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The Ethics and Politics of Dwelling Author(s): Nicholas Dungey Reviewed work(s): Source: Polity, Vol. 39, No. 2 (Apr., 2007), pp. 234-258 Published by: Palgrave Macmillan Journals Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4500274 . Accessed: 17/02/2013 11:29 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

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Polity e Volume 39, Number 2 * April 2007 ? 2007 NortheasternPolitical Science Association 0032-3497/07 $30.00 www.palgrave-journals.com/polity

The Ethics and Politics of Dwelling* Nicholas Dungey CaliforniaStateUniversity,Northridge EmmanuelLevinasarguesthatHeidegger'sontology,and theethicsit entails,fall shortbecausewhileDaseinrelatesto the Otheras being,Daseinfailsto careforthe Otheras a "pureindividual." preoccupationwithBeing,Levinasthinks, Heidegger's divertsHeidegger'sattentionfromthe empirical,ethicalclaimmade by the Other On the political front,some argue that Heidegger'spreoccupationwith Being gives rise to politicalforces of nationalismand totalitarianpolitics.I argue that Heidegger'sphilosophypreparesthe way for an alternativeapproachto ethics. are the ontologicalrelationExpressedin the way thatDasein comes-to-presence that reveal ethical Dasein's HoweverI contendthat ships being-with-one-another Heidegger'sontology becomes ethically complete when Derrida'snotion of differanceis added to the analysis.On my reading,Derrida'sdifferancedoes not effaceHeidegger'sexistentialanalyticof Dasein, but ratherdifferancefurthersthe ethicalinsightrevealedin Dasein'sdisclosurethroughthe process of presencingabsencing. Interpretingdifferance in light of Heidegger'sunderstandingof revealsthe ethicalsignificancein language,extendsethical presencing-absencing to the Otherand deepensHeidegger'snotionof dwelling.In addition, responsibility such a readinghelps guardagainstthe perniciouspoliticalpossibilitiessome find in Heidegger'sphilosophy. Polity (2007) 39, 234-258. doi:10.1057/palgrave.polity.2300064

Keywords Heidegger;Derrida;ethics;dwelling

Nicholas Dungey is an AssistantProfessorof PoliticalScience at California State University, Northridge.His primaryinterestsare modernand contemporary He interestedin the modern-postmodern debateas it politicaltheory. is particularly relatesto issues of identity,language,power and the possibilityof a postmodern democracyHe can be reachedat [email protected]

*1Ithankthe formerand currenteditors,referees,and staffof Polityfortheirthoughtfulassistancein the preparation of thisessaySpecialthanksalso go to JamesMitchelland mycolleaguesat CSUN-your supporthas been invaluable.Last,I also thank PeterDigeser,ThomasSchrock,and Lea for their unendingcare.

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Introduction EmmanuelLevinasarguesthatHeidegger'sontology,and the ethics it entails, fallshortbecause while Dasein'relatesto the Otheras being, Daseinfailsto care for the Other as a "pureindividual."2 Heidegger'spreoccupationwith Being, Levinasthinks, divertsHeidegger'sattentionfrom the empirical,ethical claim made by the Other.On the politicalfront,some like Leo Strauss,3RichardWolin,4 and KarlLowith5argue that this abstractand insular reflection gives rise to politicalforcesof nationalismand totalitarianpolitics.I contend thatHeidegger's philosophypreparesthe way for an alternativeapproachto ethics. Ourethical being is revealedthroughthe ontologicalrelationshipsby which Daseincomesto-presence.However,I propose that Heidegger'sontology becomes ethically complete when Derrida'snotion of differanceis added to the analysis. On my reading, Derrida'snotion of differancedoes not efface Heidegger's analysis of Dasein; ratherdifferancefurthersthe ethical insight revealed in Dasein'sdisclosurethroughthe processof presencing-absencing.As I presentit, the dynamicof presencing-absencingcalls our attentionto three dimensionsof ethical care residingin our way of being. These momentsare (1) presencingabsencingbetweenBeingand the individual;(2) presencing-absencingbetween the individualand his/her death; and (3) the presencing-absencingof self and other revealed in the happeningof differance.The firsttwo relationsare Heideggerean and represent simultaneous modes of practical and ethical disclosure.The third relation is my reading of Derrida'snotion of differance. Interpretingdifferancein light of Heidegger'stheory of presencing-absencing revealsthe ethicalsignificancein language,extendsethicalresponsibilitydirectly to the Other,and helps complete Heidegger'snotion of dwelling.It also helps guardagainstthe perniciouspoliticalpossibilitiesthatsome find in Heidegger's philosophy.And last, Derrida'snotion of differanceand democratichospitality 1. Translated literallyas there-being,Daseinis Heidegger'sattemptto avoidthe manymetaphysical concepts-subjectivity,ego, consciousness,spirit,soul, etc.-that havebeen used to expressthe nature of humanbeings."ThisdesignationDasein... does notsignifya what.Theentityis not distinguishedby its what,likea chairin contrastto a house.Rather,thisdesignationin its own way expressesthe way to be":MartinHeidegger,Historyof the Conceptof Time,trans.T. Kisiel(Bloomington:IndianaUniversity Press,1985),153.Daseinis distinguishedfromotherthingsthatexistby virtueof itsspecialwayof being, which is to raisethe questionof its Beingin and throughits existence.In Dasein,Heideggerattemptsto overcomethe often-sharp metaphysicaldistinctionbetweenthe subjectand object,andseeks to capture both the empiricallyfactualand ontologicaldimensionsof our Beingin a singleconcept. 2. EmmanuelLevinas,"IsOntologyFundamental?" PhilosophyToday33 (1989):124-26. 3. LeoStrauss,"AnIntroduction to HeideggerianExistentialism,' in TheRebirthof ClassicalPolitical Rationalism, ed. Thomas L. Pangle (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1989). 4. Richard Wolin, The Heidegger Controversy(Cambridge: The MITPress, 1998). 5. Karl Lowith, "The Political Implications of Heidegger's Existentialism:' in The Heidegger Controversyed. Richard Wolin (Cambridge: The MITPress, 1998).

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contributesto how we framethe issues of illegal immigration,community,and citizenship.

Heidegger's Philosophy and Totalitarian Politics MyclaimthatHeidegger'sthoughthelps producea salutaryethics and politics is a contested issue. Criticsof Heidegger'sphilosophysuch as Strauss,Wolin, and Lowithcontend that Heidegger'spreoccupationwith Being, death, and authenticitygive riseto insular,nationalist,and totalitarianpolitics.Theseauthors do not see Heidegger'sparticipationin NationalSocialismas a grievousmistake on behalf of a political novice, but rather as part and parcel with his philosophicalbelief. "Everyonewho had read his firstgreat book:' Leo Strauss writes, "anddid not overlookthe wood for the trees could see the kinship in temper and direction between Heidegger'sthought and the Nazis."6Richard Wolinasks:Did Heidegger's"existentialdecision for NationalSocialismin 1933" As a political doctrine, National Socialism was signify his "authenticity"?7 characterizedby the belief in the biologicalsuperiorityof the Aryanrace,and the pursuitof "worlddomination"based on this assertion.8 Heidegger,Lowithwrites,"tookon politicalresponsibilities.. .consistentwith the fundamentalthesis of Beingand Time." Lowithquotes Heidegger'sclaim that onlyan individual"thatis freeforits deathand can let itselfbe thrownbackupon its factical 'there'by shatteringitselfagainstdeath. .. can, by handingdown to itself the possibilityit has inherited,take over its thrownnessand be in the momentof vision for 'its time."'9In this passage,Lowithfinds the philosophical themes that he claims provideboth the foundationfor NationalSocialism,and that explain Heidegger'scommitment to it. In Being and Time, Heidegger describeshumanbeingsas the sortof beingswho are throwninto theirexistence, and who have deathas theirmostradicalformof possibility.ForHeidegger,death representsthe unsurpassablemoment of our existence. As such, our death is something that we cannot master and, therefore, our death signifies the impossibilityof our very being. Not only is death the very real possibilitythat cannot be mastered,but it is also the one possibilitythatcannot be represented in concrete or objective form. Insofaras death gives nothing to calculate, measure,or master,it revealsthe "nothing"of our existence. However,in giving this "nothing," death also gives to the individualthe freedomto choose her own 6. Strauss, 'An Introduction to Heideggerian Existentialism,"30. 7. Wolin, "Over the Line: Reflections on Heidegger and National Socialism," in The Heidegger Controversy4. 8. Fred Dallmayr, "Heidegger and Politics: Some Lessons?' in The Heidegger Case, ed. Thomas Rockmore and Joseph Margolis (Philadelphia: Temple University Press), 284. 9. Lowith, "The Political Implications of Heidegger's Existenitialism?'170.

