THE EXISTENCE AND

OF GOD, NATURAL THEOLOGY CHRISTIAN WOLFF*

There is a good deal of agreement among contemporary philosophers to the effect that the question of the existence of God should be assigned to the province of philosophy of religion. This is, however, by no means an absolute arrangement, especially since philosophy of religion is a relative newcomer as a distinct philosophic discipline. 1 An older tradition - though again not one which exhausts the history of philosophy - would resolve the problem of the existence of God in a body of knowledge called "natural theology." This science (as it is usually called) of natural theology is a familiar and venerable member of many schemas of the parts of philosophy. Particularly in Catholic circles, it was alive and vital in the textbooks just a few short years ago, and there are some signs of its rebirth in the last few years. 2 Our purpose here is to consider Some of the salient features of * Editor's Note : This paper was presented to the Society for Philosophy of Religion at the a n n u a l meeting, M a r c h , 19731 Cf.,William P. A l s t o n , " P h i l o s o p h y o f R e l i g i o n , Problemsof,"EncyclopediaofPhilosophy, V I , 285: " T e r m 'philosophy of religion' is a relative newcomer to the philosophical lexicon, b u t w h a t is now so designated is as old as philosophy itself." I n his " I n t r o d u c t i o n " to David H u m e ' s The Natural History of Religion (Stanford: Stanford University Press, I957), 7, H. E. Root offers the following observation: " I t could well be claimed that H u m e ' s two c o m p l e m e n t a r y works, The Natural History of Religion a n d the Dialogues ConcerningNatural Religion, m a r k the beginning of w h a t is now generally, if loosely referred to as the philosophy of religion." J a m e s Collins offers substantiation for a similar claim covering the period 173o-I 83o a n d its central thinkers, H u m e , K a n t , a n d Hegel, in his massive study of The Emergenceof Philosophy of Religion (New H a v e n : Yale University Press, i967). T h e plethora of nineteenth a n d twentieth-century textbooks on natural theology, philosophy of God, or metaphysics (with a substantial section on God as first cause or s u p r e m e being) need hardly be reviewed here. Perhaps the most p r o m i n e n t recent work on n a t u r a l theology (although the nomenclature has once again been altered) is J a m e s Ross, Philosophical Theology (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, I969). Ross comments that "the beginnings of a n analytic reconstruction of scholastic natural theology are w h a t will be found in this book" (p. vii).

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"natural theology" as it is exemplified in the philosophy of one of its best-known proponents, Christian Wolff (1679-I 754). Untbrtunately, Wolff is known more by reputation than as a result of direct study? Since it is not possible to expose the whole of his thought within the limits of this paper, we will limit our scope to two central topics: ~) Wolff's explicit statements about the role and character of natural theology; and 2) his twin proofs of the existence of God. Historically, this investigation is directly intended to cast some light on Wolff and the intellectual currents which dominated those relatively obscure decades in Germany during the second quarter or so of the eighteenth century. Indirectly, this effort will reflect backwards on Descartes and Leibniz, and forwards towards Kant's critique, as well as to the later manual traditions which continued to draw (often covertly) on the resources judged to be provided by Wolff. Problematically, we will seek in the conclusion to suggest some of the implications of this sort of approach and framework for a contemporary philosophical consideration of the existence of God.

I. WOLFF~S CONCEPTION OF NATURAL THEOLOGY

In his Preliminary Discourse on Philosophy in General (I 728) Wolff defines natural theology as "the science of those things which are possible through God. ''4 This definition is presented as a specific The last general study of Wolff's thought is Mariano Campo, Cristiano Wolff e il razionalismo precritico (2 vols. ; Milan: V i t a e Pensiero, 1939). In English there is little to recommend beyond Frederick Copleston, S. J., A History of Philosophy, Vol. VI: Wolff to Kant (London :Burns & Oates, 196o), i o 5- I 14, and Lewis White Beck, Early German Philosophy : Kant and His Predecessors (Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press, I969), 256-275. Wolff's natural theology is considered by Paul August Heilemann, Die Gotteslehre des Christian Wolff: Versuch einer Darstellung und Beurteilung (Leipzig: Seele & Co., 19o7), and Harry Levy, Die Religionsphilosophie Christian Wolff's (Regensburg: G. Aumfiller & Sohn, 1928), but these dissertations will now be supplanted by Anton Bissinger's fine new study, Die Struktur der Gotteserkenntnis : Studien zur Philosophie Christian Wolffs (Bonn: H. Bouvier, I97o). 4 Discursus pradiminaris de philosophia in genere, # 5 7 (P. 34) : "Theologia naturalis est scientia eorum, quae per Deum possibilia sunt." Page references and the English rendition are from the translation by Richard J. Blackwell, published as Wolff's Preliminary Discourse On Philosophy in General (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1963); the Latin text appears as a kind of preface to Wolff's Philosophia rationalis sive logica methodo scientifica pertractata, et ad usum scientiarum atque vitae aptata (editio novissima emendatior; Verona: apud Haeredes Marci Moroni, 1779).

