The Quest for Identity YAEL TAMIR Tel-Aviv University, Tel-Aviv, Israel

ABSTRACT: This paper offers an analysis of the notion "the quest for identity." The discussion emphasizes the importance of communal belonging, but rejects the view that one ought to belong to the community one was born to. It suggests that the quest for identity may lead individuals to follow many avenues: while some individuals might affirm their "inherent" affiliations and traditions, others may remain within their community of origin and strive to change its ways, or chose to leave their social group and opt for membership in a new one. This analysis suggests that choice, characteristic of the liberal conception of the person, and rootedness, characteristic of the communitarian conception of the person, both play an important role in the formation of personal identity. KEY WORDS: Liberalism, nationalism, identity, Judaism, community, cultural choices, self, authenticity

All the world's a stage, and all the men and women merely players; They have their exits and their entrances; And one man in his time plays many parts. [Shakespeare, "As You Like It", 11:7]

The quest for identity exhibits a basic human need, the need to structure one's personal identity in relation to others, to identity oneself with what lies outside the self, to find roots and establish connections to the past as well as to the future. This is a search motivated by uncertainly. Doubts concerning the definition of personal identity emerge only when the walls of the closed, primordial community crack and individuals find themselves confronted with the external world. This confrontation shatters the old, self-evident sense of identity, evokes confusion and frustrates the individual sense of belonging. The quest for identity is therefore typical of periods of social and political transition. In modern Jewish history, such search has been initiated by the Emancipation which allowed Jews, previously living separate and intense communal lives, confined to their ghettos, to encounter new options and dilemmas; by the emergence of Zionist ideology which offered Jews a new secular national identity; and by the Holocaust which forced Jews to question their ability to assimilate in other nations. It is in such periods of personal and national upheavals that individuals become conscious of their identity, forced to reflect on it and answer the most crucial question of all: "Where have I come from, where am I going, and in front of whom am I going to be judged". It is therefore no wonder that the collapse of the Soviet Union which shattered the civic, ideological identity of the people of Eastern Europe, motivated a similar quest for a new identity. The fading away of the solidarity of the workers, the obvious failure of Studies in Philosophy and Education 15: 175-191, 1996. 9 1996 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

176

YAEL TAMIR

the attempts to create "new soviet men," and the reemergence of national feelings forced individuals to redefine their affiliations. The quest for identity is a quest imbued with a hope to find a home, a group to identify with, and often a cause to fight for. It is marked by self-reflection, by the readiness of individuals to make radical changes in the way they perceive themselves as well as in their relations with others. Individuals can, as a result of such a reflective process, choose to retain the identity they held before the process began, they can reject this identity and assimilate in a new culture or "renew their identity"- i.e., adopt the national, cultural identity their forefathers held. The quest for identity thus demonstrates that identity is not sinply a matter of fate but is also a product of reflection, discovery and choice. Before we plunge into the discussion, one methodological remark is in order. Since this paper centers around issues related to national identity, it should be clear from the start that Judaism can be seen as either a religion or a cultural, national identity. If it were to be approached only as a religion, then my discussion could have been read as referring to one particular type of choices - religious choices. I tend, however, to understand Judaism in a broader sense, as encompassing religious, cultural and national aspects of identity. My discussion thus refer to this wider range of choices termed here constitutive choices. The term constitutive is used to emphasis that these choices touch upon constitutive elements of personal identity.

CHOICE,DISCOVERYAND THE FORMATIONOF IDENTITY The assumption that individuals can engage in a quest for identity presupposes that identity is not a fact about ourselves which is naturally given but something which we have to actively explore and define. But this process of defining our identity could be described in two radically different ways. The first reflects the communitarian conception of identity formation which sees personal identity as predetermined by fate; "who I am is answered both for me and for others by the history I inherit, the social positions I occupy, and the 'moral career' on which I am embarked."l Individuals are thus seen as engaged in a process of self-discovery rather than in a process of choice. The second view is a liberal one, it sees identity formation in a different way which involves reflection and choice. Central to this mode of thought is a distinctive picture of individuals as "their own creators" who may, when confronted with possible ends, roles and attachments "adopt, perform or abandon any at will (though not all, and probably not even many, at once). ''2 Will, choice, decision, calculation and evaluation, are central to this conception of identity formation. The liberal approach does not, however, suggest that individuals have "a view from nowhere," that they can make choices as entities lacking any background, attachments or commitments. Such an understanding misinterpret the essence of

