'Schooling' and the 'Naturalization' of Racial Injustice Lisa M. Jakubowski,

York University Despite various government initiatives that have emerged in response to Canada's increasing racial diversification, the unjust treatment of racial minorities remains a problem. By examining the contradictions between ideology and practice within an educational context, this paper provides an explanation of why government efforts directed towards the eradication of racial injustice have been relatively ineffective. The continued mistreatment of racial minorities is, in part, attributable to the promotion of a particular form of justice that "naturalizes' racism. First, a reformulation of the relationship among the concepts of justice, ideology, and complementarity generates an analytical framework within which to address the problem of'naturalization.' The latter part of the paper examines the 'naturalization' of inequality generally, and racial inequality specifically, within education. A critical review of the teaching of Canadian history and Philippe Rushton's controversial theory demonstrates how education currently - but not inevitably - reinforces negative racial stereotypes, inviting the unjust treatment of racial minorities to remain unquestioned. INTRODUCTION

The Canadian federal government has made a number of progressive promulgations in response to Canada's increasing racial diversification. For example, in 1988 the Multiculturalism Act was passed. This legislation was ostensibly designed to 'reaffirm' the basic right of each and every Canadian - 'that is, the right to be different ('culture') as well as the right to remain the same ('equality')' (Elliot and Fleras 1990: 66). Despite 'Multiculturalism' and other ameliorative proclamations, the treatment of racial minorities continues to be problematic. In fact, in years following the passage of the Act, annual reports by the Canadian Human Rights Commission have indicated growing racial intolerance 'on many fronts' in Canada (Vienneau 1990: A1). This paper critically explores the failure of seemingly progressive policies and initiatives to eradicate racial injustice. Focusing substantively on the educational institution as a site through which attitudes towards justice are transmitted, the contradictions between ideology and practice are examined. In this context, the mistreatment of racial minorities is attributed to the educational institution's promotion of a form of justice in which racism becomes 'naturalized' unquestioned, taken for granted, or perceived to be just common-sense. The paper is divided into two parts. To better appreciate this 'naturalization' process, the first section provides an analytical framework within which the relationship among the concepts of justice, ideology, and complementarity is reformulated. Ideally conceptualized as 'formal equality,' justice is contrasted with 'substantive inequality.' Additionally, the concepts of ideology and complementarity are used to illustrate how formal justice principles can be manipulated to promote the 'naturalness' of social inequality. The latter part of the paper specifically considers how

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racial inequality is 'naturalized' within educational institutions. Both the teaching of Canadian history, and Philippe Rushton's controversial, sociobiological theory are critically reviewed. These examples demonstrate h o w education can reinforce negative racial stereotypes, subsequently encouraging the unjust treatment of racial minorities to remain unquestioned or taken for granted. JUSTICE

For centuries, philosophers and theorists have studied the nature of 'justice.' Realizing the complexity of this concept necessitates a consideration of its ideal form and the way in which this form is substantively applied. For instance, John Rawls (1971) characterizes formal justice as 'fairness.' The particular principles he sets forth - equality and liberty emerge from a hypothetical, utopian situation in which all persons, defined as free, equal and rational, engage in a decision-making process in order to determine what principles ought to govern life in any society (ibid.: 17-22). Using these two fundamental tenets as a guide, a just society, in the ideal sense, comes to be defined as one in which all persons: (a) share certain fundamental rights and freedoms including the right to free speech and equal treatment before the law; and, (b) are afforded an equal opportunity to change, if it is 'unfair,' the system of norms and laws by which the social order is governed. Problems arise, however, when one attempts to apply formal principles of justice in a capitalist society. Canada's economic order is characterized by inequality, coercive, alienating relationships, and exploitation. The persistence and advancement of capitalism is partially dependent upon the continual reproduction of unequal social relations. It is interesting that even though one of the cornerstones of capitalism is inequality, prevailing common-sense maintains that we live in a 'just' country, where all Canadians share certain basic rights like liberty and equality. Canadians are likely to believe in the 'justness' of Canada because clear statements to this effect have been codified in law. For example, section 15 (1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (CCRF) explicitly states that: Every individual is equal before and under the law, and has the right to equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability. (CCRF, in Kallen 1989: 232) A more complete understanding of the discrepancy between the ideal principles of justice and their subsequent application in Canadian capitalist society is facilitated by Marx's distinction between 'formal equality" and 'substantive inequality.' Marx (in Elster, 1986:165) contends that an inherent tendency in law is that 'formal equality' will be accompanied by 'substantive inequality.' Specifically:

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Equal right is...in its content [a right] of inequality, just like any other right. A right can by its nature only consist in the application of an equal standard, but unequal individuals (and they would not be different individuals if they were not unequal) can onlybe measured by the same standard if they are looked at from the same aspect, if they are grasped from one particular side, e.g., if in the present they are regarded only as workers and nothing else is seen in them, everything else is ignored. Further: one worker is married, another is not; one has more children than another, etc. Thus, with the same work performance and hence the same share of the social consumption fund, one will be receiving more than another, one will be richer than another etc. If all these rights were to be avoided rights would have to be unequal rather than equal. (ibid.: 165-66) From within this passage emerges the idea that h u m a n beings become free and equal before the law only when they are abstracted from those qualities that differentiate individuals from each other - e.g., phenotypical variation, wealth, social position, education and so on (Fine 1986: 45-6, 51). However, h u m a n beings do not constitute a generic, homogeneous group. Accordingly, the/dea of freedom and equality before the law does not signify freedom and equality in actuality (ibid.: 43). What is particularly thought-provoking in Marx's discussion of 'formal equality' and 'substantive inequality' is the w a y in which 'difference' comes to be equated with 'inequality.' When the term 'unequal' is used generically to describe inherent dissimilarities, or the lack of 'sameness' a m o n g h u m a n beings, the association is neither significant nor problematic. However, questions do arise when these differences become 'natural' justifications for the privileging of some over others. Within Canada, what 'different' characteristics lead to privilege? H o w do individuals occupying positions of superiority and dominance within the social hierarchy justify their locations? And finally, h o w is the image of a 'just" Canada transmitted to, and reinforced within the minds of those who are less privileged members of the population? The reproduction and legitimation of the'distorted sense of justice that is associated with Canadian social life is very much dependent on ideology. IDEOLOGY Initially defined as 'doctrine[s] of ideas' (McLellan 1986: 6), ideologies facilitate the maintenance of social order or the promotion of social change (Allahar 1986: 616). Central to the present analysis is some consideration of the way(s) in which ideology assists in reproducing and legitimizing a conception of the Canadian social order as 'just.' Such a discussion benefits from a review of the nature of ideology and the classical contributions of Marx, Engels, and Weber.

The Contributions of Marx and Engels The w o r k of Marx and Engels highlights how 'systems of ideas' can be both illusory or distorting and socially regulating. 1 One first gains a sense of what, for Marx and Engels constitutes ideology, when there is an explicit

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recognition that labour has both a material and a mental component (Marx and Engels 1986). One's mental labour, or the production of ideas, is structured by one's material conditions. Specifically: morality, religion, metaphysics and all the rest of ideology and their corresponding forms of consciousness.., no longer retain the semblance of independence... [they are simply] sublimates of [man's] (sic) material lifeprocess. (ibid.: 47) Ideological manifestations of mental labour become illusory when individuals p u r p o r t that ideas, rather than being related to material conditions, exist independently of them. When ideology is relegated to a sphere beyond the world of h u m a n praxis, it takes on a distortive d i m e n s i o n - that is, ' m e n (sic) and their circumstances appear upside down, as in a camera obscura' (ibid.). By highlighting its illusory and regulatory quality in relation to class, Marx and Engels allude to the usefulness of ideology for creating illusions about the nature of capitalism: The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e., the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental prod uction, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships, the dominant material relationships expressed as ideas; hence of the relationships which make the one class the ruling one, therefore, the ideas of its dominance. (1986: 64, my emphases) Because 'the ruling class' enjoys a 'monopoly' over the means of both material and mental production, it will 'regulate' the production and distribution of ideas in a w a y that is consistent with protecting its interests in the field of material production. These ideologies then, set limits to the consciousness of the ruled classes ... to maintain social order and stability.., those with a direct stake in maintaining the status quo convince the less privileged that the system works to the mutual benefit of everyone in it. (Allahar 1986: 617) In this context, ideologies serve to 'justify and legitimize the rule of the few over the m a n y ' (Allahar I989: 14). The work of Marx and Engels sensitizes the reader to the ways in which ideology can be used to create the illusion of a capitalist society as 'just.' By maintaining such an image, the legitimacy of those in positions of p o w e r can be preserved. Ideologies however, are not exclusively related to domination and class interests. From a psychological standpoint (Birnbaum 1953: 131), ideologies help individuals 'to impose some sense of order and direction upon the social world' (Miles and Phizacklea 1984: 7). Interestingly, this more subjective, psychological feature was also explicit in the writings of Weber.

