International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society, VoL 10, No. 2, 1996

IV. Paradoxes of Modernity: Culture and Conduct in the Theory of Max Weber: A Review Symposium

The Question of Max Weber Today Donald A. Nielsen Max Weber is perhaps the most troublesome figure in twentieth century social and political thought. His work has been the subject of widely differing interpretations and evaluations, from varying political and sociological standpoints. But while a myriad of critics and analysts have been at work, even more has happened during the intervening decades since his death. Changing historical realities have pressured sociologists to create more comprehensive and meaningful theoretical perspectives, a truer vision of sociology's calling, and a fuller relationship with its past. The need to see the tumultuous political, social and cultural upheavals of twentieth century modernity in the context of the wider and deeper streams of "universal history" has further enhanced Weber's special claims on our attention, since no other thinker has approached sociology with a greater sensitivity to the deep historical origins of our contemporary situation. While the literature about Weber is far from unanimous in its judgment of him and his work, its very size implies that he cannot be ignored. Few of those attempting to reconstruct Weber's work have expended as much energy as Wolfgang Schluchter. He has carried through this effort on at least three major fronts. Schluchter is one of the editors of the ongoing Max Weber Gesamtausgabe which promises a complete and thoroughly edited collection of all of Weber's writings (including his correspondence). He has also edited several volumes of collected studies by specialists assessing the contemporary standing of Weber's sociological efforts, including his sociology of Confucianism and Taoism, Hinduism and Buddhism, and his uncompleted projects on Islam and Western Christianity (see the references in Schluchter, 1996: 360, 363-365). Finally, he has written a number of books which offer his own reconstruction of Weber's work, a list which promises to grow in coming years. For English readers, this series was begun in a joint volume with Guenther Roth on Weber's vision of history (see Roth and Schluchter, 1979). The translation of his book on Weber's 375 © 1996 Human Sciences Pre.~ Inc.

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developmental history marks a particularly important reference point in his work and in recent Weber studies. It also sets the tone of Schluchter's distinctive style of interpretation, one marked by an effort to capture the various dimensions, and the tensions, in Weber's work within a m o r e comprehensive framework (see Schluchter, 1981). It was followed by a wide ranging book on the themes of religion, rationalism and domination in Weber's sociology (Schluchter, 1989). His m o s t r e c e n t w o r k a b o u t Weber, Paradoxes of Modernity (Schluchter, 1996) is the occasion for the present remarks. The first part of the book is composed of two chapters discussing Weber's "philosophy," his distinctive way of relating the competing challenges of science, politics and ethics. The second part contains one chapter which reconstructs the basic outlines of Weber's uncompleted work on Islam and a second important one on Weber's theory of the rise of Western European modernity, with special emphasis on the role of Western Christianity in this process. There is also a very brief "epilogue" presenting a summary view of Weber's notions of "action, order and culture." Throughout all his writings (this one included), Schluchter has given careful attention to the main phases and "breaks" in the development of Weber's thought, the precise dating of Weber's writings and their various revisions, the connection of changing events and circumstances ("inner" as well as external) to Weber's productive efforts, and especially the complex interrelations among Weber's diverse commitments--political, ethical and scientific. I want to make several general remarks about Schluchter's efforts, and then discuss the problem of the reconstruction of Weber's work and its relationship to the challenges currently facing comparative, historical sociology. I will focus primarily on aspects of his theory of European modernity and on selected questions connected with Weber's "philosophy" (putting aside for now the question of Weber's uncompleted work on Islam). The keynote in Schluchter's interpretation of Weber is unity and comprehensiveness. While others have identified a considerable fragmentation in Weber's life and thought, or wanted to treat his work in more manageable segments, Schluehter's aims are more synthetic. He leaves few loose ends. The Weber who emerges is not without inner tensions--such a Weber would be unthinkable. But Schluchter's Weber is much more whole and his standpoint much less ambiguous than others have imagined. Schluchter's text is closely argued and the reader is struck by his various tabular presentations of Weber's "system." Indeed, this latest volume, like his earlier one on Weber's developmental history, contains many such pictoral charts and tabular summaries. Weber's concepts proceed one after another in logical order from major headings to secondary sub-divisions and their further differentiations (see e.g. Schluchter, 1996: 100, 242,

