Original Article

The geopolitics of Asia – What role for the European Union? Fraser Cameron EU-Russia Centre, 22-24 Rue du Luxembourg, Brussels 1000, Belgium. E-mail: [email protected]

Abstract This article reviews the European Union’s policy towards Asia since 2001, when an ambitious Communication from the European Commission suggested that the EU should play a political and security role in the region commensurate with its economic strength. After assessing a number of political and security issues in Asia, the article concludes that the EU has had little or no impact on the major geopolitical issues but that it is making some impact on security issues of lesser importance. The article also touches on integration as a contribution to security. It reviews the limited progress in Asian integration and suggests that the basic criteria for integration are missing in Asia. Some aspects of the EU model, however, might be useful for Asian countries wishing to move forward towards closer integration. International Politics (2010) 47, 276–292. doi:10.1057/ip.2010.10; published online 2 April 2010 Keywords: security; soft security; regional cooperation; EU and Asian integration

Introduction If there is one issue on which foreign policy analysts of all hues agree it is on the shifting balance of power from the West (Europe and the United States) towards Asia. The dramatic economic rise of China and India inevitably has led to a changed strategic environment in Asia. This poses some major issues for debate. How will China use its economic power? How will Japan, still far richer than China but with a tenth of its population, adjust to the rise of China? What ambitions does India have beyond the Indian Ocean? How will regional groupings such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) respond to the two new elephants in the room? How will the United States, the dominant external actor in Asia, react to the changed geopolitical situation? The US, which has a far greater political and security presence in Asia than the European Union (EU), is essentially a status quo power in Asia but it is r 2010 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1384-5748 International Politics www.palgrave-journals.com/ip/

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considerably weakened as a result of the war in Iraq and the economic problems following the sub-prime mortgage crisis in 2008. Finally, is there any role for the EU in the changing geopolitical landscape of Asia? The EU, seeking to expand its influence on the global stage, has struggled to find a balanced relationship with Asia. In the 2001 Communication, ‘Europe and Asia: A Strategic Framework for Enhanced Partnerships’, the European Commission (EC) proposed an ambitious core objective of ‘strengthening the EU’s political and economic presence across the region, and raising this to a level commensurate with the growing global weight of an enlarged EU’. This strategy paper was complemented by a further Communication in 2003 on the EU’s relations with the countries of South-East Asia. There have been further policy papers dealing with China, India and East Asia.1 In these documents there was no attempt to define the possible benchmarks to assess the EU’s progress in meeting its objectives and also no attempt to assess whether other countries shared the assumption of the growing global weight of the EU. This was taken as granted as was the expectation that the EU was destined to play a larger role in Asian and global affairs. How has the EU sought to engage with Asia? Only in the past decade, with the launching of the Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM) process in 1996, has the EU sought to deal with Asia as a region. Otherwise, it has laid more emphasis on bilateral relationships with its three strategic partners (Japan, China, India) and selected others such as Korea and Indonesia. Of particular note is the rapid development of EU–China ties, which have enjoyed a major boom in the past few years (Gill and Wacker, 2005; Crossick and Reuter, 2007). Partly because of hopes that it might develop closer political and economic integration along European lines, the EU has always treated ASEAN slightly differently. But as ASEAN has failed to move forward in any significant manner towards integration the EU has lowered its expectations about this grouping (Acharya, 2001). In November 2007, there was the first ever EU–ASEAN summit commemorating 30 years of relations. As will be argued later, it is increasingly clear that the basic conditions that helped the EU to develop are missing in Asia. This article reviews the EU’s ambitious aims in Asia in the security field and suggests that it has had little or no impact on the major geopolitical issues but that it is making some impact on security issues of lesser importance. It also touches on new security challenges, the question of ‘soft security’, and the lack of progress in Asian integration.

