Springer 2007

Journal of Business Ethics (2008) 81:15–25 DOI 10.1007/s10551-007-9477-2

Sartrean Existentialism and Ethical Decision-Making in Business

ABSTRACT. A wide range of decision-making models have been offered to assist in making ethical decisions in the workplace. Those that are based on normative moral frameworks typically include elements of traditional moral philosophy such as consequentialist and/or deontological ethics. This paper suggests an alternative model drawing on Jean-Paul Sartre’s existentialism. Accordingly, the model focuses on making decisions in full awareness of one’s freedom and responsibility. The steps of the model are intended to encourage reflection of one’s projects and one’s situation and the possibility of refusing the expectations of others. A case study involving affirmative action in South Africa is used to demonstrate the workings of the model and a number of strengths and weaknesses are identified. Despite several weaknesses that can be raised regarding existential ethics, the model’s success lies in the way that it reframes ethical dilemmas in terms of individual freedom and responsibility, and in its acceptance and analysis of subjective experiences and personal situations. KEY WORDS: authenticity, decision-making model, ethical decision-making, existentialism, freedom, JeanPaul Sartre, moral decision-making, responsibility

Andrew West

models that are based on both normative and positivist theories, existential philosophy does not typically form a part of most ethical decision-making models. This paper expands on this by presenting an ethical decision-making model that draws specifically on the existential philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre. Although Sartre’s existentialism is largely descriptive in nature, he was at pains to describe what it means to live in self-deception, or ‘bad faith’, and in the sense that this can be avoided or at least reduced, his philosophy can be considered conducive to a normative decision-making model. The paper begins with an overview of the range of ethical decision-making models that are currently available. A brief discussion of some of the key features of Sartre’s existentialism that are relevant for a decision-making model follows, together with a note on some previous incorporations of existentialism within the business sphere. A decision-making model is then presented and is followed by its application to a brief case study in order to present a preliminary assessment of its strengths and weaknesses.

Introduction

Ethical decision-making models

The development of decision-making models that may assist businesspeople in making decisions that can be considered ethical is an area in which the academic study of ‘Business ethics’ can be applied, and in which it can aspire to improve ‘Business ethics’ in practice. In order to assist businesspeople in making such decisions, a number of decision-making models have been presented as part of the management literature. While this literature includes decision-making

The theoretical perspectives that inform ethical decision-making models can be placed into two categories: normative or positivist. Normative models provide prescriptions of how business decision-making should take place in order to achieve a morally satisfactory result. To justify their prescriptions these usually draw upon some sort of moral philosophy such as utilitarianism/consequentialism, deontology, theories of rights, justice and fairness, or Divine command. Although these can be couched in philosophical argument, normative theories are also readily understandable by, and implicit in, the thinking of non-philosophers. Hodgson (1992,

Andrew West is a Lecturer in the School of Business and Economics at the South African Campus of Monash University, and a doctoral candidate at the University of Pretoria.

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p. 56), for instance, provided a list of seven ‘magnificent’ principles to guide decision-making across different countries and cultures: Dignity of Human Life, Autonomy, Honesty, Loyalty, Fairness, Humaneness, and The Common Good. Positivist models provide an exposition of how decision-making occurs in practice, so that explanations and reliable predictions of moral decisionmaking can be made. Loe et al. (2000, p. 185) favour positivist models of decision-making as they are ‘‘more readily evaluated, using scientific modes of inquiry’’ and note a criticism of normative models ‘‘which often assume absolute truths about appropriate decision making’’. They reviewed empirical studies of ethical decision-making, identifying the various categories of inquiry and providing a summary of positivist research in this area. The results (2000, p. 187) indicated that the most common categories to be studied are the effect of differences in gender, moral philosophy adopted, education and work experience, and culture and climate. Although there are definite benefits from understanding the various processes and characteristics of decision-making, there are also benefits to be obtained from understanding different normative approaches, particularly those that offer alternatives to traditional ethical theories. Given that ethical decision-making in business typically takes place in the workplace, the development of models that can actually be used by businesspeople is arguably the most pressing issue. Based on the theoretical normative and/or positivist perspectives described above, practical models have been developed that attempt to provide managers ‘at the coalface’ with fairly easy-to-understand tools that they can apply without needing to appreciate the complexities of ethical theory. Practical ethical decision-making models appear in a wide range of forms, including checklists/tests, process plans, and flow charts/decision trees. Checklists and tests typically require consideration of a number of ethical questions that are intended to stimulate ethical thought, with the questions being either broad or specific. Michael Josephson’s (2003) ‘‘Bell, book and candle’’ approach is one example in which the decision-maker is asked to evaluate his/ her decision using three tests: 1. Listen for the bells warning you of an ethical issue (the ‘bell’),