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possibilities.It is in this radicalfreedomto choose one's own possibilitiesthat Heideggerlocates the momentof authenticity.And, because all possibilitiesare finite,courageousreflectionon death,what Heideggercalls resoluteness,forces us to seize and live "ourtime. LowithinterpretsHeidegger'scommentsabout death, nothingness,authenticity, and "one'stime"againstthe backdropof the tumultuouseconomic and political events of inter-warGermanyFor Lowith,the struggle for individual authenticity mirrorsthe cultural and political struggle raging in inter-war GermanyHe sees in Heidegger'spersonal life and philosophya "negationin principleof all thathas existed.'0 LowithreadsHeidegger'sresolutenesstowards death as a call forthe individualto rejectthe nihilisticvaluesof ModernEurope, and to hasten their social and political disintegration.Rejectingthe nihilistic of one'sbeing, prepares values of ModernEurope,and confrontingthe "nothing" the individualfora new beginningdirectedby one'sown will.However,as Lowith argues, the "nothing"of being that resolutenessreveals must be replaced by something,and this somethingis NationalSocialism. Lowithbelieves that Heidegger'snotions of resolutenessand authenticity become synonyms for returningto one's ethnic, linguistic, and political homeland." On his account, the pursuitof authenticity,and the takingup of one's own destiny,resultsin a reinvigoratedpoliticaldutyto one's homelandand ethnic and linguisticcommunity.Lowithwrites, "one need only.. apply [the concept] of authentic 'existence'...and the 'duty'...that follows therefromto 'specifically German existence' and its historical destiny" to see the way "individualauthentic existence is transposedto the 'totalityof the authentic state.'"12As criticsof Heidegger'sphilosophysee it, derivingfromauthenticityis the celebrationof a particularform of political state. Indeed, once one frees oneself from common values and opinions, and overcomes their social and culturalexpressions,the likely result is a totalitarianstate that embodies the nation's"ownmost"politicaldestiny. Contraryto the views presented by Heidegger'scritics, I believe there is anotherway of approachingHeidegger'sanalysisof our relationshipwith Being, our own death, and others. In Heidegger'streatment of the individual's relationshipwith Being and mortalityis an alternativeway of understanding who we are, and how we relateto others,that fostersa greatersensitivityto the fragilityof our own livesand those of others.Itis my contentionthatHeidegger's understandingof our relationshipto Being and death worksagainstthe sort of 10. Lowith,"ThePoliticalImplicationsof Heidegger'sExistentialism,' 170. 11. Echoing Lowith, Pierre Bourdieu notes, the goal of authenticity is to "re-root"oneself in the essence of one's being. Pierre Bourdieu, The Political Ontology of MartinHeidegger, trans. Peter Collier (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), 8. 12. Lowith, "The Political Implications of Heidegger's existentialism,' 173.

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ethnic and nationalistpolitics ascribed to his philosophy.In addition, I argue that reading Derrida'sdifferancein light of Heidegger'sunderstandingof the interplaybetween presence and absence not only deepens the ethical relations revealedin Heidegger'sthought,but also providesyet anothertheoreticalstrategy designedto thwartthe tendencyof humanbeings to turninwardtowardethnic, linguistic,and nationalisticpolitics. Heideggerand Derridasphilosophyresists an ethnic, nationalist,and totalitarianpolitics because it disrupts the very metaphysical concepts of objective, rational, and "pure"truths that have characterizedthe sort of political ideologies associated with so much human suffering.Whatfollowsis a responseto the criticsof Heidegger'sphilosophyand politics,and one intendedto point the way towardan alternativeconception of democraticpolitics.

The Ethics of Dwelling Thephilosophicalclaimswe makeabouthumannaturedirectlyinfluenceour interpretationof the self, others, and the world we live in. For Heideggerand Derrida,the philosophicalclaims we make about human existence and Being reveal modes of togethernessand responsibilitythat are inherentlyethical. Moreover,for both of them, these ethical claims ought to influence the sort of politicaldecisionsand actionswe take.Accordingto Heidegger,to engage ethics properly,we must raise the questions of who we are, and the way we find ourselves in this world. It is in this context that he writes, "ethicsas a mere doctrine and imperativeis helpless unless man firstcomes to have a different fundamentalrelation to Being.113Ethical understandingis grounded in the ontological situation of human existence, and is revealed through a clearer understandingof our being. "Wherethe essence of man is thoughtso essentially, solely from the question concerning the truth of Being, but still without elevating man to the center of beings, a longing necessarilyawakens for a peremptorydirectiveand forrulesthatsay how man. . .oughtto live.'14Heidegger wants to raise the philosophicalquestion of human existence in a way that avoidsmakingman the objectivegroundof moralityBeforewe determinerules that regulate our behavior, we must philosophically clarify who we are. Heidegger'sphilosophy,insofar as it reveals the essential relationshipsthat discloseand characterizehumanexistence,is itselfa formof originalethics.And, for Heidegger,access to such a way of thinkingbegins with reflectionon the essence of dwelling. 13. Heidegger, What is Called Thinking?trans. J. Gray (New York:Harper and Row, 1968), 89. 14. Heidegger, "Letteron Humanism,' in Basic Writings,trans. David Farrell Krell (San Francisco: Harper Collins, 1977), 255.

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As early as Being and Time,Heideggeridentifiesdwelling as the essential For Heidegger,dwelling reveals the character of human being-in-the-world. of we holisticway expressunderstanding ourselves,our relationwith others,and the world. "IchBin (I am) means I dwell, I stay near.. . the worldas something familiarin such and such a way.Beingas the infinitive'Iam':thatis, understood as an existential,means to dwell near.. '15 To care for,and be involvedwith, one's life, others,and the world,are all manifestationsof dwelling.As the most primordialset of activitiesthroughwhich ourcare is expressed,dwellingsignifies who we are and the way of our being. It is not accidental,Heideggerinsists,that the mostprimordialassertionof existence,I am, is historicallyand etymologically synonymouswith dwelling. Dwellingentails the practicalactivityof buildingstructuresand cultivating the ontological relationshipsrevealed in and throughbuilding.For Heidegger, "both modes of building-building as cultivatingand building as raising up edifices-are comprised within genuine building, that is, dwelling."16 Practicallyspeaking, we build and inhabit homes, and we do so to protect and safeguardourselves from the environmentand others. As human beings, we are always engaged in the technological occupation of using and manipulating the physical world. In the modern period, Heidegger contends, we build only with an eye to manipulateand conquer nature. Buildingis only engineering,and engineeringis only a tool to expand man's dominion. However,Heideggerseeks to reawakenthe distinctionbetween the everyday activityof building and dwelling with others. This is necessary,he contends,

15. MartinHeidegger, Being and Time, trans. Joan Stambaugh (Albany: State Universityof New York Press, 1996), 51. In addition to the ontological status of dwelling, it is important to recognize the connection between dwelling and space-what Heidegger calls nearness and distance. It is important, therefore, to clarify Heideggers existential understanding of space. For Heidegger, all spatial dimensions are first opened through the expression of care for, and involvement with, the world. The expression of our care towards others and things opens the dimension of space, establishing the phenomenon of near and far,and constituting the grounds of actual measurement. What is near and far is not first a function of measured space. Measured space becomes possible due to the awareness of and involvement with objects, and their placement in a larger context of meaningful significance. Spatiality then, is an existential attributeof Dasein's being. Only after existential care has been reawakened, can space in both the ethical and calculative sense be ontologically clarified (Heidegger, Being and Time, 103). The ethical dimension of Dasein's spatiality concerns the way in which others are brought near and cared for. From the point of view of existential concern, near and far do not signify spatial opposites, but rather function as related points in a playing back and forth along a continuum of care towards others. The ethical dimension of nearness concerns the cultivation of an alternative mode of subjectivity,one that releases itself from the inclination to bring all things, as well as others, under the dominion of rational and technical manipulation. 16. Martin Heidegger, "Building, Dwelling, Thinking,' in trans. A. Poetry, Language, Thought, Hofstadter (New York:Harper Row, 1971), 147.