The Importance of Asia for the EU Asia is a crucial partner for the EU in many key areas. Asia accounts for over half the world’s population, more than a quarter of global gross domestic r 2010 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1384-5748

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product (GDP) and just under a quarter of international trade. Asia, defined here as those countries stretching from Afghanistan in the west and Japan in the east and from China in the north to New Zealand in the south, is now the EU’s third most important trading partner (taking 21 per cent of EU exports) and its fourth most important investment destination (Dent, 1999; Dosch, 2004). Much more than Europe, Asia is tremendously diverse, economically and politically, socially and culturally but also in terms of scale. Contrary to the oft-touted notion of an Asian model, the reality of economic and political development in Asia is that of different but co-existing national political systems accompanied by immense dynamism, but also at times by open or simmering conflict. The 2001 Communication ‘Europe and Asia: A Strategic Framework for Enhanced Partnerships’ stated that ‘the EU should work to contribute to peace and security in the region and globally, through a broadening of our engagement with the region’. The 2003 EU ‘European Security Strategy’ had few references to Asia and it had little resonance in Asia. In December 2007, the Council published a paper stating that given the EU’s political and economic interests in Asia, threats to regional security could have a significant impact on the EU. These threats include North Korea’s nuclear programme and the disputes concerning Kashmir, Taiwan, the Kurile Islands, the East China Sea as well as terrorism and political and economic instability. The paper could have added that the absence of genuine Sino–Japanese reconciliation and the fragility of Pakistan were also worrying. It might also have touched on the threats from growing nationalism, migration, climate change and rising demands for energy. The 2007 Council paper argued that EU had a major interest in encouraging China, Japan and India to take on greater responsibility for regional and global security issues. The EU had a more general stake in peaceful cooperative relations between the region’s major players, notably as regards relations between China and the United States, China and Japan, and China and India. The paper concluded that the EU’s essential interests were thus closely tied up with the security of Asia, and with the foreign and security policies of the region’s main players. It did not, however, offer any prescriptions as to how the EU might best defend its interests or achieve its aims.2

Security Dialogues In recent years the EU’s policy of engaging Asia in security matters has taken place either through ASEM (described elsewhere in this issue) or through the Asian Regional Forum (ARF) in addition to various bilateral dialogues. The 278

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EU has applied to accede to the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation to develop closer relations with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and to encourage greater involvement of regional players in multilateral peacekeeping operations. The EU is a full member of the ARF but the Forum is often criticized as being a regional security ‘talking shop’ lacking the requisite instruments to implement policies and security initiatives. Despite the ARF’s shortcomings, however, Asian nations acknowledge that the EU as a ‘distant power’ with limited strategic interests in Asia can play a meaningful role in the region’s security through a forum whose character is still mainly consultative and not designed to implement legally binding policies. The EU’s political discussions with partners now include a range of security themes such as terrorism, proliferation, energy security and climate change. These themes are also being mainstreamed into the new partnership and cooperation agreements that the EU is negotiating with China, Indonesia, Thailand and other countries. Although the security agenda has grown, particularly since the September 11 terrorist attacks, there is a general acceptance that the dialogue process has been more declaratory than specifically action oriented. The EU’s security policy in Asia is essentially one of soft power and selective engagement. Most Asian countries have a traditional view of security and look to military and economic power as the prime factors for security purposes (Wiessela, 2002). All Asian countries regard the United States as the principal security actor in the region. The EU shares this assessment and has been careful not to act against US interests. For example, in 2004 it swiftly dropped FrancoGerman plans to lift the arms embargo on China when the United States protested (Bitzinger, 2004). This dispute led to the establishment of a bi-annual EU–US dialogue on Asia, which mainly covers China affairs. In 2008, the subjects on the agenda included, Taiwan, Tibet, China’s military build up, human rights, Intellectual Property Rights and China’s trade surpluses (Bijian, 2005). The triangle formed by the United States, EU and Asia is increasingly important in world affairs, accounting for over 80 per cent of global GDP. According to some experts, the EU–Asia side of that triangle is the weakest link, thus giving the United States additional geopolitical leverage (Shambaugh et al, 2007; Mahbubani, 2008). Given the unilateral tendency in US foreign policy, many Asians have stated that they would welcome an increased EU security role.3 But compared to the United States, the EU has very few power projection capabilities and relatively little security expertise on Asia. These factors have been a handicap in its efforts to promote a greater security role, for example, in the ARF context. The enlargement of the EU from 15 to 27 member states may have increased the EU’s overall size and importance but the new members had few interests in the region. With a couple of exceptions (for example, Aceh and Chad) the r 2010 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1384-5748

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European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) missions of the EU have focussed on its immediate neighbourhood. Given the military weaknesses of the EU this is unlikely to change in the near future (Witney, 2008).

