Philosophy of Religion 22:139-150 (1987) 9 NijhoffPublishers, Dordrecht - Printed in the Netherlands

The design argument, cosmic "fine tuning," and the anthropic principle

JOHN JEFFERSON DAVIS Gordon-Conwell Theological Seminary, South Hamilton, MA 01982

Nature has been kinder to us than we had any right to expect. As we look out into the universe and identify the many accidents of physics and astronomy that have worked to our benefit, it almost seems as if the universe must in some sense have known that we were coming (Freeman Dyson). Recent attempts by Alvin Plantinga and Richard Swinburne to reformulate the design argument in the face of the well-known criticisms of Hume have generated considerable interest in philosophical circles.1 It is not the purpose of this paper, however, to rehearse the details o f these debates, but rather to present new empirical data from recent physics and cosmology that has not been addressed b y either Plantinga, Swinburne, or their critics, and to assess the possible significance o f this data for the design argument. During the last several decades physicists and astronomers have become aware of evidence o f an apparently quite remarkable fine tuning of the fundamental physical constants o f the universe, without which life as we k n o w it on this planet would not be possible. Growing awareness o f this evidence has sparked within the scientific c o m m u n i t y a vigorous philosophical debate as to its significance, generating such hypotheses as the "anthropic principle," models of "multiple universes," and even renewed interest in classical design arguments. This debate among the physicists has remained up to this point largely unknown to professional philosophers 2 and theologians, even though it bears

140 rather directly upon significant areas of their interests. Before exploring the philosophical implications of the evidence, however, it is necessary to given attention to the nature of the evidence itself.

1. Evidence of cosmic fine tuning If a visitor to Boston were to enter Symphony Hall one evening and hear a beautiful rendition of Beethoven's Fifth Symphony, with every note correct and each instrument properly tuned, she would surely be justified in inferring that such an outcome was the result of prior human contrivance. A growing number of physicists and astronomers seem to believe that the physical universe is in certain important respects analogous to a carefully contrived work of art. B.J. Carr and M.J. Rees, for example, conclude that the "... possibility of life as we know it ... depends on the values of a few basic physical constants - and is ... remarkably sensitive to their numerical values. ''3 A sampling of this data is presented below: 4

(1) If gravity were stronger by one part in 1040, there would long ago have been a catastrophic collapse of the universe (the "Big Crunch") instead of its present expansion. (2) If matter in the universe were not spread out at an incredibly low density ( - one atom/m3), the universe would long ago have collapsed in upon itself. (3) If the initial explosion of the "Big Bang" had differed in strength by one part in 1060 , the universe as we now know it would exist. (An accurary of 1/1060 can be compared to firing a bullet at a one4nch target on the other side of the observable universe, twenty billion light years away, and hitting the target.) (4) If the combined masses of the proton and electron were to become a little more rather than a little less than the mass of the neutron, the hydrogen atom would become unstable, and the Sun would fade and collapse. (5) If the strength of the electromagnetic and strong nuclear forces were only moderately different, the process of car-

141 bon formation in the cores of stars would not occur, and there could be no carbon-based life as we know it. (6) If the mass o f neutrinos were 5 x 10 -34 kg instead o f 5 x 10 -35 kg, because of their great abundance in the universe, the additional gravitational mass would result in a contracting rather than expanding universe. (7) If the strong nuclear force were about 5% weaker, the deuteron could not exist; without deuterium, the main nuclear chain reaction used by the Sun could not proceed. Stable, long-lived stars such as the Sun would not exist, and there would be no life on earth. Physicists and astronomers who study the overall structure and evolution of the universe encounter cosmic cooperation of such a "wildly improbable nature," observes Paul Davies, that "it becomes hard to resist the impression that some basic principle is at work. ''s Or as Fred Hoyle has remarked, a commonsense interpretation of the facts suggests that "... a superintellect has monkeyed with physics ... and that there are no blind forces worth speaking about in nature. ''6

2. A universe balanced on the razor's edge: Reactions by the physicists Physicists have responded in various ways to this emerging picture of a universe and life balanced on the "razor's edge." Prominent in these discussions have been the so-called "anthropic principle" and " m a n y worlds" hypotheses. The anthropic principle is so named because it attempts to relate the values of the fundamental physical constants to the presence o f human observers. 7 The principle in its "weak" form, as developed by Brandon Carter and others says, in effect, that had the fundamental constants not been what they are, we would not be here to c o m m e n t on the fact. Or to state it in another way, had the fundamental physics been different, there would be no physicists to philosophize about such an apparently remarkable state of affairs. So why bother to attempt any explanation at all for the "fine tuning"?

