STANDARDIZING BASIC CONCEPTS IN SOCIOLOGY Wma~R L W~.ACE

The idea o f s t a n d a r d i z i n g concepts in sociology is n o t new, b u t w e h a v e m a d e little progress, despite the early hopes o f such theorists as D u r k h e f m a n d Weber. TI, IS article refutes the argum e n t s o f s o m e w h o contend that w e do n o t need s t a n d a r d concepts, w e c a n n o t m a k e s t a n d a r d concepts, s o c i a l p h e n o m e n a are too complex a n d changefu~ sociologists are t o o / n d i v t d u a l i s t t c a n d sociological concepts are too context-dependent. The a u t h o r p r o p o s e s that the A m e r i c a n Sociologtcal Assoctatton a p p o i n t a Committee on Basic Sociological Concepts to investigate a n d r e c o m m e n d the o ~ c t a l adoption o f a basic conceptual language in A m e r i c a n sociology.

T h e idea o f standardizing o u r c o n c e p t s in s o c i o l o g y is, o f c o u r s e , n o t n e w . D u r k h e i m ' s insistence on having c o m m o n definitions o f t h e p h e n o m e n a w e investigate will b e cited b e l o w , b u t t h e r e is also W e b e r ' s h o p e that "ideal t y p e s " w o u l d b e c o m e s u c h standard c o n c e p t s . Ideal types, W e b e r said, s h o u l d serve as " i n t e r p r e t i v e s c h e m e [ s ] " against w h i c h "facts are c o m p a r e d " (1975, p. 189). All w h o a d o p t e d a given ideal t y p e w o u l d share a c o m m o n u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e facts c o m p a r e d to i t - i n t h e same w a y that t h o s e w h o a d o p t a given scale o f spatial o r t e m p o r a l m e a s u r e m e n t (e.g., the meter, t h e m i n u t e ) share s u c h c o m m o n u n d e r s t a n d i n g . In o r d e r to a c h i e v e this c o m m o n u n d e r s t a n d i n g , W e b e r said, ideal t y p e s m u s t b e c o n s t r u c t e d o u t o f "the m o s t u n a m b i g u o u s l y intelligible c o n c e p t s " (1949, p. 43, e m p h a s i s deleted)---i.e., u n a m b i g u o u s l y intelligible to all w h o u s e t h e m . To this day, h o w e v e r , w e are w i t h o u t c o m m o n definitions o f o u r m o s t basic c o n c e p t s . Continuing Absence of Standard Concepts O n e can hardly d o u b t that "social structure" and "culture" are basic sociological c o n c e p t s - y e t , b y virtually all a c c o u n t s , e a c h signifies different kinds o f p h e n o m e n a to different sociologists.

Walter L Wallace is professor of sociology at Princeton University. Please address correspondencc to Department of Sociology, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544.