Growing but Limited EU Involvement Since 2001, the EU has become more involved in various security issues in Asia, including Aceh, Afghanistan and Korea. The following examples illustrate the EU’s varied attempts at involvement.

Aceh (Indonesia) For several decades, Aceh remained a conflict zone, with the Indonesian government deploying primarily a security approach against insurgents in a resource-rich, but otherwise poor and vulnerable province of Indonesia. While international attempts to address the Aceh conflict began earlier, EU involvement in Aceh started in December 2002, with the EC co-chairing the Tokyo Preparatory Conference for Peace and Reconstruction on Aceh. In November 2004, the new Indonesian government re-launched the process and abandoned the security-only approach. The EC funded the Crisis Management Initiative, which involved mediation efforts by the former Finnish President, Maarti Athisaari, and led to the signing of a peace agreement between the government of Indonesia and the Aceh rebel movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka). In the peace negotiations, the EU, perceived as neutral by all sides, and in partnership with five ASEAN nations, was identified as the most suitable candidate for the crucial and sensitive issue of monitoring the implementation of the peace agreement. The EU’s involvement in Aceh, its first-ever ESDP mission in Asia, was widely appreciated in the region. Brussels provided humanitarian and development aid to Aceh and funding (over h285 million) to support the peace negotiations and the EU Election Observation Mission. In parallel to the Council-led Aceh Monitoring Mission, the Commission developed a support package for the peace process covering support for local elections, and strengthening local governance (police and justice) and the re-integration of former combatants. The objective of the EU’s involvement in Aceh was to help Indonesia regain internal stability and indirectly to help stabilize the region. The experience in Aceh demonstrated that the coordinated and sustained use of a variety of EU external relations instruments could bring significant results in terms of conflict prevention and crisis management. These efforts to negotiate and promote 280

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peace, improve livelihood and strengthen the rule of law had important implications for ASEAN. The group convened the inaugural ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting in May 2006 and agreed to establish a Crisis Management Centre drawing on civilian and military resources to respond to future humanitarian crises.4 Afghanistan Since 2001, the EU has steadily increased its involvement in Afghanistan seeking to support the international community’s efforts to stabilize the country. It has played a significant role in the reconstruction of Afghanistan, both in terms of its financial contributions, institutional support, as well as exerting political influence through the appointment of a EU Special Representative.5 To date the EU has provided over h1 billion to Afghanistan. Most of this money has been spent on paying the salaries of the police, teachers and doctors via the World Bank Trust Fund, which dilutes the visibility of EU assistance (Klaiber, 2007). Most Afghans have little appreciation of the massive injection of EU funds into their country. Operating in a very difficult environment, the EU has had some successes in improving health care and education. But the capabilityexpectations gap with regard to security remains wide; the judicial and public administration systems are riddled with corruption and fiscal sustainability is unlikely for the next decade. The issue of opium production has proved extremely difficult. The EU has provided considerable assistance for rural development and alternative livelihood programmes but with limited success. EU efforts are complemented by the initiatives of individual EU member states that have taken the lead in certain issue areas in addition to their activities as part of the International Security and Assistance Force. For some member states, such as Germany, the sending of military forces to support NATO in Afghanistan is a highly controversial move. Less controversial is civil assistance. With the launch of EU Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL Afghanistan) in June 2007 the EU has committed to sending around 200 police and justice experts to contribute ‘to the establishment of sustainable and effective civilian policing arrangements under Afghan ownership’. More particularly, the mission will monitor, mentor, advise and train the Afghan police under the authority of the Ministry of the Interior.6 As at the end of 2008 the EUPOL mission was facing an uphill task given the endemic corruption in the local police and courts. Burma/Myanmar If there is one issue where the EU and its Asian partners have consistently failed to see eye-to-eye is over how to deal with the military junta in Burma/ r 2010 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1384-5748