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249ff.). In one respect, this is entirely appropriate, since Schluchter seems committed to the idea that Weber's work is both indispensible for modem sociology, yet also quite unwieldy, perhaps even misleading, the way Weber left it. It therefore needs to be systematieaUy recast if it is to be of contemporary value (see the remarks by Roth in Schluchter, 1981: xviii). However, it is not entirely clear how these schematic devices are to be taken. They allow the unification of Weber's central concepts into more picturable systems of thought and also have evident pedagogical and mnemonic value. They are perhaps most useful as aids to the reading of Schluchter's dense and often difficult text, since they help keep the overall argument in focus while examining any single aspect of the theory. It is worth adding that they also give the impression of a greater unity in Weber's thinking than might be suspected fxom an examination of Weber's own writings. The issue is not trivial. It is in Schluchter's argument itself that one finds the systematic view of Weber. The diagrams reflect the reality of Schluchter's text. However we evaluate them, one thing seems clear: they are Schluchter's own invention, his way of collating the various dimensions of Weber's thought into a meaningful unity. In this respect, Schluchter's reconstruction of Weber's "system" is similar to the way that Habermas has recast intellectual history for his theory of communicative action or even to Parsons' earlier mode of theorizing (if not their interpretations of Weber). The emphasis is on system, even schema, and representability. Perhaps this should not surprise, given the interest of all three authors in merging theoretical, historical and ethical horizons into a unified perspective. It is worth noting that Weber's central ideas are not found in such highly unified constellations in his own texts. Weber simply does not present his theory this way (even in the opening systematic pages of Economy and Society). In my view, it is unlikely that he would ever have done so, even with the better fortune denied him of additional years to complete his studies of the world religions or satisfactorily edit his existing work. I do not mean to suggest that Weber's thinking or his mode of presentation were incoherent or that Sehluchter's approach misrepresents Weber. On the contrary, Weber was highly analytical and sometimes even systematic, and Schluchter has captured many of the central elements in Weber's thought. The problems lie elsewhere: not only (1) in the relationship between our contemporary reconstructions of Weber's thought and the actualities of his writings, but also (2) in the connection between our reconstructions of Weber's work and our own understandings of history and its paradoxes. We need to ask not only whether Schluchter has given us a convincing portrayal of Weber, but also whether Schluchter's Weber is of any value to us--as he hopes--in our efforts to understand the past, the present, their relationships, and their connection with some possible future. The question of

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Max Weber today has at least these two sides. There are evidently many possible Max Webers, at least we have been given quite a few recent reconstructions from which to choose (compare Schluchter e.g. with Bendix, 1960; Bendix and Roth, 1971; Mommsen, 1984; Collins, 1986; Sica, 1988; Scarf, 1989; Albrow, 1990; Schroeder, 1992; Wallace, 1994; Kalberg, 1994). If Max Weber is, indeed, to serve as a contemporary guide, which one should we follow? Or should we go directly to Weber's texts for intellectual sustenance? The emphases of the present study were, in part, already established in Schluchter's earlier work on Weber's developmental history. The final chapter of his most recent work continues this developmental standpoint in much the same vein, with a focus now on the wider course of Western development, the overall "Western trajectory." For Schluchter, Weber's central "object of explanation" was the genesis of market oriented capitalism with formally free labor. Weber explained the emergence of this phenomenon by placing it in a "cumulative" series of historical phases. Each "stage" in the development is marked by a "revolution" or set of revolutions. The first phase of this transformation in the Medieval world of the 12th-13th centuries saw the papal revolution, the feudal revolution, and the urban revolution, while the second phase laid new ethical foundations for modern bourgeois conduct (i.e. the Protestant ethic). These two phases of Weber's theory are examined in considerable detail by Schluchter. He offers a much briefer discussion of the most recent phase of this historical development, the so-called "iron cage" of modernity, or what Schluchter himseff calls the "new house of bondage." This is presumably in keeping with Weber's own emphasis on the historical preconditions of modernity, rather than the detailed dissection of contemporary capitalism itself. Schluchter offers a particularly stimulating reconstruction of Weber's view of the Medieval transformations. His treatment of Weber's ideas about the relationship between monasticism and "hierocracy" in the bureaucratic church, the conflicting forms of charisma, the role of doctrines of tides implicita in organizing the laity, and the general movement toward rationalization of religious and secular life during this period are particularly welcome (see Schluchter, 1996: 210-214, 217; compare Nielsen, 1990a). He connects these religious changes to a shorter, but helpful discussion of Weber's view of the urban revolution (and an even briefer look at the feudal transformations). The emphases throughout this discussion are congruent with his idea that Weber's main "object of explanation" was the modern capitalist system and its bourgeois representatives. But the result is also to underplay many issues which might provide new leads for a renovated Weberian sociology. These would include the role played by Christianity in facilitating "frater-