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T h r o u g h t h e years, "social structure" has b e e n said to b e "so fundamental to social s c i e n c e as to r e n d e r its u n c o n t e s t e d definition virtually impossible" (Udy 1968, p. 489); to attract "little a g r e e m e n t on its empirical referents" (Warriner 1981, p. 179); and to p o s s e s s a m e a n i n g that "remains unclear" (Turner 1986, p. 407). H o m a n s says " F e w w o r d s d o sociologists u s e m o r e often than 'structure,' especially in t h e phrase 'social structure.' Yet w e s e l d o m ask w h a t w e m e a n b y the w o r d " (1975, p. 53); Blau says "The c o n c e p t o f social structure is u s e d w i d e l y in sociology, o f t e n broadly, and w i t h a variety o f meanings" (1975, p. 220); Gibbs says "sociologists use the t e r m ['social structure'] in diverse ways, each o f w h i c h is either so vague as to p r e c l u d e empirical application or so b r o a d as to include virtually all collective features o f h u m a n behavior" (1989, p. 234). And w h e r e Smelser claimed, t w o years ago, that "for sociologists, the units o f social structure are conc e i v e d of...as r e l a t i o n a l characteristics" (1988, p. 105, emphasis added), Colem a n c o n c e i v e s of a t y p e o f "social structure" in w h i c h the participants "have no relations" (1990, p. 276, e m p h a s i s added). A similar history marks t h e t e r m "culture": S e v e n t e e n years ago, S c h n e i d e r said " b y n o w just a b o u t e v e r y t h i n g has b e e n t h r o w n into 'culture' b u t t h e k i t c h e n sink," and t h e n r e f l e c t e d that "The k i t c h e n sink has b e e n t h r o w n in t o o " as part o f "material culture" (1973, p. 119). Eleven years later W u t h n o w , H u n t e r , B e r g e s e n and K u r z w e i l p o i n t e d o u t that "Theorists o f c u l t u r e remain sorely d i v i d e d on h o w b e s t to define culture" (1984, p. 3), and c u r r e n t l y Colem a n refers to "values, orientations, c u s t o m s , language, n o r m s , [religion,] a n d culture" (1990, pp. 6 0 3 , 6 0 4 ) - - i m p l y i n g "culture" is different from all these, alt h o u g h he d o e s n o t say h o w it is different. No w o n d e r G i b b s simply ( b u t I believe, w r o n g l y ) gives u p h o p e : "any definition [of culture] will b e (1) inclusive to t h e p o i n t o f b e i n g meaningless, (2) arbitrary in t h e e x t r e m e , o r (3) so v a g u e as to p r o m i s e only negligible empirical applicability" (1989, p. 275, e m p h a s i s in original). Modern Opposition O b v i o u s l y , since W e b e r ' s and D u r k h e i m ' s time, t h e n e e d for standard conc e p t s has u n f o r t u n a t e l y s l i p p e d far from t h e c e n t e r o f o u r disciplinary attention. I am n o t sure w h y this has h a p p e n e d , b u t s o m e m a y think w e d o n o t n e e d s u c h c o n c e p t s , and e v e n if w e do n e e d t h e m , w e c a n n o t m a k e them. Let us c o n s i d e r t h e s e t w o beliefs in turn. We Do N o t Need Standard Concepts

D u r k h e i m ' s r e j e c t i o n o f this belief, and his insistence on t h e n e e d to share definitions o f t h e p h e n o m e n a w e investigate, g o e s as follows: Every scientific investigation concerns a specific group of phenomena which are subsumed under the same definition. The sociologist's first step must...be to define the

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things he treats so that we may k n o w - h e as well--exactly what his subject matter is. This is the prime and absolutely indispensable condition of any p r o o f or verification (1982, p. 74). In a c c o r d w i t h this vi e w , K r o e b e r a nd P a r s o n s j oi nt l y w a r n e d , t h i r t y - t w o y e a r s ago, t h a t t h e " c o n f u s i o n a m o n g a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s and s o c i o l o g i s t s a b o u t t h e c o n c e p t s o f c u l t u r e a nd s o c i e t y .... has m a d e f o r . . . c o n f u s i o n as to w h a t data are s u b s u m e d u n d e r t h e s e terms... [and] i m p e d e d t h e o r e t i c a l a d v a n c e as t o t h e i r i n t e r r e l a t i o n . ~ A c c o r d i n g l y , t h e y called f o r " c o n s e n s u s b e t w e e n a n d w i t h i n disciplines" o n b o t h c o n c e p t s ( K r o e b e r and Parsons 1958, p. 582). Seein g n o p r o g r e s s al ong t h e s e lines af t e r t w e n t y - o n e years, Blalock p u t forward a m o r e comprehensive proposal-itself ignored, now, for eleven more years. " W h a t s e e m s r e q u i r e d [in s o c i o l o g y ] , " Blalock w r o t e , is a self~onsctous and coordinated effort to focus on the basic concepts in the field, their clarity, overlap, inclusiveness, and implications for measurement strategies. The technical tools for theory building and data analysis are reasonably available, but many kinds of slippery and elusive conceptual problems remain at least as formidable as they were several decades ago. Here is where progress must be made if we are to achieve a true integration of theory and research (1979,134). T h e r e are, t h e n , s o m e v e r y g o o d r e a s o n s f o r r e j e c t i n g t h e b e l i e f t h a t w e do n o t n e e d s t a n d a r d c o n c e p t s in s oci ol ogy.