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instance of Wolff's general conception of philosophy, which is itself defined as "the science of the possibles insofar as they can be. ''5 As distinct from the historian who merely reports the facts or the mathematician who deals with the quantity of the facts, the philosopher gives the reasons of things which are or occur. Since one goal of philosophy is to attain complete certitude, these reasons must be set forth according to the method of scientific demonstration. GThis procedure advances "solely by the light of nature" as the adjective "natural" suggests, in contradistinction to the movement of a supernatural or revealed theology which takes its origin in the resources of Sacred Scripture and divine revelation. 7 Further, since the facts to be explained pertain to possible as well as to actual beings, the scope of philosophy must embrace both. Indeed, in Wolff's understanding the actual can truly and fully be grasped only through the possible. The thought behind this is that we can easily know what is actually present in a being if we already have demonstrated everything that is possible through its essence. Hence, philosophy is principally directed to the possible essence as the proper object of scientific knowledge and that through which the actual existent is

Discursus praeliminaris, ~r (p. I7): "Philosophia est scientia possibilium, quatenus esse possunt." Wolff's understanding of philosophy is examined in Hans Lfithje, "Christian Wolffs Philosophiebegriff," Kantstudien, 3~ (1925), 39-66, and Richard J. Blaekwell, "The Structure of Wolffian Philosophy," The Modern Schoolman, 38 ( 196 x), 2o3-218. On the goals of Wolff's philosophy see my article, "Certitude and Utility in the Philosophy of Christian Wolff," The Southwestern Journal of Philosophy, I (i97o), I33-x42. Questions of method are considered by H. J. de Vleeschauwer, "La gen~se de la m6thode math~matique de Wolf. Contribution ~ l'histoire des id6es an XVIIIe si~cle, "Revue Belge de Philologie et d'Histoire, I I (I932), 651-677 ; Giorgio Tonelli, "Der Streit fiber die mathematische Methode in der Philosophic in der ersten H~ilfte des I8. Jahrhunderts und die Entstehung yon Kants Schrift fiber die 'Deutlichkeit'," Archivfiir Philosophic, 9 (I959), 37-66; and Nicolao Merker, "Cristiano Wolff e la methodologia del razionalistoo," Rivista Critica di Storia della Filosofia, 22 (I967), 271-293, and 23 (i968), 21-38. Also helpful is Hans W. Arndt's introduction (pp. 7-Io2) to his edition of Wolff's Verniinftige Gedanken yon den Kriiften des menschliehen Verstandes und Ihrem richtigen Gebrauche in Erkenntnis der Wahrheit (Hildesheim: Georg Olms, I965; Text der 14, Auflage, I754). This volume is part of the new edition of Wolff's Gesammelte Werke (Abteilung I, Band i ) currently in progress; unfortunately, the major volumes which bear on this paper have not yet appeared. The phrase "solo naturae lumine" appears in Wolff's Theologia naturalis methodo scientifica pertractata. Pars prior integrum systema complectens, qua exsistentia et attributa Dei a po~teriori demonstrantur (editio novissima emendatior; Verona: apud Haeredes Marci Moroni, i779) , ~ i n (p. I), where Wolff offers a further account of his definition of natural theology.

