THE MEMPHIS POLICE STRIKE: A RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS by D.J. Giacopassi and J.R. Sparger ABSTRACT
Previo~ studies of police s t r i k e s take a narrow perspective with regard to both the causes and consequences of the job action. The present case study attempts to put the Memph~ police s t r i k e of 1978 in h i s t o r i c a l pe~pec~ive by viewing the antecedent conditions important to an understanding of why the police struck. Additionally, the a r t i c l e attempts to determine the success or failure of the s t r i k e by examining the long term co~equenc~ of the s t r i k e on both the Memphis Police Department and the Hemphis Police Association, the o f f i c i a l bargaining agent of the rank and f i l e members o f the M. P. D. I ntroducti on While numerous studies have been concerned with police s t r i k e s , most of the studies have analyzed the s t r i k e s u t i l i z i n g a very l i m i t e d time framework (Ayers, 1977; Bopp, 1971, 1972, 1977; Gehlin et a l . , 1976). The framework usually spans events that occurred s h o r t l y before the s t r i k e was i n i t i a t e d and ends with the settlement of the job action. The shortcoming of t h i s type of analysis is twofold. First, the h i s t o r i c i t y of the presumed e t i o l o g i c a l conditions is ignored. Secondly, these types of analyses r e f l e c t an assumption t h a t the end of the job action s i g n i f i e s the end of the problem. However, social events are not discrete units of measurement, and the effects of a s t r i k e often l i n g e r years a f t e r the event has occurred. In this paper, we hope to show that the Memphis police s t r i k e cannot be understood as a discrete e n t i t y , but must be viewed as an h i s t o r i c a l event that two years l a t e r continues to have an impact on the Memphis community. Toward this end, the paper w i l l be divided i n t o four major sections: the f i r s t section w i l l analyze the h i s t o r i c a l conditions c o n t r i b u t i n g to the s t r i k e ; the second section w i l l report the events that occurred during the s t r i k e ; the t h i r d section w i l l analyze events that occurred as a consequence of the s t r i k e ; and the f i n a l section w i l l report the information gathered in i n t e r views conducted with past and present union o f f i c i a l s and rank and f i l e members of the union to gain t h e i r views of the success or f a i l u r e of the s t r i k e . Emphasis w i l l be placed on t h i s l a s t section since, in the f i n a l analysis, the future course of police union39
city management relations w i l l be shaped most strongly by the subjective perceptions of the participants of the 1978 strike. Historical Conditions Crucial to an understanding of the Memphis Police strike is the fact that Memphis has no long standing tradition of "the loyal opposition" (Collins et a l . , 1977). Few power centers exist outside those in p o l i t i c a l power. This situation can be traced to the reign of E.H. "Boss" Crump who was the political boss of Memphis from 1919 until his death in 1954. Crumphas been described as a "benevolent despot" who ran Memphis according to a "plantation mentality" (Wall Street Journal, Aug. 21, 1978). Crump's political machine t o t a l l y controlled Memphis and l e f t l i t t l e room for opposing power centers. Two factors of major importance to the police strike can be traced to this period in Memphis history. First is the fact that at the time of Crump's death in 1954, Memphis found i t s e l f in a power vacuum since there was l i t t l e opportunity under the machine for leadership training. That leadership vacuum s t i l l exists today. Consequently, civic and business leaders are unaccustomed to delving into the p o l i t i c a l realm. The police strike and the accompanying curfew badly hurt Memphis businesses at a time when they should have been reaping a windfall from the thousands of visitors descending on Memphis for memorials commemorating the f i r s t anniversary of the death of Elvis Presley. As a consequence of not having any established ties to the p o l i t i c a l community, the business community stood helplessly as the strike developed and only a week into the strike were they able to mobilize for forceful action. Secondly, because Boss Crump ran Memphis as a benevolent despot, no effective mechanisms for bargaining existed. The budgetary process was almost completed before bargaining with the municipal unions began. In 1977, the year before the strike, the DAVID J. GIACOPASSI
Dr. Giacopassi is an a s s i s t a n t professor in C r i m i ~ Just i c e at Memphis S t ~ e University. He earned h ~ M.A. and Ph.D. in Sociology from Notre Dame in 1971 and 1975 r e s p e ~ v ~ y ; and a B.A. in Liberal Arts from St. Ans~m College in New Hampshire. JERRY R. SPARGER