THE QUEST FOR IDENTITY

177

this approach; individuals always choose from within a social position, they choose as members, as persons who are aware of their particular history and affiliations. The liberal conception of the person thus sees individuals as contextua!ized but assumes that this contextuality, does not prevent them from making choices. In this model contextuality and choice are seen as mutually complementary rather than antithetical process. The quest for identity could be understood, in line with the communitarian model, as describing an inward looking process, a process of discovery. Such a process can lead to a change in one's level of self-awareness but not in one's identity. If, however, the quest for identity can led individuals beyond a conscious confirmation of their identity to either assimilation or the renewal of identity then it could only be explained along the lines of the liberal model. Assimilation might be the clearest indication of the ability of individuals to make a cultural choice. Individuals who assimilate go through a process which leads them far beyond the discovery of the identity imposed on them by their community of fate. They are involved in a process which allows them to opt out of their community of origin and adopt new affiliations. Those who adopt a deterministic interpretation of human behaviour could indeed claim that it is predetermined for some individuals, that it is their fate, that they will go through a process of assimilation. Note, however, that in this context that term "fate" is used differently than in the context of "community of fate," and could fit the conception of the individual as a choosing agent - though it must presuppose that one's choices are predetermined. I make here no claim that cultural choices are the product of a free, undetermined will. The argument intentionally leaves this question open and refers not to the formation of the agent's will or preferences but to the process of choice itself. While the notion of assimilation clearly points in the direction of choice the notion of "identity renewal" seems to point in the direction of fate. It suggests that individuals can reflect upon and change constitutive elements of their identity but it also hints at the nature of such choices. It could be interpreted as referring to a predetermined choice - a person who chooses to renew her identity chose to be what she was meant to be. A closer look at this concept will reveal that this interpretation is only partially accurate. The term "renewal" is usually used to indicate the restoration of a thing to its previous condition, ~or to look new. Note, however, that "a new look" might be different from the original look. Here the sense of restoration is retained by pointing to the "newness" of the item rather than to the precise restoration of a particular state of affairs. So it might seem as if the renewal of identity points to a process of reviving, or reemphasising old traits an individual used to exhibit. But the common use of this concept does not fit this description. Discussions concerning identity renewal often refer to a process by which individuals adopt a culture or a religion which is totally new to them. Why then use the term "renewal"? What is being renewed in this process? Usually, the reference is to the social structure of a society. The renewal of Jewish identity in Eastern

178

YAEL TAMIR

Europe refers to a process whereby Jews, who were once part of a social structure, are recapturing this position. There is, however, no assurance that the same individuals who now identify themselves as Jews had, at some previous point of their lives, adopted a Jewish identity which they are now reviving; in fact, given a long enough time-gap, it could be claimed with certainty that those who now identify themselves as Jews are not the same individuals that carried that identity in the past. The term "renewal" is thus used to reflect a belief concerning a certain continuity of identity across generations. It assumes that when an individual of Jewish parentage chooses to define himself as a Jew he is thereby returning to his roots, renewing his ties with his community of origin and embracing an identity that could have been his. Individuals renew an option, a potential identity offered by their past. This process involves choice, a choice to adopt an identity which is, for the individual, new, but which has its roots in her personal history, in her innate relations with her forefathers. Processes such as assimilation and the renewal of national identity which are typically associated with the quest for identity are not the only processes whereby individuals express cultural choices. One should be careful not to embrace a common fallacy, that of identifying reflection and choice with change. Individuals can upon reflection choose to maintain their present identity. Those engaged in a process of assimilation or identity renewal are neither more free nor more reflective that those who choose to re-endorse the identity they have inherited. A decision to embark on a process of reflection and choice and a decision to embark on a process of change are indeed two different decisions.

MAKINGCULTURALCHOICES The choosing of a national-cultural identity is a modern phenomenon. It is a function of the openness of a community, the ability of its members to be exposed to other ways of life, systems of belief, traditions, language or, in short, to the cultural matrix of societies other then their own. Most individuals in the modern world are acquainted with more than one way of life and more than one cultural community, a fact making choices altogether possible. It is for this reason that the Amish, Orthodox Jews in Israel, Pakistanis in England, French Canadians or, for that matter, cultural and religious minority groups all around the globe, wish to shelter their children from outside influences. This is why ethnic or national education have become so important and why cultural communities strive for closure - if cultural choices were impossible, neither education nor closure would have been necessary. 3 What is implied by the assumption that individuals can make cultural choices? First, it means that a statement such as "I would like to be a Jew" is meaningful. This statement is different from the one "I am a Jew," which implies that one defines oneself as a Jew, as well as from the statement "I feel like a Jew," which points to a psychological state of mind. It is a statement of preferences which is meaningful regardless of the Jewishness of the person involved. I can express a

THE QUEST FOR IDENTITY

179

preference for being a Jew, whether I am one or not. But expressing a preference is not enough, the question is whether individuals can act upon these preferences and bring about a change in their identity. Note that the claim that individuals can influence their identity does not suggest that individuals will necessarily be able to successfully pursue any choice they make, but only that they are able to take actions which make the desirable situation more probable. As having the preference to be a good person, is not enough to assure that one would become one, so expressing a desire to be Jewish is no assurance of becoming one. The choice of a life plan or a goal alludes to a step in a long process whereby choice and rootness both play an important role. Individuals cannot but choose with reference to a particular cultural and social background. When choosing, they evaluate their choices on the basis of some set of values offered to them by their context, without which they would be picking options at random. Taylor called such contextualized choosers "strong evaluators." Strong evaluators have been socialized to accept a set of values and norms that allows them to evaluate the "qualitative worth" of their desires. Consequently they are able to accept or reject alternatives not only "on the ground of their contingent incompatibility with more desirable alternatives ''4, but also on the basis of an evaluation of the normative worth of the alternatives, "by a qualitative characterization of the desires as higher and lower, noble and base, and so on. ''5 Strong evaluators appraise their more "ordinary" preferences in light of the kind of life they wish to live and the kind of persons they desire to be. The set of values, necessary for the process of reflective choice, is not an external instrument picked at random; it is drawn from the personal background of each individual and reflects his identity. But if reflection and choice cannot but be based on a set of socially acquired values on what grounds can individuals reject the social affiliations which offer them these values? How can individuals reflect on thoir evaluative criteria? Taylor implies that such a process might indeed be impossible, certain fundamental features, he argues, are "inseparable from ourselves as agents. ''6 Our personal identity, as well as our basic values and norms, reflect our background, and to reject them would imply rejecting ourselves. But if we have no way of reflecting on the values prescribed to us by our background, if we cannot distance ourselves from the community into which we were born, the liberal self disappears and a well-situated communitarian agent takes her place. Having begun with a choosing agent and progressed through the need for context and socialization, we find that the person has not only lost her antecedence both to her social affiliations and to her basic set of values, but also lost her ability to reflect on them. If we are to restore the liberal conception of the self, we must assume that under some conditions individuals are able to engage in a process of self-reflection that can lead to a radical change. When a person undergoes such a radical process we may claim that she is no longer the same person: "We know what this means: we refer to a profound and pervasive shift, or reversal in a person's final ends and character. ''7 Are we not implying that such a radical process of reflection has taken place when we remark that so-and-so became a certain type of person "despite his background"? Might not this be the reason for our admiration for