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Myanmar. Since 2001, the EU has imposed political and economic sanctions against the country, with negligible impact. Asian countries have held to the principle of non-interference in internal affairs and sought to cajole the regime in Rangoon into softening its oppressive internal policies. After the brutal suppression of the Buddhist monks’ demonstrations in spring 2008, the EU imposed further sanctions and even ASEAN was moved to issue a critical statement. But China, ASEAN and India all enjoy strong trade ties with Burma and the EU sanctions policy has proved of limited value (Pedersen, 2008). Philippines EU objectives relating to conflict prevention have particular relevance for the situation in the Southern Philippines province of Mindanao where for more than 30 years the Moro Islamic Liberation Front has been fighting the Philippine army on-and-off in its efforts to achieve independence. The two sides signed a ceasefire in June 2003 and, at the time the EU stated that it would consider funding projects that would support the peace process, such as development aid work, re-integration of former child soldiers, local governance and health care. According to the EC, during the past decade the EU has spent h91 million on promoting economic development in Mindanao and in 2005–2006 it spent h12 million supporting the peace process and a similar amount was given to the World Bank-administered Mindanao Trust Fund.7 These funds covered the re-integration of former combatants, employment projects, the return of exiles, small arms destruction and human rights monitoring. The EU’s long-term support to the Mindanao peace process has helped to bring the two sides closer to reaching an accord.8 The Korean Peninsula As it is not directly involved in the Six Party Talks regarding North Korea’s nuclear programme the EU has played largely a supporting role. It has called on North Korea to dismantle its nuclear weapons, return to the nonproliferation treaty and sign and ratify the comprehensive test ban treaty. It has held out the prospect of improving relations, which could include technical and financial assistance. The EU has separately provided a significant amount of humanitarian assistance to North Korea, which has been appreciated by Pyongyang for helping to stave off famine. But it has not led to any further openings for the EU in North Korea apart from irregular troika meetings.9 The EU is also involved directly in North Korea via the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO). The EU has a seat on KEDO’s 282

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Executive Committee and has made significant contributions (in terms of funding and manpower) to KEDO in recent years. Given North Korea’s refusal, however, to verifiably dismantle its nuclear weapons programme, the KEDO process is on hold and it remains unclear as to when (or indeed if) KEDO will continue its work providing North Korea with non-nuclear energy through the construction of two light-water reactors in North Korea. Sino–Japanese relations/Taiwan One of the most significant geopolitical challenges in Asia is the Sino–Japanese relationship. China vividly remembers the Japanese invasion of the 1930s and the accompanying brutality. It has criticized Japan for its failure to offer a proper apology for its behaviour and the Chinese Communist Party uses history quite blatantly for domestic purposes. Chancellor Schroeder suggested in 2005 that that the two countries might draw on the post-1945 FrancoGerman reconciliation for inspiration but his proposal was met with indifference.10 Under the framework of its One China Policy,11 the EU has consistently called for the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue but in practical terms it has not been able to offer much assistance to the resolution of the dispute. After the dispute over the arms embargo in 2003–2004, an issue that raised EU awareness of regional stability in Asia, the EU began to issue more declarations and statements on cross-straits relations. It has warned of the dangers of provocative behaviour, sabre rattling or unilateral changes to the status quo. China has sought to isolate Taiwan and has lobbied against the EU supporting Taiwan’s efforts to join international bodies not requiring statehood. Kashmir, Sri Lanka, Nepal The EU has stated its willingness to provide financial and technical assistance to Kashmir should India and Pakistan reach an agreement. The EU High Representative, Javier Solana, has also offered the EU’s services as a mediator, a suggestion that was politely declined by both sides.12 The EU has been rather more involved in the Sri Lankan conflict, acting as a co-chair along with the United States and Japan in the Norwegian-inspired peace process. However, the breakdown of the 2007 ceasefire and the return by both sides to military action has meant that there has been no real dialogue process since then. The EU has thus had little opportunity to provide input into the peace process. The EU has also had little impact on the long-running internal conflict in Nepal. But since the agreement of 2007 it has been a major donor to shore up r 2010 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1384-5748