Dr. Sparger is a s s i s t a n t professor and coordinator of graduate p~grams in Criminal Justice at Memphis State Univers i t y . Formerly a s t a f f psychologist at the U.S. Penitentiary in Atlanta, he earned his Ph.D. in Psychology from The University of Tennessee in 1973; his M. Ed. from A p p ~ a c h i a n S t a t e Univers i t y in 1965; and his B.A. in English from Wake Forest in 1964. 40
mayor had presented the "facts and figures" as to what the city could afford. The unions reluctantly agreed to accept the c i t y ' s "final" offer. At the end of the year the city found i t had underestimated its revenue and finished with a substantial budget surpl us. The 1978 negotiations proceeded in a similar fashion with the mayor claiming that because of the fiscal condition of the city he could offer no more to the unions than what was already allocated in the budget. The union membership, remembering the previous year, f e l t they had been deceived once and were determined not to be taken advantage of again. The 1977 budget surplus was repeatedly brought up by union o f f i c i a l s and members alike, and this issue served as a galvanizing force for the union's diverse membership. Throughout the wage negotiations, the Memphis Police Association (MPA) representatives insisted that no real bargaining was taking place. Former union o f f i c i a l s characterized the c i t y ' s stance as a "take i t or leave i t " position, one which violated both the practice and s p i r i t of labor-management negotiations (Commercial Appeal, July 3, 1978). This apparent i n f l e x i b i l i t y particularly incensed the police. I t led to the impression that Mayor Wyeth Chandler shared Boss Crump's plantation mentality and viewed the police much as they were viewed in Crump's time, as "public slaves" (Bussel, 1965). David Baker, the president of the MPA, thus characterized the city administration's attitude as "paternalistic and aristocratic" (Commercial Appeal, Aug. 17, 1978). The mayor, on the other hand, insisted that his hands were tied, and that although city revenues could not be exactly predicted, he was operating honestly on the basis of the best data available and following established procedures to work for an equitable settlement. This situation can be seen as a classic example of organizational procedures being counterproductive to organizational goals. To the extent that the mayor's preceived intransigence was structurally determined is the degree tO which the strike was predestined. The established procedures that had worked well in an era of paternalism no longer functioned adequately to keep the militant worker from striking. Another historical factor of importance to the 1978 police strike occurred a decade earlier when the Memphis sanitation vforkers struck for 65 days seeking union recognition and higher wages. City o f f i c i a l s were adamantly opposed to the demands of the predominantly black sanitation workers, and the prolonged strike which ensued occassionally erupted into violence. Police 41
f i r m l y backed the c i t y ' s administration and did not hesitate to use force to control demonstrations in support of the s a n i t a t i o n workers. Martin Luther King twice came to Memphis to lead marches in support of the s t r i k i n g s a n i t a t i o n workers. The f i r s t march ended in violence. Before he was able to lead the second march, he was assassinated on the evening of A p r i l 5, 1968, at the Lorraine .Motel in the downtown section of Memphis. A f t e r King's assassinat i o n , the s t r i k e was q u i c k l y s e t t l e d and the c i t y gave the sanitation workers the r i g h t to set up a c o l l e c t i v e bargaining u n i t . The s a n i t a t i o n workers' s t r i k e served as an educational experience f o r the Memphis police. Up to that p o i n t , there was l i t t l e union sentiment to be found among the p o l i c e , probably because there was l i t t l e awareness of what a union could accomplish. In the past, when c i t y employees had attempted to organize a union, they were summarily f i r e d . In 1968, the police saw f i r s t hand the effectiveness of concerted group action. Ironically, the seeds of unionism were planted in the police department when the department was c o n t r o l l i n g those who sought to unionize. The Memphis Police S t r i k e In 1978, the Memphis Police Association was in the second year of a three-year contract. Under t h i s contract, the only questions to be negotiated were economic in nature. Bargaining proceeded f o r months without any s i g n i f i c a n t movement. I t soon became apparent that the major stumbling blocks to a negotiated settlement were size of pay increase and length of contract (the union wanted a one-year contract while the c i t y wanted a two-year wage pact). On July 3, 1978, more than 800 to reject the c i t y ' s contract o f f e r immediately, a $30 across-the-board and a h a l f percent raise on October
policemen voted unanimously ( s i x percent increase e f f e c t i v e increase in A p r i l , and seven I , 1979).