180

YAEL TAMIR

certain individuals of dubious moral background who choose a different, and in our judgment, better, set of values? Some argue that radical changes are possible since they occur in a gradual process. According to this view individuals are able to reflect upon some of their values and affiliations by making reference to other values they hold. Yet, it seems that this argument cannot, in and by itself, explain the ability to embark on a radical reflective process. If a person holds a consistent set of values then keeping some of them constant in the course of a process of reflection is unhelpful. If these values are commensurable reflecting on some of them in light of others cannot generate a radical change, if they are incommensurable they will be irrelevant to the process of reflection. We reach then a deadlock and are left without any means for reflection. It therefore seems that the assumption that reflection is a gradual process is of little help in explaining radical change. We are left with our initial question. How can individuals embark on a radical process of change? On the face of it, it would appear that in order to bring about radical change individuals must develop a totally new and detached scale of values or beliefs which would serve as their evaluative horizon, a seemingly impossible endeavour. However, an alternative option could be offered, entailing a style of criticism based on looking at ways prevailing elsewhere, an approach Collini terms the "offshore" model. 8 This process involves moral mimicry, imitation, and adaptation. It is a modern phenomenon, contingent on the ability of individuals to be exposed to ways of life, belief systems, and sets of norms other than their own. The discovery that others hold a different set of norms and beliefs, might tempt individuals to reconsider their own values and attachments. Suppose that an ultraOrthodox Jew, at the time of the Emancipation, during his work as a merchant becomes superficially acquainted with the surrounding society and consequently recognizes the existence of ways of life different then his own. He finds himself both repelled and attracted by these new alternative ways of life. As he becomes more familiar with them he is more tempted to imitate them, despite the fact that according to his values this behaviour is sinful. This tension may motivate him to reflect on his own set of values. He may then seek a compromise, be a Jew at home and a man in the street, enabling him to continue to adhere to some of his religious-national values while accommodating some of his newly found beliefs. He may try to change his own culture so that it would match some of the values presented by the surrounding society, or he may gradually reach the conclusion that his old set of ~)alues cannot incorporate the new ones and thus reject it all together. At the end of this process, he may assimilate, reform his own tradition, or decide to retain, despite temptations, his original affiliations and values. One should not be mislead by the example to think that the process of assimilation is a process whereby members of a less modern culture attempt to adhere to a more modern one. Anthropologists are well aware of the opposite process whereby an encounter with a native culture provoke individuals to "go native." This is what happens to Father Jack in Brian Friel's play "Dancing at Lughansa." Father Jack, a missionary priest is sent to Uganda and gradually embraces the native culture, to the point of including himself in the "we" which he uses to

THE QUEST FOR IDENTITY

181

describe its rituals. With deep longing he tells his sisters about the Mass he used to hold in Uganda. When I had a church, he recalls, "Okawa - my house boy summons our people by striking a huge iron g o n g . . , to offer sacrifice to Obi, our Great Goddess of the Earth, so that the crops will flourish. Or maybe to get in touch with our departed fathers for their advice and wisdom. Or maybe to thank the spirits of our tribe if they have been good to us; or to appease them if they're angry. ''9 These are processes where change has evidently taken place, but do these processes reflect choice, or do they entail a slow and unconscious drift, whereby individuals first yield to curiousity and temptation and only later seek to rationalise it? In most cases, the process does not begin with choice, the Jew in our example probably did not set out to work outside the ghetto with the deliberate intention of changing his life. Father Jack was sent to Uganda to bring the natives under the wings of the Church, and had no intention of joining the Ryangans. However, once the process is set in motion, individufils become aware of the presence of a set of options. They may then choose to remain, although aware of a certain dissatisfaction, in their present situation, seek some form of accommodation between the old and the new, or replaces the old set of values and affiliation with a new one. In this limited sense the process is indeed, a process of choice. But how can members of one nation opt for membership in another with which they are only superficially acquainted? On the one hand, it seems preposterous to suggest that one can choose a national identity merely on the basis of partial and fragmentary information, on the other, if constitutive choices were only possible as a result of a profound knowledge of the alternatives then they would be extremely rare if not impossible. One would have to closely study a variety of cultures before making a choice, but it is very hard to gain a profound knowledge of a culture other than one's own. On what grounds then is the choice being made? Members of one culture can "by the force of imaginative insight, understand the values, ideals, the form of life of another culture or society even those remote in time and space. 'q~ Individuals are like "artists and writers who pick up elements of one another's style, or even borrow plots, not for the sake of imitation but in order to strengthen their own work. So we make ourselves better without being the same. ''n Individuals can, of course, misinterpret the other culture which they wish to imitate, modify or distort its language to create their own dialect, detach symbols and rituals from their original use. Yet, their contact with this new culture, or with their own image of it, however distorted and spurious, assists them in reflecting on their own culture and bringing about change. This use of "another culture" in order to reform one's own is exemplified by a service carried by Eliezer Liebermann, one of the supporter of the New Israelite Temple Association of Hamburg in 1818. "Why should we not draw a lesson from the people among whom we live" Liebermann asks, "Look at the Gentiles and see how they stand in awe and reverence and with good manners in their house of prayer. No one utters a word, no one moves a limb... Will someone say that it is forbidden [to learn from our neighbors] for 'ye shall not abide by their status? '''~2 Liebermann attempts to support the move to reform Judaism by refer-