2. Check to see if there are any laws, regulations or rules which restrict your choices (the ‘book’), and 3. How will your decision look in the light? Could a reasonable fair-minded person conclude you acted improperly? (the ‘candle’). Another example can be found in Nash’s (1991) 12 questions: 1. Have you defined the problem accurately? 2. How would you define the problem if you stood on the other side of the fence? 3. How did this situation occur in the first place? 4. To whom and to what do you give your loyalty as a person and as a member of the corporation? 5. What is your intention in making this decision? 6. How does this intention compare with the probable results? 7. Whom could your decision or action injure? 8. Can you discuss the problem with the affected parties before you make your decision? 9. Are you confident that your position will be as valid over a long period of time as it seems now? 10. Could you disclose without qualm your decision or action to your boss, your CEO, the board of directors, your family, society as a whole? 11. What is the symbolic potential of your action if understood? If misunderstood? 12. Under what conditions would you allow exceptions to your stand? Process plans outline a series of sequential steps to be completed when making a decision. Amongst others they include six-step (Ethics Resource Center, 2006), seven-step (Josephson, 2002), and 10-step (Wallace and Pekel, 2006) plans. Although the steps clearly differ, the intent is to ensure that a complete and thorough analysis is conducted, and that no important considerations are inadvertently omitted. The PLUS decision-making model developed by the Ethics Resource Center includes the following steps:

Existentialism and Ethical Decision-Making Step Step Step Step Step Step

1: 2: 3: 4: 5: 6:

Define the problem Identify available solutions to the problem Evaluate the identified alternatives Make the decision Implement the decision Evaluate the decision

Flow charts and decision trees are similar in that they provide a sequential process, but are presented using symbols that can then incorporate alternatives (see Constance, 2003 for an example). For practical models to be justifiable, however, they should be based upon sound normative or positivist frameworks. Two significant weaknesses that can be raised against some existing decision-making models are (1) that they attempt to incorporate a range of ethical philosophies and (2) that they are held to apply to all ethical dilemmas. The first can be seen in models that include considerations of the consequences of the possible action as well as whether or not there are certain duties to be performed, or issues of rights, justice or care to be considered. These seem to carry with them the implication that the more ethical philosophies that are incorporated into the model, the more ‘ethical’ the decision should be, and there is clearly no reason why this should necessarily be true. The second weakness implies that there are certain underlying features common to all dilemmas and that while these may be obscured in day-to-day living, they can be brought to light through the application of the model, and the dilemma can then be resolved. In contrast, this paper proposes a decision-making model that is based on a single normative framework: the existential philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre. It is based particularly on his earlier works, including Being and Nothingness and Existentialism is a Humanism, and corresponds largely to Sartre’s ‘First Ethics’ (Anderson, 1994). While the model may not appeal to those who reject the basic tenets of existentialism, it nevertheless provides a useful alternative to the models that are already disseminated.

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intended to be a summary of Sartre’s thought, but an identification of the areas most applicable for the development of a decision-making model. Although there is variation amongst existentialist philosophers, the central features of Sartre’s existentialism can be agreed upon as follows (see Anderson, 1979; Barnes, 1973; Cooper, 1999; Warnock, 1967 for more detailed examinations of Sartrean philosophy). Individuals are purposeful In contrast to the objects in the world around us (a tree, a building), which are complete in themselves, humans are constantly, and inevitably, purposeful. Sartre (1956) used the terms ‘Being-for-itself’ (pour-soi) to refer to human beings, possessing consciousness, and thereby not coinciding with themselves, and ‘Beingin-itself ’ (en-soi) to refer to beings that do. These may be seen as including inanimate objects, plants, animals, and a paradoxical non-existent God, who is both en-soi and pour-soi. Ontologically Sartre believed that this duality may be seen in my desire to be en-soi-pour-soi, or God, in the sense that I desire to be a necessary rather than a contingent being, and self-fulfilled/selfcaused as well as purposefully free. This desire is then played out in my personal goals or projects, ranging from my fundamental project (how I choose to attempt, on the ontological level only, to become God) to more relative projects which must be consistent with it, such as building a career, having a family, or accumulating wealth, projects of everyday life such as we are concerned with here. Individuals are fundamentally free Following from our nature as purposeful beings, we find ourselves continuously confronted by free choice. No matter what situation we find ourselves in, we are free to make choices, even if these relate only to how we interpret our situation. This freedom was observed even in Sartre’s time as a prisoner in a Nazi camp and he went on to declare (1946a, p. 295) that we are ‘‘condemned to be free’’ and that freedom is the ‘‘foundation of all values’’ (1946a, p. 307).