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because our modern, overtlytechnological approachto building leads us to forgetthe deeper significanceof dwelling.Heideggerwrites, Thesebuildingshouse man. He inhabitsthemand yet does not dwellin them, when to dwell means merelythatwe takeshelterin them. .. do the houses in themselveshold any guaranteethatdwellingoccurs in them?17 As long as we understandbuildingonly in termsof the manipulationof the natural environment,dedicatedto the protectionand advancementof man'sends,we will continue to alienate ourselvesfrom true dwelling.Leslie Paul Thiele writes, "a properabode for humanitycan never be fabricated... Our worldlyabode is once it no longeris approachedmetaphysically as an objectivereality, transformed ."18 Becausethe characterof humanbeing-inbut ratheras a set of relationships.. the-worldis nothingotherthanthe webbingof its social and culturalrelations,the buildingof thingsmust be directedin lightof the cultivationof these essential relationships.Of the two dimensionsof dwelling,Heideggerinsiststhat it is the matrixof humanrelationsthatprovidesthe deeper significanceof dwelling."We do not dwellbecausewe havebuilt,butwe buildand havebuiltbecausewe dwell, Whenwe dwell we buildthese relations,we that is, because we are dwellers'"19 cultivatea certainposturetowardthingsand others. In Heidegger'slaterwritings,dwellingtakeson strongethical connotations.20 17. Heidegger, "Building, Dwelling, Thinking,' 146. 18. Leslie Paul Thiele, Timely Meditations: Martin Heidegger and Postmodern Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 180-81. 19. Heidegger, "Building, Dwelling, Thinking,"148. 20. While Heidegger's notion of dwelling remains constant throughout his life, his approach to thinking about it undergoes an important change. This change entails the difference between what, in Being and Time, Heidegger considered the question of the meaning of Being, to what he later thought of as the truth of Being. In Being and Time, Heidegger sought the meaning of Being by interrogating that being (Dasein) for whom Being itself is an issue. In this context, Heidegger's interrogation of metaphysics is intended to peel away the layers of metaphysical language and subjectivity that have shrouded the meaning of Being. The purpose of Being and Time is to provide an ever more refined interpretation of Dasein's existence in order to recover the forgotten meaning of Being. In his later works, the focus shifts from a concern with recovering the meaning of Being to a meditation on the truth of Being. Here the truth of Being is understood as an interdependent and mutually disclosive relationship between Being and Dasein, and the implications such reflection carries for ethical co-being. From an ethico-ontological point of view, the shift is important. In Being and Time, the search for the meaning of Being entailed an overly subjective stance by Dasein toward Being, leading Dasein to will its resoluteness in the face of death. Such willful choice is what Heidegger means by Dasein's authenticity or ability to choose its own path. In his later writings, Heidegger lets go of the emphasis on individual decision as the mark of a good life, and turns to a meditation on the more passive nature of the relationship between Being and Dasein. It is in this mode of abiding in the opening of Being that Heidegger's notion of "letting-be"becomes ethically relevant. See: MartinHeidegger, Basic Questions of Philosophy trans. R. Rojcewicz and A. Schumer (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), 178; Discourse on Thinking, trans. J. Anderson and E. Fruend (New York: Harper Row, 1966), 60-61; and "AnaximanderFragmento'in Early Greek Thinking, trans. D. Krell and E Capuzi (New York: Harper Row, 1975), 40-41.

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The way in which you are and I am, the mannerin which we humansare on the earth, is Buan, dwelling.The old word bauen, which says that man is insofaras he dwells. .. also meansat the same time to cherishand protect,to preserveand to care for...21 At its most basic, dwelling expresses the emotional care that animates and binds together the family,home, and extended relationshipswe find ourselves in. As the beings who are born (thrown) into families, tribes, ethnicities, and historical epochs, we find ourselves revealed in integrated, caring, and loving associations. In addition to our reception of care, it is characteristicof our natureto express and extend care, protection,and love to others. Not only are we cared-for,but we are also the care-takers.22 For Heidegger,dwellingcapturesboth the objectiveand subjectiveconditions of care abiding in each individualand the radiusof his or her relationships. These modes of care-cherishing, protecting,and loving-are ontologically constitutiveof who we are. Bringing together the activity of building, the place it creates, and the relationshipsit nourishes, Heidegger calls the abode the site of the ethical disclosure of dwelling. "Ethos means abode, dwelling place. The word names the open region in which man dwells. The open region of his abode allows what pertainsto man'sessence, and what in thus arrivingresides in nearness to him, to appear."23The "open region of the abode" refers to ontological, ethical, and geographicalsites of disclosure.First,Dasein itself is the abode of Being, that place where Being is manifest. Residing in and through Dasein, Being is openness to others and things, and it is within this openness that what pertains to Dasein is brought near. Second, the abode signifies the immediate space of the home, where the set of meaningful relationships-people, things,and issues-that are importantto us appear and live. Third, the abode signifies the geographical site-cultural space and historical time-where the broader life of care is experienced. By calling attentionto the abode as multiplesites of openness, Heideggerremindsus that we are always-already at home in the world,thatit is meaningfulto us, and thatit is a home/worldwe share with others. Phenomenologicallyspeaking,we are at home in a worldof essentialrelationshipsand we are "athome"in a physical and geographicalplace.

21. Martin Heidegger, "Building, Dwelling, Thinking,' 147. 22. Young, Heideggers LaterPhilosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 64. 23. Heidegger, "Letteron Humanism,' 256.

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The purposeof recoveringthe ethical dimensionof dwellingis to cultivatea non-domineeringrelationshipbetween human beings. To dwell ethically is to positivelypreservethe stayingof others.As Heideggerputs it: If the name "ethics,"in keepingwith the basic meaningof the word ethos, should now say that "ethics"pondersthe abode of man, then that thinking which thinksthe truthof Beingas the primordialelementof man,as one who ek-sists,is in itselfthe originalethics... Thisdwellingis the essence of beingin-the-world.24 To say that the essential characterof human beings is to dwell is to say that we are always-alreadyimplicated in a condition of ethical relations and considerations.As Heideggernotes, "[to] embrace a 'thing'or 'person'in its essence means to love it, to favor it. Such favoringis the proper essence of enabling... [which] can let something [or others] essentiallyunfold in its provenance,that is, let it be.'25

The Significance of Presencing-Absencing But,it mightbe asked:How is the essence of dwellingcultivated?The essence of dwellingis cultivatedthrougha way of life that acknowledgesthe interplay between presence and absence in three aspects of our life. It is, therefore, importantto examine what Heideggermeans by the (ontological) difference between presence,absence, and actual beings and things.Heideggernotes: Fromearlyon it seems as thoughpresencingand what is presentwere each something for itself. Presencing itself unnoticeably becomes something present... As soon as presencingis named it is representedas some present presencingas such is not distinguishedfromwhat is present being. Ultimately, ... The essence of presencing,and with it the distinctionbetween presencing and what is present,remainsforgotten.Theoblivionof Beingis oblivionof the distinctionbetweenBeingand beings.26 Maintainingthe distinction,and proper relationbetween the phenomenon of presencingand empiricallyexistinghumanbeings,is essential.ForHeidegger,the "truthof Being,"understoodas presencing,does not reduce to a multiplicityof individuallypresentthings.Nor is it the case that what is presentis simplythe 24. Heidegger, "Building, Dwelling, Thinking,' 149, and "Letteron Humanism' 260. 25. Heidegger, "Letteron Humanism' 220. 26. Martin Heidegger, "AnaximanderFragment' 50.