182

YAEL TAMIR

ring to both the Christian and the Jewish traditions. He calls for the accommodation of typical Christian rituals but expresses his views using the language, style and form typical of the traditional rabbinic literature. He cites King Solomon, Rabbenue Tam, Maimonides and the Talmud, the most accepted main stream Judaical sources, in order to justify a radical change of tradition. Admitting that individuals can choose their communal identity still leaves open the question of whether they can choose to adopt any national culture or whether the range of their choices is restricted. It is patently evident that some individuals can make far-reaching cultural choices and succeed in implementing them. Even a cursory look at the way in which the House of Windsor became English, or the House of Bernardotte Swedish, will show that complete assimilation is indeed possible - especially at the top. The most recent and interesting example of such a process is the attempt to suggest that Sonia Ghandi, an Italian-born woman, could become a leader of the Indian nation. Had the young Sonia Ghandi been asked to which national group she would prefer to belong and had she answered "the Indian people," the most likely reaction would have been surprise, as well as a rather pessimistic estimate of her chances of accomplishing this wish. This view would probably have relied on the fact that there was very little to connect a young Italian girl to Indian culture. But her choice would have seemed less strange had she happened to have Indian ancestors, even if she had never met them and herself knew very little about Indian culture. Why do we think that it is more "natural" and less strange for individuals to adopt an identity embraced by their parents or grandparents? Why do we tend to assume that individuals of Jewish origin who decide to define themselves as Jews, though they know very little about Judaism, are "renewing" their identity? Why is it that, although we no longer believe it is "natural" for a shoemaker's son to be a shoemaker and for the daughter of a working-class family to remain in her parent's social stratum, we still think it is "natural" for the son or the grandson of a Jew to be one too? We welcome social mobility. The age of guilds is over, and watchmakers want their sons to be lawyers and not necessarily watchmakers. Individuals want their children to move out of the old neighborhood, to have a better, more successful, life, to belong to a higher class and make new friends, but they still want them to retain their national identity. Why is this so? The first reason seems to be that, in the professional sphere, as is the case with neighborhoods and classes, there is an accepted hierarchy. It is possible that the shoemaker will think that it is better to be a lawyer than a shoemaker, and will welcome such a change for his children. But no such agreed scale exists in the national sphere, and members of national groups obviously think that, at least for them, it is better to be a Jew, a Scot, or a Corsican than to embrace any other national affiliation. They thus tend to see the assimilation of their children as a rejection of something that is dear to them, in favour of an alternative that is not demonstratively better. Those who think, however, that cultures could be ranked as more or less valid, would welcome the assimilation of "lower" cultures into "higher" ones. Indeed, Mill who assumed that such a hierarchy exits, concluded that while the absorption