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the peace process and provided the main group of election monitors in the vote of February 2008, which bought the Maoists to power.13

Assessment From the above review of EU actions (or inactions) in selected security issues in Asia it can be concluded that the EU has had little or no impact on the major geopolitical conflicts. Indeed the major powers have spurned the EU’s efforts to become involved in sensitive issues such as Kashmir, North Korea and Taiwan. The EU did make a major impact in resolving the dispute in Aceh but this operation received little publicity outside of ASEAN. The EU’s contributions in Afghanistan and elsewhere have been largely invisible. In some quarters, the EU approach is generally welcomed as being non-polemical and, according to some Asian officials, the ‘voice of reason’.14 But there have been missed opportunities for the EU to make a bigger impact on issues such as maritime security (the EU is not a member of the International Maritime Organization) and energy security. EU–Asian security cooperation has also been affected by the EU’s efforts to promote democracy and human rights highlighted by the long-running dispute over how to treat Burma/Myanmar. Asian countries have clashed with the EU over their long-held principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of states (Bartels, 2005).

The Soft Security Agenda As reviewed above, the EU’s economic strengths and its experience of integration and soft security has provided opportunities for it to play an increasing, although still very modest, role in dealing with security issues in Asia. One of the areas of common concern, with growing security implications, is the environment. A paper on the security implications of climate change published by Javier Solana in 2008 drew attention to the serious problems facing many Asian countries. Cooperation on climate change has improved but there are many other problem areas to be tackled together, such as sustainable natural resource management (for example, forestry), the management of urban development, and energy security. Migration is an increasingly sensitive issue and East Asia is the source of potentially significant migratory flows to Europe. The EU and East Asian countries have started a dialogue on this common challenge in the context of ASEM and are beginning to develop common approaches. The terrorist attack carried out in October 2002 in Bali demonstrated the threat to the Southeast Asian region. It has spurred a re-inforcement of efforts 284

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to develop cooperation on security issues both within ASEAN and with the international community. The EU–ASEAN summit in November 2007 reiterated the importance both sides attached to cooperation in this field. The EU’s dialogue on terrorism with regional players is complemented by numerous bilateral dialogues between member states and individual countries, such as that between the United Kingdom and Pakistan. It is also one of the main funders of the regional terrorism centre in Jakarta that coordinates information on terrorist groups and activities in Asia.

Regional Cooperation The EU has always supported efforts at regional cooperation in the expectation that such efforts would have a positive impact in reducing tensions (Forst and Weber, 2006). ASEAN has had a special place on the EU’s agenda. On the surface, the EU shares with Southeast Asia many common features and interests. Both are seeking to deepen regional cooperation between highly diverse member states. Countries from both regions cherish respect for their cultural, religious and linguistic identity. Both regions are committed to a multipolar world based on strong multilateral international institutions. The two regions also enjoy very strong commercial links. But ASEAN has made relatively little progress in achieving its own proclaimed goals. There has been some limited progress on the reduction of customs barriers and the abolition of tariffs. In 2003, the ASEAN Summit agreed to set up an Asian Economic Community (AEC) with the aim of achieving an ASEAN internal market by 2020. ASEAN has indicated that it sees the EU as a role model for its economic integration and is interested in learning from the EU’s experience. The drafting of the ASEAN Charter, for example, drew heavily on EU experience. However, ASEAN’s principle of non-interference into the internal affairs of member states formulated in the ASEAN Charter still stands in the way of Asian regional integration (Wahlers, 2006). For more than two decades EU–South-East Asia relations were governed by the 1980 ASEAN-EC Cooperation Agreement ‘between equal partners’.15 The failure of the ASEAN side to meet its declared goals as well as disputes over East Timor and Burma meant that relations did not develop as both sides had hoped. This led to a re-think on the European side and in July 2003 the Commission launched its communication on ‘A new partnership with South East Asia’ with the aim of reinvigorating relations with the region and ASEAN. The Communication identified the following main priorities which all are related to the concept of soft power: (1) Supporting regional stability and the fight against terrorism; (2) promoting human rights, democratic principles and good governance; (3) mainstreaming justice and Home Affairs issues; r 2010 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1384-5748