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eventually realized and understood. The two things which are known to be possible through God are His attributes and the operations which occur through them. These, then, are the specific topics to be dealt with in natural theology. Because natural theology is a part of Wolff's metaphysics, these topics must be considered in the light of categories and principles demonstrated in the preceding parts of that discipline. These parts are: ontology, which deals with the most fundamental principles of Wolff's metaphysics (contradiction and sufficient reason) and the general notion of being; general cosmology, which examines the necessary structure of any possible world or universe; and psychology, which describes the essential nature of the h u m a n soul and man's cognitive powers. In addition, there are a number of methodic principles taken from Wolff's logic which also contribute to his natural theology. Once settled on the systematic foundation of his methodology and the earlier parts of his metaphysics, Wolff's natural theology constitutes the capstone of this first part of his philosophy (the other two principal parts are physics or natural philosophy and practical philosophy). As such, it elicits from Wolff the following h y m n of praise: "There is no more sublime philosophy than that which clearly demonstrates the highest perfections of the supreme divinity and how all things are in it, from it, and through it, and which completely roots out the profane thoughts of men concerning God and religion. ''~ If it can achieve these ends natural theology will itself become a firm base for teleology, practical philosophy, and religion. Furthermore, by firmly establishing the necessary existence of a wise, powerful, and good Creator, natural theology confirms the method and implicit theory of knowledge which has led us this far, and reaches back to provide a kind of existential and retrospective warrant for Wolff's views on being, world, and man expressed in the earlier sections of his metaphysics. 8 Theologia naturalis methodo scientifica pertractata. Pars posterior qua exsistentia et attributa Dei ex notione entis perfectissimi et nature animae demonstrantur, et atheismi, deismi,fatalismi, naturalismi, splnos#mi aliorumque de Deo errorumfundamenta subvertuntur (editio novissima emendatior; Verona: apud Haeredes Marci Moroni, I779), "Dedicatio" (unpaged): "Non datur sublimior Philosophia, quam quae summas Numinis supremi perfectiones, & quomodo in eo, ex eo, & per ipsum sint omnia, evidenter demonstrat, & profanas hominum de Deo ac religlone cogitationes ex eorum animis funditus extirpat."

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In terms of textual material, Wolff first dealt with the existence of God in detail in his German volume on metaphysics entitled Rational Thoughts on God, the World, and the Human Soul, and All Things in General (I 719). 9 The chapter " O n God" in this volume occupies the last IOO pages of the text. In his later Latin series, Wolffdeveloped a formal distinction between two methodic approaches to God somewhat similar to that expressed in his division between empirical and rational disciplines in psychology. As a result, two volumes ensued: Part I (the a posteriori approach) appeared in i736 , followed by Part II (the a priori approach) in 1737. Each volume treats the existence and attributes of God: Part I proceeds from the characteristics of the visible world around us, while Part II begins with the notion of a most perfect being and the nature of the h u m a n soul. Part II also contains a refutation of atheism and a wide variety of other erroneous positions concerning God. The question of the existence of God is touched upon in a number of Wolff's other writings, but we will largely rely on the two central Latin volumes which must be taken as the mature and definitive statement of his position.

2. T H E A POSTERIORI P R O O F OF T H E EXISTENCE OF GOD

Wolff's a posteriori proof of the existence of God is as follows : The h u m a n soul exists or we exist. Since nothing is without a sufficient reason why it is rather than is not, a sufficient reason must be given why our soul exists, or why we exist. Now this reason is contained in ourselves or in some other being diverse from us. But if you maintain that we have the reason of our existence in a being which, in turn, has the reason of its existence in another, you will not arrive at the sufficient reason unless you come to a halt at some being which does have the sufficient reason of its own existence in itself. Therefore, either we ourselves are the necessary being, Verniinfftige Gedancken yon Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen, auch allen Dingen iiberhaupt, den Liebhabern der Wahrheit mitgetheiIet (neue Auflage h i n u n d wieder vermehret; Halle im M a g d e b u r g i s c h e n : Rengerischen B u c h h a n d l u n g , i747). This volume is hereafter cited as the "Deutsche Metaphysik."