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nization," an emphasis found elsewhere in Weber's comparative studies (see Schluchter, 1996: 221-222; Weber, 1958: 35-39; see also Nelson, 1981), and the significance of innovative associational structures and their related cultural forms both for Medieval life and later European developments (see Nielsen, 1991b: 487-489, 494). The tendency of Schluchter's comparative developmental history to isolate culture areas in "East" and "West" does correspond largely to Weber's own method. As a result, little room is found for the fascinating pages in Weber which suggest a more "global" study of intra-civitizational morphologies; the roles of cultures in larger geographical regions, and the radiation of cultural influences across civilizations slip out of focus (see. e.g. Weber, 1958: 329; Gerth and Mills, 1946: 323; also Nelson, 1976: 126, who draws on my unpublished paper, Nielsen, 1973). Other interesting leads in Weber could be cited. The point is that, for all his inelusiveness regarding Weber's ideas, Schluchter takes a remarkably restrictive view (at least, in this work) of Weber's aims and, by implication, their relationship to the current agenda of sociology. This is particularly surprising since he has generally been critical of the idea that we ought to seek one "central question" in Weber's work (see Schluchter, 1989: 574-575). In fairness to Schluchter, it is difficult to evaluate the present work in isolation from the many issues he discusses in his other recent writings (especially Schluchter, 1989). Of course, no one would deny that Weber does repeate~ly return to the rise of modern capitalism as a major focus, but he also frequently suggests a much broader set of research questions connected with "the specific and peculiar rationalism of Western culture" (see e.g. Weber 1930b; Nelson, 1974). It might be asked: can we afford, at this late date, to continue seeing the main aim of Weber's historical comparative sociology--or our sociology today--as an explanation of the rise of modern Western capitalism (or, for that matter, the reasons why it failed to develop elsewhere)? I would argue that this view constricts the potentially larger agenda which is found in Weber's writings. I think some of the problems emerge from the fact that Schluchter finds not only a "developmental history' in Weber, but such a systematically articulated one. The reconstruction of historical phases and sequences is itself not objectionable. We necessarily do this when we try to make sense of historical transformations. However, as Weber himself argues, these "stages" need to be identified in relationship to particular historically relevant questions and can never themselves constitute a systematically complete view of history. Despite the evident differences between Schluchter's sort of "stage theory" of history and the variants of neo-evohitionism of such figures as Parsons, Habermas, Luhmann and others, they all run the same risk of too neatly packaging our historical sensibility and leaving us little room to move either in relation to history or to Weber (see Nielsen,