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(4) injecting a new dynamism into regional trade and investment relations; (5) supporting the development of less prosperous countries.16 These aims have been followed through in the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) and ASEAN free trade agreement (FTA) negotiations that are ongoing. The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) established in 1985 is much less developed than ASEAN, a situation that reflects underlying tensions between and within its members (for example India/Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Nepal) and has very few concrete achievements to its name. Although most of these security problems require national-level solutions, SAARC could make a modest contribution to reducing tensions by promoting intra-regional economic links. The cooling of tensions between India and Pakistan led to a more productive summit in Islamabad in January 2004 when SAARC adopted three important documents on free trade, the financing of terrorism and social affairs. A further summit in August 2008, which the EU attended as an observer, continued this agenda and provided the occasion for some useful bilateral confidence-building meetings. Although the EU has been willing to support SAARC’s efforts to promote free trade, and has recently allocated funds for this purpose it has paid most attention to India and is currently negotiating a FTA with that country.17 There is a comprehensive Joint Action Plan in place with India, and regular political discussions take place on issues including conflict prevention, terrorism, non-proliferation and human rights. However India has proved a difficult partner for the EU in terms of differing views on regional issues, nuclear policy and human rights.

EU and Asian Integration Compared The EU is arguably the greatest confidence building measure in history. In the past 50 years, the EU has developed into a genuine security community extending its reach from Western Europe to embrace nearly the whole continent. The reasons for the EU’s success were numerous. Apart from United States support and encouragement they included several concepts which have been largely absent in Asia. These involved tolerance, vision, leadership, political will, economic compatibility, an agreed programme, common institutions and a legal framework. Given the importance of the confidence building process that accompanies integration efforts it is worth briefly examining the differences between European and Asian efforts. Tolerance Until 1945, European history had shown little sign of tolerance as opposed to regular bouts of bloody warfare. But after the Second World War, which saw 286

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Germany ruined and divided (and France cognizant that the previous Versailles settlement had been a mistake) the two major continental powers demonstrated a remarkably tolerant attitude towards one another. Germany was content for France to become the de facto leader of the nascent EU while France helped Germany re-integrate into the international system. In contrast, there is little evidence of such tolerance in Asia. There has been a failure to achieve reconciliation between the main players – China and Japan, Japan and Korea, India and Pakistan. China has consistently blocked Japanese (and Indian) efforts to secure a permanent seat on the United Nations’ Security Council. Vision The EU was fortunate in having an exceptional group of visionary statesmen including Robert Schuman, Konrad Adenauer, Alfed de Gasperi and Jean Monnet. Together, they provided enormous impetus to European integration with their energy, drive, commitment and ideas for a supranational community. In Asia, there have been remarkably few politicians willing to promote an Asian version of cooperation or integration. The great Asian leaders, from Mao and Nehru to Sukarto and Lee Kwan Yu have been unashamedly nationalist in outlook. Their colonial experience has also made them highly attached to and ready to guard jealously their sovereignty. A consequence is that nationalism remains one of the main, and potentially dangerous, motivating forces in Asian politics today. Leadership In the EU, the Franco-German axis has always played an essential leadership role. It has held together through successive administrations in Paris and Berlin and seemingly impervious to political colour. Helmut Schmidt and Valery Giscard d’Estaing who provided the impetus for the euro, Helmut Kohl and Francois Mitterrand who provided the impetus for Maastricht Treaty, Gerhard Schroeder and Jacques Chirac who provided the impetus for enlargement, all came from different sides of the political spectrum yet played a vital role in promoting European integration. In contrast, there has been no agreement in Asia between China and Japan; India and Pakistan; or even amongst ASEAN countries as to who should play the leadership role. Political will The original six member states made a historic decision in signing the European Coal and Steel Community and the European Economic Community (EEC) r 2010 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1384-5748