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or there is given a necessary being other and diverse from us. Consequently, a necessary being exists? ~ Two controlling themes give this argument its special Wolffian character. First, there is the typical reliance upon the principle of sufficient reason as the major premise. This is an example of what Wolff would describe as the systematic dependence of natural theology upon ontology. One problem which it raises is that this principle is defended and employed in earlier passages primarily with respect to concepts and the order of essences. Wolff insists throughout that the principle does apply to real existence, but the present argument is one of the few cases in which that usage is made explicit. Readers of Wolff's metaphysics will recall that his ontology and general cosmology are framed in terms of essential possibility, while the psychology contains only a cautious and characteristically hypothetical proof of the existence of the human soul. As a result, natural theology is the first real confrontation with existence in the Wolffian system and even that, to some extent, does not occur until the second part of the discipline. This has led at least one critic to maintain that the principle of sufficient reason cannot legitimately be applied as attempted in the present argument because of Wolff's hesitation or ambiguity on the precise philosophical status of our knowledge of existence. 11 This problem carries through to the existential affirmation in the minor premise, where it is joined to a further ambiguity concerning that which is asserted to exist. When Wolff states that "the human soul exists or we exist," does he mean to refer to a pure spirit, an 10 Theologia naturalis, I, # 2 4 (p. 13): " A n i m a h u m a n a existit seu nos existimus. Q u o n i a m nihil est sine ratione sufficiente, cur potius sit, q u a m n o n sit; ratio sufficiens d e t u r necesse est, cur a n i m a nostra existat, seu cur nos existamus. H a e c adeo ratio a u t in nobismetipsis continetur, a u t in ente q u o d a m alio a nobis diverso. Q u o d si ponas nos rationem existentiae habere in ente, q u o d d e n u a rationem existentiae suae in alio h a b e t ; n o n pervenietur ad r a t i o n e m sufficientem, nisi t a n d e m in ente aliquo subsistas, q u o d existentiae suae retionem suffieientem in seipso habet. A u t igitur nosmetipsi s u m u s ens necessarium, a u t d a t u r ens necessarium Mind a nobis diversum, consequenter ens necessarium existit." Cf., Deutsche Metaphysik, # 9 2 8 (pp. 574-575). 11 Cf., J a m e s Collins, God in Modern Philosophy (Chicago : H e n r y Regnery, 1959), 135-138. O n the principle of sufficient reason a n d its role in Wolff's metaphysics, see H a n s Pichler, Ueber Christian Wolffs Ontologie (Leipzig: Dtirr, i9io), 7 - i 7 , a n d J o h n Gurr, S . J . , The Principle of Sufficient Reason in Some Scholastic Systems, r75o-r9oo (Milwaukee: M a r q u e t t e University Press, 1959) , 31-49 .

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embodied but isolated soul, or a plurality of embodied selves in the visible world a r o u n d us ? Wolff's system affords some type of knowledge for each of these possible interpretations, but there is an obvious disequity between t h e m and between the modes of knowledge which they represent that would substantially affect the current argument. Wolff finds comfort in this, insofar as it permits him to claim t h a t "the demonstration of the present proposition is i n d e p e n d e n t of all the hypotheses of the philosophers. ''1~ As long as we know t h a t something exists, Wolff believes the a r g u m e n t can proceed. Another criticism which might be raised is the claim that the a r g u m e n t is insufficient because its conclusion does not address itself directly to the existence of a being called " G o d . " Wolff is prepared to meet this challenge by submitting a transition from the notion of a necessary being to the existence of that particular being which we call God. He argues t h a t a necessary being m a y be said to be self-sufficient with respect to existence because it does not require the support of any other being in order to exist. A necessary being exists in virtue of its own power and is, therefore, an e n s a s e or being "in and from itself." In Wolff's technical language, an e n s a s e - in contrast to an e n s a b a l i o - is a being which has the sufficient reason of its existence in its own essence. Once we recall the ontological principle that the essence of a being is the intrinsic source of its possibility, we can easily conclude t h a t the " e n s a s e exists, because it is possible. ''13 This is the true heart of Wolff's proof, since we conclude to existence precisely because we realize that a necessary being is an e n s a s e which must exist merely because of its possibility. Reflection on the h u m a n soul or world a r o u n d us is thus a precondition which makes it possible for us to come to this realization. T h e point to note is that the a r g u m e n t turns on the latter act, rather t h a n on the prior condition which provides its ostensibly empirical or a p o s t e r i o r i aspect. Thus, it is the second phase of the a r g u m e n t which is crucial because it contains the intuitive j u d g m e n t or insight into the essential determinations of the e n s a s e . Wolff is aware of the importance of his appeal to possibility as the ground of existence in the case of an e n s a s e and he is careful to 13 Theologia naturalis, I, ~ 2 4 n (p. I4) : "Praesentis adeo propositionis demonstratio ab

omni hypotesi philosophorum independens." 13 Ibid., 7r (P. i6): "Ens a se existit ideo, quia possibile."

