Axiomathes (2009) 19:155–166 DOI 10.1007/s10516-009-9059-2 ORIGINAL PAPER
The Problem of Reference to Nonexistents in Cocchiarella’s Conceptual Realism Andriy Vasylchenko
Received: 23 February 2009 / Accepted: 8 March 2009 / Published online: 25 March 2009 Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009
Abstract This article is a critical review of Cocchiarella’s theory of reference. In conceptual realism, there are two central distinctions regarding reference: first, between active and deactivated use of referential expressions, and, second, between using referential expressions with and without existential presupposition. Cocchiarella’s normative restrictions on the existential presuppositions of reference lead to postulating two fundamentally different kinds of objects in conceptual realism: realia or concrete objects, on the one hand, and abstract intensional objects or nonexistents, on the other. According to Cocchiarella, nonexistents can be referred to only without existential presuppositions. However, referring to nonexistents with existential presuppositions is an ordinary human practice. To account for this fact, Cocchiarella’s normative theory of reference should be supplemented by a descriptive account of referring. Keywords Formal ontology Ontology Conceptual realism Conceptualism Reference Nonexistent objects Abstract objects Fictional objects Intentionality
1 Predication in Conceptual Realism Cocchiarella in his Formal Ontology and Conceptual Realism1 brings together a vast range of discussions in analytic and formal ontology. The discussions can be roughly divided into three large groups. First, the book presents a scrupulous and 1
Cocchiarella (2007).
A. Vasylchenko (&) Skovoroda Institute of Philosophy, National AS of Ukraine, 4 Triohsviatytelska street, Kiev 01001, Ukraine e-mail:
[email protected]
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comprehensive development of formal tools designed for comparative analysis of different ontological theories. Second, it articulates in detail the ontology of conceptual realism and compares it with its theoretical rivals such as nominalism, Platonism, and logical realism. Third, Cocchiarella applies his theory to a number of issues in formal ontology and analytic metaphysics. Among these issues are terminist theory of supposition, Les´niewski’s Ontology, plural reference and predication, logic of natural kinds, and Aristotelian essentialism. The central topic of the book is predication. It is in terms of predication that the difference between alternative ontological theories is clarified. According to Cocchiarella, conceptual realism claims that (1) predication in thought underlies predication in language, and (2) abstract objects have no being outside the evolution of culture and language, as far as (3) they are nothing else than objectified truth conditions of the relevant concepts. In this formulation, (1) opposes nominalism, while (2) and (3) opposes Platonism and logical realism. The development of these claims leads to a comprehensive ontology which combines an account of the structure of reality in terms of causality and natural kinds with a refined theory of abstract objects designed for the analysis of the intensional contents of our speech and mental acts. These are two theoretical components of conceptual realism; Cocchiarella calls them ‘‘conceptual natural realism’’ and ‘‘conceptual intensional realism’’, respectively.2 In this article I deal with the second component and, more specifically, with conceptual realist theory of reference. Cocchiarella’s theory of predication radically differs from the well known settheoretical standard. First of all, in conceptual realism predication cannot be reduced to set-theoretical membership or functionality. Predication is more fundamental and as a human capacity lies in the base of all set-theoretical abstractions. According to Cocchiarella, there are two main types of cognitive capacities that underlie our abilities in exercising predication: referential and predicable capacities. The former have to do with the intentional nature of human speech and thought acts; they are a kind of practical knowledge, namely knowing how to use referential expressions for pointing out different kinds of objects. The latter have to do with the judgemental nature of our speech and thought acts; they constitute practical knowledge how to characterise and to relate objects in certain way. Further, concepts for Cocchiarella are neither mental objects (such as images or ideas), nor any kind of objects at all. Concepts are intersubjectively realizable cognitive rule-following capacities of using the relevant expressions. In conceptual realism we deal with two main kinds of concepts: referential and predicable concepts. The former are referential capacities and not the objects of referential practices; the latter are predicable capacities. Concepts in this sense are not real universals of Platonic realism, but they are cognitive capacities and thus ‘‘objective cognitive universals’’.3 Cocchiarella writes that both referential and predicable concepts have what he calls ‘‘unsaturated nature’’,4 to a certain extent analogous to the nature of concepts 2
Cocchiarella (2007, p. 22).
3
Cocchiarella (2007, p. 142).
4
Cocchiarella (2007, p. 143).