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The Contributions of Weber

Weber (1968) contends that an understanding of ideology could not be complete without a consideration of the fundamental, non-economic factors that affect h u m a n action. Preoccupied with showing h o w 'ideas become effective forces in history' (ibid.: 1958: 90), Weber provides evidence to suggest that human behaviour is influenced as much by one's state of mind, as it is by material interests. This evidence emerges from an examination of h o w religious beliefs, the Protestant Ethic in particular, affected the development and emergence of m o d e m capitalist society (ibid.). A central theme in Weber's argument is that the behaviour generated by Protestant beliefs was related to the individual's need to maintain some sense of mental stability in the face of salvation anxiety. Any subsequent impact that this behaviour m a y have had on economic d e v e l o p m e n t was unanticipated. Consider, for example, the Calvinist doctrine of predestination. There was a tremendous strain assodated with not knowing whether one was 'chosen' for salvation. Thus, people had to consider themselves 'elected' and combat all sense of doubt through strict self denial and hard work (Zeitlin 1987: 117). This behaviour, which was a response to the beliefs and teachings of Calvinism, coincidentally generated much of the cultural foundation of early capitalism: 'individualism, achievement motivation, opposition to magic and superstition, and a c o m m i t m e n t to organization and calculation in personal and public life' (Abercrombie et al. 1988: 198). It is in relation to ideology that W e b e f s work is particularly significant. His study highlights the importance of beliefs rather than ideas. Accordingly, ideology can be conceptualized 'primarily as a system of beliefs and only secondarily of ideas' (Rejai 1971: 3). Belief systems m a y be defined as: interrelated sets of notions and attitudes about man (sic) and society, that are accepted, at least in part, as a matter of habitual reinforcement and routinization. Beliefs, in short, say nothing about the truthfulness or falsity of a notion or an attitude; they imply only a psychological state of acceptance. (ibid.) Ideas and beliefs differ in the sense that 'ideas are subject to sdentific opera tio n (such as testing and verification), whereas beliefs are not' (ibid.). The introduction of a belief/idea dichotomy enhances the usefulness of Weber's (1958) analysis of the effects of religion on h u m a n behaviour. While he particularly discusses religious beliefs, the concept of belief can be utilized to address different questions. For example, it can be applied to a consideration of inquiries regarding issues of legitimacy and authority. Spedfically, one can examine the way(s) in which various institutions p r o m o t e widespread and largely unquestioned acceptance of the 'justness' of the unequal social order by practidng processes of 'habitual reinforcement' and 'routinization.' These reinforcement processes how-

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ever, are complicated by the personalized and subjective nature of belief systems. In helping individuals to make sense of, and develop stability within their social worlds, ideologies represent individualized forms of adaptation. The w a y one 'adapts' in society m a y not be consistent with the d o m i n a n t interest to 'naturalize' a particular conception of the social order. As Miles and Phizacklea note: people can test ideas and interpretations they receive ... against their own experience of the world. Ideology [therefore,] is not only "handed down". It is constantly being created and renewed by people in response to the world as they experience it. (1984: 9) The w a y one responds, in this case to the ideological notion of society as 'good' or 'just,' is ideology's 'programmatic' dimension. The response, whether supportive or critical, represents 'a call for action that translates specific values, norms and ideas into practice. Such actions are aimed at either maintaining the status quo or transforming it' (Allahar 1989: 17). In this sense, ideology is central to hegemony. IDEOLOGY AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO HEGEMONY

H e g e m o n y is the term used b y Gramsci (1971) to describe the process by which one group achieves domination over others using both physically coercive and ideological means. An appreciation of the hegemonic process requires a consideration of the fundamental notions of struggle and 'popular consent' (Hall 1988: 53). Before a group can become 'dominant,' it must achieve positions of leadership simultaneously in a number of different sites of social life (ibid.). Success depends upon the willingness of various ' a d v a n t a g e d ' factions to construct alliances between different sectors and social forces. Also essential to this construction process is the ability of the allied force to 'win p o p u l a r consent' for its authority among the dominated classes (ibid.). Given the inherent intricacy of 'society,' however, the establishm e n t and maintenance of a position of superiority is not easily achieved. According to Mouffe (1988: 90), society is a 'complex ensemble of heterogeneous social relations possessing their own d y n a m i s m . ' Relations include, but are not reducible to, the social relations of production (ibid.). Whether based on 'race,' gender, or class, all social relations are constructed as 'relations of subordination' and are potential sites of antagonism, conflict, and struggle. Consequently, there are m a n y fronts upon which resistance to subordination and inequality m a y occur (ibid.: 91), making far more complex the process by which one group establishes domination over another. Fundamental to the struggle which constructs or transforms hegemony is ideology, or more specifically, its ' c o m m o n sense' component. C o m m o n - s e n s e is something which is ' d o s e to the people' (Gramsci 1971: 396). Itis historically specific and represents 'the traditional p o p u l a r