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treaties that involved an agreement to share sovereignty. This was a unique experiment in history and came about through a shared political will to open a new chapter in European history. But in Asia there has been an almost complete absence of political will to move in this direction, pace the very diffident steps taken under the ASEAN Charter. Throughout the region the principles of non-interference and national sovereignty remain sacrosanct. Agreed programme Following the establishment of the EEC in 1958, the member states agreed on a series of steps to establish a free trade area, a customs union, an internal market and eventually, and for some, a single currency. Although the EU is now characterized by some member states having opt outs in certain areas (for example, eurozone and Schengen) all member states remain committed to the vast majority of EU policies and programmes. In Asia, there has been no such agreement and even ASEAN have been unable to meet its ‘paper’ commitments and timetables. Economic compatibility The founding six member states of the EU had roughly similar GDP per head. Successive enlargements brought greater economic capacity – and after 2004 more diversity – but no great differences compared to the situation in Asia where there are huge differences in size, types of economy and GDP per head. Asia contains some of the richest countries of the world (Japan, Singapore) and some of the poorest (Laos, Afghanistan). Legal framework and common institutions One of the distinguishing characteristics of the EU is that it is based on the rule of law. Member states have accepted that in areas of EU competence the European Court of Justice is supreme. Another key characteristic is the number of common political institutions. The most important are the EC, the Council, the Court and the European Parliament. These institutions have played a major role in promoting, protecting and advancing European integration. There are no prospects of such institutions being established in Asia or of agreement to allow a supranational legal authority to pass judgement on activities of individual countries. Assessment The EU model is still evolving and not without its own problems, whether related to the Lisbon Treaty or outstanding security issues such as Cyprus, 288

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Kosovo and the name of Macedonia. Nor would it be realistic to suggest that Asia, often burdened with state borders drawn up by European colonial powers, should simply follow the EU model as it exists today. But there are some principles that are universally applicable. Many Asians may not like the EU’s attempts at promoting its normative values, but one of the defining differences between the EU and Asia is the poor state of democracy in Asia. The EU might adopt a more modest and less hectoring approach towards democracy promotion and human rights, but it cannot totally neglect these core value issues. It is also difficult to see Asian countries moving closer without some effort at historical reconciliation, tolerance towards each other, greater economic convergence and some shared political and economic aims. In the meantime, East Asia could cherry pick some aspects of EU integration (for example regional aid, monetary cooperation) to suit its own needs.

Conclusion The effects of European colonial intervention over a long historical period are clearly visible not only within Asian countries. They also colour the discourse and relations between Asia and Europe today. At the same time, many Asian countries have welcomed the increased EU attention as a counter balance to the narrow, terrorist-focused agenda of the United States.18 Since 2001, there has been a rising tide of anti-Americanism in several (but not only) Muslim Asian countries. The EU is widely perceived as a proponent of soft power and a new model of political and economic integration from which Asian countries might draw their own lessons.18 But the EU is far from being in the same league as the United States when it comes to hard security. Many Asians doubt that the EU will ever develop into a powerful global security actor. Internal divisions over Iraq, the arms ban on China and the constitutional treaty has damaged the EU’s image as a strong, cohesive actor. The EU has not really clarified its interests in the region, how they should be prioritized and what means the EU should use to promote them. Overall there is an absence of a strategic vision for the region as a whole which means that there is no coherent EU approach In addition, there are different historical ties and interests of the member states which further handicap a common approach (Reiterer, 2002). It can be argued that the EU devotes too much attention to China and that it should deepen its dialogue with other Asian partners, although this would also involve additional resources. There has also been little attempt to assess the effectiveness of particular policies such as democracy promotion and human rights. Many Asians consider that the continued emphasize on human rights has led to an imbalance in relationships.18 r 2010 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1384-5748