A f t e r returning to the bargaining table with federal mediators, the police on July 17 rejected a renegotiated pact by a 9 to 1 margin. On July 19, the mayor stated t h a t , so f a r as he was concerned, the economic portions of the negotiations were ended. The mayor proposed a change in the c i t y charter to e f f e c t the immediate dismissal of c i t y employees who s t r i k e . On July 24, an extraordinary televised debate was broadcast between Mayor Chandler and David Baker, president of the MPA. Both sides f i r m l y believed public awareness and Dublic opinion were crucial to a favorable contract settlement f o r t h e i r respect i v e sides. Public response to the debate was divided; neither the c i t y nor the union gained a decided advantage. 42
At I I p.m. on the night of Aug. I 0 , 1978, the II00 member Memphis Police Association voted 528 to 266 to r e j e c t the c i t y ' s " f i n a l " contract o f f e r and to go on s t r i k e . The mayor's response to the s t r i k e vote was that i t would be the "end of the union, at least f o r a long time." The c i t y braced f o r a repeat of the chaotic events that had occurred less than one month e a r l i e r when the f i r e - f i g h t e r s struck f o r three days during which time the property losses from f i r e s reached an estimated $5 m i l l i o n . On the f i r s t day of the police s t r i k e , Friday, August I I , the c i t y obtained a temporary r e s t r a i n i n g order to end the walkout and threatened a l l who disobeyed with dismissal. The court order and the threat of dismissal proved i n e f f e c t i v e as the job action continued. Memphis had to r e l y on a handful of supervisory personnel and approximately I00 Shelby County s h e r i f f ' s deputies to police a c i t y of 650,000 people. The Memphis c i t i z e n r y reacted in a calm manner to the news of the police s t r i k e . As a r e s u l t of a plea that police only be called f o r emergencies, incoming c a l l s f o r service were reduced by 40%. The only s t r i k e - r e l a t e d violence was reported by the Deputy Chief who stated that t i r e s had been slashed on 24 squad cars on the f i r s t night of the s t r i k e . An 8:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. curfew went i n t o e f f e c t . On the second day of the s t r i k e , Saturday, Aug. 12, a permanent i n j u n c t i o n against the s t r i k e was issued in Chancery Court. The s t r i k i n g police defied the i n j u n c t i o n . Memphis was receiving national a t t e n t i o n not only f o r the police s t r i k e but also as a r e s u l t of the thousands of people a r r i v i n g in Memphis f o r a weeklong commemoration of the f i r s t anniversary of the death of Elvis Presley. On the t h i r d day of the s t r i k e , the police were given a 24-hour ultimatum: e i t h e r return to work or be f i r e d . As the deadline passed, approximately 70 police o f f i c e r s were arrested and charged with curfew v i o l a t i o n and threatened breach of peace. In response to vandalism at police precinct s t a t i o n s , the mayor ordered National Guardsmen, dressed in r i o t gear and armed with automatic weapons, placed around precinct headquarters. By Monday, Aug. 14, the fourthday of the s t r i k e , the s i t u a t i o n appeared to be worsening. The union and c i t y negotiations were at a t o t a l impasse, and the a r r e s t of the 70 police o f f i c e r s the night before hardened the resolve of the s t r i k e r s . The National Guard was ordered onto the Memphis s t r e e t s . 43
On Tuesday, Aug. 15, police association o f f i c i a l s rejected the mayor's proposal that a November referendum be held on the question of whether the c i t y ' s sales tax should be increased to finance increased pay for police and firemen. The city remained steadfast in its refusal to bargain while the police were on strike. The striking unions put pressure on teachers, public transportation workers, and sanitation workers to join the strike. In the early morninq hours of Aug. 16, a drunken security guard stationed at a key Memphis Light, Gas and Water substation tripped switches which caused a three-hour city-wide power blackout. While most of the city remainec~ calm, scattered looting was reported. On Wednesday, Aug. 16, the city