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and objects in Frege’s ontology. The unsaturatedness means that the two types of concepts possess mutually complementary cognitive structure as potential components of a thought or speech act. Just as in Frege’s ontology truth functions and objects inform the unity of predication, in conceptual realism referential and predicable concepts mutually saturate each other when both capacities are exercised in the same speech/thought act. So in conceptual realism predication is not a bond between an object and its property, but a nexus between two concepts, one referential and another predicable. For example, the cognitive structure of the assertion ‘Socrates is wise’ is analysed as follows: ð9x SocratesÞ Wiseð xÞ
ðA1Þ
where the referential expression (Ax Socrates) represents a referential act of using the proper name Socrates with existential presupposition, and the variable x shows unsaturatedness and gives the point of connection with a complementary predicable concept. The predicable expression Wise(x), in its turn, represents a predicative act in which the variable x shows the point at which the referential concept ‘‘enters’’. This is initial level of analysis at which the cognitive structure of a speech or thought act is displayed. According to Cocchiarella, in conceptual realism there is also a secondary, lower level of analysis, where truth conditions are preserved but names appear as objectual terms, and deduction can be applied. At this lower level the assertion ‘Socrates is wise’ is analysed as5 9x ½x ¼ Socrates ^ Wise ð xÞ:
ðA2Þ
Cocchiarella applies similar strategy of analysis to predication acts involving all kinds of referential concepts: proper and common names, simple and complex names (the latter category includes, e.g., definite descriptions), names used with or without existential presupposition. The analysis results in a conceptual realist theory of predication in which any reference turns out to be of quantificational nature. Formal theories of predication kHST* and HSTk , being developed on the base of second-order logic and type theory, involve quantification over predicates in the analysis of referential concepts.6
2 The Paradox of Nonexistence For any theory of reference, the most challenging objects are those which never actually exist (nonexistents). The main point of this challenge can be formulated in the form of the following paradoxical Argument of Nonexistence: (Pr1) When denying existence of something, we refer to what does not exist; (Pr2) One cannot refer to something that does not exist. From (Pr1) and (Pr2) it follows:
5
Cocchiarella (2007, p. 148).
6
Cocchiarella (2007, pp. 101–120).
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(Concl) That to which we refer when denying existence of something, does exist.7 The paradox makes us choose between accepting (Pr1) and accepting (Pr2). Fitting and Mendelsohn call those who accept (Pr1) and deny (Pr2) (thereby assuming Pr1^ ? *Pr2) inflationists, and those who accept Pr2 and deny Pr1 (thus assuming Pr2^ *Pr1) deflationists.8 Accepting (Pr1) is natural for meinongian approaches to ontology that consider being of objects (in particular, ‘so-being’, that is, having certain properties or characteristics) to be independent from existence.9 A standard inflationist response to the Paradox will be rejecting (Pr2) while accepting instead the opposite thesis: Prþ 2 One can refer to anything that is, where ‘is’ means ‘has (some kind of) being’.10 With this modification, the Argument of Nonexistence loses its paradoxical character, as the conclusion now changes to: (Concl1) That to which we refer when denying existence of something, does not exist but is. Cocchiarella’s approach shares some features with meinongian inflationism. First, ‘so-being’ or having certain characteristics, in conceptual realism does not necessarily entail existence. Second, as we will see later, the claim Prþ is not 2 unacceptable for Cocchiarella. However, conceptual realism claims that we can legitimately use the names of nonexistents only without existential presuppositions, and in this respect Cocchiarella’s view of reference is much more discreet in comparison with meinongian views. To understand Cocchiarella’s theory of reference in connection with the Argument of Nonexistence, we have to take into account two crucial distinctions of conceptual realism: first, between active and deactivated use of referential expressions, and, second, between using referential expressions with and without existential presupposition. Deactivation of reference means that, whereas a referential expression is used, no referential act is actually exercised. To see an example of deactivated reference, let us consider the assertion ‘Pegasus does not exist’. The sentence ‘Pegasus exists’ in the case of its denial undergoes what Cocchiarella calls nominalization. This means that the sentence ceases to be a judgement, turns to logical subject and starts to denote its own propositional content. The cognitive structure of this sentence, according to conceptual realism, is analytically represented as follows: Not the Caseð½9x Pegasus E!ð xÞÞ:
ðA3Þ
7
This formulation is based on Fitting and Mendelson (1998, p. 169), but has been slightly changed for our purposes.
8
The terms ‘inflationism’ and ‘deflationism’ were introduced by Berlin; see Fitting and Mendelsohn (1998, pp. 169–178).
9
See e.g. Parsons (1980), Zalta (1988), Jacquette (1996), and Priest (2005).