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specify its nature and consequences. An e n s a se is possible because its essential constituents involve no contradiction; it exists because it possesses these particular essential determinations. The fact that its essential constituents explain both its possibility and its actual existence is the special "privilege" of an e n s a se. "And thus it is that existence is not inferred from possibility in general, nor is existence determined from possibility condidered in general or in itself. ''a4 Nevertheless, the argument may still be described as "covertly a p r i o r i . ''15 Existence is derived not a p o s t e r i o r i through an inference from a finite existent, but a p r i o r i from an analysis of the essence of a necessary being. 1~ We may suspect that Wolffwould not be overly troubled by this substitution of labels, for the method of argumentation and the logical principles which sustain it are fully in accord with his expressed philosophical methodology. The final step in the argument requires us to consider the possible candidates which might be identified with the e n s a se. They are the visible world itself, its elements, the human soul, or some other kind of being. The first three m a y be eliminated rather easily. A necessary existent cannot begin or cease to be in the fashion of a compound being such as the visible universe. Moreover, although the ultimate elements of the universe and the human soul are simple beings, they have also been shown to be contingent beings which are capable of annihilation. Hence, Wolff introduces a nominal definition of a new being, God, described as "the e n s a se in which is contained the sufficient reason of the existence of this visible world and of our souls. ''17 The arbitrariness in the framing of this definition is mitigated by two claims: I) that we have already proven the existence 1~ Ibid., # 3 4 n : " E t inde est, q u o d ex possibilitate in genere n o n concludatur existentia, nee existentia in genere a u t in se spectata possibilitate determinetur." 25 T h e phrase is Collins' (God in Modem Philosophy, p. I39). 16 For a n account of this process as it applies to Wolff's proof of the existence of the h u m a n soul, see R i c h a r d J. Blackwell, "Christian Wolff's Doctrine of the Soul," Journal of the History of Ideas, 22 (196I), 339-344. A somewhat different interpretation of Wolff's theory of j u d g e m e n t is a d v a n t e d by Lewis W h i t e Beck (op. cit., 263-265) , following Gottfriend M a r t i n w h o argues in the a p p e n d i x to the second edition of his Leibniz und Metaphysik (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, i967) , 2I 1-23 I, t h a t Wolff is further from the Leibnizian theory t h a n Blackwell's account would suggest. See also Winfried Lenders, Die analytische Begriffs- und Urteilstheorie yon G. W. Leibniz und Chr. Wo/fl'(Hildesheim: Georg Olms, I97I ). 1T Theologia naturalis, I, # 6 7 (p. 27) : "Per D e u m intelligimus ens a se, in quo continetur ratio sufficiens existentiae m u n d i hujus adspectabilis & a n i m a r u m n o s t r a r u m . " Cf., Deutsche Metaphysik, ~ 9 4 5 (P. 584) .

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of a necessary being and shown that it has the characteristics of an ens a se; and 2) that this definition is consistent with the minimal meaning for God set forth in Sacred Scripture. The reach of an a p o s t e r i o r i proof extends only to the formation of this nominal definition, which is intended to serve as a provisional guide for the next portion of the investigation. Knowledge of the real essence of God and a demonstration of its identity with this nominally defined existent must be left to the second or a p r i o r i part of Wolff's natural theology. For the present, it is sufficient for us to elicit such further characteristics of the divine ens a se as His eternity, incorruptibility, and spirituality, to name only three.

3" T H E A P R I O R I P R O O F OF T H E EXISTENCE OF GOD

Following an extended discussion of the various characteristics which are to be required of an ens a se that contains the sufficient reason of the visible universe, Wolff turns in his second volume to an a p r i o r i proof of the existence of God. This second argument takes its start in the definition of an ens p e r f e c t i s s i r n u m , described as that being "to which belong all compossible realities in the absolutely highest degree. ''is This definition and the argument which it generates turn upon four central concepts: "compossibility,.... reality," the question of degrees of "reality," and "existence." Things are said to be "compossible" when they can inhere in or belong to the same subject. T h a t is, compossibles must be possible both in themselves and in relation to each other. The term "reality" designates "whatever is truly understood to belong to some being, rather than that which seems to belong to it according to our confused perceptions. ''19 Realities are positive ontological components 18 Ibid., I1, # 6 (p. ~): "Ens perfectissimum dicitur, cui insunt omnes realitates compossibiles in g r a d u absolute s u m m o . " I t should be noted that, although Wolff refers to this a r g u m e n t s as an a priori demonstration, he also offers the tbllowing c o m m e n t : " E x notione igitur entis perfectissimi existentiam veri N u m i n i s demonstrare idem est ac e a n d e m ex contemplatione a n i m a e nostrae derivare, sicque demonstratlo non m i n u s a posteriori pror q u a m si ex contemplatione m u n d i hujus adspeetabilis derivatur, q u e m a d m o d u m parte p r i m a feelmus" (Ibid., Praefatio: unpaged). This has rightly led A n t o n Bissinger (op. cit., 26i) to speak o f " d i e unfibersehbare Doppelgesichtigkeit des A r g u m e n t s " ; it also suggests that the relationship between Wolff's two a r g u m e n t s requires careful consideration. 19 Ibid., # 5: "Realitatis nomine hic nobis venit, quicquid enti alicui vere inesse intelligitur, non vero per perceptiones nostras confi~sas inesse videtur."