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objective manifestationof Being itself. The collapse of this distinctionis the mistakethat Heideggerinsistsled Westernthinkingastray Generallyspeaking,the experienceof presence (Being) is given,whatalwaysalreadysurroundshumanbeings.27Whilealwaysawarethatwe are present,the fact of our presence is somethingwe assume, and take for granted.As such, presence,and the happeningof presencing,signifiesthe unthought,background condition, and unifyingphenomenon that enables empiricallypresent human beings and things. "Whatis present:'Heideggerwrites, "coheres in unifying presencing,as everythingbecomes presentto everythingelse withinits duration; it becomes present and lingers with the others."28 Human beings come-toin time and in a realm that has been grantedto them, presence appeartogether and one that is constitutedby shared meaningand significance.Moreover,it is importantto stressthat the gift of presence is not the productof humanwill or power.Thephenomenonof presenceis not created,willed,norever masteredby any single human being. No being exists objectivelyin its own presentness. "Humanbeings and culturesare:'Youngwrites,"receptiveratherthan creative with respectto the modes of presencethey inhabit."29It is this essentialpassivity with respectto presencethatopens one dimensionof the ethicalsignificanceof humanbeings.We possess a responsibilityto care for the gift of presence. To the discussionof presence mustbe joined the importanceof withdrawal, and absence, as characteristicof humanexistence.Accordingto Heidegger,and laterDerrida,the withdrawalof Being,and the Other,enablesand illuminatesthe Put otherwise,as Being reveals itself in and present actualityof individuals.30

27. 28. 29. 30.

Young, Heidegger's LaterPhilosophy 23. Heidegger, "AnaximanderFragment,"40. Young, Heidegger's LaterPhilosophy, 23. This is one of the central motifs of Derrida'sarticulation of differance. In Derrida'slanguage, the "absent-present" trace of linguistic meaning and identity refers to that element of meaning or identity which, due to the differential structure of meaning and identity is irreducibly related to the proper meaning of a word or to the identity of the proper name before such isolation is possible. Absence refers to those elements of differential possibility, transcendental differance, that are essential to the singular appropriation of any term or identity. On Heidegger and Derrida's reading, absence is structurally constitutive of the conditions of possibility for anything; and cannot be (as metaphysics attempts), and should not be (as most forms of ethical theory attempt), forgotten or dissolved. In fact, deconstruction is made possible by the impossibility of the proper name, whether this is understood in terms of meaning or identity The "absent-present" trace always frustrates the attempt at transparent meaning and autonomous identity precisely because relational difference always-already presupposes singularity Singularity and meaning are always isolated out of differance and a thrown context of meaningful involvement, what is unrecoverable in this transcendental movement is the "absent-present"trace. What is necessary is to recover the significance that absence plays in this ontic-ontological happening. The work of Heidegger and Derrida, as well as the way in which I read a possible rapprochementbetween the two, differs from other postmodern thinking in how it understands the role and significance of absence. As constitutive of the conditions of meaning and possibility, absence represents an alternative form of connectedness and sharing.

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"Onlythe no-thingnessof Being:'Thiele throughindividuals,Beingwithdraws.31 The withdrawal,and disclose human to "allows notes, beings as things."32 being in and through form of disclosure a of Being signifies subsequent absence, We must concealment. "But:'Heideggerinsists, "withdrawalis not nothing.133 resist the temptation to interpret the withdrawal of Being as a negative characteristicof humanexistence. The withdrawalof Being does not signifyan emptinessthat must be filled, or a deficiency that must be overcome. On the contrary,the withdrawal of Being is an event in which human beings Indeed, Heideggersuggeststhat the "eventof withdrawal"could participate.34 be what is most essential "throughoutthe present:'35meaning that it is the enablingcapacityof Being'swithdrawalwhich illuminatesactualindividualsand sustainstheirconnection.Being(presence)is the open space, and its withdrawal enables humanbeings and thingsto standwithinit. But, how are we aware of that which, from the beginning, has already withdrawn?And how is participationin the event of withdrawalethically significant?"Whatwithdrawsfromus,"Heideggerwrites,"drawsus along by its verywithdrawal.... Once we are drawninto the withdrawal,we are.. .caught in the draftof what draws.... As we are drawingtowardwhat withdraws,we are pointingin that direction.3. ..36 Our way of being is opened in that pointing toward,and caringfor,Being.Drawnalong by the gravitationalpull of Being,we are alwayscaught in the draftof Being.ForHeidegger,the withdrawalof Being createsan ethicalgravityof care with which individualsare carriedforward,and throughwhich theirrelationshipsto othersare held together.I will arguelaterthat we experience the drawof this ethical gravitynot only throughthe withdrawal of Being, but also in and throughour relationshipto our own death, and the withdrawalof the Otherin and throughdifferance. In addition,the withdrawalof Being providesa furtherethical service. The withdrawalof Beingcreatesa dimensionof absence thatalwaysremainsbeyond the grasp of each individual.As such, absence forces us to confront those dimensionsof our livesthatare beyond our physical,rational,and technological mastery.Confrontinglimitsto our power serves to soften our drive to mastery, makingus more sympatheticto the hopes and sufferingsof others.Findingour presence given, being carriedalong by what withdraws,and confrontingwhat cannot be mastered,we are forced to reorienthow we relate to our self and

31. Heidegger,"Anaximander 26; and Basic Questionsof Philosophy178. Fragment,' 73. 32. Thiele,TimelyMeditations, 374. in Basic Writings, 33. Heidegger,"WhatCallsforThinking?" 34. Heidegger, "WhatCalls for Thinking?"374. 35. Heidegger, "WhatCalls for Thinking?"374. 36. Heidegger, "WhatCalls for Thinking?"374.

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others. We will see how this phenomenologyof presencing-absencingunfolds along three dimensionsof our existence. The ThreeMovementsof Presencing-Absencing Ethicaldwellingis cultivatedwhen we live with a view towardthe happening of presencing-absencingin our livesand relationshipswithothers.ForHeidegger, this awarenessrepresentsno less than the beginningof the transformationof and StevenWhite39 Scholarssuch as FredDallmayr38 have recognized humanity.37 the ethical significance of Heidegger'sphenomenology of the presencingworkfocuseson the relationshipbetweenthe self absencingof Dasein.Dallmayr's and Being, and suggeststhat this relationshipgroundsthe ethical potentialin Heidegger'sthought.White'swork focuses on the relationshipbetween the self and death,and suggeststhatour relationshiptowarddeath,and its inabilityto be rationallymanaged,servesas an openingto a deeper care towardsothers.I seek to contributeto the work of Dallmayrand White in suggestingthat a third momentof presencing-absencingoccurs on the level of individualsubjectivity, representedby Derrida'snotion of differance.Readingdifferanceas yet another momentof presencing-absencingprovidesa more complete phenomenological descriptionof the ethics revealedin and throughour way of being. Ethicaldwelling,then, namesa way of existingthatbearswitnessto the three intertwined and mutually reinforcing moments of presence-absence that constituteour being. The ethical significanceof this way of being lies in the capacityof such reflectionto loosen the self fromexcessive modes of autonomy and self-mastery.Such awarenessfostersethical sensitivitybecause it changes how we experience what is near to us, while respectingthe differencethat characterizesthe world.As one becomes moreattunedto each moment,and the way thatthese momentsrelateto each other,one developsan ever more refined experiencewith what nears and what remainsdistant. TheFirstMovementof Presencing-Absencing: Beingand Dasein The firstmovementof presencing-absencingspeaks directlyto the relationship between individualsand Being.Heideggercalls this relationshipontological joining,40the simultaneousplaybetweenthe presenceof each individualand the reciprocalwithdrawalof Beinginto self-concealment.As Heideggerwrites:"Asit revealsitselfin beings, Beingwithdraws... As it providesthe unconcealmentof 37. 38. 39. 40.

Heidegger, Basic Questions of Philosophy 181. Fred Dallmayr, The Other Heidegger (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993). White, Political Theory and Postmodernism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). Heidegger, "AnaximanderFragment,'41; Dallmayr, The Other Heidegger, 108.