10
A more detailed account of the ‘‘standard inflationist response’’ see in Fitting and Mendelsohn (1998, pp. 175–177).
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where Not-the-Case is a predicate applicable to propositional contents. The sentence ‘Pegasus exists’ has been transformed into an abstract objectual term. Unlike the assertion ‘Pegasus exists’, in ‘Pegasus does not exist’ no reference is exercised. This is why conceptual realists say that the referential concept has been deactivated; that such deactivation is involved, is indicated in (A3) by the square brackets. Similarly, in asserting a conditional ‘‘If Pegasus exists, then there is a winged horse’’ no active reference is exercised and no existential presupposition is made.11 So we can conclude that in conceptual realism (Pr1) is denied.
3 Direct Reference to Nonexistents: Lack of Existential Presuppositions Would it be appropriate then to characterise Cocchiarella’s position as deflationist? To answer this question, let us consider the second crucial distinction of conceptual realism, namely between reference with and without existential presupposition. Using a referential expression without existential presupposition is, by definition, referring to nonexistents. For example, according to conceptual realism, when we say ‘Pegasus flies’, we do exercise a referential act as a part of the act of predication. According to Cocchiarella, if in our ontology the proper name Pegasus does not denote any existent object, then the assertion ‘Pegasus flies’ at the initial level where the cognitive structure is represented will be analysed as follows: ð8x PesagusÞ Fliesð xÞ
ðA4Þ
12
which at the lower ‘deductive’ level gives : ð8xÞðx ¼ Pegasus ! Fliesð xÞÞ:
ðA4; Þ
Similarly, if our ontology does not presuppose the existence of unicorns, then for the assertion ‘unicorns are herbivorous’ at the initial level of analysis we have ð8x UnicornÞ Herbivorusð xÞ
ðA5Þ
while at the lower level, correspondingly: ð8xÞðx 2 Unicorn ! Herbivorousð xÞÞ
ðA5; Þ
where ‘[’ is a derivative operator in the conceptual realist theory of names, satisfying the condition13 x 2 A $ ð9zAÞ ðx ¼ zÞ ðC2 Þ We can see that conceptual realism admits reference to abstract intensional objects: at the initial level, abstract referential expressions can be analysed by means of universal quantificational reference; and at the lower level of analysis, abstract intensional objects can be taken as values of bound object variables. Abstract intensional objects, according to Cocchiarella, are the objectified truth conditions 11
cf. Cocchiarella (2007, p. 151).
12
cf. Cocchiarella (2007, p. 148).
13
See Cocchiarella (2007, p. 232).
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underlying all possible uses of the relevant concepts.14 So allowing reference to nonexistents is nothing else than admitting human ability to identify in intersubjective communication certain intensional contents (objectified truth conditions of the relevance of referential concepts) irrespective of their existence. Therefore we can conclude that Cocchiarella does not accept (Pr2); moreover, in conceptual is acceptable, namely: realism a version of Prþ 2 Abstr Pr2 One can refer to the intensional content of any abstract object. This thesis looks quite meinongian, however, it is not as meinongian as it seems. In fact, Cocchiarella avoids accepting what Quine called ‘‘bloated universe’’ of abstract objects; this is apparent in the conceptual realist theory of abstract objects as merely objectified truth conditions. And at the level of formal analysis, Cocchiarella’s ontological restraint shows itself in his refusal to involve existential presuppositions in the analysis of abstract intensional objects, as one can see from the analytical representations (A3)–(A5). To put it more precise, in conceptual realism the following Principle of Nonexistence15 of abstract objects is valid: (PNE) Abstract intensional objects do not ever actually exist, however, they have being and so can be referred to, although only without existential presuppositions. Now I propose to replace the notion of ‘referring’ in the Argument of Nonexistence with the notion of ‘referring with existential presupposition’, or, for short, ‘E-referring’. The modified argument will be as follows: PrE1 When denying existence of something, we E-refer to what do not exist; PrE2 One cannot E-refer to something that does not exist; (ConclE) That to which we E-refer when denying existence of something, does exist. The premise PrE2 is true in conceptual realism. The premise PrE1 is false, so the paradoxical conclusion (ConclE) is avoided. On this account, Cocchiarella’s position is deflationist.