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conception of the world - what is unimaginatively called "instinct"' (ibid.: 199). Common-sense is 'a conception formed in the closest relation to practical, everyday life' (Hall et al., 1978: 154). Generally, it refers to the 'uncritical and largely unconscious w a y of perceiving and understanding the world that has become common in any given epoch' (Gramsci 1971: 323). As Nowell-Smith explains: The key to common sense is that the ideas it embodies are not so much incorrect as uncorrected and taken for granted... Common sense consists of all those ideas which can be tagged onto existing knowledge without challenging it. It offers no criteria for determining how things are in capitalist society but only a criterion of how things fit with the ways of looking at the world that the present phase of class society has inherited from the preceding one. (cited in Hall et al., 1978: 154) This excerpt generates two particularly salient ideas. First, common-sense is related to that which is 'taken for granted.' Second, it is m a d e up of those ideas which filter into the existing sphere of knowledge without posing a threat to it. Utilizing Rejai's (1971) belief/idea dichotomy, ' c o m m o n sense" becomes central for the transformation of ideas into beliefs. This process of change is also facilitated by complementarity. According to Baldus (1977), complementary conditions are those 'already existing conditions' (ibid.: 250) in society which further d o m i n a n t interests. Where complementarity is present, existing social conditions and the behaviours of individuals within those conditions coalesce in a w a y that complements the interests of the status quo (Baldus 1975; 1977). At this point it m u s t be emphasized that the association between ideology and complementarity is highlighted to illustrate one w a y that positions of superiority are reconstituted. This particular focus should in no w a y be construed as an attempt to undermine the subjectivity and agency of individuals belonging to the dominated classes, or their potential to resist/challenge the 'dominant' ideas. The illustration to follow simply alludes to one of m a n y ways individuals m a y interpret and respond to ideas. Having made the above acknowledgment how, in a Canadian context, are dominant interests reconstituted and legitimized most effectively? Ideologically, a position of superiority will be most secure if individuals unquestioningly accept social inequalities as 'normal' or 'natural' elements of social life. With this in mind, the complementarity concept allows for the examination of particular social institutions and the w a y in which 'already existing' conditions within those institutions simultaneously: (1) further the interests of the powerful; and, (2) promote the image of a 'just' Canada. In this sense, the notion of complementarity is useful: periphery units are often not aware of the complementarity of their own behaviour. Moreover, the use of complementary periphery behaviour does not require an interaction between dominant class and periphery... The use of complementary behaviour therefore allows the dominant class to obtain needed means from a periphery which appears to pursue goals of its own choice, and free of outside interference. (ibid.: 251)

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Through complementarity, individuals in the 'periphery' believe that they are independently pursuing their own interests, free of 'dominant' interference. Consequently, the legitimacy of those holding positions of authority is unlikely to be threatened. Thus, the presence of complementary conditions can effectively convert ideas into beliefs. The transformation from ideas to beliefs emerges from within 'already existing' social conditions and is consistent with the behaviour of individuals acting within those conditions. More generally, this process of the conversion of ideas into beliefs occurs most easily when an unquestioned acceptance of the 'naturalness' of the unequal social order emerges among the dominated groups. The construction or transformation of hegemony involves 'popular consent' in the realm of civil society. 'Winning over the masses' often involves winning ideological struggles on many fronts, including law, the family, the church, unions, and schools. Accordingly in conjunction with complementarity, the final section of this analysis examines 'commonsense' ideology in a particular site of civil society - education. It is m y contention that, as transmitters of attitudes towards justice, educational institutions advance a distorted perception of justice wherein social inequality is 'naturalized.' In doing so, they encourage the unjust treatment of society`s less advantaged to remain unquestioned. 'SCHOOLING' AND 'NATURALIZED' JUSTICE

'Schooling' provides individuals with a common-sense view of how society is 'naturally" ordered. In essence, this process successfully creates the illusion of the Canadian capitalist system as 'just.' By carefully and systematically insulating persons from the realities of inequality and injustice in Canada, 'schooling' advances an understanding of justice wherein social inequality generally, and racial inequality more specifically are taken for granted. Within education, the 'naturalization' of inequality is facilitated by the existence of complementary conditions, namely, the 'already-existing' learning process and corresponding curriculum. For the less privileged members of the population, educational institutions represent places within which 'life-chances' can be improved. However, for those in power, schools are sites in which the establishment is reconstituted (Freire, in Shot 1986: xi). Essentially, the 'peripheral' social members genuinely believe that they are advancing towards their goal; however, the learning process facilitates the reproduction of relations of domination and subordination. As sites within which these social relations are reproduced, educational institutions reduce the probability of dominated groups successfully challenging Canadian capitalism. To better understand this process, it is necessary to provide a more detailed review of 'schooling.' According to Reimer (1972), 'schooling' is a form of indoctrination. It is a sophisticated way by which dominant value systems are transmitted inter-generationally (Giroux 1981: 1). Among other things, individuals

