] they note that (E) PN entails NT [At every possible world whenever God agent-causes anything, he agent-causes his bringing it about that he performs an act than which none is better.] After pointing out that NT is about agent-causation, which is uncaused causing, they conclude that no causal explanation of NT will be satisfactory.” They then say: “it seems entirely plausible to us that we should expect NT in particular to be a brute necessity; since NT is about agent-causation, which is uncaused causing, no causal explanation of NT will be satisfactory.” Noting, however, that there might be a logical explanation for NT “even though there is no causal explanation of the modal fact reported by NT,”they then ask us to consider these two claims: (PN) God has a perfect nature. (E) PN entails NT: At every possible world God always agent-causes his bringing it about that he performs an act than which none is better. and conclude that (PN and E) may explain (in the mathematical/logical sense) NT, but not vice versa. [Rowe: I entirely agree with them on this point.] The central issue We have accepted the challenge of granting that God’s moral perfection entails his lack of freedom while nevertheless denying the not-thankworthy premise that such lack of freedom entails his lack of thankworthiness. They say that they have offered a defense of (RG): God can be responsible for the good acts he performs even if he is essentially perfectly good. For BC have argued that God can be agent-causally responsible for the good acts he performs even if his nature entails that he perform them. Noting the objection that the truth of (NT) [At every possible world God always agent-causes his bringing it about that he performs an act than which none is better] is due to the fact that God’s essential nature causes him to perform the good acts he does [Rowe: logically necessitates his performing the good acts he does], they have responded by saying that NT is simply a “brute necessity.” [Rowe: Clearly, NT is not a brute necessity: a necessity without any explanation of why it is a necessity. Indeed, the fact that NT is necessary is fully explained by God’s necessary properties: omnipotence, omniscience, and perfect goodness. For if God were to perform (in any possible world) an act than which there is a better act (all things considered) that he could have performed instead, he would not be the omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good being he necessarily is.] Since they refuse to accept that God’s being omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good not only

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necessitates, but also explains, his always performing an act than which none is better, and therefore precludes his being responsible for choosing to do those good acts; I’m puzzled by their decision to simply claim that NT is a “brute necessity”. But I suspect the solution to my puzzlement is contained in what they next consider. For they next consider this objection: “It may be charged that even if it is possible for God to be the agent-cause” (in their sense) “of acts the performance of which is entailed by his having the nature he does, that alone cannot render it true that he is responsible for those acts. To put it another way: although being the agent-cause of A is necessary for being responsible for A, it is not sufficient for it.” They then point out: “This is a line of attack that Rowe will be inclined to take against responsible-though-good (RG)”, and they state Rowe’s view of agent-causation: AC∗ : X is the agent cause of e iff each of the following three conditions is satisfied: 1. X is a substance that had the power to bring about e. 2. X exerted its power to bring about e. 3∗ . X had the power to refrain from bringing about e.4 As BC note, the difference between Rowe’s account of agent-causation and their account is that while Rowe insists that the agent had the power (i.e., could have successfully chosen) not to exert his power to bring about e; they hold only that 3. “Nothing distinct from X (not even X’s character) caused X to exert its power to bring about e.” Thus BC say: “Rowe believes that both the causal buck stopping with the agent and the power to do otherwise are required for responsibility. We have claimed that only the former is required.”(p. 25) [Rowe: It is not a question of “power to do otherwise” (in the sense of doing some other act); it is being able not to (choose to) do what one does choose to do. If someone (chooses to do) an act and it is logically impossible for that person to refrain from choosing to do that act, one chooses to do that act of necessity, and not freely.] Rowe: A human being may choose to do an act and may not be free either to choose to refrain from doing that act or to choose to do some other act instead, and yet in some sense be morally responsible for choosing to do that act. For example, a person may read a book about the importance of helping others who are in need, provided one can do so without serious threat to oneself. That person may then become so profoundly convinced of the importance of helping others that he (she) is no longer able to choose to simply pass by someone who is in great need without trying to help that person, so long as he/she believes he/she can do so without any significant threat to himself or herself. Such a person may be praiseworthy, nevertheless, for his/her act of assisting a person who is in great need of help. For he/she may be morally responsible for so shaping himself/herself that he/she could not but be so deeply impressed by what he/she read in the book that he/she felt compelled to so act in the future. This reasoning, however, is inapplicable to God. For God is not morally responsible for possessing the 4 Rowe (2000).