THE QUEST FOR IDENTITY

183

of a developed people in a less advanced one is an evil, a loss to humanity, the overpowerment of an improved, cultured nation over a small, "backward" one is a net "gain in civilization". For example, he thought it would be best for the Irish to unite with their nearest neighbors which were not only wealthier than them but "one of the freest, as well as the most civilized and powerful nations of the earth. ''13 Needless to say, most Irishmen disagreed with this view. Raz presents us with a modem version of Mill's argument. He suggests that when a liberal culture encounters an illiberal culture whose members do not endorse "the condition of autonomy" then, since illiberal cultures are "inferior to the dominant liberal culture" it is justified to take action "to assimilate the minority group, at the cost of letting its culture die or at least be considerably changed by absorption. ''a4 Raz does, however, acknowledge, that wrenching individuals out of their communities may destroy their ability to live the autonomous life he would like them to five. Toleration, he thus claims, is the conclusion one must reach. But toleration does not imply, in fact it clearly denies, the creation of favorable conditions for the ongoing existence of "illiberal cultures". Raz thus gives priority to the preservation and proliferation of the conditions of autonomy, over the preservation and proliferation of forms of life individuals decide to pursue. But this is equivalent to saying that a life lived from the inside, is a worthy fife, only if it is a liberal fife. That personal autonomy is to be respected only as long as the choice is between liberal alternatives. If one choses to live an illiberal life, it is justified, though costs must be taken into account, to actively act against or passively, not support, the choice made. It then seems that what is being respected is not the fact that a person chose a particular way of life, but that he chose a fight way of life. If we respect individuals as the authors of their own lives, we must accept the fact that some of their choices will seem to us less valuable than others; they might choose to live an illiberal life, be members of a religious sect, follow an authoritarian tradition, be members of a Yoga group or of Opus Dei, dedicate themselves to, what we think is, a meaningless project. These choices should yet be respected or the whole idea of personal autonomy becomes vacuous. The second reason why cultural, national mobility is hard to accept is that continuity and respect for the past are part and parcel of national-cultural identity. The whole conception of nationhood and culture is based on a progression through time, on the transmission from one generation to another, of language, traditions, and norms. According to this conception, it is the duty of each generation to retain this continuity, to pay its debts to its ancestors by transmitting their works, deeds, and beliefs to the generations to come. In this metaphysical sense, each one of us is born with a set of communal duties one is meant to fulfil. By assuming the identity they have inherited from their forefathers, individuals take it upon themselves to comply with this duty. When an individual of Jewish parentage chooses to define himself as a Jew he thereby acknowledges his commitment, renewing his ties with his past and embracing an identity that could have been his. George Perec, a French author of Jewish descent, said in an interview about a script he wrote for a film on Ellis Island: "This place is, for me, part of a potential memory, of a possible autobiography... -t5 This sense of potentiality is

184

YAEL TAMIR

captured by the term "renewal of identity." Individuals renew an option, a potential identity offered by their past. Identity renewal and its twin notion, assimilation, teach us that individuals can reflect not only on the kind of human beings they would like to be, but also on the kind of communal identity they would like to develop. The notion of identity renewal may indicate why individuals are more likely to choose to be what they are, or what their forefathers were, while assimilation reminds us that they can also choose to adopt a foreign culture to which they seem in no way connected. No doubt, individuals are motivated to make specific choices by a variety of religious, social, political, and economic reasons, as well as by their own psychological make-up, all of which are beyond the scope of this work. It is also true that not all choices are similar, that some cultures are more difficult to leave or enter than others, that a particular colour of skin or certain physical features can make assimilation more difficult, and at times impossible. Nevertheless, in order to claim that individuals can make cultural choices one is required to show that individuals have some options, not that all options are open to them. The claim individuals can decide to adopt a new national identity needs, however, to be qualified to some extent: Stating that individuals can decide to adopt a new identity does not imply that they have an unlimited range of options, or that they will carry out successfully any choice they care to make, but only that they can act in ways that will bring them closer to their goal. These qualifications notwithstanding, individuals do assimilate, or decide to renew the national identity of their forefathers, even though they might be completely estranged from it. Mimicry, temptation, and curiosity, largely facilitated by modem communication, are essential elements in this process. The quest for identity is a process motivated by misplacement, confusion, and uncertainty, unfortunately it often leaves those who experience it in a similar state of personal disarray, roaming for ever in a no man's land, belonging to neither group. Others become fanatics, zealots of their new culture or religion. Very few succeed to become full fledged, "normal" members of a new cultural group, but these dim chances do not deter members from embarking on a process of choice, since those who learn to see the fractions in their culture, and the attraction hidden in other ways of lives cannot ignore this insight. They are doomed to carry these images for the rest of their lives. It is in this sense that there is no route back from reflectiveness. This phenomenon of self-reflection, Williams argues, "together with the intuitions and processes that support it, constitute one reason why past forms of life are not a real option for the present, and why attempts to go back aften produces results which are ludicrous on a small scale and hideous on a large one. ''16

THE PROBLEMOF AUTHENTICITY The choice to embark on a cultural change or to remain within one's own culture and transform it is often made on the basis of partial knowledge. Many of indi-

THE Q U E S T FOR I D E N T I T Y

185

viduals who decide to undergo a process of secularization or return to religion, of the Jews who decide to convert and assimilate, of the East Europeans who, following the collapse of the Soviet regime embarked on a process of identity renewal, hardly know enough to enable them to make a well-informed rational choice. Yet they choose, and this choice is far more important to them, far better informed than other choices, they may make in the course of their lives. Ironic as this may be, individuals are able to know more about the new family doctor they choose to attend or the new microwave they choose to buy than about the new "God" they choose to worship, or the new culture they choose to adhere tO. 17