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learn about the value of competition, 'the value of being taught - rather than learning for oneself - what is good and what is true,' and the need to conform 'in order to get along in the system' (Reimer 1972: 21-23). 'Schooling' teaches individuals what behaviours are 'right' and 'good.' They learn that, in order to become moral beings in the 'good society,' individuals must conform to rules. Beginning with their elementary school experiences, children are disciplined to follow rules. They are taught to follow daily routines without question. Children come to realize the importance of being punctual. They learn to speak properly, how to ask questions (i.e., by raising one's hand and not speaking until one is called upon to speak), and most importantly, students learn that the teacher is the authority and that the authority must be obeyed (Henslin et al., 1976: 308-309). Children quickly learn the value of conformity. That is, compliance with rules is rewarded, resistance to rules is punished. Within such an environment, the learning process is described by Freire (1970), as 'banking.' He contends that 'schooling' is analogous to 'an act of depositing in which students are the depositories and the teacher is the depositor. Instead of communicating, the teacher issues communiqu6s and makes deposits which the students receive and memorize' (ibid.: 58). 'Schooling,' understood as "banking,' has devastating social implications. Consider, as an example, the teaching of Canadian history. Merely by the inclusion and exclusion of certain content, racist views are surreptitiously disseminated and the 'naturalness' of racism within Canadian society is implicitly reinforced. Canadian historical accounts are primarily written from a 'eurocentric' perspective. That is, emphasis is placed on understanding the contributions made by Europeans towards the 'civilization' of Canada. However, there are other groups such as Asian, African, and Native Peoples, who have occupied roles of some significance in the history of Canada. Yet, the existing eurocentric biases have resulted in the marginalization of these peoples in historical writings. Developing an understanding of how, within Canadian historical writings, these groups acquire the status of marginal, peripheral peoples is a step towards understanding racism in a more institutionalized context. Racism begins with the denial of the value of a particular group's culture. The person whose culture is negated is not seen as an individual but as the representative of a certain manner of living that is said to threaten the cultural existence of the antagonist. When this negation of culture is applied to a racially distinct group then members of that group are no longer considered to be in full possession of those characteristics that would render them human. (Case 1977: 6, my emphasis) When the negation of a race is accompanied by conquest, colonization, and prolonged enslavement, 'the conquerors, colonizers, and enslavers elaborate theories of racial and cultural superiority in order to justify the

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denigration of their own moral values' (ibid.). For example, consider h o w French explorers Jacques Cartier and Samuel de Champlain described their first encounters with Canada's 'red-skinned' Aboriginal peoples. Skin colour differences, in combination with eurocentrism - i.e., a particular European conception of what is morally culturally and socially appropriate - lead to the subordination, colonization, and enslavement of Native people by the French. This subjugation process began with the distinction between 'civilized' and 'savage.' For the French, a 'savage' was one: who lives away from society, beyond the pale of its laws, without fixed abode.., to be savage meant to be living according to nature in a manner [as Maffei describes], 'closer to that of wild animals than to that of men' (sic). (Dickason 1984: 63-64) The French depiction of Aboriginal peoples as 'savage' was largely a product of the French negatively interpreting differences that they observed in skin colour, physical appearance, sexual practices, means of subsistence, and religion. The eurocentric image of 'savage' initially a p p e a r e d in 1534, when French explorer Jacques Cartier encountered 'Canadian' Natives for the first time. Cartier originally commented on the costumes and clothing of the first inhabitants he saw: There are people on this coast whose bodies are fairly well-formed but they are a wild and savage folk. They wear their hair tied upon the top of their heads like a handful of twisted hay, with a nail or something of the sort passed through the middle and into it they weave a few birds feathers. They clothe themselves with furs of animals, both men as well as women. (Cartier, in Biggar 1924: 22-23) Considering another tribe of Natives he encounters on this first voyage, Cartier notes: This people may well be called savage; for they are the sorriest folk there can be in this world ..... They go quite naked except for a small skin with which they cover their privy parts and for a few old furs which they throw over their shoulders .... They have their heads shaved all around in circles, except for a tuft on the top of the head, which they leave long like a horse's tail. This they do up upon their heads and tie in a knot with leather thongs. (ibid.: 60-61) There are a n u m b e r of images invoked b y these two descriptions. Most significantly, the use of phrases like 'wild and savage folk,' embellished by depictions of hair like 'hay' or a 'horse's tail,' and bodies adorned with skins, feathers, and furs, generate an initial impression of Aboriginal peoples as animalistic or sub-human. This characterization takes on yet another dimension in the latter description, where there is an implicit suggestion (e.g., 'they go quite naked except for a small skin') of a level o f sexual promiscuity that is inappropriate by European/French standards.