Existentialism Key features of existentialism Before a model that is applicable and understandable can be presented, it is necessary to review some of the key features of Sartre’s existentialism. This is not

Values are relative and subjective Sartre emphasised an important difference between facts and values. Where facts represent things that simply are what they are, values often refer to ideals, states that do not as yet exist. Anderson (1979, p. 23) explains,

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Andrew West since values … are beyond what is, what reality they have can be due only to a being that is itself able to transcend what is and posit what is not. Such a being is, of course, human consciousness. Hence values are due to human consciousness.

If values are due to human consciousness then there are no foundational justifications for our choices nor any absolute rules or principles to which we can turn to provide support for our choices. We experience absurdity at our purposeful existence characterised by free choice but lacking any absolute foundation. Our experience is subjective We experience our lives as subjects, and not as an interaction of objective, scientific laws. This challenges the view that ‘‘the differing interests and concerns of people can be satisfied through their comprehension within an all-embracing objective understanding of the universe’’ (Baldwin, 1995). The subjective, phenomenological view of our existence contrasts also with the objectivity of some moral philosophies (such as utilitarianism and Kant’s deontological ethic) and any ethical decision-making models that prescribe universal rules to ensure moral behaviour whenever they are applied. We should not live in ‘bad faith’ Kaufmann (1956) prefers to translate Sartre’s mauvaise foi as ‘self-deception’ instead of the usual ‘bad faith’. Living in ‘bad faith’, or ‘self-deception’, is then described in terms of those who do not recognise their freedom and responsibility and effectively abdicate from their personal decision-making, often preferring to accede to the pressures and expectations of others (referred to as ‘the look’ by Sartre, 1956). Instead, we should cultivate a clear awareness of the inevitability of our individual freedom as well as the associated responsibility for our own choices. This entails commitment to one’s own choice, its consequences, and the associated ‘project’ (as a consistent set of choices) while at the same time remaining available to alternatives. This can also be expressed by refusing the pressures placed on us by others and in the possibility of ‘beginning something new’ whatever the circumstances (Cooper, 1999, p. 177). It can be closely related to the popular concept of being ‘true to oneself’ (with the proviso

that no objective, independent ‘self’ is admitted in Sartre’s philosophy). These possibilities correspond, at least some extent, to the often ambiguous and ill-defined concepts of ‘authenticity’ and ‘good faith’. Values are a consequence not a determinant Following from the subjective nature of values, and the manner in which we construct our own lives through exercising our free choice, values are more accurately seen as a consequence of our moral decisions than as a determinant of our choices. If we consistently act honestly, we could say that our lives have been characterised by the value of honesty. This value of ‘honesty’ could, however, never determine our decisions.

Existentialism in business Some attempts have been made to incorporate existential themes into business ethics, notably Ashman and Winstanley (2006), Jackson (2005), and Agarwal and Malloy (2000). Both Ashman and Winstanley and Jackson emphasised the contribution that existential themes and considerations can make in business, including decision-making, but did not go so far as to formulate these considerations into a practical model. Agarwal and Malloy did include existential concerns as a step incorporated in an existing decision-making model, where existentialism is placed as one of a number of ethical factors to be considered. However, adding existential considerations to a model that, in its earlier steps, draws on other philosophical approaches does not do justice to the philosophy of existentialism which rejects outright the universalism of traditional ethical philosophies. Any model that does not advocate freedom and its associated responsibility as the overriding ethical concerns is also decidedly ‘unSartrean’. To a limited extent existential themes can also be identified in less specifically existentialist approaches, such as in Kohlberg’s ‘post-conventional’ stage of moral development (Kohlberg and Hersh, 1977) which refers to accepting personal responsibility for making ethical decisions, and in Werhane’s (2002) use of moral imagination in decision-making, which effectively includes a process of beginning

Existentialism and Ethical Decision-Making ‘something new’. Existentialism has also impacted on the business sphere through applications of existential psychology (De Klerk, 2001) and the identification of entrepreneurship as an existential phenomenon (Gilbert, 2002).