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Given the diversity of states in Asia it is impossible to construct a monolithic EU–Asia relationship, a single policy or approach, equally valid across the whole region. With this caveat in mind and having regard to the changes within both regions as well as changes in international affairs it is important that the two regions seek to deepen their relations. Both regions face similar political and economic challenges ranging from terrorism and failed states to health scares and the challenges posed by globalization. Both share a commitment to multilateralism and a desire to strengthen the institutions of global governance. Both have to deal with an American hyper-power that pursues its own and often different agenda from that of Asia and Europe. But Asia’s rising political and economic importance is too often ignored by the EU focused on its own internal affairs, enlargement, its problematic neighbourhood and transatlantic relations. The EU’s efforts to play a more active global role require closer engagement, cooperation and dialogue with the rapidly changing and increasingly dynamic countries of Asia. At the same time, it is necessary for Asians to pay more attention to developments within the EU, to support efforts to improve educational and cultural exchanges and to try and overcome differences on human rights and other issues. Although the EU cannot claim to have had a major impact on the geopolitics of Asia, (Bridges, 1999; Kagan, 2003), it has pursued a correct strategy in recent years of seeking to intensify exchanges and to deepen its security dialogues with the key actors in Asia. The various dialogues have been useful in building contacts and enriching EU expertise on Asia, which should help promote common policies. The experience has also shown the limits of the EU’s influence and it may be prudent of the EU in future to adopt a more modest approach.

About the Author Fraser Cameron is Director of the EU-Russia Centre, Director of EuroFocusBrussels, an adjunct professor at the Hertie School of Governance in Berlin, and Senior Advisor to the European Policy Centre (EPC) and the European Institute for Asian Studies in Brussels. He is an advisor to the BBC and to the UK government’s Higher Education Panel on Europe. Dr Cameron was educated at the Universities of St Andrews (MA) and Cambridge (PhD). He was a research fellow at the University of Hamburg (1973–1974) and a lecturer in International Relations at the University of Kent (1974–1975). From 1975–1989, he was a member of the British Diplomatic Service serving mainly in Germany, and covering economic, political and press affairs. He joined the EC in 1990, as an advisor in external relations, and was closely involved in a range of policies including the common foreign and security 290

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policy, enlargement, transatlantic relations, the Balkans, Asia and global governance. From 1999 to 2001 he was Political Counsellor at the EU delegation in Washington DC. Dr Cameron was seconded to the EPC in 2002 as Director of Studies. His recent books include An Introduction to European Foreign Policy, The Future of Europe and US Foreign Policy after the Cold War (all published by Routledge).

Notes 1 See ‘Europe and Asia: A Strategic Framework for Enhanced Partnerships’ COM (2001) 4 September 2001; An EU-India Strategic Partnership COM 2004 430 of 16 June 2004. 2 Council of the European Union, www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ misc/97842.pdf. 3 Fieldwork discussions, January 2008 relating to a study on EU–Asia relations for the European Commission. 4 See www.eu-acehpeace.org/. 5 See Council of the European Union, Council Joint Action 2006/124/CFSP of 20 February 2006 extending the mandate of the Special Representative of the EU for Afghanistan. 6 European Union Factsheet, EUPOL Afghanistan, May 2007. 7 See ec.europa.eu/external_relations/philippines/intro/index.htm. 8 Conversation with Philippine diplomat, January 2008. 9 See ec.europa.eu/external_relations/north_korea/intro/index.htm. 10 Interview Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen (ZDF), 6 February 2005. 11 Council Declaration of 19 September 2008, 13205/1/08 Rev 1 (Press 263) P. 117/08. 12 Reply to Asian journalists at press briefing, Brussels, 12 March 2007. 13 See Commission support outlined in Nepal Country Strategy Paper 2007–2013, ec.europa.eu/ external_relations/nepal/docs/07_13_en.pdf. 14 Interview with Japanese and Australian diplomats, February 2008. 15 See ec.europa.eu/external_relations/asia. 16 ‘A new partnership with South East Asia’, COM (2003) 399 final, 9 July 2003. 17 Conclusions of EU–India summit on 29 September 2008, ec.europa.eu/external_relations/india/ sum09_08/joint_action_plan_2008_en.pdf. 18 Discussions during field research, February 2008.

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