Ó Springer 2007

Metascience (2007) 16:455–459 DOI 10.1007/s11016-007-9120-y

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SYNTHESISING THE PHILOSOPHY OF CHEMISTRY

Davis Baird, Eric Scerri, and Lee McIntyre (eds), Philosophy of Chemistry: Synthesis of a New Discipline. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 242. Dordrecht: Springer, 2006. Pp. 362. US$179.00 HB.

By Grant Fisher At first blush, this collected volume presents something of a puzzle. In a spirit of inclusiveness, not only philosophers but also historians of science and practising chemists contribute to a volume of nineteen chapters, making it a heady mixture of topics and perspectives. This seems to indicate that the philosophy of chemistry is still in the process of synthesis, rather than a stable product of disciplinary consensus. But that need not be a bad thing. Rarely does one see such a range of issues presented from cross-disciplinary perspectives in a single volume. Such variety may be indicative of an absence of agreed foundations in a field. But the diversity in this volume can be all the more readily embraced when one considers that chemistry is a science consisting of a broad range of sub-disciplines, objectives, practices, divisions of labour, and concerns with substances and their transformations, lying at the boundaries between biology and physics. Perhaps, then, it isn’t surprising that this volume is eclectic and unselfconsciously broad in its tastes, topics, and the backgrounds of its contributors. By way of an introduction, Baird, Scerri, and McIntyre sensibly locate the philosophy of chemistry in its intellectual context, give reasons for chemistry’s lamented Ôinvisibility’ as a science of philosophical interest, and plot the themes of each section. Schummer’s opening meta-level analysis is up-beat: ‘‘[t]he time of complaining about the neglect of the philosophy of chemistry is over now’’ (p. 19). He provides reasons for the discipline’s past neglect, considers its recent trends, and offers suggestions for its future

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development, adopting a pragmatist determination of the Ôtopics of maturity’. The pragmatist stance not only necessitates a thorough understanding of chemistry, but also its history. For those of us who believe that Lakatos got it right when he claimed that Ôphilosophy of science without history is empty’, Schummer’s stance is welcome indeed. But one wonders whether his pragmatist agenda for the development of philosophy of chemistry might alienate philosophers with interests in chemistry and the broader issues that occupy the Ôgeneral’ philosopher. One perennial problem of philosophy has a central place in this volume: Ônatural kinds’. Bhusan notes how the identification of natural kinds with chemical kinds seems to raise least controversy in the philosophical literature. However, Kripke and Putnam’s connection between essential properties and natural kinds fails to recognise the significance and consequences of chemical synthesis. Molecules can occur naturally or may be synthesised in the laboratory; the latter do not always have a Ônatural’ counterpart. The fuzziness of the boundary between Ônatural’ and Ôartefactual’ undercuts the Kripke and Putnam connection, but this does not commit one to some form of Quinean conventionalism. Instead, Bhusan suggests that Cartwright’s Ôparticularism’ of The Dappled World (Cambridge, 1999) represents an alternative perspective for kind term reference in chemistry. Although contextual factors come to play in grouping Ôlibraries’ of compounds according to similarities, these possible groupings ‘‘figure in causal and explanatory narratives and therefore are real, although particular to interests and histories of the individuals involved and to the particular models and strategies they choose to solve their problems’’ (pp. 334–335). Weisberg attacks what he calls the Ôcoordination principle’ adopted by semantic externalists: namely that scientific kinds have an unambiguous one-to-one mapping to natural kinds recognised by natural language users. Taking as his example, ÔWater is H2O’, Weisberg notes two problems with the coordination principle. First, deferring to experts for the specification of the extensions of natural-kind terms, those experts cannot provide a unique natural kind recognised by natural language users. There is a surplus of kinds recognised by chemists, particularly isotopic isomers, and hence no one-to-one mapping with the kind recognised by ordinary language users. Second, since there are complex kind systems, kind terms are ‘‘context-sensitive’’ (p. 342). The coordination principle must