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properties of omnipotence, omniscience, and perfect goodness. He always had and always will have those properties. Noting that Rowe “goes on to argue that 3∗ entails 3,” they say “he doesn’t deny that agent-causing in our sense is necessary for agent-causing in his sense.” And they note that “Rowe believes that both the causal buck stopping with the agent and the power to do otherwise are required for responsibility.” Whereas, they have claimed that only the former is required. They then ask: “How might we settle this disagreement?” Concerning God they write: “What we are saying when we say “he couldn’t do otherwise than perform A is just …that it is impossible, or at any rate impossible in the circumstances, that God do otherwise than A. And we are adding that this impossibility is not due to God being forced by his nature to perform A” (p. 27). (Rowe: they do allow, however, that God is logically required by his essential properties to choose to do A).

Responsibility and thankworthiness BC note that someone may still deny their “thankworthy-if-responsible” (TR) (TR) A person is thankworthy for performing a good act so long as that person is responsible for the act in question and it was performed for the right reasons. for they may hold that a person is thankworthy only if the person could have done otherwise. But BC claim that if (TR) is true it can be deployed against the Incoherence Argument’s not-thankworthy premise: (–F –> –T) God isn’t thankworthy for an act that wasn’t performed freely. Or is the objector right to claim instead that God is not thankworthy for an action that it is impossible (in the circumstances) for him to do otherwise than perform? Again they claim that not even God’s nature (his essential properties) “caused” him to perform that act. However, as they clearly know, God’s essential properties—omnipotence, omniscience, and perfect goodness—properties he is in no way responsible for possessing—logically prevent God from having any choice as to whether or not he does that act. They think God should be “thanked” for doing the acts he does even though it is logically impossible for him not to do those acts, and he is in no way responsible for its being impossible for him to refrain from doing those acts. For given that God has always existed, and has always had the properties of omnipotence, omniscience, and perfect goodness, it is logically impossible for him to refrain from doing any act less than the best act he can perform in the circumstances, all things considered. Therefore, while it makes sense to be thankful for the fact that there necessarily exists a being whose necessary properties make it impossible for him to refrain from doing the best act he can, it makes no sense to thank that being for doing an act that, given his necessary properties, he is incapable of refraining from doing. For God is in no way responsible for the fact that he necessarily possesses the properties that render him incapable of refraining from doing the best act he can, all things considered.

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The second version of the incoherence argument Having done their best to reply to the first version of the Incoherence Argument, i.e., “explaining how to reject the not-thankworthy (–F –> –T) premise, while accepting the no-significant freedom thesis (G –> –Fs)”; BC draw on that discussion in providing an objection to the second version of the Incoherence Argument: explaining how to reject the revised not-thankworthy thesis (–Fs –> –T) while accepting the no-significant-freedom thesis (G –> ∼Fs). They recall (RG) God can be responsible for the good acts he performs even if he is essentially perfectly good. and (TR) A person is thankworthy for performing a good act so long as that person is responsible for the act in question and it is performed for the right reasons. and note that (RG) and (TR) “are used against The Incoherence Argument to show that there can be divine responsibility and thankworthiness without divine freedom”. Their objection to the first version of the Incoherence Argument relies on the following three points: (i) God can be the agent-cause of an action the performance of which is entailed by his perfectly good nature (defended in III.B). (ii) God’s agent-causing an action is sufficient for his being responsible for it (defended in III.C). (iii) If (a) God is responsible for some good act and (b) he performs it for the right reasons, then he is thankworthy even if (c) he can’t do otherwise (defended in III.D). Points (i) and (ii) are offered in defense of (RG) God can be responsible for the good acts he performs even if he is essentially perfectly good. Point (iii) is offered in defense of (TR) A person is thankworthy for performing a good act so long as that person is responsible for the act in question and it is performed for the right reasons. So, “(RG) and (TR) are used against The Incoherence Argument to show that there can be divine responsibility and thankworthiness without divine freedom.” Since BC acknowledge that God performs his good acts of necessity, and not freely, they strive to come up with an account of “agent-causation” that doesn’t require either freedom to refrain from doing that act or freedom to act differently. For they assume, without any supporting argument, that agent-causation, as defined by them, is sufficient for the agent being responsible for the acts he performs. And given that X is responsible for an act, they think it follows that the agent may be praiseworthy or blameworthy for the act he performs—even though he was incapable of refraining from performing that act and is not responsible for possessing the property (perfect goodness) in virtue of which he was incapable of refraining from performing that act.