4 Reference to Fictional Objects: Lack of Reference In this section we come back to the notion of deactivated reference. We will see how deactivated reference is involved into reference to fictional objects. The main strategy for the analysis of nonexistents in conceptual realism consists in what Cocchiarella calls ‘‘double reflexive abstraction’’. At the first step of this procedure, a referential concept is transformed into a predicate expression and so becomes deactivated. Thus, if A is a name (proper or common, complex or simple), 14
cf. Cocchiarella (2007, pp. 108–110; 153–154).
15
This principle is my summary of Cocchiarella’s views on abstract intensional objects; the formulation is based on a more extensive exposition of the issue in the book: see Cocchiarella (2007, p. 123 ff).
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and Q is a quantifier, then referential concept QxA turns into its predicable correlate, an abstract predicate [QxA](): (Abstr)
½QxA ¼ df ½kyð9FÞðy ¼ F ^ ðQxAÞFðxÞÞ;
For example, in the assertion ‘Sofia is an actress’, the referential concept that ‘‘an actress’’ stand for, analytically represented as Ax Actress, becomes inactive and turns into predicate [Ax Actress](). Further, at the second step of reflexive abstraction, the predicable concept can be nominalized, in which case it becomes an abstract objectual term denoting the intensional content of being a concept F such as (QxA)F(x). Thus, in the sentence ‘Sofia wants to be an actress’ being an actress is no more a predicate, but a part of the nominalized form of the complex predicate ‘wants to be an actress’. The referential concept that ‘an actress’ stands for, in its turn, has been deactivated and become nominalized into an intensional object. The nominalized predicate denotes the intensional content of the corresponding predicate, and thereby, of the initial referential concept.16 The appeal to double reflexive abstraction as complex linguistic practice that involves both deactivation and nominalization helps to avoid existential presuppositions regarding nonexistents in the analyses of referential acts. Cocchiarella shows how this strategy can be applied to different specialised kinds of abstract objects, such as mathematical objects or fictional objects. Thus, conceptual realist analysis of reference in fictional discourse is based upon the assumption that all referential expressions occurring in fiction are deactivated.17 That is, references are not to be taken literally: in the story we deal only with the intensional contents of referential expressions and not with actual objects. Stories themselves are to be considered, on this account, as collections of propositions, so that we can associate with each story a possible world: the set of these and only propositions which make up the story. Truth in such world is determined by the contents of the propositions making up this world. To formalise this account, Cocchiarella introduces special operator ‘In the story…’ which relativises both the propositions and the intensional objects (fictional characters) involved in the referential expressions as follows: ðAbstrS Þ ½QxAS ¼ df ½kyð9FÞðy ¼ F ^ InðS; ½ðQxAÞFðxÞÞ; where A is a name (proper or common, complex or simple), Q is a quantifier (so that QxA is the representation of a referential concept), F is a predicable expression, [(QxA)F(x)] is a nominalization of the bound formula (QxA)F(x) so that the former denotes the propositional content of the latter, and the operator In(S, Pr) indicates that the propositional content Pr is included into the content of the story S.18 If we compare the definitions (Abstr) and (AbstrS), we will see how nominalization in the actual world differs from nominalization in fiction. The operator In (S, Pr), by means of which the semantics of deactivated referential 16
cf. Cocchiarella (2007, pp. 151–155; 201–203).
17
The account of fictional objects in terms of ‘In-the-story’ operator that I present here is different from the account of nonexistents given above in (A4)–(A5). I believe that these two accounts are complementary and compatible with each other. 18
See Cocchiarella (2007, pp. 163–166).
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expressions is defined in fiction, provides less stringent conditions on intensional objects than those imposed by referential concepts referring to actual objects. Both existential presuppositions regarding fictional objects, and propositions concerning these objects, are true; however, they are true in fiction. In this way all kinds of meinongian possible and impossible objects such as unicorns and the round square are analysable. Of course, these objects are by no means realia; they are only the intensional contents of the cognitive structures underlying the use of the corresponding expressions in telling and understanding stories. So the crucial difference of Cocchiarella’s fictional objects from those assumed in meinongian inflationism consists in the absence of active reference. The concepts which seemingly refer to fictional objects, in fact only quote the truth conditions determined by all possible applications of the corresponding referential expressions.19 According to conceptual realism, the activation of fictitious referential concepts is impossible unless stories are taken as true descriptions of reality.