142 In its "strong" form, as advocated by J.D. Barrow, John Wheeler, and others, the principle states that the existence of conscious observers actually "selects" appropriate parameters for the constants from the possible spectrum of values. It is as though the laws of physics somehow managed obligingly to arrange themselves so that living organisms were subsequently assured of existence. Physical laws "foresaw," as it were, the coming of humankind. This "strong" form of the anthropic principle sounds suspiciously like an echo of the classical design argument, except that the design has no conscious Designer. I suspect that few philosophers will be satisfied with such appeals to an "anthropic principle." In its " w e a k " form, the principle is really not an explanation o f the cosmic fine tuning, but rather a "thought-stopping argument" (Hoyle) that refuses to probe any further the possible reasons for the universe's remarkable initial conditions. It is certainly true that had the values of the fundamental constants been different, we would not be here to comment about it, but that observation is trivially true, and offers no explanation of why the contingent, fundamental values are in fact what they are. It is true that had m y parents not met and married, I would not be here to write a paper on the design argument - but that truism sheds no light on why in fact m y parents did meet and marry. The " w e a k " principle suggests, in effect, that "if the thousand men of the firing squad hadn't all missed me then I shouldn't be here to discuss the fact, so I've no reason to find it curious. ''s It may be the case that conditions A, B, and C are the necessary preconditions for the occurrence of an event E, but the "weak" anthropic principle sheds no light on the question of why the contingent conditions A, B, and C should obtain in the first place. The principle in its "strong" form seems even more problematic. What can it mean, for example, for John Wheeler to say that the universe is so big because "only so can man be here"? How can the existence of human observers "select" the appropriate parameters necessary for the existence of life, long before humankind appears on the scene? How can future effects (human consciousness) "cause" the appropriate initial conditions? Did the birth o f Prince William "cause" the prior marriage of Charles and Diana? Such a reversel of the cause and effect relationship makes

143 nonsense of our experience of the world. If the anthropic principle in its weak form is trivially true, the principle in its strong form appears to be fundamentally incoherent. I conclude that the anthropic principle fails as an attempt to illuminate the problem of a universe balanced on the "razor's edge." Other physicists have attempted to address the issue of cosmic fine tuning in terms of "multiple universe" hypotheses. Hugh Everett, for example, has postulated the so-called "many worlds" interpretation of quantum mechanics, the branch of physics that describes the fundamental behavior of the subatomic world. 9 According to this view, with each subatomic event the universe may be pictured as continually splitting into a multiplicity of mutually unobservable and independent worlds. All "branches" are equally "real." We can imagine that in one branch (ours) Julius Caesar crossed the Rubicon, while in another branch he did not. One branch has no effect on another, and no observer is ever aware of the branching process. Everett's "many worlds" hypothesis does offer a way of explaining the "cosmic coincidence." We just happen to be living in the branch where the values of the fundamental constants are such as to permit the existence of conscious life; in a multitude of other branches the constants are different, and there are no physicists or theologians to be troubled by coincidences of fine tuning. Not surprisingly, Everett's interpretation of quantum mechanics have failed to win wide support in the scientific community. As Bryce Dewitt, a physicist sympathetic to this view has admitted, this picture of a near-infinity of branching universes is "not easy to reconcile with common sense. ''1~ From a philosophical point of view, the Everett hypothesis represents about the most extreme negation of "Ockham's razor" that one could imagine. To explain the remarkable features of our one observable world, one postulates the existence of an inifinity of unobservable worlds! (Medieval theologians accused of speculating about the number of angels able to dance on the head of a pin might well believe that their speculations are modest when compared to those of the physicists.) From a purely scientific view, Everett's hypothesis, while internally coherent as a mathematical formalism and consistent with the empirical data, is neither verifiable nor falsifiable by any conceivable experiment. There is simply no experiment

144 that could reveal the existence of these "other worlds." The Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics may be a philosophically intriguing hypothesis, but it would appear to have little or no scientific value. A somewhat less exotic variant of the "many worlds" genre of cosmological speculations is the "oscillating universe" model proposed by Princeton physicist John WheelerJ 1 The present expansionary phase of our "Big Bang" universe is merely one of a countless series of expansions and contractions. "Big Bangs" are followed by "Big Crunches" and subsequent "Big Bangs" ad infinitum. It just so happens that in our particular expansionary phase the values of the constants come out right, life is possible, and we are here to marvel at the fact. Like many other physicists Wheeler believes that the cosmic fine tuning calls for an explanation and is not to be viewed simply as "brute fact." The hypothesis of the "oscillating universe" is his attempt to offer an explanation. While such a model is logically conceivable, there is simply no empirical evidence to indicate that the universe's present expansion is merely one part in an indefinitely long series of oscillations. Even if the present "Big Bang" expansion did eventually reverse itself and become a "Big Crunch" (scientific opinion is divided on the likelihood of such event), there is no assurance that the universe would in fact rebound in a new expansion. The "Big Crunch" could lead to the end of the physical universe in the ultimate "black hole." Wheeler's model is a highly speculative construction that is lacking in any empirical support, and one which appears to be a merely post hoc explanation of limited scientific value.