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1987) . It is not clear what questions historically minded sociologists can now ask from this standpoint, or how they would go about using Schluchter's reconstructed Weberianism in their own work. Indeed, have such comprehensive reconstructions of major sociologists' theories ever led to new breakthroughs in comparative historical sociology (even if they sometimes help us better understand those authors)? Weber himself argued that sociological and historical investigations must begin with questions having a "value relation" to the investigator's time and that these value standpoints change (Weber, 1949: 84). He wrote: "The points of departure of the cultural sciences remain changeable throughout the limitless future as long as a Chinese ossification of intellectual life does not render mankind incapable of setting new questions to the eternally inexhaustible flow of life" (Weber, 1949: 84). Weber is largely clear about the values he deems to be at stake in his investigations. Should we rely on his questions and answers--even a systematically recast version of them--or pose "new questions" of our own, tied to our "axiological interests"? Or do we suffer from the "ossification of intellectual life" mentioned by Weber, one which not only disables us from setting new questions of a scope and significance comparable to his own, but betrays the deeper suspicion that perhaps we have few remaining "ultimate values" from which to initiate historical, cultural inquiries? Such questions are best examined in connection with particular sociological issues. For example, a brief discussion of the sociological problem of rationalization and rationality will give us a better sense of some of the ambiguities in the reception of Weber's work and the questions facing current sociology. We have a good deal of valuable literature about Weber's own net of concepts concerning rationalization (e.g. Kalberg, 1980; Levine, 1981; Brubaker, 1984). For the most part, these authors have stayed close to Weber's texts. In the process, they have clarified the meanings attached to these terms by Weber and their relationship to at least some of his wider problems. Despite this, it is not clear that these exegetical studies have advanced our understanding of the actual history of rationalization, rationality, and rationalism very far beyond where Weber left it or even fully captureA Weber's own evolving position. Weber's widest mature statements direct us to study the many varieties of rationalization of thought and conduct and the fact that social and cultural practices can be rationalized from many standpoints and in many different directions (see the key passages in Weber, 1930b: 26). In any case, clarification of concepts, even Weber's concepts, is not the same as a world historical sociology of rationalization processes. Even with his many leads, this is still very much lacking, three quarters of a century after Weber.

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Weber's image of a rationalized and disenchanted world--an "iron cage", in Parsons' disputed rendition of Weber's famous phrase, ein stahlhartes Gehause--has often been accepted as an adequate portrait of our present condition. In fact, it is an incomplete sketch. Weber does not actually provide a full historical sociology of rationalization in its many dimensions. If Weber's metaphor is then used as a standpoint for the critique of modernity, a double misstep occurs: we rest precariously on Weber's unfinished research program at the very same time that we borrow his rhetorical image to pass judgement on modemity's human inadequacies. Weber's notion of rationalization itself threatens to become further trivi~lized by its (sometimes insightful) use in popular sociological investigations. For example, Ritzer introduces a version of Weber's concept of rationalization under the cover of the more digestable notion of the "McDonaldization of society" (see Rimer, 1996). This engaging thesis has been rapidly disseminated and is not without value for sociology. However, it is as much a symptom of the processes it is describing as it is an elaboration of Weber's program of research. It may be a sign of the coming "McDonaldization" of sociology itself that Weber's notion of rationalization needs to be introduced in such a commercially attractive form. A related symbol of our current situation can be found in an area closer to Weber's own central concerns: Baltzell's important study of the two Protestant ethics and the spirit of authority and class leadership (see Baltzell, 1979). Baltzell entirely uncouples the problem of rationalization t-ore the question of "the Protestant ethic." His text never mentions the name of Frederick Winslow Taylor, the American pioneer of "scientific management" and "prophet of the stop watch" immortalized in Dos Passos's U.S.A., despite Taylor's interesting "mixed" roots in the Protestant communities of both Boston and Philadelphia. His Protestant experience was related to his "leadership" in the introduction of new forms of rationalization of modem American industry and the subsequent importance of "Taylorism" as an international movement in Weber's own day. Weber was evidently familiar with "scientific management" in Germany, which went under the telling name of the movement of rationalisierung. The movement found echoes in his contemporaries Lenin, who adapted Taylorism to the uses of nascent communism (see Lenin, 1967, II: 664), and Zamiatin, who satirized the Russian Taylorist craze in his "dystopian" novel We (see Zamiatin, 1952). Study of the "global" character of this movement toward rationalization would certainly represent a fascinating chapter in Weberian sociology. It is ironic that Marxists have often told us as much from their own standpoint about the historical rationalization of labor and production under capitalism as Weberians, regrettably without focusing on either Weber or the concept itself (see e.g. Braverman, 1974; but also Bendix, 1956,