We Cannot Make Standard Concepts T h e b e l i e f t h a t w h e t h e r s t a n d a r d c o n c e p t s are n e e d e d o r not , w e c a n n o t m a k e t h e m , s e e m s t o r e s t o n o n e o r m o r e o f t h e f o l l o w i n g p r e m i s e s : (1) Social p h e n o m e n a are t o o intrinsically c o m p l e x and t o o i n e x p l i c a b l y c h a n g e f u l ; n o w a y o f classifying any t w o o r m o r e o f t h e m as similar in f o r m o r in c a u s e can b e d e v i s e d . (2) Sociologists are t o o individualistic in t h e i r t hi nki ng; w e c a n n e v e r r e a c h c o n s e n s u s o n any s t a n d a r d i z a t i o n - e v e n if w e w a n t e d to. (3) S o c i o l o g i c a l c o n c e p t s are t o o d e p e n d e n t o n t h e t h e o r e t i c a l c o n t e x t s in w h i c h t h e y a p p e a r . Conceptual standardization would require discipline-wide a c c e p t a n c e of some p a r t i c u l a r t h e o r y ( t a k e n as an a b s o l u t e l y u n i q u e , indivisible, a n d u n t r a n s l a t a b l e p a c k a g e ) in its e n t i r e t y . Let us c o n s i d e r t h e s e p r e m i s e s . Social P h e n o m e n a Are Too Complex a n d Changeful R e g a r d i n g t h e first p a r t o f this claim, it is W e b e r ' s o p i n i o n t hat

Every individual event, no matter how simple it may appear, includes an intensively infinite multiplicity of properties-if, that is, one chooses to conceive it in that way. It follows that no matter how complex a course of human "actions" may be, "objectively" it is in principle impossible for it to include more "elements" than could be identified in [a] single event in the physical world (1975,124).

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A n d regarding t h e s e c o n d part o f t h e claim, it is D u r k h e i m ' s o p i n i o n that The human mind would suffer a grievous setback if this segment of reality [i.e., human social phenomena]...should escape it even temporarily. There is nothing necessarily discouraging in the incompleteness of the results thus far obtained. They should arouse new efforts, not surrender....Sociology should, then, renounce none of its aims; but, on the other hand, if it is to satisfy the hopes placed in it, it must try to become more than a new sort of philosophical literature. Instead of contenting himself with metaphysical reflection on social themes, the sociologist must take as the object of his research groups of facts clearly circumscribed... [for] by such concentration, real laws are discoverable (1951, pp. 36, 37). Clearly, if w e take t h e s e r e m a r k s o f W e b e r and D u r k h e i m seriously, w e m u s t r e j e c t t h e idea that social p h e n o m e n a are in p r i n c i p l e less liable than any o t h e r p h e n o m e n a to d e s c r i p t i o n b y standardized c o n c e p t s . Sociologists Are Too Individualistic. This claim, o f c o u r s e , is an empirical o n e b u t u n f o r t u n a t e l y t h e only p u b l i c a t i o n s I k n o w that s e e m directly relevant to it are m y o w n . T h e s e analyses have led m e to think t h e f o l l o w i n g g e n e r i c definitions are latent in all sociological (and also all sociobiological) uses o f t h e ind i c a t e d terms: A "social structure" is any o b s e r v a b l e i n t e r o r g a n i s m physical b e h a v i o r regularity-i.e., p e o p l e a n d / o r o t h e r organisms doing things t o g e t h e r (in unison, e x c h a n g e , o r conflict w i t h e a c h other). A "cultural structure" (or "culture ~) is any o b s e r v a b l e interorganism psychical b e h a v i o r regularity-i.e., p e o p l e a n d / o r o t h e r o r g a n i s m s thinkingfeeling things t o g e t h e r (in c o n s e n s u s , c o m p l e m e n t a r i t y , o r dissensus w i t h e a c h other). O f c o u r s e , t h e specific things o r g a n i s m s d o t o g e t h e r vary, and t h e specific things t h e y think-feel t o g e t h e r vary, and o n this basis w e differentiate e c o n o m i c , political, religious, scientific, and o t h e r kinds o f social s t r u c t u r e s and cultural structures. O n t h e s a m e basis o f variability in t h e things organisms do, and think-feel, w e t h e n go on to differentiate various kinds o f s u b s t r u c t u r e s o f social s t r u c t u r e s (e.g., s u p e r o r d i n a t e , and s u b o r d i n a t e ) and o f cultural s t r u c t u r e s (e.g., cognitive, cathectic, and conative)---to any d e s i r e d level o f detail. Add that all social and cultural s t r u c t u r e s a n d s u b s t r u c t u r e s take p l a c e in s p a c e and time, and w e have d e f i n e d sociological interest in their spatial location, e x t e n t , density, patterning, etc., as w e l l as t h e i r t e m p o r a l o c c u r r e n c e , duration, periodicity, evolution, d e v o l u t i o n , etc. (see Wallace 1983, p p . 1 3 - 1 5 5 ; 1988, pp. 3 1 - 3 7 ) . Sociological Concepts Are Too Context-Dependent. Garfinkel asserts that "a distinction b e t w e e n o b j e c t i v e [context-free] e x p r e s s i o n s and indexical [cont e x t - b o u n d ] e x p r e s s i o n s is...unavoidable for w h o s o e v e r w o u l d do s c i e n c e " and claims that t h e f o r m e r are p o s s i b l e only in "the exact s c i e n c e s " - o f w h i c h socio l o g y is n o t o n e (1967, p. 5, italics added). But an alternative possibility is that all e x p r e s s i o n s in all s c i e n c e s are partly c o n t e x t - f r e e and partly c o n t e x t - b o u n d t h e p r o p o r t i o n s varying n o t w i t h t h e s c i e n c e b u t w i t h t h e b r e a d t h o f t h e cont e x t o n e has in mind. O n this basis, o n e can agree w i t h D u r k h e i m that