petitioned Chancery Court asking that the police union be held in contempt for disobeying court orders not to strike. For the f i r s t time, civic and business leaders took an active position and urged the reopening of negotiations and a speedy settlement. On Thursday, Aug. 17, the seventh day of the strike, injunctions against police union o f f i c i a l s were l i f t e d as long as the union executives used their "best efforts" to terminate the strike. Approximately 2,500 union supporters marched to city hall in a show of solidarity and support for striking police and firemen. Bargaining sessions were reopened with the aid of federal mediators and civic and business leaders. The session lasted throughout the night and a tentative agreement was reached in the early morning hours Friday, Aug. 18. The agreement was r a t i f i e d by a voice vote by the police association membership at 8:00 a.m. the same morning. The r a t i f i e d agreement gave the police almost the identical pay package offered by the city at the i n i t i a t i o n of the negotiations. The major change from earlier proposals was the agreement that a fact-finding committee would be appointed that would have the power to make recommendations to the city concerning whether the city should increase the agreed upon raise for the second year of the contract. While the city would not be bound by the committee's recommendation, the union would be. As the strike ended, both sides claimed victory. The mayor had a two-year contract while the union chose to view i t as a two year contract with a one-year wage reopener. While the city was not bound by the recommendations, the union made i t clear i t would strike again i f the city ignored the recommendations made by the impartial panel. 44
The S t r i k e ' s Aftermath The s t r i k e was a traumatic event for the citizens of Memphis. Its reverbrations were strongest in the weeks following the end of the walkout, but i t s effects are s t i l l being f e l t today. At the conclusion of the s t r i k e , a police union o f f i c i a l said the success of the s t r i k e could only be judged in the future, a f t e r new contract negotiations had taken place. These negotiations have now occurred. A mayoral election has also taken place, with the events of the s t r i k e being a prime issue. A c i t y referendum has been held posing a controversial amendment to the c i t y charter s t i p u l a t i n g that any s t r i k i n g c i t y employee be automatically dismissed. While the s t r i k e had a major influence on a l l of the above events, the most ir,~ediate and most obvious result of the s t r i k e was the antagonism that flared between union and management and between s t r i k e r s and non-strikers did not end with the s t r i k e nor did i t even quickly subside in the weeks and months a f t e r the s t r i k e ' s termination. Perhaps the best example of the i l l feeling that existed immediately following the s t r i k e is the fact that the director of police cancelled a new r e c r u i t class because he did not feel that i t was appropriate to expose new r e c r u i t s to the negative environment that existed in the department four weeks a f t e r the s t r i k e ended. That antagonism s t i l l lingers today. The rank and f i l e union members are well aware of the handful of o f f i c e r s who "were out for themselves" and refused to s t r i k e . Friendships and working r e l a t i o n ships were strained not only between s t r i k i n g and non-striking patrolmen but also between the supervisory personnel, who remained active during the s t r i k e , and the patrolmen. As one patrolman Put i t , "the ranks were s p l i t wide open by the s t r i k e . " Consequently, a h o s t i l i t y seems to e x i s t between the ranks to a degree never before seen. Patrolmen suspiciously view action taken by superior officers as punishment for t h e i r s t r i k e a c t i v i t i e s , and superior officers feel even t h e i r most basic directives are u n f a i r l y questioned as to t h e i r motivation. The attitudes of the people of Memphis were less easily gauged. However, less than three months a f t e r the s t r i k e , an election was held on the r i g h t of public employees to s t r i k e . It involved an addition to the c i t y charter e n t i t l e d " D i s c i p l i n a r y Action Against S t r i k i n g Employees" The referendum asked the voters of Memphis whether an amendment should be included in the c i t y charter to deem any municipal employee who participates in a s t r i k e to have resigned his appointment or employment with the city. Furthermore, the c i t y charter amendment proposed to make i t unlawful for any government o f f i c i a l to grant amnesty to 45