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who discusses Taylorism in connection with managerial ideologies and authority, rather than rationalization). A related item on the agenda of the sociology of modern "rationalism" is the study of the historical development and revolutionary social impact of "symbolic technologies," including artificial languages, mathematical forms, logics, and the practical instrumentalities related to communication, culture and conduct emerging from them (see the suggestive remarks in Nelson, 1969b). This study would engage the histories of science and technology, as well as modern industry and modern organizations, including the state and the business corporation, but it would especially focus on the historical "rationalization" of collective mental structures through the gestation of new symbolic systems and their impact on cultures. In a related vein, we might ask: where is the comparative historical sociology of electricity and electrification, from its scientific origins in the late eighteenth century to its current (nearly omnipresent) applications? This and many other chapters examining the "varieties" of rationalization and, in particular, "the specific and peculiar rationalism of Western culture," await their "Weberian" sociologists. Kalberg (1994:1) has recently suggested that, with the exception of Bendix, Collins and few others, the current "renascence" of comparative, historical sociology owes relatively little to Weber. This judgment is directed mainly at the more visible and widely debated exampies of this revival (e.g. the work of Wallerstein, Moore, Skocpol, Tilly, etc.). Although it greatly underestimates the number of comparative historical "Weberian" studies done in recent years, including some concerned with problems of cultural rationalization (see e.g. Nelson, 1981; also Nielsen, 1989; 1990a; 1990b; 1991a), it does suggest some limitations of the current wave of social structurally oriented "macro-sociology" and the incomplete character of Weber's reception. Weber was also concerned with the calling of science in modern society and its relationship to politics, religion, ethics, and the other value spheres (for Schluchter, his "philosophy"). The first part of Schluchter's book goes a long way toward comprehensively mapping Weber's tangled discussions of these problems. He is surely correct in saying that Weber was neither a moral "relativist" nor an exponent of a cynical, "success" oriented politics. Weber does attempt to create "bridging principles" and "balance" ethics of conviction against an ethic of responsibility for consequences of one's value choices. He does not merely reject ultimate convictions in favor of political "realism." Weber frequently couched his discussion in terms of an examination of valued "ends" and the "means" used for their achievement. He was preoccupied with the "demonic" character of political power, its inevitable recourse to violence, and the contamination of our highest values by such

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"evil" means. He also insisted on presenting "inconvenient" facts which called into question the viability of simplified and self-deluding "utopian" proposals. He focused especially on the examination of the "costs" or "consequences," for the maintenance of alternative values. He assumed that such "costs" could be "objectively" linked with the quest to realize values and the application of particular means used in pursuing goals (see e.g. Weber, 1949: 552-53). In this way, he thought science, including historical sociology, could come to the aid of ethical decisions by offering "clarity" (see Gerth and Mills, 1946: 151). I think there remain unresolved questions connected with Weber's "philosophy" which are not fully exposed in Schluchter's valuable systematic account. His desire to demonstrate the internally self-consistent character of Weber's arguments raises particular problems. I will briefly explore some connections between Weber's historical sociology and his discussion of the ethics of conviction and responsibility and suggest that his writings are more ambiguous than Schluchter seems to imply. Weber suggested some broad "predictions" connected with the outcome of the Russian revolution. In an essay of 1918 on "socialism", he criticised the Marxist view that revolution would bring the "dictatorship of proletariat" and instead foresaw a "dictatorship of the official" (see Weber, 1994: 292). In this respect, he was remarkably prescient. But did even Weber's fertile "sociological imagination" allow b.im to foresee the other "costs" which were soon to be paid out in "ultimate values" with the seizure of power by Bolshevism and the rise of Stalinism? The one party state and the "cult of personality"? The forced collectivization of agriculture? The purges? The Gulags? His writings on Russia, both of 1905-06 as well as later during the war (whatever their other merits), give little indication that he envisioned anything remotely like these outcomes were Bolshevism to triumph in Russia (see Weber, t995). Weber is not particularly at fault. I doubt that anyone, even Dostoevsky, with his almost clairvoyant vision of a deadly future in the "crystal palace" (see Dostoevsky, 1961: 106f0, could have foreseen them in any clear or meaningful way. In a related vein, Wells and Baehr have recommended Collins' diagnosis, before the fact, of the Soviet Union's likely crisis and collapse as an example of how "Weberian" sociology might predict the outcomes of given social and cultural arrangements (see their introduction in Weber, 1995:25, 37-38; also Collins, 1986). Without wanting to detract from Collins's creative extensions of "Weberian" sociology, I would argue that his long list of more than a half-dozen "factors" which might conceivably generate a future Soviet crisis gives his "prediction" a highly indeterminate quality and makes its scientific efficacy largely an illusion. It is easy to posit "predictive" value for the account--since so many factors were named, in retrospect, some