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Perspectives on subsistence also varied between the French and Aboriginal peoples. Unlike the French, Native peoples did not believe in surplus. They produced only enough for their needs and for the purpose of 'mutual sharing.' During his second voyage (1535-36), Cartier observed that: 'this whole tribe [the Huron], gives itself to manual labour and to fishing merely to obtain the necessities of life for they place no value upon the goods of this world'(ibid.: 160-61). This method of survival which, from a humanistic perspective, is far more advanced than methods that rely on surplus production and individual accumulation of wealth, was derogated b y the French. Beyond the a m o u n t they produced, the Europeans were able to link the diet of Native peoples to the devil/Satan: certain elements in their diet very quickly raised the suspicion that Amerindians were in association with devils, a natural consequence of the belief that one acquired the characteristics of the food one ate ... this seemed to be indicated by the fact that they ate serpents, even poisonous varieties, as well as lizards, toads, grubs, insects, and other 'filth!' (Dickason 1984:11) During his voyage to N e w France in 1603, Samuel de Champlain further contributed to the negative imagery associated with food production and consumption by suggesting that Natives turn to cannibalism when food shortages arise: 'Sometimes they are so short of food, on account of the cold and the s n o w that they are sorely tempted to eat one another' (Champlain, in Macklem 1971: 72). On the basis of their religious beliefs, the Canadian Aboriginal peoples were classified as 'heathens.' This belief in a different God is affiliated with wickedness, sin, the devil, and all that is evil. When commenting on some of the customs, beliefs, and habits of the Huron people, Cartier alludes to this negativity: This tribe has no belief in God that amounts to anything; for they believe in a god they call Cudouagny ... After they had explained things to us, we showed them their error and informed them that their Cudouagny was a wicked spirit who deceived them and that there is but one God, who is in Heaven, who gives us everything we need and is the Creator of all things and that in him alone we should believe. Also, that one must receive baptism or perish in hell. (in Biggar 1924: 179-180) While discussing religious beliefs with a Chief, Champlain expressed similar, if not harsher sentiments: I then asked him how they prayed to their gods and he said they didn't have any ceremonies, that each man (sic) prayed in his own way. This is why they have no principles and know nothing of God and behave like animals ... They are a brutish people .... (in Macklem, 1971: 72-76) Through their eurocentric reporting, the French negated the existence of a 'red-skinned' people. The negation of the Aboriginal populations provided justification for their imminent subjugation. They were portrayed

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as inferior, unfortunate, almost sub-human beings in need of guidance by the benevolent and superior White, European explorers. By classifying the Aboriginals as animalistic, heathen savages that needed to be 'tamed' or 'civilized,' the Europeans were able to create the ideology that justified, legitimized and facilitated the colonization of overseas empires. With this obviously eurocentric reporting comes an equally obvious omission of accounts of these encounters as experienced by those elements of our population that have historically been oppressed. Historically in Canada, there has occurred conquest, colonization, and prolonged enslavement. In particular, Natives, Blacks, Chinese, and Japanese Canadians have been subjected to extremely harsh and unjust treatment by the so-called "benevolent' founding fathers of our nation. Their gut-wrenching experiences and the struggles by which they attempted to overcome their oppression make up a crucial component of our country's history. However, when one studies Canadian history, one finds no mention of these experiences. Case observes that: In Canada one just does not mention the barbarity, rape, and exploitation of the Native Peoples by the so-called founding nations. In Canada one just does not mention that slavery of native peoples and of Blacks existed here and that there were welbestablished systems of segregated schools in various provinces as well as de facto segregation in many places of entertainment. One does not mention that after the Chinese built the trans Canada railroad, many were expelled because they were Chinese. In Canada, until the Japanese Canadians decided to speak up years after the event, one just does not mention the internment of people and their projected expulsion. (1977: 59, my emphases) An inability to study marginalization, exclusion or oppression from the perspective of the affected populations, creates, within the student, a tainted, distorted conception of Canadian history, replete with eurocentric bias. This type of exclusion blinds people to the systemic racism which has been an integral element of Canadian history. This distorted conception of reality is internalized by the student through a unilateral process in which the teacher provides the 'correct' information and the student unquestioningly receives it and memorizes it. If the norms and attitudes generated by the course content are also internalized by the students, the course will have succeeded in subtly reinforcing the 'naturalness' of racism in Canada. This kind of education then, does nothing more than 'misinform' individuals with information that can be described as little more than 'lies and half-truths' (ibid.: 42-43). If individuals are to learn about 'true' Canadian history, 'the history of racism' is a necessary course requirement. The introduction of the realities of 'conquest' and 'colonization' into a Canadian History course, however, is unlikely to occur. The availability of such material could threaten the legitimacy of the powerful, for it would allow marginalized, subordinate groups to develop some degree of collective consciousness, or common identity. They could 'draw dangerously close parallels' between the historical 'facts' and their own situations