municipal employees before a s t r i k e or to make amnesty to s t r i k e r s part of the s t r i k e settlement. Municipal employees who s t r i k e would automatically lose employment with the c i t y . They could be rehired through the regular employment process, but would lose a l l s e n i o r i t y and accrued benefits. The referendum also provided for a change in bargaining procedures where the c i t y council would set up procedures for a r b i t r a t i o n of economic issues when bargaining remained deadlocked for seven consecutive days. The referendum was a clear cut vote on the r i g h t of public employees to s t r i k e . I t was supported by the elected c i t y o f f i c i a l s and u n i l a t e r a l l y opposed by the unions representing the municioal employees. The results of the referendum indicate that a substantial majority of the voters are opposed to public employee strikes since 78,381 (64%) voted in favor of the amendment, while 44,333 (36%) voted against the proposed change in the c i t y charter. Although the results seemed to indicate overwhelming c i t i z e n support for the charter amendment, we observed profound differences in voting patterns between blacks and whites. A high c o r r e l a t i o n was found between percent of black voters in a precinct and percent who voted against the referendum amendment. A zero order correlation was Computed to measure the strength of relationship between the two variables and the c o e f f i c i e n t approached a nearly pe~rfect linear f i t (Rho = .93). The c o e f f i c i e n t of determination (R~ = .82) indicates that eighty-four percent of the variance in voting patterns can be accounted for by the percent of registered black or white voters in the precincts. This, in turn, would seem to suggest that Memphis voters are r a c i a l l y polarized in t h e i r attitudes toward public employees' s t r i k e a c t i v i t y . A possible explanation of this vote might be related to the sanitation worker s t r i k e of 1968. Although the current s t r i k e did not involve sanitation workers, i t is quite possible that the events and issues of the e a r l i e r s t r i k e concerning municipal union recognition and the r i g h t to engage in work stoppages convinced many blacks to vote against the a n t i - s t r i k e referendum (Giacopassi, Anson, and Donnenwerth, 1980). The sentiments of the people were reflected in a more i n d i r e c t way through the mayoral election that occurred a year and a h a l f a f t e r the police s t r i k e . One of the consequences of the police s t r i k e was that the MPA became more p o l i t i c i z e d , as i l l u s t r a t e d by the formation of the MPA P o l i t i c a l Action Committee.
46
As a r e s u l t of the s t r i k e , a h o s t i l i t y had developed between the union and the c i t y leadership. The mayor had stated at the i n i t i a t i o n of the s t r i k e t h a t i t would be the end of the union, while the union had vowed to bring the c i t y to i t s knees. N e i t h e r of these events occurred, but the r h e t o r i c exacerbated the c o n d i t i o n of an already s t r a i n e d r e l a t i o n s h i p . When the mayoral e l e c t i o n was held in 1979, the municipal unions mobilized s o l i d l y behind the mayor's opponent. The mayor, however, used the f i r e and p o l i c e unions' opposition as, an i n d i c a t i o n of his a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s f i s c a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and won r e e l e c t i o n e a s i l y over his black opponent, 53% to 47%. The 1980 concluded one subsequent to negotiate the
c o n t r a c t n e g o t i a t i o n s between the c i t y and the MPA f u l l c o n t r a c t cycle since i t was the f i r s t time the 1978 s t r i k e t h a t union and management had to economic elements of a c o n t r a c t .