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were likely to prove correct. In any case, it is hardly a demonstration of "consequences" or "costs" associated with particular values and associated lines of conduct. As such, it is of no help in evaluating Weber's "philosophy." Weber once wrote: "The Puritans wanted to work in a calling; we are forced to do so" (Weber, 1930a: 181). I will not now question Parsons' translation of these familiar lines, but note only that they capture a world of historical irony and unintended outcomes. They also imply some unresolved questions. Did the Puritans, in pursuing their ultimate value of serving God in an ascetic pursuit of a calling in this world, realize that value? We know (at least, if we agree with the broad outlines of Weber's historical sociology of "the Protestant ethic") that they "succeeded" in their worldly callings, as an indirect result of their religious commitments. Perhaps, as Weber suggests, they even felt psychologically justified before their God. Does this mean that they "succeeded" also in achieving their ultimate religious values? What evidence could count in any attempt to answer this question (surely not their merely "psychological" sense of justification)? Moreover, we also know (again assuming Weber's analysis) that their actions helped, in part, to build the great economic cosmos of today, in which we are forced to labor (not always precisely in a "calling," or as a Berufsmensch). Of course, the Puritans were not wholly unaware of the unintended relationship between disciplined labor in a calling and the likely burdens of worldly goods (see Baxter's remark quoted in Weber, 1930a: 181). However, it is as clear as it can possibly be that the Puritans did not foresee this wider set of "consequences" of their conduct. Like their God, it was hidden from them. Given the demand for our "responsibility in the face of history", we must also ask: "costs" and "consequences" for whom? "Costs" (sometimes disasterous ones) are frequently born by those swept up in the historical processes which the "carriers" of these values help set in motion. "The Puritans wanted to work in a calling, we are forced to"--and it is not only we, now who are forced to. In tracing the notion of inalienable rights to the system of competing Protestant sects, Weber remarks: "The 'basic Rights of Man made it possible for the capitalist to use things and men freely, just as the this-worldly asceticism. . . . and the specific discipline of the sects bred the capitalist spirit and the rational 'professional' (Berufsmensch) who was needed by capitalism" (Weber, 1968, III: 12091210). In opposing the imposition of religion by the state, not only on themselves, but on others, the sectarians safeguarded the rights of religious conscience, and simultaneously freed themselves ethically to "use things and men freely" with a "good conscience" in pursuit of their worldly callings. The historical "consequences" of conduct driven by this robust good

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conscience, grounded in a particularly consistent "soteriology" and ethic of conviction, may have been "acceptable" to the Puritans who were "serving their God," but they appeared differently to the workers being subjected to the new forms of discipline. They frequently chose, like Adam, and sometimes even in his name, to rebel against service to th/s God (see e.g. Hill, 1973; Thompson, 1963). Even if consequences could be clearly established (as they often undoubtedly can), it would remain necessary to establish universal standards for judging the "acceptability" of these "costs" and "consequences." Without some "hierarchy of values," how are such ethical judgments of the relative "acceptability" of different "costs" to be determined? Schluchter seems to imply that we are wedded to an irreversibly "Kantian" worldview and that any attempt to move outside the general confines of Kant's philosophical outlook is necessarily a "regression" back to indefensible standpoints (see e.g. his remarks on Scheler's critique of Weber in Schluchter, 1996: 43). Under these circumstances, I cannot see how earlier philosophies and value systems, which interest him (and Weber) so greatly as "legacies" from the past, can be of any real contemporary relevance. It seems to me that Schluchter's reconstruction of Weber's "system" bars the door to alternative historical value structures (and at a time when we greatly need them). Sociology may be relatively successful in offering a convincing causal explanation of the various factors which have brought about a relevant historical outcome (e.g. the rise of modem capitalism). It is less certain that sociology or any imaginable "social science" can give us a clear picture of the likely future consequences associated with the pursuit of various ultimate values. Weber himself repeatedly acknowledges that history involves complex "conjunctures" of diverse processes, decisions and events, many of which are highly unpredictable. But if conduct--rooted in any set of ultimate values whatever--always combines with a myriad of other historical circumstances, processes, events and decisions to yield future outcomes, it is difficult to attribute those outcomes unambiguously to those values. It is even less plausible to view such outcomes as "consequences" of the value stand, calculate their "costs" for other values, or determine whether those "consequences" are redeemed by the achievement of those values. Here, it is not only a political question of whether the choice of ethically dubious "means" contaminates the "ends," or whether the achievement of a desirable value justifies evil means. The questions go deeper and involve the meaningfulness of history. In part, it is Weber's extreme sensitivity to the unintended and the unforeseen in history which makes him link ethical and political questions to science. He thinks that it is only through the objective study of the historical processes that we can ever shed light on the consequences associated with