As a result of these quasi-informed choices the quest for identity might result in a confused and inconsistent melange of different cultures. But we cannot infer from the fact that individuals do not go through a full blown transition from one well-defined culture to another that no cultural choice has been made. In fact, the creation of a new cluster of features differing from both the old and the new culture reflects a series of cultural choices concerning both the cultural group one would like to belong to, and the best interpretation of that culture. This is well demonstrated by many third-world countries that were introduced to Western culture by imperialism. The inhabitants of these countries - although merely superficiaHy acquainted with the colonial culture - often attempted to assimilate in this culture (especially in those colonies that were ruled by the French) or adopt some of its features and transform their native culture under its influence. Writing on the invention of tradition in colonial Africa, Ranger argues that the very thin knowledge of Western traditions did not prevent African elites from aspiring to assimilate in these cultures or use them as models for modernizing their own. The new, modernized tradition distorted both the traditional trible one and the colonial one and created a new cultural reality. King's College Budo in Uganda, is a good illustration of the attempts to "westernize" the local culture, it closely imitated English public schools and preached loyalty to the kings - that is, both the English and the Ugandan crowns. And since the settlers played golf and polo, went to horse-races and royal hunts in red coats and riding breeches, the Black pupils tended to do the same, "only with greater zeal; golf and horses have become 'national' institutions. ''18 This could seem a rather superficial adoption of culture but, for many Africans "cricket was not just a game. Rather, it was a uniquely British institution that embodied so many of the values and ideals which ... they aspired to. ''m Some may fear that the legitimization of cultural choices may lead to the multiplicity of cultural variants, and as a result to the disintegration of communal identity and to the creation of "thin cultures" which would be meaningless. Steinberg argues that such a process is already well on the way.for ethnic groups in America. In such communities the core traditional elements "have been modified, diluted, compromised, and finally relinquished." Moreover those elements of the traditional culture that have been preserved are "removed from the social and cultural matrix in which they once belonged. ''2~ Cultural patterns, once rooted in the exigencies of life, now appear to be increasingly irrelevant or even dysfunctional. Ethnicity becomes symbolic and thin and faces a crisis of authenticity.

186

YAEL T A M I R

What is a crisis of authenticity? Culture is often seen as a thick, comprehensive set of rituals, symbols, norms, and values. Such thickness can only be the result of a continuous process, through which cultural features are being crystalised and transmitted. Yet, if only comprehensive systems, which have grown organically, continuously and uninterruptedly deserve to be defined as cultures, then it is reasonable to assume that in a world where cross cultural influences as well as cultural choices are a matter of daily concern, most cultures face the danger of fading away. The development of "the global communication village" where everyone watches the same soap operas, eats McDonalds and drinks Coca-Cola, threatens even the most remote cultures. But are we really facing only either of two extreme alternatives: closure and cultural coherence on the one extreme openness and the deterioration of culture on the other? This image seems to be misguided. Fortunately, there is another option, to have open cultures which are ever changing but which are, at the same time, meaningful for their members. Israelis do not care less about their national culture because it features many new dimensions. In fact, they are likely to be more aware of it and more involved in its recreation. Similarly, Palestinians, presently involved in the process of developing an independent Palestinian culture, show deep allegiance to the symbols of their newly emerging national identity. Indeed, modern cultures often are not preserved in their old traditional structures. The range of norms, values and social habits they offer might not be mutually consistent and might involve largely symbolic acts, but for those who choose to adhere to them they constitute a culture. The distinction that Steinberg and others draw between authentic and symbolic as synonymous with superficial - cultures, might then be slightly misleading. It assumes a particular version of culture as canonical and evaluates new variations according to their resemblance to "the original." Yet, the attempt to arrange cultures in a hierarchical order according to their authenticity is a dangerous one. To claim that a particular cultural interpretation is authentic is to claim that any variant interpretation entails factitious beliefs and is invalid. Agents of revision are thus likely to be called disloyal and their products inauthentic. Indeed the term "authentic" has been often "recruited" to the cultural struggle in order to rebut agents of change, or rival groups. Although authenticity is, one would think, always relative to a particular national history (and dubious even in its relativity, given the actual variousness and the internal contradictions of all such histories), nationalist intellectuals often reach for a stronger argument: that their culture, morality, and politics is authentic t o u t c o u r t real, historical, orthodox, organic, faithful, uncorrupted, pure, and enduring - and so superior to all the synthetic, unnatural, and hybrid creations of other poeples.2~

The term "authentic" could thus be used as an instrument of conservatism, as a means to keep individuals where they "ought to be". According to this interpretation to claim that individuals should be authentic is to suggest that they should accept the identity or the roles that were ascribed to them and that, if they attempt to deviate from these roles, they must be guilty of developing a false conscience or hiding their "true" selves. In nineteenth century England it was widely accepted that "a person who accepts his class situation, whatever it may be, as a given and