3. Is the present state of the universe highly improbable? "It is hard to resist the impression," writes physicist Paul Davies, "that the present structure of the universe, apparently so sensitive to minor alterations in the numbers, has been rather carefully thought out." He concludes that the "... seemingly miraculous concurrence of numerical values that nature has assigned to her fundamental constants must remain the most compelling evidence for an element of cosmic design. ''12

145 Not only to a scientist such as Davies, but to most laypersons as well, such "orchestrations" o f the fundamental constants, so seemingly improbable, would prima facie appear to be evidence o f design. If I were standing at some gaming table in Las Vegas and emptied a canister of twenty-five dice on the green felt cloth and observed twenty-five "sixes" to be the result, I might well conclude that such an improbable result had been produced by someone loading the dice. Similarly, the present state o f the universe, considered as a "single roll of the dice," appears to be highly improbable if viewed as the result of a merely chance process. Such preanalytical or " c o m m o n sense" reactions have, however, been strongly criticized by various philosophers during the last several centuries. It is argued that it is highly problematic or even meaningless to apply concepts of statistical probability to the present state o f the universe, inasmuch as the universe is a unique entity. In the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion Hume pointed out that the origin o f the universe is a singular event that by its very nature transcends the bounds of human experience. "Have worlds ever been formed under y o u r eye? ... then cite y o u r experience, and deliver y o u r theory. ''13 In a similar vein, Hugh Mellor has observed that "We cannot wait to see if the next world we observe has the property our hypothesis ascribes to all worlds. ''14 Or as C.S. Peirce remarked, "Universes are not as c o m m o n as blackberries." The difficulty in applying any statistical concept of probability to the present state o f the universe arises from the fact that ordinarily our concepts o f probability are related to the observation o f repeated events (or to an event which is at least in principle repeatable), as While the given "orchestration" o f the basic constants does strike the naive consciousness as being "wildly improbable," it is very difficult, if not impossible, to quantify the precise degree of improbability. While it may be true that if the force of gravity were only slightly stronger, the whole universe would have collapsed long ago, it seems quite impossible to calculate a priori the probability that gravity would have its present value as opposed to some other possible value. It makes sense to claim that obtaining twenty-five "sixes" on a single roll of the dice is highly improbable, since m y knowledge o f the

146 range of possible outcomes is in principle complete. In the matter of the strength o f gravity, however, I simply do not have enough information to conclude that one value is more likely than another. Despite the difficulty of applying a concept o f statistical probability to this or other possible worlds, it does not follow that the evidence of cosmic fine tuning has no relevance to a consideration of the design hypothesis, or that a valid inference of design can not be drawn. As Lewis and others have pointed out, the heart of the design argument lies not in some probability calculus, but in the strength of the analogy it employs. 16 The key issue in fact is whether or not the empirical evidence supports the contention that the universe as a whole is in certain significant respects analogous to a watch (Paley) or to some other human artifact, whether mechanical or artistic. If the physical universe is in significant respects analogous to a human contrivance, then it is plausible to infer that it, too, is the product of intelligent design. While it is true that "universes are not as c o m m o n as blackberries," it is also the case that the physical universe as a whole, seen in certain relevant aspects, could be considered a m e m b e r of a set C, where C is the set o f all contrivances. Before giving further consideration to this basic premise that the universe in significant respects is analogous to a human contrivance, it may be convenient to anticipate two objections, both raised by Hume. 17 How can we draw inferences concerning the nature of the world as a whole when we have no experience of the world as a whole? And rather than comparing the world to a machine, why not compare it to an animal, and conclude that it arose from natural generation? With respect to the first objection, it may be observed that the range of empirical data available to scientists today as a basis for cosmological theories dwarfs that of Hume's day. Radio telescopes, deep-space probes, and sophisticated mathematical models make it possible to reconstruct meaningful scenarios for the origin of the universe. The concept of "the universe as a whole" transcends the limits of m y naive, everyday experience, but the fact o f the matter is that the workaday world of m o d e m physics and astronomy is not limited to naive experience. Modern scientific instrumentation and mathematics have radically expanded