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ethically and politically meaningful decisions and have any hope of removing the choice between the "competing gods" from the realm of pure "irrationality" (where, in the end, it remains for Weber, even with the help of scientitle consequentialism). Yet, Weber's own historical sociology (e.g. of "the Protestant ethic") seems to demonstrate that we not only act in an "ethically irrational world," where good intentions often result in dubious (if sometimes predictable) outcomes, but that this "irrationality" penetrates into the Iongue duree of history itself and ends by "uncouping" (in our possible "consciousness") our present value oriented conduct from its long term results. In this respect, I sense a much greater "tension" between Weber's substantive historical sociology and his "philosophy" than seems apparent from Schluchter's unifying account. The "philosophy" argues (among other things) for an ethic of responsibility which accepts the burden of consequences. The historical sociology reveals the darker clouds enveloping such an ethic: we simply cannot see the full fate of our ultimate strivings, at least, not in the longer term, nor in any really precise or meaningful way. Can "balance" or any other meaningful "bridging principles" then be established with confidence? Of course, this hardly means that individuals should be counseled to reject the aid of science and embrace "irresponsibility" in the name of imperfect knowledge. Even less does it require that we reduce our demands of responsibility for "consequences" resulting from the conduct of the large "corporate" actors who increasingly take center stage. However, I think Weber's position does imply a much deeper fracture in historical existence, a more irremediable rift, than he was willing to admit, between history and our ultimate values. Although sociologists have increasingly adopted--with good reason--a much broader view of Weber's work, I would like to cast a vote "out of season" for The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism as perhaps Weber's most enduring contribution to the study of "ethical" questions. I think it proves to be of greater value in this connection than his "philosophy" (although I by no means scorn the latter), for it actually traces the historical vicissitudes of a particular value system. Indeed, it is the only writing by Weber where he systematically presents as much historical evidence concerning such problems. Of course, the fuller estimate achieved in recent decades of the enormous scope of Weber's work makes it unlikely that we will ever again view him exclusively as the author of this study in "cultural history" (as Weber himself described it). That danger is past and sociology is the beneficiary. In this sense, we have progressed markedly in our understanding of every facet of his work. For precisely that reason, I think we can now return with new questions to this first piece of historical research completed after his recovery. It fell within a diversely creative period of his life, which included not only the work on Protestantism, but