5 Two Kinds of Objects in Conceptual Realism We can see from (PNE) that in conceptual realism some kinds of objects cannot be reached by existential reference. In other words, one can distinguish between two fundamentally different kinds of objects: realia or concrete objects, on the one hand, and abstract intensional objects or nonexistents, on the other. The latter, unlike the former, are unavailable for E-referring. The rationale behind (PNE) is that, according to conceptual realism, abstract intensional objects never actually exist. But what does it mean ‘never’? Cocchiarella’s list of realia includes (1) present actual objects; (2) temporally possible objects (what did or will exist)20; (2) causally possible objects, in the sense of special relativity theory (objects that are neither exist in the present nor temporally possible, but might exist in a causally connected local time simultaneously with our present21; (3) objects that are possible regarding laws of nature22; (4) natural kinds (Aristotelian essences).23 For each of these kinds of existents, an appropriate formal ontology with the relevant possible world semantics is developed. So what a conceptual realist means when he states ‘abstract intensional objects never actually exist’ is that, unlike realia, they do not exist in any possible world of any of these semantics. Except modal ontologies listed above, Cocchiarella considers two more modal ontological paradigms. One is logical atomism, in which being is the same as existence, every logically necessary proposition is logically true, and every 19
See Cocchiarella (2007, p. 109).
20
cf. Cocchiarella (2007, pp. 40–44).
21
cf. Cocchiarella (2007, pp. 48–52).
22
Cocchiarella gives two examples of the model for naturally possible objects: the concordance model of multiverse in cosmology and the many-worlds model in quantum mechanics; see Cocchiarella (2007, pp. 74–78). 23
Cocchiarella (2007, pp. 281–288).
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a posteriori proposition is logically contingent.24 Obviously, ontology with such characteristics is appropriate only for dealing with strictly logical possibility and thus can account neither for natural realia nor for abstract objects. Another paradigm, the only one left to deal with what Kripke called ‘‘metaphysical modality’’25 and what in conceptual realism is called ‘‘conceptual modality’’, is a conceptualist counterpart of logical realism, namely conceptual intensional realism. Formally this paradigm is embodied in the systems hkHST* and HSTk( .26 The category of conceptually (or, for logical realism, metaphysically) possible objects thus embraces all kinds of objects that fall short of natural realia (1)–(4), such as numbers, mathematical objects, fictional objects, imaginary objects etc. It is worth noting that the logic of actual and possible objects, basic for Cocchiarella’s formal ontology, is modified in hkHST* and HSTk( in such a way so that, unlike systems for the analysis of natural realia (1)–(4), the systems hkHST* and HSTk( include only ‘‘free logic’’, so that no existential presupposition regarding possible objects is made, quite in accordance with the principle (PNE).27
6 Existential Reference to Nonexistents: Contradictio in Adjecto or Ordinary Practice? Consider a person, called John, who believes that unicorns actually exist. If we take into account only objective content of the term ‘unicorn’, then John’s assertion ‘Unicorns are herbivorous’ should be perhaps analysed in conceptual realism as ð8x UnicornÞ Herbivorusð xÞ
ðA5Þ
At the same time, John’s assertion ‘Elephants are herbivorous’ is analysed as ð9x ElephantÞ Herbivorusð xÞ
ðA6Þ
Let us imagine that John has never seen elephants, and he has no idea about evolutionary history or genetics; for him both ‘unicorn’ and ‘elephant’ stand for imaginary kinds of creatures depicted in a book. The cognitive structures underlying the two assertions ‘Elephants are herbivorous’ and ‘Unicorns are herbivorous’ are similar; as far as the predicable concept ‘herbivorous’ is existence-entailing, both assertions imply the existence of creatures in question. What are our reasons to analytically represent one assertion with existential presupposition, while representing the other without it? One reason, Cocchiarella might answer, lies in the objectivity of the concept ‘elephant’ as a cognitive universal, and in the lack of such objectivity in the concept ‘unicorn’. But we have to recognize that this objectivity has nothing to do with John, his experience, his knowledge, his linguistic or cognitive capacities. Rather, the objectivity of elephants is a part of our knowledge about the world, so the representation (A5) is our 24
cf. Cocchiarella (2007, pp. 61–69).
25
Kripke (1980, pp. 34–39).
26
cf. Cocchiarella (2007, p. 123 ff).
27
cf. Cocchiarella (2007, p. 123).