THE QUEST FOR IDENTITY

187

necessary condition of his life, will be sincere beyond question. He will be sincere and authentic, sincere because authentic. ''2z The idea that individuals were meant to be what they were born to be contradicts the view of individuals as free choosing agents, as makers of their own lives. For those who embrace this interpretation of authenticity a converted Jew, a liberated woman or a commoner who married gentry are always guilty o f fraud since they are constantly hiding what they were meant to be. These individuals thus face a dilemma they can be either free or insincere. Authenticity has also been used as a tool in internal cultural debates. One example is the debate that followed the emergence of liberal Judaism which attempted in light of the decay of public prayer, and in order to "restore public worship to their deserving dignity and importance" to introduce at services "a German sermon, and a choral singing to the accompanied o f an organ. ''23 The Hamburg Rabbinical Court set to answer these claims in an appeal carried under the t i r e "These Are the Words o f the Covenant" in which it was said: Behold, we had hoped that these men [who have introduced reforms] would have attended to our words and listen to the voices of their teachers, who alone are fit to express an opinion on matters concerning what is permitted and what is prohibited... Those men disobeyed the counsel [of their teachers] and sank into sin... For they have added to and deleted from the text of the prayers according to their heart's desires... Moreover, they have printed most of the prayers in German rather than in Hebrew... Brethren, the children of Israel, it shall not be; Israel has not yet been abandoned. There are still judges in the land who are zealous for God's sake and who will rend the arm, and even crack the skull, of him who peruse the sin of reform.''24 This debate illustrates the nature of claims put forwards in the name o f tradition, authority and authenticity. The debate over reform is a debate about power, about the boundaries of communities, the sources of authority and the freedom of individuals to choose and make changes. There is, however, no reason to think that the Jewish practices o f the Liberal community are less authentic than those of the followers of the Rabbinical court of Hamburg. We have no Archimedean point from which we can judge cultures or religions and evaluate their authenticity. Is the reform interpretation less authentic than the orthodox one because it is heavily influenced by Christian culture? Was not Jewish tradition in the past influenced by neighboring cultures? The view that in the past there were genuine, coherent cultures is unfounded. It fosters a romantic and organic view of community which was never true. The fear that every process of change will necessarily produces a thin, superficial culture is equally extreme and questionable. It seems strange to revere closure and rigidity which could also lead to the decay o f a culture and not the richness and ability o f a culture to develop and prosper despite openness. The view that individuals can and should be able to reflect on their culture and change it leads to an alternative understanding o f the term "authenticity" which is closely related to the existentialist understanding of the term. It sees the authentic person as a person who is his own creator and the authentic act as an act done by a person, in accordance with his own will and understanding. In this view "the only authentic and genuine way of life is that freely chosen by each individual for himself. ''25

188

YAEL TAMIR

Cohen reminds us that the word authentic could indeed be interpreted as pointing to a prospect of self-creation, self development and even self-destruction. The word authentic, he argues, originated from the Greek word authentoe, meaning to have full power over something, as well as to commit a murder. "Authenes; not only a master and a doer, but also a perpetrator, a murderer, even a self-murderer, a suicide. ''26 A comprehensive discussion of the questions raised by the concept of "authenticity" transcends the scope of this paper yet its most important aspects, which are closely related to our thinking on the quest for identity, could be summarized in the following three points: a Individuals are authentic when they follow the culture of their choice. b. Cultures are authentic when they are created by their members. c. Newly created cultures, or cultural variants, are no less constitutive of the identity of their members, than old ones, and should therefore be equally respected. The search for roots, the demands of Jewish, Hispanic and Italian parents that their children be taught their ethnic languages attests that, in the modern world, attachments to national cultures cannot be easily dismissed. We have been accustomed to think that the importance of cultural rootedness is based on a notion of culture as inherent rather than valuntarily elected, but this position is quite unreasonable. We readily accept that life-plans, religious beliefs and social roles which are constitutive of our identity are all objects of reflection and choice. Why, then, can we not see cultural and national affiliations as falling within the category of elements which are at the same time chosen and constitutive? The view presented here sees cultural groups as well as culture itself as being in a constant flux. It assumes that there is no one genuine, true way of practicing a culture or being a member. Culture and membership are understood in a dynamic way, whereby patterns established in a historical process are respected but not sanctified. Culture, tradition, membership and patterns of behaviour, though never dissociated from the past, are forever changing and being recreated. This dynamic view of culture suggests that individuals can exercise two types of cultural choices: they can choose their cultural membership and they can participate in shaping and reinterpreting the culture they have chosen to practice. This does not imply that individuals can always be assured that they will be able to successfully pursue their cultural choices, as it is true for almost every other choice, but it legitimises the attempt to try and bring about a change. Though we cannot clearly indicate when a cultural choice has been fully implemented, we can easily detect that a process of change is taking place. The only judges of the success of such a process can be the person himself and those others, which have to decide whether to consider him a fellow member. A Jew, Isaiah Berlin once told me, is "a person whom others normally take to be a Jew." Much of the complexity of modern ethnic identity is encompassed by this definition. It emphasises the fact that exhibiting membership and convincing others that one has become a member is the most difficult aspect of both assimilation and identity renewal. Involvement in a new culture is not merely a matter of

THE QUEST FOR IDENTITY

189

intellectual interest, it demands a readiness to adhere to the chosen culture as well as to exhibit a sense of identification with and of responsibility toward other members of the cultural group. Membership requires more than saying "It is a splendid language, I love the sound of it," or "I appreciate the manners, the tradition, the history of this people." It requires a sense of association with the people and their common destiny as well as the feeling - or the illusion - that personal relations with other members of the cultural group are in some sense special and different from relations with non-members. Membership in a group emerging through this relational network will be marked by feelings of familiarity and closeness which enable individuals to create a sense of community. When we speak of identity renewal or assimilation we therefore speak of a readiness to establish new social bonds and to assume new communal obligations. This is why new members will rarely allow themselves to make changes, and will often be more conservative then old ones, who from their secured position might preach for change. The importance of the idea of cultural choices, embedded in the quest for identity, might be easier to grasp in its negative form - no one is obliged to practice his native culture and no one is obliged to continue cultural practices as they have crystallized at some point in the past because they are now being defined as authentic. Whenever individuals are unable to recreate their identity, to restructure their society, and reproduce their culture, they cannot be considered free. Tim making of society is grounded in "active debate and amendment, under the pressures of experience, contact, and discovery, writing themselves into the land. The growing society is there, yet it is also made and remade in every individual mind. ''27 It is precisely because culture must be made and remade in each individual's mind that it becomes a matter of personal choice. Our discussion so far portrays the individual as an autonomous person who can reflect on, evaluate and choose his conception of the good, his life plans and his cultural and social affiliations. Yet he is capable of making such choices because he is situated in a particular social and cultural environment that offers him a set of evaluative criteria. In short, it portrays individuals not as free of context, but as free within a context. Tile contextual individual forms his identity through a process of discovery, self-reflection and choice. He is always a member, always situated in some society; his conceptual vocabulary as well as his language reflect the culture he is part of. His community offers him a wide spectrum of attitudes, beliefs and ends, but these, are subject to reflection and evaluation and need not be accepted unconditionally. Society presents the contextual individual with a range of social options and with the means for evaluating them, but does not underwrite a particular conception of the good or a specific life-plan. Self-determination, autonomy, faculties of critical reflection and choice are essential features of this concept of the person, but so are cultural affiliations, religious beliefs, and conceptions of the good, which are the products of such choices. This idea of the person combines individuality with sociability as two equally genuine and important features. While