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beings it foundsthe concealmentof Being.Concealmentremainscharacteristic of that denial by which it [Being] keeps to itself."41Insofaras individualsstand in the actual, concrete world, they do so throughthe absence of Being. The withdrawalof Being is the enabling capacity and openness in which the meaningfulworld appears.This is why,Heideggerinsists,"theattemptto grasp this Being as if it were a being yields emptiness.Being is not simplyhidden;it withdrawsand conceals itself.'42 Dallmayrsuggeststhat it would be a mistaketo think of ontologicaljoining as a metaphysicalframeworkor totalizingsystem. statusof "Whatpreventssuch totalization'," Dallmayrnotes, "isthe present-absent in Being,implicit Being'swithdrawal."43 It is impossibleforany individualto overcomethis formof radical,existential passivityAs Heideggernotes, ...the clearing is the clearing for self-concealment,and, above all, the clearingof beingsis not somethingwe ourselvesmerelythinkor represent.On the contrary,it is something in which we ourselves stand and apparently nothingof our own doing.Westand in this clearingin such a way that it first opens for us a relationto beings-and to ourselves.44 Being is the awareness of human existence, how we are related, and our possibilities.As such, this openness,and the relationshipthatconstitutesit, is not some "thing"thatwe can thinkor cognitivelyrepresent.Noris our relationshipto Beinga productof our own cognitionor will to power.The relationshipbetween humanbeings and Being presupposeseach individual.As a disclosiverelationship, it makes it impossiblefor any individualto appropriateto itself complete masteryover its own being, or thatof others.The claim thatthe groundof one's existence is also simultaneouslyan abyss is preciselywhat sustainsHeidegger's characterizationof existence as becoming and thoroughly relational, and revealedthroughthe play of presencing-absencing.45 Affirmingthat Being is not reducibleto individualsubjectivityis the firststep in cultivatinga posturetowardexistence and others that reduces the drive to mastery.Ethicalco-beingis premisedon a postureof existence that is released fromthe desireto masterBeingand one thatis respectfulof the being of others. Releasemententails an alternativemode of Dasein'sstance towardBeing and others because it helps recoverthe primordialsense of nearnessand distance. 41. Heidegger, "AnaximanderFragment:'26.

178. 42. Heidegger,Basic Questionsof Philosophy, 43. Dallmayr, The Other Heidegger, 111.

44. Heidegger,BasicQuestionsof Philosophy179. 45. It is precisely the absence of a metaphysical ground that is timeless that gives rise to the possibility that "the ground of humanity must therefore be grounded through humanity as ground" (Heidegger, Basic Questions of Philosophy 179).

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Appreciationof ontological joining helps individualsrecover the essence of nearnessand distance because of the distinctivemannerin which spatialityis opened. Throughawarenessof its place in ontologicaljoining, the individual bearswitnessto the enablingcapacityof Being,but does so withoutthe desireto masterit, or make it its own. Beingretainsits distance,its difference.Nearnessis opened throughour care for Being, and distance, as well as difference(from Being), is maintainedand respected as irreducible.Ratherthan aggressively competingwith others,we come to see others,as Thielenotes,as "coinhabitants of the worldwho requirecaringaccompaniment,who are to be escorted."46No longermasterof the self,others,and earth,humanbeingscome to see themselves as the caretakersof a set of relationshipsin and throughwhich theyare revealed. TheSecondMovementof Presencing-Absencing: Daseinand Death The phenomenologyof presencing-absencingis not constitutedby a single moment, but ratherthrough multiple, mutuallyreinforcingrelationshipsthat reveal the ethical natureof human beings. In ontologicaljoining,we saw how each individual,as it takes up its projectsand goals, comes to understandits existence throughthe withdrawaland absence of Being. The recoveryof this awarenessis, however,oftenobscuredby ourveryinvolvementwiththe everyday world.Consumedwith our workand projects,we often become entrenchedin the presentness,and immediacy,of ourselves,others,and things.To this end, we often fail to rememberthe significancethat absence plays in the perpetually unfoldingflow of our lives and our relationto others. However,there is another,more immanentopportunityfor humanbeings to become sensitive to the flow of presencing-absencing:reflectionon our own Death.Likethe self'srelationshipwith Being,death, with its alwaysoutstanding and deferredcharacter,is constitutiveof our way to be, and thereforesignificant to understandinghuman existence. As White has noted, ". . .that essence, as Heideggercomes to see more and more, has to do with finitude:coming into presence,passinginto absence."47 ForHeidegger,death is not simplysomethingthat occurs at the end of one's life, norcan it be reducedto the biologicalend of life. Inkeepingwiththe special statusthatHeideggeraffordsto humanbeings,it is importantto emphasizethatof all thingsthatexist,onlywe die.48Becausewe are throwninto the world,wherein 46. Thiele,TimelyMeditations, 181. 47. White,PoliticalTheoryand Postmodernism, 58. 48. Heidegger, Being and Time,229-31. Heidegger makes the claim that only Dasein dies because he believes that Dasein is that being for whom its Being is an issue. It is precisely because my being is an issue for me, and that my being is finite, that no considerations of existence and ethics can ignore the question of death.

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we always-already find ourselvesunderway,an essentialaspect of our existence is characterizedby open-ended possibilities.Indeed, in both practical, and ontologicalways,we understandourselvespurelyin termsof our possibilitieswhat Heideggercalls our potentiality-of-being. Therefore,so long as we exist, or some something, possibility,is alwaysoutstandingwith respect to our being. ForHeidegger,deathsignifiesthe most radicalpossibilityof each individual,one thatis alwaysbeyond its grasp.As radicalpossibility,death mustremainforus an As a possibilitythat is ever impending,we have our "notever-present"not-yet." thatcan never be actualized,since deathsignifies yet"in the formof a "will-be" the loss of our being-there. To be humanmeans to have being-towards-death as our way to be: As long as Daseinis, somethingis alwaysstilloutstanding,whatit can and will be. Butthe "end"itselfbelongs to what is outstanding.The "end"of being-inthe-worldis death .... A constantunfinishedqualitythus lies in the essence of the constitutionof Dasein.49 As an unfinished quality,death belongs to Dasein as the not-yet achieved possibilitythat inheres in the being of Dasein. As Heideggerstates, "Dasein always-already exists in such a way that its not-yet belongs to it ... [t]he most extreme not-yethas the characterof somethingto which Dasein relates"50The

always present "not-yet"of death situates each individual in the play of its presencing-absencingbetween life and death. Dasein'sbeing-towards-death, Dasein to to learn relate to the most form radical of "not-yet,"requires own death. Death for the is, Dasein, (im)possibility-its possibility of impossibility51 Heideggercalls learningto relatecourageouslytowardone's death resoluteness. "Resoluteness," Heideggerwrites,"does not detach Dasein fromits world, nor does it isolate it as a free floatingego. Resolutenessbringsthe self rightinto its being. . . and pushes it toward concerned being-withwith the others"'52 Confrontingthe always impending "not-yet"of our existence transformsour understandingof ourselves, and others, by challenging our will-to-power. Resolutenessentails confrontinglimits-of reason, control, and being. These limitsforce us to experiencethe precariousnessof our powerand the fragilityof our existence. "Attentive concern for otherness'," Whitewrites, "meansthat the gestureof nearing,bringinginto one'spresence,into one'sworld,mustalwaysbe complementedby a lettinggo, an allowanceof distance,a lettingbe in absence, 49. 50. 51. 52.

Heidegger, Being and Heidegger, Being and Heidegger, Being and Heidegger, Being and

Time, 215-16 and 219-20. Time, 226, 231. Time, 242. Time, 274.