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(ibid.: 59), subsequently leading to the development of a true, rather than a distorted conception of the reality of capitalist Canada. A banking method of instruction in combination with selective course content 'naturalizes' the unequal, unjust social order. However, in the maintenance of this unequal order, educational institutions serve to reproduce relations of subordination between society's dominant and dominated groups. Justification of the inequalities inherent in capitalist societies means that the dominated members of society genuinely believe that 'people (often characterized in terms of classes, races, or gender) are differentially equipped by nature or social origin to occupy the varied economic and social levels in the class structure' (Bowles and Gintis 1976: 29, my emphasis). This belief is established and reinforced through successful promotion of the 'equality of educational opportunity" ideology, in conjunction with the practices of intelligence testing, tracking (see Lazerson et al. 1985; Henslin et al. 1976; Bowles and Gintis 1976), and 'cooling-out' (see Goffman 1952). The above practices represent the 'hidden curriculum' of educational institutions. This hidden curriculum 'provides the structure needed to develop the psychological dispositions appropriate for work and citizenship' (Feinberg and Soltis 1985: 20) in an industrialized, capitalist country like Canada. Given the nature of capitalism, IQ testing, tracking, and 'cooling-out' serve to psychologically reinforce, within the minds of the less advantaged, the 'naturalness' and inevitability of their positions of subordination. Along with the inherent class bias of educational practices that 'naturalize' inequality, comes a subtle, yet systematic form of discrimination against people of colour and ethnic minorities. As an example, consider IQ testing. Even though evidence indicates (see Henslin et al. 1976) that IQ tests discriminate against ethnic minorities and people of colour, they continue to be relied upon as 'objective' measures of intelligence and reliable predictors of economic success. Supporters of the IQ test like Arthur Jensen (1969) and Richard Herrnstein (1973) 'explain away' the consistently low IQ scores of ethnic minorities and people of colour by arguing that intelligence is hereditary, and those who score poorly on the tests are 'genetically inferior' (Gartner et al. 1974: 1). While many studies have been conducted to discredit the claim that differences in levels of intelligence are the result of genetic dissimilarities (e.g., Rose et al. 1990; Gould 1981; Kamin 1973; Haggard 1954), the debate over whether differences in intelligence are the result of genetic or environmental differences rages on. The ongoing debate has resulted in the resurgence of a form of scientific racism with very serious social repercussions. One only needs to look at the recent, controversial research of University of Western Ontario psychologist, Philippe Rushton, as an illustration. Rushton (1989), asserts that a 'natural' racial hierarchy exists in society. This hierarchy, which places 'Mongoloid' at the top, 'Caucasoid' in the middle, and 'Negroid' at the bottom, is determined by genetic

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differences among the races. Rushton (1989) claims to have used over 50 different measures to examine the differences among these three racial groups, including the IQ test. He classifies the measures into several different categories: brain size, and intelligence; speed of maturation; sexuality, and sexual restraint; personality, and temperament; and social organization. Rushton's work, aptly characterized by David Wiesenthal as 'a rehash of pretty old race science, wrapped u p in a package of biological theory" (Weizmann et al., 1989a: 4), has been particularly devastating to members of the Black community. It has successfully reinforced and lent credibility to already existing negative racial stereotypes. Consider the following examples. According to Rushton (1989), blacks have the lowest level of intelligence, and correspondingly, have achieved least in the education and occupational realms. This finding would seem to explain Rushton's (1989) claim that of the three populations, blacks have the lowest socio-economic status. In terms of sexuality, Rushton (1989) asserts that, among other things, the frequency of premarital, marital, and extramarital intercourse is highest among blacks. Of the three populations, blacks are characterized by Rushton (1989) as the most 'aggressive, dominant, excitable, impulsive, and sociable," and least 'cautious' (p. 7). Finally, consider Rushton's assessment of social organization. He claims that 'stable social organization depends on following rules. This can be indexed by marital functioning, mental durability, and law abidingness' (ibid.: 8). After examining the differences among the three populations, Rushton concludes that blacks are socially problematic. That is, of the three groups under consideration, blacks have the most unstable family life, are most mentally unbalanced, and commit the most crime (ibid.). At a time when manifestations of racism are on the increase in society, Rushton's work has generated much outrage and criticism from within the scientific and academic communities. ~ He has been accused of being both incompetent and racist. What has generally been overlooked in criticism and condemnation, however, is the fact that there is something far more problematic in this situation than the racist tendencies of one individual. There are m a n y persons and organizations, linked to the academic community, who lend credibility to the work Rushton does, including the University of Western Ontario. For example, Western has refused to investigate Rushton's alleged wrongdoing, arguing that he is protected by 'academic freedom.' While the principle of academic freedom was established in order to protect those individuals who express 'unpopular views,' it does have its limitations. Academic freedom, for instance, is irrelevant in cases of incompetence. According to Ziegler et al. (1991:78): A strong case for investigating Rushton's competence as a scholar could be based on the numerous public claims by his peers that his work is incompetent, that he has misunderstood or misrepresented the studies he uses to support his theory, that he is highly selective in his use of evidence, largely ignoring counter evidence, and that he violates the standards of scientific investigation. Academic freedom does not protect such incompetence.