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sociological definitions p o s s e s s a significant d e g r e e o f i n d e p e n d e n c e f r o m sociological theories. Thus: Since the deflnition...is made at the beginnings of the science its purpose could not express the essence of reality; rather it is intended to equip us in order to arrive at this essence later. Its sole function is to establish the contact with things .... But it does not thereby explain them; it supplies only an initial framework necessary for our explanations. (Durkheim 1982, p. 80) Very similarly, W e b e r claims "the t e r m 'social'....provides, w h e n t a k e n in its 'general' meaning, n o specific point of view, from w h i c h t h e significance o f g i v e n e l e m e n t s o f c u l t u r e can b e analyzed" (1949, p. 68). But if o n e asks w h e r e s u c h context-independent "initial f r a m e w o r k s " in s o c i o l o g y c o m e from (or w h e r e t h e general m e a n i n g of t h e t e r m 'social' c o m e s from), t h e a n s w e r w o u l d a p p e a r to b e s o m e p r i o r and b r o a d e r f r a m e w o r k (let us call it 'the c u r r e n t cultural c o m m o n s e n s e , ' o r , w i t h Kant and less relativistically, "the c a t e g o r i e s o f t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g " - o n w h i c h t h e y are v e r y m u c h context-dependent. Steering b e t w e e n Garfinkel's v i e w on t h e o n e hand, and D u r k h e i m ' s on t h e other, it s e e m s fair to c o n c l u d e that although different t h e o r e t i c a l c o n t e x t s m u s t surely give t h e m e a n i n g s o f individual t e r m s w i t h i n t h e m different connotations, a c o m m o n generic m e a n i n g ( d e r i v e d from t h e c u r r e n t cultural comm o n s e n s e ) is almost sure to underlie t h e m all. O t h e r w i s e t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n - - i n science, as in e v e r y d a y c o n v e r s a t i o n - f o r c e us to a d o p t n e w terms. N o t e , then, that it is only t h e generic empirical r e f e r e n t s o f c o n c e p t s that I claim s h o u l d b e s u b j e c t e d to standardization in s o c i o l o g y (or in any o t h e r discipline, or, i n d e e d , in e v e r y d a y talk). W e s h o u l d t h e r e f o r e s e e k systematically to subsume different c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n s already in t h e field, r a t h e r than to impose o n e particular c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n on t h e field; federation-building, r a t h e r t h a n empire-building, s h o u l d b e o u r goal. This will e n a b l e us, for t h e first time, to b e g i n c u m u l a t i n g k n o w l e d g e across t h e entire discipline, and m o r e rigoro u s l y c o m p a r i n g different t h e o r i e s pertaining to that k n o w l e d g e .

Two Qualifications In p u r s u i n g t h e c o n c e p t u a l standardization b e i n g u r g e d h e r e , h o w e v e r , it s e e m s i m p o r t a n t to b e a r in m i n d at least t h e f o l l o w i n g qualifications. First, t h e discipline as a w h o l e s h o u l d c o n c e r n itself only w i t h standardizing t h e handful o f c o n c e p t s u s e d b y t h e discipline as a w h o l e - b a s i c c o n c e p t s s u c h as "social p h e n o m e n o n , " "society," "social structure," "culture, ~ "institution," "status," "role, ~ "norm, ~ "value." T o o m u c h c o n c e p t u a l standardization can c h o k e o f f r a t h e r than systematize criticism and innovation, just as t o o little p r o p e l s us tow a r d a w a r o f solipsisms. S e c o n d , w e s h o u l d b e self-consciously tentative a b o u t any standardization