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death helps releaseus from thusbearingwitnessto ourown limits1'53 Confronting the desire to manage formsof closure,impossibility, and absence. An importantconsequence of confrontingdeath is greaterawarenessof the hope and sufferingof others.Releasingoneself into the happeningof the absentpresenttrace of death facilitatesa mode of thinkingthat bringsothers near in ethicallysignificantways. "Themostdramaticopeningtowardsotherness... was human 'being-towards-death'. .. as an unsurpassablepossibility,death also renders Dasein sensitive to the existentialpossibilitiesof others.'54Othersare broughtnear throughour existentialconcern with death.The self-estrangement that is partof the experienceof deathopens us to the existence of others,others who are also disclosed throughfinitude.Death is not only a condition we all it is the conditionthatconditionsour presence.The share,but more importantly, we to death-and we are always relatingtowardfinitudein some relate way in the manner which we take up our being-in-the-world-withway-determines others.WhatI wish to emphasizeis the shared,and irreduciblyrelational,nature of the world that is opened through reflection on death. From an ethicoontological standpoint, becoming open to such possibilitiesentails bearing witnessto the radicalbelonging-together that is the conditionof our existence. The ThirdMovementof Presencing-Absencing: Differanceand Identity The third moment of presencing-absencingis revealed through Derrida's notion of differance.I arguethat differanceextends Heidegger'sinsightinto the ethicalsignificanceof ourway of being,and thereforeshouldbe readas another moment in the phenomenologyof presencing-absencing.Reading differance in this way providesan opportunityto extend Heidegger'sethical understanding of nearnessand distance to individualidentity,and the individual'srelationto others. Before going on, however, it is necessary to rehearse some fundamental Derrideanthemes in order to clarifyhow I interpretand utilize them. Derrida coins differanceto describe how he understandsthe movementof signification, language,and the experienceof subjectivityitself.Differancerefersto the spatial and temporalmovementof differentiationand deferral.Derridaarguesthat no word has meaningin and of itself,but rathereach word serves as a markerof signification. Furthermore,the meaning of each sign is generated by the differencebetween it and otherwords. Derridawrites:"thesignifiedconcept is never presentin and of itself,in a sufficientpresence that would referonly to itself.Essentiallyand lawfully,everyconcept is inscribedin a chain or in a system 53. White, Political Theory and Postmodernism, 67. 54. Dallmayr, The OtherHeidegger, 151.

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within which it refersto the other,to otherconcepts, by means of a systematic A word'smeaning is furthercodified by its juxtaposition play of differences.'55 or with, relationshipto, otherwordsin a structuraland temporalchain regulated by rulesof grammar. Moreover,the happeningof differanceis not limitedto the movementof the spokenand writtenword,it also infectsand disruptsthe verycenterof individual autonomyand identity.Differanceextends beyond the field of "semio-linguistic and conditionsthe "entirefield of what philosophywould call communicationS' experience,even the experienceof being. . .."56As the playof spatialdifference and temporaldeferral,differanceis, for Derrida,an account of the conditionsof subjectivityin general.Differanceis an irreducibleelement in the webbing of This is why Derridaclaims thatwhat is named in the present(even subjectivity. identity), always include its differential,or non-present(absent), Other.The ubiquityof the absent-presenttrace of the Other,and its relationto the self, constitutesthe linguisticmomentin the phenomenologyof Dasein'spresencingabsencing.Callingattentionto the circulationof self and Otherin the primordial play of identity,Derridawrites: Fromthe very beginningof Greekphilosophythe self-identityof the logos is alreadyfissuredand divided.. .. Moreover,the rapportof self-identityis always a rapportof violence with the other;so that the notions of...appropriation and self-presence,so central to logocentric metaphysics,are essentially dependent on an oppositionalrelationwith otherness.In this way, identity presupposesalterity.57 The absent-presenttrace of the Otherpresupposesindividualidentity.Differance calls our attentionto the always-already circulatingeconomy of differencesthat constituteidentityand withwhich identityalwayshas some relation.The radical play of differance,the primordialplay of presencing-absencingout of which identityis struck,providesthe individualan opportunityto bear witness to the nearnessof the otheras an irreducibleelementof its own identity58 Therefore,for Derrida,the experience of self always takes the form of a spatio-temporal 55. Jacques Derrida, "Differance:'in Marginsof Philosophy trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982), 11. 56. Jacques Derrida, Limited Inc., trans. Samuel Weber (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1988), 9. 57. Jacques Derrida, "Interviewwith Richard Kearney,"in Dialogues with ContemporaryContinental Thinkers(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984), 117. 58. It is important to note that Derrida is not denying the empirical fact, nor the significance of, our subjectivity As Derrida insists: I have never said that the subject should be dispensed with. Only that it should be deconstructed. To deconstruct the subject does not mean to deny its existence. There are subjects, 'operations' or

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relationshipwith the Other.Differancerevealsin yet anotherway the fact thatour being is being-with-others. However,underthe swayof metaphysics,ratherthana sensitivityto the other, what develops is a dismissalof the otherand a belief in absoluteautonomyand self-presence. Derrida calls this form of subjectivity logocentrism. As an interpretationof subjectivity grounded in the certainty of self-presence, logocentrismgovernsthe mannerin which we negotiateour nearnessto, and distancefrom,others.Fromthe logocentricpointof view,distancefromthe other is constitutedthroughthe absolute autonomy of the agent, and nearness is equated with the desire to bring things and others under increasingcontrol Logocentrismisolates,and organizes,the happeningof throughtechno-reason.59 differencein specific, and the concert of presencing-absencingin general.The consolidationof identity,and the push to solidifyself-presence,obscures one's primordialrelationshipwith the other that is revealed through differance (linguisticpresencing-absencing). Deconstructinglogocentricsubjectivityis importantbecause the essence of cannotbe realized nearnessand distancethatcharacterizesourbeing-with-others from the perspective of logocentrism.For Derrida, (re)calling the relation between the self and other, and cultivatingcare for it, constitutesa form of Speakingabout the responsibilitythat deconstrucoriginalethical responsibility. tion reveals,Derridawrites: and the most We are alreadycaught,surprised.. . in a certainresponsibility, ineluctableof responsibilities-Weare investedwith an undeniableresponsibilityat the momentwe begin to signifysomething.. .. Andwe see it coming fromthe Other.It is assignedto us by the Other,fromthe Other,before any permitsus to assume this responsibilityin the space hope of reappropriation of what could be called autonomy.6

fact.Toacknowledgethisdoes not mean,however, 'effects'of subjectivityThisis an incontrovertible substanceor identity,some thatthe subjectis whatit saysit is.Thesubjectis notsome meta-linguistic pure cogito of self-presence;it is alwaysinscribedin language.Myworkdoes not...destroy the with Kearney," 124] subject;it simplytriesto resituateit. [Derrida,"Interview claimthatthe subjectmaynot be whatit thinks, Withrespectto the facticityof the subject,and Derrida's that claimin Beingand Timeregardingthe modeof inauthenticity we can see the parallelsto Heidegger's each Daseinassumesby virtueof its thrownnessinto the world.It is not the case, for Heideggeror Derrida,thatcriticalquestioningof the natureof humanexistenceconstitutesa denial of the subject. Ratherthanreadingdeconstructionas a levelingassaulton subjectivity perse, I arguethatwe interpret disclosuredeconstructionfromthe pointof view of the fullphenomenologyof presencing-absencing, as it relatesto ethical co-being.For Derrida,like Heidegger,the withdrawal,and nearness-distance ethical opening to the other is found in recognizing the limits of the possible and releasing oneself from the desire to foreclose the play of presencing-absencing. 59. White, Political Theory and Postmodernism, 67. 60. Jacques Derrida, The Politics ofFriendship, trans. George Collins (New York:Verso, 1997), 231-32.