An existentialist decision-making model A decision-making model structured around the themes discussed above must reject the claim that a morally right decision can be objectively discovered or determined through the application of an ethical theory (such as consequentialism). The model’s focus is rather on the individual’s awareness of his/ her freedom, responsibility, prior choices, projects and goals, the pressures and expectations of others, and the practical constraints of the situation. The overriding ethical value is individual freedom. The very idea of a decision-making model could be seen to be an exercise in ‘bad faith’, particularly where the model is used by decision-makers to avoid taking responsibility. Sartre’s (1956) statement ‘‘When I deliberate … the chips are down’’, also emphasised the futility of ‘objective’ reasoning. Yet rather than presenting ‘objective’ criteria, this model takes the form of a reflective process with the aim of encouraging a clearer awareness of freedom and responsibility that can then lead to ‘authentic’ action. The model comprises the following six sequential steps. Some brief examples are provided to explain some of the concepts. 1. Acknowledge and identify my freedom to act. As noted above, even in the most unlikely circumstances we always face choices. The first step in making an ‘authentic’ decision therefore involves acknowledging that I have choice. Once this is accepted, I should identify the various choices, no matter how preposterous or impractical they may appear. Such impracticality could implicitly suggest that they conflict with a pre-existing goal or project; it does not mean that the choice does not exist. As an example, a manager may be required to select employees that are to be retrenched. The possibility exists that the manager may resign and thereby avoid having to make the selection, yet as the

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manager has previously maintained the goal of progressing within the company, this choice might not be considered. This step requires that all such choices are acknowledged and identified. 2. Accept my responsibility. Living ‘authentically’ requires that I accept that freedom is my defining characteristic, and that in order to truly exercise my freedom I must accept that I am responsible for my choices. In practical terms, this means that decision-making structures, committees, codes or policies cannot obviate my own personal responsibility to make a choice. Similarly, I cannot appeal to superiors or subordinates to make the decision for me, or avoid making the decision in the hope that the situation will somehow resolve itself. 3. Consider my prior choices, projects, and goals. Typically, my prior choices reflect my life’s goals and projects. My choices are not independent occurrences but relate to my goals at both a relative and fundamental level. Although the concept of freedom necessarily includes the ability to begin a new project, or to change my course of action, it is useful to identify and consider my goals and projects, as if I choose to maintain them, a particular course of action may be suggested. Consider the example of the manager who must select the employees to be retrenched. If he maintains his goal of progressing within the company, then at this point he may reject the option of resigning. On reconsidering his goals he may, however, decide that he has reached a point at which the goal of progressing within the company is no longer appropriate and conflicts with another goal (such as to live a low-stress life). In this case the choice of resigning may gain in significance. This demonstrates again the importance of identifying all possible choices in step 1. 4. Consider the pressures and expectations of others. This step involves considering in what ways the pressures and expectations of others may be influencing my decision. The intention here is to encourage an individual decision that is made in freedom and with full accep-

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Andrew West tance of responsibility. In practice, this would include questioning the assumptions that underlie many job titles and descriptions, as these typically encapsulate the actions that are expected by employers. Justifying my refusal to consider the requests of union representatives on the basis that I am a manager, and that is what managers do, would be characteristic of ‘bad faith’. Similarly, the requirements of the law, professional codes, institutional and global codes of ethics and trends in society (often expressed through the media) all represent ‘the look’. These do not always have to be rejected, but for my decision to be ‘authentic’ it should not amount to following the prescriptions of another. 5. Consider the practical constraints of the situation. Sartre referred to the practical constraints within which we operate as the facticity of the situation and includes the limiting factors placed on us by our physical characteristics, time, and place. No amount of free choice can change these practical constraints, so it is appropriate to consider these before coming to a decision that could simply prove impossible to implement. Problems identified at this stage would require retracing the above steps in order to identify other possible choices that can be carried out. This step was not included at the beginning of the process to limit the risk that possible actions would be excluded up front, not due to practical constraints but due to a bias that may be present before one’s goals and projects have been reconsidered. (The possibility of resigning may have then been excluded due to practical constraints when in fact it may reflect the pre-existing goal to progress within the company, which had not yet been questioned.) 6. Proceed with the choice that best reflects my awareness of freedom, my acceptance of personal responsibility and is most consistent with the goals and projects that I freely choose. This step presents the requirement to act in ‘good faith’. Although there is clearly a strong emphasis on the reflection of the subject, Sartre did not suggest that the subject is independent from the world. The subject’s reflections

therefore take place while embedded within the world, which through the subject’s own interpretations is effectively created by him/ her. It is clear from the above that the model’s emphasis is on creating awareness and encouraging reflection. The model is flexible in the sense that it does not prescribe specific courses of action in particular circumstances, but may equally be criticised for the same.