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some of his most important "methodological" writings, and his first forays into Russian history and politics--certainly a fascinating mix. Among these questions is the one posed above concerning the-relationship between the turbulence and drift of history and the place of ultimate values in human existence. Did Weber absorb into his "philosophy" the full lessons to be drawn from his own historical study? Weber's particular development of neo-Kantian value theory--his way of "balancing" convictions against responsibility, alternative values against one another, means against ends, and pursuit of chosen ends against "costs" incurred in their realization--is confronted by other particularly difficult practical challenges today. Are the 'barring Gods," among whom Weber insists we must ultimately choose, any longer at war? The very "advances" today in the rationalization process have the effect of functionalizing individual conduct and reducing alternative value choices to elements in akeady established "formulae" for the calculation of collective welfare, one measured by complex balances of "costs," "benefits," and "average rates" of desirable or undesirable outcomes (a variant of Bentham's "greatest happiness" principle). What Weber called Zweckrafionalitat has, in fact, been modified and expanded in this century in the direction of a collective rationality which absorbs all values. Responsibility is consequently collectivized and removed from the sphere of individual conviction. Individual convictions and individual responsibility (in Weber's senses) increasingly find little room in such a world. This process is now accomplished with the aid of science ("natural" and "social") and its technical offshoots. Schluchter sees Weber as a supporter of critical dialogue in the interest of clarifying both potential consequences of conduct and value alternatives. However, as Schluchter himself notes, dialogue is an "artificial" institution (Schluchter, 1996: 101), dependent on, yet largely removed from the restless movement of a prior "life world" in which values are gestated, sustained and enacted. As many authors have noted, this "life world" is itself under increased threat. Moreover, it is precisely this value related dialogue of intellectual specialists which has an increasingly ambiguous relationship to the processes of rationalization taking place in modern institutions. Can the critical dialogue over alternative values avoid being drawn into the mix as simply another "team technique" in the collective rationalization and management of decisions, conduct and accounting? We now face the possibility of a complete "rational calculation" of all alternative values and all possible consequences for all actors in advance, in some sort of huge "equation" (rather like Zamiatin's fictional "integral"), with the added proviso that such a calculation is "useful" only under the condition of total management and control of all prospective conduct. I fear that "science" today is no "means" to the "end" of robust individual

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responsibility sought by Weber, unless the "science" is something vastly different in character from that which inhabits the state, the corporation, the research laboratory, and even the university. Was this alternative science of ultimate values Weber's true goal? If so, it places him closer to the deeper, inherited traditions of Western philosophy--religious and moral, more than political--than Schluchter might allow. Perhaps the question is not only our "responsibility in the face of history" for the consequences of our values and conduct, but whether we, as individuals, will be able to sustain--even be "allowed" to sustain--any "ultimate values" at all. Weber evoked Luther's words, "Here I stand, I can do no other", as an eventual (if exceptional) human possibility for anyone who was not spiritually dead. He viewed it as a paradigm of an ethic of responsibility suddenly merging into an ethic of conviction. This possibility may need to play a more frequent role today than he imagined, if only to "irrationally" maintain the very existence of ultimate values in the face of a mechanism of collectively coordinated "rational calculation" which relentlessly hammers all values into mutually congruent forms. In this sense, the ethical obligations which Weber already placed on the individual are today not only increased, but their focus is shifted. Where do we stand today in relation to Weber's "philosophy" and his comparative historical sociology? I have made some brief (and very incomplete) comments concerning both of these problems, largely in response to some of the issues raised in Schluchter's book. We might conclude by taking a page from Weber's own sociology of religion and suggest that modern sociologists have treated Weber more like an "ethical" than an "exemplary" prophet. They have taken more time in systematizing his ideas than in emulating his example. Indeed, it is not clear that even the most systematic and seemingly "useful" reconstructions of Weber's perspectives will provide the basis for new work in comparative historical sociology in the absence of new questions with a "value relation" to our present situation and a "subordination" of ourselves (and Weber) to the relevant materials. This is not meant to denigrate either the valuable work being done in comparative, historical sociology or the (often heroic) labors of Weber's recent interpreters. Schluchter's extraordinary efforts to reconstruct the full range of Weber's life and work cannot but help clarify our contemporary relationship to him. Perhaps it will also sustain the hope that sociology's vocation as a comparative, historical and systematic discipline with world historical intentions and "spiritual" relevance might one day be fulfilled. Despite this welcome intellectual "progress," it would be a mistake to think that we have now gone "beyond" Weber, either through the reconstruction of his writings or with our recent efforts in comparative, historical sociology. This goal will be achieved only when we can confront him with

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an i n d e p e n d e n t scholarly " p e r s o n a l i t y " o f o u r own c o m p a r a b l e in s t a t u r e to his.

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