Several changes had occurred since the 1978 s t r i k e . The mayor had been r e e l e c t e d , g i v i n g him some confidence t h a t the c i t i z e n s of Memphis had supported his 1978 p o s i t i o n . The union had elected new l e a d e r s h i p , who many characterized as more r a d i c a l than the previous union leaders. The budgetary process was changed so that the c i t y had more f l e x i b i l i t y in i t s bargaining o o s i t i o n . Both sides were represented by professional n e g o t i a t o r s , and both sides were now operating under the conditions imposed by the 1978 Referendum. Negotiations proceeded smoothly and q u i c k l y as the MP# s e t t l e d f o r one of the l a r g e s t raise increases in i t s h i s t o r y (9% f o r 1980, 8% f o r 1981). Two Years Later:
Reaction of MPA Members to the S t r i k e
Crucial to an understanding of the s t r i k e is an accurate assessment of the union members' motivation f o r s t r i k i n g and t h e i r perception of the success or f a i l u r e of the s t r i k e . As W.I. Thomas has w r i t t e n , " I f men define s i t u a t i o n s as r e a l , they are real in t h e i r consequences." The s u b j e c t i v e perception of the s t r i k e r s , then, is of great importance in determining the f u t u r e course of police-management r e l a t i o n s in Memphis. I f union members define the s t r i k e as a success, they w i l l be more l i k e l y to s t r i k e again in the f u t u r e . I f they define i t as a f a i l u r e , the l i k e l i h o o d of future s t r i k e s diminishes. To evaluate the union members' perceptions of the causes and e f f e c t s of the s t r i k e , the authors conducted interviews with p o l i c e supervisory personnel, past and present MPA leaders, and rank and f i l e union members. 47
The interviews provided new i n s i g h t s , but generally revealed no unanimity of opinion. However, one area where there was almost t o t a l agreement was on the " r e a l " cause of the s t r i k e . While the public issues of the 1978 s t r i k e were pay and length of contract, most union members p r i v a t e l y agreed that the i n i t i a l o f f e r was not "bad enough" to force the MPA to s t r i k e . Most agreed that the 1978 s t r i k e was the inevitable culmination of resentment and f r u s t r a t i o n that had b u i l t up as a r e s u l t of previous negotiations. The union believed that in the past the c i t y had not bargained in good f a i t h . The "take i t or leave i t " attitude and the predicted 1977 budget d e f i c i t that turned into a surplus a f t e r negotiations had ended were given as proof. Union members f e l t they had been treated u n f a i r l y and went into the 1978 negotiations determined to teach the c i t y a lesson. While most union members overwhelmingly agreed that they have not gained anything f i n a n c i a l l y from the s t r i k e , most were unwilling to call the s t r i k e a f a i l u r e . They believed they had demonstrated to the c i t y a willingness to stand up for t h e i r p r i n c i p l e s . A number of o f f i c e r s mentioned that t h e i r supervisors now treated them with more respect for having the courage to s t r i k e . To judge the s t r i k e a f a i l u r e because i t did not r e s u l t in the achievement of i t s financial goals would be to ignore the workers' motivation for s t r i k i n g . The very act of s t r i k i n g was symbolically important and served as a c a r t h a r t i c experience, r e l i e v i n g years of pent-up f r u s t r a t i o n and h o s t i l i t y . The s t r i k e , then served an expressive function without being instrumentally e f f e c t i v e in achieving the stated financial goals. This circumstance leads to an ambivalent feeling toward the s t r i k e on the part of most MPA members. They feel the s t r i k e was necessary, but realize l i t t l e was achieved in concrete terms. When the p o s s i b i l i t y of future s t r i k e s is broached, most r e f l e c t on the amount they had risked by going on s t r i k e . While many said they would not risk going out on s t r i k e again, others stated they would s t r i k e again, but only for an extreme cause and not for a "few percentage points raise". The union leadership view the effects of the s t r i k e in a much more positive way than do most of the rank and f i l e . While the interviews revealed a d e f i n i t e hesitancy on the part of the rank and f i l e to s t r i k e again, the leaders believed there would be l i t t l e problem getting the members to s t r i k e i f the " r i g h t issue" came along. 48