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Derrida'sphrase, "the most ineluctable of responsibilities,"is specific and strategic.Ineluctablemeans "inescapable:'and "incapableof being evaded." Here,Derridais speakingto the a priorihappeningof differance,and the role it plays in the constructionof meaning and subjectivityDifferanceassigns us a responsibilitythat cannot be evaded; it is inescapablebecause identityitself is disclosed in a structureof responsibilityopened in language.We are invested, Derridainsists,with a formof radicalresponsibilityat the momentwe respondto the Other-at the moment we say yes. In language, we always-alreadyfind ourselves caught up in a circulationof responsible involvementdue to the relationalgroundof meaning,significance,and the ethical gravityof language itself.Speakingdeliversus into a structureof involvementand concern thatbinds us in mutualresponsibilitybecause our possibilitiesare defined in and through that opening. It is an excessive assignationbecause, as Derridaargues, "[t]hat which comes beforeautonomymust.. .also exceed it, that is, succeed it, survive no autonomy, it, and indefinitelysurpassit."61Thereis no formof responsibility, no will thatstands outside the economy of differences.The intertwiningof self and other that happens ecstaticallywith the fact of subjectivity,and alwaysalready circulatesthroughlinguisticexpression,constitutesa radical form of responsibility. As the happening of linguistic presencing-absencing that names the individual,then binds him or her to the other, differanceis the linguistic dimensionof Heidegger'sontologicaljoining,and as such, extends Heidegger's ethics directlyto the relationshipbetween the self and Other.As is the case with ontological joining, where Dasein is delivered over to a belonging and responsibilityto Being, differanceassigns us our responsibility,a responsibility Derridabelieves is conveyed in the call of the Other.ApplyingHeidegger's we see that analysisof the withdrawalof Beingto Derrida'saccount of differance, the affect of singularidentityis actualizedin and throughthe withdrawalof the Other.As the othernessof differancewithdraws,ever more powerfulclaims to autonomyand personalidentityare asserted.Indeed,the deep self is constituted in and throughthe absence of the Other.Ultimately,we believe ourselves to be morallyautonomousand self-presentby virtue of the degree of absence, exclusion,and distanceof the Otherfromthe innerrealmof the self. But, as was the case with the relationshipbetween Being and Dasein, the withdrawalof the Otheris nevercomplete,normasteredby the individual.Andit is here thatI wantto extend Heidegger'sanalysisof the ethicalgravitycreatedby the withdrawalof Being to Derrida'sinjunctionto (re)call the absent-present traceof the Other.ForDerrida,(re)calling,or rememberingto hear,the call of the Otherconstitutesa way of pointingtowardand caringforthe actualOtherin and 61. Derrida, The Politics of Friendship,232.

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throughits withdrawal.In hearing,and respondingto, the call of the Other,we allowourselvesto be carriedalongin the draftof ethicalgive-and-take. Thecall of the Otheris the ethical gravitythatdrawsout our answer,our response,and our Disclosedin and throughlanguage,the self has responsibilityas its responsibility. to be. We do not possess responsibility, but ratherare, responsible. way Similarto the relationshipbetween the self and Being, and one's stance towarddeath, the ethical imperativerevealedthroughdifferanceconsists in the self's ability to resist the temptationto deny or dominate the interdependent relationbetween self and other.This entailsthat we respect the significanceof difference,combinedwith an acknowledgmentof the structureof responsibility thatopens and bindsthe possibilityof differenceitself.Inthisway,differancecalls our attentionto the mannerin which the otheris simultaneouslyvery near (in its essence as alterityin and throughdifferance),and yet respectfullydistant(in its existence as actual Other). With regard to the relationshipbetween ethical dwellingand language,I suggestthatdifferanceradicalizesHeidegger'sclaimthat: "Languageis the house of Being.In its home man dwells.Thosewho thinkand those who create with words are the guardiansof this home.'62The origin of ethics is dwelling.Languageis the primordialhome within which we ethically dwell:thatis, it governsthe way in which we bringothersnearwhile respecting theirdistance.

The Politics of Dwelling Politicsalways depend on the fundamental,philosophicalclaims we make about who we are. Regardingthe question of whether or not Heidegger's philosophygives rise to perniciouspolitical forces, Thiele writes, "ontological difference is the foundation on which the acknowledgementof political difference-that of humanotherness-ultimatelyrests."63Ithas been my purpose, so far,to demonstratehow ethical care, revealedthroughontologicaldifference, is reinforcedby reflectionon deathand Derrida'snotion of differance.Heidegger and Derrida'saccountof humanexistenceoperatesto lessen the emphasison the autonomousindividualas the source of objectivelyfreeactionand thought.Such thinkingseeks to transformour metaphysicalconception of the self fromone of solitaryisolationand possessivemastery,to an awarenessof the being-with-others thatdefines our existence. Recognizingboth thatour existence is characterized by shareddisclosureof meaningand possibilities,and that there are existential limitsto humanmasteryand control,necessarilychanges how we act politically 62. Heidegger, "Letteron Humanism,' 217. 63. Thiele, TimelyMeditation, 161.

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ForHeidegger,the beginningof a politicsof dwellingstartswith an alternative conception of freedom. Heidegger'sunderstandingof freedom undergoes a dramaticevolutionfromBeing and Timeto his laterworks.In Being and Time, Heideggerspeaks of "freeing"things in their nature.To free an entity literally means to disclose its meaningand significancein the world by using it in the context and relationshipsto which it belongs. "Tolet something be relevant meansto let thingsat hand be in such and such a way in. . .takingcare of things, to let thembe as theyare and in orderthatthey be such."64InBeingand Time,this is most clearlydemonstratedthroughHeidegger'sdiscussion of the workshop. WhenHeideggerdiscussesthe "freeing" of thingshe is mostlyreferringto objects and things.WhileHeideggerdoes speak of the "freeing"of one humanbeing by another in Being and Time,there is no developed, sustaineddiscussion of the ethical and politicalimplications. Whatseparatesthe discussionof "freeing"in Beingand Timefromthatof the laterworksis the lateressays'focus on the ethical-ontologicalrelationsbetween humanbeings. In his laterworks,Heideggerspeaks to the "freeing"of othersto live and pursuetheirprojectsin a worldof sharedmeaning.ForHeidegger,there is a direct relationshipbetween the ethics of dwelling and the disclosure of freedom. On this account, freedom denotes not the egoistic pursuitof one's privateinterests,but refersto the way and ease with which othersare allowedto come to presence, appear,and be as they are. "Freedomis not what common sense is content to let pass under the name: the randomabilityto do as we please..,. freedom is participationin the revealment of what-is-as-such."65 Freedom is not simply the expression of individualwill, but rathercare-full participationin the giftof possibilities.Whenwe bearwitnessto thisdonation,we let others be in and throughtheir possibilities,and act in such a way that we preserveand sparethe gift itself.Freedomdenotes a particularunderstandingof one's disclosurein a worldof meaningfulrelationshipsand mutualpossibilities. In takingup freedom,then, one not only considershis/herown activityand situation,but also recognizesthat freedomis manifestwithina sharedspace of mutualdisclosure. To free reallymeans to spare.The sparingitself consists not only in the fact that we do not harm the one whom we spare. Real sparingis something positive and takes place when we leave somethingbeforehandin its own nature,when we returnit specificallyto its being,when we "free"it in the real sense of the word into a preserveof peace.66 64. Heidegger, Being and Time, 79. 65. Martin Heidegger, Existence and Being (Washington DC: Regnery Gateway, 1949), 307. 66. Heidegger, "Building, Dwelling, Thinking:' 149.

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We free someone when we acknowledgethat the world in which we act and pursue our goals is a shared world. It is not a world that I objectivelyor accidentallysharewith others.To free and spare in a primordialsense meansto resistthe temptationto dominatethe social space and bringothersunderone's control. While Heidegger'saccount of freedom is evocative, it is, admittedly, ratherabstract. In orderto groundHeidegger'sconcept of freedom,I wantto employDerrida's notion of differanceand the DemocraticHospitalityit gives rise to. I arguethat Derrida'sdifferanceacts as a furthercheck against the claim that Heidegger's philosophytranslatesinto a nationalisticor totalitarianpolitics.Derridaprovides yet anotherway to resistthe tendency in humanbeings to turn inwardtoward ethnic and nationalisticpolitics. The human difference that deconstruction reveals resists the desire to reduce politics to a pure language, identity,and history.Therefore,I contendthatDerrida'snotionof DemocraticHospitalityis the politicalexpressionof Heidegger'saccount of the ontologicaldifference. One of the centralissues facingdemocraticpoliticsis how to create a social and political arena that is as welcoming and open to the foreigner(Other)as possible,while at the same time remaininga cohesive,sovereignstate governed by laws and institutions.ForDerrida, ... there [is] an insolubleantinomy... between,on the one hand, Thelawof unlimitedhospitality(to givethe new arrivalall of one'shome and oneself,our own, withoutaskinga name or compensation...), and on the otherhand,the laws (in the plural),those rightsand duties that are alwaysconditionedand conditional,as they are definedby the... family,civil society,and the state.67 TheLawof Hospitalityentailsan unconditionalofferingto the foreigner.Yet,in orderto give at all, to be hospitable,requiresthat one be sovereignof what is offered.The tension in DemocraticHospitalityarises in the aporiabetween the command to give unconditionally,while at the same time, retainingpolitical power over what, and how, resources and rights are defined. There is an inescapable tension between the infinite demand to give, and the concrete, factualconditionsof all politicaldecisions.As Derridaconceives it, the concrete laws and institutionsof politics,as well as the rightsand obligationsof citizens, constitutethe "lawsof hospitality," and are made possibleby the infinite"Lawof The Lawof Hospitality, like Heidegger'sconception of the relation Hospitality."68 between the individual and Being (ontological difference), is a mode of disclosurethat is infinite,and one thatcan neverbe masteredby,or reducedto, 67. Jacques Derrida, OfHospitality,trans. Rachel Bowlby (Stanford University Press, 2000), 77. 68. Derrida, Of Hospitality,77.