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reconstruction of what John says, not his account of what he means by saying ‘Unicorns are herbivorous’. However, why should we interpret John in terms of objective scientific knowledge, instead of trying to find out what he really means? My point in this discussion is not to affirm the relativity of existential presuppositions. As natural scientists and analytic philosophers, we have to give credit to the objectivity of realia. However, as psychologists, cultural anthropologists or literary critics, we are also interested in subjectivity and cultural peculiarity. So if we are concerned not only with our own objective worldview, but also with cultural or personal presuppositions of the others, then we should supplement Cocchiarella’s normative theory of reference with a descriptive account of referring. In particular, we might sometimes find it reasonable, in order to describe John’s world, to represent the cognitive structure of John’s speech act in agreement with his own beliefs. It may seem that using ‘In-the-story’ operator is more in line with this purpose, so that the representation in terms of existential but deactivated reference can be used: ½ð9x UnicornÞ Herbivorousð xÞJ
ðA50 Þ
where J is a story of John’s beliefs. Or, to put (A5’) in words, ‘In the story of John’s beliefs, unicorns are herbivorous’. However, this analysis is as much biased as (A5). It is in the story of our beliefs that we consider the content of John’s assertion as a part of the story of his beliefs. John himself, on the contrary, takes this content literally as true description of reality. He is straightforward in his assertion, and does not mean reference to be deactivated. What he means is rather: ½ð9x UnicornÞ Herbivorousð xÞ:
ðA6Þ
So if we are to understand John in terms of his own beliefs, we have to acknowledge that (A5) and (A5’) do not adequately represent the cognitive structure of his speech act, while (A6) does. Now I can formulate my point in the form of the following Statement of Existential Reference: (SER) We do existentially refer to nonexistents. As John’s example shows, (SER) is an a posteriori statement; due to its descriptive character, it does not contradict the normative principles (PNE) and PrE2 . What it affirms is that our thought or speech acts, as a matter of fact, happen to violate these principles. Leaving John alone, it seems that referring to a nonexistent can be regarded an inherent trait of some intentional states: one kind of believing in the existence of what does not exist is called ‘‘idolatry’’ or, more generally, ‘‘prejudice’’; another kind is ‘‘indulging in wishful thinking’’, when we believe that something exists just because we wish it to exist.
7 Some Reflections on the Psychology of Referring Human beings are not only rational, but also emotional creatures. They use concepts according to common (culturally determined) rules, although often loading them
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with additional connotations. Thus, if I like dogs, the referential concept ‘a dog’ will be charged in my mind with positive emotions. Perhaps it will even be associatively linked in my beliefs with another positive concept, say, ‘a friend’. Or, if I had a bad experience of communication with dogs, the concept ‘a dog’ has for me negative flavour and can be associated with some negative concepts, for example, ‘wild beast’ or ‘dangerous animal’. Now, a speech or thought act will involve different intensional contents depending on whether the referential concept ‘a dog’ is used by dog-liking or dog-disliking person; due to associative links between concepts, even the (implicit) cognitive structure will be different in each case. Similarly, if we take into account the emotional aspects of referential concepts that we find in stories or borrow from our cultural environment, we will have to admit that many seemingly abstract objects possess some kind of participation in our lives that goes far beyond the possible influence of objectified truth conditions. If I wait for the Messiah, do I wait for imaginary or real person? If a young lady hopes to meet Charming Prince, what kind of creature does she have in mind? If Charming Prince was merely a fictional character, why would she hope to meet him in the actual world? Perhaps, cognitive structure of these and many others intentional states can be explained if we allow for what can be called a ‘confused’ or ‘condensed’ reference. When we desperately hope or wait or intend for something, we quite often have in mind something imaginary-and-tangible, something fictional-and-real. When we deeply fear or enjoy something, isn’t the object of our feeling concrete and at the same time abstract, existent and at the same time nonexistent? Psychologically, only such mixtures prove to be so much threatening or enjoyable. More generally, we can say that in intentional contexts, referential concepts often stand for much more than only objectified truth conditions of the applicability of corresponding expressions. A concept can stand for an entity that lives only in our memory; for a ‘self-object’, the result of unconscious transformation of our experience; for a fictional character tinged with our infantile emotions; for an actual or merely possible existent; for all these taken together and, in addition, for the truth conditions of the concept’s applicability. These brief reflections about psychology of reference reinforce the significance of Cocchiarella’s normative semantical theory in which ontological restraint is rigorously kept, in order to achieve the lucidity of mind and to avoid confusions about the objects of our thoughts. However, should we wish to leave the firm ground of normative ontology and undertake a descriptive study of how humans actually talk or think about objects, these preliminary remarks would clear the way to the fascinating world of eidola and simulacra emerging from human subjectivity. Acknowledgments I am grateful to Nino Cocchiarella for reading a preliminary version of this paper and giving a number of valuable suggestions and comments that helped me both to improve the paper and to understand better details of his theory
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