Application to a case study A brief case study provides a more detailed example of the model’s application, and enables some comparison to be made with more traditional models and ethical theories. It involves the case of affirmative action in post-apartheid South Africa, and the position of a young white male who faces changing prospects and considers alternative courses of action. Sam du Preez is a 28-year-old white male working as a financial accountant in a large insurance company in Johannesburg. He has an Honours degree in accounting and six years’ experience working in an accounting department. The job of chief accountant was advertised several months ago and Sam applied for the position. He went through the interview process but did not get the job. In the last week an announcement was made that the position has been filled by Sihle Dlamini, a 22-year-old black graduate. Although Sihle has the same academic background as Sam, he has no experience. Frustrated by the appointment, Sam approached the Human Resources manager who, confidentially, advised him that the appointment was an ‘affirmative action’ appointment, and that this is the way in which things must be done in the ‘New’ South Africa. The Human Resources manager expressed his sympathy but advised that Sam had better get used to it and should assist Sihle in settling in. As the affirmative action policy is supported by executive management and the Employment Equity Act, any appeals are unlikely to find any support. Sam is unsure how best to act. Firstly, he feels a duty of loyalty to the company, despite the appointment, and has always considered himself to be a conscientious employee. Secondly, he is aware of the general need for affirmative action policies in order to create a sustainable, more equitable economy; theoretically at least, he supports their implementation. Thirdly, he believes that he is entitled to

Existentialism and Ethical Decision-Making pursue a career and be awarded appropriately and fairly, on merit. The model described above can be applied to Sam’s situation as follows: 1. Acknowledge and identify my freedom to act. Although the situation may leave Sam feeling trapped and frustrated, he nevertheless has a range of choices that he must acknowledge and identify, including but not limited to the following: (1) He can continue in his current position, resent the appointment and respond negatively to the new manager. (2) He can continue in his current position, accept the new appointment and work constructively with the new manager. (3) He can resign immediately and begin looking for another job. (4) He can start looking for alternative employment with a view to leaving as soon as another job is available. (5) He can resign immediately and leave the country in the hope of finding employment overseas (where such affirmative action policies may not apply). (6) He can sabotage the new manager’s work, and hope to replace him by revealing his inexperience. 2. Accept my responsibility. Sam must accept that the responsibility for his own actions and choice of behaviour is solely his. No matter how unfair he may consider the situation, he cannot conclude that he is trapped by the affirmative action practice, or that he is without alternatives. The attainment of his personal goals is ultimately his responsibility, and while this may have been frustrated it has not been negated. He is faced with free choice and must face up to this. Consequently, he should not allow another person to make the decision for him, nor should he conclude that he is forced to follow a particular course of action. 3. Consider my prior choices, projects and goals. The possible courses of action identified in step 1 must be seen in the context of a project or goal. These projects may include (but again, are not limited to) the following: (1) Sam wishes to fulfil his career aspirations by progressing within the company. (2) Sam wants to do whatever it takes to advance his

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career as quickly as possible. (3) Sam wishes to be a constructive member of an accounting department. (4) Sam wishes to contribute to the development of a sustainable ‘New’ South Africa. Each of these (and any others that Sam can identify) must be considered in turn, and a choice must be made as to which of these projects take priority and which can be rejected (even if they had previously been followed). The choice of projects will in turn assist in selecting a choice of action. If Sam accepts project (1) (Sam wishes to fulfil his career aspirations by progressing within the company) over other projects, he will then reject any possible courses of action that would involve him resigning. If he also accepts project (3) (Sam wishes to be a constructive member of an accounting department) then he will reject courses of action in which he would respond negatively or sabotage the new manager. 4. Consider the pressures and expectations of others. Affirmative action in South Africa has generated much discussion and there are strong viewpoints on the topic from various sources. In this case this would include the company policy which supports affirmative action and by implication expects its employees to do the same, the Employment Equity Act which clearly endorses the policy, and the viewpoint expressed by the Human Resources manager that Sam should ‘get used to it’. Sam may also experience pressure from other sources such as his own family and friends, who may disapprove if he resigns without another job, if he works for a black man, or if he leaves the country. A trend in the media can also be identified which suggests that those adversely affected by affirmative action should use their skills in starting their own businesses. In making an ‘authentic’ decision, Sam must ensure that his choice of action is shaped by his own choices of his personal projects and goals, and is not unduly influenced by these external pressures and expectations. No matter how forceful these pressures may be, Sam must be aware that he can reject them.