147 the scope of "possible experiences," such that it is quite meaningful to make assertions about the nature of the physical universe as a whole. The supposed force of Hume's second objection is in part dependent on the ambiguity of the term "world" or "universe." Aspects of the world of ordinary experience (e.g., an Amazon rain forest) may suggest analogies of biological growth more than mechanical ones, but again the point to be remembered is that the "world" of modern physics is not the world of naive experience, but rather an abstract world of mass and energy, devoid of secondary qualities, adequately describable only in the mathematical language of quantum mechanics. When physicists do attempt to translate quantum-mechanical results into the language of ordinary experience, the analogies that are invariably chosen are drawn from the inanimate rather than the animate world, e.g., the Bohr "planetary" model of the hydrogen atom and the "Big Bang" cosmology. The entities studied by the physicists are not self-replicating like those studied by biologists. Consequently, it is not surprising that the analogies favored by the physicists are drawn more from the world of machines (or computers) than from the world of living organisms. My argument, then, is that the world as a whole, in those aspects o f interest to modem physics, is analogous to a human contrivance. By "contrivance" I mean a complex entity whose interrelated and interdependent parts are delicately adjusted to one another, and function over time in a regular, law-like manner, so as to produce an intellectually interesting result. By this definition a computer and printer producing an accurate readout, or a symphony orchestra playing Beethoven's Fifth, would be instances of contrivances, while one thousand monkeys pounding randomly on one thousand typewriters would not. The universe as known by modern physicists, with its finely tuned parts, operating according to regular laws, so as to produce a significant result - conscious life - is, on this construction, a contrivance. If human contrivances are the products of intelligent design, and if the empirical evidence shows that the universe is in relevant aspects analogous to a human contrivance, then it is valid to infer that the universe as a whole is the product of intelligent design.18

148 Conclusion

I conclude that the data concerning the fine tuning of the fundamental constants of nature, such that the emergence of conscious life on earth was possible, does count as evidence relevant to the design hypothesis. The fact that physicists, in reflecting upon this data, have suggested hypotheses such as the "anthropic principle" and "multiple universe" models, indicates that within the scientific community itself there is the conviction that such cosmological contingencies are not to be set aside as "brute facts," but call for rational explanation. These hypotheses, though somewhat unsatisfactory in themselves on various philosophical and scientific grounds, nevertheless do draw attention to new data of fundamental and far-reaching character, of the type that historically has been understood to be relevant to the evaluation of design hypotheses. I further conclude that these data are not only relevant to the design hypothesis, but are actually favorable to it. Inasmuch as these new discoveries indicate that the universe in certain aspects of interest to modern physicists is analogous to a human contrivance, then it is valid to infer that the universe, in those relevant aspects is, like a human contrivance, the product of intelligent design. Such an argument for design admittedly does not establish the full claims of traditional theism, as Hume and others have pointed out. While the theist, who may have reached her conclusions on other grounds (e.g., religious experience), may see such cosmological data as further confirmations of theistic belief, 19 the evidence in itself may be construed in terms of pantheistic, polytheistic, henotheistic, or deistic frameworks as well. The value of such an apparently meager result is not to be minimized, however. Insofar as any new evidence shows the design hypothesis to be more plausible, then the natural human drive to explain cosmological contingencies rather than setting them aside as "brute facts" receives additional rational justification. The perennial fascination of design hypotheses is but one expression of an instinct common to Western philosophy and science as well to see rationality rather than "brute fact" at the very heart of the cosmos) ~ The design argument has the further merit of providing linkage between the worlds of natural science and religious expe-

149 rience, t w o realms o f discourse t h a t in the m o d e r n world have all t o o o f t e n gone their separate ways. Finally, the design a r g u m e n t , while n o t in itself capable o f reaching fully theistic conclusions, does articulate the merits o f a w o f l d v i e w which sees intelligence and p u r p o s e at the h e a r t o f things, vis-d-vis various naturalistic alternatives. A n d a n y f o r m o f a r g u m e n t a t i o n which p u r p o r t s to tip the balance o f plausibility away f r o m naturalism is surely, in the p r e s e n t climate, o f considerable philosophical significance.