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of the essence of a being. T h e y are contrasted with "phenomena" which merely appear to be real constituents of beings. 2~ If the combination of realities in an ens perfectissimum is such that they are both mutually compatible and realized in the highest degree, then the ens perfectissimum is by definition at once perfect and possible. It can have no flaws, either privative or negative, which would make it defective or self-contradictory, i.e., impossible, in any way. We need only add to this explication a second nominal definition of God as the most perfect being to complete the pre-requisites for our argument. God is now known to be intrinsically possible; the issue is whether or not we can prove that He actually exists. In order to carry out his proofWolffattempts to specify the meaning of the term "existence" which applies in this context. In his Ontology Wolff had nominally defined existence as "the complement of possibility" and suggested that it is a mode or essential component of being. 21 In the Natural Theology he adds that any positive perfection of a being, such as existence, is a "reality." This means that necessity and contingency are to be understood as diverse forms of the reality called existence. Necessary existence is taken as the highest and fullest degree of existence, while contingent existence is viewed as a kind of hypothetical necessity or lower degree of existence. A contingent being, in other words, is only hypothetically or relatively necessary to the degree that its determining conditions permit. More precisely, since a necessary being can possess no modes 20 The term "phenomenon" is defined by Wolff in his Cosmologia generalis, methodo scientifica pertractata, qua ad solidam, imprimis Dei atque naturae, cognitionem via sternitur (herausgegeben und bearbeitet yon Jean ~cole; Hildesheim: Georg Olms, I964; Text der 2. Auflage, Frankfurt und Leipzig. 1737), # 2 2 5 (P. I73) : "Phaenomenon dicitur, qulequid sensui obvium confuse percipitur." This volume appears in Wolff's Gesammelte Werke (Abteilung II, Band 4). 2a Philosophia prima sive ontologia, methodo scientifica pertractata, qua omnis cognitionis humanae prineipia continentur (herausgegeben und bearbeitet yon Jean l~cole; Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 196~ ; Text der ~. Auflage, Frankfurt und Leipzig, x736), # 174 (P. 143): "Hinc Existentiam definio per eomplementum possibilitatis." This volume also appears in the Gesammelte Werke (II, 3). Cf., Julius Bergmann, "Wolff's Lehre yore Complementum possibilitatis," Archiv fiir systematische Philosophic, 2 (1896), 449-476, and Anneliese Michaelis, Der ontologische Sinn des Complementum Possibilitatis bei Christian Wolff (Berlin: Kalbfleisch, 1937). Wolff's notion of being and his ontology are examined by Etienne Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers (2nd edition; Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, i952), I i 2 - I 2 i , and J e a n l~cole, "La Philosophia prima sive ontologia de Christian Wolff: histoire, doctrine et m~thode," Giornale di Metafisica, I6 (I96I), 114-In5.

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or changing constituents, its existence must be a necessary attribute of its essence. This brings us to the a priori demonstration which follows from these presuppositions. God contains all compossible realities in the absolutely highest degree. But He is possible. Wherefore, since the possible can exist, existence can belong to it. Consequently, since existence is a reality, and since realities are compossible which can belong to a being, existence is in the class of cornpossible realities. Moreover, necessary existence is the absolutely highest degree. Therefore, necessary existence belongs to God or, what is the same, God necessarily exists. 2~ The principal steps of this argument are not difficult once we grant Wolff's interpretation of the key terms: God is the ens perfectissimum; hence, He is possible; existence is a compossible reality possessed by the ens perfectissimum; necessary existence is the highest degree of existence, the degree approprite to an ens perfectissimum; hence, God possesses necessary existence, i.e., He exists necessarily. For every other being existence is rather arbitrarily (contingently) joined to essence, but in the unique case of God it flows directly from the divine essence. In Wolff's words, "God exists through His essence or His existence is essential. ''23 This means that the ambiguities inherent in the treatment of existence in the earlier parts of Wolff's metaphysics have now been decisively overcome, for natural theology has finally captured a fully essentialized instance of existence singularly appropriate to the strict requirements of Wolffian philosophy. 4. CONCLUSION