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5. Consider the practical constraints of the situation. Once he has accepted projects and goals that see him continuing within the company and working constructively, there do not appear to be any practical constraints to carrying out this course of action which could require a return to earlier steps. For the purposes of illustration, if Sam had arrived at a course of action of resigning immediately without another job, he might consider this to be impossible if he could not afford to live without an income. He would then return to step 3, with the added goal of having sufficient income to survive. This goal would likely take precedence over other goals, and lead to a different decision. 6. Proceed with the choice that best reflects my awareness of freedom, my acceptance of personal responsibility and is most consistent with the goals and projects that I freely choose. In this case Sam has identified his primary goals as pursuing his career within the company and working constructively. His course of action will then consist of continuing in his current position, accepting the new appointment and working constructively with the new manager. For Sam this decision is ‘authentic’, as he has accepted his responsibility and freedom to make choices. In doing so he has considered his choice of personal goals and projects and is aware of his ability to reject the pressures and expectations of others. On these grounds the decision is considered ethically acceptable.

Reflection The application of the model to the case study above reveals a number of strengths and weaknesses, discussed in detail below:

Strengths (1) As the model draws on the central themes of Sartre’s existentialism, it affirms Sartre’s phenomenological ontology which itself has received both support and criticism. Its success lies partly in the

way in which it corresponds with how we perceive our own lives, and with the common cry to ‘be true to oneself’ (subject to the proviso that no objective, independent ‘self’ is admitted in Sartre’s philosophy). Although not explicitly stated, this view of human activity can be seen throughout the popular media and the argument can be made that this model corresponds more closely to human activity as we experience it, than models that are based on more abstract, objective moral principles. (2) The existential model encourages and allows for the personal circumstances surrounding the ethical dilemma to be considered. This is in contrast to traditional moral decision-making which attempts to reduce the dilemma to its barest form, so that it can be subjected to certain objective rules or tests to arrive at an ‘ethical’ decision. As an example, Olen and Barry (1996, p. 366) provide the following arguments for and against reverse discrimination (affirmative action) in the United States: Arguments against reverse discrimination • All discrimination on the basis of race and sex is inherently unfair; • Reverse discrimination leads to resentment and social tensions; • Reverse discrimination stigmatises minorities and women; and • Reverse discrimination wastes the best human resources. Arguments for reverse discrimination • Justice requires that we compensate for the results of past discrimination; • Preferential treatment is the only way to overcome current racism and sexism; and • Women and minorities need role models in all walks of life. Using these arguments to come to a decision concerning a specific case of affirmative action does not adequately acknowledge the subjective nature and personal circumstances of Sam’s situation. Each individual and each situation is different, and ethical dilemmas in these situations cannot be adequately resolved through a trade-off of various ethical arguments. The existential model succeeds in its

Existentialism and Ethical Decision-Making consideration of the individual’s personal goals and projects, in encouraging individual responsibility and in avoiding a simple following of the ‘ethical’ prescriptions of others. (3) The existential model used above is based on a single normative framework. Other models attempt to incorporate a range of philosophies, without addressing the shortcomings of each approach, or addressing how these approaches could be combined. A model may, for example, require the decisionmaker to consider whether the consequences of the action will be beneficial to the greatest number of people (a consequentialist ethic), followed by a question regarding whether the action treats others solely as a means to an end (a violation of Kant’s categorical imperative). Consequentialist ethics conflicts with Kant’s deontological ethics in certain circumstances, yet models do not usually address this. It is questionable, then, if the outcomes are truly ‘ethical’. In contrast, the existential model is subject to all of the criticisms, both positive and negative, of existentialism as a philosophy. Where existentialism can be questioned (such as in the belief that all humans are fundamentally free), so the model can be questioned. Yet where existentialism finds support and corresponds to human experience, so the model does the same.

Weaknesses (1) One of the principal criticisms of existentialism is that in its rejection of objective values, it must allow that everything is permissible (Anderson, 1979, p. 3). In the case study above, if Sam had preferred his goals of progressing in his career as quickly as possible while continuing within the company, he might have followed a course of action which involved sabotage of his new manager. According to one reading of the existentialist model, this decision would be ethical as long as it was made in ‘good faith’. This conflicts with most common morality, which usually regards such sabotage as unethical. Such ethical relativism can be taken further. If my personal projects are geared solely towards selfadvancement, am I then permitted to kill someone if this is consistent with these projects? If the decision was made in ‘good faith’, that is, in full acceptance of my freedom and responsibility, then the model must answer in the affirmative. Clearly, this is again in