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accommodate ‘‘a mechanism for picking out the right chemical kind to be coordinated with ordinary language kinds in different contexts’’ (p. 343). The broad range of interests and scholarly skills of this volume are evident in the section on tools of representation. Representation is a current theme in general philosophy of science, and no less current in philosophy of chemistry. Johnson plots the history of computer-aided chemical process design in chemical engineering between the 1950s and 1970s. The members of the post-war generation of chemical engineers were increasingly trained in mathematical techniques. Johnson argues that post-war and 1970s chemical engineering were incommensurable, but not at the level of theory. Incommensurability is to be located in the practices of chemical engineering. By contrast, Vollmer offers an account of Ôpictorial’ representation in chemistry. Dalton’s diagrams introduced the representation of spatial relations of atoms. Both representation and atoms share a two-dimensional planar geometry, and Vollmer argues that it is this shared property that underpins chemical representation. Even though the representation of molecules in three dimensions requires the conventionalisation of spatial relations (through the introduction of depth-cues, for example), the shared property of geometry in two dimensions means that representation in chemistry is at least in part natural. The relationship between chemistry and physics also figures prominently. Hendry, for example, attacks the causal completeness thesis at the heart of strict physicalism. The burden of proof for the completeness of physics lies squarely with the strict physicalist for whom completeness is a critical thesis. In quantum chemistry, quantum mechanics is employed ‘‘to explain the motions of parts of the molecule within the context of a given structure for the molecule as a whole’’ (p. 183; original emphasis). The prior specification of molecular structure might suggest, if one were an Ôemergentist’, that downward causation is a live possibility. The strict physicalist must answer to this possibility without recourse to what Hendry calls the Ôproxy defence’: that model Hamiltonians serve a pragmatic function by standing in for the exact Hamiltonian (ibid). The explanation of empirically determined molecular structures ‘‘is conditioned on determinate nuclear positions’’, which are plugged-in, Ôby hand’, using the Born-Oppenheimer procedure (pp. 184–185).

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The topic of explanation is also central in the section on chemistry and current philosophy of science. Hunger argues that the deductive-nomological and causal models of explanation fail to capture how chemists explain molecular structures. He concludes that if these accounts are taken seriously then Kant’s famous negative appraisal of chemistry as a science returns with a vengeance. But of course, DN and causal models are not the only options for those interested in explanation in chemistry, and Hunger suggests that van Fraassen’s model represents at least a good starting point for capturing the ‘‘pragmatic character of chemical explanations’’ (p. 153). Scerri’s concerns are with normative and descriptive philosophies of science and their relevance to chemistry. A normative philosophy of chemistry might advocate anti-realism with respect to the orbital concept in quantum chemistry from the perspective of quantum mechanics, since such concepts fail to refer to entities in the physical world. However, a naturalistic approach, wedded to a due regard to what chemists do and what attitudes they hold with respect to chemical concepts, suggests a realist appraisal of these concepts. Both normative and naturalistic approaches can co-exist, Scerri argues, if a dynamic view of scientists’ and philosophers’ Ôattitudes’ rather than static Ôpositions’ is upheld. Returning to Kant’s negative comments on chemistry, mentioned above, in the section on chemistry and the history and philosophy of science van Brakel presents a tantalising opportunity for a reappraisal of Kant’s attitude. Although Kant’s comments originally hail from both the Critique of Pure Reason and the Prolegomena, van Brakel ventures that the Opus postumum reveals Kant as one who not only followed developments in chemistry, particularly the new chemistry of Lavoisier, but also placed chemistry right at the heart of his later philosophy. Also welcome is Needham’s appraisal of Aristotle’s connection to the development of chemistry. Aristotle’s theory of chemical reactions and substances was such that while a substance may not be actually present in a mixture or combination, it is potentially present. Although Needham points out that the theory is problematic, its significance is marked by its ‘‘adoption and adaptation by Duhem (1902) as the basis of his understanding of the diversity of chemical substances systematised by chemical formulas and for providing what he thought was the natural interpretation of matter as treated by thermodynamics’’ (p. 43). Elsewhere in the book, it is

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notable that Early offers a contribution on the philosophical implications of chemical symmetry. He manages to connect his discussion of group theory to contemporary philosophical structuralism, proposing consistency with a Ômoderate’ form of ontic structural realism advocated by French and Ladyman (ÔRemodelling Structural Realism: Quantum Physics and the Metaphysics of Structure’, Synthese, 2003). There is material here of interest not just to philosophers, but also those with interests in history and philosophy of science and indeed the study of science and technology more broadly. I have deliberately not attempted to address a question presumably on the lips of those who are unfamiliar with philosophy of chemistry: ÔWhat is the philosophy of chemistry?’. An answer, I suspect, is still evolving. But for those who are curious, this volume would be a very good place to start seeking illumination. Department of Science & Technology Studies University College London London, UK