The major reason the leadership defines the s t r i k e as a success is they perceive the s t r i k e as having given the union a sense of legitimacy i t had been lacking up to that time. The MPA was founded in 1973. Under a "Memorandum of Understanding with the City of Memphis," the MPA was recognized as the designated bargaining representative for commissioned o f f i c e r s below the rank of Lieutenant. The memorandum s p e c i f i c a l l y prohibited the bargaining unit from organizing any work stoppage, slow down, or s t r i k e . In the eyes of one MPA leader, the no s t r i k e clause reduced what was supposed to be c o l l e c t i v e bargaining to " c o l l e c t i v e begging." The c i t y administration had always stated that a s t r i k e would be the end of the union9 The union struck for eight days and survived9 Although the new contract contained a no s t r i k e clause and although the c i t y charter amendment now makes for automatic dismissal for a l l municipal employees who s t r i k e , the union leadership is confident the union could survive another s t r i k e . The union leadership view this new legitimacy as a turning point in management-labor relations 9 One MPA o f f i c i a l speaks about the department in terms of p r e - s t r i k e and p o s t - s t r i k e eras. The leadership sees as concrete manifestations of this new legitimacy a stronger union with a more e f f e c t i v e grievence procedure. They believe this has improved the l o t of every member by eliminating a great deal of the a r b i t r a r y and capricious power that police o f f i c i a l s previously wielded. They also point to the 1980 pay increase as an indication that the c i t y takes the s t r i k e p o s s i b i l i t y seriously 9 Summary and Conclusions The Memphis police s t r i k e of 1978 was p r i m a r i l y the r e s u l t of frustration that had been building for a number of years. The s t r i k e created a c r i s i s atmosphere in the c i t y , but resulted in few disruptions and created no s i g n i f i c a n t problems for the average tlemphian. The s t r i k e was settled a f t e r eight days with the police gaining no s i g n i f i c a n t economic concessions from the c i t y . Public events, however, do not always r e f l e c t the private r e a l i t i e s of a s i t u a t i o n . Daniel Katz and Robert Kahn (1966) have written that 9 We can easily be misled by teloological f i c t i o n s presented by organizational spokesmen. The organization is a social system and the consciously expressed intent of some of i t s members is not to be confused with the functioning of the system. Hence, we should look at the actual systemic changes taking place rather than accepting the statement at face value. We should follow such a procedure not because there may be i n s i n c e r i t y in o f f i c i a l pronouncements, but because the functioning of a system is not 49
necessarily given in the statements of i t s leaders no matter how sincere they may be. (p. 261) Robert Merton (1949) has w r i t t e n that the stated objective of an organization may in fact mask more important organizational realities. The Nemphis Police s t r i k e is an i l l u s t r a t i o n of t h i s principle. To understand the private r e a l i t i e s of the police s t r i k e , i t is necessary to see the s t r i k e from the perspective of the p a r t i c i p a n t s of the s t r i k e . The rank and f i l e of the union are ambivalent about the s t r i k e and i t s e f f e c t s . While they know they gambled a great deal and won no s i g n i f i c a n t economic concessions, they also evaluate the s t r i k e p o s i t i v e l y in the sense that they f e l t they had to s t r i k e to "teach the c i t y a lesson." The police f e l t they had not been bargained with in good f a i t h in past negotiations and that a s t r i k e was necessary to ensure that these events did not occur again. The union leadership, on the other hand, see the greatest b e n e f i t from the s t r i k e . The union gained l e g i t i m a c y , i t survived the s t r i k e , and demonstrated a bargaining muscle