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stark contrast with common morality. In the business arena, if an accountant discovers an opportunity to secretly misappropriate funds, and this is consistent with her personal goals, one existentialist model would again support the action as ethical (as long as the decision is made in ‘good faith’). Sartre posed the ethical dilemma of a student who must decide between looking after his ailing mother and joining the Free French resistance during the Second World War. There are traditional ethical principles that could be used to support either course of action, but Sartre’s (1946a, p. 297) advice to the student was ‘‘You are free, therefore choose – that is to say, invent’’. Despite the apparent relativism, Cooper (1999, p. 175) points out that ‘‘Sartre would not, I am sure, have told his student ‘You are free, therefore choose and invent’ if the ‘dilemma’ were between joining the Free French and peddling heroin to children in Marseilles’’. It appears, then, that there may be some sort of value by which competing courses of action can be judged. Sartre (1946a) asserted that the ultimate (not objective) value is freedom. This then becomes the criterion by which actions can be judged: does the action support every individual’s fundamental freedom? Although this corresponds with the basic theme of Sartre’s existentialism, it remains difficult to apply. Even if this may preclude killing (as that would clearly deny another’s freedom), it is less clear that misappropriating funds amounts to a denial of freedom, or that sabotaging a new manager’s work amounts to a denial of freedom. This problem is particularly evident when one considers that in Sartre’s early ontology, we are fundamentally free in all circumstances. (2) Sartre’s existentialist ethic as outlined above is highly individualistic. If we consider that ethics can be seen as the interplay of the good, the self, and the other (Rossouw and Van Vuuren, 2004), then it is unclear how the model incorporates considerations of the ‘other’ if they do not directly form a part of the individual’s own goals and projects. Sartre viewed relationships with others as being defined by conflict, and one of his fictional characters claimed that ‘‘Hell is other people’’ (Sartre, 1946b). Cooper (1999) acknowledges this criticism and provides a discussion of how the concept of ‘reciprocal freedom’ can be used to describe a social existential ethic. Sartre’s concept of the ‘pledged group’ as developed in

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Critique of Dialectical Reason also reflects his movement away from a purely individualistic view of humanity and ethics. This therefore could be seen as a valid criticism, but one which may at least be partly remedied. (3) Step four in the model requires that the decision-maker recognise his/her ability to reject the pressures and expectations of others. This implies that individuals are able to withdraw themselves from the pressures and expectations of others and to make a judgement about them. This is questionable at best, and post-modern theorists in particular insist upon deconstructing the subject and emphasising the socially constructed nature of all of our existence. Despite many commonalities between Sartre’s existentialism and aspects of postmodernism, particularly the rejection of objective, absolute values, his concept of the subject does stand in contrast to postmodern claims of difference. Counter-arguments could emphasise the coherence of Sartre’s existentialism in the face of a lack of absolute values, in contrast to the celebrated incoherence of postmodernism. The correspondence that Sartre’s depiction of the necessity of human choice has with our individual experience (however illusory or mistaken) is also a useful observation. (4) Ethical dilemmas in business do not only comprise dilemmas of the sort faced by Sam in the case study above. Frequently, ethical issues relate to corporate activity and it is not clear that all corporate activity can be reduced to certain individuals’ decisions. Corporate culture, as well, can continue relatively unchanged despite changes in management. French (1993) illustrates how the decisionmaking structures in corporations effectively grant moral agency to the corporation itself, independent of its employees. If this is the case, is it possible to evaluate the ‘authenticity’ of corporate decisions? Does a corporation have projects or goals that are distinct from those of the individuals involved? Should corporations (rather than individuals) accept their existential responsibility? Although it may be tempting to answer in the affirmative to all of these questions, this model is based upon Sartre’s phenomenological ontology, which focuses on the uniqueness of human consciousness. Considerations of ‘authenticity’ or ‘good faith’ are accordingly based upon Sartre’s understanding of consciousness and absurdity, and cannot simply be extended to

corporations that lack consciousness and do not experience absurdity.

Conclusion Sartre’s existentialism provides a unique view of human activity and human consciousness, and leads to a radically different conception of ‘how one is to live’ when compared to most ethical theories. Rooted in an understanding of subjective human experience it rejects any objective and absolutist claims, preferring instead an awareness of individual freedom and responsibility. Formulated in a decision-making model, the steps are different to most ethical decision-making models, and can provide extremely different results. The model presented here has emphasised awareness of one’s individual freedom, acceptance of one’s individual responsibility, consideration of one’s freely chosen projects and goals, and the ability to reject the prescriptions of others. The overriding principle is freedom. The application to a case study reveals both strengths and weaknesses. Despite its weaknesses there are good reasons to suggest this model as an alternative decision-making tool. This is particularly true when one considers the increasing proliferation of external codes of ethics, and concerns about how to ‘enforce’ ethical behaviour after a series of significant ethical lapses in the business world. An approach to decision-making drawn from Sartre’s existentialism is then useful in the way that it reframes ethical dilemmas in terms of individual freedom and responsibility, and in its acceptance and analysis of subjective experiences and personal situations. References Agarwal, J. and D. C. Malloy: 2000, ‘The Role of Existentialism in Ethical Business Decision-Making’, Business Ethics: A European Review 9, 143–154. Anderson, T. C.: 1979, The Foundation and Structure of Sartrean Ethics (The Regents Press of Kansas, Kansas). Anderson, T. C.: 1994, ‘Sartre’s First Two Ethics’, in S. Watson and A. Dallery (eds.), Transitions in Continental Philosophy (SUNY Press, Albany), pp. 227–237. Ashman, I. and D. Winstanley: 2006, ‘Business Ethics and Existentialism’, Business Ethics: A European Review 16, 218–233.