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we reach, and therefore permit nonconformity, encourage challenges, and welcome revisions. Moreover, we should not exhaust ourselves trying to hit prec i s e l y t h e b e s t s t a n d a r d i z a t i o n o n t h e first try. P a r e t o s a y s " G i v e m e a f r u i t f u l e r r o r a n y t i m e , full o f s e e d s , b u r s t i n g w i t h its o w n c o r r e c t i o n s , " a n d B a c o n s a y s " T r u t h e m e r g e s m o r e r e a d i l y f r o m e r r o r t h a n f r o m c o n f u s i o n . " At t h i s p o i n t in our history, any empirically referenced conceptual standardization will lead us out of confusion into fruitful error. Conclusion: A Proposal SO far, I h a v e t r i e d t o d e s c r i b e s o m e t h i n g t h a t d e s p e r a t e l y n e e d s t o b e d o n e , t o e x p l a i n w h y it n e e d s t o b e d o n e , a n d t o s k e t c h h o w it c a n b e d o n e . N o w let m e s u g g e s t a f e a s i b l e first s t e p - - n a m e l y , t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f a n e w s t a n d i n g c o m m i t t e e o f t h e A m e r i c a n S o c i o l o g i c a l A s s o c i a t i o n - - a C o m m i t t e e o n Basic Sociological Concepts. The charge to this committee would be (1) to begin moving immediately--using any means (commissioned reviews of the literature, f o r m a l d e p o s i t i o n s , h e a r i n g s , p e r i o d i c p o l l i n g s ) t h a t h e l p s a s s u r e o p e n a n d fair c o n s i d e r a t i o n t o all p o i n t s o f v i e w - t o w a r d t h e o f f i c i a l a d o p t i o n o f a b a s i c c o n c e p t u a l l a n g u a g e in A m e r i c a n s o c i o l o g y , a n d ( 2 ) t o j o i n a n d o t h e r w i s e s u p p o r t a n y s i m i l a r e f f o r t s b y o t h e r s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s , a n d b y s o c i o l o g i s t s in o t h e r c o u n tries. W h a t a m e s s t h a t w i l l b e at first. N o d o u b t . B u t w i t h p a t i e n c e a n d f o r t i t u d e , t h i n g s w i l l s m o o t h o u t - - a n d b e s i d e s , w h a t a l t e r n a t i v e d o w e h a v e as l o n g as w e b e l i e v e in s o c i o l o g y ' s p o t e n t i a l as a s c i e n c e ? A n d j u d g i n g f r o m t h e s u c c e s s f u l , t h o u g h f o r t y - y e a r (!), t r a v a i l o f o r g a n i c c h e m i s t r y in p u r s u i t o f a s i m i l a r o b j e c t i v e ( s e e C r o s l a n d 1 9 6 2 ) , t h e t a s k w i l l c e r t a i n l y b e d i f f i c u l t b u t it is a l s o c e r tainly not impossible. So w e s h o u l d m a k e a s t r o n g s t a r t at o n c e , f o r t h i s m a y b e t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t s i n g l e c o n t r i b u t i o n o u r c o h o r t o f s o c i o l o g i s t s c a n m a k e t o t h e f u t u r e o f o u r discipline-not just for the next decade but for generations to come. Note This paper is excerpted from a longer discussion first presented to a session on metatheory at the 1990 meetings of the American SociologicalAssociation, and forthcoming in a collection of papers from that session. References Blalock, Hubert M. 1979. ~Dilemmasand Strategiesof Theory Construction: Pp. 119-35 in Contemporary Issues in Theory and Research, edited by William E. Snizek, Ellsworth R. Fuhrman, and Michael K. Miller. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Blau, Peter M. 1975b. "Parametersof SocialStructure." Pp. 220-53 in Approaches to theStudy of SoctalStructure, edited by Peter M. Blau. New York: Free Press. Colernan~JamesS. 1990. Foundations of Social Theory. Cambridge, MA:HarvardUniversityPress. Dufl~cim, Finite. 1951. Suicide. Glcncoc, IL Free Press. ~ . 1982. TheRules of SociologicalMefhod. New York: Frcc Press. Garflnkcl, Harold. 1967. Studies in Ethnomethodology. EnglewoodCliffs,NJ: Prentice-Hall. Gibbs,Jack P. 1989. ControL"Sociology's CentralNotion. Urbana, IL: Universityof Illinois Press.

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