190

YAEL T A M I R

our discussion of cultural choices and assimilation has emphasised the individualistic aspect of this conception, our discussion of identity renewal illuminated the communal aspects of such conception. This brief attempt to analyze the idiom "the quest for identity" reveals the importance of being a member, but not just of being a member of any group, or of the group one was born in, but being a member of the group one would like to be a member of. It illuminates the fact that the search for identity may lead individuals to follow many avenues, some might affirm their "inherent affiliations" and traditions, others may remain within their community of origin but strive to change its ways or chose to leave their social group and opt for membership in a new one. These various paths embody - choice and rootedness - which are characteristic of the duality inherent in modern individuality.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I would like to thank Princeton University Press for allowing me to reprint this paper, which is a revised version of Chapter Two of my book, Liberal Nationalism (1993 ). NOTES I Lukes (1985), p. 299. 2 Ibid., p. 289.

3 In certain cases, closure is not only meant to prevent group members from assimilating into the surrounding society but also to prevent outsiders from entering the group. 4 Taylor (1985a), p. 19. 5 Ibid., pp. 19-23. 6 Ibid., p. 34. 7 Rawls (1985), pp. 41-42. 8 Collini (1988), p. 427. 9 Friel (1990), p. 47. 10 Berlin (1990), p. 10. 11 Walzer (1989a), p. 41. J2 Mendes-Flohr & Reinharz (1980), p. 146. 13 Mill (1975), pp. 386-387. 14 Raz (1986), pp. 423-424. 15 Perec (1989), p. 106. 16 Williams, B. (1985). 17 Cultural choices are only one examples of the negative relations between the importance of a decision and the acquisition of relevant information needed in order to make a well-informed, rational choice. 18 Hobsbawm & Ranger (1983), p. 261. 19 Ibid., p. 238. 20 Steinberg (1989), p. 63. 21 Walzer (1989b), p. 25-26. 22 Trilling (1972), p. 115. 23 Mendes-Flohr & Reinharz (1980), p. 145. 24 Ibid., pp. 150-153.

THE QUEST FOR IDENTITY

191

25 Stevenson (1974)0 p. 78. 26Trilling (1972), p. 131. 27Williams, R. (1981), p. 75.

REFERENCES Berlin, I.: 1990, The Crooked Timber of Humanity, John Murrary, London. Collini, S.: 1988, 'Speaking from Somewhere', Times Literary Supplement, April. Friel, B.: 1990, Dancing at Lughnasa, Faber and Faber, London. Hobsbawn, E. and T. Ranger (eds.): 1983, The Invention of Tradition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK. Kymlicka, W.: 1991, Liberalism, Community and Culture, Clarendon Press, Oxford. Larmore, C.: 1987, Patterns of Moral Complexity, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK. Lukes, S.: 1985, 'Conclusions', in M. Carrithers (eds.), The Category of the Person: Anthropology, Philosophy, History, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK. Mendes-Flohr, P. and J. Reinharz: 1980, The Jews in the Modern WorM, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Mill, J.S.: 1975, Three Essays: Consideration of Representative Government, On Liberty, the Subjection of Women, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Perec, G.: 1989, 'Interview', in A. Shiloni (ed.), "How to Make Use of Life. Davar. Rawls, J.: 1985, 'Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical', Philosophy and Public Affairs 14, 223-251. Raz, J.: 1986, The Morality of Freedom, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Stevenson, L.: 1974: Seven Theories of Human Nature, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Steinberg, S.: 1989, The Ethnic Myth: Race, Ethnicity and Class in America, Beacon Press, Boston. Taylor, C.: 1985a, Philosophical Papers, Volume 1, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK. Taylor, C.: 1985b, Philosophical Papers, Volume II, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK. Trilling, L.: 1972, Sincerity and Authenticity, Harvard University Press,Cambridge, MA. Walzer, M.: 1989a, 'Two Kinds of Universalism', in Nation and Universe, Tanner Lectures, Part L Walzer, M.: 1989b, 'The National Question Revisited', in Nation and Universe, Tanner Lectures, Part II. Williams, B.: 1985, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. Williams, R.: 1981, 'Culture is the Ordinary', in Culture and Society: 1780-1950, Columbia University Press, New York.