Existentialism and Ethical Decision-Making Baldwin, T. R.: 1995, ‘Existentialism’, in T. Honderich (ed.), The Oxford Companion to Philosophy (Oxford University Press, Oxford), pp. 257–261. Barnes, H.: 1973, Sartre (Quartet Books, London). Constance, B.: 2003, ‘The Ethical Leader’s Decision Tree’, Harvard Business Review 81, 18–20. Cooper, D. E.: 1999, Existentialism 2nd Edition (Blackwell, Oxford). De Klerk, J.J.: 2001, Motivation to Work, Work Commitment and Man’s Will to Meaning. Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, University of Pretoria, Pretoria. Ethics Resource Center: 2006, The PLUS Decision Making Model, http://www.ethics.org/resources/decisionmaking-process.asp (5 Mar. 2007). French, P.: 1993, ‘The Corporation as a Moral Person’, in T. I. White (ed.), Business Ethics: A Philosophical Reader (MacMillan, New York). Gilbert, D. R.: 2002, ‘Ethics, Management and the Existentialist Entrepreneur’, in R. E. Freeman and S. Venkataraman (eds.), Ethics and Entrepreneurship, Ruffin Series in Business Ethics, vol. 3 (Society for Business Ethics, Charlottesville). Hodgson, K.: 1992, ‘Adapting Ethical Decisions to a Global Marketplace’, Management Review 81, 53–58. Jackson, K. T.: 2005, ‘Towards Authenticity: A Sartrean Perspective on Business Ethics’, Journal of Business Ethics 58, 307–325. Josephson, M.: 2002, Making Ethical Decisions (Josephson Institute, Los Angeles). Josephson, M.: 2003, Why Ethics Matters, http:// www.csudh.edu/admfin/Michael-Josephson-Powerpoint-4-22-03.ppt. (1 Jun. 2006). Kaufmann, W.: 1956, Existentialism: From Dostoevsky to Sartre (The World Publishing Co., Cleveland). Kohlberg, L. and R. H. Hersh: 1977, ‘Moral Development: A Review of the Theory’, Theory into Practice 16, 53–59.

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Loe, T. W., L. Ferrel and P. Mansfield: 2000, ‘A Review of Empirical Studies Assessing Ethical Decision Making in Business’, Journal of Business Ethics 25, 185–204. Nash, L. L.: 1991, ‘Ethics Without the Sermon’, Harvard Business Review 58, 78–90. Olen, J. and V. Barry: 1996, Applying Ethics: A Text with Readings 5th Edition, (Wadsworth, California). Rossouw, D. and L. Van Vuuren: 2004, Business Ethics 3rd Edition, (Oxford University Press Southern Africa, Cape Town). Sartre, J.-P.: 1946a, ‘Existentialism is a Humanism’, in W. Kaufmann (ed.), Existentialism: From Dostoevsky to Sartre, translated by P. Mairet (The World Publishing Co., Cleveland). Sartre, J.-P.: 1946b, No Exit, A Play in One Act, and, The Flies, A Play in Three Acts, translated by S. Gilbert (Knopf, New York). Sartre, J.-P.: 1956, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology, translated by H. E. Barnes (Philosophical Library Inc., New York). Wallace, D. and J. Pekel: 2006, The Ten Step Method of Decision Making, http://www.managementhelp.org/ ethics/long.htm. (1 Jun. 2006). Warnock, M.: 1967, Existentialist Ethics (MacMillan, London). Werhane, P.: 2002, ‘Moral Imagination and Systems Thinking’, Journal of Business Ethics 38, 33–42.

School of Business and Economics, Monash University South Africa, 144 Peter road, Ruimsig, Johannesburg, 1725, South Africa E-mail: [email protected] University of Pretoria, Pretoria, South Africa