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the politics of any given historicalor culturalmoment.It is the ethical claim of differancethat firstopens, and then sustains,the (in)finite gift of Democratic Hospitalityand the promiseof politicaljustice.The political responsibilitythat attends the (in)finite giving of DemocraticHospitalityderives from Derrida's notion of languageand subjectivity.One is politicallyresponsibleto the Other because one's relationshipto the Otheris predicatedon a mode of experience that precedes the free will and legal identityof the individual."Letus say yes,' Derridawrites, "towho [ever] turnsup, before any determination,before any whetheror not it has to do witha foreigner, anticipation,beforeany identification, an immigrant,an invitedguest, or an unexpected visitor...69 democracyas the politicalsite of TheLawof Hospitalityprovides Interpreting an alternativewayof thinkingaboutthe issuesof rights,laws,and membershipin the democraticcommunityWe can get a concrete view of what Democratic Hospitality entails by applying it to a current, hotly debated political controversy-the question of whetheror not to give driver'slicenses to illegal immigrants.FromCaliforniato Georgia,communitiesand states are faced with this very difficultpolitical dilemma. The concrete political facts are straightforward.There are millions of individualswho "reside"in cities and states throughoutthe UnitedStateswho do not possessproperlegaldocumentation.For the most part,they are here to stay-America is their "home"'Theyare here to stay because they work in, and contributesignificantlyto, the local, state, and nationaleconomy In addition,they contributesignificantlyto the ethnic and culturalrichness of Americansociety Moreover,their children attend public schools and participateas young membersof the communityThe politicalfacts are that millionsof people "reside"here, work here, and are integralmembers of the political "community." In California,for example,there are approximately"2.5millionundocumented residents,2 million [which are] drivingage."'70Those who advocate giving driver'slicenses to illegalresidentsdo so mainlyfor reasonsof publicsafetyand legal accountabilityGivinglicenses to illegal residentshelps insure that they knowthe rulesof the roadand complywith insurancerequirements.Thosewho oppose the legislationdo so because they believe that illegal immigrationis a serious economic and political problem,and they do not want to "reward lawbreakers" by extendingto them a tacit recognitionof legitimacyAcrossthe nation,legislationthatwould give driver'slicenses to illegal residentshas been defeated. However,simply defeatingthe legislationdoes not solve the political problem,and I suggest that the standardmodel for arguingthe meritsof the 69. Derrida, Of Hospitality 77. 70. Ed Mendel, "Bill would let Illegal Immigrants get Licenses7' San Diego Union-Tribune,April 2, 2003.

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debate-the model of legal citizenship based on birth or naturalization-is insufficientto fullygraspthe dilemma. The presenceof these fellowresidents,and the politicaldebatesunleashedby the fact that they make Americatheir "abode,'forces us to rethinkthe way we of individuals,and what it means to be a part interpretwho we are, the "rights" of a political community.Derivingfrom the conception of ethics revealed in Heidegger'sand Derrida'sthought,DemocraticHospitalityrequiresthatwe "say yes" to "whoever shows up." At the most fundamental level, Democratic Hospitalityrequiresthat we recognizethe Otheras being here,with us, and for whom she is. Ethicalresponsibility,and the "yes"of DemocraticHospitality,is is disclosed priorto the possessionof rights.The most primordialformof "right" in and throughthe linguisticand politicalspace opened by the call of the Other, and the question of the foreigner.The command to respond, the "right"to respond, and the mutual responsibilityconveyed back and forth are simultaneous withthe determinationof identity-whetheras citizenor foreigner.Finding oneself always-already withinthe community,speakingits language(s),responding to its demands of personal and civic responsibility,and calling upon the is itself communityto live up to its own commitmentto protectionand prosperity, the most primordialformof rightfully belonging. Therefore,it is the unsurpassablerecognitionof the Otherthat opens the politicaldomain.Onlyonce the Otherhas been recognizedas being-here-with-us, in thiscommunity,and as essentialto the economic, cultural,and politicalvitality of the community,can the detailsaboutrulesand lawsand politicsbe negotiated. But, as it now stands, the Other lacks this sort of fundamentalrecognition. Lacking"legal"standing,the millions of Othersare marginalizedin a sort of ambiguouseconomic and politicalnetherworld.Indeed,it is the veryambiguous, adumbratedlife they live on the marginsof the communitythatnot only adds to theirlackof recognition,but also frustratesthe attemptat politicalsolution.Now, it is importantto stressthat DemocraticHospitalitywill not provideus with an easy solutionto thisproblem.Norwill readingHeideggerand Derridatell us how to legislate,or "decide'," the issue. Partof the politicalimportof deconstructionis the way it remindsus that,forjusticeto be served,each case mustbe recognized individuallyEach legal and political decision is always made in a sort of "madness"of the political moment. As Derridanotes, "we will always be threatenedby this dilemmabetween,on the one hand,unconditionalhospitality that dispenseswith law,duty,even politics, and, on the other hand, hospitality circumscribedby law. .. Wewill have to negotiateconstantlybetweenthese two extensionsof the concept of hospitalityas well as language.71WhatDemocratic Hospitalitydoes do is deepen our understandingof what is at stake in this issue. 71. Derrida, Of Hospitality 135.

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258 ETHICSAND POLITICSOF DWELLING

Byshiftingthe paradigmwithwhichwe interpretourselves,and our relationships with others,we open up new ways of articulatingthe politicalproblemswe face, and hopefullycreate new solutionsto these problems.It is in this way,I believe, thatDerrida'saccount of the relationshipbetween the Lawof Hospitalityand the laws and duties of democraticcitizenshippoliticizes the ethical responsibility revealedin the three momentsof presencing-absencing.

Conclusion As I read Heideggerand Derrida,ethicalsensitivityflows throughour way of being. Ethicsis not an abstract,objectiveconditionthatwe seek throughreason or rules, but a webbing of relationshipsheld together by the care and responsibilitythatfirstdiscloseswho we are, and then extendsfromus to others. Ethics is a circulatingeconomy of care and involvement.For Heidegger,this circulatingcare is revealed throughour capacity to dwell, which entails the cultivationof human relationshipsand the building of houses and structures intendedto shelterand nourishthose relationships.Dwellingentailsrecognizing the coming and passingof others, a letting-beof their essential natures,and a respect for their plans and projects.We do this by resistingthe temptationto controland dominatethe space and possibilitiesof the worldin which we live. Butsuch a way of being and relatingto others is frustratedby metaphysical conceptionsof subjectivityand politics.Tocounterthis perspective,and prepare the groundforethicalco-beingand democratichospitality,I have arguedthatwe come to see ourselves, others, and the world as disclosed through three, simultaneousmodes of presencing-absencing.Ethical co-being is cultivated when we recognizethat our life and possibilitiesare shaped by the donationof presenceand the withdrawalof Being,by the giftof identityopened in differance, and throughour alwaysimpending,but absentdeath.The ethicalsignificanceof find this way of thinkingis revealedthroughthe realizationthat I always-already for in a sustained the ethical of what comes shared world, gravity caring myself by to presence and what passes away.In addition,ethical sensitivityis awakened throughthe awarenessthat what withdrawsinto absence-Being, the Other,or my own death-must alwaysremainbeyond my grasp,beyond my rationaland technologicalmastery.Facingthe limits of our power,and the fragilityof our existence, we are made sensitive to the existentialand political concerns of others. Such a way of thinkingreveals that we are alreadyshaped by ethics, responsibleby virtueof our way of being.

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