The primary strength of Wolff's natural theology comes from its thorough integration in the rest of his philosophical system. From a formal standpoint, natural theology, like the other parts of Wolff's 22 Theologianaturalis, II, ~i~21 (p. 8): "Deus e n i m c o n t i n e t omnes realitates compossibiles in g r a d u absolute s u m m o . Est vero idern possibilis. Q u a m o b r e m cure possibile existere possit; existentiarn eidem inesse potest: consequenter cure sit realitas, & realitates compossibiles sint, quae enti u n a inesse possunt, in realitatum eompossibilium n u m e r o est. J a m porro existentia neeessaria est gradus absolute s u m m i . Deo igitur competit existentla necessaria, seu quod perinde est, Deus necessario existit." 23 Ibid., # 2 7 (p. 9) : " D e u s per essentiam exlstit, seu existentia ipsi essentialis est."

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philosophy, is dominated by the twin themes of method and order. A univocal method modelled after that of mathematics and epitomized in the logic of the categorical syllogism insures that each section of Wolff's philosophy will proceed in the same manner and meet the same standards of demonstrative certitude. This method produces an internal ordering of particular theses, as well as an external ordering between the various philosophical disciplines. The twofold order which results is then constitutive of the systematic unity which Wolff so highly prizes. From a material standpoint, Wolff's natural theology is supported in a similar way by the preceding parts of his metaphysics. Everything that is said in natural theology is framed by the basic principles, definitions, and conceptual distinctions established in ontology as applicable to all being. Additional limitations - which are at the same time instances of supporting evidence - are provided by the account of the characteristics of any possible world given in general cosmology and the description of man given in psychology. Wolff has thus exploited to the full the methodological and metaphysical resources which sustain a natural theology and without which it cannot even be conceived. Natural theology for Wolffis not simply one more part of philosophy; it is an integral component of a thoroughly systematized totality which fulfills the promise of its antecedents and retroactively guarantees their possibility and existential relevance, z4 It is perhaps unusual to charge that the principal weakness in this panoramic spectrum is that it has a gap among its members, but this is indeed the case. There is in the whole range of Wolff's writings no treatise or separate section which could be said to set forth a developed theory of knowledge. 25 In natural theology this deficiency is manifested in two principal ways: the absence of the 2~ This is w h a t A n t o n Bissinger m e a n s w h e n he says (op. cit., 2i i), "Gott selbst [ist] der letzte G r u n d der M6glichkeit der Gotteserkenntnis." T h e intermediate level between this ultimate appeal to God a n d the proximate claims of logic a n d the principle of sufficient reason is the doctrine of a " n a t u r a l logic." Wolff's conclusions are said to be reliable because they accord with a n d are the products of the n a t u r a l workings of the h u m a n m i n d . This doctrine is set forth in C h a p t e r 16 (not a d d e d until the fifth edition, 1727) of Wolff's Verniinftige Gedanken von den Kriiften des rnenschlichen Verstandes (pp. 244-252), a n d in his Philosophia rationalis sire logica, Prolegomena, # # i - 2 9 (pp. 59-68). See also m y article, "Christian Wolff's T r e a t m e n t of Scientific Discovery," Journal of the History of Philosophy, Io (I972), 323-334 . 85 Cf., Bissinger, op. cir., 55: " M i t E r s t a u n e n stellt m a n fest, dasz sich weder u n t e r d e n deutschen noch d e n lateinischen Schriften Wolffs ein W e r k befindet, das sich ausschliesz-