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Even more serious is the issue of ethics. When one reviews ethical guidelines, strong emphasis is placed on protecting research subjects from psychological or physical harm. However, since Rushton's research is based primarily on secondary data analysis, his ethical violations are of a different type. Specifically, in his case, one needs to consider what sort of ethical limitations should be placed on a researcher who reports findings that 'have the potential for seriously harming others' (ibid.). It is not yet clear if Rushton's work has done irreparable damage. Nevertheless the University, as a social institution accountable to the public, has an obligation to respond to the social implications generated by his ethical irresponsibility. Thus far, it has not. The decision to allow Rushton to continue to teach his theories of racial superiority has potentially serious implications for the student body at Western. Specifically, there is good reason for black students to fear being treated differently by a professor who says that blacks are less intelligent than whites. If Rushton believes his own theory, there can be little doubt that he will, consciously or unconsciously, treat blacks, whites and 'orientals' differently. No student should be subject to the threat of such discrimination. (Editorial, the University of Western Ontario Gazette, March 9, 1990) While Rushton's work promotes racial intolerance, he is really not the primary offender in this instance. His racism is simply derivative of the wider social order (represented here by educational institutions). Because the University of Western Ontario, an accredited academic institution, continues to implicitly legitimize Rushton's work by providing him with a platform from which to disseminate his views, Rushton's racist ideas are reaching a wider audience. By indirectly endorsing Rushton's work in this way, the University of Western Ontario has both reinforced the 'naturalness' of racial inequality and 'set back' the little progress that has been made against racism within our society. By 'schooling' individuals, selectively choosing course content, and lending credibility to practices like IQ testing, educational institutions are guilty of perpetuating two interrelated injustices. While reproducing and legitimizing an unjust economic hierarchy, these institutions are also implicitly promoting the discriminatory treatment of racial minorities. As a consequence, racism becomes more deeply entrenched in the wider social order. CONCLUDING REMARKS

This paper began with a description of justice in its ideal form. 'Formal equality' was differentiated from 'substantive inequality' in order to highlight the discrepancy between ideal principles of justice and their subsequent application in Canadian capitalist society. Initially, this analysis revealed an equation between the ideas of 'difference' and 'inequality.' This original observation led to an exploration of the process through which real human 'differences' become 'natural' justifications for privi-

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lege, reinforcing a m o n g Canadians, a belief in the 'justness' of Canada's unequal social order. This 'naturalization' process is clarified b y a review of ideology and complementarity, especially in relation to the reconstitut-ion of hegemony. More concretely, the 'naturalization' of substantive aspects of inequality within education was examined. Deliberately moving a w a y from the traditional, legalistic focus of justice, the injustices perpetrated b y educational institutions in reproducing and legitimating racism were exposed. Emphasis was placed on h o w 'schooling' both reproduces unequal social relations, and influences the way(s) in which these relations come to be understood within the wider community. Thus, when negative racial stereotypes are reinforced within education, or the value of a particular culture is denied through the inclusion and exclusion of certain course content, there is an intensification in the process which 'naturalizes' racial injustice. The discussion of the problems inherent in Canadian history classes and the review of Philippe Rushton's work lend support to this contention. On the basis of the former analysis, one can better appreciate w h y the g o v e r n m e n t ' s ameliorative proclamations around racial issues have been relatively ineffective. As long as educational institutions continue to insulate individuals from the realities of injustice in Canada, inequality will continue to be 'naturalized' and the plague of racism will remain. I am indebted to Livy Visano and Anton Allaharfor their continual support and invaluable insights. I would also like to thank Brian MacLean and three anonymous reviewers for their meaningful suggestions on earlier versions of the manuscript.

ENDNOTES 1 The idea of ideology as socially regulating is not unique to Marx. This notion is also prevalent in the work of other theorists, including Emile Durkheim. For an elaboration, see Durkheim (1958; 1965). 2 While space does not permit a detailed review and critique of Rushton's work, the reader is encouraged to examine Weizman et al. 1989a, 1989b; Ziegler et al. 1991; and The University of Western Ontario (1989).

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