i t was not supposed to have. The greatest b e n e f i t of the s t r i k e , then was acquired by the union organization rather than i t s i n d i v i d u a l members. From a departmental perspective, one r e s u l t of the s t r i k e and emergence of a viable union has been a s i g n i f i c a n t a l t e r n a t i o n in management s t y l e by police supervisory personnel. A study by Reams et al. (1975) reported that police strongly preferred a consult a t i v e type of management in which personnel were allowed to part i c i p a t e in decisions a f f e c t i n g them. Our conversations with police personnel made i t apparent that a strong resentment had formed against the autocratic leadership s t y l e that had long characterized the department and which had rendered the lower ranking o f f i c e r s helpless in t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p to superiors, e s p e c i a l l y in s i t u a t i o n s where d i s c i p l i n a r y action was possible. A f t e r the s t r i k e , leadership of the MPD allowed increased p a r t i c i p a t i o n from rank and f i l e in the decisions that affected them. Evidence of this can be seen from union leadership reports that grievances are discussed and resolutions attempted before a formal grievance is f i l e d , and from the fact that union members have obtained positions on o f f i c i a l departmental committees concerned with formulation and promulgation of departmental policy. As the authors of a police administration textbook have asserted, ". based on the success of p a r t i c i p a t i v e management in nonpolice organizations i t can serve as a useful tool to police organizational improvements i f only the police w i l l give i t a t r y . " I t appears that the impetus f o r giving this approach a t r y was the s t r i k e of 1978. 5O
While the stated goal of this paper is to put the s t r i k e in some perspective, i t may s t i l l be too early to assess whether the overall impact of the s t r i k e on the c i t y of Memphis is constructive or destructive. How the union flexes i t s perceived new found strength w i l l determine the future course of municipal labor relations in Memphis. Footnote llnformation presented in this section was taken from accounts presented in the Memphis Press Scimitar and The Commercial as well as from information gathered from personal interviews by the authors. Refe ren ces Ayres, R. Case studies of police strikes in two c i t i e s : Albuquerque and Oklahoma City. Journal of Police Science and Administration. March, 1977, 5, pp. 19-31. Bopp, W. The police rebellion. Thomas Publishing, 1971.
Springfield; I I I . :
Charles C.
Bopp, W. (ed.) The Boston police strike of 1919. Police administration (selected readings). Boston: Holbrook Press, 1972. Bopp, W. The San Francisco police strike of 1975: a case study. Journal of Police Science and Administration, March, 1977, 5, pp. 32-42. Bussel, A. The Memphis Press Scimitar and E. H. Crump. (University of Wisconsin, 1965 unpublished thesis). Collins, T., Schick, R. and Couturier, J. The public interest in goverpmen~ labar relations. Cambridge, Mass: Ballinger Publishing, 1977. Gehlin, F., B a r t e l l , T., Anderson, R. and Winfree, L. Support your local police--on strike? Journal of Police Science and Administration. March, 1976, 4, pp. I-8. Giacopassi, D., Anson, R. and Donnenworth, G. Comparison of racial attitudes: right of police to s t r i k e . International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice, Winter, 1980, 4 (2), pp. 191-201. Katz, D. and Kahn, R. The social psychology of organizations. New York: Wiley Publishing, 1966.
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Leake, G. The once and always Mister Crump. Memphis State University Press. Script presentation and production background for television documentary. Merton R. On theoretical sociology. 1949.
New York: Free Press,
Reams, R., Kyykendall, J., and Burns, D. Police management systems: what is an appropriate model~ Journal of Police Science and Administration, December, 1975, 3, pp. 475-481. Sheehan, R. and Cordner, G. Introduction to police administration. Reading, ~.lass: Addison Wesly Publishing. Thomas, W.I. and Znaniecki, F. The Polish p.easant in Europe and America. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1918.
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