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Suppose we accept (i). Let’s now look carefully at their conception of agent-causation. After noting my account of agent causation, an account that includes 3∗ , they provide their own account by substituting their 3 for my 3∗ : X had the power to refrain from bringing about e. Thus, as they report, Rowe’s account of agent causation is as follows: X is the agent cause of e iff each of the following three conditions is satisfied: 1. X is a substance that had the power to bring about e. 2. X exerted its power to bring about e. 3. X had the power to refrain from bringing about e.5 As BC are aware, the difference between Rowe’s 3 (described by them as 3∗ ) and their 3. “Nothing distinct from X (not even X’s character) caused S to exert its power to bring about e.” is that Rowe’s 3 includes the agent’s ability to refrain from choosing to bring about e, whereas BC’s 3, while permitting that God’s essential properties (omnipotence. omniscience, and perfect goodness) logically necessitates God’s act of bringing about e, deny that his essential properties cause God to bring about e. Of course, their 3 fails to note that God’s essential properties (omnipotence, omniscience, and perfect goodness) logically necessitates God’s act of bringing about e, deny that his essential properties cause God to bring about e. Of course, their 3 fails to note that God’s essential properties (omnipotence, omniscience, and perfect goodness), rather than merely causing God to bring about e (the best act that can be done in the circumstances), logically necessitates God’s bringing about e. [Rowe: moreover, God was not responsible for the fact that he couldn’t do otherwise, since he is in no way responsible for possessing the properties (omnipotence. omniscience, and perfect goodness) that rendered it logically impossible for him to refrain from choosing to do, and doing, that act.] Conclusion As BC are aware, the difference between their definition of AC (agent causation) and Rowe’s is that they have substituted their 3. “Nothing distinct from X (not even X’s character) caused S to exert its power to bring about e.” for Rowe’s 3. “X had the power to refrain from bringing about e.” Of course, their 3 fails to take account of the fact that God’s essential properties (omnipotence, omniscience, and perfect goodness), rather than merely causing God to bring about e (the best act that can be done in the circumstances), logically necessitates God’s bringing about e. So, given their account, as well as mine, it is logically impossible for God to refrain from binging about e. Should we then be thankful to God for doing an act that it is logically impossible for him to refrain from doing? Well, is he in anyway responsible for possessing the properties of omnipotence omniscience, and perfect goodness? Clearly not. For he never had a choice concerning his possessing those properties. Nor is he capable of ceasing to possess those properties. Therefore, although believers should be thankful for the fact 5 Rowe (2000, p. 427).

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that there necessarily exists an omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good being who is incapable of refraining from doing what he knows to be the best act that can be done in the circumstances, all things considered; it makes no sense to thank that being for doing an act that, given his necessary properties, he is incapable of refraining from doing. For he is not responsible for the fact that he exists and necessarily possesses those properties. References Bergmann, M., & Cover, J. (2006). Divine responsibility without divine freedom. Faith and Philosophy, 23, 381–408. Rowe, W. L. (2000). The metaphysics of freedom: Reid’s theory of agent causation. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, 74, 425–446. Rowe, W. L. (2002). Can god be free?. Faith and Philosophy, 19, 405–424. Rowe, W. L. (2004). Can god be free?. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

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