Notes 1. Alvin Planfinga, God and Other Minds (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1967); R.G. Swinburne, "The Argument From Design," Philosophy 43 (1968):199-211, and The Existence of God (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), pp. 133-151. For a response to Plantinga, see MarieLouise Friquegnon, "God and Other Programs," Religious Studies 15 (1979):83-89; for criticisms of Swinburne, see A. Olding, "The Argument From Design," Religious Studies 7 (1971):361-373; J.C.A. Gaskin, "The Design Argument: Hume's Critique of Poor Reason," Religious Studies 12 (1976):331-345, and Gary Doore, "The Argument from Design: Some Better Reasons for Agreeing With Hume," Religious Studies 16 (1980):145-161. 2. The work of the philosopher John Leslie is an exception to this generalization. See John Leslie, "Observership in Cosmology: The Anthropic Principle," Mind 92 (1983):573-579, and "Anthropic Principle, World Ensemble, Design," American Philosophical Quarterly 19 (1982): 141151. 3. B.J. Cart and M.J. Rees, "The Anthropic Principle and the Structure of the Physical World," Nature 278 (1979):605-612 at 612. 4. The information in this section is drawn from Freeman J. Dyson, "Energy in the Universe," Sciennfic American 225 (1971):51-59; Cart and Rees, op.cit.; Fred Hoyle, Galaxies, Nuclei and Quasars (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), and The Intelligent Universe (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1983); and especially P.C.W. Davies, The Accidental Universe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), and God and the New Physics (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983). 5. Davies, The Accidental Universe, p. 77. 6. Quoted by Davies, op.cit., p. 118. 7. For discussions of the anthropic principle, see the articles by Leslie cited in note two above; George Gale, "The Anthropic Principle," Scientific American 245 (1981):154ff., and especially J.D. Barrow and F.J. Tipler, The Anthropic Cosmological Principle (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986).

150 8. Leslie, "Anthropic Principle, World Ensemble, Design," p. 150. 9. Hugh Everett, III, "'Relative State' Formulation of Quantum Mechanics," Reviews of Modern Physics 29:3 ( 1 9 5 7 ) : 4 5 4 - 4 6 2 . 10. Bryce S. Dewitt, "Quantum Mechanics and Reality," Physics Today 23 ( 1 9 7 0 ) : 3 0 - 3 5 at 33. 11. John Wheeler, " F r o m Relativity to Mutability," in J. Mehra, ed., The Physicist's" Conception of Nature (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1973), pp. 2 0 2 247. 12. Davies, God and the New Physics, p. 189. 13. David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, Norman Kemp Smith, ed. (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1 9 4 7 ; originally published in 1779), p. 151. 14. D. Hugh Mellor, " G o d and Probability," Religious Studies 5 (1969): 2 2 3 - 2 3 4 at 232. For a response to Mellor, see Richard L. Sturch, "God and Probability," Religious Studies 8 ( 1 9 7 2 ) : 3 5 1 - 3 5 4 . 15. The philosophy of probability is, of course, a highly controversial area, and the so-called "frequency" or statistical interpretations are by no means the only ones possible. For a helpful discussion of the entire range of the many problems in this area, see William Kneale, Probability and Induction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1949). 16. Delmas Lewis, "On Salmon's A t t e m p t to Redesign the Design Argument," International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 13 (1982): 7 7 - 8 4 at 83 ; see also Swinburne, "The Argument From Design," op.cit., p. 205. 17. Hume, op.cit., pp. 1 7 7 - 1 8 1 . 18. It is beyond the scope of this paper to respond to issues related to the problem of evil as it bears upon the present argument. It can be noted, however, that the analogy of the world as "contrivance" is drawn from the abstract and impersonal "world" of modern physics, not from the world of ordinary experience. To the extent that both moral evil (e.g., Auschwitz) and natural evil (e.g., earthquakes) relate more immediately to naive experience than to the world as considered by the cosmologist, the existence of such evils does not undermine the force of the analogy (world as "contrivance") here proposed. 19. Louis Dupr~ notes that "Even the much-criticized Paley did not think of himself as 'proving' God to someone who had never heard of him, for he admitted that the recognition of divine purpose might require 'some previous knowledge of the subject.' . . . . The Argument of Design Today," Journal of Religion 54 ( 1 9 7 4 ) : 1 - 1 2 at 12. 20. In this regard it is of interest to note that Kant, while quite sceptical of the design argument in the Critique of Pure Reason, in the Critique of Judgment admitted that it had great practical justification: "We are in fact indispensably obliged to ascribe the concept of design to nature if we wish to investigate it ... this concept is therefore an absolutely necessary maxim for the empirical use of reason." Critique of Judgment, tr. J.H. Bernard (New York: Harrier, 1951 ; originally published in 1790), pp. 2 4 5 , 2 4 6 . F o r a discussion of Kant on this point, see Michael Kraft, "Thinking the Physico-Teleological Proof," International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 12 ( 1 9 8 1 ) : 6 5 - 7 4 .