T H E EXISTENGE OF GOD, N A T U R A L T H E O L O G Y

II 7

traditional scholastic confrontation with the problem of whether it is possible for finite human beings to obtain any knowledge of an infinite God; and, secondly, the failure to offer a theory of analogy or some other account of the way in which predication applies to the divine essence. It may be said in defense that for Wolff the possibility of human knowledge of the divine is subsumed in the more general question of the possibility of philosophy itself, and that he does speak in one or two places of symbolic knowledge or predication per eminentiam. We might add that, historically, it was not until Kant that the so-called "critical" issues were fully joined, z6 Against this, there is the obvious fact that Wolff's scholastic and rationalistic predecessors explicitly responded to the kind of issues we have mentioned. The problem runs deeper than a mere failure to attend to some issues or to compose a specific treatise. For Wolff, the point of systematic focus is not epistemology, but the juncture at which logic and ontology or reason and experience converge. Wolff felt deeply the need to reconcile the divergent forces in these pairings and he made strong efforts towards this goal. The tensions which remain in his account of existence and of history as the bearer of factual knowledge suggest that he did not succeed in achieving his goal. Although he proclaimed the need to permit each to make its proper contribution, Wolff's consistent tendency is to fall back on reason as the bearer of truly scientific knowledge and to regard experience somewhat skeptically as little more than a springboard for rational analysis. The outcome is an unresolved ambiguity in which realistic lich m i t Erkenntnisfragen besch~fligt." G. K a h l - F u r t h m a n n has rightly argued that Wolff's ontology encompasses both a theory of being a n d a theory of knowledge, b u t the p r o b l e m is to disengage the latter from the former in such a w a y as to be able to come to grips with the epistemological principles in their own right. See K a h l - F u r t h m a n n , "Inwiefern k a n n m a n Wolffs Ontologie eine Transzendental-philosophie n e n n e n ? " , Studia Philo~ophica, 9 (I949), 80-92- I n this I do not m e a n to suggest t h a t epistemological considerations m u s t paralyze all other philosophic work, b u t only that they are a m o n g the m a n y questions which m u s t he dealt with directly in a n adequate account of a n y philosophical problem. A l t h o u g h George Mavrodes' book, Belief in God (New York: R a n d o m House, i97o), concentrates on epistemological issues such as the n a t u r e of a good demonstration in philosophy of religion, it properly concludes with the w a r n i n g t h a t instrumental considerations always depend on the substantive problems to w h i c h they are joined a n d for which they are secondary. 26 O n e of the most striking aspects of Wolff's twin proofs of the existence of G o d is the detailed target which they presented to K a n t . W i t h o u t detracting from K a n t ' s critique, one cannot help b u t be struck by the inviting schema which Wolffso meticulously posed.

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and experiential motifs are set alongside stronger themes ofinnatism and even a sort of crypto-idealism. A more general problem which arises from the kind of natural theology which Wolff has set before us is the adequacy of this paradigm for a contemporary philosophical approach to the existence of God. This issue may be tested in two related ways: must philosophic work in this area be conducted in the rigorously demonstrative way that Wolff has adopted, and is an approach through natural theology sufficient or necessary as a philosophic response to the phenomena of human experience? The first of these tests echoes familiar charges concerning Wolff's mathematical model, his syllogistic logic, and his univocal methodology. More generally, although Wolff's work well illustrates the necessary involvement of methodological, metaphysical, and (by omission) epistemological considerations in a philosophical approach to God, it is not clear that this involvement must occur in the way he has selected. M a n y contemporary philosophers have seized on this last point to abandon natural theology in favor of philosophy of religion, often in order to avoid certain metaphysical or other pre-selected sets of issues. We need not subscribe to this line of thinking completely in order to find some value in such a shift of approach. Wolff has argued, for example, that philosophy is both strict science (Wissenschaft) and practical wisdom (Weltweisheit). His view is the familiar Cartesian notion that the former is the necessary base for the latter. Some of the problems which we have noted in the execution of this program in Wolff's natural theology suggest that a more complex and inductive model may be desirable. Wolff's abstract and metaphysical approach lacks sufficient intimacy with the full range of human experience including man's religious activities. If we attend more closely to the resources provided by experience, it may be that we can pose in a new w a y many of the issues which Wolff has joined from another direction. 27 CHARLES A. CORR

Southern Illinois University at Edwardsville 27 F r o m a quite different standpoint, J o h n E. S m i t h has recently proposed a similar e n r i c h m e n t of our u n d e r s t a n d i n g of experience. Smith suggests that we concentrate not on inferences from some supposedly neutral brute facts or on w h a t is loosely referred to as "religious" or "mystical" experience, b u t instead that we seek to elucidate the religious dimension of h u m a n experience. See Experienee and God (New york: Oxford University Press, i968), esp. 46-67.